THE "RED TEAM"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: February 17, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
. SECRET -
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Executive Assistant to the DDCI
0
2 February 1984
Bob,
Regarding the attached, the DDCI continues to agree with your
suggestion that this Red Team be under McFarlane. That was not
referred to anywhere in Casey's note, however. You can imagine what
the DDCI's reaction is to the suggestion on page 7 that the Red Team
be attached to the DDCI. Could you make sure that any "exploration" that
you do leads to putting this group under McFarlane.
Attachment:
DCI's Memo dtd 1 Feb 84 re The "Red Team"
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
Central IntelligencSency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
I e~-Zkll
f7,~ A~ 40L
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
0 SECRET 40
EYES ONLY
l ebruary-1984=
MEMORANDUM FOR: / Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
1. I appreciate) (very thoughtful review of the options and 25X1
implications in setting up a "Red Team." I have signed approval to indicate
agreement in principle to move forward on this. There are a lot of implications
which could turn on exactly how we proceed and which of the options in the
paper are pursued. This has to be explored and tested carefully and we have
to do everything we can to avoid duplication of effort and strains on resources
that might be directed to more urgent and fundamental needs. In short, 25X1
memo has lots of food for thought and I congratulate him on that. I leave it
to all of you to explore this further and proceed in accordance with whatever
you decide.
2. I look forward to going into this further with all of you upon my
return.
William J. Casey
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 ? SECRET ?
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence -- EYES ONLY --
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief, Arms control Intelligence Staff
1. Your concurrence with the recommendations below, beginning in
paragraph 13. (U)
2. NSDD 121 (Tab A) reiterates the President's decision to establish a
Red Team to review arms control compliance questions. NSDD 121 states
(page 4):
A Red Team review panel will be established to consider
and anticipate possible Soviet noncompliance, concealment,
and deception activity.
You also need to be aware that NSDD 65, in November 1982, established a Red
Team as part of the NSC Verification Committee. NSDD 65 states (page 3):
Creation of a permanent "Red Team" to challenge US verification
capabilities, assumptions and policies. This team would
anticipate how, in what ways, and for what purposes the Soviets
might try to avoid compliance with the provisions of arms
control agreements. START and INF should have highest
priority.
And the implementing memo for NSDD 65, in July 1983, also dealt with the Red
Team concept (page 2) by assigning the following task to the Analysis Group:
Assessment of Soviet concealment and deception activities
and "Red Teaming" current and proposed arms control agree-
ments, especially for START, INF, Nuclear Testing, and CBW;
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4 _
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
i
0
supervision of the "Red Team" mandated by NSDD 65 when such
a team is established.
As you ma remember, the Analysis Group is co-chaired by Dr. Eimer of ACDA and
myself. 25X1
3. My understanding is that in your conversation on 18 January 1983,
with National Security Advisor McFarlane, he agreed with you that the Red Team
envisaged in NSDD 121 should be under your leadership if not your control. It
is clear to me that the purpose of the NSDD 121-Red Team is a variation on the
work of US intelligence; intelligence data and intelligence-like work will be
the vast majority of the effort. Given the substance of the NSDD 121 mandate,
I consider it vital that the DCI have a dominant role. At the same time, it
also is apparent that the NSDD-121 Red Team is supposed to affect the Policy
Community as well. Consequently, given the history in this Administration of
the Red Team (see para 2 above), I believe you should consider allowing or
asking ACDA, or State, or the NSC Staff to play a role in overseeing the Red
Team. Beyond this, there are a number of fundamental structural and
procedural questions which are not answered by NSDD-121 (or any of the other
key documents) but which are answered in this memo.
Discussion
4. The Red Team, as we envision it, would pull together much of the work
from the ostensibly separate fields of compliance and CC&D, and focus that
work on the specialized intelligence and policy questions and requirements
generated by the arms control process. In my view, the key operative words of
NSDD-121 about the Red Team are: " . . . consider and anticipate . . ."
Those words encompass more a specific words of NSDD-65, et al. It seems to
me that the output of the Red Team ought to be kept as simple and short as
possible, preferably memoranda. The one thing which the Executive Branch does
not need more of, in the arms control arena, is a big stack of thick,
complicated reports which few (if any) key people have time to read or use.
5. There already is a plethora of Intelligence Community and Executive
Branch committees, each looking at part of the problem. Within the
Intelligence Community, for example, the Red Team likely would have to draw
upon existing entities and the new ones which I understand you have agreed to
create:
-- Several NIOs, especially NIO/SP.
-- The Strategic Arms Monitoring Working Group.
-- Several DCI committees, such as WSSIC, JAEIC, SIGINT Committee,
and COMIREX.
-- The new DCI committee on Denial and Deception analysis.
-2-
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
In-add- o he-spec-a xpe s F -NSk, NP-IC -DIA -and-CIA-Vdtird-'have t-6
contribute to specific analytical problems. (S/NF)
6. Outside the Intelligence Community, there are several Executive
Branch committees with overlapping responsibilities, some of which approach
those of the Red Team--most importantly:
-- The Analysis Group of the Arms Control Verification Committee.
-- The Consolidated Verification Group of the INF/START
Interdepartmental Groups.
-- ACDA's General Advisory Committee.
In addition, PFIAB is trying to get more involved these days both in the
intelligence aspects of arms control and in the neral subject of
concealment, deception, and data denial.
Composition, et al
7. A fundamental question here is whether the Red Team membership should
be drawn from within the Intelligence Community, from outside the Intelligence
Community, or both:
-- A Red Team made up of outside wise men would be a visible sign
that the Administration is taking this aspect of arms control
seriously. And new blood may generate new ideas on how to
approach the problem. But this subject is so complex that such a
group probably would not be able to offer more than general
guidance.
-- A Red Team made up of intelligence professionals would stand a
better chance of providing a useful input to the decisionmaking
process, and would be more responsive in fast-breaking
situations. Moreover, such a group probably would be less
susceptible to political or ideological bias. But, being closer
to everyday intelligence analysis, it would be less inclined to be
innovative;a."business as usual" approach could be criticized as
putting old wine in new bottles.
-- A Red Team made up of insiders and outsiders is an attractive
compromise, which would capture some part of the best features of
both of the first two approaches, while diluting their
disadvantages.
8. None of these approaches would prevent the Red Team from drawing upon
outside consultants with expertise in specific areas of concern. Moreover,
each of the three approaches would impose about the same load on US
-3-
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
is SECRET
Intelligence for support--although that load probably would be spread out more
evenly if the Red Team members were drawn solely from the IntelgeneP~
Comurr ty: -- hhate eer-it~'composition tthieeRed-Team "s mo tff cu urd e
will be adopting a Soviet-like attitude toward cheating and activities at the
edges of treaty provisions. 25X1
9. Irrespective of the approach, we do not envision a large Red Team.
About half a dozen would be a practical upper limit. The requirements for an
executive secretary and for dedicated clerical and analytical support would
ynry- ending on the Red Team's composition and the scope of its duties.
10. There are compelling arguments for removing the Red Team from the.
day-to-day arms..control support process. First, the NSDD clearly envisions a
separate, independent advisory body. Second, as best we can tell, the concept
appears pointed toward brainstorming and thoughtful analysis, activities which
would not be possible in the frantic, brushfire, environment generated by this
Administration's approach to routine arms control support. Third, the Red
Team's charter appears to go considerably beyond the customary limits of day-
to-day intelligence (or policy) support to the arms control process.
11. Nevertheless, we anticipate a close working relationship between the
Red Team and the Intelligence Community's established mechanism for arms
control support. Equally close working relationships will have to be
developed in the concealment and deception area and with the relevant
analytical entities within the Intelligence Community.
Duties, et al
12. Given the absence of clear guidance in the NSDD, the Red Team's
responsibilities can be whatever you want to make them. At one extreme, they
could encompass all of the monitoring and compliance work now handled by the
Arms Control Intelligence Staff, plus arms control-related deception and
denial work. At the other extreme, the Red Team could be swallowed up by
existing fiefdoms at the expense of its independence. My general thoughts--
subject to your wishes and clarification, if any, from the White House--are,
drawing from the past and present:
-- The Red Team should focus on future Soviet activities which could
reduce US monitoring confidence or engender US concerns with
respect to Soviet arms control compliance--or to breakout,
irrespective of compliance or non-compliance. This will require a
thorough understanding of:
- Soviet attitudes and intentions with respect to arms control.
- The details of present and projected arms control agreements.
- Intelligence judgments on current and future US capabilities to
monitor existing and proposed limitations.
-4-
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
SECRET ?
- Soviet knowledge of, and likely Soviet judgments on, current
amt ure-1Smonitoring-capabil-iti ems.
- Present and projected US intelligence collection and analysis
capabilities applicable to existing and proposed limitations.
- Soviet plans for their force modernization.
- US force modernization plans which might affect Soviet
attitudes on compliance or breakout.
- The history of Soviet concealment, deception, and data denial
activities.
-- The Red Team should not take over any functions of the Arms
Control Intelligence Staff, or of any other existing or soon to be
created Intelligence Community body, but should draw upon all
relevant Intelligence--and Policy--Community assets.
-- The Red Team should be empowered to suggest lines of enquiry
relevant to specialized arms control concerns for pursuit by other
intelligence and policy entities.
-- The Red Team should address changing Soviet practices as they
-apply-to al-1-Soviet -forces and to all existing arms control
agreements, and, upon request, should be prepared to comment on
the susceptibility of US negotiating positions under consideration
to Soviet cheating and CC&D.
-- The Red Team clearly should focus on the Soviet Union, but should
be ready to extend its role as needed to other countries party to
multilateral arms control agreements.
Recommendations
13. I believe you need to discuss--or at least explain--your plans about
the Red Team with Bud McFarlane, with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, with
Director Adelman, and with Chairman Vessey (in that order) before you
implement those plans. They all have interests in the Red Team and, in the
case of Director Adelman, my guess (from preliminary discussions with Dr.
Eimer) is that Director Adelman thinks he is going to have a major--if not
leading--role.
14. In any case, the Red Team should (in my view):
-- Be an advisory body, independent substantively from other, related
intelligence and policy entities, to literally do what NSDD 121
directs.
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
0
?
-- Be a catalyst to bring about analysis in both the Intelligence and
--- o y mmuni re e-rs garding-the-compliance; cotreeltnet~t; aiTd
deception areas, but should not do the work itself--consequently
it need not be heavily staffed.
-- Produce simple, short memoranda for the Executive Branch's senior
policy and intelligence officers which they can actually use.
-- Consist of six or seven members, with outsiders in the numerical
majority but not as a chairman alone, in the following kind of
mix:
Insiders
- Two intelligence officials:
o The Chairman of the new DCI Committee of Denial
and Deception Analysis or
o the new NIO for CC&D (if not the same as the
above)
o The Chairman of the Strategic Arms Monitoring
Working Group
- One policy official (depending on your desires), such as:
o Assistant Director ACDA for Verification & Intelligence
(Dr. Elmer)
o Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control/NSC Staff
(Dr. Ron Lehman)
Outsiders (the names are illustrative; feel free to add)
- A physical scientist, such as:
Dr. Michael May Dr. William Graham
Dr. James Fletcher Dr. Russell Sharer
Dr. Gerry Johnson
- A senior former official with experience negotiating
with the USSR, preferably including compliance issues,
such as:
Robert Buchheim
Sidney Graybeal
- A senior former official from the policy/programmatic
world, such as:
Sy Weiss
Dr. John Foster
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
? -SECRET
NOFORN
- A senior former intelligence officer such as:
Sayre Stevens
Howard Stoez
(It might be necessary to forego this type of outsider.)
Avoid at all costs members who are heavy on ideology and fervor
but light on reality and practicality.
the Chairmanship should be joint between either an intelligence
official and an outsider, or three-way between an intelligence
official, a policy official, and an outsider.
Logistics
15. For administrative purposes--most importantly security and
logistics--I believe that the Red Team should be attached for oversight to the
DDCI. If you felt like doing so, joint oversight by the DDCI and either
D/ACDA or Deputy Secretary of State, might be tolerable and achievable. Given
that the Red Team is intended to address issues of Soviet behavior relating to
compliance, as an intelligence officer who has CIA and Intelligence Community
responsibilities simultaneously, I am willing to have the Red Team connected
to me on a day-to-day basis, solely for administrative purposes, if you so
desire. There can be no doubt that compliance and related issues will be a
major element of the arms control process for a long time and whomever you
choose to act for your equities has to have a mandate encompassing both CIA
and the Intelligence Community-.
16. A small secretariat will be needed, consisting of a senior
intelligence officer (GS-15/SIS-1 level) with experience in intelligence
support to the arms control process and one secretary. My candidate for this
officer would be of my staff; other people would be
satisfactory too. in my view, a key qualification is a thorough
understanding of both the intelligence and the policy aspects of the arms
control business. In any case, it so happens that I have space within ACIS
for this support team, even if the bilateral strategic arms talks with the
17. Whatever else you desire, the Red Team's products should be printed
and controlled (in the security sense) by CIA and should be disseminated
simultaneously to:
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4 25X1-
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
? SECRET ?
Secretary of Energy (as appropriate)
____.-- ~rea~or-=o~Centr-al=Intelligence- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of the US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Resources
18. Since the creation of the Red Team, no matter what else you desire,
will impact most heavily on CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff and the new
NIO for CC&D, each staff should be augmented by one analyst to provide Red
Team support. This kind of augmentation ought to be funded easily in the
additional bundle of resources for the NFIP which are (in effect) mandated in
another portion of NSDD-121 and which were earlier agreed at senior levels
within the Executive Branch as necessary.
Implementation
19. Once you have decided what you want to do about consultations with
your other key NSC officers, have done that, have made some decisions about
members, or--in any case--have given your go-ahead, I am prepared to:
-- give you
-- make space available in ACIS or create a separate entity.
-- negotiate your desires inside the Executive Branch, if
appropriate.
-- make exploratory phone calls to potential Red Team members,
whoever they may be.
-- help in any other way you may desire, then or later.
20. I also believe that you need to know that the material in this
memorandum, because of its political sensitivity, has not been coordinated
with anyone. This material, however, is based upon the recent talking points
we provided you for your meeting with Bud McFarlane and based upon the memo I
prepared for you last summer when Director Adelman mentioned the Red Team to
you at a NSC meeting on START issues. Thus, we have been consistent.
25X1
F
21. If there is anything more I may to do assist you here, please call
and let me know.
25X1
25X1
-8-
Approved For Release 2007/06/15 CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
SECRET
SUBJECT: The "Red Team" (OUO)
DDI 0468/84
ACI9-042/84
27 January 1984
1 FEB 1984
Director of Central Intelligence Date
-9-
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4
? SECRET 0
DDI 0468/84
ACIS 042/84
27_Janua --x-984
SUBJECT: The "Red Team" (OUO)
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ExReg
1 - C/ACIS
1 - ACIS/Starr
1 - DI Reg (Blind Memo)
1 - ACIS Chrono (Blind Memo)
DDI/ACIS/ (27Jan84)
-10-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP86B00885R000100060042-4