INTERAGENCY STUDY ON BATTLEFIELD LASERS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86B00885R000800990210-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 23, 2007
Sequence Number:
210
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 6, 1982
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP86B00885R000800990210-8.pdf | 503.04 KB |
Body:
Central Intelligence Agency
6 October 1982
Executive Assistant
to the DDCI
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Executive R6gistrp
MEMORANDUM FOR: General E. C. Meyer, USA
Chief of Staff, Army
THROUGH . Major General William E. Odom, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
SUBJECT : Interagency Study on Battlefield Lasers
In light of your expressed interests, John McMahon asked me
to forward you the attached proposal, which indicates that the
Community is beginning to focus on battlefield lasers.
Attachments
SECRET
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
DDI #7143-82
15 September 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee
Chairman, Scientific and'Technical Intelligence Committee
VIA Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM
REFERENCE
Acting airman, National Intelligence Council
Proposal for an Interagency Study on Soviet Battlefield
Laser Threat to US Forces
Memo from D/OSWR to C/IiIC, Same Subject, DDI-6870/82,
Dated 23 Aug 82
1. I have re??iewed the referenced proposal and believe it outlines an
excellent approach to a key intelligence issue. It is clear that'the deploy-
ment of anti-sensor laser weapons on the battlefield presents a..major
challenge to US weapon developers. The US Army Chief of Staff has recently
reiterated his concerns over these developments. I believe these concerns
and the other factors noted proposal argue fora prompt response b5X1
the Intelligence Community.
2. The most effective and efficient vehicle for such an assessment
appears to be a joint WSSIC/STIC study. The assessment should include some
projective thinking on where in the force structure these weapons may be
deployed. and how they would be used on the battlefield.. This will require
some work outside of the S&T Community. The study should be geared to the
people who allocate R&D dollars. than bench engineers and should be2SR1
as tight a schedule as possible.
3. MG Edward B. Atkeson, USA, National Intelligence Officer for General
Ted can offer valuable igsichts as your committees becin definina terms of __ _.
Purpose Forces, is prepared to cooperate fully in this project. He has
spoken with General Meyer about. Army concerns in this area and has recently
begun a dialogue with the Army-Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development
and Acquisition and his staff on more specific Army requirements. I believe
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? SECRET
ME31ORANDUM' FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
TUROCGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Scientific and Weapons Research
.SUBJECT: Proposal for an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on
Soviet Battlefield Laser Threat to US Forces:
and a statement of official concern are contained in the March 1982
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Forward Area Laser
Weapons. The covering memorandum for this report, approved by the
Secretary of Defense, made specific recommendations for actions by the
DOD, USDRE, and the Services. It also noted certain deficiencies in
:intelligence support, declaring that:
1.. From a variety of sources, it is clear that there.is heichtered
interest and concern over Soviet threats to US forces that are posed by
lasers, particularly low and medium-energy devices that have received
little or no serious attention in the Intelligence Community. Though
,recognition of the possibility of such threats is not at all new, having
been discussed for well over a decade, there is now an appreciation of
the enormity of the potential threat and the perception of a clear and
present danger to US forces. 25X1
2. The most authoritative and up-to-date assessment of the problem
"
mchhaid hiho
u more empss anger priority shuld be given by the
intelligence community to evaluating the laser threat, both from
collection and analysis viewpoints. In particular, more emphasis
is needed in the: low and medium energy threat evaluation.
-.the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, is to be required by
"
USDRE to
provide greater effort and higher priority for
intelligence collection and analysis on the Soviet anti-sensor
laser threat,.incl of only high, but low and medium, energy 25X1
programs as well=" .
=or Re.te~se:2007/04/2 .,.UA-RDP86B0
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C r en r- -r
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SUBJECT : Proposal for an Interagenc;? Intelligence ::erioranduc on
Soviet Battlefield Laser Threat to 1S Forces
o
.brief. 25X
Collection
Earlier this year, the DCI received a letter from' Genera? `'ever,
Army Chief of Staff, asking for support and higher priority in
collection of'intelligerce on the Soviet use of lasers in ground weapon
systems. The Human Resources Committee was tasked to review community'
collection capabilities and the Weapon and Space Systems Subcommittee
(WSSIC) was instructed to prepare a. tactical laser collection Su
Tt
y
the low/tedium energy laser threat. The ?.?'SSIC collection support brief
will help to improve collection and it serves as the beginning of a
formal community response to the implorations of the Defense Science
It seems fair to conclude that the Intelligence Comm unitv'now
recognizes, albeit belatedly, the need to assize a higher priorit to
Board and General Neycr regarding collection.
But a community response to the challenges and requirements to
improve the analyses and threat estimates of Soviet battlefield lasers
~~
.is not apparent. Analysis
Within the Intelligence Community, Army and Air Force have been the
primary producers of the finished intelligence that does exist on the
low/medium energy laser problem. For the record, their major
publications include:
"Projection of rlectro-Optical Systems for viet Ground Forces "
(FSTC.SST-1740R-100-76-SAO, November 1976.
- "Low Energy Laser Technologies--USSR," (FTD), DST-17435-034-79,
12
Sep 979; Eti S74
xecuveummary, DST-10E-034-30, 18 April 25X1.
1980.
"Low Energy Laser Applications--USSR," (FSTC), DST-1743S-031-7
2 November 1979; Supplement 2, DST-1740S-036-82-SUP 2, 7 May
,non ' I
"Soviet Ta al Laser Threat," (Arrnvl - 1740-013-80-SA0, xi
I I December 1979.
"Helicopter and Ground-Based EO Capabilities-- Eurasian Communist
Countries, Volume 2: Electro-Optics," DST-1740S-005 81-VOL 2,
31 July 1981; update issued 16 July 1982. 25X1.
SECRET
. Aoraroved For. Release 2007/04/25 CIA-RE),P86B00885R00080099.0210-
E. Wayne Boring
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SUBJECT: Proposal for an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: on
Soviet Battlefield Laser Threat to US Forces
mentioned previously, so this effort would be a logical extension. The
alternative would be to commission an IN, but we believe that the state
of knowledge at this time would not support as definitive a product as
desired from an IIIM. The WSSIC/STIC assessment would then serve as the
first step, identifying areas for research prior to writing an IIM.? (A
rough outline and a terms of reference for such a study are attached for
your consideration). II . . ? .. 25X1
jointly prepared by WSSIC and STIC. These .com-.ittees have: established
subcommittees with some knowledge and responsibility-.-in this area, and
.would be in the best position: to respond in a timely manner.
Furthermore, they are already working on a project in this area, as
4. I suggest that the NIC request an assessment of this issue
.consideration ought to be ven to a prompt and direct response.by the
Intelligence Community. Y25X1
3. In addition to any intramural efforts that individual
intelligence agencies can and must undertake, perhaps serious
25X1
would be time consuming and difficult, I nevertheless suggest that such
an effort would be worthwhile and that serious consideration be given to
undertaking it as soon as possible. I have discussed the possibility of
undertaking this project with the Chairmen of WSSIC and STIC. 25X1
capabilities to develop strategic (high-energy) laser systems. Last
year, the STIC produced the community' minal assessment of Soviet
radiofrequency weapons capabilities. F-1
6. Though preparation of the assessment on battlefield lasers
5. The WSSIC/STIC assessment as proposed would not be unique or
without precedent, and it would not be premature. Recall that in the
early 1970s the NIO/SP requested an encyclopedic assessment of Soviet
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SECRET . ,
PROPOSED INTERAGENCY ASSESSNENI: The Soviet Fattlefield Laser Threat
to US ! _!!Lary Forces
Background
either presently deployed or planned for deployment in this decade, is
heavily dependent upon electro-optical (EC) systems for navigation,
target acquisition, fire control and precision guidance of w.unitions.
Many billions of dollars have been or are programmed to be invested in
air. and ground weapon systems which depend upon. EO sensors and seekers.
Most of the US tactical equipment in t forward combat area,
The US dependence on EO systems is considerable and. pervasive.
that threat ray well be imminent.
energy laser damage weapons-the Soviet low and cediun-energy threats to
tactical systems were, with some exceptions, largely overlooked. Today
The concern is primarily over low and rediun-energy laser weapons
that could be derived from current technology. The Intelligence
Community has been concerned with the 'strategic threat posed by high
Key Questions
Most of the key questions of interest on the subject of the.
battlefield laser threat were recently compiled by the Letterman Army
Institute of Research. With some paraphrasing, these are:
-- Which Soviet/Warsaw Pact military platforms currently field
laser devices? What are. the purposes of these lasers? .
-- For each fielded or deployed Soviet/::arsaw Pact laser device,
what are the'types of lasers, their wavelengths, average.
power/pulse energy, peak power/pulse energy, pulse width, prf,
and. beam divergences? .
Are low-energy/low-power laser devices used in Soviet/Warsaw'
Pact war-gaming. scenarios and military exercises?
-. What are the. Soviet/Warsaw Pact employment provisions,
.and tactics for their military lasers?
-- ;:hat are the capabilities of the Soviet/tiarsaw Pact forces in
engaging US/NATO'forces with existing laser hardware,_either as
Does Soviet/Warsaw Pact military training provide for the use of
lasers offensively? Against what targets? Under what
circumstances?::
-- What are the Soviet/Warsaw Pact projections for introducing
additional an$i new low or medium-energy laser devices into their
_.armed forces?:- By what time? On what platforms? For what uses?
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This study should address the emergin issue of low and mediur
-
..
energy tactical battlefield laser capabilities, of the Soviet Union and
the l?arsaw Pact countries and the threats these pcse to US and NATO
forces and systems. It should review and.sum ari7e the status and
prospects in Soviet research, development, production, and deplolner.t of
illurinators, designators and guidance systems, and ~;eapons. The issues
anti
Soviet/Warsaw .Pact capabilities to 'produce rugged, 'reliable
A deployed laser order of battle for Soviet/!:arsav Fact rali'_arv
-- Technical characteristics of deployed and projected
Soviet/Warsaw Pact laser systems and their perforra ce in their
helicopters, and aircraft).
equipments (tanks, armored vehicles., personnel carriers,
-- Performance of deployed and projected laser systems used in any
secondary or ancillary roles,.e.g., a rangefinder used as a
countermeasure to a sensor or as an antipersonnel "blinding"
weapon.
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