LDC URBANIZATION PROFILE 1/

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6
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Table 1
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LDC Urbanization Profile'1/
Countries over 50 percent urbanized
Algeria
China (Taiwan)
Peru
Argentina
Colombia
Qatar
Bahamas
Hong Kong
Singa
ore
Bahrain
Iraq
p
Trinidad/Tobago
Brazil
Kuwait
Urugua
Chile
Mexico
y
Venezuela
Countries 35 percent - 50 percenturbanized
Barbados
Congo, Peoples Rep.
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt.
El Salvador
Iran
Jamaica
Jordan
Korea, Rep, of
Lebanon
Malaysia
Mauritius
Morocco
Nicaraqua
Panama
Paraquay
Surinam
Syria
Tunisia
Countries loss than 35 percent urbanized
Afghanistan
Fiji
Maldives
Se
chell
Angola
Gabon
Malawi
y
es
Sierra Leone
Bangladesh
Gambia
Mali
Somalia
Benin
Ghana
Mauritania
Sri Lanka
Bolivia
Guatemala
Mozambique
Sudan
Botswana
Guinea
Nepal
Tanzania
Burma
Haiti
Niger
Thailand
Burundi
Honduras
Nigeria
Togo
Cameroon
India
Oman
Ton
a
Cape Verde Isl.
Indonesia
Pakistan
g
Uganda
Chad
Ivory Coast
Philippines
Upper Volta
Comoros
Kenya
Rhodesia
Western Samoa
Equatorial Guinea
Liberia
Saudi Arabia
Zaire
Ethiopia
Libya
Senegal
Zambia
Data are 19,75 with urban areas defined as having 10,000 or more
inhabitants.
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Comparative Rates of Urbanization
and Pa ~ulation Grow h~ /'~
Urbanization Rate More Than Double Population Growth Rate
Algeria Gabon Mozambique
Angola Gambia Nepal
Barbados Ghana Nigeria
Benin Guinea Qatar
Brazil Haiti Senegal
Burundi Ivory Coast Sudan
Cameroon Jamaica Togo
Chad Korea, Rep. of Trinidad/Tobago
Comoros Liberia Uganda
Congo, Peoples Rep. Malawi Uruguay
Equatorial. Guinea Malaysia Upper. Volta
Ethiopia Mali. Zaire
Zambia
Ur_hanizcatio:ri Rit'e' 1.5' to' '2.0 times Pof~Lilati~n Growth Rite
Botswana
Chile
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
Fiji
Guatemala,--
Honduras
Hong Kong_
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kenya
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Niger
Oman
Panama
Peru
Saudi Arabia
Sierra Leone
Sri Lanka
Somalia
Syria
Thailand
Western Samoa
Urbanization Rate' Less than 1.5 times Po~pulat.ion Growth Rate
Afghanistan
Argentina
Bahamas.
Bahrain
Bolivia
Burma.
Cape -Verde Islands
China (Taiwan)
Costa Rica
El-Salvador,
India
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya .
Maldives
-Mauritania
Pakistan
Paraguay
Philippines
Singapore
Seychelles
Surinam
Tonga
Tunisia
1/ 950-75.average annual rates.
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Economic Development Branch
29 August 1977
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I recently asked a panel of distinguished experts to review our
activities in the population field within the World Bank.
They took a hard look at everything we have been doing since
1969, and they rightly reproached us for a tendency to treat
population too much in isolation from our other activities.
They pointed out that we have beep prepared to lend for
population projects, and were read Eo bring specialized analy-
sis to population issues when thwere of obvious immediate
importance.
programs.
But too many of us in the"ank had proceeded as if population
issues could be left to specialists, rather than considered auto-
matically in all aspectls'of our investment and development
in short, they as ed us to think about the problem in a more
comprehensive ay--and deal with it accordingly.
They were right. And that is exactly what we plan to do.
Let meow, summarize and conclude the central points I
have maft this evening.
Vt. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The argument I have made is this.
It now appears that a significant decline in fertility may have
at last begun in the developing countries. The data are not yet
fully conclusive, but the indications are that the crude birth rates
have fallen over the past two decades by an average of about 6
points, or nearly 13%.
By major region, the decline has been 6.5 points in Asia; 5.4
points in Latin America; and 2.3 points in Africa.
Further, the decline appears to have been general and wide-
spread. it has occurred in 77 of the 88 countries for which esti-
mates are available.
If these indications are confirmed by the censuses scheduled
for 1980, then what we are seeing here is something of historic
11
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importance. It would mean that the period of rapid acceleration
in the rate of growth of the world's population has finally
reached its peak and is now definitely moving downward-
towards stabilization.
But as welcome as this is, the fact remains that the current rate
of decline in fertility in the developing countries is too slow to
avoid their ultimately arriving at stationary populations far in
excess of acceptable levels.
,Unless governments, through appropriate policy action, can,
accelerate the reduction in fertility, the global population may
not stabilize below 11 billion. That would be a world none of us
would want to live in.
But governments can take action, and can accelerate the pro-
cess, given the resolve and determination to do so.
The critical point is this: for every decade of delay in achieving
a net reproduction rate of 1.0-replacement-level fertility-the
ultimate steady-state world population will be approximately
15% greater.
Governments, then, must avoid the severe penalties of pro-
crastination, and try to hasten the process forward.
But how?
The causes and determinants of fertility reduction are ex-
tremely complex, but it appears likely that there are a number
of key linkages between that reduction and certain specific ele-
ments of socio-economic development.
The factors that appear to be the most important are: health, .
education, broadly distributed economic growth, urbanization,
and the enhanced status of women.
These factors are at work in the developing world today, but
their progress is too slow to be fully effective.
Without additional intervention on the part of governments,
the current population in the developing world is going to con-
tinue to grow at rates very substantially in excess of those that
52 would permit far more economic and social progress.
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There are two broad categories of interventions that govern-
ments must undertake: those designed to encourage couples to
desire smaller families; and those designed to provide parents
with the means to implement that desire.
The first set of interventions sets out to alter the social and
economic environment that tends to promote fertility, and by
altering it to create a demand among parents for a new and
smaller family norm.
And the second set of interventions supplies the requisite
means that will make that new norm attainable.
To create the demand for a change in family norm, govern-
ments should try to:
? Reduce current infant and child mortality rates sharply.
? Expand basic education and substantially increase the pro-
portion of girls in school.
? Increase the productivity of smallholders in the rural areas,
and expand earning opportunities in the cities for low-
income groups.
? Put greater stress on more equitable distribution of income
and services in the drive for greater economic growth.
? And above all else, raise the status of women socially, eco-
. nomically, and politically.
To satisfy the demand for a change in family norms, govern-
ments and the international community should:
? Provide a broad choice of the present contraceptive tech-
niques and services to parents.
? Improve the delivery systems by which parents can get the
services they wish.
? And expand present levels of research seeking better tech-
niques and services.
Both categories of interventions are necessary.
Recent studies confirm that the effect of family planning pro-
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grams is greatest when they are joined to efforts designed to
promote related social goals.
We know that eventually the world's population will have to
stop growing. That is certain.
What is uncertain is how. And when. At what level. And with
what result.
We who are alive today can determine the answers to those
questions. By our action-or inaction-we will shape the world
for all generations to come.
We can avoid a world of 11 billion, and all the misery that
such an impoverished and crowded planet would imply. But we
cannot avoid it by continuing into the next quarter century the
ineffective approach to the problem of population that has
characterized the past twenty-five years.
Man is still young in cosmic terms.
He has been on earth for a million years or so. And our mod-
ern ancestor, Homo sapiens, for a hundred thousand years.
But the universe of which he is a part is some twenty billion
years old.
And if we represent the history of the universe by a line a mile
long, then modern man has appeared on that line for only a frac-
tion of an inch.
In that time perspective, he is recent, and tentative, and per-
haps even experimental. He makes mistakes. And yet, if he is
truly sapiens-thinking and.wise-then surely there is promise
for him.
Problems, yes. But very great promise---if we will but act.
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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Tuesday, July 5, 1977 ; lr
A world of '11
billion people
At last birthrates are declining around
the globe. But unless that decline steps
up, today's world population of 4 billion
will not stabilize until it reaches 11 bil-
lion. That would mean `a world no one
wants.'
By David R. Francis
Business and financial editor of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The United States can't build a Berlin wall along the border
with Mexico. The border is too long - more than 2,000 miles.
But if the Mexican population continues to explode the way it
has in the past, some Americans may wish they could, The U.S.
could suffer from a huge influx of illegal Mexican entrants -
more than the 5 million or 6 million. illegal entrants of all nation-
alities now estimated to he resident in this country.
Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank, sees in
such a situation the interdependence of the industrial and the less
developed countries.
In the rich nations the number of births has dropped or almost
dropped to zero growth reproduction levels. But that's definitely
not the case in the poorer countries. There the number of people
continues to soar.
As a result, the Soviets worry about the safety of Siberia next
to overcrowded China. The Australians wonder if an ever-more-
populous Indonesia eventually might cast an expansionary eye on
relatively empty western Australia.
All the industrial nations face the prospect of living in a world
where 9 out of 10 people will live in the developing nations and
huge numbers of these could be desperately poor - if population
growth is not brought under control.
In written replies to questions Mr. McNamara examines the
world's population question. The former U.S. Secretary of De-
fense now heads an institution that is making development loans
at a rate exceeding $5 billion a year. Because of rising popu-
lations, the projects financed by those loans do less to raise living
standards than they would otherwise. Mr. McNamara wants the
world to get off the population-explosion treadmill.
Recently you warned that unless the developing countries can
reduce their birthrates further, the global population will not
stabilize below 11 billion. What would the world be like with a pop-
ulation that size? Would the population actually reach that level
or would -it be trimmed by catastrophe before then?
If current trends in fertility rates continue, i.e., if crude birth-
rates in developing countries decline by approximately 6 points
per decade, it appears that the world might reach a net reproduc-
tion rate of 1.0 in about the year 2020. This would lead to a steady-
state population of 11 billion some 70 years later.
We have to try to comprehend what such a world would really
be. We call it stabilized, but what kind of stability would be pos-
sible? Can we assume that the levels of poverty, hunger, stress,
crowding, and frustration that such a situation could cause in the
developing nations - which by then would contain 9 out of every
10 human beings on earth - would be likely to assure social stabil-
ity? Or political stability? Or, for that matter, military stability?
It is not a world that anyone wants.
If the world continues to move toward a population of 11 billion,
some countries will find their populations increasing three- or
fourfold - this would be true, for example, of a Bangladesh. It
would be impossible, I believe, for that to occur without serious
danger of political and social disorder. It is for this reason that
more and more of such countries, including Bangladesh, are put-
ting increasing emphasis on programs designed to reduce fertility
rates.
When replacement level fertility rates are reached, why does
the population level continue to rise after this rate is reached?
When a new reproduction rate of 1.0 - replacement level fer-
tility - is reached in a society, it does not mean that the popu-
lation immediately ceases to grow. It will continue increasing for
decades. That is a function of the society's age structure.
The population will continue to grow because the higher birth-
rates of the past have produced an age distribution with a rela-
tively high proportion of persons currently in, or still to enter, the
reproductive ages. This in turn will result in more births than
deaths until the population changes to the older age distribution
intrinsic in the low birthrate. Thus, even at replacement-level fer-
tility, the population does not become stationary until the age
structure stabilizes, which takes 60 to 70 years.
What are the factors that have reduced the birthrate somewhat
in the developing world! Do you expect these factors to continue
working?
A complicated mix of variables is at work, some economic.
some not. Mortality decline, urbanization, educational advance,
higher aspirations for one's self and one's children - all these ele-
ments appear to be involved in differing combinations.
The demographic transition in the industrialized countries dem-
onstrates that socio-economic development and mortality declines
were accompanied by significant reductions in fertility. What is
not clear is which of the many elements of general development
led to that specific result, and with what relative effectiveness.
Though we can learn from the experience of the developed na-
tions, we must recognize that their historical circumstances were
quite dissimilar to those in the developing countries today.
The developing nations are confronted with a very different set
of circumstances, some of them unfavorable, but some of them
advantageous. Their mortality decline has been the most precipi-
tous in history: five times faster than in the developed nations.
Compared to the last century, the means of controlling birth are
far more numerous, more effective, and more easily available.
Modern mass communications are both more pervasive and
more influential. Increasingly the mass of the people are becom-
ing more aware of living standards in the developed world, in-
cluding smaller family size and less traditional life-styles. Ex-
posure to alternate possibilities stirs their imaginations and af-
fects their aspirations.
Governments have much greater ability now to reach across
subnational barriers of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences
and can stay in touch with villagers if they choose to do so.
Most developing countries regard basic literacy for both males
and females as essential for development goals and greater na-
tional unity.
Finally, there are an increasing number of governments in the
developing world committed to lowering fertility, and an even
larger number supporting family planning programs. By 1975
there were 63 countries with official family planning programs
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WASHINGTON POST
11'177
Soviet Abortion Rate
Double Number of Births
By Dan Griffin
Washington Post Staff Writer
In the Soviet Union, there are more
than twice as many abortions each
year as live births; in France, the
number is about equal for both; in
England, despite very liberal laws,
there are about six times as many
full-term births as, abortions each
year.
But in seven other countries sur-
veyed by Washington Post corre-
spondents-Brazil, Italy, Japan, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia-
there is a general consistency: Despite
religious, ethnic and cultural differ-
ences, they average from 11/2 to 3 live
births for every abortion.
Clearly, there are differences. In
Catholic Italy, Portugal Ireland and
Spain, where abortions are illegal, ac-
curate figures are hard to ebme by. In
equally Catholic Brazil, where the
two grounds for legal abortion are to
save the woman's life or to terminate
a': pregnancy caused by rape, estimates
are that the number of abortions is 30'
t~ 40 per cent of the number of live
births.
NEW YORK TIMES
6 July 1977
Iraq Is Passing Up
5% Rise in Oil Price
BAGHDAD, Iraq, July 5, (Reuters)--
Iraq has decided not to forgo a 5 percent
increase in the price of crude oil sched-
uled for July 1, the Iraq press agency
said today.
The Iraqi decision leaves Libya n as
the only one of the 13 member states
of the organization of Petroleum Export-r
ing Countries still formally committed to
increase the price of its oil from lash.
Friday.
Libya announced at the end June that
it would also forgo its latest price in-'
crease if the Saudis andthe United Arab
Emirates restored price unity within the
organization.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi-
rates agreed on Sunday to increase their
oil prices by 5 per cent to bring them
into line with the otherOPECcountries.
But Still there was no , announcement
from Libya.
OPEC has operated a two-tier oil prico
system since the beginning of the year,.,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi-,
rates then raised prices by 5 percent
while the 11 other countries posted i4j,
creases of 10 per cent and planneda
further increase of 5 per cent from July
1.
Nine countries - Algeria, Ecuador,
Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria,
Qatar and Venezuela-agreed last month
to cancel the second increase. This was
in anticipation of Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates announcing an in-
crease to end the price split.
World Oil Usage Is Record
LONDON, July 5(AP)-World oil con-
sumption rose to record levels in 1976
after falling for two sucessive years fol-
lowing the oil crisis of 1973, the British
Petroleum Company Ltd. said today..
Regions or countries showing a more
than average increase in oil consumption
in 1976 included the United States, Latin
America, the Netherlands, Spain, West
Germany, the Middle East, Southeast Asia
and China, B.P. said. In Britain, oil use
fell 0.5 per cent
In its annual survey of oil use, B.P.
said total international oil consumption
rose 6.6 percent, or 178 million tons, (1.28
billion barrels) last year to a record 2.88
billion tons, or 20.7 billion barrels, sur-
passing the previous record of 2.77 billion
tons,-or 19.9 billion barrels, in 1973.
Oil use, excluding the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe and China, increased last
year by 6.6 percent to 2.34 billion tons
from 2.19 billion tons, or 15.8 billion bar-
rels, in 1975, BAP said.
Lions appears to be directly connected
with the availability of sex education,
contraceptives and birth-control pro-
grams. For example, Japan's ratio-
now about one abortion for every
three births-is down sharply from
figures 20 and 25 years ago, despite
changes in customs and the casual
ease with which abortions can be ar-
ranged.
In other places-Yugoslavia is per-
haps the best example-religious and
cultural traditions have the strongest
impact. In Serbia, where the Orthodox
Church is relatively less strict on sex-
ual mores than either the Catholic
Church or Islam the average number
1 P
fi
Prof. Dmitri Velentei of Moscow children, and Franco had only one, a
i)niversity argue Jsdn tr44LMeas&2045/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6
tions is useless: "A woman who does
not want to have a baby will not have
it. Legal barriers have practically no
effect anywhere in the world."
The French Movement for Family
Planning says that France in general
is even more hostile to contraception
and sex education than to abortion.
The organization's director, Simone
Iff, says: "Contraception remains a
privilege of wealth. and is not widely
practiced by the working class. A
woman who demands contraception is
asking for the right to make love
when she wants. Her punishment is
abortion. This is the Catholic mental-
ity."
` Iff's group, a privately funded or-
ganization that works closely with the
Ministry of Health, estimates that 75
per cent of French women do not use
contraceptives. .
In Italy, where fewer than 5 per
cent of women are thought to use any
contraceptive method other than coi-
tus interruptus, a study five years ago
of more than 500 30-year-old married
women in Rome showed two abortions
for every two or three children.
A referendum on abortion is to be
held next spring, unless an abortion
law is passed before then, and it is
widely expected that the result will be
similar to the 1974 divorce referen-
dum, when 60 per cent voted for its
legalization. Meanwhile, illegal abor-
tions and charter trips to London pre-
sumably will continue to be the main-
stays.
England, with its relatively liberal
laws that draw foreign women by the
thousands-some 27,000 last year-
presents an anomaly. Although there is
reported to be wide public support for
the present laws, anti-abortion senti-
ment is high in the House of Com-
mons, and there is some expectation
of abortions per married woman is that the law may be made more re,
1,78. "Every year in Belgrade" which strictive.
is in Serbia "we kill the equivalent of Pro-abortion forces in Commons be-
the population of a small town-about lieve they have a chance to prevent
40,000," a Yugoslav doctor said. the new restrictions from passing into
in wealthier, Catholic Slovenia, it is law by bottling them up in committee,
0.28, and in Moslem Kosovo it is 0.23, but the fact that they are trying to
lowest in the country. kill the bill rather than let it come to
By contrast, laws regulating abor- a vote shows how strong the antiabor-
tion seem to have little effect, other tion side has become.
than channeling women to illegal In Macho Spain, where widely avail-
abortionists. When Josef Stalin made able contraceptives are cutting down
abortions illegal in 1936, it produced the number of abortions, King Juan
only a short-term rise in the Soviet Carlos is continuing the practice be-
birthrate; when Nikita Khrushchev gun by Generalissimo Francisco
made them legal in 1955, there was no France of awarding medals to parents
erce tible drop in the birthrate. of large families. The king has three
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and why?
income helpful
The rate of growth of the world's population
,
The key elements that can be deliberately managed to acceler-
ate fertility reduction are:
Year
Total population
Rate of growth
per year since
previous date
Doubling
Health: Improving the level of health, particularly of chil-
dren, ensures the survival of a desired minimum of offspring
1,000,000 B.C.
a few thousand
-
8,000 B.C.
8 million
.0007%
100,000 years
Birth rates and death rates in developing
1 A.D.
300 million
.046 %
1.500 years
1750
800 million
.06 %
1,200 years
and developed countries
1900
1,650 million
.48 %
150 years
Dev ctnping Develo
ed Total
1970
3,600 million
1.0 %
70 years
p
Iount lies countries varld
2000
6,300 million
2.0 %
35 years
and 34 with explicit policies to reduce the growth rate.
Now all of this is encouraging.
Will the change of government in India make a material differ-
ence in regard to that nation's population control program?
As you may know, the outcome of the recent election raised
some concerns over how the population control program would be
regarded by the new government. I was encouraged to see that
the new leaders, while stressing their commitment to the wholly
voluntary approach, have reaffirmed after the election their sup-
port of the program. While doing so they drew attention to the
very important linkages between fertility and health, education,
enhanced status of women, and other tangible improvements in
living standards. There is in India itself the hopeful example of
the state of Kerala which, despite having a lower per capita in-
come, has achieved higher standards of literacy and general edu-
cation, lower infant mortality rates and lower birthrates than
other, richer states. India's family planning system is making
progress: the crude birthrate has been falling and sometime in
the 1960s the rate of natural increase stopped accelerating: the
1981 census is likely to show this rate has fallen to or below 2 per-
cent per annum. This development, together with the government
of India's continued support for its population program and its
recognition of the linkages with broader social economic devel-
opment, leaves me hopeful that substantial progress in controlling
India's population will be achieved.
Why is a high birthrate damaging to the economic development
of a nation?
Excessive population growth severely penalizes many of the de-
veloping nations. Ii drains away resources, dilutes per capita in-
come, and widens inequalities.
In most developing countries today birthrates range between 30
and 50 per thousand, and their death rates between 10 and 25 per
thousand. The result is that as a group their population is growing
at about 2.3 percent a year, and at that pace it will double in
about 30 years.
At the national level the government must devote more and
more investment simply to provide minimal services to an ever-
increasing number of children. At the family level the same needs
press in on the parents of large families.
During their early years most children are primarily con-
sumers rather than producers. For both the government and the
family, more children mean more expenditures on food, on shel-
ter, on clothing, on health, on education, on every essential social
service. And it means correspondingly less expenditure on in-
vestment to achieve the very economic growth required to fi-
nance these services.
As children reach adulthood the problem is compounded by
mounting unemployment. There are not enough jobs to go round
because the government - grappling with the daily demands of
the increasing numbers - has been unable to invest enough in job-
producing enterprises. Thus the cycle of poverty and over-
population tightens - each reinforcing the other - and the entire
social and economic framework weakens under the weight of too
great a dependency ratio. A typical example is the case of Al-
geria, as contrasted with Sweden. In Algeria, with its high birth
rate, every 100 persons of working age in 1970 had to support 98
children under the age of 15. In Sweden, with its low birthrate, ev-
ery 100 persons of working age had to support only 32 children un-
der 15.
What should be done to reduce fertility? Is better distribution of
('rude ('rude Rate of Crude Crude Hate of Crude Crude Hale of
birth death natural birth death natural birth death natural
rate rate increase rate rate increase rate rate increase
1969 42.9 17.0 2.6 18.0 9.1 0.9 32.0 13.3 1.9
1975 39.0 15.1 2.4 17.3 9.3 0.8 30.0 12.3 1.8
Source: United Nations, Selected World Demographic Indicators by Coun-
tries, 1950-2000. May, 1975: and Population Council Data Bank.
and provides parents with greater incentive for planning and
investment for both their children and themselves.
Education: Broadening the knowledge of both males and fe-
males beyond their familial and local milieu enables them to
learn about and take advantage of new opportunities, and to
perceive the future as something worth planning for, in-
cluding personal family size.
Broadly distributed economic growth: Tangible improve-
ment in the living standards of a significant proportion of the
low-income groups in a.society provides visible proof that as-
pirations for a better life can in fact be realized, and that a
more compact family size can have economic advantages.
Urbanization: It generally offers greater accessibility to
health services and education; increased familiarity with the
more modern economic sector; and new savings and con-
sumption patterns: all of which tend to alter attitudes to-
wards traditional family size.
Enhanced status of women: Expanding the social, political,
occupational, and economic opportunities of women beyond
the traditional roles of motherhood and housekeeping enables
them to experience directly the advantages of lowered fertil-
ity, and to channel their creative abilities over a much
broader spectrum of choice.
The data (on birthrates and selected development indicators) in
several developing countries demonstrate that there are apparent
correlations and that fertility levels and levels of certain specific
socio-economic indices tend to move together. Declining levels of
infant mortality, and rising levels of nutrition, literacy, and non-
agricultural employment appear to be accompanied by lower
birthrates. The correlation appears to be with specific elements
of development - literacy, for example, and nutrition and infant
mortality - rather than with the, general level of economic
wealth.
Governments should try to:
? Reduce current infant and child mortality rates sharply.
? Expand basic education and increase the proportion of girls
in school.
? Increase the productivity of smallholders in the rural areas,
and expand earning opportunities in the cities for low-income
groups.
? Put greater stress on more equitable distribution and ser-
vices in the drive for greater economic growth.
? And above all else, raise the status of women socially, eco-
nomically, and politically.
While economic growth is a necessary condition of development
in a modernizing society, it is not in itself a sufficient condition.
The reason is clear. Economic growth cannot change the lives of
the mass of the people unless it reaches the mass of the people.
Most countries in Latin America, for example, have consid-
erably higher per capita income than countries in Asia and Af-
rica. And yet fertility rates are not proportionately lower. That, in
part, is a function of the -serious inequalities in income dis-
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 tribution in the LatinAwm4gFici lr Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-R $fiQQQ,5WQQt(Q QP440 be understood by ap-
A study of various characteristics in 64 countries from both the
developed and developing areas of the world, for which data are
available, confirmed that more equitable income distribution,
with the resultant broader distribution of social service, is
strongly associated with lower fertility. The analysis suggested
that each additional percentage point of total income received by
the poorest 40 percent reduces the general fertility rate by about
3 points.
Will it be necessary to use coercion to reduce birthrates?
There are many different approaches to the task of promoting
a new social consensus on population problems within a society,
and the choice of one over another - or any particular mix of ac-
tions - must, of course, be guided by the cultural context of the
society in question. But the truth is that most of the approaches,
and all of the actions, are difficult to implement. If these ap-
proaches fail, and population pressures become too great, nations
will be driven to more coercive methods.
A number of governments are moving in the direction of coer-
cion already. Some have introduced legal sanctions to raise the
age of marriage. A few are considering direct legal limitations on
family size, and sanctions to enforce them. No government really
wants to resort to coercion in this matter. But neither can any
government afford to let population pressures grow so dan-
gerously large that social frustrations finally erupt into irrational
violence and civil disintegration.
How hopeful are you that governments will move fast enough to
bring down birthrates dramatically? Why is speed necessary?
For every decade of delay in achieving a net reproduction rate
of 1.0 - replacement level - the world's ultimate steady-state
population will be about 15 percent greater.
Friday, July 1, 1977
plying it to the present outlook. If current trends in fertility rates
continue, i.e., if crude birthrates in developing countries decline
by approximately 6 points per decade, it appears that the world
might reach a net reproduction rate of 1.0 in about the year 2020.
This would lead to a steady-state population of 11 billion some 70
years later.
If the date at which replacement-level fertility is reached could
be advanced from 2020 to 2000, the ultimate population would be
approximately 3 billion less, a number equivalent to 75 percent of
today's world total.
This reveals in startling terms the hidden penalties of failing to
act, and act immediately, to reduce fertility.
If global replacement levels of fertility were to be reached
around the year 2000, with the world ultimately stabilizing at
about 8 billion, 90 percent of the increase over today's levels
would be in the developing countries. It would mean, if each coun-
try followed the same general pattern, an India of 1.4 billion; a
Brazil of 275 million; a Bangladesh of 245 million; a Nigeria of 200
million; and a Mexico of 175 million.
But, given today's level of complacency in some quarters, and
discouragement in others, the more likely scenario is a world
stabilized at about 11 billion. Populations in the developing coun-
tries would be 40 to 60 percent greater than indicated above be-
cause of two decades of delay in reaching replacement levels of
fertility.
By our action - or inaction - we will shape the world for
all generations to come. We can avoid a world of 11 billion and
all the misery that such an impoverished and crowded planet
would imply. But we cannot avoid it by continuing into the next
quarter century the ineffective approach to the problem of popu-
lation that has characterized the past 25 years.
India's economy drifts; prices soar
By Mohan Ram
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor
New Delhi
The Indian economy is drifting, and while the new govern-
ment is trying to halt the drift, the outlook is somber.
On balance, fiscal 1976-77 was a bad year. The gross national
product rose only by 2 percent, against 8.5 percent the year be-
fore. Food-grain output plummeted by 10 million tons. Overall
industrial production went up by 10 percent, but this conceals
something: Most consumer-goods industries did not show any
appreciable increase. Wholesale prices rose by 12 percent.
The only bright spots are a record 18 million-ton food-grain
reserve held by the state - although one-third of it is rotting in
the open for want of proper storage space - and a comfortable
position in foreign exchange reserves, thanks to expanded ex-
ports and a drop in imports (mainly food and fertilizer).
But these are dubious plus points. Ironically, they are also a
source of embarrassment because they are contributing to the
inflationary pressures. Despite the huge food-grain reserve,
large numbers of Indians continue to live on a semi-starvation
diet because they cannot afford to buy food.
Inheriting an economy that by many estimates is in
shambles, the new government of Prime Minister Morarji
Desai wants to shift the emphasis away from the Soviet-style
physical planning and heavy industry that had been the policy
of. his predecessor (Indira Gandhi) to agriculture, irrigation,
and labor-intensive small industries.
Industrial production, it is hoped, will be stimulated by an
"easy" money policy and incentives for private investment.
The new rulers recognize the need for expanding exports to
meet foreign-exchange needs, but they reject a World Bank
recommendation for "export-led growth."
The latest World Bank report wants India to take risks to
"grow faster" and calls for a growth-oriented strategy, taking
advantage of the food-grain reserves and favorable balance-of-
payments position.
The report, much of it prepared before the dramatic politi-
cal change here last March, notes that long-term growth has
been unsatisfactory, both in agriculture and industry. Despite
the "green revolution," agricultural output barely has kept
pace with population growth. In industry, shortage of supplies,
particularly imported ones, and rigidities in the licensing sys-
tem have held back growth. Recent improvements have yet to
bring about a fundamental change in the situation.
Given the resource position of India, investment and devel-
opment expenditures could be raised without an extra burden
on consumption. The major area of additional investment
should be agriculture and irrigation, the report says.
A faster growth trend in agriculture also will help industrial
growth, the report continues, and exports provide another
source of demand that can stimulate industrial production.
Prime Minister Desai's budget for 1977-78 seems to have an-
ticipated the World Bank report. It seeks to give a new direc-
tion to the economy. (The new government party had prom-
ised bread, liberty, and work for all in 10 years' time, mainly
through labor-intensive, decentralized industries.)
But it is questionable whether significant results can be
achieved in the nine months left in the current fiscal year. The
government contends that it took over only three months ago,
and not with a clean slate at that. Even so, it has yet to devise
a strategy for accelerating development that takes advantage
of the comfortable food-grain and improved balance-of-pay-
ments positions.
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