IPC MEETING ON UNESCO, NOVEMBER 9, 1984, 2:00 P.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000900080021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 9, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Executive Secretary
9 Nov 84
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MMEDIATE
USIA -'Mr- C. William LaSalle
8430686-8430687-8430688
United States Department of State
II ~1shr n~ tun. I).C. 20520
November 9, 1984
NSC - Mr. Robert
(` T T K;mmitt
SUBJECT IPC M
? Charles Hill Memorandum of November 2, 1984, on
UNESCO Strategy,
The meeting of the IPC that is alluded to
2, 1984, Charles Hill Memorandum, an IPC charged n the November
such reform as UNESCO might have achieved during to evaluate
1984, will
meet on November 9, 1984, at 2:00 p.., to hold ln
a pnesimidary
discussion. This will include a review of 1984 e
and
occurrences. The proposed agenda is attached (Tab A).
The following background materials are also rovid
inasmuch as they formulate our commitment to monitory andd,
review, and relate directly requisite concrete changes havvetmaterializedwduring 1984, and the
whether, thus, a Presidential review is called for:
Decision Memorandum of December 23, 1983 (Tab B);
,
Shultz/M'Bow Correspondence (Tab C);
NSC/State Department Communications (Tab D);
,
- Newell Letter to M'Bow, July 13,
suggestions for concrete UNESCO reform (Tab ETa detailed
).
Additional materials will be provided may be needed in light of the ovided subsequently--as
ice
of the Monitoring Panel; or to consiiderootherlinputs thatama
come to be relevant; or as the IPC may itself determine.
y
Attachments
as stated.
eeting on UNESCO, November 9, 1984, 2:00 p.m.
Charles 4ill
Executive Secretary
DEC AOL DR
Oct
EXEC
REG
n
8. -
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (IPC)
U14ESCO
November 9, 2:00 p.m.
Room 7240, Main State
1. Opening Remarks - Under Secretary Armacost, Chairman
2. Review of Events - Assistant Secretary Newell
3. Discussion: IPC Membership
4. Discussion: Materials Submitted for Consideration
- Decision Memorandum of December 23, 1983
- Shultz/M'Bow Correspondence
- NSC/State Department Communications
- Newell Letter to M'Bow, July 13, 1984, making detailed
suggestions for concrete reform.
5. Discussion: Further Materials Needed for Consideration
CIA Report on the impact of our UNESCO withdrawal***
GAO Draft Proposed Report on UNESCO's Management,
Budgeting and Personnel Practices**
UNESCO Monitoring Panel Report*
10 Analysis of 1994 UNESCO reform efforts*
Discussion: Materials Providing Informational Background
House Foreign Affairs Committee report on UNESCO*
- Report by 5 Members of the U.S. National Commission
for UNESCO**
Schedule of future IPC meetings
* In preparation
** To be provided at meeting
*** To be provided separately by CIA
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A
THE WHITE HOUSE
Dear George:
As the end of the year draws closer, so too does our decision
about whether our withdrawl from UNESCO is final, or whether we
choose instead to renew our membership. As a scientist, I would
like to offer my assessment of the implications of formalizing our
withdrawl from UNESCO.
.Frankly, I think that it would be in the long-term interest of
international science for the U.S. to leave UNESCO. The corruption,
bureaucracy and politicization of UNESCO that has plagued other
UNESCO programs also plagues the science programs. Only a small
portion of UNESCO science programs are involved in what we consider
real science. A large portion are short-term, quasi-development
programs that train Third World technicians instead of scientists.
I believe that the original intent of UNESCO--the free exchange of
knowledge and talent as a means of accelerating industrial develop-
ment and improving the quality of life in the Third World--was
correct and worthwhile. That intent, sadly, has been lost.
It will stake some effort, but in the long run I think we can
strengthen other existing mechanisms for the conduct of international
science and the propagation of the fruits of science and technology
to the developing world. As part of that mechanism, I would suggest
that the U.S. contributions to international science be administered
through the science agencies of the U.S. government, with oversight
by State, as appropriate. This would help restore and maintain
the emphasis on substance that UNESCO was originally intended to
engender.
The various science bureaucracies in the U.S. have a stake in
continued U.S. participation in UNESCO, and thus advocate that we
remain active participants. Perhaps, had the many reform efforts
of the last 11 months led to results, I might have agreed. However,
since significant reform does not seem to have occurred, and
considering the important relationship between science and interna-
tional progress, clearly it is best for the U.S. to proceed with
the President's decision to withdraw from UNESCO.
Yours truly,
.-A. Veyworth
Science Advisor to the President
The Honorable George Schultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
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Department of State
ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S
CONFIDENTIAL
TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Eagleburger
FROM: 10 - Gregory J. Newell
SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)
ISSUE FOR DECISION
Whether to continue U.S. membership in UNESCO, given its
declining effectiveness, and its long-standing adverse impact
on U.S. interests.
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
For more than a decade, opinion leaders in the Executive
branch and Congress;=and among the informed public, have
questioned the value of U.S. membership in UNESCO. In 1974,
the Congress actually suspended payments to UNESCO, because of
actions that denigrated the status of Israel.
UNESCO policies, for several years, have served anti-U.S.
political ends. This Administration has frequently advised
UNESCO of the limits of U.S. (and Western) toleration of
misguided policy and programs, and budgetary mismanagement.
For nearly three years we have applied to UNESCO the same
priorities and criteria that guide our relations to all
multilateral organizations. UNESCO alone, among the major
multilateral organizations, has not responded constructively.
Six months ago, I commissioned an in-depth policy review of
U.S. participation in UNESCO. At the same time, I directed
that a special effort be made to describe our reasoned
expectations as to policy, programs, budget and management at
the biennial General Conference of UNESCO, which ended November
26, 1983.
Now, at the conclusion of this two-pronged effort to
reassess, reason and rehabilitate, I have concluded that
continued U.S. participation in UNESCO -- as it is currently
organized, focused, and directed -- does not serve the
interests of the United States. I recommend that you give
notice, before December 31, 1983, as provided by UNESCO's
constitution, that the United States will withdraw from
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membership, effective December 31, 1984. (A proposed letter
giving the required notice is appended at Tab A. A memoranlum
from the Legal Adviser relative thereto is appended at Tab B.)
This careful and thorough policy review confirmed prior
impressions that the Organization does have deep-seated
problems. What appeared was a persistent pattern of:
(1) extraneous politicization of virtually every subject
dealt with: Israel, South Africa, human rights,
disarmament, communications, etc.
(2) an endemic hostility toward the basic institutions of
a free society, especially a free market and a free
press; and
(3) the most irresponsible and unrestrained budgetary
expansion in the United Nations system.
This was the obvious negative side of UNESCO, in which we could
no longer acquiesce; but various UNESCO-sponsored conventions
and arrangements have performed usefully. We asked ourselves
whether there were irreplaceable UNESCO activities. If we
withdrew, would our national interests be adversely affected in
a significant way? We could not identify major UNESCO
activities giving us important affirmative results that could
not be obtained in some other way.
We have not overlooked the problems that might follow upon
our departure from UNESCO, as that might relate to our
participation in the UNESCO-sponsored Universal Copyright
Convention, and the Beirut and Florence Agreements dealing with
the international exchange of visual and auditory materials;
nor problems possibly associated with our participation in the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the International
Hydrological Program, and the Man and the Biosphere program --
ad hoc UNESCO-sponsored initiatives promoting specific
scientific inquiries. Genuinely needed scientific and
commercial cooperation of this sort pre-dates the creation of
UNESCO. A focus on particular matters in whfch participants
fin t useful to cooperate is more likely to produce useful
results. We are confident that such cooperation will continue
-- in other channels if need be. To such cooperation we would
continue to contribute. The intrinsic significance of the work
of U.S. nationals, universities, and business firms in science,
education, publishing, and communications gives us considerable
assurance that international practices with respect to all
these matters (with or without UNESCO) will not leave U.S.
interests out of account.
UNESCO conventions occasionally seek to provide benefits to
members that are not provided to non-member states; but UNESCO
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and other UN agencies do not provide the only possible channels
for culturril and commercial cooperation. It is possible to
find means of working together to achieve particular desired
ends outside of UNESCO. Given the fact that neither culture,
commerce, nor world science can proceed meaningfully without
the participation of U.S. nationals and American institutions,
other cooperative arrangements will surely be activated -- and
on a healthy non-ideological basis. Significant cultural'
interchange has always flowed best from the free contact of
authors, scientists, artists and audiences with one another
across national boundaries.
Conclusions of our Evaluation:
(1) Politicization. UNESCO programs and personnel are heavily
freighted with an irresponsible political dbntent, and answer
to an agenda that is consistently inimical to U.S. interests.
The approach that UNESCO consistently takes to "disarmament"
(which is not the proper concern of that forum) reflects either
a specific pro-Soviet bias, or, at best, adheres to the naive
and simplistic "Delhi.Declaration" view. Human rights programs
and resolutions in UNESCO are almost invariably infected with
Soviet and statist concepts of alleged "collective rights," in
denigration of personal and individual freedoms, privileges and
immunities -- which-are recognized in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. But UNESCO too often lends itself to the
machinations of those who think that "collective rights"
(including those of the state) are equal to, or more signicant
than, the rights of individuals. Anti-Israel attitudes, too,
leading to still-maintained sanctions, are deeply rooted there.
More particularly, and in relation to specific elements of
U.S. foreign policy, UNESCO parrots the product of an extreme
and unproductive posturing on Southern Africa issues. It
supports the PLO, SWAPO and the ANC, both financially and
politically, and provides assistance to Cuba. In UNESCO
proceedings, the United States is regularly pilloried -- much
more sternly than is the Soviet Union for its repressive rule,
or other totalitarian regimes for their brutal behavior.
Recent slight improvements in these matters, as in the
newly-concluded 1983 General Conference, are, we suspect, mere
tactical or transitory exceptions to the now deeply-ingrained
rule. Voluble UNESCO participants are persistently hostile to
U.S. political views, values and interests. Our participation
in UNESCO "consensus" can on occasion amount to complicity in
villification of the U.S. -- which is part of everyday life
there. The UNESCO environment is relentlessly hostile to our
ideals, and this environment is unlikely to change, whatever
reasonable effort we bring to bear.
(2) Organizing Orwellian "Freedom." The ordered freedom to
which all aspire is not to be found in the Orwellian state.
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Various UN agencies, however, early sought to give life to
their vision of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO) --
compulsively statist and necessarily ineffectual. UNESCO
functionaries soon undertook their own quest -- to create the
"New World Information and Communication Order" (NWICO). The
contemplated NWICO, in particular, would establish a program in
which we must not acquiesce. It poses a real threat to the
freedom of the press (given the common involvement of
governments in telecommunications practice). We are, as you
know, already obliged by specific statutory mandate to end our
support for UNESCO if it takes certain actions restricting the
freedom of the press. There is no sign that powerful elements
within UNESCO have now abandoned advocacy of their cherished
"New World Information and Communications Order." In this
particular, we consistently fight against biased rules, much
inimical to press freedom, but an occasional tactical retreat
by the UNESCO establishment is the most we are likely ever to
achieve. In line with the NWICO agenda,. repression of a free
press will persistently be advocated. This agenda, as Leonard
Marks has noted, "is now with us and will be around for a long
time in some form, whether we identify it or ignore it."
Yet another "New Order," also originally inspired by the
NIEO, may be waiting to be born in Paris. A large number of
UNESCO members have pressed for action to create a "code of
conduct" controlling the operations of multinational
corporations in UNESCO's various fields of interest. This
would include the film, book publishing, and television
industries. This initiative, with or without our opposition
(and regardless whether we speak in or apart from UNESCO), will
return again and again as circumstances seem propitious to its
proponents. We must oppose such a movement: our conclusion is
that we can better do so from without than from within. We
simply cannot abide the constraints that UNESCO would likely
seek to apply someday. We suggest that opposition from without
-- principled and total opposition -- would be most forthright
and effective.
(3) UNESCO Budgets and Management. UNESCO has far exceeded the
"zero-growth" budget policy of the U.S. and the Geneva Group in
that it initially proposed, for the 1984-8S biennium, a 9.7%
program increase. This it did while all other UN agencies --
FAO, WHO, ILO, ITU, ICAO,.WMO, WIPO, and others -- responded
with zero or near-zero program growth. UNESCO was forced to
"accept" a Nordic proposal for an alleged 2.5% increase
(embodying a 3.8% -.5.5% budget increase for the next biennium
in real terms).
UNESCO management practices are atrocious. It is widely
accepted that only one dollar out of every five is allocated to
programs -- and in using that remainder there is little program
concentration. Meaningful priorities are neither established
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nor policed. There is no real system of evaluation. There are
reams of misleading or impenetrable management information.
Here we encounter politically motivated and anti-Western
personnel practices. No serious effort is made either to
control or cut back on conferences, meetings, publications, and
other effluvia of a large and unfocused bureaucracy of some
2300 persons. The impact of new personnel practices just
approved by the General Conference is unclear, but it appears
that a new majority of posts are to be reserved for nations
thought to be disadvantaged or formerly dependent.
Discrimination against employment of Western officers and staff
will thus escalate further. These budget and personnel
practices, moreover, are used by the Director General to
support his own rule, and to secure his own perquisites --
through his dispensing of program funds to countries whose
support he seeks or rewards, and through the use of personnel
appointments with like purpose and effect.
These problems, understandable to some degree in any
international organization, exist in UNESCO to a far greater
degree than elsewhere.. In three years of consistent effort,
this Administration has produced improvements elsewhere in the
UN system -- in pqlicy formulation and program development, in
establishment of budget levels and in management practices --
but significant improvements have eluded us in UNESCO.
Our review was not cursory; neither was it prejudiced. We
genuinely sought to determine how we could participate in
UNESCO on any satisfactory terms; and simultaneously sought, in
good faith, to persuade the Organization and its Director
General that UNESCO had embarked on a counter-productive path.
I personally met with him five times to discuss our concerns.
He must appreciate that UNESCO has been given timely warning of
our apprehensions and attitudes. In effecting our review, we
solicited the views of 13 federal government agencies. We
requested, and obtained, evaluation of UNESCO field projects
from 77 of our overseas missions. Through the U.S. National
Commission for UNESCO, we also gathered input from the key
private sector organizations in education, science, culture and
communications. The accumulated material is extensive (and can
be mined for further insights), but it is already clear that
the specific benefits, services and accords implicit in useful
international cooperation can be had at a far lower price than
that of the obloquy we endure in Paris, and the $50 million per
year we are assessed as our 25% contribution to this now-
ritualized condemnation of the Western World.
We must now make a careful assessment of the potential
impact of our proposed action, and of the appropriate strategy
for its implementation. (A "Balance Sheet" of Benefits from
UNESCO membership is appended at Tab C; a Proposed Strategy for
Disengagement from UNESCO is appended at Tab D.)
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A summary of our assessment of the impact of our proposed
action, following upon the review described earlier, iss
- Membership in UNESCO damages and distorts the views,
values and interests of the United States.
- Experience. shows that the United States cannot change
UNESCO substantially if it remains a member.
- The United States receives few benefits from UNESCO
membership that it could not otherwise negotiate and obtain
through othe4 channels.
- Our influence in other UN agencies would be strengthened
if we took the step of withdrawing from UNESCO.
- Foreign policy costs associated with withdrawal do not
appear to be heavy. Many, not openly supportive, rely on
the United States to provide leadership and to protect the
interests of all democratic peoples. Our leadership will
pay dividends in enhanced respect and in more responsible
behavior by member states in other international forums.
- At home, as abroad, our commitment to international
cooperation may well be more respected (and taken much more
seriously) if we can succeed in providing incentives to
those UN organizations that take the work of world
cooperation seriously, but disincentives to those that
impose upon us all an illiberal, unenlightened, and
repressive rule of cultural regimentation.
The signal that a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO would send to
multilateral international organizations is not that the U.S.
is bent upon withdrawal from multilateral affairs. It is,
rather, that we seek effective, non-politicized, and particular
means of achieving international cooperation and coordination.
To the creation of that form of international cooperation we
are committed. To further that end we would contribute both
effort and resources -- prudently committed, to be wisely and
impartially used.
A STRATEGY FOR WITHDRAWAL
.Withdrawal from UNESCO would raise (as would the withdrawal
of the United States from any specialized UN agency) a number
of more comprehensive questions. The answers we give to some
questions would naturally further our general policy purposes
in multilateral international organizations; others would
require us to provide reassurances to various interest groups:
(1) Impact on the UN System. Withdrawal from UNESCO would
likely have a salutary effect on other UN system agencies.
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for this toloccur, however, we must carefully explain that we
are not hereby undertaking a wider disengagement from the UN.
Our concerns are with UNESCO. Our arguments originate in our
experience there, and are related to behavior in (and of) that
organization. We shall need to emphasize that we are strongly
committed to the basic proposition reemphasized by President
Reagan in his remarks to the UN on September 26, 1983. We
seek, as we have sought, honest international cooperation. We
want this to be effective cooperation.
4
(2) Acting in Concert with Friendly Countries. Although a
number of UNESCO members Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK,
FRG, and others) have applauded our hard look at UNESCO, none
have said precisely what they would do if the U.S. were to
withdraw. I suggest that we explain our decision to others, but
that we not explicitly encourage others to follow us. We have
no intention of destroying UNESCO. Let it live, for whatever
good it may do, as individual participants therein may
calculate their advantage. We are saying that we see little
advantage for us in UNESCO. We can, however, anticipate some
near certain reactions,. We will witness:
- widespread interest in our review, and in the information
and analysis that led us to our conclusions;
- pressure from some to soften our approach, and to
entertain proposals for projected UNESCO actions that might
cause us to relent (the French, Nordics, and others will
probably volunteer as intermediaries for such negotiations);
- stronger support than ever for UNESCO by some states
(Italy, Spain, and numbers of Arab and African states);
- other withdrawals, eventually, when it becomes clear that
we do mean to go ahead.
The stance we adopt should reflect our actual process of
decision. We have made this decision on the basis of our own
evaluation of U.S. national interests.
(3)France and Israel. Both France and Israel will have to be
dealt with tactfully, and at a high level -- France, because it
is the UNESCO host country; Israel, because it has already
expressed concern that any U.S withdrawal would work against
its interests within UNESCO. As to the French, we should
recall the serious problems in the Organization with which we
have both been concerned; we should stress that we are
unwilling any longer to remain as a member of an organization
producing so few constructive results. To the French,
especially, we should stress that we are not encouraging others
to follow us. In our discussions, Rich Burt has indicated his
feeling that any problematical French reaction is containable.
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The Israelis have expressed concern that, with the United
States absent, Israel would be eventually be ejected from
UNESCO. We think that unlikely. To allay such fears, we can
emphasize the gains that we (and they) can thereby reasonably
foresee elsewhere in the UN system -- redounding to their
benefit. In my consultations with Ambassador Sam Lewis (an 10
predecessor of mine), he said that, while the Israelis would
not like our withdrawal, they would, if it were done properly,
"swallow hard" and understand our decision.
(4) U.S. Interest Groups. I have undertaken informally to
assess the reaction of concerned State Department officials and
some others to this decision. The recommendation I here make
is supported by Kirkpatrick, McPherson, Derwinski, Abrams,
Malone, McCormick, Dougan, and UNESCO Amb. Gerard. Various
regional Assistant Secretaries, properly concerned, have been
consulted. My findings, both in these consultations and from
careful examination of materials gathered in the process of our
policy review, is that there is a unanimous recognition, in and
out of government, that UNESCO faces grave problems. But a
common editorialist's.reaction to the admitted problems is to
suggest, resignedly, that we have no alternatives, and that we
should put UNESCO on probation yet again. We do have other
alternatives -- and UNESCO has already failed the probationary
term we have extended for nearly three years.
It follows -- from this near-universal comprehension that
there are serious problems at UNESCO -- that we would probably
experience relatively little strong and sustained opposition to
withdrawal. Nevertheless, we must be alert to domestic
interest groups arrayed in the the educational, scientific,
cultural and media establishments. Our position, which they
should understand, is simple. The costs are too hi h, and the
benefits are too few. This is a foreign policy decision, made
for reasons of foreign policy: It is no longer worthwhile for
the U.S. to remain as a member of an international organization
that acts as UNESCO acts, and in which negative foreign policy
considerations so much outweigh technical benefits received.
We should emphasize, however, that an intervening year remains,
during which we will work with all interested groups to
organize an effective kind of international cooperation
respecting education, science, culture, and communication. Our
willingness to engage in existing alternative forms of
cooperation on an international basis should plainly appear as
a prominent feature of our decision to withdraw from UNESCO.
(5) Congress. We will consult in detail with interested
members of both Houses of Congress. (See Tab D.)
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CONCLUSION
It is my best judgment that we must take this decisive
action now. The notice of withdrawal we propose could not take
effect, however, until December 31, 1984. An opportunity for
possibly salutary developments remains open. If, during 1984,
there should be aignificant evidence of a substantial and
lasting change in the way UNESCO approaches its tasks, this
action could conceivably be rescinded. Under existing
circumstances, however, our resolve to withdraw should remain
firm.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That you agree to a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO
effective December 31, 1984, with notice to be given
immediatelyr and
Approve Disapprove
2. That you 4ign the letter of notification to UNESCO
Director General M'Bow at Tab A.
Approve Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab A - Letter to UNESCO Director General M'Bow
Tab 8 - Memorandum from the Legal Adviser
Tab C - Memorandum: "Balance Sheet" of Benefits from
UNESCO Membership
Tab D - Memorandum: A Proposed Strategy for
Disengagement from UNESCO
Drafted: 10: RWAherne/GWClark Cleared: USUN:Kirkpatrick ~.
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CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
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What Are the Issues Concerning
the Decision of the United States To
Withdraw from UNESCO?
An Advisory from the United States National
Commission for UNESCO
A project authorized by the Executive Committee
and prepared by the Vice-Chairpersons and other members
of the United States National Commission for UNESCO
Nancy Risser, Leonard R. Sussman, and David Wiley, Vice-Chairpersons
Published and disseminated with private funds
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This document is provided for the purpose of public information and may be
freely reproduced. Acknowledgment to the United States National Commission
for UNESCO is requested.
? 1984
Additional copies of this publication are available on written request from the Vice-chairpersons:
Nancy Risser
Leonard Sussman
David Wiley
P.O. Box 8124
Third Floor
100 Center for International Programs
FDR Station
20 West 40th Street
Michigan State University
New York, NY 10150
New York, NY 10018
East Lansing, MI 48824-1035
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SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION Page
1. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO opposes U.S. withdrawal but wants to Page 3
institute improvements in the Organization. Based upon extensive review and assess-
ment of UNESCO, the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO voted overwhelmingly
on December 16, 1983, in support of a resolution calling for the United States to
remain in UNESCO as a "matter of national interest," to defend U.S. interests there,
and to seek needed changes in the organization.
2. The Administration has a number of reasons for the proposed withdrawal. Several Page 4
reasons have been given for the Administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO,
primarily: (1) politicization of issues; (2) statist concepts, particularly in communica-
tions and education; and (3) budget and management issues.
3. .Timing of the U.S. decision to withdraw did not allow full assessment. No public Page 4
indication of the serious possibility of withdrawal from UNESCO was given by the
Administration prior to its announcement in December 1983. After the July announce-
ment of the policy review, the Director of UNESCO Affairs at the State Department
informed the U.S. National Commission that the purpose of the review was to secure
improvements in UNESCO's behavior, not to pave the way for withdrawal. In fact the
United States served notice of its intention to withdraw after UNESCO had adopted
the basic elements of the six-year program with the United States joining in a consensus
in its favor.
4. Other Federal agencies, embassies, and consulates do not support the U.S. decision Page 6
to withdraw. The 83 U.S. embassies and consulates around the world and 13 federal
agencies responding to the Administration's review of policy regarding UNESCO did
not recommend withdrawal. The summary of the review released by the State Depart-
ment on February 27, 1984, does not include any specific references to these responses.
5. Allies and other nations do not support withdrawal. While they recognize the right of Page 7
the United States to withdraw and acknowledge the serious problems within UNESCO,
representatives of other Western and Third World delegations consider the loss of U.S.
intellectual and political leadership a major blow. No other nations, including Britain,
have followed the U.S., choosing instead to work for reform from within.
6. The decision can be altered. The decision to withdraw can be modified-revoked or Page 10
extended-at any time up to December 31, 1984. Assistant Secretary Newell has
indicated the feeling that "there is no conceivable way" that UNESCO can make the
changes necessary to have the U.S. remain. A Monitoring Panel has been appointed
to advise the Secretary of State on changes occurring in UNESCO over the remainder
of 1984.
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7. U.S. evaluations of the 1983 Biennial UNESCO General Conference were generally Page 10
positive. Evaluations in November 1983 by the Ambassador to UNESCO and the Head
of the U.S. Delegation, both appointed by the Administration, were clearly positive.
Ambassador to UNESCO Gerard noted that "we can take pride in the work and in many
of the accomplishments of the General Conference." Ambassador Hennelly, Head of the
Delegation, noted that the General Conference was among "the least politicized and most
constructive from the U.S. point of view in recent memory."
8. UNESCO has been no more politicized than other international organizations. Like other Page 11
UN organizations, UNESCO's General Conference and Executive Board meetings provide
a forum for political rhetoric, some of which is hostile to the U.S. and to Western posi-
tions. The 161 representatives of national governments in UNESCO, including the U.S.,
inevitably bring their political concerns to UNESCO; however, little of the substantive
educational, scientific, and cultural program is politicized. Only approximately one per-
cent of the annual budget is spent on programs which the U.S. State Department believes
are "highly politicized," namely, disarmament studies, the rights of peoples, and refugee
education.
9. The "rights of peoples" need not detract from individual freedoms. This term, which Page 12
originated in the. Organization of African Unity, is still evolving as a concept-and need
not necessarily diminish individual human rights. The way in which it is ultimately
defined will very much depend on the strategies of the U.S. and like-minded govern-
ments as the discussion proceeds within UNESCO. Withdrawal will end U.S. participa-
tion in the debate.
10. UNESCO itself does not advocate a "statist" approach to issues. Although some member Page 13
nations have a "statist" philosophy that national governments should direct, control,
and determine the educational and cultural development of their people, UNESCO does
not itself advocate a statist approach. UNESCO programs and materials are available to
member countries regardless of the political system used by the nation.
11. The USSR does not exercise inordinate control of UNESCO programs. The Soviets Page 13
play the same aggressive role in UNESCO that they play in other UN bodies, but they
cannot and do not control or exert a major influence on the program. The USSR does
take an active interest in UNESCO and devotes significant resources to it, unlike the
relative apathy shown by recent U.S. administrations. Only eight percent of the UNESCO
staff originates from Eastern bloc "communist" countries.
12. Disarmament studies in UNESCO constitute a small proportion of programs. Support Page 14
of disarmament studies, cited as politicization of UNESCO educational programs, con-
stitutes less than one percent of the total education budget and about one-third of one
percent of the total budget. More active U.S. participation would help assure that dis-
armament studies reflect Western views.
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13; Israel is not being attacked in UNESCO. Israeli policies have been attacked in many Page 15
meetings in the UN system. Continued U.S. participation in UNESCO can protect
Israeli interests. At the General Conference in November 1983, Israeli credentials
were not challenged and anti-Israeli rhetoric was muted or nonexistent, according to
Ambassador Hennelly.
14. Services to the PLO and African liberation movements are small in scale and largely Page 16
educational. UNESCO does not provide support for terrorism. Like other UN bodies,
it does accord non-voting observer representation to organizations such as the
Palestine Liberation Organization, African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress,
and South West African Peoples Organization. UNESCO provides primarily educational
materials and teacher training for schools serving the children of these groups. Funding
for such programs is annually deducted from the U.S. payment.
15. UNESCO has taken no actions to and freedom of the press. UNESCO has taken no Page 16
actions to control journalists or limit press freedom; however, justifiable concern has
been aroused by proposals by the Soviets and others to misuse The New World Infor-
mation and Communications Order (NWICO). Negotiations on communications
issues at the 1983 General Conference generally favored the Western free press position.
16. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) has not been central to UNESCO Page 18
programs. The UN-originated NIEO is reflected in many of the debates, publications,
and program activities of UNESCO. The NIEO proposals, which are of some concern
for the industrialized countries even though they have no legal force, do reflect the
aspirations and needs of many developing countries and cannot be ignored.
17. No actions have been taken by UNESCO against U.S. corporations. UNESCO has never Page 18
passed proposals for a Transnational Corporate Responsibility Code to control American
corporations operating abroad. Strong U.S. efforts have curtailed any such codes and
have advocated the interests of American corporations.' Continued U.S. participation
in UNESCO can forestall the elaboration of codes harmful to U.S. interests.
18. The United States is not underrepresented in the UNESCO professional staff. The Page 19
United States has the largest number of professional posts in the UNESCO Secre-
tariat of any nation (82 of 814 at the end of 1983). The recent slight decline in
number of U.S. nationals could be remedied by appointment of four or five more
Americans, placing U.S. representation within the "desirable range." More staff
work by the State Department and close monitoring by the U.S. Mission would
ensure a balanced distribution of Americans by sector and grade of post, as well
as by stage of career.
19. The UNESCO budget had a small increase this year and the U.S. contribution is only Page 19
$25.8 million. Assistant Secretary Newell has confirmed that the actual U.S. assess-
ment for the current fiscal year will be $25.8 million, significantly less than in recent
years. Though described in the U.S. as growing by "profligate leaps," increases in
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the UNESCO budget have generally not deviated from those of other UN agencies,
and the increases are reported to have been smaller than those of the International
Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health
Organization.
20. The UNESCO salary structure is high, like that of all international agencies and foreign Page 20
missions. Although there are aspects of the UNESCO salary structure to which the U.S.
rightly objects, these objections apply throughout the UN system; they are not unique
to UNESCO. Its professional salaries are based on those prevailing in the best civil
service, that of the United States itself. The total salaries of the UNESCO staff con-
stitute less than one-half of the UNESCO budget, a proportion which has been declining
since the early 1970s.
21. The proportion of staff in the Paris headquarters reflects the types of tasks performed by Page 20
the Organization. The U.S. has always taken the position that, while UN agencies must
have field offices to handle their activities in member countries, most funding for tech-
nical assistance programs such as UNESCO should come from voluntary contributions
and not from the assessed budgets. The UNESCO pattern is consistent with this position.
22. According to a 1979 study, the proportion of UNESCO budget allocated to administra- Page 21
tion is not inordinately high. UNESCO's mandate is to develop international coopera-
tion within its fields of competence. This requires a large headquarters staff to interpret
and translate into six official languages, print its many publications, and service its
General Conference and other meetings. A 1979 study of UNESCO plans and budgets
by the U.S. General Accounting Office "regarded the management procedures to be
unique and forward-looking compared to other UN agencies examined; and further,
as having the potential for improving the effectiveness of U.S. participation in UNESCO
....We believe they are conceptually sound and permit progress toward improved dis-
closure of program aims and their financial implications for member governments."
23. The U.S. has been successful in participating in UNESCO and accomplishing its goals Page 22
there when it has exerted strong leadership. The U.S. delegation to the 22nd General
Conference in 1983 achieved a number of successes, but generally there has been a
decline in the quality of U.S. participation in UNESCO during the past decade or more.
More than one delegation has been sent which included no recognized respresentatives
of U.S. scientific, cultural, and educational communities. Delegations have included
too many persons being rewarded for domestic political purposes. They lacked experi-
ence in international conference procedures and, in that sense, were no match for the
professional conference experts fielded by many other delegations.
APPENDIX I ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL Page 25
COMMISSION FOR UNESCO AS OF DECEMBER 1983
APPENDIX II STATEMENTS REGARDING UNESCO BY U.S. SCIENCE, EDUCATIONAL, Page 27
CULTURAL, AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
On December 28, 1983, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz notified the Director-General of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) of the intention of the United States to
withdraw from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984. Prior to this decision, the U.S. National Commission for
UNESCO had conducted several assessments of UNESCO, especially that reported in A Critical Assessment of
U.S. Participation in UNESCO, published in 1982, and in a survey of nongovernmental organizations of the
United States in the education, science, and cultural/arts sectors in 1983. On December 16, 1983, the National
Commission voted overwhelmingly in support of a resolution calling for efforts to reform UNESCO, but equally
calling for the United States to remain in UNESCO as a matter of "national interest."
The U.S. National Commission (USNC)-established by Congress (Public Law 565, 1946) in fulfillment of
Article VII of the UNESCO Constitution-provides liaison between UNESCO and its programs with the major
U.S. organizations "interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters." Two-thirds of the USNC
membership has been designated by nongovernmental organizations and one-third nominated by the U.S.
Administration from federal, state, and local governments and members at large. (See Appendix I for a list of
organizational members.)
The role of the USNC is to:
a) disseminate information concerning UNESCO to the private sector,
b) prepare position papers for the Department of State, the U.S. Mission to UNESCO, and the U.S. delega-
tions to UNESCO meetings,
c) initiate conferences and seminars on UNESCO themes,
d) ensure U.S. representation in the wide variety of UNESCO activities and conferences,
e) consult with the U.S. State Department concerning U.S. participation in UNESCO, and
f) occasionally conduct joint projects with other national commissions.
The USNC met December 16, 1983, at the time the State Department had announced it was considering
withdrawing from UNESCO. The USNC then reviewed its own previous assessments and those of the U.S.
Mission to UNESCO, the State Department, and members of the U.S. Delegation to the Biennial UNESCO
General Conference (November 1983). On the basis of this information the USNC then passed a resolution
urging continued U.S. membership in UNESCO in order to defend U.S. interests there, to seek needed changes
in the organization, and to achieve the original objectives that motivated the United States to assist in founding
UNESCO.
The need for dispassionate, reliable, and objective information on UNESCO has never been greater. For
nearly ten years, the U.S. press reported almost exclusively the controversial debates at UNESCO concerning
the performance of the news media. The National News Council, an independent press-monitoring group
sponsored by some U.S. media, examined 448 news reports and 206 editorials concerning the 1980 General
Conference of UNESCO. Said the Council:
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Not one story emanating from the six-week conference dealt with any of the
reports, speeches or resolutions on UNESCO's basic activities in combatting
illiteracy, developing alternative energy sources, protecting historic monuments,
broadening educational programs for scientists and engineers, sponsoring basic
research in food production and oceanic sciences, and scores of other fields.
Debate over communications issues was the "central topic" for news reports and editorials, the Council said,
and most of them were "hostile."
At the 1983 General Conference, one major newspaper devoted the top of a page to the report that a press-
control resolution had been introduced. When the resolution was withdrawn, no story appeared, and only a
short article reported the generally Western-oriented conclusion of the two-week debate.
Discussion is now underway on reform in UNESCO. Specific proposals are on the agenda of the Organiza-
tion's Executive Board. It is not the purpose of this publication to discuss specific proposals for reform. The
objective is rather to examine the main arguments and allegations which have been made against UNESCO and
to help bring about a better understanding in this country of the problems affecting UNESCO. In particular,
it is important to promote understanding of what can in fact be improved in the Organization and also to
separate fact from exaggeration or myth in some of the charges which have been leveled.
To enable all constituents of the USNC to share with their memberships reliable information on this
important issue, the officers offer this summary and comment on the implications of the United States'
announced withdrawal from UNESCO.
Nancy Risser
Leonard R. Sussman
David Wiley
Vice-Chairpersons
U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
June 15, 1984
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1. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO opposes U.S. withdrawal but wants to institute improve-
ments in the Organization.
The National Commission agrees with the Admin-
istration that UNESCO requires reform, but considers
that this should be achieved by seeking change from
within, together with other like-minded countries.
The Commission has conducted several important
reviews of relations with UNESCO in the past two
years. A Conference was devoted to a "Critical
Assessment of Relations with UNESCO" in the
summer of 1982. Five working groups unanimously
concluded that the U.S. should stay in UNESCO and
increase our participation with a view to exerting
stronger leadership. The lack of high level policy
attention towards UNESCO and general American
neglect of the Organization were regarded as having
contributed to its decline.
At the request of the State Department, another
review was conducted in 1983. All 97 Commissioners
were contacted, together with some forty nongovern-
mental organizations most closely concerned with
UNESCO's work. Twenty substantive replies were
received. Nearly all were critical of some aspects of
UNESCO's performance; however, without exception
all concluded that the U.S. should stay in UNESCO.
The issue was also thoroughly debated at the
Commission's annual meeting on December 16, 1983,
where a resolution criticizing UNESCO's failings, but
calling "in the national interest" for continued U.S.
membership was adopted overwhelmingly.
(A summary of comment from the U.S. scientific,
educational, arts, cultural, and media communities is
provided in Appendix I I of this document.)
The Commission has been misrepresented in some
quarters as an apologist for UNESCO, "glowingly
supportive" of the Organization. This arises from a
misconception both of the Commission's role and
what it has been saying. The main function of the
Commission is to be a channel of communication
between this country and UNESCO and between the
government and those non-governmental organiza-
tions most concerned with UNESCO's work.
UNESCO commissions in most countries have
important advisory, communicative, and management
functions. The U.S. Government, by contrast, has
largely ignored the U.S. National Commission, and in
fact the Department of State made an unsuccessful
attempt early in 1983 to eliminate its funding.
Although Congress restored part of the funding, the
Commission's professional staff has been effectively
eliminated.
Many members of the Commission are truly dis-
mayed at UNESCO's declining effectiveness and have
experienced its failings more directly than most.
Many members are also more aware than most of the
continuing value of much of UNESCO's work and,
more significantly, of the considerable scope for
achieving improvement in UNESCO's direction and
performance. While a small minority in the Commis-
sion believe that constructive reform will be achieved
by the U.S. turning its back on UNESCO, a majority
believe rather that dedication and commitment are
required on the part of those who believe in the
legitimate goals of UNESCO and who are in a posi-
tion to improve the direction and management of the
Organization. The Commission has been saying, in
essence, that the decline of UNESCO is attributable
in part to its neglect by this country, and that if any
serious attention had been paid to the Commission's
advice and practical recommendations over the past
two to three years, genuine reform could hav e
achieved. In that case there would be no occasion to
consider withdrawing.
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2. The Administration has a number of reasons for the proposed withdrawal.
Differing reasons have been given in the public
statements and letters of Assistant Secretary of State
Gregory Newell, Secretary of State George Shultz,
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs Robert McFarlane, and in the State Depart-
ment's U.S./UNESCO policy review. These have been
summarized in a 1984 staff study of the U.S. House
Foreign Affairs Committee:
The McFarlane memo of December 23 refers to
U.S. inability to reform UNESCO in a substantive
way over the past 3 years, its continued politiciza-
tion of almost every issue, its attack upon a free
flow of communications and an unrestrained
budgetary expansion.
The Shultz letter refers to trends in the manage-
ment, policy, and budget of UNESCO that detract
from the organization's effectiveness and failed
U.S. efforts to encourage the organization to
reverse these trends and redirect itself to its
founding purposes.
Mr. Newell says the U.S. decision came at the
conclusion of a long effort to reason with
UNESCO, and a careful reassessment of U.S.
relations with UNESCO. The administration
finally determined that as currently directed,
organized, and focused, UNESCO does not serve
U.S. interests. Mr. Newell also says UNESCO
policies serve anti-U.S. political ends and in par-
ticular that UNESCO policies are misguided, its
programs tendentious and its budget both
extravagant and mismanaged.
The U.S./UNESCO policy review states three
major reasons for the decision:
(1) Politicization of almost every issue (disarma-
ment, human rights, etc.); (2) statist concepts (new
world information order); and (3) budget and
management issues.
Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell has
stated that the Reagan Administration has frequently
advised UNESCO of the limits of U.S. toleration and
that for three years the Administration has applied to
UNESCO the same goals and priorities that guide our
relations with all multilateral institutions. "UNESCO
alone has not responded." The U.S. decided to leave
"after a long effort to reason with UNESCO, and a
careful reassessment of our relationship." The U.S. is
no longer willing to pay "tribute money," and be-
lieves that the goals of genuine international develop-
ment in the fields of education, science, culture, and
communications can be more effectively pursued
outside UNESCO. The Administration has stated
that the U.S. remains committed to membership in
the UN system and that withdrawal from UNESCO
will have a salutary effect on our relations with other
UN agencies.
It should be noted, however, that the only signifi-
cant difference between UNESCO's response and that
of other UN bodies was in regard to its budget.
UNESCO persisted in seeking a substantial increase in
its annual budget, while the UN and other agencies
asked for little or no increase. Even so, the UNESCO
budget was cut substantially below the amount re-
quested by its Director General, largely because of
pressure from the U.S. and other major contributors.
The record shows that, apart from the budget
issue, most,of the political problems identified by the
United States in UNESCO in fact originate in the
United Nations. While it may be useful to warn the
UN system of U.S. concerns, our withdrawal from
UNESCO will leave that forum open to easier
manipulation by those who do not share our views.
3. Timing of the U.S. decision to withdraw did not allow full assessment.
Following the announcement by the State Depart- General Conference, although no specific indication
ment of a review of relations with UNESCO in June of a planned withdrawal was given by the Administra-
1983, the possibility of U.S. withdrawal was on the tion until December 1983.
minds of many a egates to the November 1983 Although general dissatisfaction with UNESCO has
4
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been expressed by some U.S. public and private
sector representatives for several years, especially on
the grounds of politicization and alleged attempts to
interfere with the free flow of information, no
specific complaints or threats to withdraw were
evident. The U.S. joined the consensus which
approved the Second Medium Term Plan of UNESCO
in 1982 and the 1984-85 Program in November 1983.
Like other countries, the U.S. registered objections to
specific aspects of the Plan and the Program in the
course of the debates leading to their adoption. Some
of the U.S. concerns were met. Others were not.
The comprehensive Report to Congress by the
State Department in February 1983, concluded
that:
U.S. interests are generally well served by
UNESCO programs, which are, for the most part,
non-political and which can most effectively be
pursued through international cooperation.
The same Administration report also said:
UNESCO is a major forum .for U.S. multilateral
diplomacy. As such, it provides the U.S. with an
opportunity to promote U.S. (and Western) values
and methods-particularly in the Third World.
In November 1983, U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO
Jean Gerard gave a favorable view of the General Con-
ference. Just a month before the decision to with-
draw was announced, she concluded:
We can take pride in the work and in many of
the accomplishments of this General Conference.
It has been marked, in many instances, by agree-
ment on issues about which such agreement has
not always been easy. Most importantly, I believe
-1 hope-that we have laid the groundwork here
for greater efficiency and effectiveness in
UNESCO's programs.
Moreover, the statements made by Ambassador
Gerard last November are consistent with the position
she had taken in the previous year. Addressing the
U. S. National Commission in 1982, Ambassador
Gerard had said:
My report from Paris is, in a word, positive ...I
would like to quote one phrase from Luther Evans
that conveys a lot of what I myself feel about
(UNESCO)-"UNESCO is more than an institu-
tion, it is a work of art still being thought out and
worked on, therefore, fascinating by reason of its
very incompleteness and its unresolved 'enigmas.' "
On September 23, 1982, Ambassador Gerard had
delivered a comprehensive statement to the Executive
Board on the UNESCO Draft Medium Term Plan. She
gave no hint of a possible withdrawal.
These positions are consonant with statements
made by Assistant Secretary Newell more than nine
months before the decision to withdraw was made.
Addressing the February 3, 1983, meeting of the
National Commission, Assistant Secretary Newell,
referring to the Special Meeting of the U.S. National
Commission in June 1982, said:
The basic thrust of that special meeting was the
unanimous recommendation that the United States
should continue to remain a member of UNESCO,
but that the effectiveness of U.S. participation in
the work of the organization be increased.
He then added, "I fully supported your' review then
and support the conclusions of that meeting now."
In this and other statements U.S. officials
expressed criticism of UNESCO, but the ton was
generally mild. At no time until December 1983
was any public indication given that the possibility of
withdrawal was seriously under consideration. In
fact, after the policy review had been announced, the
Director of UNESCO Affairs at the State Department
in July 1983 informed the U.S. National Commission
that the purpose of the review was to secure posits iive
improvements in UNESCO's behavior, not to pave the
wa for withdrawal UNESCO officials expressed
surprise at the announcement of U.S. withdrawal for
the same reason-namely that the U.S. had at most
given mixed signals about its attitude, but at no stage
any indication of serious intention to withdraw.
A credible threat to withdraw, issued with
adequate public notice for the 161-nation organiza-
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Lion to consider concrete reforms, might have
resulted in constructive change. For example, a
British government document with specific sugges-
tions for reform was placed on the Agenda of the
UNESCO 119th Executive Board Session in May
1984, and another unofficial proposal by a group
under the chairmanship of the Netherlands Perma-
nent Representative to UNESCO also suggests specific
reforms. But until December 1983 U.S. statements
suggested that withdrawal was not planned at this
stage. Evidence has yet to be made public to support
the contention made by U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State Newell that the United States served notice of
4. Other Federal agencies, embassies, and consulates
In 1983 the State Department consulted thirteen
separate departments and agencies of the Federal
Government and a large number of U.S. embassies
and consulates abroad, in addition to the National
Commission, in the course of the Administration's
review. The review was released by the State Depart-
ment on February 27.
After a highly critical review of UNESCO, sector
by sector, the State Department concluded:
UNESCO programs benefit selected groups and
sectors in American society, especially certain
groups of scholars, scientists, and cultural special-
ists. Most UNESCO programs are aimed almost
exclusively at the Third World and have little or no
direct impact on U.S. interests, but many of them
complement general historic U.S. foreign assistance
objectives. Many UNESCO field programs in edu-
cation, science, and culture are of this nature. It
must be concluded, however, that UNESCO's
severe management problems diminish the con-
structive results that these programs could make if
the Organization were effectively managed.
A number of other programs, particularly in
communications, human rights, education for
"peace and understanding," and "peace and
disarmament," clearly work against U.S. interests.
Still another group of programs involve support for
theoretical studies and for unnecessary, costly, and
duplicative activities that divert resources from real
its intentions three years ago and that the absence of
any UNESCO response led to the decision to with-
draw.
In fact, the United States served notice of its in-
tention to withdraw after UNESCO had adopted the
basic elements of a six-year program (with the United
States joining in a consensus in its favor) and after it
had voted funds for the implementation of that
program during the next two years. It is difficult to
see what major changes the United States could hope
to achieve in this program in the immediate future if
the U.S. is not actively involved as a member in press-
ing for such changes.
do not support the U.S. decision to withdraw.
and pressing needs. These programs are supported
by what has come to be an automatic majority in
UNESCO-a majority that is opposed to Western
ideas on personal freedom, human rights, free-
market economics, and the role of the state in its
citizens' affairs; and negative toward the need for
budget restraint. Given UNESCO's grave institu-
tional malfunctions and its other problems in both
the program and managerial areas, it would require
major, significant, structural reform to bring
UNESCO into line with U.S. interests.
It is not clear on what evidence these conclusions
were based, because the agency and departmental
submissions, subsequently released to Congress in
mid-1984 apparently indicate opposite conclusions.
In May 1984, a State Department official indicated
that not one of the 83 U.S. embassies and consulates
responding recommended withdrawal.
For example, the National Science Foundation,
which coordinated the responses of seven scientific
and technical agencies, concluded:
The weight of tangible benefits over certain
impediments clearly justifies continued U.S.
participation in UNESCO. Many of the science
projects sponsored by UNESCO bring contri-
butions and unique benefits to the U.S. scien-
tific research effort and also promote selected
U.S. foreign policy goals including development
assistance.
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UNESCO provides a unique forum for inter-
national cooperative scientific research and data
exchanges and gives access to important scien-
tific research, data, expertise and resources....
despite UNESCO's obvious management short-
comings, it plays an important role in providing a
broad range of scientific services and information
to developing and industrialized nations. There is
no other obvious organization which could assume
this role.
The U.S. Department of Education concluded
that in the event of withdrawal:
...the U.S. would lose the influence it now
undoubtedly has on the UNESCO education
program, the drawbacks notwithstanding. In
spite of the problems, the U.S. exerts as much
or more influence in education than any other
nation, certainly more than the Soviet Union. We
would lose important ground in the significant
areas of intergovernmental meetings, normative
instruments, UNESCO administration and
American staff in headquarters and field positions.
The U.S. would abandon the field to the Soviet
Union and radical Third World countries.... During
negotiations on what the U.S. considers funda-
mental, uncompromisable issues in education, the
U.S. usually prevails.
(Regarding possible alternatives) [t] he U.S.
does have educational interaction in some impor-
tant international bodies, notably the OECD and
the OAS.... (These) and any other regional fora are
necessarily limited in the nations involved and
would not compensate for the voids in education
that would occur by withdrawing from UNESCO.
Likewise, AID could in no way make up for
UNESCO educational development..., Neither the
present combined effort of higher education, nor
any conceivable increased activity could compen-
sate for diminished U.S. involvement in legitimate
world educational issues. UNESCO is increasingly
at the center of world educational concerns.
The Smithsonian Institution concluded:
It is essential that U.S. access to UNESCO be
maintained and that UNESCO's essential programs
not be crippled for want of U.S. financial support
and leadership. It must be realized that UNESCO
is a democratic international forum, however
imperfect, for which there exist no alternatives in
its subject fields. It replaces informal structures
destroyed forever by the modern world. Because
of this, UNESCO serves very real U.S. interests of
which preservation of cultural property is but one
important example, and one for which the Smith-
sonian is particularly suited to attest.
Without U.S. support, UNESCO will surely con-
tinue to exist and to play its vital role, albeit
without the most important constituent voice for
democratic processes. If the U.S. should remain
outside UNESCO, it could be vulnerable to the
charge that it was neglecting broad consideratinn
of international responsibility. ILLEGIB
5. Allies and other nations do not support withdrawal.
In a report, "U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO," a
February 1984 staff study of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, the
foreign reaction is summarized as follows:
Except for certain radical states hostile to the
United States; namely, Iran and Libya, who reput-
edly applauded the U.S. decision, the announce-
ment of the U.S. decision met with varying degrees
of official regret by several foreign delegations to
UNESCO....
Representatives of other Western and Third
World nations to UNESCO recognize the right of
the United States to withdraw from UNESCO,
acknowledge the serious problems plaguing that
institution and consider the U.S. decision a major
blow to UNESCO. In the latter regard, various
representatives consider the loss of U.N. intellec-
tual and political leadership a greater potential
problem than the loss of the U.S. financial con-
tribution.
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Several themes characterize the reaction of
representatives of a Latin American member and
African member of UNESCO and close observers
of the Third World. First, genuine surprise was
expressed at the U.S. decision because it was
believed the 1983 UNESCO General Conference
had substantially accommodated U.S. concerns
about the biennial budget and politicization. It
was pointed out that the general conference
reduced the 1984-85 UNESCO program budget by
$10 million following adoption of the Nordic
compromise and that a drafting and negotiating
group under the Third World leadership succeeded
in persuading governments to withdraw 10 conten-
tious resolutions and substantially amend some 2
other resolutions which were then adopted by con-
sensus. It was also believed that statements given
by the U.S. head of delegation and the U.S.
Ambassador to UNESCO at the conclusion of the
1983 General Conference signaled satisfaction with
the gains achieved and praise for the conference
results.
Second, there were references to the principle of
universality and the importance of continued
participation by member states in international
institutions such as UNESCO. One Representative
said the U.S. decision not only undermined that
principle but showed inconsistency of behavior
since the United States had always urged adherence
to the principle of universality on behalf of other
countries.
Third, the importance of U.S. intellectual con-
tributions to UNESCO was underscored and it was
made clear that the threat of losing U.S. support
for 25 percent of UNESCO's budget was of secon-
dary importance to the loss of U.S. intellectual
leadership in the organization.
Fourth, there is strong fear that a political
imbalance will occur in UNESCO if the United
States-one of the two global superpowers-with-
draws. Without the United States, who will
stand up to the Soviets? Smaller developing
countries can scarcely be expected to stand up
alone to and resist Soviet efforts in areas such as
peace and disarmament. I n this respect, it was
pointed out that the Third World is less interested
in disarmament studies, than in education.
A number of countries have expressed "under-
standing of the reasons" which led to the U.S. deci-
sion. Assistant Secretary Newell has cited this in
support of the U.S. decision. In fact, no country has
supported the U.S. action. The "understanding" in
some cases reflects agreement with some of the criti-
cisms the United States has expressed and, in other
cases, the diplomatic equivalent of "no comment."
Those countries which share U.S. criticisms have all
expressed the desire to work for reform from within.
This includes Britain, which has indicated concrete
reforms it deems necessary to secure continued
British support for membership in UNESCO. No
other country so far has voiced any plans for with-
drawal.
Privately, some representatives of UNESCO
national commissions from U.S. NATO allies have
indicated their great dismay at the U.S. decision,
believeing it flies in the face of significant change be-
gun at UNESCO by a number of nations, weakens the
forces for continuing change, and endangers recent
rapprochments between the West and the Third
World.
Specific comments by other countries include:
We eventually decided that the right course for the
United Kingdom, at least for the time being, was
to stay in UNESCO and fight for reform within.
Baroness Young, Minister of State
A few members argued for United Kingdom with-
drawal, but the clear majority of those that spoke
were in favor of our staying in on the grounds that
to leave would be to turn our back on an impor-
tant channel of communication and cooperation
with the developing countries.
Mr. Timothy Raison, Minister
for Overseas Development,
reporting on meeting held
with United Kingdom National
Commission for UNESCO,
December 1983
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France:
The spokesman for the Ministry of External Re-
lations was reported on December 29 to have said
that France was disappointed with the U.S. deci-
sion and hopes that the period of notice may be
used profitably to enable a decision to be reached
that is consistent with the principle of universality.
He added (that) UNESCO's spheres of activities are
so important that it is preferable for the values
affirmed by the Western countries and in particu-
lar, the United States, to remain present.
Canada:
Although we understand U.S. concerns we regret
their decision and we have no intention of follow-
ing suit. We shall continue to work within the
organization to bring about the changes we seek.
Canadian Government Spokesman
The Manchester Guardian has reported a cable
from the U.S. mission to UNESCO to the State
Department in which, according to this publicly
reported cable. the Israel Government argued
vehemently to the U.S. Government against U.S.
withdrawal. Israel representatives pointed out
that they will be put in the peculiar position of
perhaps having to follow suit and that this will
lead to delegitimization of the State of Israel in
other international fora. So exactly what the
Israel Government wants in international organiza-
tion this U.S. policy works against.
Congressman Jim Leach (R-Iowa)
in the House of Represenatives
May 9, 1984
The Commission regrets that at this critical time in
the search for world peace the United States
should announce its intention to withdraw from
UNESCO.
UNESCO provides the only continuing interna-
tional forum for the discussion of many world
issues.
For the United States to maintain a position of
intellectual isolation would be a world tragedy.
Australian National
Commission for UNESCO
...UNESCO is the only world wide co-operation
forum for experts in different fields of science and
culture....We all need UNESCO and I hope, there-
fore, that the activities of UNESCO, could as soon
as possible, again rest on a universal basis.
STAT M
The Netherlands:
r. Gustav Bjorkstrand
Minister of Science and Culture
The Netherlan ...regrets e wit -
drawal of the United States. The last (22nd)
General Conference of UNESCO...has proceeded,
in the opinion of the government, in a reasonably
positive and calm atmosphere. Notably, no serious
clashes concerning the media and human rights
issues did occur during that conference. Further-
more, as withdrawal could have negative effects
on the future course of UNESCO and the function-
ing of the U.N. system in general, the Netherlands
have urged the U.S. Government not to withdraw.
Statement by the Netherlands Government
Malaysia:
Over such issues as UNESCO, the United States has
been at odds with the Third World....this is un-
fortunate because to my mind the United States
has always had a historic role and the capacity to
truly champion the interests of the Third World.
Dr. Mahathir Mohamed
Prime Minister of Malaysia
Organization of African Unity:
...It should be stressed that the great merit of
UNESCO stems from the fact that during its 38
years of existence, it succeeded in promoting
cultural dialogue, initiated discussions on scien-
tific developments which have enabled our
societies to train men and adapt themselves par-
ticularly to the revolution of the computer age.
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It is patent that in all these various fields, the
contribution of the United States of America
has been very significant. Its withdrawal from the
UNESCO would, in the medium term, deprive the
Second Plan and the activities of the Organiza-
The decision to withdraw can be revoked or
canceled at any time up to December 31, 1984.
During that period, the U.S. can also announce that
it is extending the minimum period of notice to a
date later than December 31, 1984, for example
until the end of 1985. That would allow the regular
meeting of the 23rd General Conference of UNESCO
to consider any recommendations from the Executive
Board or relevant resolutions from Member States.
That Conference, moreover, will be voting on the
next Program and Budget (for 1986-1987).
The Administration has appointed a panel of
experts from the academic, media, and corporate
communities to advise the Secretary of State on
changes occurring in UNESCO over the remainder of
1984. This Monitoring Panel was the result of wishes
expressed by President Reagan in a December 23,
1983, memo to Secretary of State Shultz from
National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane.
McFarlane wrote:
The President wishes us to continue to expend
every effort to effect meaningful changes over
the next year to eliminate the suppression of
minority views and political diversions and restore
fiscal integrity. In pursuing the effort he wishes
you to consider significant upgrading of our
tion, of an essential element of dialogue and
stimulation.
Dr. Peter U. Onu
Secretary General a.i.
representation in UNESCO and appointment of a
panel consisting of senior representatives of the
academic community, the media and the corporate
world to advise us over the next year. He is
prepared to review the decision to withdraw should
concrete changes materialize.
On the other hand, Assistant Secretary of State
Gregory Newell at a December 29, 1983, briefing
noted:
...our feeling is that there is no conceivable way
that UNESCO could change its policies, its direc-
tion, its practices, such that we would be enticed
to remain as part of the organization. Having said
that, and stating that the elements of UNESCO are.
important to the United States in the development
area, should there be significant progress moving
away from politicization, number one, statist
approaches, number two, and reordering its house
managerially and fiscally, then we would be open
perhaps at the end of the year to look again to
make sure that the decision which the President
has made remains. But for the time being, it is our
conclusion that those changes are just not in the
offing.
7. U.S. evaluations of the 1983 Biennial UNESCO General Conference were generally positive.
In spite of her subsequent active advocacy for
U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO Jean
said, in a speech at the end of the General
We can take pride in the work and in many of
the accomplishments of this General Conference. It
has been marked, in many instances, by agreement
on issues about which such agreement has not
always been easy. More importantly, I believe...
that we have laid the groundwork here for greater
efficiency and effectiveness in UNESCO pro-
grammes.
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.. Head of the U.S. Delegation, Ambassador Edmund
P. ennelly who is an executive officer of Mobil Oil,
has i ed he went to the General Conference
expecting to support withdrawal. However, after
the conference, he remarked that:
...22nd General Conference was among the
least politicized and the most constructive from
tFe U.S. point o view in recent memory...the
personal balance sheet that I have tallied up shows
that the conference was a clear plus for the U.S.
A long-time critic of UNESCO, Leonard Sussman,
Executive Director of Freedom House and member of
the U.S. delegation, said:
I feet the conference generally showed that it
can be responsive to Western positions. If we
sever our ties, we would have still less chance of
influencing policy consistent with our objectives.
8. UNESCO has been no more politicized than other international organizations.
U. S. interests are generally well served by
UNESCO programs which are, for the most part,
non-political and which can most effectively be
pursued through international cooperation. This
is particularly the case in the sciences, where the
U.S. is active in inter-governmental bodies dealing
with oceanography, ecology, hydrology and
geology.
Report of the U.S. State Department
to the Congress, January 24, 1983
Because it is constituted by representatives of 161
governments, the UNESCO General Conference
inevitably is a forum for the expression of points of
view of representatives of governments; therefore, the
political situation of the world is inevitably reflected
at the General Conference. That is less true in the
programs and projects of UNESCO dealing with
substantive issues of education, science, and culture.
The UNESCO program and the allocation of
resources to it are proposed by the Director General.
Then they are reviewed and endorsed first by the
Executive Board and then by all members of the
General Conference with such changes as the Con-
ference decides to make. The great bulk of that
program and the studies, publications, and other
activities which it calls for have been endorsed by a
consensus procedure in recent years without a nega-
tive vote being cast by any member, including the
United States (except on a limited number of projects
during discussions in the Conference's commissions).
The issue of politicization usually arises in connec-
tion with some of the general policy resolutions or
the programs and resource allocations on which there
is not a consensus at the General Conference and a
vote must be taken. Like all broadly representative
deliberative bodies-the U.S. Congress not excepted
-UNESCO conferences cannot avoid political issues
even when dealing with technical matters.
Actually, the United States government has di-
rected its main objection to the insertion of
extraneous political issues that are raised by individ-
ual member states, thus recognizing that some politi-
cization is inevitable because of the heterogeneous
values and politics of the family of nations. What is
objectionable is the raising of political issues which
do not further UNESCO's purpose, which would
inject a tendentious bias in its program, or which
make it difficult to assure full and fair consideration
of legitimate issues.
An example of such an issue was the attempt led
by some Arab delegates a few years ago to deny
Israel's participation in certain UNESCO program
activities on the basis of disputable allegations con-
cerning Israel's behavior in the occupied territories.
Moreover, denying Israel's right to participate would
have violated the principle of universality in United
Nations bodies. But that attempt was eventually
defeated, due largely to the strong objections of the
United States, and it has not been repeated since.
However, an Administration official has also
accused UNESCO of 'Qoliticizing the South Africa
question." Since UNESCO is involved in promoting
respect for human rights, can the U.S. really object
when UNESCO sponsors studies critical of that
government's universally condemned apartheid
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policies? Would the U.S. object if the General Con-
ference could be persuaded to take a similar stance
regarding human rights violations by the Soviet Union
or Iran?
The real problem is the double standard which is
applied by the United Nations and some of the
specialized agencies in their consideration of human
rights violations. Whereas South Africa and a few
Western states are repeatedly cited for violations,
little or no public notice is taken of violations by the
Soviet Union, Eastern European, and other govern-
ments which are members of the majority voting bloc
in the UN.
Throughout the United Nations system, the United
States must be prepared to enter the international
arena of diverse interests and ideologies, to defend its
own values such as for a free press and democratic
rights, and to tolerate the inevitable disagreements
and divisions of the world system in which we must
advocate the values for which this nation stands.
Reviewing the State Department's charges of
"politicization" of UNESCO, the House Foreign,
Affairs Staff Report of February 1984 concluded:
In sum, the Department's conclusion that
UNESCO is "politicized" and acts against U.S.
interests because it spends $1 million on dis-
armament studies, entertains discussions and
adopts resolutions on people's rights, and provides
minimal support for refugee education seems to be
an attempt to denigrate the Organization's perfor-
mance on extraordinarily weak grounds. To be
sure, the United States and other interested states
should monitor these programs and seek to in-
fluence their direction in concert with other
interested states. However, if $2 million of
UNESCO programs are politicized out of a total
program of $186 million, it is difficult to sustain
the argument that "politicization" should serve as
a basis for immediate, unilateral withdrawal.
9. The "rights of peoples" need not detract from individual freedoms.
U.S. delegations have objected to the new formula-
tion of human rights in UNESCO. Some American
observers foresee in the forthcoming discussions of
"rights of peoples" at UNESCO a scrapping of sup-
port for individual rights in favor of collective rights.
(The term originated in the Organization of African
Unity, not the USSR, as some believe).
The term "rights of peoples" is not in itself objec-
tionable. In fact, it can and should be defined to
reflect the traditional concerns of the U.S.: for
example, the rights of peoples includes self-
deter-mination as American as Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen
Points. The rights of peoples should be combined
with individual rights, rather than reflect a
dichotomy.
The democratic countries have stood by the
Human Rights sections of the Helsinki Accords for
nine years. The Eastern Bloc nations have been dis-
comfited, but they remain in the fray. It would be
extremely shortsighted of America to withdraw from
efforts to further define and elaborate human rights.
The U.S. should seize the initiative and become a key
participant in that debate.
It should be noted that UNESCO has a long history
of concern for human rights. The United States
actually initiated UNESCO's Human Rights Com-
mittee, which has assisted victims of repression in the
Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc countries, Latin America,
and elsewhere. I n the 1983 U.S. State Department
Report to Congress, it was noted that the UNESCO
Special Committee on Human Rights:
...allows any individual or nongovernmental
organization with reliable knowledge of a viola-
tion of human rights within UNESCO's spheres
of competence to seek the Organization's assis-
tance in achieving a "friendly" solution. Its
procedures, which are confidential, are among the
most advanced in the international system, and
they have led to positive results in a number of
cases.
After carefully reviewing the specific proposals for
discussion of the rights of peoples in UNESCO, the
staff study of the U.S. House of Representative's
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Committee on Foreign Affairs summarized the issue
as follows:
Five points should be made in this regard.
First, debate on people's rights may be inevit-
able, as noted above, but such a debate does not
necessarily diminish the legitimacy of individual
human rights. In this respect, the U.S. position
would be stronger diplomatically if it would
ratify the various international human rights
conventions pending in the Senate. Second, the
whole issue of people's rights and human rights
and the long term implications they raise for U.S.
foreign _poliy in a l uralis zmplex, interdeoenj
dent world deserves considerably more attention
than mere opposition to peoples' rights. Otherwise
how can the United States an its estern allies
manage and influence the debate and its outcome?
Third, U.S. categorical opposition to people's
rights and support for individual human rights runs
the risk of denying our own recognition of certain
group rights such as the right of self-determination.
Fourth, the U.S. Government should consult with
Western allies and other like-minded governments
to formulate strategies for managing proposals
regarding people's rights in UNESCO, as they will
continue to be made. Fifth, the United States
helped establish UNESCO's human rights section
and had encouraged international conferences and
programs on the teaching of human rights that
American and foreign educators have found to be
quite valuable. Yet the U.S. decision to withdraw
appears not to have accounted for this and other
benefits. In sum, and particularly in view of the
U.S. nonratification of most of the international
human rights conventions that exalt individual
rights,. U.S. objection to UNESCO's discussion of
peoples' rights seems an insufficient basis for a
decision to withdraw from the Organization. It
also obscures the fact that the United States has
been able to use the UNESCO forum to promote
U.S. interests in human rights.
10. UNESCO itself does not advocate a "statist" approach to issues.
UNESCO does not advocate a "statist" philosophy
that nations should direct, control, or determine the
educational and cultural development of their people.
Its program provides educational materials and train-
ing for teachers regardless of the system used by the
member countries. It is in the nature of international
organizations to comprise countries with different
viewpoints and systems of government. That is the
main reason for their existence. The point of an
international body like UNESCO is to provide a
forum where differences of attitude and outlook can
be reconciled amicably and constructive policies can
be hammered out.
While the membership of UNESCO reflects every
political tendency and idology, the majority of
UNESCO members are from the Third World whose
governments operate the national school system from
a national department of ministry of education in-
stead of local school boards. Many of those countries
also administer cultural matters from a national
ministry. Only a few Western countries have a tradi-
tion of locally administered schools and private
sponsorship of the arts. School systems are nation-
ally administered in most European countries, but it
does not follow that their governments use them to
carry out a "statist" philosophy, as is the case in the
USSR and other similar regimes.
11. The USSR does not exercise inordinate control of UNESCO programs.
The USSR, with 26 posts, has less than one-third 40 percent of all professional staff originate from
the number of professional UNESCO staff positions Western Europe and North America, only eight per-
held by the United States, and less than France (54), cent have come from Eastern Bloc countries.
West Germany (31), and Japan (27). While almost
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The Soviet Union plays the same aggressive role in
UNESCO that it plays in other UN bodies. Many
votes are taken by a process of log-rolling, as prevails
in the U.S. Congress. Thus, some African and Latin
American states are inclined to support Arab posi-
tions in Middle East questions (even when they have
little sympathy for them) because they want Arab
support in economic development or anti-colonial
issues. The major powers support both groups
whenever it suits their purpose. In so doing they
gain support for initiatives of their own, as well as
some immunity from attack on their own policies and
behavior. For instance, the Soviet Union's "peace
offensive" seeks to capitalize on world public opinion
favoring disarmament, a theme included in some
UNESCO programs, and to gain some leverage against
the West.
By themselves, however, the Soviets cannot and do
not control or even come close to exerting a major
influence on the program. They may take advantage
of proposals made by others, when they can, to insert
ideas of their own. They also exert influence by
virtue of the much greater effort they have made, as
compared with the U.S., to send experienced and well
prepared delegates to the General Conference and to
propose competent people to the UNESCO Secre-
tariat.
The Soviet Union does attach importance to
UNESCO. A Soviet foreign affairs journal in 1982
stated :
The useful work done by UNESCO is well
known and much valued in the Soviet Union.
Taking part in this work are dozens of Soviet
ministries and organizations and hundreds of
people *working in the field of culture, education
and science. This work in the Soviet Union is co-
ordinated by a special interdepartmental body, the
USSR Commission for UNESCO, on which serve
some 70 high ranking representatives of ministries,
agencies and scientific institutions and public
organizations.
The Soviet Union joined UNESCO well after it
began and soon learned how to act effectively there.
At about the same time, the U.S. began losing inter-
est. The USSR has steadily enlarged its National
Commission for UNESCO, while the U.S. has reduced
the U.S. Commission's effectiveness by steadily cut-
ting its staff support and budget. The USSR Commis-
sion plays an active role in formulating and carrying
out Soviet policies through UNESCO. The U.S.
Commission is generally ignored by American
officials. The USSR has enlarged its staff support at
UNESCO/Paris. The U.S. has a small staff there and
rotates them frequently before they can provide con-
sistent counsel and service. Most important, Moscow
recognizes that UNESCO is a useful forum for dis-
cussing those issues of most direct concern to the
entire developing world. The U.S., at UNESCO,
seems far less concerned with these matters.
In addition to defending the physical security of
the United States, it is important for us to defend and
advocate American beliefs and values in international
forums. A heavy Soviet commitment of resources to
UNESCO requires the commitment of U.S. resources
adequate to stand up to the country's adversaries-
not unilateral intellectual disarmament.
12. Disarmament studies in UNESCO constitute a small proportion of programs.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff
comments:
In fact, UNESCO's budget allocation for the
education sector is about $135.7 million or 37
percent of its 1984-85 regular budget. In what
sense are educational programs politicized when
disarmament studies cost only $1 million or less
than one percent of the entire program? One of
UNESCO's most important programs is eradica-
tion of illiteracy for which the 1984-85 approved
program budget authorized about $15 million.
This program could have long-term effects on
improving the capability of an electorate to vote
more intelligently in elections, a long-term polit-
ical effect. Staff recommends that the United
States and other interested states carefully monitor
14
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these disarmament studies and take appropriate.
? -action to insure that they reflect Western views
as well as the view of others. The United States
might also encourage UNESCO members to refer
the preparation of those studies to the UN Insti-
tute of Disarmament in an effort to achieve budget
reductions when necessary. However, to attribute
politicization to UNESCO as a failure in its perfor-
mance because of the $1 million cost of the
13. Israel is not being attacked in UNESCO.
Every UN forum has been used by some Arab
states to attack Israeli policies. Such attacks have in
fact diminished lately, due largely to the strong
opposition of the United States and other Western
countries. It should be remembered, however, that
the debate seeking to equate "Zionism with racism"
occurred in the United Nations and not at UNESCO.
The United States cannot prevent such attacks, but
it has blocked proposals that would have led to
actions harmful to Israel, such as denying that
country the right to participate in a UNESCO body.
Indeed, continued U.S. participation in UNESCO is
necessary to protect Israeli interests, as that govern-
ment has made clear to the U.S.
The U.S. Congress has authorized the State Depart-
ment to suspend its participation in UNESCO and
withhold payment of its assessed contribution if any
illegal action is taken against Israel. Congressman
James Leach noted on March 8, 1984:
In the case of the Israeli question, Assistant
Secretary of State Gregory Newell acknowledged
at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Organizations on Febru-
ary 7, 1984, that the Israeli question was not a
problem for the U.S. and that this particular con-
cern was not a reason for the U.S. withdrawal. In
a report to Congress in February 1983 (required
under section 108 of P.L. 97-241) the Administra-
tion stated that while there have been a number-of
unacceptable resolutions on the Middle East
questions, the worst excesses have been avoided.
It further said that efforts to deny Israel her right
to participate, such as had taken place in the
IAEA, have not prospered in recent years in
UNESCO. Why? Largely, the report explains,
because of the "forceful presentation of U.S. Gov-
ernment views, skillful diplomatic intervention by
the Director general, and help of moderates in the
Group of 77." Clearly, on this major issue, the
U.S. has forcefully presented its case and success-
fully carried the day. It is unclear to me how the
United States can actively defend our own inter-
ests, let alone the right of Israel to participate in
UNESCO, from an empty chair.
Assistant Secretary of State Newell in a briefing on
December 29, 1983, was asked, "You didn't mention
Israel in this list of problems. That has been a prob-
lem, has it not, in UNESCO?" He replied, "It hasn't
of recent months. UNESCO has behaved well on that
question."
U.S. Ambassador Edmund Hennelly, Head of the
U.S. Delegation to the Biennial UNESCO General
Conference in November 1983, commented: "...the
Conference was not politicized, i.e., Israeli credentials
were not challenged. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was muted
or nonexistent."
program seems hardly sufficient justification for
U.S. withdrawal; especially when the U.S./
UNESCO policy review notes that "UNESCO's
work in the field of peace research and arms con-
trol and disarmament education has been of
significant value to American researchers and
teachers according to the consortium of Peace
Research Education and Development.
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t4. Services to the PLO and African liberation movements are small in scale and largely educational.
UNESCO does not provide support for terrorism;
however, UNESCO, like other UN bodies, has
accorded non-voting observer representation at its
meetings to groups such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), the African National Congress
(ANC), and the South West Africa Peoples Organiza-
tion (SWAPO). Both the ANC and SWAPO are recog-
nized by the Organization of African Unity as the
official representatives of the African peoples of
South Africa and Namibia. Some other UNESCO
services are also provided, consisting primarily of
supplying educational materials and training teachers
f_the school
systems which serve the children of
such groups. The UN, which administers the relief
program for Palestinian refugee camps, has designated
UNESCO to provide educational services for the
camps. Few would contend that helping to educate
Palestinian children contributes to terrorism.
The total allotted to all these movements from
assessed budgetary funds for teacher training, fellow-
ships, educational equipment and materials, teacher
salaries, travel funds, and tuition and fees have
averaged approximately $200,000 per year in the
three years 1981, 1982, and 1983.
Most support for these organizations is given
through the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP).
The State Department specifically charges
UNESCO is politicized by giving $350,000 per year
for PLO fellowships. Reviewing this charge, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff Report of
February 1984 states:
There can be little doubt that the seating of the
PLO as well as the issue of UNESCO budget alloca-
tions for PLO-related activities represent a highly
politicized matter which the United States has
strenuously opposed despite overwhelming
majority support in UNESCO. The 1974 General
Conference did seat the PLO as an observer and
recognized the right of other NLMs recognized by
the OAU to participate in the General Conference.
(The United Nations in 1974 also seated the PLO
as observers contrary to U.S. wishes, but
regrettably supported by the majority of U.N.
members.) However, Congress in both the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act and in the Foreign
Assistance Act prohibits U.S. contributions to the
United Nations for support of PLO activities in the
Secretariat or policy bodies of the United Nations.
Thus, the proportionate share of the U.S.-assessed
contribution to UNESCO for such programs is
annually deducted from the U.S. payment. Yet,
neither the Congress nor the Department of State
has yet found U.N. support of PLO activities a
sufficient reason.for withdrawing from the United
Nations or its specialized agencies.
15. UNESCO has taken no actions to end freedom of the press.
UNESCO has taken no action to control journalists
or to limit press freedom. However, justifiable con-
cerns have been aroused by proposals by the-Soviets
and a few others to misuse the New World Informa-
tion and Communications Order (NWICO). Actually,
NWICO was conceived by the developing countries
as a means of helping poor countries to expand their
mass media facilities in order to enable them to avoid
a total dependence on Western media and to com-
municate their own views more effectively. It has, of
course, provided a tempting vehicle for proposals by
the Soviets to limit press freedom.
UNESCO, however, has not approved or taken any
action on such proposals. The negotiations on com-
munications issues at the 1983 General Conference
generally favored the Western free press position.
There were 49 communications resolutions. Of these,
33, including those of the United States and its
friends, were not objectionable to free-press advo-
cates. Of the remaining 16, the worst, introduced by
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the Soviet Union and East Germany, were withdrawn
without ever reaching the floor. ' Moreover, for the
first time in a decade the Biennial Conference
approved programs to study the "watchdog" role of
the press, examine governmental censorship and treat
the controversial NWICO as an evolving process
rather than a set of regulations. Each of these pro-
grams represents a gain for supporters of a free press.
That is why the observer of the World Press Free-
dom Committee at the General Conference, Dana
Bullen, said: "If anyone is looking for an assault on
the media at this conference serious enough to justify
United States withdrawal, they won't find it." (New
York Times, Nov. 17, 1983)
Of all the resolutions adopted at UNESCO on in-
formation and communication, and of the statements
by the Director-General, none advocates licensing or
codes of conduct for journalists, much less censor-
ship. This was verified in a February 25, 1983, report
of the State Department to Congress, which stated,
"UNESCO to date has debated but not implemented
policies or procedures of an anti-free press nature."
It is commonly believed in the United States that
UNESCO plans or advocates licensing journalists.
This is not true. Indeed, one recommendation in the
Final Report of the International Commission for the
Study of Communications Problems stated, "All
countries should take steps to assure the admittance
of foreign correspondents and facilitate their collec-
tion and transmission of news."
The 1980 UNESCO resolution setting forth the
elements of a "new world information order" in-
cludes freedom of the press and information, the
freedom of journalists and all professionals in the
communication media, and removal of internal and
external obstacles to a free flow and a wider and
better balanced dissemination of information and
ideas.
U.S. newspapers repeatedly attack a "new world
information order" discussed at UNESCO. But news
reports and editorials rarely make clear that a "new
order" has never been defined formally at UNESCO,
that U.S. delegates of several administrations, includ-
ing the present one, have accepted the general term
without definition, and that last November the
General Conference stipulated that a "new informa-
tion order" is an evolving process, not an imposed set
of regulations intended to hamper the free flow of
information.
In fact, proposals threatening the free flow of
information, as independent journalists describe it,
have been repeatedly rejected at UNESCO. More-
over, at the last General Conference the U.S. Delega-
tion was instrumental in pushing through recom-
mendations to study the "watchdog" role of the press
and the effects of government censorship.
Commenting on the gains made on press freedom
at the 1982 UNESCO General Conference, Dana
Bullen, Executive Director of the World Press Free-
dom Committee, noted:
While plenty of loopholes for bad ideas remain,
a surprising number of improvements were
endorsed for UNESCO's Medium-Term Plan for
1984-89 during marathon negotiations at the 158-
nation organization's Extraordinary General Con-
ference that ended December 3.
James D. Phillips, former Director of the State
Department's Office of Communications and
UNESCO Affairs, said, "We went beyond damage
control and got some positive things in there. There
were some basic principles we couldn't compromise
on and we didn't."
Among the gains at the Paris conference, according
toPresstime, October 1982, were:
Recognition of the "watchdog" role of the
press against abuses of power.
Rephrasing of wording that called for inter-
national attention to the "content" of news.
Language recognizing that "censorship and
self-censorship" restrict freedom of information
Apparent ruling out of further consideration of
controversial items in "Part B" of the MacBride
Report [Presstime, June 1980, p. 14]
Deletion of a call for study of the "respective
responsibilities" of those involved in communica-
tion
Broadening a goal of building "national press
agencies" to support both "public or private press
agencies."
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16. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) has not been contralto UNESCO programs.
The NIEO is a UN and not a UNESCO declaration.
However, some UNESCO debates, publications, and
program activities are replete with references to that
declaration. As an organization committed to the
needs of underdeveloped countries, UNESCO cannot
avoid discussion of the declaration in the areas of
education, science, and technology.
Many Third World nations have been thrown into
economic depressions by the worldwide recession of
the 1980s and the lower and unstable prices on the
world market for the raw material commodities they
sell. Pressed by their citizens for better health
standards, education, and standards of living, these
younger nations seek guarantees of market stability,
high prices for their commodities, cheaper loans, and
more development assistance from the wealthier
nations. These ideas are reflected in the NIEO, but it
is important to note that the NIEO proposals have nom
I a force nor any implementing machinery. What needs to be taken seriously, however, is the
fact that the declaration does reflect the aspirations
of most developing countries in which the United
States has important economic and political interests.
At a time when the U.S. is running a massive deficit
iq its balance of trade, it must recognize that the
developing world already takes about one-third of its
exports and that the future expansion of its inter-
national trade must take place with developing
countries, since the European and other industrial
countries are now competitors. In expressing con-
cerns about the NIEO program, the U.S. should take
care not to do so in a manner which appears to deny
the development needs of the Third World.
Commenting on the NIEO issue, Walter Mertineit,
Vice President of the West German Commission for
UNESO, noted:
The U.S. allegation that UNESCO is ruled by a
coalition of Third World and Soviet-bloc countries
seeking to create a dictatorial economic and infor-
mation order has little basis in fact. The idea of a
new world economic order is an expression of
impatience on the part of the developing countries
with the ineffectiveness of international organiza-
tions in which they control a two-thirds majority
but nevertheless are unable to change the balance
of power. The weakness of the idea is that it occa-
sionally leads its proponents to aggressive rhetoric
and unrealistic draft resolutions.
Die Zeit, 1.6.84
17. No actions have been taken by UNESCO against U.S. corporations.
UNESCO has done no more than consider pro-
posals alleging the need for a Transnational Corporate
Responsibility Code. In this it is following in the
wake of the United Nations, which has been at work
on such a code over the past decade. In the'UN the
discussion began in an atmosphere of hostility to
American corporations, but the discussion has be-
come much more moderate and balanced of late, due
largely to the positions taken by the U.S. and most
other Western countries. U.S. delegations have made
clear that they will not feel bound to observe any
code, even a voluntary code, that is contrary to the
interests of the United States.
U.S. delegations have also opposed any UNESCO
activity in this field as beyond its competence and an
unnecessary duplication of work underway in the
United Nations and the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO), as well as of similar voluntary codes
already adopted by the Organization for economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
European Economic Community (EEC). A proposal
to bring UNESCO into the business of establishing a
code of conduct for international corporations was
gutted due to strong diplomatic U.S. activities at the
last General Conference. Continued participation in
UNESCO is needed to head off the elaboration of
any code harmful to U.S. interests.
18
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Americans are interested to see that corporations substances, and product integrity, but these matters
operate responsibly abroad where they are not guided are most properly the concern of other international
by U.S. law regarding workers' rights, hazardous organizations.
18. The United States is not underrepresented in the UNESCO professional staff.
In the UNESCO Secretariat, the United States
has the largest number of professional posts of
any nation (82 of 814 at the end of 1983). Although
the United States is only one of 161 member nations,
it holds more than eight percent of the professional
posts, plus 11 professional employees not subject to
professional quotas and 47 General Service employ-
ees. France is second with 54. Approximately five
times as many professional staff members originate
from North America and Western Europe as from the
Soviet bloc, and the West provides 63 percent of all
staff. The Soviet Union had only 36 professional
posts at the end of 1983.
For 11 of the first 12 years of UNESCO's exis-
tence, an American citizen held the post of Director-
General or Deputy Director-General of the organiza-
tion. Indeed, there has been a U.S. national in at
least one of the three-top ranking posts of Director-
General for 30 out of 38 years of UNESCO's history.
Currently, an American holds the post of Assistant
Director-General for Administration. Moreover, a
U.S. citizen served as the editor of The UNESCO
Courier for about 30 years prior to his retirement
in the late 1970s, and over the last 17 years, three
editors of the science journal Impact have been
Americans. Americans hold other important posts
within the organization. For example, recently a
U.S. citizen was appointed to UNESCO's Inter-
national Bureau of Education in Geneva.
The number of U.S. nationals on the UNESCO
staff (professional posts under the regular budget,
not posts on operational projects financed by volun-
tary funds) is slightly below what is known as the
"desirable rams." This is a recent development and
could be corrected by appointment of four or five
more Americans. The decline in U.S. nationals is
partly the result of the retirement of those recruited
in the 1947-1960 period.
More important may be the distribution of
Americans within the Secretariat by sector and by
grade of post, as well as by age (career development).
To assure a balanced distribution requires more staff
work by the State Department than has been avail-
able, as well as close monitoring of UNESCO recruit-
ment by the Permanent Delegation.
In light of the U.S. experience in the ILO, it is
likely that the U.S. withdrawal would lead to a
reduction of the American staff of UNESCO.
19. The UNESCO budget had a small increase this year and the U.S. contribution is only $25.8 million.
The budget has grown over time with inflation
and program growth, but is not far out of line
with other UN agencies. The 1984-85 biennial
budget approved by the General Conference last fall
totaled $374.4 million, or $187.2 million per year.
For the previous period, the annual budget was
$208.5 million. As these figures show, UNESCO's
new budget is smaller per annum than the preceding
one. The figures must be read with care; the nominal
budget does not coincide with real costs because part
of the entire global budget was intended as a reserve
against fluctuations in currency rates. Since the
dollar was strong against the French franc, members
have actually been given a rebate of $70,813,000, an
amount that is only about one-half of the total sur-
plus of the previous three-year budget period.
Annually, that amounts to a reduction of about
$23.6 million. Thus, the actual UNESCO budget for
that period was approximately $184.9 million a year
rather than the apparent $208.5 million. Since the
entire rebate has just become available, it has been
applied to reduce what members owe UNESCO as
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-their shares of the budget for the current year. For
the United States, an obligation of $46.8 million (25
percent of $187.2 million) is reduced by the rebate
and other reductions to an actual payment of $25
million. Last year, the U.S. paid twice as much under
the previous budget.
According to UNESCO sources, other UN agencies
have recently adopted budget increases larger than
UNESCO's-the International Labor Organization in-
creased by four percent, the World Health O E W
nijan-_.
tion by 12 percent., and the Food and Agriculture
Organization by 15 percent.. These figures compare
with UNESCO's real increase of 2.5 percent according
to UNESCO officials, or three to five percent accord-
ing to Assistant Secretary Newell.
Mr. Newell has confirmed, moreover, that the
actual U.S. assessment for the current fiscal year will
be $25.8 million, significantly less than in recent
years, owing to the rebate system, the strength of the
dollar, and the budget reduction negotiated by the
United States at the 1983 General Conference.
20. The UNESCO salary structure is high, like that of all international agencies and foreign missions.
Like other UN agencies, UNESCO professional
salaries are based on those prevailing in the best civil
service, which is the United States. To this base
salary, as in the U.S. Foreign Service, allowances are
added to compensate for the extra expense of school-
ing, maintaining more than one residence, home
leave, language instruction, etc. This practice, known
as the Noblemaire Principle, was established in 1920
by a study commission of the League of Nations.
Although there are aspects of this salary structure to
which the U.S. rightly objects, these objections apply
throughout the UN system; they are not peculiar to
UNESCO.
The total salaries of UNESCO staff constitute less
than one-half of the UNESCO budget, a proportion
which has been declining since the early 1970s when
it peaked at about 65 percent.
What should concern the U.S. more is the quality
of the UNESCO Secretariat, which appears to have
diminished in recent years. A major effort must be
made to strengthen its effectiveness by persuading the
Director-General to hire the most competent avail-
able applicants and turn aside pressure from some
member governments on behalf of less qualified
persons.
STAT
21. The proportion of staff in the Paris headquarters reflects the types of tasks performed by the
- lOrganization.
With approximately two-third s of its professional
and general staff located in Paris, UNESCO has less
concentration in its headquarters than the Inter-
national Labor Organization, World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), and the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU), each of which has
74-75 percent of staff located at central headquarters.
The U.S. would be pleased if UNESCO were to
allocate much more of its regular budget funds to
projects in Third World and other developing coun-
tries. Yet the United States has always taken the
position that, while UN agencies must have field
offices to handle their activities in member countries,
the bulk of funding for UN system technical assis-
tance programs in member countries-15-6-611d come
from voluntary contributions by governments and
not rof m_ assessed budgets. Otherwise, the U.S.
would 'be submitting to what amounts to a tax levied
by the large majority of recipient countries against
the minority of large contributors.
Moreover, while UNESCO does provide technical
assistance within its fields of competence to many
underdeveloped countries, it is not a development
agency as such. The bulk of its activities concerns all
of its members and is addressed to communities of
scholars, educators, scientists, and development
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- specialists in the world at large. As a result, most pretation, conferences and seminars, for which a
UNESCO activities require extensive multinational large central headquarters staff in Paris is a relevant
planning and execution, resulting in a focus on and legitimate allocation of resources.
publications, communications, foreign language inter-
22. According to a 1979 study, the proportion of UNESCO budget allocated to administration is not
inordinately high.
UNESCO is not itself a development agency;
rather, its mandate is to develop and to facilitate
international cooperation within its fields of compe-
tence. This requires a large headquarters staff to
handle interpretation and translation into six official
languages, to print its many publications, and to
service its General Conferences and other meetings.
Programs and projects are not self-executing.
Following an extensive study of UNESCO plans
and budgets, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) presented a report to Congress dated Sep-
tember 14, 1979, entitled "UNESCO Programming
and Budgeting Need Greater U.S. Attention." In the
report, the Comptroller General of the United States
gave the following assessment:
Although UNESCO activities were not studied in
detail during that review, we regarded the manage-
ment procedures to be unique and forward-looking
compared to other UN agencies examined; and
further, as having the potential for improving the
effectiveness of U.S. participation in UNESCO and
in other international organizations as well.... After
closer study of UNESCO planning and budgeting
processes, we believe they are conceptually sound
and permit progress toward improved disclosure of
program aims and their financial implications for
member governments.
UNESCO operations are subject to the continuing
scrutiny of the UN Joint Inspection Unit and an
external auditor, the United Kingdom Comptroller
and Auditor General, neither of whom have ques-
tioned UNESCO procedures or management.
The UNESCO staff administers an extensive and
varied program of concrete operational activities. For
example, according to UNESCO sources, between
1979 and 1983 UNESCO carried out over a thousand
"operational projects" in nearly one hundred member
states, for which purpose it mustered nearly $400
million, to say nothing of the hundreds of other
projects which it helped to implement by providing
the services of experts and advisors or by acting as an
intermediary. These "projects" cover a multitude of
undertakings, ranging from educational planning and
reform in an African country to the restoration
of a Buddhist temple or the construction of an ocean-
ographic research vessel.
During the same period, UNESCO was involved in
campaigns which brought literacy to over 15 million
adults and young people not enrolled in schools. In
1980 alone it took part in the training of nearly
30,000 teachers.
Since 1978, UNESCO has raised more than $40
million for 29 international campaigns to safeguard
historic monuments and sites. Among these are
Venice, the Acropolis, the Plaza Vieja in Havana, the
island of Goree in Senegal, and Sri Lanka's "Cultural
Triangle." More than a billion dollars must be found
to complete these campaigns.
The organization spends nearly $30 million a year
on its international scientific programs, such as the
International Hydrological Program, the International
Geological Co-operation Program, or the Program on
Man and the Biosphere (MAB). The member states
contribute more than $500 million to these programs,
and over 20,000 scientists are taking part in them.
Every year, more than 4,000 researchers receive
training under UNESCO's auspices.
The U.S. General Accounting Office is conducting
a review of UNESCO management regarding person-
nel, budget, and administration at the request of
Congress and will make evaluations and recommenda-
tions later this year.
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.23. The U.S. has been successful in participating in UNESCO and accomplishing its goals there when it has
exerted strong leadership.
The delegation to the 22nd General Conference in
October-November 1983 secured a number of vic-
tories for U.S. positions. Ambassador Edmund P.
Hennelly, Head of the U.S. Delegation, has testified
that the conference was the least politicized in recent
memory, UNESCO's communications sector was
improved, an appropriate distinction was made be-
tween traditional human rights and the rights of
peoples, the proposed budget was reduced, a victory
was won on the issue of the transnational corpora-
tions' code of conduct, and the U.S. won election, in
secret ballots, to all five major committees for which
it was a candidate. (Among negatives, Ambassador
Hennelly listed the U.S. failure to secure further
reductions in the budget, and a lopsided vote in favor
of holding the 1985 General Conference in Bulgaria.)
Firm and forthright leadership can clearly pay off.
However, despite these victories, there has been a
decline in the quality of U.S. participation in
UNESCO over the past decade or more. Unlike the
delegations sent to represent the U.S. at earlier
General Conferences, in recent years more than one.
delegation has included no recognizable representa-
tive of U.S. scientific, cultural and educational com-
munities. It is not surprising that U.S. delegations
which excluded the best American expertise were
bewildered by the UNESCO program.
In general, U.S. delegations have included too
many persons being rewarded for domestic political
purposes and not enough delegates or alternates with
any understanding of, or interest in, the UNESCO
program. Moreover, they lacked experience in inter-
national conference procedures and, in that sense,
they were no match for the professional conference
experts fielded by many other delegations, such as
the Soviet Union.
John E. Fobes, former chairman of the U.S.
National Commission for UNESCO (1979-1981) and
a former UNESCO Deputy `Director-General (1971-
1977), commented on U.S. participation and noted:
UNESCO certainly has serious problems. Some
of those who have worked with that multifaceted
organization have given more thought to those
problems and to solutions than have the U.S.
Government and the news media, both of which
appear unwilling to bother to learn all the facts
or to give the necessary attention to remedial
action.
A number of other governments-north and
south, including our closest allies-are also con-
cerned about the health of UNESCO. They are
dismayed, however, that the U.S. does not ade-
quately consult and concert ideas and action with
them, failing to give time and effort and often
acting with apparent narrowness of vision.
The U.S. shares heavy responsibility for the
present state of affairs in UNESCO-its general
conference, executive board, secretariat and
national commissions. In fact, U.S. neglect of
these bodies and its low estimation of them have
engendered feelings among friendly governments
ranging from sadness to dismay and even anger.
The most powerful country in the world in educa-
tion, science, culture and communications has
failed to play its role fully and to exercise its
strengths in those areas.
What is crying for attention is the way in which
the U.S. participates in the organization, the way
in which it collaborates with other governments
and the ways in which we can help to bring about
improvements in the organized intellectual and
cultural cooperation that. is so important to the
world-including the U.S.
Threats of withdrawal are simply poor excuses,
a copping out. What is needed is that we make
known our purposes and our readiness and willing-
ness to fulfill our responsibilities to the world
(while protecting our interests); that we state more
clearly what it is that we want changed and how
that could be brought about (not simply by reduc-
ing a budget), and that we convince others that we
are prepared to stick in, both for the battles and
for the constructive projects that are crying out for
our full participation.
Lawrence Finkelstein, a long time observer of
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UNESCO and Professor of Political Science at
Northern Illinois University, has commented:
...the United States has not used well the leader-
ship capabilities it still has, even in the changing
world environment. In UNESCO, for example, the
U.S. essentially stopped trying to be an effective
leader about thirty years ago. The result was that
others took over and it was only belatedly and
somewhat suddenly that we discovered about ten
years ago that being on the losing side could hurt
on matters of importance-primarily issues affect-
ing Israel and the questions about freedom of the
media and the new information order....
The experience of the last ten years or so in
UNESCO has been that when the United States
takes UNESCO seriously, identifies its objectives
clearly, organizes effectively both the govern-
mental and private sector participation it needs to
assert its views, and pursues well conceived tactics,
it can achieve what it needs. To argue from this
record that the U.S. interest is served by getting
out is to project a strange and harmful image of
the credibility of the United States as an inter-'
national actor.
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APPENDIX I
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
UNESCO AS OF DECEMBER 1983
Alliance for Environmental Education
American Home Economics Association
National Academy of Sciences
International Council of Fine Arts Deans
Association of Science Technology Centers
Consortium on Peace, Research, Education and
Development
Women's International League of Peace and Freedom
International Center of Photography
National Wildlife Federation
International Council of Monuments and Sites
American Psychological Association
American Association of Community and Junior
Colleges
One Hundred Black Men, Inc.
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
American Student Association
Association for Asian Studies
American Association of University Women
American Theatre Association
Council of Chief State School Officers
National Council of Jewish Women
National Education Association
American Library Association
American Anthropological Association
American Society of International Law
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.
American Political Science Association
American Women in Radio and TV, Inc.
Overseas Development Council
Institute of International Education
National Science Teachers Association
American Society for Engineering Education
National Association of Broadcasters
AFRICARE
Women's American ORT (Organization on the
Rehabilitation Through Training)
American Geological Institute
American Jewish Committee
National Council of Churches of Christ
Association of American Geographers
International Studies Association
American Council of Learned Societies
American Council on Education
ASPI RA of America, Inc.
League of Women Voters
American Association for the Advancement of
Science
American Economic Association
National Indian Education Association
International Reading Association
National Congress of Parents and Teachers
Freedom House
Social Science Research Council
National Council of Negro Women
Sierra Club
National Council for the Social Studies
American Sociological Association
National Council of La Raza
American Newspaper Publishers Association
American Society for Information Science
United Nations Association of the United States
World Wildlife Fund
Young Women's Christian Association
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APPENDIX 11
STATEMENTS REGARDING UNESCO BY U.S. SCIENCE, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL,
AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS
Scientific interests are responding, as in the past,
that the U.S. must not withdraw. The response from
the National Science Foundation review of the
Natural Science Sector activities cites eight inter-
national UNESCO science activities as "distinctly
beneficial" to the United States and notes, "No
projects harmful to U.S. interests are reported." The
report continues by listing seven major benefits U.S.
science derives from participation in UNESCO and
discusses the consequences of nonparticipation in the
Organization's Natural Science Sector as follows:
The withdrawal of the United States from
UNESCO science activities would lead to a signifi-
cant reduction in the direct access the U.S. scien-
tific. community now enjoys to important data
bases, localities, and scientific resources through-
out the world. Withdrawal from UNESCO
membership would result in a general decline in
the leadership position the U.S. now holds in inter-
national science and also contribute to the further
politicization of UNESCO in ways detrimental to
U.S. national interests.
Similarly, the Foreign Secretary of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS), responding to a State
Department query, reported:
Certain sciences, particularly those concerned
with the oceans, climate, the solid earth and the
biosphere, depend critically on international
cooperation. The assistance of governments is
frequently required for access to areas and data
needed by U.S. scientists working in these dis-
ciplines, and UNESCO is a forum in which such
cooperation by governments can be achieved.
There is much criticism leveled at UNESCO pro-
grams, structure and management, but, in the area
of the sciences at least, there is no real alternative
to UNESCO at the present time.
A third major organization, the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science, responded to
the U.S. UNESCO Commission as follows:
AAAS supports the conduct of the policy review
of UNESCO participation by the U.S. and urges
the interagency task force to make specific recom-
mendations to strengthen the U.S. voice in
UNESCO affairs. The U.S. should continue and
enhance its active participation in UNESCO
affairs.
A very long list of such statements on the need for
U.S. scientific participation in UNESCO has ap-
peared. The social science professional organizations,
less satisfied with the UNESCO program than the
natural sciences, emphasize that as a nation the U -"
must participate in UNESCO efforts. Given these
responses, it is obvious that suggestions that the U.S.
withdraw from UNESCO are not supported by the
scientific community.
Would reduction in commitment, in fact, improve
returns to the U.S. from continued involvement in
UNESCO? Again, the responses to the question are
unanimous in suggesting that improvement can be
made not by reducing the commitment but by
increasing it. Thus, the NSF report states:
The United States' negative attitude to its
commitments, responsibilities, and participation
within UNESCO hinders the achievement of U.S.
national objectives.
The NSF report concludes:
A stronger leadership role in the United States is
necessary to obtain maximal benefits from scien-
tific participation in UNESCO. A high levei
commitment to the central management and co-
ordination of all U.S. participation, coupled with
increased resources to support programs of U.S
priority and interest, are essential steps to be
taken to achieve national objectives within
UNESCO.
The Foreign Secretary of NAS summarized the
problem in his response by writing:
Without an appropriate and funded infrastruc-
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ture to manage our investment in UNESCO, frus-
tration is bound to continue.
For a change, a UN-related policy question seems
clearly answered. The real question is whether the
U.S. public and government can respond to the
answer.
Similarly, the Social Science Research Council has
commented:
UNESCO plays a unique role in providing oppor-
tunities for international contact among scientists
on methodological issues, and also practical current
problems in social, economic and political change.
UNESCO, or its functional equivalent, is needed to
improve the quality of our own social analytic
skills and our knowledge of problems and events in
other areas of the world. If UNESCO did not
exist, we would have to invent it.
....a marginally greater investment of time and
high quality people-not additional financial
support-would bring the United States a much
greater return on its investment.
Education and Culture:
U. S. educational and cultural associations have
generally agreed with the evaluation of the U.S. State
Department, as noted in its February 1983 report
to Congress, which stated:
U.S. interests are generally well-served by
UNESCO programs which are, for the most part,
non-political and which can most effectively be
pursued through international cooperation....The
education, social sciences and culture sectors also
produce some highly visible successes, such as the
preservation and restoration of the Abu Simbel
temples. The UNESCO-administered Universal
Copyright Convention is an important interna-
tional instrument which protects authors, pub-
lishers and other beneficiaries of copyrights.
(Report to the Congress Requested
in Sections 108 and 109 of Public
Law 97-241, February 24, 1983)
An official of the American Council on Education
notes about UNESCO education programs that:
[UNESCO] programs focus heavily on issues in
developing countries and are compatible with
much of the U.S. AID development work of the
United States....The work of the education sector
provides opportunities for American specialists and
academics to establish professional contacts with
colleagues that would be difficult to have other-
wise.
Similarly, in January 1984, the American Library
Association Council concluded that:
UNESCO's programs are vital to the inter-
national flow of publications and information, to
Universal Bibliographical Control, to international
copyright, to the world wide promotion of books,
libraries, publishing and literacy.... the American
Library Association deeply regrets the decision of
the President of the U.S., on recommendation of
the Secretary of State, to issue notice of the
intention of the United States to withdraw from
membership in UNESCO.
The Dean of the University of Pittsburgh School of
Library and Information Science testified to Congress
on March 15, 1984, that:
Over its 38 year history, UNESCO has promoted
a broad range of important, effective programs to
enhance access to information worldwide... creating
a world climate that supports, facilitates and
encourages the flow of essential scientific and
technical data across national boundaries.
The National Wildlife Federation contributed a
comment to the State Department Review of
UNESCO in Fall 1983, stating.
We would like to take this opportunity to
express our support for this country's participation
in UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program
(MAB). MAB is one of the few international con-
servation programs that combines ecological
research with practical applications .... This
country's active participation in MAB is crucial to
the success and effectiveness of the program. This
program deserves to be included among the highest
priorities of UNESCO activities.
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At , the same time, the National Educational
Association commented:
We urge the continuance of United States
participation in UNESCO. We believe that a means
can be found to improve the performance of
UNESCO functions without overt financial intimi-
dation of the institution and its Secretariat; we
hope for constructive U.S. effort toward that end.
We suggest the strengthening of the U.S. National
Commission to enable an increased flow of useful,
timely information to Commission members and,
through them, to the necessary constituency.
And the League of Women Voters noted:
The LWVUS supports the fundamental respon-
sibilities of UNESCO: to help in the advancement
and spread of knowledge; to give a vigorous im-
pulse to the development of education and the
spread of science; to work for knowledge and
mutual understanding among nations. The
LWVUS...urges that any reassessment of U.S.
policy options toward UNESCO focus on a
strategy of tough diplomacy on the one hand and
practical accommodation on the other.
The American Association of University Women
observed:
UNESCO is uniquely established and serves
quite well as a data base source on education for
women and girls, and is improving in its role as an
information clearinghouse and transmittal library
as well as catalyst for developing of social science
research on women.
It has 'been beneficial to the world's women and
U.S. women to have the immediate past and cur-
rent Ambassador to UNESCO be women. Their
advocacy of the importance of hiring women and
serving women's needs through sector programs has
a positive effect on the bureaucracy of UNESCO
which has been primarily male.
The Institute of International Education stated:
UNESCO and its activities are important to the
United States and to the Institute of International
Educatiion.... UNESCO's own goals in education
include equality of educational opportunity,
quality in curriculum and teaching methods, and
literacy, all of which correspond to our own....it
is better for the U.S. to participate in a forum
where conflicting policies and world views meet
than to be absent from such meetings.
The U.S./International Council on Monuments
and Sites commented:
UNESCO is a vital organization, having made
many significant and immeasurable contributions
to cultural heritage worldwide and to the U.S.
This is the only vehicle through which the U.S.
public sector can identify with the world family of
sovereign nations concerned with heritage.... Con-
tributions from the international community of
government and private sources have been chan-
neled to 27 international campaigns since the first
one at Nubia. These UNESCO missions and their
work are respected around the world for setting
high standards and for being of the highest pro-
fessional calibre. U.S. professionals have been
involved in a number of these campaigns.
Several national newspapers provided editorial
support initially for the decision of the Administra-
tion to withdraw; however, the American Newspaper
Publishers Association has commented:
U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO almost certainly
would encourage greater activity by totalitarian
governments which seek to restrict information
and press freedom both internationally and domes-
tically....
We feel that in order to continue strong U.S.
support for the principles of free expression, free-
dom of the press and the international free flow of
information, the U.S. should remain in UNESCO.
At the same time, we understand that American
policy in intergovernmental organizations must
serve the broad spectrum of national interests. If
U.S. policy evolves in such a way that it is advis-
able to withdraw from UNESCO, or to restrict our
financial participation in UNESCO, we believe such
action should be taken in concert with a number of
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other like-minded UNESCO member states. Uni-
lateral action by the U.S. without the support of
Wester ,allies could severely damage efforts within
UNESCO to advocate freedom of expression as a
fundamental human right.
Similarly, the President and Executive Committee
of Freedom House, an organization which has moni-
tored UNESCO communications and press affairs, has
commented:
...the United States should not only continue
its full membership in UNESCO but expand and
intensify our participation in the affairs of the
organization. We address this to you because we
know that your Administration is undertaking an
extensive reassessment of the value of UNESCO to
this country while weighing our continued mem-
bership in that organization.
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STAT
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-? r v a V V V?, V i J V V I J, -?
SUBJECT: UNESCO Strategy
The President decided last December 23 that the United
States would withdraw from the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), effective at the
end of 1984.
Extensive efforts to reform UNESCO were generated by this
decision. To evaluate the extent to which significant and
permanent reforms might have been achieved during 1984, and to
analyze comments from relevant sources, the individuals listed
below are requested to serve on the International Political
Committee (IPC) that will address these issues. Should it be
necessary, the IPC will convey recommendations to the Special
Planning Group (SPG) for final disposition by the President.
The first meeting of the IPC, a preliminary discussion, will be
held November 9 at 2:00 p.m. in Under Secretary Armacost's
office, Room 7240, Main State. The participants will be
contacted concerning the specific agenda. Background materials
will be provided by the Department's Bureau of International
Organization Affairs (10). Membership of the IPC for this
purpose includes:
Chairman: Under Secretary Armacost
Members : Charles Wick - USIA
Ralph DeVries - White House Science Office
- CIA
Walter Raymond - NSC
Gregory Newell - State/IO
Ii/
Charles Hill:
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 2, 1984 Executive Registry
84- 9201/3
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TO NSC - Mr. Robert Kimmitt
 STAT
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FOREIGN MEDIA -- 26 March 1984
December 1983 Pg. 62-64
The Soviet Navy after Gorshkov
By Dr G. TILL
The art- le rriKipal Lertwer In she Drpn newt of Nlstory ed /wtemaNowd Afabs as the Recd Nand College
Gneww** -d YWttwg Leetwer it d w Dep.uiww of ww Studies at "W *8 College. La/w..
Even Soviet admirals do not live for ever and there
are plenty of signs that Admiral Sergei Gorshkov is
approaching the end of a long and distinguished
career. One of the relatively few successful naval
commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Gorshkov
became Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy in
1956. In that position, he supervised the transition of
the Navy from a large but essentially local force
primarily intended to assure the defence of Soviet
territory in its narrowest sense to a substantial blue-
water foroe capable of seriously contesting the US
Navy's mastery of the oceans. The Soviet Union is
now a global rather than a local superpower and
Sergei Gorshkov has made a vital contribution to that
most important of post-war developments. In 1976
Gorshkov presented his case in a book, The Sea
Power of the State. the second and even more interest-
ing edition of which appeared in 1979. (Sadly the 1979
English edition is a translation of the first edition.)
Such an unprecedented publication attracted enor-
mous interest in the West. Naval analysts fell over
themselves deciding whether it was advocacy or
announcement, -whether Gorshkov was urging the
unpersuaded to adopt` the naval policies he described
or was simply stating the Politburo's current and future
line. Quite a few analysts even saw the book as
Gorshkov's last will and testament and looked for
puffs of smoke coming from the chimneys of Moscow's
main naval headquarters which would signify Gorsh-
kov's going out to pasture. As it turned out, such
obituaries were on the premature side, but this time it
really does seem to be true. The analysts have even
decided Gorshkov's most likely successor, namely
Admiral Vladimir N. Chernavin, already Chief of the
Main Naval Staff and a FirstiDeputy Commander of
the Soviet Navy. A submariner who commanded the
Northern Fleet for four years, Chernavin is a candidate
member of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party and notably sec v doctrinally.
But?the really interesting--thing about the-process of
succession seems to',el old mauls hiving to be
persuaded "i6b ? d 1sd, and';go. `In= an
exceptionallyperrepsdve !persuasive recent article
in the USNarot1n*ft It i e+ dtgg Itobcn C Suggs
theoretical,isppttt~,? 7',tet naval
as*
digest Morskot orlrl t -er 'the past` year or so
signified a substantial quack on` Gorshkov's views
and should best be seen as part of an orchestrated
attempt to replace him. Put briefly, Vice Admiral K.
Stalbo (for long considered to be a Gorshkov man)
wrote a couple of (to Westerners) deeply obscure
articles on the development and employment of a
navy in the April and May 1981 editions of Morskoi
Sbornik. These articles have been subjected to quite
unprecedented criticism occasionally bordering on the
abusive. Significantly, Admiral Chcrnavin was one of
the critics. Suggs also pointed to recent shifts at the
very top of the naval hierarchy in support of his
proposition that an era was ending. The thesis also
fits in with persistent rumours that all has not been
well between Admiral Gorshkov and his Defence
Minister Marshal Dmitri Ustinov. If so, it may well
be that Ustinov will be able to use the extra leverage
that Brezhnev's replacement by Yuri Andropov has
probably given him finally to dispose of Gorshkov.
New policies for the future?
If it is really true that Gorshkov's career is ending
in some disfavour, then this raises the fascinating and
important possibility that what is at issue'is not just
the man but the policy he represents. If this, in turn,
is true it seems reasonable to expect the new man to
have new policies and that the Soviet Navy of the
future will take new directions that we currently do
not anticipate-an unnerving prospect for naval
analysts and writers of recent books, myself included.'
Two arguments nevertheless support this proposi-
tion. One emerges from the nature of the criticism of
Stalbo's ideas which Suggs so admirably explains.
Amongst other things, Stalbo was taken to task for
violating probably the Soviet Union's most cherished
principle in military theory, namely that of the unity
of forces. Stalbo was said to be wrong to imagine that
naval theory was independent from military science as
a whole and paid-too little attention to the determining
influence of-Marxist-Leninist ?philosophy.,In.Soviet
terms. these are very severe- criticisms indeed and
historically they have often been used, as arguments
against the - idea- that, the, Navy, coWd.?,aad>,&ould
develop "independent missions". In particular, Navy
people from time.to time have *o be, diseiplined.against
t yingito develop a gneatescapacity to:eoaa+otutnd use.
the sea? than.the-iSoviettaauthorities i*=?''either
intrinsically .valid or' strategically necessary for the
interests of the state. Some Soviet Navy people, in
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