YOUR 5/27 REQUEST FOR MY COMMENTS ON A MEMO (SANITIZED) TO SAYRE STEVENS ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CIA AND PRIVATE SCHOLARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00985R000300080015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 31, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT:
25X1
it... as an institution, CIA is generally uninformed about r Raearch.. .
on the Soviet Union currently underway at
this country. "
only to scholars who specialize on the USSR but also and with even
more relevance to scholars who specialize on other parts of the world,
on foreign policy, and on international affairs in general):
DATE: 31 May 77
., Ps c c?u a
4 A4 cam/
Your 5/27 request for my comments on a memo
(from
ships between CIA
to Sayre Stevens) on relation-
and private scholars specializing
on the USSR -- requested comments follow
is RIGHT on the following points (AND his comments apply not
"Many academics work on subjects having low priority in our [CIA]
research program." BUT: "Several academics are deeply involved
in basic research on topics of present or potential interest [to CIA].
It would be quite worthwhile for our [CIA] analysts working, on simi-
lar problems to establish contact with these people and try to main-
tain a dialogue. " AND: "A number of senior academic Sovietologists,
while not current in Soviet affairs, have long experience in dealing
with the Soviets and in studying problems of the USSR. It would be
of considerable value to us, in my view, to take advantage of that
experience. and perspective... "
HOWEVER, virtually no academic people are willing to establish
25X1 "any kind of formal relationship to CIA," or to "consent to debrief-
ing
is WRONG, I believe, in thinking that any significant number of
these scholars would agree "to participate in Agency-sponsored seminars
and conferences on specific substantive topics." The key error here is
"Agency-sponsored. " BUT IF, as I contended in my Memo #4 to you
dated 3 May, the sponsorship could be neutralized across several rele-
vant government agencies including CIA, as a form of initial contact
that the CIA could later exploit in direct follow-ups on a gradual basis,
the results would be dramatically more successful.
3. The CIA would find it relatively more easy to establish useful contacts
with academic Sovietologists than with any other category of academic
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25X1 4.
specialists on foreign affairs, because:
-- Most academic Sovietologists (such as Alex Dallin, Roman Kolko-
wicz, Dick Staar, Jan Triska, etc.) are from Central and Eastern
European immigrant families, and grew up with strongly conserva-
tive anti-Soviet sentiments. Or, the younger professors were
trained under these senior professors, and acquired the perspec-
tives of their mentors.
-- Most of the senior academic Sovietologists, and many of the
Russian research centers on various campuses, have had a long
history of intimate ties (including the receipt of federal funding)
with U.S. government agencies, and therefore do not view this
as being quite so abhorent as do other categories of academic
specialists on foreign affairs. Moreover, many of these campus
Sovietologists and campus Russian research centers have been
starved for new !funding in recent years, and might be receptive
to new money from otherwise unattractive sources. Hungry folks
are typically a little less fussy about sources of support.
HOWEVER, it should be stressed that none of the conditions cited above
apply very closely to any other category of academic specialists in
foreign affairs, and therefore the CIA would find it far more difficult
to establish useful contacts on a direct basis with--for example--those
academic people who specialize on Africa, Asia, Latin America and
most parts of the Middle East.
Theo memo specifically notes that top admini =tors and professors
at the University of California (Berkeley), University of Washington, and
Stanford University are very "gun-shy" or "nervous" about "the dangers
of outside involvement with the Establishment"--particularly the CIA. He
is very correct. But the same problem exists at almost all other major
(and most less well known) schools. I could name a large number of
professors on almost any campus who would create a massive ruckus
if they knew of any significant CIA contacts on their campuses.
5. I commend (and whomever allowed him to do it) in the effort to
fan out across the nation searching out relevant academic people, in
contrast to the typical Washington agency effort confined to a few Eastern
schools. However,...
- - He passed up the South and Southwest.
-- He missed a number of relevant schools in the general Midwest,
such as the Universities of Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Notre
Dame, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Syracuse, etc., where there are some
very good Soviet specialists.
-- Even on the campuses that he covered, he missed a few relevant
people, such as Professor Robert Byrnes at Indiana--who is surely
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Nftvl V
one of the top Russian specialists on that Bloomington 'campus
(and a frequent lecturer on the war college circuit, etc. ).
Indeed, Bob Byrnes is one of the prime movers in Russian
studies in U. S. academic life since World War II.
He missed some pretty good Soviet specialists who do not happen
to be located on large well-known campuses. For example, I am
thinking of Professor Roger Hamburg at Indiana University's
small satellite campus in South Bend. Roger is not the greatest
or best-known Soviet specialist in U.S. academic life, but he's
not bad. He spent much of the summer of 1976 in the USSR,
talking with Arbatov and all the top people at the Institute for
USA Studies in the Soviet Academy in Moscow. He recently de-
clined an offer to join the faculty of Mike MccGwire's prestigious
Center for Naval Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax.
POINT TO REMEMBER: Not all the good people in academic
life are located on the big famous campuses.
6. MAIN' SUMMARY POINTS: My Memo #4 to you from Lexington,
dated 3 May 1977, argued that there is a huge canyon o#_ ~. Ort
and ill wjll (building for about the past 15 years) dividing the government
sectors and the academic sectors specializing in foreign policy and inter-
national affairs. Your reply to me of 12 May beautifully illustrated pre-
cisely this point, from the government side of the canyon, by stereotyp-
ing academic people as "silly sheep... irresponsible... lacking leadership...
needs spine, not more shirking." On the other hand, from the academic
side of the canyon, most government bureaucrats in the defense and
intelligence business are viewed as crypto-fascists who would like to
run their operations-as small elites with little regard for civil liberties,
public opinion, or the people at large. I happen to think that these gross
stereotypes are wrong in both directions, and injurious to the national
inter e st. I suggested one solution that I thought could significantly
improve the situation, but you did not like it. Thus, you will persist
with your own preferred solutions, and all I can add at this point is
that your highly negative stereotypes toward the academic community
will not help you very much in whatever solution you attempt. Good
luck!
-3-
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washinr~ton. n C.20505
12 May 1977
I have just received your compendium of
memoranda. I am sorry that I can't possibly do.
them justice. There's more reading material than
I can attempt to absorb on top of the mandatory
daily workload.
On Memo #1, I understand yocfr professional
commitment, though I really don't 'see that as a
complete obstacle.
On Memo. #2, your politics, your professed lack
of diplomacy, and your reservations on the President
are understandable and acceptable. Your reservations
on me are particularly well taken. I appreciate them.
I know that my providing more complete
answers to the press and releasing unclas-
sified versions of our work are, and will be,
controversial. I have a strong personal
conviction that these are not only necessary
steps, but quite proper ones in an American
intelligence operation.
2 1I
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Your criticisms of my "bull in the
1
china shop" strategy are very well taken.
I do have a strong conviction and intuition
that: some very positive measures are needed
here quickly:
(1) setting a new tone of sensitivity
to the ethical issues;
(2) reorienting the entire intelligence
apparatus of the country from a
series of independent fiefdoms to
a coordinated effort.
On Memo #3. while I certainly don't profess to
understand academia, I do despai;.-when Vince Davises
and others who know that the current wave of anti-CIA
McCarthyism is'wrong, will not stand up and be counted.
I disagree strongly that nothing can be done to-change
this. I disagree strongly that if a few people like
yourself 'db?-stand up, that some impact cannot be made.
In my view, the academic community has demonstrated
irresponsible lack of leadership in the last decade.
The leaders have been sheep. By the same token, if a
few good leaders would stand up now, the rest of the
silly sheep would follow, even in a new pro-CIA direction.
The academic community needs spine, not more shirking.
Specifically, I would be ashamed to accept studies who
would not apply to the Patterson School just because you
had been to the CIA; ashamed to ask distinguished faculty
to lecture at the Patterson School if they might decline
because you had been to the CIA; ashamed to be the least
concerned about those who would not invite you to lecture
or not grant you funds if you had been at the CIA.
Where in the world does one stand up and be counted in
life if we are going to kowtow to people of such narrow
and unopen attitudes. Is this the kind of outlook that
academia stands for today in the United States? If so,
I despair for our future.
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On Memo #4, I can only say that your proposal
has lots of appeal, but the terms are simply too
high. I do have a very genuine desire to increase
understanding and participation with academia. There
is some limit on the price I can afford to pay, however.
in terms of my own personal involvement and commitment
to this important, but subsidiary objective. Your
terms, I believe, would require more of me than I can
possibly give. Beyond that, I simply will not be a
party to any program in which money from the CIA might
be funneled to some front organization such as the
White House, in order to pay for such an activity.
That is simply going backwards and asking for the same
kinds of problems that the CIA has come a cropper on
in days past. Either we are honest:, or we are not. Ht'
if you cannot accept CIA funding, I simply cannot take
the time to go find $100,000 and all the other.front
activities that would be needed.
Beyond all that, Vince, I am not persuaded that
a program such as you describe cannot be achieved und'.
CIA auspices. I am going to try, I will probably fail
as you would likely predict, but I will have a go at {;.
I look forward to seeing you on May 23rd. T t'h:i::
it would be best if we plan on your two-week's acti-
duty training only. From there on, I hope I can =-1 "
on you for advice and consultation as a friend, ;i1
possibly an occasional short-term consultant arr.anr;--
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%101 1ww
Many thanks for your forthrightness and all
the time you've taken on this project.
STANSFIELD TURNER
.Director
Dr. Vince Davis
Director
Patterson School of Diplomacy
and In_terpational Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506
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Internatio al Studies Assoc iation r- 30,3
University Center for International Studies ? University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260 ? Phone: [phone]
May 3, 1.9
f 1?J.f tti is > Sat A r stFfi:;U
MEMORANDUM #4
TO: Admiral Stan Turner, USN
OEOB Suite 347
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
FROM: Vince Davis
schxdl. a Or D uma
U (-Pat e so i Bower, SLM.& ] ?ri^
rhonc: r ,TS 2t-:7 f
RE: An alternative proposal to improve relationships between
the academic community and the governmental community
concerned with foreign affairs and international relations
Memorandum 44 here is the final in the series of memos that I have
written to you, over the past 72 hours, all. in response to your
cordial and flattering invitation expressed in. letters and most
recently in your offices last Tuesday, April 26, on the possibility
of my working with you in some manner for about a year starting.in
the summer of 1977.
Memoranda #1, #2 and #3 were written on my Patterson School letter-
head. Memorandum #4 is being written on my ISA presidential paper,
to help illustrate some points that I will make later on herein.
(Note that my year in office as ISA president expired in mid-March..)
1. A history of strained relations between academic people
and government people in the international affairs field
At the risk of telling you some things that you already
know, let me briefly trace some aspects of the history of
the relationship between the academic community and the U.S.
governmental community in the area of international affairs.
This relationship was strong and cordial as the United
States moved out of the World War II experience. Many pro-
fessors took leaves of absence from their campuses in order
to serve in the military or with the Department of State
VINCENT DAVIS, University of Kentucky, president; RICHARD N. ROSECRANCE, Cornell University, past-president;
HERBERT C. KELMAN, Harvard University, president-elect; AREND LIJPHART, University of Leiden (The Netherlands),
vice-president; DINA ZINNES, Indiana University, vice-president CARL BECK, University of Pittsburgh, executive director,
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5/3/77
Wage. 2
during the 1941-45 hostilities. After the war, most pro-,
fessors sp ciali_.zing in. foreign policy and interrto.t.ional.
affairs accepted the fact of the "cold war" relationsl-ip,
and willingly did research and. teaching in keeping with.
U.S. policy interests. Much of U.S. cold war strategic
thinking actually emerged from civilian. intellectuals
working as university faculty members or in related.
"think tanks" such as the RAND Corporation.
The launching of Sputnik I in October 1957 further
stimulated the ir_tellectua.l-academic-scholarly community
in civilian life to do more research and teaching consonant
with US, policy interests. The National Defense Education
Act (NMEA) was prompted by Sputnik I, and NDEA pouured. huge
sums into campus efforts. The major private foundations
such at, Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie added many more mil-
lions of dollars to support campus-based research which was
designed to support U.S. foreign policy in one way or another.
Most scholars in academic life, particularly those who
specialized in foreign policy and international' affairs
research, strongly supported the 1960 presidential candidacy
of John F. Kennedy, and dozens of those scholars soon.'went
to Washington to take positions in the Kennedy Administra-
tion. In the early 1960's, the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA) and the DOD Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
supported some of the best and most exciting new research.
underway by campus-based professors in foreign. policy and
international affairs.
In summary, the period of about 20 years, from about
1945 to about 1965, was marked by close, cordial and coopera-
tive links between U.S. government agencies and civilian
professors and other scholars- in the foreign policy and
international affairs categories.
But those close, cordial and cooperative ties began
to break down. in the mid-1960's. Indeed, some early signs
of strain. could be seen in the negative reactions by many
professors to President Kennedy's handling of theBay of
Pigs episode, the Berlin Wall crisis, and the Cuban missile
crisis. President Kennedy was still largely a hero to most
professors at the. time of his assassination in November 1963,
but some criticisms were growing.
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If the academic community had developed a few growing
criticisms of President Kennedy and U.S. foreign. 1policy as
of late 1963, the scholars were far less friendly toward
President Johnson. The reservations toward Johnson grew
quickly louder in connection with the Dominican Republic
operations in 1965, and the criticisms from the campuses
grew to a loud roar of outrage as the 'Vietnam War got
steadily larger in the late 1960's.
Other things happened in the late 196Oss that increased
the criticisms from the academic community toward Washington.
The International Education Act, with Congressman John Brade-
mas as the successful floor manager of the bill in the House,
was enacted with great enthusiasm from the campus cheering
sections. But the President did not fight for the bill, and
the legislation (although. technically still on the books to
this day) was never funded. For practical purposes, the Act
was a dead letter, thus marking the beginning of the end of
large-.scale federal support for research and teaching about
international affairs at American. universities and colleges.
Similarly, the famous "Project Camelot"--sponsored bit a
U.S. Army research entity--provoked great outrage in the
academic community, on the assumption that the university
scholars had been duped into serving as covert intellectual
spies to assist U.S. warmongering in the Third World. The
fall-out on campuses from Project Camelot produced new uni-
versity policies designed to strongly discourage if not actu.-
ally to prohibit professors from doing military-supportive
research, and certainly to prohibit any kind of secret re-
search? Ten years earlier, it was perfectly acceptable--
indeed, even fashionable--for young scholars to write doctoral
dissertations that had to be classified and kept in government
vaults? But, by about 1967-68, this was a strong taboo.
Scholars on campus were badly frustrated by the Vietnam.
War as of the 1968 elections, and relatively few professors
got enthusiastic about either candidate. Nixon was certainly
not attractive on many campuses. But. Nixon convened a meet-
ing in. the White House in. April 1.969, attended by about 3.5
very prominent scholars and scientists--a meeting that Nixon
said was intended to help heal the breach between government
on the one hand, and the scholarly-scientific community on
the other hand, in the area of international. affairs and
foreign policy.
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Nwe MEMO #4
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Page 4.
was one of the apriroximately 35 people invited to
attend that meetir __,, witty. Nixon iin the White- House in April
1969 (a`'ter I had written the Department of Defense chapter
in a review study sponsored by Johnson's White House and
the Ford Foundation, in the summer and fall of 1968). Some
of the others on hand at that An ril. 19F.9 meeting with Nixon
included Harold Brown and Albert Wohlstet.ter. gut nothing
ever came of that one-shot affair. Kissinger grew rapidly
in power, and Kissinger did not feel the need of significant
assistance from the academic community. Thus, throughout
the eight years of the Nixon-Ford period, the civilian
scholars in academic life who specialized in foreign. policy
and international affairs felt progressively more neglected
by government people.
Neo-isolationism was a part of the picture too. Ironic-
ally and paradoxically, even those scholars who argued for
more government attention toward domestic problems such, as
race relations and the environment--and who therefore were
themselves part of the neo-isolationist trend--grumbled
about the dwindling federal support for research and teach-
ing on foreign policy and international affairs.
The dwindling federal support for research and teaching
on foreign policy and international affairs was matched by
a turn-off of private support from the big foundations. As
a result, in the early and middle 1970's, the civilian, aca-
demic specialists in foreign policy and international affairs
research, and teaching found themselves with almost no sources
of support other than what their local universities and col-
leges could provide--at that very time when universities and
colleges were experiencing serious financial problems for
other reasons.
A few other things happened in. the late 1960's or
early 1970's that were initially encouraging to the academic
people on campus, but that turned sour.' For example, as part
of the fall-out from the Project Camelot episode of 1967,
Secretary of State Rusk was given, new authority by the Presi-
dent, and Rusk issued a tough new set of guidelines governing
virtually all (except CIA) government-sponsored contract
research in the social sciences dealing with foreign areas.
i_,usk gave the operational responsibility to an inter-?a.gency
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MEMO #4
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entity called the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group
(or FAR as it was called) , V, Lich had. been. in existence for
about three years already. Sixteen (16) U.S. government
agencies were represented on FAR, including the CIA and
many DOD components within the DOD representation. FAR
was chaired by George Denney of State, although most of
the work was actually done by E. Raymond Platig, Director
of the Office of External Research in the Bureau. of Intelli-
gence and Research at State. FAR began to produce a bi-
monthly newsletter, called "FAR Horizons," which appeared
first in January 1968.
FAR was intended to improve the quality and quantity
of government-sponsored research in foreign affairs, but
it never amounted to much. The participating agencies
were not very interested in cooperating, and the key people
at Stat:e were relatively ineffectual. In short, FAR failed
for many of the same reasons that Maxwell Taylor's "State-
prime" SIG/IRG syEtem failed. The big action in Washington
was not: at the State Department, and State lacked the clout
or will. to honcho this kind of thing.
Entering the bicentennial '76 election year, ther'efore',
the academic community engaged in foreign policy and inter-
national affairs research and teaching was a rather dis-
heartened and disspirited lot. Most of these scholars were
able to show some degree of enthusiasm for, the Carter candi-
dacy, but partly because very few of the scholars had ever
supported Republican candidates in any case, and certainly
not after the Watergate scandals. These people on campus
hoped that Mr. Carter was serious about being a president
of all.. the people, about taking a fresh new look at U.S.
foreign policy substance and organizational structures,
and about attracting fresh new talent from all over the
nation to work on foreign policy and international affairs
issues.
But now, some 100 days into the Carter presidency,
most of the academic specialists on foreign policy and
international. affairs are reverting to pessimism if not
cynicism. The appointment of Andy Young as Ambassador to
the United Nations has drawn loud applause, because it seems
to symbolize a fresh new U.S. policy response toward t le
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problems of the Third World. But the handling of the SALT
negotiations are getting mixed reviews in academic circles,
and mmmany (of the relatively few) Carter appointees In
foreign policy and international affairs jobs have not met
with great applause among interested professors. Strange
as it may,seem, many professors are emerging from their
dove-like posture of the Vietnam War period, and are becoming
more concerned about the growth of Soviet military capabil-
ities, but these professors see no clearcut Carter response.
Ideas on foreign aid and many other policy areas have not
been clearly enunciated, and academic specialists have not
been asked to help.
indeed, one criticism of Carter that can be heard on
many campuses from academic specialists in foreign. affairs
and international issues is that the President, after having
promised to seek fresh new talent, has largely appointed the
same old people who work or hang around. policy-oriented in-
stitutions within the Boston/Cambridge-to-Wash.ington corridor
along the East Coast.
Nevertheless, with appropriate strategies, the academic
specialists across the land in foreign policy and international
affairs fields want to believe in President Carter and want
to help. They may appear cynical, but cynicism is usually a
mask for idealism. They are not seeking government jobs--
indeed, few of them would accept government jobs, because
they are genuinely committed to their academic work. But,
if asked, they would help in other occasional formats.
In summary, then, the academic-scholarly-intellectual
specialists in foreign policy and international affairs
enjoyed a. close, cordial and cooperative relationship with
relevant U.S. government agencies from the end of World War II
to the early 1960's, but for. about the past 15 years this once-
warm relationship has been very strained to the point where
it is now virtually broken,, but with new possibilities because
of the Carter Administration for restoring it to something
approximating its earlier cordiality. It won't happen auto-
matically, but it could happen with the appropriate strategies.
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2. A proposed strategy for restoring government-scholar cordiality
First, the strategy must not aim for overnight victories.
A relationship that was broken over about 15 years may take
another 15 years to restore.
Second, the strategy must not be window-dressing. There
must be signs of gen.uin.e interest: and enthusiasm on. the part
of the government sector. The government, in a sense, must.
take the lead. in, the courtship.
Third., the strategy should work with relatively low-
visibility programs, not splashy efforts designed to attract
media attention.
Fourth., the programs within the strategy should be held
on relatively "n.eutral. turf," and should be neutralized in
other ways. The White House, for example, would qualify as
relatively neutral turf, but so would locations away from
Washington such as Wingspread (the Johnson Foundation confer-
ence center in .Racine) or similar places around the nation.
Further neutralization implies that State, Defense and the
intelligence community (or, for short, CIA here) should be
represented at most program events, but no one of tIie.~e
agencies should be the sponsor or host.
As one format that I feel. sure would be successful
(although other format devices are well worth considering,
for possible addition to this strategy), I propose a series
of "policy seminars" to be held at least monthly for about
a year as a trial run--or perhaps more often than monthly.
For simplification. here, let me call these "World Issues
Policy Seminars"--or the WIPS program.
Each. WIPS would focus on a specific and genuine policy
problem, such as (for example) "U.S. Policy Options and
Problems in the Marianas and Western. Pacific Basin." There
should be a structured but relatively f.exible agenda, fea-
turing perhaps two or three prepared papers circulated in
advance to all participants. Each WIPS should run for about
24 hours, perhaps beginning with a get-acquainted lunch on a
Friday, with continuous plenary sessions that afternoon, a
working dinner, an after-dinner session, followed by a Satur-
day morning session and a, wrap-up farewell. lunch.
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Each WIPS should include not more than about: 16 or 12,
people, which is roughly the maximum number that. could sit
around a single table and hold meaningful discussions -Lnder
a firm but friendly chairman. The participants should be
about equally divided between government and academic people,
as for example:
Government: 2 from the NSC
2 from Defense
2 from State
2 from the CIA
Academia: 8 research sch.olaxs/sci.entists
from a relevant mixture of
disciplines and backgrounds
Defense, State and the CIA are emphasized in the little
chart above, because the estrangement between the academic
sector and the government sector pertains most particularly
to these three federal bureaucracies--and most particularly
to the CIA. The great value of this kind of mixture on the
government side is that tie professor who has strongly un-
favorable views of any one of these three federal bureau-
cracies will not necessarily have similar views toward the
other two. For example, a professor who would under no cir-
cumstances accept a direct bilateral invitation-from the CIA
to meet at the CIA Building in Washington would almost surely
have no hesitation in accepting a "neutral" invitation (per-
haps from the White House) for a multilateral meeting where
CIA people would be merely some among various government
agency officials from different parts of government.
For some topics, the government sector representatives
at a WIPS event should include people from agencies other
than or in addition to the NSC, Defense, State and the CIA--
for example, from Treasury or Agriculture. But those other
agencies typically do not have the same severe relationship
problems with academia.
:Neverth.eless, a main point to stress here is the beauti-
ful flexibility of the WIPS format. For some topics, for
example, it might be very useful to have two or three corpora-
tion executives and/or labor leaders around the table, in
addition to the academic and government represen.tat:.ivves.
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Paa ;e 9
Indeed, I would. argue that it could be very useful to
have one or two "wild card" participants at each WIPS event---
for example, the dean of a good school of journalism, or a
leader in the League of Women Voters. The "wild card" people
would help "to keep the others honest," and to prevent the
discussions from becoming too narrowly specialized and tec}.-.,
nical. and inbred.
I would discourage inviting very mazy--if any--of the
non-campus research specialists who work for contract re-
search organizations such as RAND, because those people have
ample working contacts with most government agencies already.
Finally, a. "project manager" should, be chosen to manage
this overall. endeavor designed to restore mutual respect and.
cordiality between the government sector and the academic
sector in foreign policy and international. affairs fields.
Ideally, this person should come from academic life on a
one-year assignment on a leave of absence from his/her campus.
To use an academic person in this capacity would convey a
critically important symbolic message stressing the govern-
ment sector's commitment to improve relationships. 'Bixt, of.
course., it should be an academic person who, although friendly
toward the government and government people, has absolutely
no ambition to join. the government, and who would not attempt
to use this position as a springboard into a longer-range
government post.
If this project proved useful and successful after a
year, the first "project manager" could be succeeded by a
new person similarly invited to take on these responsibilities
for a year, on leave from a campus professorship. Obviously,
this project manager should be a person enjoying a very good
reputation and widespread. personal contacts throughout the
academic community.
The project should be headquartered on "neutral turf,"
which could be somewhere within the White House or in one
of the Executive Office Buildings nearby. Alternatively,
the arrangement could be set up on a contract basis with the
project manager, allowing him to use some wholly independent
office in midtown Washington working under his/her own name
or as a branch office of his/her home campus. But this
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.Page 10
independent office should not be at Brookings or at., any
of the university campus .s in Washington which already
have extremely close (maybe incestuous) ties with govern-
ment, and which therefore are not likely to appreciate the
main problem that we are addressing
here in the fir.st place.
The first-year budget for this project would be rela-
tively small, at least by Washington standards. I think
that the figure should not be over about $100,000, and maybe
well under this. The main costs would be good salaries for
two people, in. order to attract top talent. The two people
would be the "project manager" and an "executive secretary"
who would constitute the entire project staff. Each WIPS
event would include about eight (8) academic people, and we
can assume that about half of those would require travel
support covering airfares at an estimated average of $250
per person. All eight of the academic people would need
about $50 per diem each, covering a hotel. room and meals
for about 24 hours in Washington. Other miscellaneous costs
would probably result in a total layout of about $2,000 per
WIPS event. Assuming about twelve (12) WIPS events per year,
we can round off 12 x $2,000 to $25,000. A rough budget,
not counting office rental or office equipment and supplies,
would therefore resemble:
$55,000 --- Project manager's salary
20)000 -- Executive secretary's salary
25,000 -- WIPS costs (airfares, per diems, etc.)
$100,000 -- ROUGH TOTAL PER ONE YEAR
If invitations to the academic participants at the
WIPS events were issued on some kind of White House paper,
this would cut costs, because most professors can easily
get their own universities or'colleges to cover their costs
to travel to participate in a White House event. Otherwise,
the project would need to be able to cover more travel costs
for the academic participants.
In summary, this basic WIPS idea is very flexible, and
is susceptible to many variations. It can be scaled up, down,
backwards or sideways. However, if scaled up very much, this
would endanger the small-group informality that is desired,
and if scaled down. very much, this would jeopardize. the
intended cumulative monierntum.
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Page 1.1
Th.e ha Loal to be kept upper_r:-_ost in mind at all times
is that this project would be designed to improve cordial
working relation ships between. those government and. academic
sectors where reciprocal attitudes have become severely
strained if not broken over the past 15 years, and. this
means primarily the relationship between the NSC-State-
Defense-CIA network on the government side, and the scholarly
specialists on foreign policy and international affairs on
the academic side.
3. Corollary advantages to the government
The basic purpose of the proposed program is stated in
the paragraph immediately above. However, in addition to
this general goal, there are important corollary benefits
that could. accrue to the government side.
one i.mportnnt kind of spin-off advantage would be for
the participating government agency representatives to use
a WIPS event as an, opportunity informally to "audition"
professors whom an agency might wish to contact later on
for a more specific set of purposes.
Let us say, for example, that the CIA was interested in
getting better acquainted with some academic specialists on.
Subject X. A WIPS event could be scheduled to examine some
dimensions of Subject X, and a couple of top CIA people would
represent that agency at the WIPS. During lunch, dinner and
at other relaxed breaks in the schedule, the CIA people could
"mix and mingles' getting better acquainted with the academic
participants and establishing friendly first-name face-to-face
contacts. Then, several days later or at some point following
the WIPS, if the CIA people found that some one or two of the
participating professors were particularly stimulating and
insightful, the CIA people could place phone calls on a first-
name basis and invite those professors to a follow-up event
`
under Agency sponsorship. The contact would have already
been made on "neutral turf," and the follow-up phone calls
would appear very natural in the course of events. On the
other hand, if none of the professors appeared especially
relevant to CIA purposes and needs, no follow-ups would occur,
and there would be no wasted. time, money or embarrassment to
any parties concerned. The same "auditioning" function coulc?
be utilized by all participating government agencies at a Cal-J PS.
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Page 12
Some serious consequences of allowing the strained
government-academia relationship to continue
It is impossible to assure that U.S. foreign soli cy
would be "better" if there, were improved relationships
between the relevant a and interested government agencies
on. the one ihand., and the relevant academic specialists on
the other hand.
?owever, three basic functions performed by the
academic specialists can be identified, and the performance
of these functions on campus will work against the interests
of the U.S. government if the strained relationship is
allowed to continue.
The first major function performed by the academic
specialists is to teach the, citizens of tomorrow about
the nature of U.S. government and the nature of the world.
It may sound corny and trite, but the kids who sit in our
college and university classrooms are going to be the
business leaders and professional people tomorrow--trey
will be the voters who send representatives to Congress,
and who put pressure on those Congressmen. to do this or
do that:--the;r will be the people who respond to public
opinion polls, and help to shape public opinion in their
communities.
The views toward government and toward the world that
these students acquire while on campus can have a marked
impact on their behavior as adult citizens later on. In-
deed, 'keep in mind that--with the voting age at 18--most
college students are eligible voters while on campus.
Therefore, if the professors who teach the classes on
campus are cynical and disenchanted toward government,
and if the professors have a sense of despair about what
it is possible to do to improve the international system,
these attitudes of the professors will be transmitted to
the students. And if government leaders are indifferent
toward helping the professors toward a fuller understanding
of the problems of government, and a fuller understanding
of world issues, then the government leaders themselves
are contributing to widespread public cynicism and. misunder-
standing.
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1 can give you one example of this kind of serious
indifference on the part of government leaders. About ten
years ago 11 was having a conversation with. my o1..d friend
Tom Hughes, then the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research at the Department of State (with the rank of
Assistant Secretary then--he is now president of the Carnegie
Endowment headquartered in. Washington). Ton. was c.o :__)lain.ing
to me that none of the college textbooks on American foreign
policy really understood the problem. I challenged him by
replying, "This is a. serious allegation, Tom. If you are
right--and you may well be right--then join me in writing a
new textbook that will avoid the misunderstandings of the
existing textbooks. You have some responsibility in this
matter, if you seriously think that we professors are miss
educating whole generations of college students about a
matter as serious as American foreign policy." And he
snorted with contempt, "I don't really care what you teach
college kids." End of that conversation. But I regret to
say that Tom Hughes is not unique in this regard. Many go-
vernment-leaders allow themselves to become totally isolated
from the nation while they sit in Washington, and they become
quite indifferent toward what people know or think out in
the boondocks of America. The best recent example ?f the
problems which can arise when, government leaders make'this
mistake is the whole Vietnam War business from about 1968
to about 1973.
Bear in mind that the college and university professors
also teach the students who will go on to become 'high school
teachers, and bear in mind that most Americans terminate
their formal educations with a high school diploma. What do
these elementary and high school kids know about the world?
Here are a few startling results from a survey taken. by the
Department of HEW in 1974, from a national sample of students
in the 4th, 8th and 12th grades:
----- 40% of the 12th graders thought that Israel. was
an Arab country; I f`
50%.of the 12th graders could not correctly name
the Arab country from these choices: Egypt, Israel,
India and Mexico;
.Most of the. 8th graders though.t that Go1.da. Meir
rather than Answar Sadat was President of, Egypt.
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In another survey taken by my good friend Professor
Judy Torney at the University of Illinois in 1974, looking
at l_4.-year.-old students in. eight (8) different countries
including the U.S., the American students ranked near the
top in knowledge of local, state and national affairs, but
next to last in knowledge of world affairs.
Col.l.ege and university professors in the fields of
foreign policy and international affairs, in addition to
training the citizens and general public of the future,
also provide the specialized training for people who enter
government service. Virtually 100% of the staff members
at th.eNSC, at the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, and the CIA received their educations (often in-
eluding graduate degrees) from U.S. colleges and univer-
sities. These professors therefore provide the "raw material."
that the U.S, government recruits for the major agencies in-
volved in foreign policy and international affairs. There-
fore, if the professors have cynical. attitudes and misunder-
standings toward government and toward the world, the recruits
entering government careers will. not be ideal "rata material."
This, then, is the second major function performed on campus
that should be of interest to government people.
The third major function is research.. College and uni-
versity professors specializing in foreign policy and inter-
national affairs do a great deal. of research, writing articles
and. monographs and books that sometimes are widely read in
government circles in Washington. In this sense, the research
output from the campus people constitutes a significant part
of the "intellectual capital" drawn upon by the government
people. The academic researchers are therefore a precious
resource to the government, further stressing the importance
of cordial. contacts between. the government sector and the
academic sector.
All of the things that I am saying here may be so trite
ft
and obvious to you that you are bored ih reading this (if
you are reading it at all). But, take it from me, having
dealt with these problems for at least the past 15 years,
there are damned few governmentople wh.o are activel.
concerned and doing anything about these problems. The
"Tom Hughes syndrome" is far from unique--indeed, it's the
norm.
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5. My qualifications as a candidate to be "project manager"
and related considerations
Let me stress again, in the strongest possible terms,
that I have no desire to work in government for anyi-body
a where. I have declined various attract.:.-.;re proposals
for government work consistently over the past 18 years.
My only personal commitments to government-type work are
connected with my obligations as a Naval Reserve officer.
This desire not to be in government is certainly not
because I am hostile toward government. On the contrary,
in an old-fashioned patriotic way, I am strongly committed
to improving the quality of government, and I admire the
many good people who work in government at all levels.
My desire not to be in government service stems from my
overriding commitment to continue "doing my thing" in
academic life, contributing to improved government by per-
forming those three major functions described on pages 12-14
of this Memo #4.
However, I have been crusading in various ways over the
past 20 years for improved relationships between government.
people and academic people concerned with foreign policy and
international affairs. This is my strongest single extra-
curricular commitment. Therefore, if I could contribute to
this "cause" by performing in the role of "project manager"
as described starting on page 9 of this Memo #4, I would
give such a proposal my most earnest and probably favorable
consideration, for the 1977-78 year starting in summer 1977.
I could name for you several dozen prominent people in.
academic life who would be well-qualified to perform in this
role of "project: manager." as I have outlined the project.
However, since you have raised. this matter with me, allow
me to suggest some of my own qualifications.
I think that I am perhaps the only `person in the fields
of foreign policy, military policy and international affairs
in American academic life who possesses all five of the
following characteristics:
(a) Executive Director of the most prominent profess-
ional. society in the field, the International
Studies Association (ISA)--'for six years, 1.964-70
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(b) Later, President of this same professional society,
ISA, 1976-77, with about 4,000 members and affilia~.tes
worldwide
(c) Dean or Director of one of the eleven (11) specialized
international. affairs graduate schools in American.
academic life
(d) Holder of one of the very few distinguished endowed-
chair professorships in this field in American aca-
demic life
(e) Executive Editor of a major publications series
(Sage Professional Papers in International Studies,
distributed worldwide from Los Angeles and London)
in the field, with about 60 paperback books in print
starting in 1971
I used my old ISA presidential letterhead for page 1 of
this Memo #4 merely to stress that my work for the International
Studies Association over the past 15 years has given me wide-
spread contacts through academic life. ISA is an interdiscip-
linary organization, meaning that these contacts extend into
all of the social sciences--anthropology, business administra-
tion, geography, history, journalism, psychology, sociology,
etc.--beyond my own training in political science and economics.
Note that my successor as the new incoming ISA president, Pro-
fessor Herb Kelman at Harvard, is a distinguished psychologist.
My immediate predecessor as president was Professor Dick Rose-
crance, a noted political scientist at Cornell who served on
the Department of State's Policy Planning Council in the late
1960's. Dick's immediate predecessor as ISA president was
Professor Ken Boulding, an economist so distinguished that he
is often mentioned as a, candidate for a Nobel Prize (and he
is one of the "five top economists in the world" as described
in the new book by Leonard Silk of the New York Times). Ken's
wife, Elise Boulding, also very active in ISA, is a prominent
sociologist. ISA also includes within its membership many
area, specialists on regions such as Asia, Africa, Latin Amer-
ica, etc.
In. summary, m.y ISA work has given me extensive contacts
throughout academic life, in the U.S. and worldwide. I: th.inn I
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that. I have first--name friends or acquaintances on at lea;=t
1,000 college and university campuses in the U.S. (or about
half of the accredited colleges and universities _r the na-
tion), and I can indirectly make contact with people on. all
of the others. Many know me by first name but I cannot al-
ways recall their names when I see them at meetings--I am
not a very good politician. in t1,..-E.s regard (and other regards
too). These people range the sp_pectrum--old established pro-
fessors and youngsters, males and females, prominent people
and obscure people, hawks and doves, rightwingers and left-
wingers and middle-of-the-road types--the whole spectrum.
I am active in some other contexts too. I founded. one
of th.e':two most respected professional organizations special-
izing in military policy research---the Section on Military
Studies (SUMS). The other one, chaired by Professor Morris
Jan.owit:z at the University of Chicago, is the Inter-University
Seminar on Auied Forces and Society (IUSAFS) for which you
spoke after dinner a few years ago (because of my reconuien(M.--
tion to Morris), and I have been a member of the IUSAFS Execu-
tive Council for about the past decade. I am a member of the
Society for the History of American. Foreign Relations, and a
member of the smaller Committee for the Study of Diplomacy.
Since so much of my work has been within the Interna-
tional Studies Association (ISA), I will enclose here a few
ISA documents. But let me add some other kinds of situations.
I have been a consultant and. guest lecturer for all
five of the major U.S. senior wax colleges, and for some of
the command and staff schools. I was once even a consultant
and guest lecturer for the old U.S. Department of Agriculture
"Executive Development Seminars" program, and some more or
less similar work for Defense and State over the years.
T TEL
Perhaps my most challenging work as a consultant began
in January 1968 when President Johnson, with the cooperation
of McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation, decided to sponsor
a major study of the NSC-State-Defense-CIA network. I was
originally used as an outside consultant, but later was invited
aboard actually to write the chapters on the Defense Department.
I I of the CIA was also a key figure on that project.)
_. was a er invited., but declined, to serve in a, somewhat simi-
lar capacity as "-Director of Studies" for the recent Murphy
Commission.
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P age 18
A few years ago 1 agreed to serve as Chairman of the
"Civilian Advisory Panel" for the so-called. Clements Com-
mittee on Excellence in -Military Education in the Pentagon.
Although the overall advisory panel was never actually
formed, I was used fairly frequently as an individual con-
sultant on that matter (but little if any of my suggestions
were taken).
In. February 1976, 1 was used as the featured wrap-up
speaker at the first conference held by the RAND OSD Man.-
power Project: in Santa Monica, and project director Rick
Cooper continues to call me occasionally for advice on that
matter. (See attached letter copy from Pick.)
.Last week I was phoned by Dr. George Tanham, vice pres-
ident and the man in charge of RAND's Washington operations,
asking me to be a. key person in helping him to launch. a new
academic-type journal. to be called. Tntern.ation.al Conflict.
I had to tell him 01,,, as a quid pro quo--because he is writing
a major book in. a. series that I. am publishing here at the
University Press under the overall title "The U.S. and the
World in. America's Third Century."
In February 1.977, I was one of the relatively few
academic people on hand for the first big meeting of the
Civilian/Military Institute (C/MI) in Colorado Springs.
Others on. hand included five 4-star officers (among whom
were C/JCS General George Brown and VCNO Admiral. Harold
Shear), 14 3-star officers, and 14 1-and-2-star officers,
plus many former assistant secretaries of State and Defense
(such as Paul Nitze), many former or active ambassadors
(such as George Kennan), and numerous other dignitaries.
(See attached copy of a New York Times report on the C/MI
meeting.) The C/MI people have asked me to continue helping
them to develop their programs.
A few days ago I received a letter inviting me to be
a key member of a committee of consultants to evaluate the
New York State University System Regents Doctoral. Programs
in political science. (See attached letter copy.) Other
key members of the evaluation group include Professor Sam
Beer at Harvard., current President of the American Political
Science A.ssocia.tion. (APSA) , and Professor John 1A'ah.l.ke of
Iowa, the APSA President-elect. In short, this is a real.
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blue-ribbon group, and it has a very "Large U.ssirr"} r.::t : To
evaluate Ph.D. programs within. one of the biggest and most
pr..omi.n.ent: state cIIT-;i..vcrs_it.v syst:ens in the nation. It look's,
as if my specific assignments will include e-valuating the
Ph.D. programs at Columbia and Cornell, perhaps also Syraci.i.se.
c:an, I have not said these t;-hings about myself here
"to toot my own horn." I would have an incentive to toot
my horn only if I were seeking a job in Washington, when
in fact:: I am trying to avoid precisely that. Therefore,
I have mentioned all of these matters about myself because
I was not sure that you were fully up-to-date on ;.,iy various
professional activities, and for some related reasons as
follow below.
fFirst, i I worked in government or a year, I could
not simply go into isolation from the academic community
as if 1 ha-,] dropped off the edge of the earth. I have
continuing commitments and responsibilities which could
mean, if I were working in Washington, an occasional 'trip
(maybe once a month or so) away from Washington. Amo.ng
other things, f would need to make maybe three or four short
trips back to my Patterson School here in. Kentucky, to make
sure that operations were still securely afloat.
Second, for better or worse, I am a "public person" ?
in my profession, with high visibility (which I often wish
that I did not have). Several months ago when I was con-
sidering Bob Card's invitation for me to join him at NDU
during 1977-78, 1 was having a separate conversation with
some of the most prominent and respected senior professors
in my , .cademic field. One of these old boys said to me,
"Vince, why would you want to-go work for a freshly-minted
3-star Army officer, when you are already the equivalent
of a 4-star officer in our academic community?" Whether or
not that was an accurate observation (and, thank goodness,
we don't have that kind of military rank-consciousness in
the academic community), I am a sufficiently "senior officer"
that whatever I do tends to get discussed and attracts some
attention. across the academic community nationwide. Senior
officers, as I don't have to toll you, send important symbolic
signals merely -?Eckuse of 1 fiere they are located any:` 11k713at t::a.e.:
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Page 20
are doing. BUT this could be an asset if I were to serve
in the role oP"projo.ct manager" as described in ti-Lis memo,
because my work in that role would carry useful symbolism
about improved government-academic relationships.
Third., because of my various professional endeavors,
I do have extensive contacts throughout the academic com-
munity (and many places in government) which could be very
useful in launching the kind of project that I have outlined
in this Memo #4. Indeed, perhaps I ought to mention one
particular program for w=z.ich. I served.more or less as the
"father," and that can be viewed in some respects as a pilot
model for the WIPS idea that I have outlined here. Back in
about 1967, when I was Executive Director of the Interna-
tional Studies Association (ISA), i approached the. American
Foreign SSer.vice Association (AFSA) about creating an ISA-AF'SA
joint committee designed to improve relationships between the
academic community and the Department of State. The joint
committee was in fact created, it was very active for about
two years, and we (the joint corimiittee) sold Secretary Rusk
on three out of four major proposals that we made to him.
One of these three that has been. most successful (anal' is
still in operation.) is State's "Scholar-Diplomat Seminars"
program.
6. Some specific terms and requests
If :C were asked to be "project director" or program
manager" for the kind of ideas outlined herein, I would
hope to receive an annual salary in the $50,000 to $55,000
range. This kind of figure would. not earn me any "profit"
over my ordinary financial situation here--in. fact, it would
maintain. me at roughly the same situation that I have here
in terms of standard of living, disposable income, etc. The
detailed figures on the costs to me involved in a one-year
move to Washington were worked out when I was talking to Bob
Gard earlier. If you want these detailed figures, I can
certainly provide them to you.
As suggested above, it would. need to be understood that
I would have to make occasional short trips (24-to-4z'~ hours,
maybe once per month. on average) away from Washington on my
other academic community business (at no cost to the govern--
mentkpprcl ti Ftd1n ilea ~~BQ~1Q3168a. fl O8 0( ~1 r6ctiz~a;s
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Paste 21
would afford me further opportunities to publicize my
government-academia "good-will. ambassador.' ' role" for
1977-78 .
I. would like to be, given some reasonable assurr.nce
against.. purely political/personal. dabbling by others in
my work. Of course, I am not naive enough to think that
any job in Washington is ever wholly free from political
considerations. But here is the kind of situation that
I would want to avoid. Some guy on the NSC staf=f says to
me, "Rey, Vince, on that seminar you are organizing next
month., please invite my old friend Professor X---he and I
were college roommates." And some guy at State says to me,
"Vince., I sure hope you can invite Professor Y---1-he and I
were in the Foreign Service together in the Antarctic back
in '37, and he is really a top expert on pen.guins." And
some guy at DOD or CIA says to me, '.Vince, for your seminar
invitees, be certain to include Professor. Z---he and I were
in the Army and in the OSS together in. War II and, besides
all that, his wife's third cousin is the brothei?'of President
Carter's cook." -----? Needless to say, I would welcome in.puts
from all participating government agencies for any events
that I might be organizing, but I would prefer to have sug-
gested invitees described in terms of professional qua.lifi-
ca.tions rather than by individual name. I certainly do not
plan to invite any "old buddies" of my own merely because
they are old buddies. What I am proposing is a top-quality
operation, with invitees chosen purely on their records and
qualifications. This means that, for many if not most of
the seminars, the academic invitees could well be people
known to me only by reputation and not personally--although.
I would make detailed prel_iiiinary checks to make sure we
were getting th-,.e kind of people we desired.
Eventually, if anything comes of this proposal here,
I would want to receive a formal appointment letter origin.at- i
ing from some place other than State, Defense or the CIA.
I would want my paychecks and my budget account on somebody's
ledger other than at State, Defense or the CIA, although it
would be immaterial to me if the money originally came_vi_a a
fund. transfer from one of thecepartments or agencies. I could
beg ~a year o,~ more . ~.s o wor r. as ca.r...3' as "un 6, 1977,
immediately after finishing my Naval Reserve duty wit.ti. you.,
but I would need the month of August to wrap up of 'airs here.
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rr+ MEMO #4
Turner
5/ 3/77
.Page 22
I have suggested at several points herein that the Wji.it e
House would be a wholly suitable (and in some respects a.dvan-
ta.geous) overall sponsor and c o Tact:i.n.g e itit for the pro-
posed year-long project. However., if the White House desired
merely to serve as the contracting ent .ty, but v-,ith. no overt
or )?t7: 1..1.[ 1 c c~. W a.i t:e illou.se s on{,o 5: ?_p, I would be more than
willing to let you trade on the good name of the Patterson
School, and my own name. In other words, the contract could
provide for me to operate out of a new Patterson School "branch
office" to be established in Washington for the purposes of
carrying out the contract, and I could have printed an. appro-
priate variation on my basic letterhead here--which I think
is pretty well known around the academic community. In the
business world, you get charged. a special additional fee if
you want to use somebody's logo or trademark. I offer you
this as a "freebie', and nothing about the White House would
be printed on. the letterhead. In this case, however, for
reasons that I: could. explain, I would pros ably need the use
of a good IBM "mag-card" typewriter, and a fairly good phone
budget.
IFi.nall.y, here is a -major request--not a condition--but
a MAJOR. REQUEST. To do this job well, as I have described
it, I would need one (and only one) super-assi.stan.t. I have
such a person in mind. She is Mrs. Lilliam "Lil" Pancorbo,
who has been my Executive Assistant here at the Patterson
School. S1 e is the most extraordinarily talented person
who has ever worked with or for me. She has been a'key figure
with me in building the Patterson School from relative obscur-
ity into a. position of growing prominence nationwide and world-
wide. She is perfect in all matters ranging from routine
office work to major executive-managerial work. She is beau-
tiful in handling all of the VIPs who visit us here, and
these 1-,have included Dean Rusk, Denis Healey, Henry Cabot Lodge,
Gerald R. Ford, and a good many people now in the Carter Admin-
istration such as Dick Holbrooke and Don McHenry. Because of
her work for me, she has almost as many good first-name friends`
and acquaintances in academic life and in. government as I do.
Thus, she is truly my alter ELgo,
Lil and her husband Dr. Sal Pancorbo are a very close
couple. They are dear personal. friends of Anne and myself,
r~si.d.e from the ;r_ofessi.onal connection. Li.l. is leaving my
staff here (an Irreplaceable loss) because Sal has accepted
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MEMO #4
Turner
5/3/77
Page 23
an extremely attractive position as Professor of Clinical
Pharmacology at the University of Minnesota Medical School.
Thus, ;a1_ and Lil. will move to Minneapolis over the summer.
However, I have tentatively discussed a Washington possibility
with Sal and Li.l, involving her working with me there. They
are willing, if the situation should. rra.teri.alizc= in an. appro-
priate fashion, to consider an. arrangement whereby Lil would
commute from Minneapolis to Washington- work with me during
the five-day working week, returning to Minneapolis virtually
every weekend. This would be a strain. It would take a
substantial chunk of money too, particularly if the weekly
roundtrip airfares had to come out of about a $20,000 annual
salary ($25,000 would be much more comfortable), plus the
costs of a small efficiency apartment for Lil to live in
during the workweeks in Washington.
San, when you went to the Naval War College, you insisted
on taking with. you Rusty Williams (plus a few other people)
on the grounds that Rusty was your invaluable assistant. I am
saying that Lit Pancorbo is equally valuable tome, particu-?
larly in the kind of work that we are discussing here. If she
were with me in. this assignment, it would at least double my
own output capacity, thus probably leaving we enough surplus
time to spend perhaps two or two and a half days per week
helping you and Bob Bowie at your McLean address.
If it proves impossible for you to include LII Pancorbo
in the package, then please let me know as soon as possible.
Among other things, this factor will be important to Lil and
Sal in planning their Minneapolis move over the summer. But
it will. also be a key factor in my own thinking. If it is
impossible for Lil to be involved. in Washington work with me,
please advise what you have in mind for an assistant for me.
(I can. think of one or two pretty good people already in the
Washington area whom I might be able to get.) I have planned,
organized, hosted and chaired literally hundreds of meetings
and conventions of various kinds in academic life, but it is
more than a one-man job. If you take the two people whom I
am suggesting (i.e., Lil. and myself), I think you would be
getting the most successful team of its kind in American
academic life--the team that has put the Patterson School. of
Diplomacy and International Commerce on the academic map.
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MEMO #4
Turner
5/3/77
.Page 24
Feel, free to share this memorandum with any people whoa;
you consider appropriate, including President Cr-n.rter and/cxr.
Zbig Brzezinski. I shoul.d add that I have had only casual.
contacts with. Zbig over the years. He might or might not
recognize my name. (Enclosed is the most recent letter that
I have in Tm..y files from him, Ti 1 ly i f 1i": s: an lnivitat3.o n.
to lecture for us here.) As 1' said elsewhere i.'. Lh.ese memos,
Zbig's orientation was always toward Washington, and perhaps
to one or two New York organizations such as the Council or.
Foreign Relations. As far as I am aware, he never held any
significant offices or roles in. professional societies in
academic life. My own orientation was always the reverse,
toward, the academic community and its work within professional
societies. In short, Zbig and I operated in. separate orbits.
[End of Memo #41
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