THE GULF WAR AND THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001000030007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 8, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/12/08: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000030007-4
SECRET
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01543-84
8 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: The Gulf War and the USSR
1. The Gulf War has posed a predicament for Moscow in the Middle East.
Moscow often can, and does, profit from regional instability. But in this war
Moscow neither served as the spark nor has it really been involved as much
more than a bystander. Yet Moscow's interests have probably suffered more
than they have gained.
Soviet gains:
Iran has a growing need for weapons, giving the Soviets a possible
opportunity down the road to develop an inroad into Iran. Moscow has
not yet been able to profit from his however.
The Gulf War and Shia. passions kindled by it have probably served to
raise somewhat the level of anti-American feelings among Shia in the
region. But these Islamic passions rarely translate into positive
gains for the Soviets either.
Soviet losses:
- The general instability has caused the regional states to join in a
pro-Western political-military defense grouping--the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). The GCC furthermore deliberately excludes Iraq--th
only Gulf state over which the Soviets have any influence.
SECRET
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Soviet policies in the course of the war have annoyed Iraq and caused
it to move towards the West both for arms supplies and
diplomatic/economic support.
The war has moderated Iraq's formerly revolutionary policies in the
Persian Gulf, which e're of net gain to the USSR.
Syria and Iraq--Moscow's two main allies in the region--are now at
loggerheads.
- The Gulf States now look more to the West for security in the face of
the Iranian threat.
The Gulf States are also growing more Islamically conservative--to
protect their right flank from fundamentalism--which doesn't help the
West but certainly doesn't help the USSR either.
2. In the long run, then, it is probably in the Soviet interest to see
the war wind down. But Moscow can play almost no role in such a process:
it has'no special access to Iran,
it has less entree to Baghdad than the West does,
- it has no appropriate regional military forces to move in to help
keep the Gulf open for shipping--and wouldn't want to join the West
in such a quasi-imperialistic exercise anyway, and
- it has no critical national interests at stake--compared to Western
Europe and Japan.
3. Any effort by the US to work jointly with Moscow would give the
Soviets the major role they crave, but would probably not produce any results
beyond what the West could do without Moscow. Moscow could benefit from being
publicly granted such a role, however, in that it would help legitimize
Moscow's position in the eyes of the Gulf States--none of which have
diplomatic relations with Moscow now (except Kuwait).
1Z
2
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FJL
Approved For Release 2008/12/08: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000030007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000030007-4
NIC 01543-84
8 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Gulf War and the USSR
NIC/NIO/NESA
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DOCI
1 - SA/IA
ER.
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC (HM)
1 - VC/NIC (CW)
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - NIO/USSR
2 - NIO/NESA
8 Mar. 84
Approved For Release 2008/12/08: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000030007-4