SPAIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATO
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86M00886R000800020020-3
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 18, 2008
Sequence Number:
20
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 31, 1984
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 83.77 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800020020-3
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC No. 03189-84
31 May 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Milton Kovner
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe
SUBJECT: Spain, the European Community, and NATO
1. Failure of the EC Summit (25-26 June) to resolve its financial
crisis will not only have implications for the future of European economic
integration, but for Allied security interests as well. The absorption of
European leaders with the British demand for wide-ranging budget reform will
make highly unlikely the completion of enlargement negotiations with Spain
this fall -- a time frame which the Socialist government in Madrid believes
necessary to permit full accession prior to the 1986 general elections.
Prime Minister Gonzalez and other Spanish officials have made it clear that
early accession to the European Community will be a sine qua non for Spain's
fuller integration into NATO's military wing, and that exclusion from
"Europe" could affect Spain's continued association with the Alliance.
2. Moreover, both Madrid and Brussels face concerns of their own in
moving ahead with enlargement. Spain will either have to accept most of the
Community's severe limits on Spanish agriculture and fisheries, thereby
reducing the apparent benefits of membership, or consider slipping the
September deadline to permit a longer bargaining process at the risk of
stengthening anti-EC -- and anti-NATO -- sentiment at home. At the same
time, Community experts are beginning to realize that accession will only
deepen the long-term EC budget crisis, and the Community will have to raise
revenues far above what is now being discussed to cover the additional
financial burden that Spanish and Portuguese membership will entail.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800020020-3 =---
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800020020-3
3. In light of these complications to early accession, we think
that Gonzalez will have to weigh very carefully whether it is prudent for
him to retain the connection between the 1986 target date for EC
membership and membership in NATO or, in light of current realities, seek
to sever it. The issue may he unavoidable at the Socialist Party (PSOE)
Congress this December, if no substantial progress on accession is
registered by then. The Party remains generally hostile to Spanish
participation, and anti-NATO demonstrations are on the rise with some
local PSOE participation. Gonzalez, you will recall, is committed to a
public referendum on Spain and NATO, a step he hopes to delay until
1985.
4. While the March 1984 NIE on Spain and NATO appropriately noted
that Gonzalez would be able to elicit party and public approval for NATO,
provided a tentative date for EC accession was apparent, we are now less
sanguine that accession negotiations can be completed in time to
accomplish this objective. And we continue to believe that Gonzalez will
be reluctant to commit Spain to the defense of a Europe from which it
could be economically excluded. If enlargement negotiations falter, as
we suspect they will, we will review this issue this Fall, perhaps in a
Memorandum to Holders.
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800020020-3