PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 97TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
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Publication Date:
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United States
of America
Zon,gitzzianaf Record
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 9j tl~ CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1982
Senate
No nomination shall be reported to the
back-
EXECUTIVE SESSION Senate unless the nominee has filed a back-
ground and financial disclosure statement
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask with the C nmittee.
unanimous consent that the Senate go John McMahon has filed both of
into executive session for the purpose these statements with the committee.
of considering Calendar Order No. 773, I ask unanimous consent that the
under Central Intelligence, the norm- unclassified sections of these state-
nation of John N. McMahon, of Mary- ments be printed in the RECORD.
land, to be Deputy Director. There being no objection, the mate-
There being no objection, the Senate rial was ordered to be printed in the
proceeded to the consideration of ex- RECORD, as follows
ecutive business. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY PRESI-
nomination will be stated. DENTIAL NOMINEES
A. Biographical Information:
CENTRAL INTELLIGINCE 1. Name: McMahon. John Norman.
2. Former name(s) used, if any: N/A.
The legislative clerk read the nomi- 3. Date of birth: July 3, 1929.
nation of John N. McMahon, of Mary- 4. Spouse's name: Hugger, Margaret Joan:
land, to be Deputy Director. 5. Former name(s) used by spouse, if any:
A
.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I NS
rise today to support the nomination tricia Joy, 1928; Christopher John, .1%27;
of John N. McMahon, of Maryland, to Timothy Richard, 1923; And Peter Collins,
be Deputy Director of Central Intelli- 1918.
gence, replacing Admiral Inman who 7. Education: Holy Cross. 1947-51. B.A.;
has resigned. Georgetown Law. 1951; and Harvard Ad-
With 31 years of service at the Cen. vaned Management Program 1968.
tral Intelligence Agency, Mr. McMa- Employment record (list all positions since
hon certainly has the background to college, including military service):
do a good job. I believe that he is a Position or title: (See attachment.)
topnotch professional who is highly Name of employer: CUL
regarded within the intelligence tom- Location and dates of employment:
His confirmation should have Abroad and Washington, D.C. 1981-present.
munity. His
a positive effect on morale within this Community. Employment Record:
All of Mr. McMa)noa's working life September 19.2-rune 1952, communica-
has been spent at the CIA where he bons processing and distribution clerk.
June 1952-June 1952, communications
accumulated a distinguished record. tech (crypt) (overseas).
During that time, he served in all July 1951-August 1953, communications
phases of 'CIA operations including cable analyst (overseas).
top jobs in electronic ? intelligence, August 1953-July 1954. chief, cable desk
technical services, administration, op- (overseas).
erations, and analysis. He has also July 1954-November 1954, home leave and
served on the intelligence community training at CIA's training site.
staff as acting deputy. November 1954-February 1955, adminis-
trative officer (overseas).
John McMahon will have a tough February 1955-January 1957, Assistant to
job replacing Admiral Inman, whom I Chief of Station (overseas).
consider to be one of the best intelli- March 1957-Septemberr 1957, entered mil-
gence officers I have known. Nonethe- itary service under Agency auspices.
less, I axn pleased that someone with September 196 November 1957, Head-
John's qualifications and experience Quarters, European Division, counterintelli-
has been named for this poet. gence.
Rule 5.6 of the rules of procedure November 1167-December 1958. Deputy
Processins.
C
hief, the Select Committee on Intelli January Mav anusryt 1959-i![ay 196
1961, case officer for
gence states that: U-2 pilots and contract monitor of technical
representatives.
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2
May 1981-November 1962, Executive OIf!? as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
cer, Development Projects Division; was re- for Operations (1978-1981). In that capacity
sponsible for CIA reconnaissance activities, I was responsible for the collection of for-
and support to all phases of air operations., eign intelligence from human sources, coun-
November 1962-January 1964, Chief, Pro- terintelligence, and conducting special actiy-
gram Analysis Staff /Development Projects ities as directed by the National Security
Division. Council. As Deputy Director for National
January 1964-July 1964, DCI program Foreign Assessment (April 1981-January
analysis staff. 1982), I was the Director's principal advisor
August 1964-September 1965, DDS&T sys- on the analytical process and the productin
tems analysis staff. of national intelligence, including Intelli-
September 1965-September .1970, Deputy gence Community estimates and CIA pro-
Director, Office of Special Projects. duction. Finally, as Executive Director since
September 1970-July 1971, Deputy Direc- January of this year, I have been responsi-
tor, Office of ELINT. ble for the day-to-day management of the
July 1971-April 1973, Director, Office of Central Intelligence Agency.
ELINT. Within the Intelligence Community, I
April 1973-August 1974, Director, Office served as Associate Deputy (1976) and then
of Technical Service. Acting Deputy (1977) to the DCI for the In-
August 1974-May 1978, Associate Deputy telligence Community. In those capacities I
Director for Administration. assisted the DCI in executing his Communi-
May 1976-April 1977, Associate Deputy to ty responsibilities and served as his princi-
the DCI for the Intelligence Community. pal advisor on all matters relating to the
April 1977-January 1978, Acting Deputy National Foreign Intelligence Program
to the DCI for the Intelligence Community. budget and on Community-wide collection
January 1978-April 1981. Deputy Director tasking. I would also like to note that
for Operations. during most of my career (since 1959), I
April 1981-January 1982, Deputy to the have served in positions involving national
DCI for National Foreign Assessment. programs requiring coordination, and in
January 1982, Executive Director. many cases joint efforts, with the military
Honors and awards: List below all scholar- services.
ships. fellowships, honorary degrees, mili- I believe my long and varied career has
tary medals. honorary society memberships provided me an in-depth appreciation of all
and any other special recognition4 for out- facets of the intelligence process, both
standing service or achievement. within the CIA and the Intelligence Com-
Distinguished Intelligence Medal (2). munity, and therefore qualifies me for the
Intelligence Medal of Merit. position for which I have been nominated.
Certificate of Distinction. Foreign aryilfations:
National Intelligence Distinguished Serv- Have you or your spouse ever represented
ice Medal. in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney,
Certificate of Recognition-William A. business or political adviser orr consultant),
Jump Memorial Award. with or without compensation, a foreign
References: Please provide the Committee government or any entity controlled by a
with the names and current addresses and foreign government? No.
telephone numbers of five individuals whom If you or your spouse have ever been for-
you believe are in a position to comment mally associated with a law, accounting,
upon your qualifications for the office to public relations or other service organiza-
which you have been nominated. Please in- tion, have any of you or your spouse's asso-
clude the names of at least three (3) persons ciates represented, in any capacity, with or
who have known you for more than five without compensation, a foreign govern-
years. ment or any entity controlled by a foreign
Name, address, tel. No., No. of years refer- government? No.
ence has known you: If the answer to either or both of the
Vice President George Bush, White above questions is "yes", describe each rela-
House, 456-7123, 7. tionship.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Frank Car- (Note.-The questions above are not limit-
lucci, Pentagon, 695-6352, 6. ed to relationships requiring registration
Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, White House, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.)
456-6606, 7. During the past five years, have you or
Adm. Stansfield Turner, 1320 Sldpwith your spouse received any compensation
Road, McLean, Virginia 22101, 522-5258, 6. from, or been involved in any financial or
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., State Department, business transactions with a foreign govern-
632-9640, 6. ment or an entity controlled by a foreign
Qualifications: State fully your qualifiea- government? No.
tions to serve in the position for which you If yes, please furnish details.
have been nominated. (Note.-Questions 1, 2, & 3 do not call for
During my 31 years of government service, a response if the representation or transac-
I have had the good fortune to work in all tion was authorized by the United States
four Directorates of the Central Intelii- Government in connection with your em-
gence Agency as well as on staffs supporting ployment in government service.)
the DCI in executing his Intelligence Com? Have you or your spouse ever registered
munity responsibilites. Within CIA, my re, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act?
sponsibilities in the scientific and technical No.
arena have included reconnaissance oper- (a) As far as it can be foreseen, state y4 r
ations and research and development (1965-, plans after completing government service.
1974). As Associate Deputy Director for Ad+. Please state specifically any agreements or
ministration (1974-1976), I helped manage understandings, written or unwritten, con-
our support capabilities, including commu- cerning employment after leaving govern
nications, logistics, data processing, person- ment service in particular concerning agree-'j
nel, security apd training. I have also served ments, understandings or options to return
to your current position.
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Undetermined-no agreements or under- 3 3. Are you willing to provide such Informa-
standings. tion as is requested by such committees?
(b) Have you received any offer or expres- yes.
sion of interest to employ your services in Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
any capacity? If yes, please furnish details.
No. here a letter from the Office of
.
(c) If you are presently in government Government Ethics on John N. McMa-
service, during the past five years of such hon. This letter states that:
service have you received from a person out- Be is in compliance with applicable laws
side of government an offer or expression of and regulations governing conflict of inter-
interest to employ your Services after you est.
leave government service?
No. , I ask unanimous consent that it be
Do you have any commitments or agree- printed in the RECORD as well.
ments to pursue outside employment, with There being no objection, the letter
or without compensation, during your serv- was ordered to be printed in the
ice with the government? If yes, please fur- RECORD, as follows:
nish details.
No. OFFICE or GOVERNMENT ETHics,
List all securities, real property, partner- OFFICE Or PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
ship interests, or other investments or re- Washington, D.C., May 14, 1982.
ceivables with a current market value (or, if Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER,
market value is not ascertainable, estimated Chairman, Select Committee on Intelli-
current fair value) in excess of $1,000. gence, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
(NOTE: The information provided in re- DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with
sponse to Schedule A of the disclosure the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, I en-
forms of the Office of Government Ethics close a copy of the financial disclosure
may be incorporated by reference, provided report filed by John N. McMahon, who has
that current valuations are used.) been nominated by President Reagan for
Description of Property: Home. the position of Deputy Director of Central
Value: Estimated $170,000. , Intelligence.
List all loans mortgages, or other indebt- We have reviewed the report and have
edness (including any contingent liabilities) also obtained advice from the Central Intel-
in excess of $10,000. (NOTE: the informa- ligence Agency concerning any possible con-
tion provided in response to Schedule D of ' flict in light of the Agency's functions and
the disclosure form of the Office of Govern- the nominee's proposed duties. Based there-
ment Ethics may be incorporated by refer- on, we believe that Mr. McMahon is in com-
ence, provided that contingent liabilities are pliance with applicable laws and regulations
also included.) governing conflicts of interest.
Nature of obligation: Mortgage. Sincerely,
Name of obligee; Richard and Margaret J. JACKSON WALTER,
Hugger (in-laws). Director.
Amount $30,000. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
List source and amounts of all income re- have a letter here from Congressman
ceived during the last five years, including EDWARD P. BOLAND, chairman of the
all salaries, fees dividends, interest, gifts, House Permanent Select Committee
rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and on Intelligence, which is the counter-
other items exceeding $500. (If you prefer to part of our own committee in the
do so, copies of U.S. income tax returns for House of Representatives. Chairman
these years may be substituted here, but BOLAND writes:
their submission is not required.)
Salary: 1977, $48,427; 1978, $50,003; 1979, In strong support of the nomination of
$50,584; 1980, $63,299; 1981, $52,749. John N. McMahon to be Deputy Director of
Interest: 1977, $284; 1978, $325; 1979, $377; Central Intelligence.
1980,$498;1981,$658. As well, I have a letter here from
Have you ever been convicted (including Congressman J. KENNETH ROBINSON,
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere) of any ranking minority member of the
criminal violation other than a minor traffic House Permanent Select Committee
offense? If yes, please furnish details.
No. on Intelligence, expressing strong sup-
Have you ever been arrested or named as port for John McMahon's nomination.
a defendant in an indictment or information I ask unanimous consent that both
for any criminal violation, other than a these letters be printed in the RECORD.
minior traffic offense? if yes, please furnish There being no objection, the letters
details. were ordered to be printed in the
No.
Other information: RECORD, as follows:
1. Please advise the Committee of any ad- HOUSE or REPRESENTATIVES, PERMA-
ditional information, favorable or unfavor- NENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN-
able, which you feel should be considered in TELLIGENCE,
connection with your nomination. Washington, D.C. May 25, 1982.
None. Hon. BARRY GoLDWATER,
2. Are you willing to appear and testify Chairman, Senate Select Committee on In-
before any duly constituted committee of' telligence, Washington, D.C.
the Congress on such Occasions a$ YOU may DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I write in strong sup-
be reasonably requested to do so? port of the nomination of Mr. John N.
Yes. McMahon to be Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence.
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'During the past nearly five years of this
Committee's existence, it has held frequent
meetings with Mr. McMahon. He has im-
pressed me with his honesty, integrity an
forthrightness. During those years, he has
held several of the most senior, sensitive
and responsible positions in the Central In-
telligence Agency and he has carried out
those assignments in an exemplary fashion.
As the Deputy Director for Operations,
Mr. McMahon was responsible for some of
the most sensitive operations our nation's
intelligence services carry out. Under his
guidance, the DDO enhanced its profession-
alism and reinvigorated its morale.
During his tenure as the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, Mr. McMahon carried out a
major and long overdue restructuring of
CIA's analytic assets, bringing cross-disci-
pline capabilities to bear on key issues In a
more effective way.
In recognition of his managerial talents,
Director Casey appointed John McMahon
to the newly recreated position of Executive
Director of the CIA. Now, with the retire-
ment of Admiral Inman, Mr. McMahon has
been chosen by the President to become the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
When Admiral Inman's name was before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence for confirmation as Deputy Director,
I wrote to you endorsing him for that posi-
tion. In doing so, I stressed his attributes of
integrity, deep honesty and well reasoned
decisionmaking. The Intelligence Communi-
ty, the CIA and the nation can be gratified
that those very same attributes apply to Mr.
McMahon.
John McMahon is an excellent manager, a
widely experienced intelligence officer and a
well respected senior government official. I
am confident that he will do well in his new
assignment.
I am certain that all the Members of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelli- j
gence join with me in giving an unqualified,
endorsement to this fine American for the
post to which he has been nominated.
With every good wish, I am
Sincerely yours,
EDWARD P. BOLAND,
Chairman.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PERMA-
NENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN-
TELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C. May 26, 1982.
Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GOLDWATER: As the ranking
minority member of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence I want to
join my Chairman, Congressman Edward
Boland in endorsing the nomination of John,
N. McMahon for the position of Deputy Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.
During the past five years I have known
and worked with Mr. McMahon I have
found him to be extraordinarily responsive,
forthright and trustworthy in helping this
Committee meet its oversight responsibil-
ities of the Intelligence Community.
John McMahon has set a standard of pro-
fessionalism and leadership unequalled in,
the intelligence field. He has distinguished.
himself as head of the Intelligence Commu-
nity Staff; as Deputy Director of Operations
and Deputy Director of Intelligence as well
as Executive Director of the CIA. No other
officer of the agency has held so many di-
verse and key positions and done so in such
an outstanding manner.
Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that his
service in the position to which he has now
been nominated by the President- will be of
the greatest value to the Congress and to
this nation. Mr. McMahon has my full sup-
port and I urge speedy confirmation.
Respectfully,
J. KLNNETH ROBINSON.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
when John McMahon appeared before
our committee in public session on
May 27, 1982, he stated his firm con-
viction that "Congressional oversight
is beneficial, both for the American
people and for the Intelligence Com-
munity."
He also stated that.
The activities of the Intelligence Commu-
nity involving Americans are, and most con-
tinue to be, limited, subject to strict stand-
ards of accountability, and far removed.
from any abridgment of cherished Constitu-
tional rights.
I concur with these judgments, and
would like to share Mr. McMahon's
full statement with my colleagues.
I ask unanimous consent that his
statement before our committee be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF JOHN N. MCMAHON
Mr. Chairman, members of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, I am honored to
appear before you today to discuss my nomi-
nation to be Deputy Director of Central In-
telligence.. I appreciate the President's ex-
pression of confidence in me, and I ap-
proach this new challenge with enthusiasm
and determination.
I have, as you know, served our Nation as
an intelligence officer for over 30 years. I
feel fortunate to have had a varied, reward-
ing, and constantly challenging career, per-
mitting me to serve in all phases of intelli-
gence-from operations to analysis, and
from research and development of technical
collection systems to administration. Let me
briefly review it for the committee.
I began my career with the agency as a
clerk in 1951. After serving overseas for 5
years, I returned for basic training in the
army, and I then joined the U-2 program. In
1965, I became Deputy Director for the
Agency's Office of Special Projects, which
was concerned with applying the latest in
advanced technology to major intelligence
collection problems. Later, I served as Direc-
tor of the Office of Electronic Intelligence
and then as Director of the Office of Tech-
nical Service, responsible for technical sup-
port to overseas operations. In 1974, I
became Associate Deputy Director of CIA
for Administration. I then served as Asso-
ciate Deputy and Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the intelligence community, until being
appointed Deputy Director of CIA for Oper,
ations in January of 1978. In this capacjty t
directed , agency operations overseas.`;. Iii'
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April 19811 became Deputy Director for Na- undertaken in secret are being monitored by
tional Foreign Assessment, responsible for their elected representatives. Second, it as-
directing analysis and ' production of intelli- sures the intelligence officers who under-
gence. I served in that capacity until Janu- take those activities that the Congress and
ary of this year, when I was appointed as the American people stand behind and sup-
the Agency's Executive Director, responsi- port them in their difficult and often- dan-
ble for the day-to-day management of CIA. gerous assignments.
My assignments, many of which involved The oversight arrangements which have
joint programs with the military, have given developed and matured over the past several
me both a detailed knowledge of the Central years have also served to enhance congres-
Intelligence Agency and a substantial appre- sional understanding of the intelligence mis-
ciatipn of military requirements and intelli- Sion and of the need for the long-range com-
gence needs. My 2 years with the intelli- mitment of resources to meet the challenges
gence community staff provided me with an which lie ahead. The cumulative impact of
in-depth understanding of all national pro- the annual authorization of appropriations
grams, military and civilian, the priority of for intelligence activities by this committee
intelligence requirements associated with and its counterpart in the House. of Repre-
those programs, and the best means of satis- sentatives, the review conducted in great
fying intelligence needs for policymakers, as detail by the appropriations committees,
well as our military commanders in the and the statutory obligation to keep the two
field. intelligence committees "fully and currently
When I Joined the Agency in 1951. Mr. informed" has made the Congress an active
Chairman, we lived in an essentially bipolar I partner in our Nation's intelligence activi-
world. In those days our adversary was obvi- ties. This is as it should be, and I pledge to
ous, our mission was clear. and our efforts you that if confirmed I will make every
were focused accordingly. The United States effort to foster and improve this vital rela.
worked to build the democratic institutions tionship.
and economic capabilities of its friends, Mr. Chairman, that concludes my pre-
while the Soviet Union strove to subvert our pared remarks-I would be pleased to
ex:arts. The risk of atomic catastrophe was answer any questions which you and the
just then beginning to become a factor in members of the committee may have.
the struggle between freedom and totalitar- Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
ianism. We focused intelligence resources on in my judgment, the Senate Intelli-
the Soviet Union and its allies, and we ana- gene Committee has been very thor-
lyzed world events mainly in terms of their ough in its consideration of John
effect on the East-West balance of power. McMahon's nomination to this impor-
As we move through the 1980's and tart position in the U.S. Intelligence
beyond, it is clear that the intelligence mis- community.
sion must be geared to threats which are in- For example, we have devoted a full
creasingly varied, subtle, and complex. We 30 days to consideration of his norm-
can never take for granted our ability to ac-
curately assess the military capabilities and
intentions of our key adversaries, and the held a closed as well as a public hear-
Soviet Union must remain our first intelli- ing so that all aspects of his back-
gence priority. At the same time, we should ground could be examined in detail.
also insure that we appreciate fully the Four senior staff members read his
broad range of political, economic, social, complete personnel file and security
and religious forces whose interaction will file at the CIA. This is an unprec-
shape world events and influence the desti- edented precaution and has not been
ny of our own country. Finally, we should done before. We sent Mr. McMahon
never set aside the importance of more tra-
ditional causes of international conflict,
such as irredentism and national pride. tionnaire and followup questions from
The ability of the intelligence community the staff. These were responded to in
to provide national policycnakers with the writing before our hearings were held,
timely, accurate, and insightful information
and we inquired of other committees
they need to advance American interests in and other agencies of Government
the world requires that we constantly strive about Mr. McMahon before holding
to improve our capabilities to collect the our hearings. Finally, in spite of Mr.
right kind of information, to- analyze it ef- McMahon's long service with the CIA,
fectively, and to present it in a relevant and asked that an updated background
useful manner. We are encouraged that the we
mutual determination of the President and investigation on him be prepared by
the Congress to restore the vitality of our the FBI. Yesterday afternoon the vice
Nation's intelligence community is helping chairman of the Senate Intelligence
us translate these goals into reality. As we Committee, Senator MOYNIHAN, and I
do so, however, I would like to emphasize personally reviewed the FBI report.
for the record that the activities of the in- We have been very thorough, and
telligence community involving Americans
are, and must continue to be, limited, sub-
ject to strict standards of accountability,
and far removed from any abridgment of
cherished constitutional rights.
I am firmly convinced that congressional
oversight is beneficial, both for the Ameri-
can people and for the intelligence commu-
nity. The oversight system serves two key
purposes. First, it assures the 4merican
people that activities which are of necesgity
yet we have not been able to uncover
any factual information which would
reflect adversely on Mr. McMahon. As
a result, the committee voted unani-
mously that his nomination be sent to
the floor with a recommendation that
it be approved. I have no doubts that
we can expect a good relationship with
John McMahon in the future as
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6
Deputy Director of Central Intelli- when it had been misled, regardless of
gence, to the benefit of our people and whether this was done by persons
of the country. below or above him in the intelligence
I urge my colleagues to support this
nomination.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the
choice of John N. McMahon to be
Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence is a good one. During his 301
years with the Central Intelligence
Agency he has compiled a distin-
guished record of service to his coun-
try. He has received five significant
awards and has served in leadership
positions in all four directorates of the
CIA, as well as in the intelligence com-
munity staff. He is, in short, as highly
qualified a candidate for the position
of Deputy Director as we are evelt
likely to see.
The confirmation process is impor-
tant not only because it gives the
Senate a chance to make an independ..
ent evaluation of the qualifications of
the nominee, but also because it offers
a major opportunity for the exercise
of the congressional oversight func-
tion It enables us to take stock of
community. Mr. McMahon's answer
was that he pledged "to keep the com-
mittee fully and currently informed"
and to make sure that the committee
"received the information it deserves
to have and needs." We ask for noth-
ing more.
Mr. President, John McMahon is an
old friend to the select committee, of
which I am now vice chairman. He has
appeared before us on numerous occa-
sions during the 6 years the committee
has been in existence. I have every
confidence that our relationship in the
future will be as open, beneficial, and
professional as it has been in the past.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
I am pleased to join in urging my col-
leagues to support the nomination of
John McMahon as Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence. He brings to that
position a wealth of experience in all
aspects of the intelligence enterprise,
and I expect that we will provide solid
here we have been and where we are -4eadership for the intelligence commu-
W
headed. During my 5'rs years on the'
Senate Select Committee on Intelli.
gence we have concentrated on two
major tasks. First, we have established
mechanisms for congressional over-
sight. Second, we have tried to provide
the resources necessary for the re-
building of our intelligence capabili-
ties.
At both the closed and open,hear-
ings on his nomination, Mr. McMahon
was asked to address himself to these
two concerns.
Concerning the committee's role in
rebuilding the intelligence capabilities
of the country, Mr. McMahon noted
that "the downward trend has been re-
versed" and that this has occurred
"principally on the initiative of the
Congress." Too often, Mr. President,
the oversight function of the Congress
is seen in merely a negative light, as
only an exercise in checking the possi-
ble abuses of power. But this view is L
severely limited one. In fact, the over-
sight function can and does serve to
provide the needed guidance and impe-
tus for the proper use of power as
well. It was therefore gratifying to
hear Mr. McMahon's comments.
However, the oversight relationship
also demands that the Director and
Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence be willing to provide this com-
mitt a with the information it needs
in a timely and candid manner. During
the hearings, I asked Mr. McMahon
whether he would feel it his duty
under law and his obligation as a pro-
fessional intelligence officer to-Inform
the committee when he knees: iihat it
had been given wrong. 1 ' atiea or
nity.
At the Intelligence Committee's
hearing on his nomination last month.
I asked Mr. McMahon several ques-
tions which I believe are crucial for
the Senate's assessment of his views
on key intelligence policy issues. First
of all, it was important to find out Mr.
McMahon's position regarding the
danger of politicization of intelligence.
The use of intelligence to serve parti-
san, political interests has, I believe,
increased in the past several years. It
poses a serious threat to the integrity
of the Central Intelligence Agency and
other agencies in the intelligence com-
munity.
Problems in this regard are not
unique to any one administration or
party. They often involve the use of
sensitive information to defend partic-
ular policies, without regard to the
damaging impact of the disclosures on
our national security or the effective-
ness of our intelligence agencies.
Therefore, I asked Mr. McMahon in
the confirmation hearing what he
would do if he learned that intelli-
gence officials were being forced to
distort their reports to support an ad-
ministration's policy decisions. Mr.
McMahon replied that he would resign
if he were unable to resist such pres-
sures.
The second matter that I raised with
Mr. McMahon was the role of the CIA
within the United States under Presi-
dent Reagan's recent Executive order
on U.S. Intelligence activities. Execu-
tive Order 12333, issued in December
1981, expanded the authority of the
CIA to collect information by clandes-
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tine means within the United States
about U.S. citizens and domestic
groups without their consent. This ex-
pansion of CIA's authority to operate
domestically has troubled many of us
on the Intelligence Committee.
In his prepared statement at the
confirmation hearing, Mr. McMahon
said:
The activities of the Intelligence Commu
nity involving Americans are, and must,. con-
tinue to be, limited, subject to strict stand-
ards of accountability, and far removed
from any abridgment of cherished constitu-
tional rights.
The question, however, is what the
specific limits will be in practice. For
that reason, I asked Mr. McMahon
whether the CIA would use intrusive
investigative techniques within the
United States against American citi-
zens. Mr. McMahon replied that the
CIA would not be involved in using
such techniques against Americans in
this country and that only the FBI
would have such authority.
I believe it is also important for the :
Senate to know that at a closed session
of the Intelligence Committee prior to
the open confirmation. hearing Mr.
McMahon assured the committee that
the wider authority for CIA collection
of information within the United
States under the Executive order
would be exercised only in rare, excep-
tional cases.
The precise limits and safeguards,
such as the determination of intrusive-
ness of techniques like infiltration of
domestic groups, will be contained in
implementing procedures to be ap-
proved by the Attorney General. I was
pleased with Mr. McMahon's assur-
ances to the committee that it would
have an opportunity to review the new
procedures prior to their implementa-
tion.
Finally, I believe this nomination
comes at a time of increasing uneasi-
ness about where the intelligence com-
munity is going. If there is one thing
this committee has tried to do, it is to
keep intelligence free from partisan or
ideological bias.
We must be a watchdog to make
sure that intelligence operations serve
the national interest. We must be alert
to the danger that an administration
may seek to distort intelligence re-
ports or slant intelligence analysis.
Equally important is our mandate to
protect constitutional rights and other
basic principles of our free society. We
need to monitor the safeguards that
keep U.S. intelligence activities from
violating the rights of our own citi-
zens.. And we should also try to strike
a proper balance between secrecy and
the public's right to know.
On many of these counts I believe
we must increase the vigilance of our
oversight efforts. No single event leads
me to this conclusion. Rather, it is a
series of issues which, taken together,
make the prospects more disturbing.
The nomination of John McMahon
as Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence gives us an opportunity to work
with an experienced and dedicated in-
telligence officer in our wider efforts
to maintain congressional oversight. I
strongly urge my colleagues to support
his nomination so that we can work
with him to keep the intelligence busi-
ness free from partisan politics.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, the nomination is con-
firmed.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which
the nomination was confirmed.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to
lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President
be immediately notified of the confir-
mation of the nominee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection it is so ordered.
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Usised States
of America
a:o Mona! PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF T'iiE 97 tb CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1982 Na 73
Senate
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PRO-
TECTION ACT-CONFERENCE
REPORT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I call
up the conference report on H.R. 4.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
report will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The committee of conference on the disa-
greeing votes of the two Houses on the
amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R.
4) to amend the National Security Act of
1947 to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure
of information identifying certain U.S. intel-
ligence officers, agents, informants, and
sources, having met, after full and free con-
ference, have agreed to recommend and do
recommend to their respective Houses this
report, signed by a majority of the confer-
ees.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, the Senate will proceed
to the consideration of the conference
report.
(The conference report is printed in
the House proceedings of the RECORD
of May 20, 1982.)
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, it is my
understanding that a rollcall vote will
take place at 11:30 a.m., although that
has not been entered as an order; is
that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, it
would be my intention to seek a roll-
call starting at 11:30, because I know
that some Senators have to leave at
that time and then others will be ar-
riving shortly thereafter.
Mi. President, what we have before
us today is the conference report on
the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act of 1982. The original bill passed in
the Senate, as you recall, on vote of 90
to 6 at the time.
The conference took place, and the
conference report was approved in the
House on June 3, by a vote of 315 to
32.
I will summarize the differences be-
tween the final piece of legislation
before us today and the piece of legis-
lation that was passed in the Senate in
March.
The bill is essentially the same.
except for section 603. Section 603
deals with cover.
Mr. President, when we got into this
matter on the floor of the Senate,
there was a group of Senators who felt
very strongly that nothing should be
dealt with in cover that did not have
an exception for the Peace Corps. So
the instruction to the Senate confer-
ees, from those who felt so strongly
about this issue, was either to include
an exemption for the Peace Corps or
to have nothing dealing with cover.
The House version did have a consid-
erable amount dealing with cover,
with no exemption for the Peace
Corps. So a compromise was reached
which provides as follows:
Under section 603, it really is re-
duced to this: The President of the
United States, after receiving informa-
tion from the Director of Central In-
telligence, shall submit to the Select
Committee on Intelligence in the
Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in the
House an annual report on measures
to protect the identities of covert
agents and on any other matter rele-
vant to the protection of the identities
of covert agents.
Paragraph (b) of section 603 states:
(b) The report described in subsection (a)
shall be exempt from any requirement for
publication or diclosure. The first such
report shall be submitted no later than Feb-
ruary 1, 1983.
That is the sum total dealing with
cover. It has been greatly cut down
from the version that originally exist-
ed in the House, and it is acceptable to
those who felt so strongly regarding
the matter of cover and the exemption
for the Peace Corps.
As a matter of fact, we cleared it
with those Senators, particularly the
senior Senator from California, who
felt strongly about it, and he approved
of this version in the final bill. That is
the only significant change from the
legislation that was passed in the
Senate in March.
Mr. President, this is the culmina-
tion of a long and difficult effort. This
matter was debated for some time for
3 days on the floor of the Senate. It
'1,im been gone. into thoroughly.
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The conference report has been
signed by the junior Senator from
Delaware, who argued against the
measure originally on the floor. He
has' signed the conference report as
one of the managers on the part of the
Senate. The conference report also
has the signature of the junior Sena-
tor from Vermont, who also has some
concerns about the overall legaisla-
tion.
Mr. President, it is our hope that
this legislation will accomplish its ob-
jective-namely, to punish those who
make it their business to disclose the
names of our agents who are serving
this Nation abroad, serving us as
Americans, our fellow Americans who
were sent overseas to accomplish mis-
sions for us, on behalf of this country.
We do not believe that other Ameri-
cans should be disclosing their names.
That is the objective of this legisla-
tion. We believe we have tailored it so
that we are able to walk that narrow
boundary between the objectives we
seek and the protection of rights
under the first amendment.
I see the distinguished chairman of
the full committee in the Chamber,
and if he wishes to make any remarks,
we will be glad to hear them at this
time.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank my
good friend from Rhode Island.
Mr. President, before I commence
my remarks, I should like to compli-
ment the Senator from Rhode Island
for the very patriotic thing he has
done in the matter of this legislation.
It is long, long overdue, for the protec-
tion of one of the most important
parts of our governmental system, the
intelligence family.
Mr. President, the agent identities
conference report before us today will
help us protect our intelligence per-
sonnel in foreign countries. It will stop
intelligence sources from refusing to
cooperate with us because they are
afraid their names will be exposed. It
shows we can be trusted to protect
them. This bill will assist us to get the
information our policymakers. need to
make informed judgments about the
world we live in. This information is
vital to the continued security and
freedom of our country.
Last week, the House approved this
conference report by the overwhelm-
ing vote of 315 to 32. Last year, the
House passed H.R. 4 by the vote of 354
to 5& On the Senate side, this bill was
reported out of my committee in 190
by the vote of 13 to 1, after 9 days of
hearings and over 650 pages of testi-
mony. In March of this year, the.
Senate passed this legislation by the
vote of 90 to 6, after 7 long days of
debate.
The bill before us today has wide
support but has been delayed over the
misperception that it might interfere
with first amendment rights of Ameri-
cans. Well, the first amendment rights
of the news media were carefully con-
sidered and, as a result, the bill will
protect those rights while allowing for
the prosecution of those who disclose
the names of agents.
This act will help protect our em-
ployees working abroad in the intelli-
gence operations of this country. It
will reduce the chances of their being
identified and exposed and will reduce
the risks of their being harassed, shot
at, or even killed. The pernicious activ-
ity of "naming names" has the sole
purpose of disrupting and destroying
our intelligence activities. These unau-
thorized disclosures have been exten-
sive and yet, until today, we have not
had a law to stop it. I think it is high
time we have such a law. I hope the
Senate passes this conference report
.today by an overwhelming vote.
It is bad enough that our citizens
serving overseas and their families are
exposed to violence. But to allow
someone here at home to do it by put-
ting an ID tag on them so that they
become targets does not make any
sense at all.
This act sends out a clear signal that
U.S. intelligence officers will no longer
be fair game for those members of
their own society who wish to take
issue with the existence of the CIA, or
have some other motive for making
these unauthorized disclosures.
This bill makes one clear statement:
If intelligence identities and intelli-
gence activities are worth protecting,
they are worth protecting fully and ef-
fectively.
Mr. President, I commend my col-
league on the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, Senator JOHN H.
CHAFEE of Rhode Island, for his cour-
age and persistence in pursuiig this
legislation. He was an original cospon-
sor of this bill in 1980.
He worked to mold'it into its current
shape when the committee reported
the bill out in the summer of 1980, and
he has worked long and hard in get-
ting this legislation through the Con-
gress ever since. He has done a great
job for the committee, for the Con-
gress, and for the Nation. We should
be pleased and proud that there are
men like this in the U.S. Senate. I, for
one, consider it a high point of my
chairmanship of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that I am
chairman at the time this bill has
passed the Congress and will be signed
into law. This is a great event and I
am proud to be a part of it.
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Mr. President, in concluding my re- Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. I
marks today, I say, thank God for pa- commend the able Senator from
triotic Americans like Richard Welch, Rhode Island for the great service !-hie
the Kinsman family, Jesse Jones, and has rendered on this piece of legisia-
many others who serve their Nation tion. He has worked very diligently
loyally on difficult and dangerous mis- day and night to try to bring i, , :A
sions abroad. These patriotic Ameri- being a law that should have bet ri
can families carry the torch of free- acted on long ago.
dom to the dark corners of the world. In my opinion, there should not
Their work, their knowledge and their have been any question about the pas-
understanding enlightens our Govern- sage of this legislation long before
ment and our policymakers. We owe now. At any rate, there was objection,
them far more than the simple protec- but I am glad that the differences
tion this law provides. They consti- have been ironed out and that the bill
tute, in effect, the first line of defense can pass. .
of the free world. They are soldiers in Mr. President, I also commend the
the war against ignorance, and they fine statement by the chairman of the
perform their duties amidst great Intelligence Committee on this report,
hardship, difficulty and danger. Our and I hope that this matter will be
support of this bill and of this confer- speeded and the President will sign
ence report is a reflection of the Sen- this bill promptly so we can give the
ate's understanding and support for protection that should have been done
their sacrifice and their contribution. long ago to important agents of this
Thank God for these patriotic Ameri- Government who are trying to protect
can citizens. our people.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I thank The conference report on H.R. 4 rep-
the distinguished chairman of our full resents the culmination of a great deal
committee, the Senate Select Commit- of work during at least two Congress-
tee on Intelligence, for that fine state- es. Legislation of this nature has been
ment. I also take this opportunity to examined in one form or another by
express my personal thanks to him for both the Select Committee on Intelli-
the support he has given us in this gence and the Committee on the Judi-
long and arduous trip we have been ciary since early 1980. Hearings have
on, attempting to achieve passage of been held, there has been lengthy
this legislation. debate, and each and every section has
I see the distinguished chairman of been closely and carefully scrutinized.
the Committee on the Judiciary in the I do not believe that there is much dis-
Chamber. This measure, of course, was agreement in the Senate as to whether
jointly referred, and it also went to or not legislation of this type is
the Judiciary Committee. I will be needed. I think that it is time for the
glad to hear from the senior Senator Senate to say with a loud and clear
from South Carolina at this time. voice that we do not condone the type
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. of action prohibited by this bill.
MATTINGLY). The Senator from South This measure aims-at protecting the
Carolina. identities of those individual whose
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as anonymity serves the interest of the
the senior member, I was the chair- country. Moreover, this legislation
man of the conference. This matter would insure an appropriate balance
has been worked out in a way that we between individual rights and the ab-
think is satisfactory, and I am very solute necessity for secrecy in intelli-
pleased that action is finally being gence collection vital to the security of
taken. It has taken a year or two to do the Nation.
something we should have done in 30 The prohibitions contained in H.R. 4
days in view, of the high priority of are directed at punishing those indi-
this matter. viduals who intentionally and without
I commend the able Senator from authorization disclose information
Rhode Island. identifying intelligence officers and
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, if the agents of the United States. This bill
Senator will yield for 1 minute, I think is not intended to apply to members of
we have present in the Chamber a suf- the press or others engaged in legiti-
ficient number of Senators for a roll- mate activities protected by the first
call. amendment. It is intended, however,
Mr. President, at this time, I ask for to stop those people who are in the
the yeas and nays on this conference 'business of "naming names" of our
report. covert agents.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is We must keep in mind the special
there a sufficient second? There is a needs of the brave and unsung em-
sufficient second. ployees of the intelligence agencies of
The yeas and nays were ordered. this country. We must remember, too,
Mr. CHAFEE. I thank the Chair and
I apologize for the interruption that uninformed policymakers cannot
.
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properly serve the people, and without
the information these agents provide,
the American people will suffer.
I take this opportunity to commend
our distinguished colleague from
Rhode Island, Senator CHAFEE, for the
exemplary service he has done the
country in shepherding this legislation
through Congress and for his tenacity
and determination in seeing the meas-
ure become law.
If the Senate approves this confer-
ence report on H.R. 4, I am confident
the President will sign the bill into
law, and when that day comes Senator
CHAFEE should be given a major share
of the credit for enactment of this
overdue and clearly beneficial statute.
I also feel that the Senate should re-
member the superb work done in the
final days of his life by Representative
John Ashbrook, of Ohio, a man held
in high esteem by his colleagues in the
House of Representatives and admired
and respected by the Senate.
Representative Ashbrook was re-
sponsible for a significant strengthen-
ing improvement in this bill which he
obtained on the floor of the House of
Representatives. That action was typi-
cal of his long and distinguished
career as a legislator.
I believe it is particularly fitting to
remember Representative Ashbrook at
this time, while the Senate is acting on
one of the many bills to which he de-
voted his skill and labor.
For that reason I ask unanimous
consent that immediately prior to the
conference report on H.R. 4 there be
printed in the RECORD the speech
made by Representative Ashbrook on
the floor of the House of Representa-
tives on Wednesday, September 24.
1981, when the House had under con-
sideration the legislation now before
the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, before
moving passage of this legislation, I do
wish to extend my thanks to a host of
people who have helped me and have
worked so diligently and effectively in
achieving passage of this legislation.
We started on this in January 1980.
So, as I mentioned, it has been a long
road. I have had the help. of a whole
host of people. I was an original co-
sponsor of this legislation. Since that
time, many of my distinguished col-
leagues have lent a strong and able
hand to assist in getting this legisla.
tion to the point where it now can be
signed into law.
First of all, I thank the distin-
guished chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Senator THVRMOND, who
has done such an excellent job and
given such fine support, and also his
able members on that committee, Sen-
ators DENTON and EAST who have
shown great enthusiasm and support.
These men played a key role in con-
ducting hearings and getting the bill
reported from the Judiciary Commit-
tee last fall.
Senator THURMOND has also played
an important role during the confer-
ence.
I also thank the distinguished senior
Senator from the State of Washing-
ton, Senator JACxsoN, who joined me
as principal cosponsor to our amend-
ment on the floor of the Senate this
spring. He rendered yeoman service in
having that amendment agreed to by a
vote of 55 to 39, and without his help
we certainly would not be here today.
I also thank the majority leader,
Senator BAxER, and, of course, as I
mentioned earlier the outstanding
chairman of our Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Senator GOLD-
WATER, who has previously spoken,
who have given their unqualified sup-
port for our efforts in these long and
difficult days. They have worked long
and hard in bringing this bill to the
floor and in promoting its final pas-
sage. There are many others who I
wish to thank as well, but I find the
list is just too long.
Mr. President, at this time I shall
take a moment to comment on the
roles played by two Members of the
other body regarding this important-
indeed historic-legislation.
First, I pay tribute to the late John
Ashbrook, whose floor amendment to
H.R. 4 last year incorporated the cur-
rent language of section 601(c) into
the bill. John and I did not see eye-to-
eye on all the issues, but when it came
to the protection of American intelli-
gence officers, we were of one mind.
He was a man of unique integrity,
great energy, and enduring tenacity.
John was a leader in arriving at the
point where we are today, and he was
dedicated to the protection that we
have provided for those who serve us
in our intelligence community. I regret
that John Ashbrook is not here with
us today and that he has missed seeing
this body, this Congress, pass this bill
in a manner in which I know he would
approve.
Second, I praise the distinguished
chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Honorable EDWARD P. BOLAND, a Rep-
resentative in Congress from the
Springfield area of Massachusetts. I.
was designated by the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, Senator THUR-
moND, as the one to conduct the nego-
tiations with Chairman BOLAND.
Over the past 2 months, I have dis-
cussed the issues which this legislation
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involves with Chairman BOLAND on nu-
merous occasions. His intimate knowl-
edge of the subject, integrity, and
"great fairness in compromising on
many points were largely responsible
for the statutory language which we
have voted on today. I commend him
for the great service he has performed
for the Congress and the Nation in
this regard.
Finally, Mr. President, I thank Will
Lucius and Quentin Crommelin of
Senator THURMOND'S staff, Joel Lisker
and Bert Milling of Senator DENTON's
staff, and Sam Francis of Senator
EAST'S staff for their untiring efforts
in getting this legislation through the
Judiciary Committee last year and
through the conference this spring. I
thank, of course, Rob Simmons, who is
the staff director of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, the counsel for that
committee, Victoria Toensing, and
Larry Kettlewell, Chip Andreae, and
Rose Nahrgang, all who helped us a
great deal and for their untiring ef-
forts in support of this important leg-
islation.
Mr. DENTON. Mr. President, I wish
to add my voice to those who have
spoken in support of Conference
Report 97-580 on the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act of 1982 (H.R.
4). The report has the overwhelming
support of the House of Representa-
tives, which passed it on June 3 by a
vote of 315 to 32.
The report has been signed by all
the Senate conferees.
Mr. President, this report is not per-
fect. In some areas I would personally
have preferred tougher language, es-
pecially in dealing with section 601(c).
Nonetheless, I believe that any com-
promise requires that all the parties
accept less than they would ideally
like.
In my view, Mr. President, it was im-
perative to do all that we could to
insure that the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982 became law. I
believe that desirable result will now
be achieved.
The disclosure of the identify of a
covert agent is an immoral act, nation-
ally and personally harmful, which
cannot be tolerated. The conference
report makes clear that prohibition of
this activity, as it is defined by the bill,
would in no way inhibit an individual
from speaking about Government pro-
grams that are wasteful. Nor would it
impede the whistle-blower who seeks
to enhance his Government's ability to
perform more efficiently by bringing
to the attention or those in responsi-
ble positions deficiencies, fraud, or
waste.
The reprehensible activities that
this bill makes criminal have repeated-
ly exposed honorable public servants
to personal peril and vastly reduced
their effectiveness in pursuing their
endeavors. This has produced a signifi-
cant detriment to the national secu-
rity. The insensitivity, irresponsibility,
and amorality shown by those who
seek to undermine the effectiveness of
our intelligence capability are so inimi-
cal to our American democratic system
that it seems certain that what we are
about to do today should not be neces-
sary. This bill is indeed overdue for
passage.
Although in a free society we must
welcome public debate about the role
of the intelligence community as well
as about other components of our
Government, the irresponsible and in-
discriminate disclosure of names and
cover identities of covert agents serves
no useful purpose whatsoever. As
elected public officials, we have the
duty, consistent with our oaths of
office, to uphold the Constitution and
to support the men and women of the
U.S. intelligence services who perform
important duties on behalf of their
country, often at great personal risk
and sacrifice.
I urge my colleagues to vote for this
report.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, the Intelligence Identities Pro-
tection Act, as amended and reported
out of conference, should put an end
to years of controversy. All of us want
to protect our country against. those
who would maliciously expose Ameri-
can intelligence officers. Yet none of
us wants to undermine a free and
probing press, whose contributions to
an informed public are a bulwark of
democracy. Thanks to the hard work
of many people, this bill now meets
both tests.
The lion's share of the credit for this
successful result must go to my good
friend from Rhode Island, Senator
CHAFEE. He guided this bill through
the Senate since its earliest days. He
steered a steady, constitutional course
despite pressures to weaken the bill or
to undermine the freedom of the
press.
When the Select Committee on In-
telligence reported out an earlier bill
in 1980, we wrote a report that set
clear limits on the type of conduct this
bill would reach. When the Chafee
amendment to the current bill was
proposed last winter, many feared that
it would have a chilling effect on the
press. Senator CHAFES and I recog-
nized that the report language of 1980
was needed to underline congressional
intent that the press not be harmed.
So he and I engaged in a colloquy last
March on the floor of the Senate to
reiterate and update the 1980 report
language and make it part of the cur-
rent bill's legislative history.
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6
The conference committee wisely Act, which the Senate approved by a
relied upon the legislative history that wide margin on March 18. On May 20,
Senator CHAFEE and I had created. the committee of conference favorably
The chairman of the House Intelli- reported H.R. 4 in slightly modified
gence Committee, Representative form. I felt constrained to vote in the
BoLAND, cited our role in his floor negative on March 18 and I regret that
statement of June 2: I must also do so today. The clear
In structuring statement of managers lan- weight of scholarly legal opinion is
guage to explain section 601(c), the so-called that a major provision of this bill is
Ashbrook or Chafee amendment, the con- unconstitutional. Moreover, this provi-
ferees noted that there had been little ex- sion is, by any measure, imprudent.
planation in the House of the Ashbrook For we had before us an alternative
amendment. The most satisfactory sources which was less subject to constitution-
of explanation were those referred to' in the al objection; recommended by the
Senate debate-the explanation provided by Committee on the Judiciary as well as
the 1980 report of the Senate Select Com-
mittee by the House Intelligence Committee;
on Intelligence to accompany S. acceptable to the Central Intelligence
2216, the Senate forerunner of this bill in
the 96th Congress, and a colloquy between Agency; and enforceable in the opin-
Senators Chafee and Durenberger which ion of the Justice Department. Unfor-
drew from and expanded upon this same tunately, it was the will of the Senate
report. and the House to reject this approach,
It was the intention of the conferees that opting instead for a standard of culpa-
these'sources constitute the legislative his- bility which is preferred by the admin-
tory of this statute. Therefore, the confer- istration because it will facilitate suc-
ees very carefully excerpted text from these
sources. cessful prosecutions. It now appears
The conference report is the pri- that we will soon have a -law which,
wary element of legislative history, while making it easier to convict
and I am certain that the courts will scoundrels, will chill the exercise of
heed its message of moderation. It is first amendment rights.
this moderation-in the 1980 report, Let me say that I do not take any
the Chafee-Durenberger colloquy, and pleasure in voting against H.R. 4.
now the conference report-that has Indeed, it was perhaps the most diffi-
won over many former opponents of cult vote in my 5 years in this body. I
this bill. Senators BIDEN, BENTSEN, and sponsored the predecessor of this leg-
LEAHY all opposed the Chafee amend- islation in the last Congress, when it
ment, with Senator BIDEN opposing was considered by the Select Commit-
the bill as a whole. All three have tee on Intelligence, of which I was
signed the conference report, as have then a member and now serve as vice
seven House Intelligence Committee chairman. I felt strongly then, as I do
members who originally opposed this now, that the existing espionage laws
language. Representative BOLAND has need to be supplemented by clear
acknowledged the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions against unau-
the current bill, once this legislative o~rizeNation's d disclosure of the identities
intelligence
history is taken into account:
As one who had serious doubts about the operatives. Two provisions of H.R. 4
constitutionality of this bill as it passed the would penalize the unlawful disclosure
House, and who returns with a conference of a covert agent's name by persons
report substantially similar to that bill, I who have had authorized access to
must say that, based on the interpretation classified information relating to the
of this statute as provided in the statement agent's identity. These provisions are
of managers, I believe that this statute can sound and have received widespread
be considered constitutional. I believe that third provision of
it has a good chance to withstand the test of support. However, a
Judicial scrutiny. It can do so because of its the bill, proposed section 601(c) of the
narrow focus and explicit avoidance of pro- National Security Act, applies to per
protected speech. sons who have not had authorized
Senator CHAFES and I always knew access to classified information. It
that his language had a narrow focus would make it a crime to identify pub-
and did not proscribe protected licly a covert agent even if the identify
speech. The fact that both Houses of was discovered from public source in-
Congress have come to support this formation and even if there was no in-
stand so overwhelmingly is testament tention to harm the national interest.
to the importance of preserving this It is this section which, in my view, is
sense of proportion in legislative histo- unconstitutional. As a consequence, I
ry. Senator CHAFES is to be saluted for, could not vote for H.R. 4 and in good
his role in maintaining this delicate conscience believe that I had kept
balance. . faith with my oath to support the
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS IDENTITIES Constitution.
PROTECTION ACT Mr. President, I would ask the
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I - Chair's indulgence while I discuss the
rise to comment on H.R. 4, the Intelli? considerations which underlie my posi-
gence Agents Identities Protection tion.
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Section 601(c) would impose criminal
sanctions on a person if he discloses an
agent's identity-
In the course of a pattern of activities in-
tended to identity and expose covert agents
and with reason to believe that such activi-
ties would impair or impede the foreign in-
telligence activities of the United States ...
By a vote of 55 to 39, the Senate
substituted this version for the one rec-
ommended by the Committee on the
Judiciary which would have imposed
criminal liability on a person who dis-
closed an agent's name-
In the course of an effort to identify and
expose covert agents with intent to impair
or impede the foreign intelligence activities
of the United States by the fact of such
identification and exposure.
Section 601(c) as approved by the
Senate, as well as the Judiciary Com-
mittee's formulation, would crimina-
lize the publication or other disclosure
of information which could be drawn
entirely from unclassified or public
sources. There was general agreement
among the Members of this body that
the national security interest in an ef-
fective clandestine service was suffi-
cient to warrant a proscription on
what are, in essence, private counter-
intelligence operations which ferret
out and expose the identities of covert
agents for the propose of disrupting
U.S. intelligence activities. The dis-
agreements arose over how to reduce
to statutory language our desire to
punish those in the business of
naming names without inhibiting le-
gitimate press activity and political
debate.
Many law professors and legal schol-
ars expressed doubt that any legisla-
tion could be devised which would
outlaw such conduct without violating
the first amendment's guarantees of
free speech and press. This advice
could not be lightly dismissed. Howev-
er, the notion that it was impossible to
reconcile the interests of national se-
curity and first amendment rights was
unacceptable.
The sharpest and most succinct
scholarly comment came from Philip
B. Kurland, professor of law at the
University of Chicago and one, of the
Nation's leading constitutional law-
yers. In September 1980 he wrote:
I have little doubt that it [Section 601(c)]
is unconstitutional. I cannot see how a law
that inhibits the publication, without mali-
cious intent, of information that is in the
public domain and previously published can
be valid. Although I recognize the inconsis-
tency and inconstancy in Supreme Court de-
cisions. I should be very much surprised if
that Court, not to speak of the lower federal
courts, were to legitimize what is for me, the
clearest violation of the First Amendment
attempted by Congress in this era.
The Judiciary Committee took Pro-
fessor Kurland's warning to heart and
amended the bill as introduced to
impose a requirement of proof that a
defendant specifically intended to
impair or impede U.S. intellience activ-
ities by naming names. By putting the
Government to a more exacting
burden of proof, the intent standard
reflected the traditional judgment of
our Nation that our interest in pre-
serving free speech and press tran-
scends in importance the value of
prosecutorial convenience. This stand-
ard of proof properly takes into ac-
count that the chief characteristic
which distinguishes a person who en-
gages in the business of naming covert
agents as against a journalist who re-
veals agents' names as part of a legiti-
mate news story is the intent with
which each acts. The manner of
names intends to expose the.. identity
of covert agents with the ultimate pur-
pose of disrupting intelligence oper-
ations. The journalist's purpose in dis-
closing the identity of a covert agent is
not to disrupt intelligence activities,
but to inform his readers, for example,
of possible wrongdoing.
In rejecting the Judiciary Commit-
tee's recommendation, the supporters
of the "reason to believe" version of
section 601(c) have maintained that it
would not affect the first amendment
rights of those who disclose the identi-
ties of agents as an integral part of an-
other enterprise such as news media
reporting of intelligence failures or
abuses. The statement of the manag-
ers in the conference report on H.R. 4
expressly embraced this interpreta-
tion. However, saying it does not make
it so. There is nothing on the face of
this provision which codifies such a
limitation. In a September 1980 letter
to the Judiciary Committee, another
University of Chicago professor of law,
Geoffrey R. Stone, pointed out that:
[A]s drafted, . . . [this provision]
relies soley upon the "pattern of activities"
clause to limit the bill's scope. This is inad-
equate. The clause is ambiguous and is sub-
ject to easy manipulation. Moreover,* it
might (and probably would) cover a newspa-
per or other publication that made a regular
practice of investigating undercover activi-
ties in order to expose abuse.
Professor Stone went on to conclude,
as did his colleague Professor Kur-
land, that a malicious intent standard
is "essential if the legislation is to
comport with the First Amendment."
I am deeply saddened that the
Senate has foresaken the opportunity
to codify its desire not to infringe
upon the exercise of press freedom.
Neither the press nor any member of
this body can or should take any com-
fort in seeingly benign interpretations
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of section 601(c) offered by its proper.
nents and the conferees. Indeed, the
Senate voted down an amendment of
fered by the Senator from New Jersey'
(Senator BRADLEY) which would have
codified one such interpretation.
Moreover, the arm of Government
which will be responsible for enforcing
this law has given every indication
that it will not apply the law benignly.
During congressional consideration
of this legislation, the Justice Depart-
ment spokesman plainly stated that
the language of section 601(c) would
be construed to minimize the possibil-
ity of a successful defense based on a
claim that a disclosure of an agent's
name was intended to inform the
public about wrongdoing or abuse by
intelligence agencies. He stated that
this provision would permit prosecu-
tion of someone who was merely "neg-
ligent" in overlooking the adverse con-
sequences of his disclosure on intelli-
gence activities. Asked how this provi-
sion would apply to a journalist who
engages for 3 years in a pattern of ac-
tivity intended to identify double
agents or moles in the CIA and writes
articles naming such agents, the
spokesman acknowledged that this hy-
pothetical at least raises a "question"
whether a crime would be committed.
Do we want journalists to be at risk
of prosecution and conviction if they
reveal covert agents' names in order to
expose misconduct such as occurred in
the news stories on the Wilson-Terpil
affair? Do we want to put a newsman
in jail for negligent conduct? Every
Member of this body most assuredly
would answer "no." But where are the
words in the statute that permit the
Journalist to predetermine that the ex-
ercise of his first amendment rights
will not constitute a crime in the eyes
of the Government? The answer is
simply that there are none.
By failing to differentiate between
protected first amendment activity
and conduct which properly may be
made criminal, section 601(c) forces a
journalist, at his peril, to speculate as
to whether the disclosure of certain
information would constitute a viola-
tion. The risk which proceeds from
the uncertainty in the statutory lan-
guage is the very essence of a "chilling;
effect." "Due process" requires fair
notice or warning. This requirement is
greatest when first amendment values
are at stake. Legitimate legislative
goals cannot, according to the Su- '
preme Court, "be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental person
liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 478,488 (1960). The Court has
also said:
It has long been recognized that the First
Amendment needs breathing space and that
statutes attempting to restrict or burden
the exercise of First Amendment rights
must be narrowly drawn and represent a
considered legislative judgment that a par-
ticular mode of expression has given way to
other compelling needs of society. Broad-
rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,607 (1972).
I regret that this distinguished body
has departed from these principles in
passing H.R. 4. This bill does not take
the narrower path. Nor does it allow
the press the breathing space that is
so vital to its effectiveness.
In closing, Mr. President, I must
admit that I did consider the possibil-
ity of voting for passage on the theory
that the judicial branch would save us
from mischief that might be done in
the enforcement of section 601(c). I
suspect that many of my colleagues
have predicated their "aye" votes on
just this rationale. However, I think
we serve the Republic best when we
are mindful of the teaching of Justice
Oliver Wendell Homes that "legisla-
tures are ultimately guardians of the
liberties and welfare of the people in
quite as great a degree as the courts."
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the
Senate is about to finish one of the
most difficult tasks which it has un-
dertaken in the last several years. We
have been called upon to strike a care-
ful balance between the very real
needs of the men and women who are
serving our country in the intelligence
services and the stringent dictates of
the first amendment.
We have before us a conference
report which, I believe, strikes that
balance in a proper and constitutional
way. The debate over this bill has
always been a debate over a handful of
words. But this handful of words have
the most important implications for a
free press and free speech in this
country of any I have debated since I
have been in the Senate.
The joint explanatory statement of
the Committee on Conference pro-
vides the crucial piece of legislative
history which underscores the Con-
gress commitment to preserving legiti-
niate first amendment rights. As the
conference report notes, both those
who argued for the "reason to believe"
language, as well as those of us who
argued for the intent standard, sought
to proscribe the same scope of con-
duct. Both sides were seeking to reach
only those individuals engaged in the
business of "naming names," the in-
tentional "blowing" of cover. The con-
ference report makes clear that Con-
gress did not intend to invade the
province of legitimate commentary by
newspapers or scholars.
The focus of the report concerns sec-
tion 601(c) of the bill. Section 601(c)
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established three elements of proof
not found in section 601(a) or (b). The
United States must prove: First, that
the disclosure was made in the course
of a pattern of activities, that is, a
series of acts having a common pur-
pose or objective; second, that the pat-
tern of activities was intended to iden-
tify and expose covert agents; and
third, that there was reason to believe
that such activities would impair or
impede the foreign intelligence activi-
ties of the United States.
The conference report makes quite
clear that the Government must prove
that the defendant engaged in a pat-
tern of activities both intended to
identify and intended to expose a
covert agent. In my view, it is the
latter element which limits the reach
of this bill to those individuals not en-
gaged in legitimate first amendment
activity. The process of exposing
covert agents must involve the deliber-
ate exposure of information identify-
ing the agents. In other words, it must
involve the intentional "blowing" of
intelligence identities. As the Judici-
ary Committee report states, this in-
tentional "blowing of cover" implies a
design to neutralize a covert agent or
to damage an intelligence agency's
ability to carry out its functions.
The conference report, thus, nar-
rows the scope of coverage of section
601(c), and, I trust, the courts will
seize upon this report to give a narrow,
constitutional construction to this act.
Finally, I want to commend my dis-
tinguished colleagues, Senator CHAFEE
and Senator BIDEN, as well as their
staffs, for the countless hours they
have devoted to this vital legislation.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I
want to express my deep appreciation
to- the distinguished Senator from
Rhode Island (Mr. CHAFES), the rank-
ing minority member of the Judiciary
Committee (Mr. BIDEN), and the other
Senate conferees for their efforts in
achieving a satisfactory resolution of
the differences between the House bill
and the Senate amendment relating to
section 603 of H.R. 4. Section 603 of
the House-passed bill contained provi-
sions requiring, in essence, cooperation
by Federal agencies in providing
"cover" for intelligence agents. Be-
cause of the concern that I and other
Members of the Senate expressed re-
garding the potential adverse implica-
tions such a policy might have on the
Peace Corps and its historic policy of
complete and total separation from in-
telligence activities, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee voted to provide an ex-
plicit exception from this requirement
for the Peace Corps, thus reaffirming
once again congressional support for
the complete and total separation of
the Peace Corps from intelligence ac-
tivities.
When the Senate amendments to
H.R. 4 were considered on the floor,
the distinguished Senator from Rhode
Island, author of the Senate bill, S.
391, offered an amendment to delete
the entire section 603 with the under-
standing, expressed in a colloquy be-
tween myself and the Senator from
Rhode Island, and a number of mem-
bers of the Judiciary Committee, that
the Senate conferees would insist that
if section 603 was retained in the con-
ference bill, it would include the ex-
press exemption for the Peace Corps
that had been approved by the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
I am pleased to report that this tin-
derstanding was fully adhered to in
conference. The conferees worked out
an agreement which substituted, for
the original House version of section
603, a provision providing merely for a
report on measures taken to protect
the identity of intelligence agents.
This, along with language in the con-
ference report joint explanatory state-
ment reiterating the strong congres-
sional support for the maintenance of
the historic separation of the Peace
Corps from intelligence activities, was
a totally satisfactory resolution with
respect to the concerns which I and
other friends of the Peace Corps had
regarding the House version of H.R. 4.
I greatly appreciate the adherence
of the Senate conferees to their com-
mitments and their achieving full vin-
dication of the Senate's very strong
views on this issue. I an, also grateful
to the House conferees for their coop-
eration in resolving this matter in a
manner that.would protect the Peace
Corps from even the slightest appear-
ance of connection to intelligence ac-
tivities. I wish also to acknowledge
gratefully, the great courtesy of the
Senators from Rhode Island and Dela-
ware and of their staffs--especially
Rob Simmons of the Intd-lligence Com-
mittee staff-in consulting fully with
me and my staff throughout the weeks
of efforts to reach a conference agree-
ment. Their cooperation was truly re-
markable and of great value to me. .
Mr. President, I ask unanimous- con-
sent that excerpts of the conference
report joint statement relating to the
disposition of the difference between
the House and Senate relating to sec-
tion 603 of the House version of H.R.
4, along with a copy of a letter I sent
to several of the House conferees be
reprinted in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
SECTION 603
The House bill contained section 603
which deals with procedures for establish-
ing cover for intelligence officers and etrm-
ployees. This section required the President
to establish Procedures to ensure the protec-
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tion of the identities of covert agents. Such
.procedures were to include provision for any
federal department or agency designated by
the President to assist in maintaining the
secrecy of such identities.
The Senate struck section 603 by unani-
mous consent.
The conference report contains a substi-
tute section 603 requiring an annual report
from the President on measures to protect
the identities of covert agents. The confer-
ees expect such report to include an assess-
ment of the adequacy of affirmative meas-
ures taken by the United States to conceal
the identities of covert agents.
The conferees stress, however, as was
made clear during consideration of this
measure in both bodies, that nothing in this
provision or any other provision of H.R. 4 or
in any other statute or executive order af-
fecting U.S. intelligence activites in any way
diminishes the 20-year old Congressionally-
sanctioned Executive Branch policy of
maintaining the total separation of the
Peace Crops from intelligence activities.
The importance to the effectiveness of the
Peace Corps of maintaining this policy and
its essential components was spelled out in
detail in the reports of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and in the
debate on this measure in both bodies and
the conferees wish to reemphasize this
point and call attention to the strong views
of both bodies as set forth in that legislative
history.
U.S: SENATE,
OFFICE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WHIP,
Washington, D. C., April 20, 1982.
Hon. PETER W. RODINO, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR PETE, I'm writing to you in your ca-
pacity as a conferee on H.R. 4, the "Intelli-
gence Identities Protection Act of 1981". En-
closed is a copy of a note I recently sent to
John Chafee rtigarding section 603 in the
House bill and the matter of the Peace
Corps' being in any way connected with the
concept ,f United States intellige.z^c-cover
activities. Also enclosed are copies of a
March 1 colloquy I had with a number of
Senators and of a May 4, 1981, letter from
Dean Rusk on this point.
The long and the short of it is that I feel
very strongly that enactment of H.R. 4 with
section 603 in it (without a specific Peace
Corps exception) could be potentially very
damaging to the future effectiveness of the
Peace Corps program. Congress has just
taken steps to reinvigorate the Peace Corps
by restoring its independence as a separate
agency. An integral part of that independ-
ence is the maintenance of the historic,
total separation of the Peace Corps from in-
telligence activities. In the opinion of Dean
Rusk, Ed Muskie, and Cyrus Vance as well
as the Senate Judiciary Committee, enact-
ing section 603 without a Peace Corps ex-
ception would undermine that historic
policy at the very time that it most needs
reemphasis.
The Senate agreed to Senator Chafee's
amendment to drop section 603 from the
bill only with the express understanding
that either that result or a section 603 with
an explicit Peace Corps exception would be
an acceptable result in conference. I remain
fully committed to that principle, and I be-
lieve that will be the firm posture of the
Senate conferees on H.R. 4.
With regard to the necessity of having a
section 603 in the bill, I think it is signifi-
cant that the recent Executive Order No.
12333 (section 1.6(a)) on intelligence oper-
ations deals with the obligations of Federal
agencies to support intelligence activities
and that the CIA does not see the need for a
statutory provision to that effect. It seems
to me that a statement of the conferees in
the Joint Explanatory Statement accompa-
nying the conference report on H.R. 4 (to
the effect that the conferees recognize the
existence of this intelligence-support provi-
sion in the Executive Order-at the same
time making clear Congress' understanding
that the Order in no way alters the funda-
mental Peace Corps separation from Intelli-
gence activities) would be a reasonable way
to accommodate the differing positions of
the conferees on the section 603 question.
Peter, I very much hope that you will give
this matter your close personal attention
and will support either deleting section 603
from the conference report (with language
in the Joint Explanatory Statement along
the -lines I've suggested) or amending it to
include a Peace Corps exception in the form
reported by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.
I will greatly appreciate any help you can
provide.
With warmest regards.
Cordially,
AL.A1 CRANSTON.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have
carefully reviewed the conference
report on H.R. 4 the agent's identities
legislation and am pleased with the
result. As a conferee on the bill I
worked for the narrowest possible con-
struction of the so-called reason to be-
lieve language. We largely achieved
that goal in the conference by incorpo-
rating the so-called Duri nberger collo-
quy into the joint statement of the
managers. Therefore. I signed the
report but I do not feel that that obli-
gates me to vote for passage of the bill
in its final form.
. In essence what we accomplished in
the joint statement of the managers
was to incorporate into the bill the
language that Senator BRADLEY at-
tempted to have adopted on the
Senate floor requiring that the main
direction of the reporter's pattern of
activities must. be toward naming
names. It would not be sufficient
under this interpretation to prove that
the reporter intended to name the
names by writing the story with the
names or that the reporter should
have known that the naming of the
names in the article would jeopardize
their cover.
Therefore, the conference attempted
to make the reason to believe language'
into the intent standard. For now the
Government must prove 'that the re-
porter really intended to harm the in-
telligence collecting apparatus of our
Government by the fact of disclosure
which is exactly what my amendment
of the bill was intended to accomplish.
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Unfortunately, the Senate rejected my
amendment. Furthermore, I am con-
cerned that neither the Justice De-
partment nor the courts will feel con-
strained to follow the language in the
joint statement since it is mere legisla-
tive history and indeed appears to be
inconsistent with prior action by both
Houses in rejecting the intent stand-
ard.
I was strongly tempted to vote for
the conference report because we had
accomplished so much in conference
and because I feel that the provisions
of the agent identities legislation that
do not cover the legitimate media
ought to be enacted. However, upon
reflection I have decided to cast my
vote against the report and the bill. I
fear that the Justice Department and
the courts will not comply with the
legislative history set out in the joint
statement.
Continued intransigence on the part
of the advocates of the reason to be-
lieve language not only raises grave
doubts in my mind but is short-sight-
ed. To the extent that the major
media organizations of this country
fear that the bill will be used as a
device for censoring their coverage of
intelligence and foreign policy the De-
partment of Justice and the intelli-
gence community can be assured of a
serious legal confrontation in the
courts. From experience in reviewing
the way past administrations and in
particular the Department of Justice
deal with enforcement of espionage
and leak statutes when faced with seri-
ous and sophisticated legal challenges,
I predict that the agent identities leg-
islation may become dead letter as has
its predecessor section 893 of title 18
which creates a similar strict liability
criminal sanction for leaking commu-
nications intelligence.
When I was chairman of the Secrecy
Subcommittee of the Intelligence
Committee, I learned that there were
numerous explicit and undisputed vio-
.lations of section 898 brought to the
attention of the Justice Department
since that statute was enacted -in the
1950's that were not prosecuted. They
were not prosecuted because experi-
enced prosecutors in the Department
of Justice knew that they would face
sophisticated and well financed chal-
lenges to their prosecutors that fo-
cused both on the gray-mail technique
and direct constitutional challenges to
the statute. The Department was
never willing to have that issue put
before the courts because of their own
doubts about its cons titutionality.
Therefore serious leaks went unprose-
cuted.
To the extent that the impasse that
stalled this bill for years jr , .f?te Con-
gress continues after is :. ment,
the statute may beccme dead letter be-
cause of a misguided insistence on cov-
ering the legitimate media. If this
occurs we will have achieved the worst
of all worlds. We will have sent a mes- '
sage to the intelligence community
and to allied services abroad that our
secrets are secure from deliberate ef-
forts to name names by phony jour-
nalists, but the statute will remain un-
enforced because of these fears by ex-
perienced prosecutors. So that major
leaks that violate this statute, like the
violations of 898, will go unproseculed.
Furthermore, if a prosecution goes
ahead and a serious test goes up to the
Supreme Court the statute could well
be held unconstitutional. If either of
these developments occur we in Con-
gress will have on the one hand given
the impression that our intelligence
secrets are secure and on the other
laid the groundwork for a successful
court challenge to the bill which
might well obliterate the legal protec-
tions we purport to be giving.
In conclusion, I ask that a recent ed-
itorial in the Washington Post making
many of these same points be printed
at this point in the RECORD.
The editorial follows:
[Editorial from the Washington Post, June
6. 1982]
NICE TRY, BuT No CIGAR
A bad piece of legislation made some prog-
ress on the road to enactment last week.
The House accepted a conference report on
a bill that makes it a crime to disclose infor-
mation identifying certain American intelli-
gence officers, agents, jnforlnants and
sources. The prohibition applies to private
citizens as well as government employees
and even covers information that is nor clas-
sified. Supporters intended to put a stop to
the activities of a small band of individ-
uals-former CIA agent Philip Agee among
them-who have revealed the names of over
2,000 American agents with the express pur-
pose of destroying the American foreign in-
telligence apparatus. But this bill goes far
beyond that narrow objective by eliminating
the element of intent from the crime.
Both House and Senate committees re-
ported pills that would have required pros-
ecutors to meet a standard proof that in-
cludes "intent to impair or impede the for-
eign intelligence activities of the United
States." can the floor of each house, howev-
er, this was changed so that a person could
be con, icted simply because he had "had
reason to believe" that damage to the intel-
ligence apparatus would occur. In practical
terms, this language will inhibit the publica-
tion of information on such matters as cor-
ruption and illegal or unauthorized activity
by intelligence operatives even where there
is absolutely no intention of disrupting le-
gitmate intelligence activities.
Because there were minor differences be-
tween the House and the Senate versions of
the bill-though not in the section described
above--a conierence committee was appoint-
ed to v- .rlr out a compromise, which it
quickly did. Then it did something quite un-
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usual. -It, issued a conference report that
dealt at great length with a matter that was
not in controversy-the government's
burden of proof in cases arising under the
proposed statute. Both the House and the
Senate had rejected the intent standard by
record votes. Yet the conferees sought to
minimize the meaning of these votes and to
assure judges who will be faced with inter-
preting the statute that it should ve viewed
narrowly.
"The standard adopted in section 601(c)"
the conferees wrote, "applies criminal pen-
alties only in very limited circumstances to
deter those who make it their business to
ferret out and p;iblish the identities of
agents. At the same time, it does not affect
the First Amendment rights of those who
disclose the identities of agents as an inte-
gral part of another enterprise, such as
news media reporting of intelligence failures
or abuses, academic studies of U.S. govern-
ment policies and programs. or a private or-
ganization's enforcement of its internal
rules." Would that it were so.
The conferees, apparently concerned that
Congress had gone too far in eliminating
the intent standard, made a well-inten-
tioned effort to soften the clear language of
the bill. Unfortunately, the courts have to
work with the text of the law first. They
only look at legislative history if the law is
unclear. Even then, in this case they would
look at the House and Senate votes to elimi-
nate the intent standard and have a clear
understanding of what Congress meant to
do. A conference committee report that is at
odds with both text and recorded votes is
unlikely to be relied on by the courts.
The House has voted to accept the final
version of the bill, and the Senate will act
soon. Senators cannot duck the important
consitutional question presented here by re-
lying on the assurances of the conference
report instead of confronting the plain lan-
gauge of the bill. Both should be rejected.
EXHIBIT 1
[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 24,
1981]
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT
(Speech of Hon. John M. Ashbrook, of
Ohio, in the House of Representatives,
Wednesday, September 23, 1981.]
The House in Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union had under
consideration the bill (H.R. 4) to amend the
National Security Act of 1947 to prohibit
the unauthorized disclosure of information
identifying certain U.S. intelligence officers,
agents, informants. and sources.
Mr. AsHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, I rise to
support H.R. 4 with amendments. This bill
is long overdue. For the past 8 years, a small
group of anti-American extremists have
been engaged in spying on Americans to
identify those who are engaged in gathering
intelligence for our country. Some, like
Phillip Agee, are former employees of the
CIA. Others, like Louis Wolf, come out of
the New Left antiestablishment movement.
They have united with the aim of disrupt-
ing our intelligence capabilities. As we
know, without adequate intelligence, our po-
licymakers will be blinded in a hostile envi-
ronment.
In 1968, the KGB began the program of
exposing American intelligence officers. The
assignment to do this was given to the East
German and Czech intelligence services.
The product of their labors was a book
called. "Who's Who in The CIA," by Julius
Mader, printed in English in East Germany
in 1968.
Ladislav Bittman. a former official of the
Czech Intelligence Service who worked on
the book.,testified before the House Intelli-
gence Committee on February 19, 1980, that
only about half the names in the book were
real CIA officers. The rest were put in to
disrupt other U.S. Government activities.
When the Tupamaro terrorists murdered
an AID employee. Dan Miirione. the Cuban
Communist newspaper "Grannia." justified
the murder on the grounds that he had
been listed in the Mader book. The listing
was one of the false identifications.
In 1973, the focus of the exposure activity
shifted to the United States with the publi-
cation of the magazine "CounterSpy." Since
then, much of the campaign to identify and
expose U.S. covert agents has centered
around Phillip Agee, a renegade former CIA
officer who openly admits his close ties to
the Cuban Government and Communist
Party.
Agee is affiliated with a publication called
"CovertAction Information Bulletin." He
was formerly associated with the publica-
tion "CounterSpy." Both of these maga-
zines are actively engaged in attempting to
identify and expose U.S. covert agents.
They also are extremely active in promoting
Soviet and Cuban propaganda lines. "Cover-
tAction Information Bulletin," for example,
reprinted a Soviet forgery of a purported
U.S. Army document that pretended that
the United States supports terrorism. De-
spite worldwide exposure by the United
States of that document as a forgery, it was
disseminated in our own country by Phillip
Agee and his cohorts. "CounterSpy," in ad-
dition to naming alleged U.S. covert agents,
has published a whole series of propaganda
articles closely following the Soviet and
Cuban line attacking not only the United
States, but each of our allies such as
Turkey. Israel, and so forth.
Although it has been 6 years since the
CIA chief of station in Athens, Richard
Welch, was murdered after his name was ex-
posed in CounterSpy, we have done nothing
to stop this kind of irresponsible naming of
names. The House Intelligence Committee
has been working on the bill for 2 years, but
last summer's violence against American
diplomats in Jamaica has called public at-
tention to the urgent needs for this-legisla-
tion. On July 2, 1980, Louis Wolf, Phillip
Agee's associate in the CovertAction Infor-
mation Bulletin, held a press conference in
Jamaica in which he identified 15 Ameri-
cans as CIA officers. He not only listed
names, but home addresses, license plate
numbers, and the descriptions of their cars.
A number of his identifications were incor-
rect; however, gunmen attacked the homes
of two of those named. Richard Kinsman,
the victim of the first attack, is the first sec-
retary of our Embassy in Kingston. Mr.
Kinsman', home was attacked by persons
using a bubmachine gun and grenades.
Shortly thereafter, gunmen attacked the
home of a young AID employee, Jesse
Jones. The gunmen exchanged fire with
police officers who have been assigned to
protect the Jones' home after the attack on
the Kinsman home. Mr. Jones, who is in no
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way connected with the CIA, has left the
Government service, rather than risk his
own life and the lives of his family in the
light of the violence. Mr. Jones is now suing
Louis Wolf and CovertAction Information
Bulletin.
These are posters put up in Jamaica right
after Louis Wolf named the American diplo-
mats as alleged covert agents. You will
notice on one poster we have the pictures of
some of these people, including Kinsman
and Jones. On the other poster, we have the
home addresses, license plate numbers, and
descriptions of cars. While Wolf disclaims
responsibility for the posters they are iden-
tical to the press release that he distributed
in Kingston, Jamaica.
Last year, the House Intelligence Commit-
tee unanimously reported out H.R. 5615
after careful consideration. However, now
the bill has been considerably weakened by.
an amendment suggested by the ACLU and
-the Center for National Security Studies. As
a result, I would prefer the Senate language
in place of 601(c), which says it is sufficient
for the defendant to have reason to know
that it would impede or impair the intelli-
gence activities of the United States.
It is my intention to offer an amendment
to bring the House language closer to that
of the Senate which I believe is a more ap-
propriate solution to the problem and which
protects constitutional rights while penaliz-
ing those who knowingly jeopardize the
lives and effectiveness of our covert agents.
I also intend to introduce an amendment
that would make it a crime to knowingly
jeopardize someone's life by identifying a
person as a covert agent. This would protect
real covert agents as well as those falsely
identified.
Phillip Agee wrote in the introduction to
the book, "Dirty Work," coauthored with
Louis Wolf.
"Once the list is fully checked, publish it.
Then organize public demonstrations
against those named-both at the American
Embassy and at their homes-and, where
possible, bring pressure on the Government
to throw them out. Peaceful protest will do
the job. And when it doesn't, those whom
the CIA has most oppressed will find other
ways of fighting back."
This open invitation to violence against
Americans both intelligence officers and
other diplomats makes it imperative that we
protect our overseas personnel from this
kind of attack.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill's
passage to assure both our intelligence per-'
sonnel and our enemies that we intend to
protect those whose jot it is to provide us
with the vital information needed for
American security.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, the
yeas and nays having been ordered, I
move passage of the conference
report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there further debate?
If not, the question is on agreeing to
the conference report.
On this question, the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the Clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON [after having voted
in the negative]. Mr. President, I have
a live pair with the Senator from Ten-
nessee (Mr. SASSER). If he were here
present and voting, he would vote
"yea." I have voted "nay." I therefore
withdraw my vote.
Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
the Senator from Florida (Mrs. HAw-
KINS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr.
JEPSEN), the Senator from Alaska (Mr.
MuRKowsKI), the Senator from
Oregon (Mr. PACKwooD), the Senator
from South Dakota (Mr. PRESSLER),
the Senator from Delaware (Mr.
ROTH), the Senator from New Mexico
(Mr. SCHMrrr), and the Senator from
Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD), are nec-
essarily absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Florida
(Mrs. HAWKINS) and the Senator from
Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) would each
vote"Yea."
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. BvM-
PERS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr.
DECONCINI), the Senator from Hawaii
(Mr. MATSUNAGA), the Senator from
Maine (Mr. MITCHELL), and the Sena-
tor from Tennessee (Mr. SASSER) are
necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (-Mrs.
KASSEBAI M). Are there any other Sen-
ators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced-yeas 81,
nays 4, as follows:
(Rollcall Vote No. 170 Leg.]
YEAS-81
Abdnor
Boren
Byrd,
Andrews
Bosehwitz
Harry F., Jr.
Armstrong
Bradley
Byrd, Robert C.
Baucus
Brady
Cannon
Bentsen
Burdick
Chafee
Chiles
Heflin
Pell
Cochran
Heinz
Percy
Cohen
Helms
Proxmire
D'Ainato
Hollings
Pryor
Danforth
Huddleston
Quayle
Denton
Humphrey
andolph
R
Dixon
Inouye
Riegle
Dodd
Jackson
Rudman
Dole
Johnston
Sarbanes
Domenici
Kassebaum
Simpson
Durenberger
Kasten
Specter
Eagleton
Kennedy
Stennis
East
Laxalt
Stevens
Exon
Leahy
Symms
Ford
Levin
Thurmond
Gun
Long
Tower
Glenn
Lugar
Tsongas
Goldwater
Mattingly
Wallop
Gorton
McClure
Warner
Grassley
Melcher
Weicker
Hatch
Metzenbaum
Zorinsky
Hatfield
Nickles
Hayakawa
Nunn
NAYS-4
Biden Mathias
Hart Moynihan
PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-1
Cranston, against.
NOT VOTING-14
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Baker
Matsunaga
Roth
Bumpers
Mitchell
Sasser
DeConcini
Murkowski
Schmitt
Hawkins
Packwood
Stafford
Jepsen
Pressler
So the conference report was agreed
to.
Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, I.
move to reconsider the vote by which
the conference report was adopted.
Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
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STATEMENT OF
JOHN N. McMAHON
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
MAY 27, 1982
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MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
I AM HONORED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS MY NOMINATION
TO BE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I APPRECIATE THE
PRESIDENT'S EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN ME, AND I APPROACH THIS
NEW CHALLENGE WITH ENTHUSIASM AND DETERMINATION.
I HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, SERVED OUR NATION AS AN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS. I FEEL FORTUNATE TO HAVE HAD A
VARIED, REWARDING, AND CONSTANTLY CHALLENGING CAREER, PERMITTING
ME TO SERVE IN ALL PHASES OF INTELLIGENCE -- FROM OPERATIONS TO
ANALYSIS, AND FROM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL COLLECTION
SYSTEMS TO ADMINISTRATION. LET ME BRIEFLY REVIEW IT FOR THE
COMMITTEE.
I BEGAN MY CAREER WITH THE AGENCY AS A CLERK IN 1951. AFTER
SERVING OVERSEAS FOR FIVE YEARS, I RETURNED FOR BASIC TRAINING
IN THE ARMY, AND I THEN JOINED THE U-2 PROGRAM. IN 1965, I
BECAME DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR THE AGENCY'S OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS,
WHICH WAS CONCERNED WITH APPLYING THE LATEST IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
TO MAJOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROBLEMS. LATER? I SERVED AS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE AND THEN AS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE, RESPONSIBLE FOR
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS. IN 1974, I BECAME
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CIA FOR ADMINISTRATION. I THEN SERVED
AS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY AND ACTING DEPUTY TO THE DCI FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, UNTIL BEING APPOINTED DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CIA FOR OPERATIONS IN JANUARY OF 1978. IN THIS CAPACITY I
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-2-
DIRECTED AGENCY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS. IN APRIL OF 1981 I BECAME
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT, RESPONSIBLE
FOR DIRECTING ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE. I SERVED
IN THAT CAPACITY UNTIL JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, WHEN I WAS APPOINTED
AS THE AGENCY'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAY-TO-
DAY MANAGEMENT OF CIA.
MY ASSIGNMENTS, MANY OF WHICH INVOLVED JOINT PROGRAMS
WITH THE MILITARY, HAVE GIVEN ME BOTH A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND A SUBSTANTIAL APPRECIATION
OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE NEEDS, MY TWO YEARS
WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF PROVIDED ME WITH AN IN-DEPTH
UNDERSTANDING OF ALL NATIONAL PROGRAMS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN,
THE PRIORITY OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE
PROGRAMS, AND THE BEST MEANS OF SATISFYING INTELLIGENCE NEEDS FOR
POLICYMAKERS, Al CO ELL- A;;' ~c. f-z * c~-~-c~cR- o~~ ~.~ ~~~~
WHEN I JOINED THE AGENCY IN 1951, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE LIVED
IN AN ESSENTIALLY BIPOLAR WORLD. IN THOSE DAYS OUR ADVERSARY
WAS OBVIOUS, OUR MISSION WAS CLEAR, AND OUR EFFORTS WERE FOCUSED
ACCORDINGLY. THE UNITED STATES WORKED TO BUILD THE DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF ITS FRIENDS, WHILE
THE SOVIET UNION STROVE TO SUBVERT OUR EFFORTS. THE RISK OF
ATOMIC CATASTROPHE WAS JUST THEN BEGINNING TO BECOME A FACTOR
IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND TOTALITARIANISM, WE FOCUSED
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, AND
WE ANALYZED WORLD EVENTS MAINLY IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECT ON
THE EAST-WEST BALANCE OF POWER.
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-3-
AS WE MOVE THROUGH THE 1980s AND BEYOND, IT IS CLEAR THAT
THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION MUST BE GEARED TO THREATS WHICH ARE
INCREASINGLY VARIED, SUBTLE, AND COMPLEX. WE CAN NEVER TAKE
FOR GRANTED OUR ABILITY TO ACCURATELY ASSESS THE MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF OUR KEY ADVERSARIES, AND THE
SOVIET UNION MUST REMAIN OUR FIRST INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY. AT
THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT WE APPRECIATE FULLY
THE BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS
FORCES WHOSE INTERACTION WILL SHAPE WORLD EVENTS AND INFLUENCE
THE DESTINY OF OUR OWN COUNTRY. FINALLY, WE SHOULD NEVER SET
ASIDE THE IMPORTANCE OF MORE TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT, SUCH AS IRREDENTISM AND NATIONAL PRIDE.
THE ABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE NATIONAL
POLICYMAKERS WITH THE TIMELY, ACCURATE, AND INSIGHTFUL INFORMATION
THEY NEED TO ADVANCE AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE WORLD REQUIRES
THAT WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES TO COLLECT
THE RIGHT KIND OF INFORMATION, TO ANALYZE IT EFFECTIVELY, AND
TO PRESENT IT IN A RELEVANT AND USEFUL MANNER. WE ARE ENCOURAGED
THAT THE MUTUAL DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
TO RESTORE THE VITALITY OF OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS
HELPING US TRANSLATE THESE GOALS INTO REALITY. AS WE DO SO,
HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE FOR THE RECORD THAT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INVOLVING AMERICANS
ARE, AND MUST CONTINUE TO BE, LIMITED, SUBJECT TO STRICT STANDARDS
OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FAR REMOVED FROM ANY ABRIDGMENT OF CHERISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
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-4-
I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IS
BENEFICIAL, BOTH FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. THE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM SERVES TWO KEY PURPOSES,
FIRST, IT ASSURES THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
OF NECESSITY UNDERTAKEN IN SECRET ARE BEING MONITORED BY THEIR
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES. SECOND, IT ASSURES THE INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS WHO UNDERTAKE THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT THE CONGRESS AND
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE STAND BEHIND AND SUPPORT THEM IN THEIR
DIFFICULT AND OFTEN DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENTS.
THE OVERSIGHT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED AND MATURED
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAVE ALSO SERVED TO ENHANCE CONGRESSIONAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND OF THE NEED FOR
THE LONG-RANGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE CHALLENGES
WHICH LIE AHEAD. THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES BY THIS COMMITTEE AND
ITS COUNTERPART IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE REVIEW
CONDUCTED IN GREAT DETAIL BY THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES, AND
THE STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO KEEP THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
"FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED" HAS MADE THE CONGRESS AN ACTIVE
PARTNER IN OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS IS AS IT
SHOULD BE, AND I PLEDGE TO YOU THAT IF CONFIRMED I WILL MAKE
EVERY EFFORT TO FOSTER AND IMPROVE THIS VITAL RELATIONSHIP,
MR, CHAIRMAN, THAT CONCLUDES MY PREPARED REMARKS -- I WOULD
BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF
THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE.
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STATEMENT OF
JOHN N. McMAHON
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
MAY 27, 1982
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MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
I AM HONORED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS MY NOMINATION
TO BE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. I APPRECIATE THE
PRESIDENT'S EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN ME, AND I APPROACH THIS
NEW CHALLENGE WITH ENTHUSIASM AND DETERMINATION.
I HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, SERVED OUR NATION AS AN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS. I FEEL FORTUNATE TO HAVE HAD A
VARIED, REWARDING, AND CONSTANTLY CHALLENGING CAREER, PERMITTING
ME TO SERVE IN ALL PHASES OF INTELLIGENCE -- FROM OPERATIONS TO
ANALYSIS, AND FROM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL COLLECTION
SYSTEMS TO ADMINISTRATION. LET ME BRIEFLY REVIEW IT FOR THE
COMMITTEE.
'I BEGAN MY CAREER WITH THE AGENCY AS A CLERK IN 1951. AFTER
SERVING OVERSEAS FOR FIVE YEARS, I RETURNED FOR BASIC TRAINING
IN THE ARMY, AND I THEN JOINED THE U-2 PROGRAM. IN 1965, I
BECAME DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR. THE AGENCY'S OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS,
WHICH WAS CONCERNED WITH APPLYING THE LATEST IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
TO MAJOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROBLEMS. LATER, I SERVED AS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE AND THEN AS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE-OF TECHNICAL SERVICE, RESPONSIBLE FOR
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS. IN 1974, 1 BECAME
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CIA FOR ADMINISTRATION. I THEN SERVED
AS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY AND ACTING DEPUTY TO THE DCI FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, UNTIL BEING APPOINTED DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CIA FOR OPERATIONS IN JANUARY OF 1978. IN THIS CAPACITY I
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DIRECTED AGENCY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS. IN APRIL OF 1981 1 BECAME
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT, RESPONSIBLE
FOR DIRECTING ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE. I SERVED
IN THAT CAPACITY UNTIL JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, WHEN I WAS APPOINTED
AS THE AGENCY'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAY-TO-
DAY MANAGEMENT OF CIA.
MY ASSIGNMENTS, MANY OF WHICH INVOLVED JOINT PROGRAMS
WITH THE MILITARY, HAVE GIVEN ME BOTH A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF
THE. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND A SUBSTANTIAL APPRECIATION
OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE NEEDS. MY TWO YEARS
WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF PROVIDED ME WITH AN-IN-DEPTH
UNDERSTANDING OF ALL NATIONAL PROGRAMS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN,
THE PRIORITY OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED. WITH THOSE
PROGRAMS, AND THE BEST MEANS OF SATISFYING INTELLIGENCE NEEDS FOR
POLICYMAKERS, AS WELL AS OUR 1'IILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE. FIELD.
WHEN I JOINED THE AGENCY IN 19511 MR. CHAIRMAN, WE LIVED
IN AN ESSENTIALLY BIPOLAR WORLD. IN THOSE DAYS OUR ADVERSARY
WAS OBVIOUS, OUR MISSION WAS CLEAR, AND OUR EFFORTS WERE FOCUSED
ACCORDINGLY. THE UNITED STATES WORKED TO BUILD THE DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF ITS FRIENDS; WHILE
THE SOVIET UNION STROVE TO SUBVERT OUR EFFORTS. THE RISK OF
ATOMIC CATASTROPHE WAS JUST THEN BEGINNING TO BECOME A FACTOR
IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND TOTALITARIANISM. WE FOCUSED
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, AND
WE ANALYZED WORLD EVENTS MA I N LY IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECT ON
THE EAST-WEST BALANCE OF POWER.
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-3-
AS WE MOVE THROUGH THE 1980s AND BEYOND, IT IS CLEAR THAT
THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION MUST BE GEARED TO THREATS WHICH ARE
INCREASINGLY VARIED, SUBTLE, AND COMPLEX. WE CAN NEVER TAKE
FOR GRANTED OUR ABILITY TO ACCURATELY ASSESS THE MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF OUR KEY ADVERSARIES, AND THE
SOVIET UNION MUST REMAIN OUR FIRST INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY. AT
THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT WE APPRECIATE FULLY
THE BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS
FORCES WHOSE INTERACTION WILL SHAPE WORLD EVENTS AND INFLUENCE
THE DESTINY OF OUR OWN COUNTRY. FINALLY, WE SHOULD NEVER SET
ASIDE THE IMPORTANCE OF MORE-TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT, SUCH AS IRREDENTISM AND NATIONAL PRIDE,
THE ABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE NATIONAL
POLICYMAKERS WITH THE TIMELY, ACCURATE, AND INSIGHTFUL INFORMATION
THEY NEED TO ADVANCE AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE WORLD REQUIRES
THAT WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES TO COLLECT
THE RIGHT KIND OF INFORMATION, TO ANALYZE IT EFFECTIVELY, AND
TO PRESENT IT IN A RELEVANT AND USEFUL MANNER. WE ARE ENCOURAGED
THAT THE MUTUAL DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
TO RESTORE THE VITALITY OF OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS
HELPING US TRANSLATE THESE GOALS INTO REALITY, AS WE DO SO,
HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE FOR THE RECORD THAT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INVOLVING AMERICANS
ARE, AND MUST CONTINUE TO BE, LIMITED, SUBJECT TO STRICT STANDARDS
OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FAR REMOVED FROM ANY ABRIDGMENT OF CHERISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
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-4-
I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IS
BENEFICIAL, BOTH FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. THE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM SERVES TWO KEY PURPOSES.
FIRST, IT ASSURES THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
OF NECESSITY UNDERTAKEN IN SECRET ARE BEING MONITORED BY THEIR
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, SECOND, IT ASSURES THE INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS WHO UNDERTAKE THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT THE CONGRESS AND
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE STAND BEHIND AND SUPPORT THEM IN THEIR
DIFFICULT AND OFTEN DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENTS.
THE OVERSIGHT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED AND MATURED
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAVE ALSO SERVED TO ENHANCE CONGRESSIONAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND OF THE NEED FOR
THE LONG-RANGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE CHALLENGES
WHICH LIE AHEAD. THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES BY THIS COMMITTEE AND
ITS COUNTERPART IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE REVIEW
CONDUCTED IN GREAT DETAIL BY THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES, AND
THE STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO KEEP THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
"FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED" HAS MADE THE CONGRESS AN ACTIVE
PARTNER IN OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS IS AS IT
SHOULD BE, AND I PLEDGE TO YOU THAT IF CONFIRMED I WILL MAKE
EVERY EFFORT TO FOSTER AND IMPROVE THIS VITAL RELATIONSHIP.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT CONCLUDES MY PREPARED REMARKS -- I WOULD
BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF
THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE.
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STATEMENT OF
JOHN N I1cMAHON
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
MAY 27, 1982
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MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
I AM HONORED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS MY NOMINATION
TO BE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. I APPRECIATE THE
PRESIDENT'S EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN ME, AND I APPROACH THIS
NEW CHALLENGE WITH ENTHUSIASM AND DETERMINATION.
I HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, SERVED OUR NATION AS AN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS. I FEEL FORTUNATE TO HAVE HAD A
VARIED, REWARDING, AND CONSTANTLY CHALLENGING CAREER, PERMITTING
ME TO SERVE IN ALL PHASES OF INTELLIGENCE -- FROM OPERATIONS TO
ANALYSIS, AND FROM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL COLLECTION
SYSTEMS TO ADMINISTRATION. LET ME BRIEFLY REVIEW IT FOR THE
COMMITTEE.
.I BEGAN MY CAREER WITH THE AGENCY AS A CLERK IN 1951. AFTER
SERVING OVERSEAS FOR FIVE YEARS, I RETURNED FOR BASIC TRAINING
IN THE ARMY, AND I THEN JOINED THE U-2 PROGRAM. IN 1965, I
BECAME DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR. THE AGENCY'S OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS,
WHICH WAS CONCERNED WITH APPLYING THE LATEST IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
TO MAJOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROBLEMS. LATER, I SERVED AS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE AND THEN AS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE, RESPONSIBLE FOR
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS. IN 1974, I BECAME
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CIA FOR ADMINISTRATION. I THEN SERVED
AS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY AND ACTING DEPUTY TO THE DCI FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, UNTIL BEING APPOINTED DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CIA FOR OPERATIONS IN JANUARY OF 1978, IN THIS CAPACITY I
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DIRECTED AGENCY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS. IN APRIL OF 1981 I BECAME
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT, RESPONSIBLE
FOR DIRECTING ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE. I SERVED
IN THAT CAPACITY UNTIL JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, WHEN I WAS APPOINTED
AS THE AGENCY'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAY-TO-
DAY MANAGEMENT OF CIA.
MY ASSIGNMENTS, MANY OF WHICH INVOLVED JOINT PROGRAMS
WITH THE MILITARY, HAVE GIVEN ME BOTH A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF
THE.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND A SUBSTANTIAL APPRECIATION
OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE NEEDS. MY TWO YEARS
WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF PROVIDED ME WITH AN IN-DEPTH
UNDERSTANDING OF ALL NATIONAL PROGRAMS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN,
THE PRIORITY OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE
PROGRAMS, AND THE BEST MEANS OF SATISFYING INTELLIGENCE NEEDS FOR
POL I CYMAKERS, AS WELL AS OUR 1'I I L.ITARY COM?1ANDERS IN THE FIELD.
WHEN I JOINED THE AGENCY IN 1951, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE LIVED
IN AN ESSENTIALLY BIPOLAR WORLD. IN THOSE DAYS OUR ADVERSARY
WAS OBVIOUS, OUR MISSION WAS CLEAR, AND OUR EFFORTS WERE FOCUSED
ACCORDINGLY. THE UNITED STATES WORKED TO BUILD THE DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF ITS FRIENDS, WHILE
THE SOVIET UNION STROVE TO SUBVERT OUR EFFORTS. THE RISK OF
ATOMIC CATASTROPHE WAS JUST THEN BEGINNING TO BECOME A FACTOR
IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND TOTALITARIANISM. WE FOCUSED
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, AND
WE ANALYZED WORLD"EVENTS MAINLY IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECT ON
THE EAST-WEST BALANCE OF POWER.
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-3-
AS WE MOVE THROUGH THE 1980s AND BEYOND, IT IS CLEAR THAT
THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION MUST BE GEARED TO THREATS WHICH ARE
INCREASINGLY VARIED, SUBTLE, AND COMPLEX, WE CAN NEVER TAKE
FOR GRANTED OUR ABILITY TO ACCURATELY ASSESS THE MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF OUR KEY ADVERSARIES, AND THE
SOVIET UNION MUST REMAIN OUR FIRST INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY. AT
THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT WE APPRECIATE FULLY
THE BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS
FORCES WHOSE INTERACTION WILL SHAPE WORLD EVENTS AND INFLUENCE
THE DESTINY OF OUR OWN COUNTRY. FINALLY, WE SHOULD NEVER SET
ASIDE THE IMPORTANCE OF MORE TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT, SUCH AS IRREDENTISM AND NATIONAL PRIDE.
THE ABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE NATIONAL
POLICYMAKERS WITH THE TIMELY, ACCURATE, AND INSIGHTFUL INFORMATION
THEY NEED TO ADVANCE AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE WORLD REQUIRES
THAT WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES TO COLLECT
THE RIGHT KIND OF INFORMATION, TO ANALYZE IT EFFECTIVELY, AND
TO PRESENT IT IN A RELEVANT AND USEFUL MANNER. WE ARE ENCOURAGED
THAT THE MUTUAL DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
TO RESTORE THE VITALITY OF OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS-
HELPING US TRANSLATE THESE GOALS INTO REALITY. AS WE DO SO,
HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE FOR THE RECORD THAT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INVOLVING AMERICANS
ARE, AND MUST CONTINUE TO BE, LIMITED, SUBJECT TO STRICT STANDARDS
OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FAR REMOVED FROM ANY ABRIDGMENT OF CHERISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
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-4-
I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IS
BENEFICIAL, BOTH FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. THE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM SERVES TWO KEY PURPOSES.
FIRST, IT ASSURES THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
OF NECESSITY UNDERTAKEN IN SECRET ARE BEING MONITORED BY THEIR
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES. SECOND, IT ASSURES THE INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS WHO UNDERTAKE THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT THE CONGRESS AND
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE STAND BEHIND AND SUPPORT THEM IN THEIR
DIFFICULT AND OFTEN DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENTS.
THE OVERSIGHT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED AND MATURED
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAVE ALSO SERVED TO ENHANCE CONGRESSIONAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND OF THE NEED FOR
THE LONG-RANGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE CHALLENGES
WHICH LIE AHEAD. THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES BY THIS COMMITTEE AND
ITS COUNTERPART IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE REVIEW
CONDUCTED IN GREAT DETAIL BY THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES, AND
THE STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO KEEP THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
"FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED" HAS MADE THE CONGRESS AN ACTIVE
PARTNER IN OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS IS AS IT
SHOULD BE, AND I PLEDGE TO YOU THAT IF CONFIRMED I WILL MAKE
EVERY EFFORT TO FOSTER AND IMPROVE THIS VITAL RELATIONSHIP.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT CONCLUDES MY PREPARED REMARKS -- I WOULD
BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF
THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE.
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STAT
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i
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a CVRC1
Central Intelligence Agency
19 May 1982
Mr. Robert R. Simmons
Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Reference to your letter of 17 May, attached
are my responses keyed to enclosures 1 and 2
respectively. If you need further information,
please call.
You can discern from my responses that when
it came to events such as those involving the
Wilson/Terpil case, I have gratefully led a
sheltered life.
Also enclosed are the citations associated
with my awards as well as a detailed chronology
and job description of my assignments.
John N. McMahon
Unclassified when
separated from attachments
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l~PICELc~! ~YCE$t~2[~BYCxP ~BYLG~7
iMthrr
MR. JOHN N. McMAHON
is hereby awarded the
DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE MEDAL
for his outstanding services to the Central Intelligence Agency from January 1978 to
January 1981. A rare and uncommonly resourceful official, he has provided to the Director
and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence invaluable advice in developing and
implementing operational activities of vital concern to the highest levels of the United
States Government. An exceptionally talented and enlightened manager, Mr. McMahon
has achieved dramatic improvements in the personnel management system of the
Operations Directorate that have been of great benefit to those associated with that vital
element of the CIA. A tower of strength in the last three years in redirecting and guiding
the operations of his Directorate, he also played a major role in maintaining the
cohesiveness that is essential to the overall goals of the Agency. Dynamic and energetic,
Mr. McMahon typifies the finest in Agency leadership and his contributions have been of
immeasurable value to the national security of the United States, reflecting great credit
on him, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal service.
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flC c , rrn,
Admiral Turner announced his appointment of
John McMahon as CIA's Deputy Director for Operations.
He asked NFIB to concur in his recommendation to
award John McMahon the National Intelligence
Distinguished Service Med. for his fine work as
Associate Deputy and Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community. The NFIB concurred unanimously.
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Extract from NFIB Minutes [NFIB-M-32]
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HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS CEREMONY
Monday, 14 April 1975
12 Noon
Presentation by Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE MEDAL
to
Mr. John N. McMahon
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL - MR. JANNEY: It is our privilege
today to honor Mr. John N. McMahon for his outstanding service
to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of Central
Intelligence, Mr. Colby, will present the Distinguished Intel-
ligence Medal.
STAT
Would you step forward please, Mr. McMahon.
Citation: Mr. John N. McMahon is hereby
awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition
o~ his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency.
During the period September 1970 to August 1974 Mr. McMahon
served as Deputy Director and Director of ELINT and as Director
of Technical Service. In these very senior positions in the
Directorate of Science and Technology, his dynamic leadership,
foresight and executive ability were instrumental in the
success and operational effectiveness of projects of vital
importance to the national security of the United States.
Mr. McMahon's dedication and accomplishments in the service
of his country reflect the highest credit on him, the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Federal service.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE: I am delighted to say
that we are not giving this medal on the occasion of a retire-
ment, which reflects a rather deliberate position we've taken
that we like to award these kinds of medals at the time of, or
as near to it as possible, the event that justifies it. And
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certainly John has done a lot of things which have entitled
him to this medal. He did receive an Intelligence Medal of
Merit about five years ago for some of his work in a previous
iob, but the additional responsibilities and the way he has
conducted himself over the past five years have clearly war-
ranted this additional medal.
If you look with some curiosity through John's
background to see just what the key is that leads to a suc-
cessful performance of this nature, you see him graduating
from Holy Cross with a degree in English and philosophy,
which sort of makes you wonder a little bit. Then you find
him coming to work in CIA as a GS-5 Commo Clerk, and you
sort of wonder, well, oh, that's fine. Then he served in
Europe for five years. He served in almost every Direc-
torate including the DD/S&T before it was even named DD/S&T
- DDR, the DDP and of course the DDA, or 11&S, whatever title
it happened to have at any one time. But he has served us
well and in some of the most technical jobs we can imagine
where he used that firm technical base he had established.
But you finally end up with the key indicator, which is his
mobility and his ability to handle tough problems that he
didn't know much about maybe when he walked into them; but
he studied it, understood not only how to run the operation
itself but how to be imaginative about where it should go
in the future, how to get along with the people involved.
He was a personnel officer for awhile. He has that under-
standing of motivation, what makes people turn out the best
work they can. He also has served us for awhile as a budget
analyst, so that he knows where the dollars are and how they
have to be watched and managed and directed. And he has put
all of these qualities together - his technical excellence,
his English and philosophy and his ability to articulate
things and get them across.
So I think all of these qualities together show
the kind of performance that can jump from managing ELINT to
managing Technical Services to being our Associate Deputy for
Administration generally and can be summed up as this is a
very all-around competent fellow who can put all these prob-
lems together and come out with good solid solutions and
maintain good morale while he's doing it.
I add one thing that I usually do at these events,
which is that we don't give the medal to John alone, but
his family shares and has a piece of it because we know the
kind of dedication and the kind of effort that John has
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presented could only have come from a family which has sup-
ported him and understood and been an equal contributor to
the kind of loyalty and dedication that has been shown here.
So the medal very much belongs.to the family and we are
delighted to have them here to enable us to award this at
this time rather than waiting for John's retirement, which
I hope is a long way off.
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Mr. McMahon has no formal technical training, but
he has assimilated a vast amount of technical knowledge
which allowed him to make a major impact on the technolo-
gical decisions of primary concern to the various offices
to which he was assigned.
Mr. McMahon has amply demonstrated his expertise as
an executive manager in every aspect of his responsibilities.
His entire service during the period covered by this
recommendation has been characterized. by responsible leader-
ship, outstanding initiative, foresight, and total dedication.
I very strongly recommend that Mr. John N. McMahon be awarded
the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for his exceptionally
meritorious service to the United States while assigned to
the Directorate of Science and Technology.
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:t . ~, K? s S cut .ve LYr 4~Ct~: -C:ft ltroil 'r
General Caunsel
Ins tar General
Dle~ Director for I3telrllgen e
Doty Direetar for ln..a
Deputy Director for Sciexe an a log1
men Director "or SuTport
t s' D:.minatioua nor : i1M. aa A. Ju u r4 a2 A ax :s
1. On -,. 16t of ieceY. er at the .zecutiv-r Cow ttee 4'teetiugs
T? r t a for for aupcrt r :,..e tz your s :^.Y?ers3ti3U In the
o ns Age= 7 c=.-'-I date Z'= the rJ f llicrn - J }4e ria1
rt*i s {tie su et} :.:'I ed >
an U. J."
it is elt that thia is cam an-ward. : or .,1ic 2 `te. sho:L1d.
hs a ca< "titi e c- i:.ate. The Director haa of received an.
a -.n7._st: ou f =a ::r. ;.,1 Sr State, C its t of t, e
B-,a... .^..' Trastees or tie ilia A. J, N+ rtal x aun.daticn, and it
i~ rer Qwtea ttbst r iir.ees be presented by yaur respective co ts.
2.. r T rt r irrar 'ion ^.A this wara MV 1. :'nuns, in
PubU c Seice A ..3. I "u.-~..c r ass. stta is r eededplease
^i viP1e< rote that the tz ea ne or suo axs-
s! on to tbs ?ouuat is the 15th o Febr --. To permit necessary mti= of docuzents ve should bay y ' 7 ations in babel by
the 34th nr J==7. y. Your ew. erstion is ap ated.
25X1
I
25X1
25X1
A.:ting erector o= Perms
Distribution:
L - Each Addressee
1 -
,V - Dj Pers Subject
1 - Pers Chrono
OD/Per 22 Dec 65)
25X1
I
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DD/S 65-5931
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel
SUBJECT : Nominations for William A. Jump Memorial
Award
1. Attached is a letter dated 7 December 1965 from Mr. Staats
to the Director inviting nominations for the William A. Jump Memorial
Award. When I advised Mr. Bannerman that the response to your solicitation
for all awards produced no nominations for the jump Award, he asked that
you again survey the Agency for nominations.
2. Will you please take the necessary action and prepare a reply for
DCI signature.
Executive Officer to the
Deputy Director for Support
Att: Ltr dtd 7 Dec 65 to DCI fm
Elmer B. Staats, same subject
w/atts
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I Executive .B. ictr7
WILLIAM A. JUMP MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20250
December 7, 1965
Vice Admiral W. F. Raborn (Ret.)
Director, Cnntra2.. Intalliganca Agancy
Washington, D. C. 20505
The William A. Jump Memorial Foundation is pleased to announce its 17th
annual awards program for distinguished career service in public adminis-
tration. We invite you to nominate a candidate for this award to provide
incentive and recognition to young Federal employees for exemplary public
service. Again in 1966 we plan. to give two or three principal awards in
order to more fully recognize the commendable achievements of the many -
outstanding candidates nominated each year.
This awards program was established in 1950 in honor of the late William A.
Jump, Budget and Finance Officer of the U. S. Department of Agriculture,
who was recognized nationally for his leadership and distinguished con-
tributions to effective public administration. In May 1965 the Jump Award
was given to three outstanding young men, honored for their exemplary
accomplishments and services. They were: William Josephson, for outstanding
achievement in administration of the Peace Corps; Samuel A. Lawrence,
Bureau of the Budget, for exceptional contributions and sound judgment
in analyzing complex Federal programs; and Edwin P. Trainor, for exemplary
leadership in work planning and control for revenue collection activities,
Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury.
As Chairman of the Board of Trustees I am glad 'to invite you to continue
participation in this program by nominating outstanding young men and women
for this special recognition. The announcements of the program give the
necessary information about submission of nominations.
Sincerely yours,
Lu
Elmer B. Staats
Chairman, Board of Trustees
Address replies to:
Mr. Carl R. Sapp, Secretary-Treasurer
William A. Jump Memorial Foundation
Room 117-E, Administration Building
U. S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D. C. 20250
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