LDC URBANIZATION PROFILE 1/

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Table 1 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 LDC Urbanization Profile'1/ Countries over 50 percent urbanized Algeria China (Taiwan) Peru Argentina Colombia Qatar Bahamas Hong Kong Singa ore Bahrain Iraq p Trinidad/Tobago Brazil Kuwait Urugua Chile Mexico y Venezuela Countries 35 percent - 50 percenturbanized Barbados Congo, Peoples Rep. Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt. El Salvador Iran Jamaica Jordan Korea, Rep, of Lebanon Malaysia Mauritius Morocco Nicaraqua Panama Paraquay Surinam Syria Tunisia Countries loss than 35 percent urbanized Afghanistan Fiji Maldives Se chell Angola Gabon Malawi y es Sierra Leone Bangladesh Gambia Mali Somalia Benin Ghana Mauritania Sri Lanka Bolivia Guatemala Mozambique Sudan Botswana Guinea Nepal Tanzania Burma Haiti Niger Thailand Burundi Honduras Nigeria Togo Cameroon India Oman Ton a Cape Verde Isl. Indonesia Pakistan g Uganda Chad Ivory Coast Philippines Upper Volta Comoros Kenya Rhodesia Western Samoa Equatorial Guinea Liberia Saudi Arabia Zaire Ethiopia Libya Senegal Zambia Data are 19,75 with urban areas defined as having 10,000 or more inhabitants. Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :'CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : G g 8~B00985R000200100004-6 Comparative Rates of Urbanization and Pa ~ulation Grow h~ /'~ Urbanization Rate More Than Double Population Growth Rate Algeria Gabon Mozambique Angola Gambia Nepal Barbados Ghana Nigeria Benin Guinea Qatar Brazil Haiti Senegal Burundi Ivory Coast Sudan Cameroon Jamaica Togo Chad Korea, Rep. of Trinidad/Tobago Comoros Liberia Uganda Congo, Peoples Rep. Malawi Uruguay Equatorial. Guinea Malaysia Upper. Volta Ethiopia Mali. Zaire Zambia Ur_hanizcatio:ri Rit'e' 1.5' to' '2.0 times Pof~Lilati~n Growth Rite Botswana Chile Colombia Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt Fiji Guatemala,-- Honduras Hong Kong_ Indonesia Iran Iraq Jordan Kenya Mauritius Mexico Morocco Nicaragua Niger Oman Panama Peru Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Sri Lanka Somalia Syria Thailand Western Samoa Urbanization Rate' Less than 1.5 times Po~pulat.ion Growth Rate Afghanistan Argentina Bahamas. Bahrain Bolivia Burma. Cape -Verde Islands China (Taiwan) Costa Rica El-Salvador, India Kuwait Lebanon Libya . Maldives -Mauritania Pakistan Paraguay Philippines Singapore Seychelles Surinam Tonga Tunisia 1/ 950-75.average annual rates. Approved For Release 2005/01/10: CIARDP86B00985RR00Wl00b041tI I iams Economic Development Branch 29 August 1977 Approved For Release 2005/01/10,: CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100f I recently asked a panel of distinguished experts to review our activities in the population field within the World Bank. They took a hard look at everything we have been doing since 1969, and they rightly reproached us for a tendency to treat population too much in isolation from our other activities. They pointed out that we have beep prepared to lend for population projects, and were read Eo bring specialized analy- sis to population issues when thwere of obvious immediate importance. programs. But too many of us in the"ank had proceeded as if population issues could be left to specialists, rather than considered auto- matically in all aspectls'of our investment and development in short, they as ed us to think about the problem in a more comprehensive ay--and deal with it accordingly. They were right. And that is exactly what we plan to do. Let meow, summarize and conclude the central points I have maft this evening. Vt. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The argument I have made is this. It now appears that a significant decline in fertility may have at last begun in the developing countries. The data are not yet fully conclusive, but the indications are that the crude birth rates have fallen over the past two decades by an average of about 6 points, or nearly 13%. By major region, the decline has been 6.5 points in Asia; 5.4 points in Latin America; and 2.3 points in Africa. Further, the decline appears to have been general and wide- spread. it has occurred in 77 of the 88 countries for which esti- mates are available. If these indications are confirmed by the censuses scheduled for 1980, then what we are seeing here is something of historic 11 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/10?: CIA-RDP86B00985R0002001'00004-6 importance. It would mean that the period of rapid acceleration in the rate of growth of the world's population has finally reached its peak and is now definitely moving downward- towards stabilization. But as welcome as this is, the fact remains that the current rate of decline in fertility in the developing countries is too slow to avoid their ultimately arriving at stationary populations far in excess of acceptable levels. ,Unless governments, through appropriate policy action, can, accelerate the reduction in fertility, the global population may not stabilize below 11 billion. That would be a world none of us would want to live in. But governments can take action, and can accelerate the pro- cess, given the resolve and determination to do so. The critical point is this: for every decade of delay in achieving a net reproduction rate of 1.0-replacement-level fertility-the ultimate steady-state world population will be approximately 15% greater. Governments, then, must avoid the severe penalties of pro- crastination, and try to hasten the process forward. But how? The causes and determinants of fertility reduction are ex- tremely complex, but it appears likely that there are a number of key linkages between that reduction and certain specific ele- ments of socio-economic development. The factors that appear to be the most important are: health, . education, broadly distributed economic growth, urbanization, and the enhanced status of women. These factors are at work in the developing world today, but their progress is too slow to be fully effective. Without additional intervention on the part of governments, the current population in the developing world is going to con- tinue to grow at rates very substantially in excess of those that 52 would permit far more economic and social progress. 51300985R0002001fl0004-6' Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 There are two broad categories of interventions that govern- ments must undertake: those designed to encourage couples to desire smaller families; and those designed to provide parents with the means to implement that desire. The first set of interventions sets out to alter the social and economic environment that tends to promote fertility, and by altering it to create a demand among parents for a new and smaller family norm. And the second set of interventions supplies the requisite means that will make that new norm attainable. To create the demand for a change in family norm, govern- ments should try to: ? Reduce current infant and child mortality rates sharply. ? Expand basic education and substantially increase the pro- portion of girls in school. ? Increase the productivity of smallholders in the rural areas, and expand earning opportunities in the cities for low- income groups. ? Put greater stress on more equitable distribution of income and services in the drive for greater economic growth. ? And above all else, raise the status of women socially, eco- . nomically, and politically. To satisfy the demand for a change in family norms, govern- ments and the international community should: ? Provide a broad choice of the present contraceptive tech- niques and services to parents. ? Improve the delivery systems by which parents can get the services they wish. ? And expand present levels of research seeking better tech- niques and services. Both categories of interventions are necessary. Recent studies confirm that the effect of family planning pro- Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 grams is greatest when they are joined to efforts designed to promote related social goals. We know that eventually the world's population will have to stop growing. That is certain. What is uncertain is how. And when. At what level. And with what result. We who are alive today can determine the answers to those questions. By our action-or inaction-we will shape the world for all generations to come. We can avoid a world of 11 billion, and all the misery that such an impoverished and crowded planet would imply. But we cannot avoid it by continuing into the next quarter century the ineffective approach to the problem of population that has characterized the past twenty-five years. Man is still young in cosmic terms. He has been on earth for a million years or so. And our mod- ern ancestor, Homo sapiens, for a hundred thousand years. But the universe of which he is a part is some twenty billion years old. And if we represent the history of the universe by a line a mile long, then modern man has appeared on that line for only a frac- tion of an inch. In that time perspective, he is recent, and tentative, and per- haps even experimental. He makes mistakes. And yet, if he is truly sapiens-thinking and.wise-then surely there is promise for him. Problems, yes. But very great promise---if we will but act. Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R0002001000004-Jy- THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Tuesday, July 5, 1977 ; lr A world of '11 billion people At last birthrates are declining around the globe. But unless that decline steps up, today's world population of 4 billion will not stabilize until it reaches 11 bil- lion. That would mean `a world no one wants.' By David R. Francis Business and financial editor of The Christian Science Monitor Washington The United States can't build a Berlin wall along the border with Mexico. The border is too long - more than 2,000 miles. But if the Mexican population continues to explode the way it has in the past, some Americans may wish they could, The U.S. could suffer from a huge influx of illegal Mexican entrants - more than the 5 million or 6 million. illegal entrants of all nation- alities now estimated to he resident in this country. Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank, sees in such a situation the interdependence of the industrial and the less developed countries. In the rich nations the number of births has dropped or almost dropped to zero growth reproduction levels. But that's definitely not the case in the poorer countries. There the number of people continues to soar. As a result, the Soviets worry about the safety of Siberia next to overcrowded China. The Australians wonder if an ever-more- populous Indonesia eventually might cast an expansionary eye on relatively empty western Australia. All the industrial nations face the prospect of living in a world where 9 out of 10 people will live in the developing nations and huge numbers of these could be desperately poor - if population growth is not brought under control. In written replies to questions Mr. McNamara examines the world's population question. The former U.S. Secretary of De- fense now heads an institution that is making development loans at a rate exceeding $5 billion a year. Because of rising popu- lations, the projects financed by those loans do less to raise living standards than they would otherwise. Mr. McNamara wants the world to get off the population-explosion treadmill. Recently you warned that unless the developing countries can reduce their birthrates further, the global population will not stabilize below 11 billion. What would the world be like with a pop- ulation that size? Would the population actually reach that level or would -it be trimmed by catastrophe before then? If current trends in fertility rates continue, i.e., if crude birth- rates in developing countries decline by approximately 6 points per decade, it appears that the world might reach a net reproduc- tion rate of 1.0 in about the year 2020. This would lead to a steady- state population of 11 billion some 70 years later. We have to try to comprehend what such a world would really be. We call it stabilized, but what kind of stability would be pos- sible? Can we assume that the levels of poverty, hunger, stress, crowding, and frustration that such a situation could cause in the developing nations - which by then would contain 9 out of every 10 human beings on earth - would be likely to assure social stabil- ity? Or political stability? Or, for that matter, military stability? It is not a world that anyone wants. If the world continues to move toward a population of 11 billion, some countries will find their populations increasing three- or fourfold - this would be true, for example, of a Bangladesh. It would be impossible, I believe, for that to occur without serious danger of political and social disorder. It is for this reason that more and more of such countries, including Bangladesh, are put- ting increasing emphasis on programs designed to reduce fertility rates. When replacement level fertility rates are reached, why does the population level continue to rise after this rate is reached? When a new reproduction rate of 1.0 - replacement level fer- tility - is reached in a society, it does not mean that the popu- lation immediately ceases to grow. It will continue increasing for decades. That is a function of the society's age structure. The population will continue to grow because the higher birth- rates of the past have produced an age distribution with a rela- tively high proportion of persons currently in, or still to enter, the reproductive ages. This in turn will result in more births than deaths until the population changes to the older age distribution intrinsic in the low birthrate. Thus, even at replacement-level fer- tility, the population does not become stationary until the age structure stabilizes, which takes 60 to 70 years. What are the factors that have reduced the birthrate somewhat in the developing world! Do you expect these factors to continue working? A complicated mix of variables is at work, some economic. some not. Mortality decline, urbanization, educational advance, higher aspirations for one's self and one's children - all these ele- ments appear to be involved in differing combinations. The demographic transition in the industrialized countries dem- onstrates that socio-economic development and mortality declines were accompanied by significant reductions in fertility. What is not clear is which of the many elements of general development led to that specific result, and with what relative effectiveness. Though we can learn from the experience of the developed na- tions, we must recognize that their historical circumstances were quite dissimilar to those in the developing countries today. The developing nations are confronted with a very different set of circumstances, some of them unfavorable, but some of them advantageous. Their mortality decline has been the most precipi- tous in history: five times faster than in the developed nations. Compared to the last century, the means of controlling birth are far more numerous, more effective, and more easily available. Modern mass communications are both more pervasive and more influential. Increasingly the mass of the people are becom- ing more aware of living standards in the developed world, in- cluding smaller family size and less traditional life-styles. Ex- posure to alternate possibilities stirs their imaginations and af- fects their aspirations. Governments have much greater ability now to reach across subnational barriers of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences and can stay in touch with villagers if they choose to do so. Most developing countries regard basic literacy for both males and females as essential for development goals and greater na- tional unity. Finally, there are an increasing number of governments in the developing world committed to lowering fertility, and an even larger number supporting family planning programs. By 1975 there were 63 countries with official family planning programs Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 WASHINGTON POST 11'177 Soviet Abortion Rate Double Number of Births By Dan Griffin Washington Post Staff Writer In the Soviet Union, there are more than twice as many abortions each year as live births; in France, the number is about equal for both; in England, despite very liberal laws, there are about six times as many full-term births as, abortions each year. But in seven other countries sur- veyed by Washington Post corre- spondents-Brazil, Italy, Japan, Portu- gal, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia- there is a general consistency: Despite religious, ethnic and cultural differ- ences, they average from 11/2 to 3 live births for every abortion. Clearly, there are differences. In Catholic Italy, Portugal Ireland and Spain, where abortions are illegal, ac- curate figures are hard to ebme by. In equally Catholic Brazil, where the two grounds for legal abortion are to save the woman's life or to terminate a': pregnancy caused by rape, estimates are that the number of abortions is 30' t~ 40 per cent of the number of live births. NEW YORK TIMES 6 July 1977 Iraq Is Passing Up 5% Rise in Oil Price BAGHDAD, Iraq, July 5, (Reuters)-- Iraq has decided not to forgo a 5 percent increase in the price of crude oil sched- uled for July 1, the Iraq press agency said today. The Iraqi decision leaves Libya n as the only one of the 13 member states of the organization of Petroleum Export-r ing Countries still formally committed to increase the price of its oil from lash. Friday. Libya announced at the end June that it would also forgo its latest price in-' crease if the Saudis andthe United Arab Emirates restored price unity within the organization. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi- rates agreed on Sunday to increase their oil prices by 5 per cent to bring them into line with the otherOPECcountries. But Still there was no , announcement from Libya. OPEC has operated a two-tier oil prico system since the beginning of the year,., Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi-, rates then raised prices by 5 percent while the 11 other countries posted i4j, creases of 10 per cent and planneda further increase of 5 per cent from July 1. Nine countries - Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar and Venezuela-agreed last month to cancel the second increase. This was in anticipation of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates announcing an in- crease to end the price split. World Oil Usage Is Record LONDON, July 5(AP)-World oil con- sumption rose to record levels in 1976 after falling for two sucessive years fol- lowing the oil crisis of 1973, the British Petroleum Company Ltd. said today.. Regions or countries showing a more than average increase in oil consumption in 1976 included the United States, Latin America, the Netherlands, Spain, West Germany, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China, B.P. said. In Britain, oil use fell 0.5 per cent In its annual survey of oil use, B.P. said total international oil consumption rose 6.6 percent, or 178 million tons, (1.28 billion barrels) last year to a record 2.88 billion tons, or 20.7 billion barrels, sur- passing the previous record of 2.77 billion tons,-or 19.9 billion barrels, in 1973. Oil use, excluding the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China, increased last year by 6.6 percent to 2.34 billion tons from 2.19 billion tons, or 15.8 billion bar- rels, in 1975, BAP said. Lions appears to be directly connected with the availability of sex education, contraceptives and birth-control pro- grams. For example, Japan's ratio- now about one abortion for every three births-is down sharply from figures 20 and 25 years ago, despite changes in customs and the casual ease with which abortions can be ar- ranged. In other places-Yugoslavia is per- haps the best example-religious and cultural traditions have the strongest impact. In Serbia, where the Orthodox Church is relatively less strict on sex- ual mores than either the Catholic Church or Islam the average number 1 P fi Prof. Dmitri Velentei of Moscow children, and Franco had only one, a i)niversity argue Jsdn tr44LMeas&2045/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 tions is useless: "A woman who does not want to have a baby will not have it. Legal barriers have practically no effect anywhere in the world." The French Movement for Family Planning says that France in general is even more hostile to contraception and sex education than to abortion. The organization's director, Simone Iff, says: "Contraception remains a privilege of wealth. and is not widely practiced by the working class. A woman who demands contraception is asking for the right to make love when she wants. Her punishment is abortion. This is the Catholic mental- ity." ` Iff's group, a privately funded or- ganization that works closely with the Ministry of Health, estimates that 75 per cent of French women do not use contraceptives. . In Italy, where fewer than 5 per cent of women are thought to use any contraceptive method other than coi- tus interruptus, a study five years ago of more than 500 30-year-old married women in Rome showed two abortions for every two or three children. A referendum on abortion is to be held next spring, unless an abortion law is passed before then, and it is widely expected that the result will be similar to the 1974 divorce referen- dum, when 60 per cent voted for its legalization. Meanwhile, illegal abor- tions and charter trips to London pre- sumably will continue to be the main- stays. England, with its relatively liberal laws that draw foreign women by the thousands-some 27,000 last year- presents an anomaly. Although there is reported to be wide public support for the present laws, anti-abortion senti- ment is high in the House of Com- mons, and there is some expectation of abortions per married woman is that the law may be made more re, 1,78. "Every year in Belgrade" which strictive. is in Serbia "we kill the equivalent of Pro-abortion forces in Commons be- the population of a small town-about lieve they have a chance to prevent 40,000," a Yugoslav doctor said. the new restrictions from passing into in wealthier, Catholic Slovenia, it is law by bottling them up in committee, 0.28, and in Moslem Kosovo it is 0.23, but the fact that they are trying to lowest in the country. kill the bill rather than let it come to By contrast, laws regulating abor- a vote shows how strong the antiabor- tion seem to have little effect, other tion side has become. than channeling women to illegal In Macho Spain, where widely avail- abortionists. When Josef Stalin made able contraceptives are cutting down abortions illegal in 1936, it produced the number of abortions, King Juan only a short-term rise in the Soviet Carlos is continuing the practice be- birthrate; when Nikita Khrushchev gun by Generalissimo Francisco made them legal in 1955, there was no France of awarding medals to parents erce tible drop in the birthrate. of large families. The king has three Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 and why? income helpful The rate of growth of the world's population , The key elements that can be deliberately managed to acceler- ate fertility reduction are: Year Total population Rate of growth per year since previous date Doubling Health: Improving the level of health, particularly of chil- dren, ensures the survival of a desired minimum of offspring 1,000,000 B.C. a few thousand - 8,000 B.C. 8 million .0007% 100,000 years Birth rates and death rates in developing 1 A.D. 300 million .046 % 1.500 years 1750 800 million .06 % 1,200 years and developed countries 1900 1,650 million .48 % 150 years Dev ctnping Develo ed Total 1970 3,600 million 1.0 % 70 years p Iount lies countries varld 2000 6,300 million 2.0 % 35 years and 34 with explicit policies to reduce the growth rate. Now all of this is encouraging. Will the change of government in India make a material differ- ence in regard to that nation's population control program? As you may know, the outcome of the recent election raised some concerns over how the population control program would be regarded by the new government. I was encouraged to see that the new leaders, while stressing their commitment to the wholly voluntary approach, have reaffirmed after the election their sup- port of the program. While doing so they drew attention to the very important linkages between fertility and health, education, enhanced status of women, and other tangible improvements in living standards. There is in India itself the hopeful example of the state of Kerala which, despite having a lower per capita in- come, has achieved higher standards of literacy and general edu- cation, lower infant mortality rates and lower birthrates than other, richer states. India's family planning system is making progress: the crude birthrate has been falling and sometime in the 1960s the rate of natural increase stopped accelerating: the 1981 census is likely to show this rate has fallen to or below 2 per- cent per annum. This development, together with the government of India's continued support for its population program and its recognition of the linkages with broader social economic devel- opment, leaves me hopeful that substantial progress in controlling India's population will be achieved. Why is a high birthrate damaging to the economic development of a nation? Excessive population growth severely penalizes many of the de- veloping nations. Ii drains away resources, dilutes per capita in- come, and widens inequalities. In most developing countries today birthrates range between 30 and 50 per thousand, and their death rates between 10 and 25 per thousand. The result is that as a group their population is growing at about 2.3 percent a year, and at that pace it will double in about 30 years. At the national level the government must devote more and more investment simply to provide minimal services to an ever- increasing number of children. At the family level the same needs press in on the parents of large families. During their early years most children are primarily con- sumers rather than producers. For both the government and the family, more children mean more expenditures on food, on shel- ter, on clothing, on health, on education, on every essential social service. And it means correspondingly less expenditure on in- vestment to achieve the very economic growth required to fi- nance these services. As children reach adulthood the problem is compounded by mounting unemployment. There are not enough jobs to go round because the government - grappling with the daily demands of the increasing numbers - has been unable to invest enough in job- producing enterprises. Thus the cycle of poverty and over- population tightens - each reinforcing the other - and the entire social and economic framework weakens under the weight of too great a dependency ratio. A typical example is the case of Al- geria, as contrasted with Sweden. In Algeria, with its high birth rate, every 100 persons of working age in 1970 had to support 98 children under the age of 15. In Sweden, with its low birthrate, ev- ery 100 persons of working age had to support only 32 children un- der 15. What should be done to reduce fertility? Is better distribution of ('rude ('rude Rate of Crude Crude Hate of Crude Crude Hale of birth death natural birth death natural birth death natural rate rate increase rate rate increase rate rate increase 1969 42.9 17.0 2.6 18.0 9.1 0.9 32.0 13.3 1.9 1975 39.0 15.1 2.4 17.3 9.3 0.8 30.0 12.3 1.8 Source: United Nations, Selected World Demographic Indicators by Coun- tries, 1950-2000. May, 1975: and Population Council Data Bank. and provides parents with greater incentive for planning and investment for both their children and themselves. Education: Broadening the knowledge of both males and fe- males beyond their familial and local milieu enables them to learn about and take advantage of new opportunities, and to perceive the future as something worth planning for, in- cluding personal family size. Broadly distributed economic growth: Tangible improve- ment in the living standards of a significant proportion of the low-income groups in a.society provides visible proof that as- pirations for a better life can in fact be realized, and that a more compact family size can have economic advantages. Urbanization: It generally offers greater accessibility to health services and education; increased familiarity with the more modern economic sector; and new savings and con- sumption patterns: all of which tend to alter attitudes to- wards traditional family size. Enhanced status of women: Expanding the social, political, occupational, and economic opportunities of women beyond the traditional roles of motherhood and housekeeping enables them to experience directly the advantages of lowered fertil- ity, and to channel their creative abilities over a much broader spectrum of choice. The data (on birthrates and selected development indicators) in several developing countries demonstrate that there are apparent correlations and that fertility levels and levels of certain specific socio-economic indices tend to move together. Declining levels of infant mortality, and rising levels of nutrition, literacy, and non- agricultural employment appear to be accompanied by lower birthrates. The correlation appears to be with specific elements of development - literacy, for example, and nutrition and infant mortality - rather than with the, general level of economic wealth. Governments should try to: ? Reduce current infant and child mortality rates sharply. ? Expand basic education and increase the proportion of girls in school. ? Increase the productivity of smallholders in the rural areas, and expand earning opportunities in the cities for low-income groups. ? Put greater stress on more equitable distribution and ser- vices in the drive for greater economic growth. ? And above all else, raise the status of women socially, eco- nomically, and politically. While economic growth is a necessary condition of development in a modernizing society, it is not in itself a sufficient condition. The reason is clear. Economic growth cannot change the lives of the mass of the people unless it reaches the mass of the people. Most countries in Latin America, for example, have consid- erably higher per capita income than countries in Asia and Af- rica. And yet fertility rates are not proportionately lower. That, in part, is a function of the -serious inequalities in income dis- Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6 tribution in the LatinAwm4gFici lr Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-R $fiQQQ,5WQQt(Q QP440 be understood by ap- A study of various characteristics in 64 countries from both the developed and developing areas of the world, for which data are available, confirmed that more equitable income distribution, with the resultant broader distribution of social service, is strongly associated with lower fertility. The analysis suggested that each additional percentage point of total income received by the poorest 40 percent reduces the general fertility rate by about 3 points. Will it be necessary to use coercion to reduce birthrates? There are many different approaches to the task of promoting a new social consensus on population problems within a society, and the choice of one over another - or any particular mix of ac- tions - must, of course, be guided by the cultural context of the society in question. But the truth is that most of the approaches, and all of the actions, are difficult to implement. If these ap- proaches fail, and population pressures become too great, nations will be driven to more coercive methods. A number of governments are moving in the direction of coer- cion already. Some have introduced legal sanctions to raise the age of marriage. A few are considering direct legal limitations on family size, and sanctions to enforce them. No government really wants to resort to coercion in this matter. But neither can any government afford to let population pressures grow so dan- gerously large that social frustrations finally erupt into irrational violence and civil disintegration. How hopeful are you that governments will move fast enough to bring down birthrates dramatically? Why is speed necessary? For every decade of delay in achieving a net reproduction rate of 1.0 - replacement level - the world's ultimate steady-state population will be about 15 percent greater. Friday, July 1, 1977 plying it to the present outlook. If current trends in fertility rates continue, i.e., if crude birthrates in developing countries decline by approximately 6 points per decade, it appears that the world might reach a net reproduction rate of 1.0 in about the year 2020. This would lead to a steady-state population of 11 billion some 70 years later. If the date at which replacement-level fertility is reached could be advanced from 2020 to 2000, the ultimate population would be approximately 3 billion less, a number equivalent to 75 percent of today's world total. This reveals in startling terms the hidden penalties of failing to act, and act immediately, to reduce fertility. If global replacement levels of fertility were to be reached around the year 2000, with the world ultimately stabilizing at about 8 billion, 90 percent of the increase over today's levels would be in the developing countries. It would mean, if each coun- try followed the same general pattern, an India of 1.4 billion; a Brazil of 275 million; a Bangladesh of 245 million; a Nigeria of 200 million; and a Mexico of 175 million. But, given today's level of complacency in some quarters, and discouragement in others, the more likely scenario is a world stabilized at about 11 billion. Populations in the developing coun- tries would be 40 to 60 percent greater than indicated above be- cause of two decades of delay in reaching replacement levels of fertility. By our action - or inaction - we will shape the world for all generations to come. We can avoid a world of 11 billion and all the misery that such an impoverished and crowded planet would imply. But we cannot avoid it by continuing into the next quarter century the ineffective approach to the problem of popu- lation that has characterized the past 25 years. India's economy drifts; prices soar By Mohan Ram Special to The Christian Science Monitor New Delhi The Indian economy is drifting, and while the new govern- ment is trying to halt the drift, the outlook is somber. On balance, fiscal 1976-77 was a bad year. The gross national product rose only by 2 percent, against 8.5 percent the year be- fore. Food-grain output plummeted by 10 million tons. Overall industrial production went up by 10 percent, but this conceals something: Most consumer-goods industries did not show any appreciable increase. Wholesale prices rose by 12 percent. The only bright spots are a record 18 million-ton food-grain reserve held by the state - although one-third of it is rotting in the open for want of proper storage space - and a comfortable position in foreign exchange reserves, thanks to expanded ex- ports and a drop in imports (mainly food and fertilizer). But these are dubious plus points. Ironically, they are also a source of embarrassment because they are contributing to the inflationary pressures. Despite the huge food-grain reserve, large numbers of Indians continue to live on a semi-starvation diet because they cannot afford to buy food. Inheriting an economy that by many estimates is in shambles, the new government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai wants to shift the emphasis away from the Soviet-style physical planning and heavy industry that had been the policy of. his predecessor (Indira Gandhi) to agriculture, irrigation, and labor-intensive small industries. Industrial production, it is hoped, will be stimulated by an "easy" money policy and incentives for private investment. The new rulers recognize the need for expanding exports to meet foreign-exchange needs, but they reject a World Bank recommendation for "export-led growth." The latest World Bank report wants India to take risks to "grow faster" and calls for a growth-oriented strategy, taking advantage of the food-grain reserves and favorable balance-of- payments position. The report, much of it prepared before the dramatic politi- cal change here last March, notes that long-term growth has been unsatisfactory, both in agriculture and industry. Despite the "green revolution," agricultural output barely has kept pace with population growth. In industry, shortage of supplies, particularly imported ones, and rigidities in the licensing sys- tem have held back growth. Recent improvements have yet to bring about a fundamental change in the situation. Given the resource position of India, investment and devel- opment expenditures could be raised without an extra burden on consumption. The major area of additional investment should be agriculture and irrigation, the report says. A faster growth trend in agriculture also will help industrial growth, the report continues, and exports provide another source of demand that can stimulate industrial production. Prime Minister Desai's budget for 1977-78 seems to have an- ticipated the World Bank report. It seeks to give a new direc- tion to the economy. (The new government party had prom- ised bread, liberty, and work for all in 10 years' time, mainly through labor-intensive, decentralized industries.) But it is questionable whether significant results can be achieved in the nine months left in the current fiscal year. The government contends that it took over only three months ago, and not with a clean slate at that. Even so, it has yet to devise a strategy for accelerating development that takes advantage of the comfortable food-grain and improved balance-of-pay- ments positions. Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200100004-6