WHY CHERNENKO? AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001000030011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 24, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council
NIC #01256-84
24 February 1984
Special Assistant for Warning
SUBJECT : Why Chernenko?
An Alternative View and Implications for Warning
1. Initial assessments of Konstantin Chernenko's elevation to the post of
general secretary have focused on the domestic political dimensions of the
Politburo-Central Committee decision. This memorandum advances the hypothesis
that foreign policy imperatives outweighed domestic considerations in
determining the choice of Chernenko--specifically the Politburo's recognition
that its political strategy for dealing with the Reagan Administration and INF
deployment was in serious trouble. The hypothesis also contends that the
selection of Chernenko was made several months ago when the leadership
concluded there was little or no prospect that Andropov would recover and that
the succession scenario was elaborated in detail well in advance of his
death. Finally, this "theory of the case" holds that the four-day delay in
convening the Central Committee to place its formal imprimatur on the
Politburo's choice was not caused by resistance to Chernenko by younger
members but rather by an agreed judgment that public disclosure should be
withheld until the eve of Andropov's funeral in order to forestall a perceived
possibility that President Reagan would attend the funeral.
Foreign Policy Context of the Succession Scenario
2. By late last summer, with Andropov in seclusion and the Reagan
Administration effectively eluding sustained Soviet attempts to oortrav it as
a "serious threat to peace," the Soviet drive to disrupt INF deployments and
deepen transatlantic divergences over policy toward the USSR was running into
the ground. The frustration of Moscow's political strategy was in laroe part
the result of an underestimation of the Administration's political flexibility
and resourcefulness in blunting Soviet political warfare. Since the spring of
1981., the Soviets had based their strategy on the assumption that the
Administration would adhere rigidly to what were widely viewed in Europe as
unnegotiable positions in the INF and:-:START negotiations in 1981 and 1982.
The Soviets were excessively confident that the President's unyielding posture
would not only play into their hands but rapidly increase public resistance in
Western Europe to INF deployments.
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3. The leadership's estimates and assumptions suffered a number of heavy
blows in 1983, beginning with the victory of Chancellor Kohl's governing
coalition in the 6 March elections, President Reagan's offer on 30 March to
negotiate an interim INF agreement, and the adjustments in his START proposals
on'8 June. These setbacks culminated in the international furor over the
shootdown of KAL Flight 007 on 1 September, and Moscow's embarrassment was
heightened by the President's address to the UN General Assembly on
26 September in which he made further adjustments in his INF negotiating
position. These events had the effect of neutralizing the centerpiece in
Moscow's political strategy--the attempt to discredit the Administration's
foreign, defense, and arms control policies and to cast Washington in the role
of an international villain committed to overturning the US-Soviet strategic
balance and mounting "crusades" against the socialist countries. These Soviet
objectives required a deliberate cultivation of a new cold war atmosphere in
Soviet-American relations.
Succession Imperatives
4. The failure to block initial INF deployments in November and to
undermine the Reagan Administration's credibility in Europe shaped the context
in which the Politburo addressed the succession problem. By the autumn of
1983, the Soviets were irrevocably committed to implementing the three
"countermeasures" that had been announced in late May and to terminating the
Geneva arms control talks. The leadership had engaged its prestige and
credibility at home and abroad so deeply in the campaign against the
Euromissiles that the option of retreat or concessions was foreclosed. In
sum, the Soviets had been cornered by their own misjudgments of the
Administration and the.strength of anti-nuclear and peace movements in Western
Europe and by their moves throughout the year to raise the stakes in the
contest over INF deployment. They had gone too far to entertain the option of
abandoning their ambitious political strategy. In the minds of senior
Politburo members, these circumstances dictated that the succession scenario
must be managed in a way that would convey composure, continuity, and unity in
the leadership. These imperatives ruled out the choice of any candidate who
could not meet three main tests: (a) he must be well known at home and abroad
as a senior and experienced member of the hierarchy; (b) he must be a
credible symbol of continuity and unity; (c) his selection must not create
confusion and uncertainty in the CPSU, Eastern Europe, and the West about the
consistency of Soviet policies; he must not project false or misleading
signals that the leadership might now undertake significant departures in
domestic or foreign and defense policies.
5. Of the three members of the Secretariat generally regarded as the
principal candidates, only Chernenko, as the senior secretary, met these
tests. In the Judgment of the senior Politburo members, the selection of
either Gorbachev or Romanov would have conveyed uncertain and potentially
troublesome signals. The deterioration in Andropov's condition in late August
brought matters to a head, and the Politburo seniors began shortly thereafter
to devise a succession scenario anchored to Chernenko as the symbol and
putative guarantor of seniority, firm and confident control over policy,
continuity, and unity. The scenario was calculated to symbolize steadiness
and consistency in the transition from the Brezhnev era through Andropov's
brief 15-month tenure to the elevation of another member of the elder
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generation. In short, no retreat or vacillation, particularly in resisting
alleged US plans to achieve strategic superiority over the USSR.
6. The principal decisions governing the succession process probably were
made by late November or early December. About that time, Chernenko and
Premier Tikhonov--another symbol of seniority and continuity--began to take
more conspicuous roles and precedence in public events. They were singled out
from the rest of the Politburo (except Andropov of course) to receive a
greater number of nominations for the elections to the Supreme Soviet on
4 March. This deliberate display of Chernenko's and Tikhonov's greater
prominence was carried over into the arrangements for Andropov's funeral.
Chernenko was named chairman of the funeral commission and Tikhonov delivered
the speech to the Central Committee plenum on 13 February nominating Chernenko
at the "unanimous" request of the Politburo. He hailed Chernenko as "a true
associate of such Leninist-type leaders as Leonid Ilich grezhnev and Yuriv
Vladimirovich Andropov were." Chernenko's "acceptance" speech emphasized that
"ensuring continuity in politics" is the "best way of paying tribute" to
Andropov's memory. He also assured the country that the Central Committee and
its Politburo "are acting... in concord and unity." Politburo seniors played
predominant roles in all public ceremonies after Andropov's death. Chernenko,
Tikhonov, Ustinov, and Gromyko stood at the forefront of the leadership during
the lying-in-state and honor guard ceremonies on 11 February. At the funeral,
Chernenko, Ustinov and Gromyko delivered eulogies, and these three, plus
Tikhonov, were the only Politburo members to hold discussions on 14 February
with East European party and government leaders.
7. When weighed against the logic, motivations, and intentions signalled
by the succession and funeral scenario, claims by some Soviet officials,
reported by a Western news service, that the delay in announcing the selection
of Chernenko was caused by resistance on the part of younger members of the
Politburo carry little credibility. Such claims should be discounted because
they come from the small group of Soviet journalists and foreign affairs
specialists to whom Western newsmen have access and who, as Dmitri Simes has
noted, describe Chernenko as a "muzhik" whose only accomplishment was serving
as Brezhnev's chief lackey. The senior members of the Politburo chose
Chernenko because he was the most plausible candidate to meet the imperatives
posed by a potentially costly impasse in foreign policy. Their choice was not
contested by Gorbachev, Romanov, or other younger leaders. These men were
fully aware of the reasons and stakes involved, and they supported the senior
members' solution. Three days after the Central rommittee meeting it was
revealed that Gorbachev had closed the session with an appeal for unity in
carrying out party policy, a distinction that appears to have been intended to
convey that he now ranks as the senior party secretary under Chernenko and, as
such, is the presumptive next-in-line for the top post.
The Delay in Announcing Chernenko's Elevation
8. The four-day delay between Andropov's death and the Central Committee's
approval of the Politburo's "proposal" to elect Chernenko was not caused by
disagreement in the hierarchy or by rival bids by Gorbachev or Romanov. It
was a deliberate and carefully considered precaution to avert the dilemma that
would have been created by a decision by President Reagan to attend the
funeral. The Politburo sought to escape this dilemma by withholding
disclosure of Chernenko's elevation until less than 24 hours before the
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funeral, assuming that this would afford Washington insufficient time to
arrange a presidential trip. The leadership could hardly avoid naming
Andropov's successor before the funeral, but they calculated that the
President would not consider attending if he did not know whom he would be
dealing with at least two or three days before the funeral. In retrospect,
this precaution proved to be unnecessary in view of the early designation of
Vice President Bush to represent the 115, but the President's decision of
course was not known when the Politburo devised the funeral scenario.
9. The Soviet leaders' suspicion that the President might embarrass them
by attending the funeral was heightened by his 16 January speech on US-Soviet
relations in which he said, "We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue
as serious and constructive as possible..." and by similar remarks in his
State of the Union address. This suspicion was only the most recent
manifestation of the Soviets' apprehension since early last summer that
President Reagan might corner them and cut the ground from under their
political strategy by proposing a summit meeting in late 1983 or early 1984.
They feared that their strategy to block INF deployment would be seriously
compromised if they rejected an American summit invitation or were maneuvered
into a meeting under unfavorable circumstances. In late June they took the
precaution of having Gromyko pour cold water on summit prospects. He slyly
noted that, "An outsider can get the impression that Washington is indeed
giving serious thought to a (summit) meeting," but he insisted that the
reality was quite different. "U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet
Union," Gromyko contended, "does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of
which American leaders make no secret." He proceeded to bar the door to a
summit until "there appear in American politics real signs of a readiness to
conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner."
10. The Soviets remained apprehensive throughout the second half of 1983
that the Administration would play the summit card against. them. Andropov
told a group of nine US Democratic Senators on 26 Auqust that while he favored
a summit "in principle," it would be "meaningless" under existing
circumstances. One of Andropov's motives in issuing his harsh denunciation of
the Administration's policy on 28 September was to further discourage
Washington from considering a summit hid. In addition to condemning the
President for "foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on
morality and humanity," Andropov asserted that, "If anyone has any illusions
about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present
administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for
all." On 22 October, Georgiy Arbatov said the Soviet Union would not
participate in a summit if it was "planned as a gimmick to help re-elect
President Reagan." Three weeks later, Arbatov declared, "Even before the KAL
incident, I thought there would be no US-USSR summit meeting. The reason is
that as far as Mr. Reagan is concerned, such a meeting would be only a game
for his reelection, and Mr. Andropov would see no reason why he has to be a
partner in it." In early December, Arbatov said, "We are assuming that on the
eve of the US presidential election we can expect the most incredible
tricks. Reagan will act as the great man of peace; in the final analysis
acting is his profession; that is why he was hired, the foremost actor among
today's politicians."
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Implications for Warning
11. The predominant role in the succession scenario played by senior
Politburo members and the balance of power in the leadership established by
the promotion of Andropov's proteges and supporters at Central Committee
plenums in June and December 1.983, will hold Soviet policy to the general
course that has emerged since the spring of 1981. Chernenko will preside over
a more authentic collective leadership than that which prevailed in the last
decade of the Brezhnev era or perhaps even during Andropov's 15 months as
party chief. Soviet policy toward the US and Western Europe will continue to
be managed primarily by Gromyko and Ustinov. Political strategy and tactics
during the past year have carried the imprint of that most experienced of
foreign policy masterminds, Andrei Gromyko. His promotion to first deputy
premier last March, at the time of Andropov's first absence, was intended to
invest Gromyko with greater authority in coordinating all the instruments of
Soviet action in the international arena. It seems likely that Gromyko's
influence will be even stronger under Chernenko than it was under Andropov.
12. In sum, the Soviets will not retreat from their ambitious strategy for
exploiting the INF issue as leverage to alter the political equilibrium in
Europe. Despite their failure to block initial deployments, the Soviets
remain convinced that long-term trends in Western Europe will work to their
advantage and that the Euromissile issue represents a point of great
vulnerability in the Atlantic Alliance. As the second phase of INF
deployments next fall approaches, Moscow will concentrate on attacking
perceived contradictions between the commitments of the West German, British,
and Italian governments to proceed with the deployment schedule and growing
undercurrents of public resistance marked by widespread desires to see the
missiles negotiated away. Soviet political and arms control initiatives will
be tailored to erode the authority and political base of these governments to
the point that they will be compelled to break with the Reagan Administration
on NATO nuclear strategy.
13. The Soviet assessment of the Administration's intentions will not
change, although the President's initiatives since mid-January to alter the
atmospherics in US-Soviet relations will oblige Moscow to foreqo some of the
more virulent rhetoric that characterized its pronouncements last year. This
shift was already apparent befeore Andropov's death, notably in his last
public statement on 25 January. Chernenko's initial statements and the Pravda
editorial on 19 February drew upon Andropov's theme that any US-Soviet
dialogue "should be conducted on an equal footing and not from a position of
strength, as it is proposed by Ronald Reagan." Andropov declared that the
Soviet Union is ready for talks to reach arms reductions "on the basis of the
principle of equality and equal security." Pravda reported that Chernenko, in
his talk with Vice President Bush, had "made the point that Soviet-American
relations should be based on equality and equal security, on mutual
consideration for the legitimate interests of the other side."
14. The elevation of Chernenko will not alter the basic Soviet view that
the Administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, after three years in
office, is firmly fixed in what they regard as a confrontational posture.
Andropov's last statement expressed skepticism that the President's new
conciliatory tone signalled a change in policy: "The American leadership, as
all signs indicate, has not given uo its intention to conduct talks with us
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from positions of strength, from positions of threat and. pressure. We
resolutely reject such an approach." The Soviets of course have a powerful
interest in refuting impressions abroad, particularly in Western Europe, that
the Administration's policy is changing. They were much more comfortable when
Administration leaders were expounding highly critical views of the nature and
objectives of the Soviet regime because their political strategy relied on
widening and exploiting transatlantic differences. This explains attempts by
the Soviet media to represent the President's recent statements as nothing
more than tactical adjustments addressed exclusively to the domestic audience
in an election year. Moscow radio dismissed his 16 January speech as "nothing
but purely face-lifting operations," and a Novosti political observer
described it as words "uttered in some kind of vacuum."
15. The Soviets, however, are apprehensive about the impact of the
President's statements in the past month in Western Europe, and they will seek
in the near future to recover the initiative. One of their first moves may be
to bring their familiar proposal for a moratorium on nuclear weapons
production and deployment into the forefront of international attention.
Andropov on 25 January recalled that, "We offer the US as a beginning a simple
and at the same time sufficiently effective step--a freeze on nuclear arms."
Arbatov on 24 January endorsed the Palme Commission's proposal for a one-year
moratorium on deployment of nuclear missiles as a "valid proposal," describing
it as "not much" but still an "opportunity to take stock and review the
situation and perhaps find new initiatives."
16. Moscow's major initiative in the next six months probably will be a new
and comprehensive arms control proposal that will redefine strategic weapons
to include the Pershing II and cruise missiles, British and French missiles,
and at least some Soviet and NATO "medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft."
The Soviet statement on 8 December justifying a recess in the START talks
without setting a date for their resumption contended that the "change in the
overall strategic situation" created by INF deployments required the Soviet
Union to "reexamine all the issues" subject to discussion. Soviet officials
have claimed that the Euromissiles have not only invalidated Moscow's proposal
to reduce strategic weapons by 25 percent but violated the SALT II treaty
because INF and British and French missiles are considered to be strategic
weapons.
17. There is a strong possibility that the Soviets will insist that their
new comprehensive proposal requires a broadening of the talks to include all
the nuclear powers. A hint that Moscow will propose that China be included in
a five-power negotiating forum appeared in Andropov's Pravda interview on
26 August: "As we understand it, PRC leaders now seem to be displaying
interest in certain questions relating to nuclear and other weapons under
discussion at the United Nations and in the Geneva Disarmament Committee. If
this trend develops there is no doubt that China could make a considerable
contribution to the solution of problems linked with averting nuclear war and
ending the arms race." In late October, Arbatov declared, "It is impossible
to fully ensure the security of the world or achieve disarmament without
China's complete participation." Translated into specific proposals, this
rhetoric suggests that the Soviets have replied to China's complaints about
SS-20 deployments in eastern USSR by holding out the prospect of limitations
or reductions if the Chinese agree to join a five-power forum and accept
limits on their long-range missiles.
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18. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that a new proposal based
on a broader and more inclusive definition of strategic weapons will be
rejected by the US, Britain and France, but they would also expect that it
will attract considerable interest in West Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
The crucial question concerns the steps the Soviets intend to take after their
proposal has been rebuffed. Andropov's 24 November statement indicated that
the scope and pace of Soviet "countermeasures" will be geared to the scale of
INF deployments. Soviet actions so far suggest that they are adhering to
Andropov's declaration that "countermeasures from the Soviet side will be
restricted strictly to the limits which will be dictated by the NATO
countries' actions." These guidelines, however, would not preclude Soviet
actions calculated to precipitate a limited and controlled confrontation with
the US. The Soviets, for example, may intend to disclose the presence of a
substantial force of ballistic and cruise missile submarines off US coasts in
a provocative manner, with the aim of eliciting a strong reaction from the
Administration. A delphic hint of a move of this nature was made in late
January by Valentin Falin, a senior Izvestia commentator. Falin predicted
that the Administration will want to negotiate intensively on the changed
strategic situation when it feels the weight of Soviet countermeasures.
Speaking to Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post, Falin said, "You will begin
serious talks. I am convinced."
19. If such a strategem succeeds in triggering a crisis atmosphere, the
Soviets may attempt to turn the tables on Washington by offering to withdraw
their missile submarines in exchange for the removal of the Euromissiles and a
renunciation of NATO's 1979 deployment decision. As part of this deal, Moscow
may revive Brezhnev's proposal of March 1982 to limit the patrol areas of each
side's missile submarines.
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