LETTER TO JOHN DAVIS LODGE FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000700080030-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: May 17, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700080030-7
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
NOTE FOR: DCI
Attached for your signature is a
proposed response to a recent letter from
Ambassador Lodge commenting on the extent
of Soviet influence on Syrian actions and
policy.
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700080030-7
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Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
NOTE FOR: DDI
14 May 1984
In a recent letter to the DCI,
Ambassador Lodge raised some questions
about the Soviet-Syrian relationship
after reading a piece by Brian McCauley.
NESA has prepared a draft reply to
Ambassador Lodge for Mr. Casey's signature.
The reply, I am assured, was coordinated
with SOYA.
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700080030-7
Central Intelligence Agency
The Honorable John Davis Lodge
American Ambassador
Bern, Switzerland
In response to your comments on the
client state Syria exercises a significant degree of
independence from its Soviet patron, lust as our
DDI-02881/84
17 MAY 19
Intelligence Memorandum, we believe that as a
friends in the region do.
The Soviet supply of arms to Syria does not
translate into control over President Assad's foreign
policy. Assad realizes that the Soviets have few
friends in the region and believes that they need him
as much as he needs them. Although Soviet concerns do
influence Syrian thinking in some instances, Damascus
pursues its major foreign policy goals independently,
confident that the flow of arms from the Soviet Union
Assad frequently has demonstrated his willingness
to act against Moscow's wishes when he thinks funda-
mental Syrian interests are at stake. The Syrians
intervened in Lebanon in 1976, sent troops to the
Jordanian border in 1980, and introduced SA-6 missiles
into the Bekaa Valley in 1981 either over Soviet
objections or without consulting the Soviets. Moscow,
in our view, is sometimes reluctant to challenge Syrian
policy for fear of antagonizing Damascus. The Soviets,
for example, almost certainly opposed the Syrian move
against PLO leader Arafat last year, but did not make a
will continue despite independent Syrian actions.
concerted effort to rein in the Syrians.
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SECRET
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SECRET
In many cases, of course, Syrian and Soviet
interests coincide. Assad shares with the Soviets the
fundamental goal of weakening US influence in the
region. Both sought to impede US attempts to broker a
settlement between the Lebanese factions and are
determined to prevent Jordan's King Hussein from
entering US-sponsored negotiations with Israel. Both
continue to oppose the Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon and hope to force the Israelis to withdraw.
Syrian and Soviet policy in these areas may be nearly
identical, and we can expect cooperation between them
in the future. Nonetheless, Assad has proven himself
quite prepared to ignore Soviet advice when he
disagrees with it.
Yours,
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
-2-
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700080030-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700080030-7