CURRENT STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000800100036-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: April 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800100036-7
SECREJJ1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 02526-84
26 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David B. Low
National Inteligence Officer at Large
SUBJECT: Current Status of the Iranian Nuclear Program
1. The 25 April UPI report greatly overestimates Iranian capability
to develop nuclear weapons in the near term. The report was probably
inspired by recent Iranian interest in resuming work on a nuclear power
reactor and a nuclear research center in Teheran that were neglected after
the Shah's overthrow.
2. Iran lacks the trained work force and facilities to produce
nuclear weapons and will need at least a decade to develop them.
3. Attached is a summary of the current status of the nuclear program
drafted by ONESA and OSWR.
4. A similar asssessment is being made available to Vice President
Bush through the PDB Staff in reponse to a request from his office.
David B. Low
Attachment:
As Stated
SECRET C-'
25X1
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SECRET)
26 April 1984
CURRENT STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Iran lacks the trained scientific workforce and facilities to produce
nuclear weapons, and will need at least a decade to develop them. Few of
the Islamic loyalists staffing the Nuclear Research Center in Teheran have
scientific training. The small, US-supplied reactor at the Center could
not produce enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon, even if facilities for
extracting the plutonium from spent nuclear fuel were available.
Although the Bushehr reactors are not optimal for producing weapons-
grade plutonium, material for bombs could be produced if one of the
reactors can be completed and operated. Additional facilities would be
necessary to separate the plutonium from the reactor spent fuel, and
diversion of plutonium in this way would be a violation of international
safeguards that apply to the reactor. The Iranians would also have to
develop the high explosive and other non-nuclear components of a nuclear
weapon.
Currently, Iran has little or no indigenous capability either to
complete the Bushehr reactors on her own or to reprocess spent fuel. Iran
has expressed interest in acquiring hot cells that could be useful for
research in areas related to reprocessing. Iran also has no indigenous
capabilty for enriching or processing uranium for use as nuclear reactor
fuel.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800100036-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800100036-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800100036-7