9 MAY PFIAB SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000701380005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 4, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
9 May 1984
Please return to:
SA/DCI/IA
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
You are scheduled for your bimonthly session
with PFIAB next Wednesday, 9 May. Attached is a
draft presentation prepared by Hal Ford's people.
There are some blanks that will be filled in after
next week's Central American elections.
Let me know if we can do anything else to help
prepare you for this session.
P. S. I will get a back up book to you.
Date 4 May 84
FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
5-75 EDITIONS
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with PFIAB, 9 May 1984
8 May 1984
1. You are scheduled to meet with the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board on Wednesday, 9 May, from 9:30 to 11:00. PFIAB has indicated,
and then only informally, that it would like to hear about Central America.
2. This book includes the following materials for your use:
-- DCI Briefing. The presentation, at TAB A, was prepared by Hal
Ford's people; that presentation is an intelligence update and
covers key items since your last appearance before PFIAB on 14
March. Among the items covered are the Central American scene and
particularly the elections, the power struggle in Syria, the
latest on the Iran-Iraq war and Lebanon, the Soviet offensive in
Afghanistan, the recent major Soviet naval exercise, developments
on the China-Vietnamese border, and the status of arms control
efforts.
-- At TAB B is a copy of the tentative agenda for the two-day session.
-- At TAB C are talking points Bob Gates expects to use during his
appearance at PFIAB.
-- At TAB D is a copy of the actions accomplished by the Agency in
response to PFIAB requests over the last two-month period.
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-- At TAB G are talking points that summarize where the USG stands on
the issue of Soviet POWs in Afghanistan.
25X1
TO-P ECRET
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STAT
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P_F 1 A13 Mee ti rig
AGENDA
9 May 1984
0930-1100 Director of Central Intelligence*
1100-1200 Task Force Reports
1200-1415 Lunch with Secretary of the Treasury Regan
1415-1500 Task Force Reports
1500-1745 Bob Gates, DDI, brief on variety of analytical
subjects CS sz-q- TO C)
1800 DDI - Unclassified talk with PFIAB spouses on
intelligence
is
10 May 1984
0830-0930 Task Force Reports
0930-1100 Consultant Richard Helms - Variety of subjects
1100-1200 Task Force Reports
1300-1430 Larry Gershwin, NIO for Strategic Programs -
"Offensive Threat" (L&r r-y c9 oe-S A a+ he
1430-1700 Executive Session -f-or-w~t wrt I4e (\ .presr-n+o,41-%n)
?
*No identified topics requested but anticipate high interest in
Central America.
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 001
TOR: 020622Z APR 84
-'1ID/USSR
INCOMING
G
RP RUEAIIE
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
VSK375 610 STU2375
RR RUEHSD RUEHC
DE RUEHILP #0417 0880445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280455Z MAR 84
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1734
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1114
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2474
RUEHILL/AMCONSUL LAHORE 2014
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 184
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
2ND CORRECT EDCOPY (TEXTPARA2. LINE 1.
SNOW'S VICE SNXU'S)
ORIGINALLY PROCESSED AS CDS 3770265
E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: SREF. PREL, SHUM, PGOV, AF. PK, UP
SUBJECT: AFGHAN BITS AND P;ECES
2. HA/HR OFFICER SNOW'S MARCH 27 MEETING WITH AFGHAN INFOR-
MATION CENTER DIRECTOR PROF. B. MAJROOH PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY
FOR WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF AFGHAN-RELATED TOPICS
(CONSUL WAS ALSO PRESENT). FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMENTS
MADE BY MAJROOH.
3. SMUGGLING OF FOOD INTO AFGHANISTAN: ACCORDING TO MAJROOH.
FOOD SUPPLIES ARE SMUGGLED INTO AFGHANISTAN FROM PAKISTAN BY
BOTH PRO- AND ANTI-DRA FORCES. MUJAHIDIN TAKE FOOD TO THEIR
COMPATRIOTS AND CIVILIAN SUPPORTS RENDERED, SUCH AS THE SHIA
TURI TRIBE OF KURRAM AND SOME OF THE WAZIRS, ARE RUNNING A
COMMERCIAL OPERATION AND SELLING TO DRA FORCES. IN PAKTIA,
SAID MAJROOH, REGIME FORCES GET THE BULK OF THE FOOD. BUT IN
NANGERHAR AND KANDAHAR SITUATION IS MORE BALANCED. ACCORDING
TO MAJROOH. MUJAHIDIN GET THEIR FOOD FROM AFGHAN REFUGEES WHO
SHARE THEIR EXCESS RATIONS WITH THEM WHILE THE CGKMERCIAL
OPERATORS BUY IN PAKISTANI BAZAARS (MAJROOH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
SOME OF THIS FOOD MAY ALSO BE DIVERTED FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS).
MAJROOH ALSO ADDED THAT REFUGEES OCCASIONALLY ARE ABLE TO
BRING THEIR HARVESTS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO PAKISTAN TO SELL
LOCALLY.
4. AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN; MAJROOH SAID THAT THE SITUATION
FACED BY AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN IS NOT AS GOOD AS THAT
IN PAKISTAN. HE ASSERTED THAT THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES RESTRICT
THEIR MOVEMENTS AND FORCE THEM TO FIGHT IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. HE
CLAIMED THAT BETWEEN 300 AND 600 FAMILIES FROM
,%, ft 1 r! 1 11- A 1 T 1 Al
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 002
TOR: 020622Z APR 84
---------------- ------------ ------------------------------------------
WESTERN AND SOUTHWESTERN AFGHANISTAN FLED IRAN INTO
SWLUCHISTAN ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO BECAUSE THEY WERE BEING
FORCED TO DONATE BLOOD. MAJROOH ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE
ASA NO RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS ASSISTING HE REFUGEES IN IRAN.
5. REFUGEE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN: MAJROOH CITED AN
INCIDENT HE SAID OCCURRED LAST WEEK IN A REFUGEE CAMO NEAR
KOHAT. HE SAID THAT ABOUT EIGHTY ARMED PAKISTANIS. LATER
DETERMINED TO BE PPP SUPPORTERS. HAD CONFRONTED THE REFUGEES
IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE HHEM TO LEAVE THE AREA. SECURITY FORCES
WERE SUMMONED FROM KOHAT AND CAPTURED THIRTY OF THE PAKISTANIS
WHILE DISPERSING THE REST. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED. IN
GENERAL. HOWEVER. MAJROOH FOUND REFUGEE-LOCAL RELATIONS STILL
TO BE GOOD, BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOME OPPOSITION
POLITICIANS WERE TRYING TO EXPLOIT THE REFUGEES AS AN ISSUE
6. SOVIET PRISONERS: MAJROOH THOUGHT THERE MAY BE ABOUT THIRTY
SOVIET PRISONERS IN MUJAHIDIN HANDS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS
SEEK TO MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF THEIR TROOPS WHO ARE CAPTURED
BY TRYING TO LOCATE THEM AND KILL THEM. HE MENTIONED THE
CASE OF A DOWNED HELICOPTER. EXPLAINING THAT ANOTHER HELICOPTER
HAD ATTACKED THE SITE AND KILLED THE FOUR OR FIVE SOVIET
SURVIVORS.
7. AFGHAN RESISTANCE GROUPS: MAJROOH BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE
SOME SHIFTS UNDERWAY IN THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE VARIOUS
PESHAWAR-BASED AFGHAN RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS. IN HIS
JUDGMENT. BOTH GUL BADEEN'S HEZB-I-ISLAMI AND MOHAMMAD NABI
MOHAMMADI'S HARAKAT ARE LOSING GROUND. RABBANI'S JAMIAT-I-
ISLAMI (WHICH IN HIS JUDGMENT HAS SOME OF THE BEST COMMANDERS
INSIDE AFGHANISTAN) IS GAINING STRENGTH. ACCORDING TO MAJROOH.
AS IS YUNUS KHALIS AND -- TO SOME EXTENT -- SYED ARMED GAILANI.
MODERATE ALLIANCE CHAIRMAN MOJADEDI'S FOLLOWING IS ABOUT THE
SAME AS IT HAS BEEN. ADDED MAJROOH.
8. REBUILDING THE AFGHAN ARMY: MAJROOM SAID HE HAD
RECENTLY RECEIVED INFORMATION INDICATING THAT THE SOVIETS AND
THE KHALOI WING OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PART? OF AFGHANISTAN
HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT TO REBUILD A COMPLETELY KHALOI AFGHAN
ARMY, LEAVING THE PARCHAM WING TO RUN THE POLITICAL SIDE OF
THE REGIME. MAJROOH AGREED WITH CONSUL. HOWEVER. THAT SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT (IF IN FACT TRUE) WOULD NOT SEEM TO PROMISE AN
IMPROVEMENT IN REGIME UNITY.
9. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LORTON
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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tT
The Director of Central Intelligence
W.uhingwn.I).( 2005
National Intelligence Council NIC #02397-84
18 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
25X1 FROM:
ssis an National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT: Recommended Discussion Item for Meeting with Mr. McFarlane
1. Recommendation: Despite Western protests and Soviet avowals that
they do not intend to change the rules in the Berlin air corridors, the
Soviets continue unilaterally to impose restrictions and th
W
e
est has not
vet developed a strategy -- beyond continued talking with the Soviets -- to
eal with the
it
i
T
s
uat
on.
provided as Attachment #1.
2. Background:
-- Air access to Berlin is governed by a post-war agreement that
established the three corridors;
-- in the early 60's the Soviets unilaterally imposed a 10,000
foot flight ceiling in the corridors. The Allies rejected the
ceiling in principle but accepted it in practice.
-- In the fall of 1979 the Soviets began imposing minimum
altitudes (usually around 5,000 feet) over some training
areas. Despite Allied apprehension over the precedent a modus
vivendi was developed for the sake of flight safety and the
West accepted the Soviet restrictions. A joint CIA/DIA
retrospective has shown that the Soviets Have indeed used the
reserved air space for air exercise activities.
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On 2u February of this year the Soviets began periodically
imposing fin niorum flight levels for the entire length of one or
more corridors. The Soviets claimed that their intent was to
ensure flight safety. But these reservations forced flights
going into Berlin to use an undesirable landing pattern, as
can be seen in the graphic that constitutes Attachment #2.
Although objecting that the Soviets had no right to impose
such reservations, the Allies have obeyed them in practice.
They have continued to protest the Soviet reservations at
various levels but have so far rejected the advice of US
mission Berlin (given on 8 March) that "we should fly through
the restricted area to demonstrate to the Soviets that we have
no intention of simply acquiescing in their attempt to change
the air regime."
A retrospective study of the reservations since 20 February
shows that the Soviets behaved prudently in that they
initially did not fly in the air space they had reserved.
Having established that the allies would not fly through the
reserved air space, however, they have now begun to use that
air space for air exercises.
On 12 April Dobrynin (as well as the Soviet Ambassadors in
Paris and London) was called in to be told that the
"unilateral assertion of the primacy of Soviet flights cannot
continue". Dobrynin averred that the Soviets had no
intentions of precipitating a crisis or making a unilateral
change to the air regime (see attachment #3 for the account of
the Eagleburger-Dobrynin meeting).
On 13 April State convened a meeting at which DAS Niles
briefed the Dobrynin meeting and expressed the hope that the
Soviets would now stop imposing reservations. I argued that
that was an optimistic scenario and that we should develop a
strategy to be implemented if the Soviets did not desist from
i i,iposi ng reservations. The rest of the meeting was
inconclusive and no such strategy was developed (as can be
seen in Attachment 44 - the State cable summarizing the
meeting).
On lb and 17 April the Soviets once again imposed reservations.
2
SECRET
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3. Current Situation: In sum, we keep protesting the reservations,
the Soviets keep imposing then, and we have no plan for dealing with their
tactic of sweet talk and tenacity on the issue. As you know, we are
examining the possibility that the Soviet air reservations constitute but a
larger pattern of activity, (bigger military exercises and the possible
escalation in Afghanistan, etc.) designed to intimidate the U.S. But action
on Berlin cannot await the completion of that examination. The longer the
situation is allowed to develop as it has so far, the harder it will be to
reestablish acceptable flight rules. I recommend that the USG rapidly
develop a new approach, encompassing both a plan to fly through the air
space reserved by the Soviets and a negotiating package of trade-offs
intended to meet both allied and Soviet concerns.
Attachments: As stated
CFri FT
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DENTIAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
4 May 1984
?
SUBJECT: PFIAB Meeting on Unauthorized Disclosures, 3 May 1984
1. On 3 May 1984, DCI Casey met with the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. Members present were Vice Chairman Leo Cherne
(presiding), Messrs. John S. Foster and Edward Bennett Williams and Dr. Albert
Wheelon.
2. The DCI told the PFIAB of his mounting concern about unauthorized
disclosures, using the list of 16 most serious intelligence leaks of 1984 to
illustrate the gravity of the situation. He also cited the frustration of the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the apparent lack of
resolve to follow leak investigations through to the identification of the
perpetrators of unauthorized disclosures.
3. Mr. Williams commented that investigating leaks from the government
side, which involves a large number of possible suspects, is unproductive. He
suggested that it would be more effective to go to the one individual who
obviously knows how the leak happened, the reporter. He pointed out that
there is no legal basis for the alleged journalistic privilege to refuse to
identify a source.
4. Mr. Cherne suggested that jailing a reporter for contempt tends to
make a martyr of the journalist. Dr. Wheelon recalled that the New York Times
had been assessed a daily fine of more than $1000 in a case where a Times
reporter had refused to identify a source. After several days, the amount of
the fine was substantial and the Times reporter revealed to the court the
identity of his source.
5. Mr. Foster suggested that some of the recurring proposals for
combating leaks probably have merit, and should be tried, in conjunction with
an effort to bring a reporter before a grand jury and require him to reveal
the source of a classified disclosure.
6. There was discussion of the political risk involved in taking drastic
action affecting the news media during an election year.
CL BY SIGNER
C ENTIAL DECL OADR
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7. Mr. Casey reminded the members of the collapse of NSDD-84 in the face
of severe media criticism. He pointed out that the NSDD was the strongest
presidential statement ever made against unauthorized disclosures, yet the
Congress took action to disable it, after the media mounted a concerted attack
upon it.
as the receipt of stolen property.
8. The remainder of the discussion on unauthorized disclosures centered
around ways to marshal congressional support for measures to stop unauthorized
disclosures, including possible legislation to make it illegal for newsmen to
receive classified documents. Mr. Williams characterized such a transaction
airman, DCI Security Committee
Prepared by: SECOM
'mm/4May84
?
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - ExAsst/OCI
1 - SA/ DC I
1 - D/OS
1 - D/ICS
1 - ICS Registry
1 - SECOM chrono
1 - SECOM Subject (Leaks)
2
CONFIDENTIAL
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ARrTCL.E LP EJ,.F
AI" P6GE
WP.SHINGTON POST
. Agri 1 1 ?84
U.S. Seen Assisting Duai'te
?
In Sunday's St1vadran
Vote
wfuntr.gton r ro u 1 , 0 , w
asnington said that "virtually all"
tgn &rv ce
SAN SALVADOR, May for 3-As of its funds for El Salvador's farm-
official cam
pa 'labor programs are provided by the
igning ends.-for =U.S. government under 'a contract
day's presidential' election, there are
strong indications that L'.S.govern ;that MELD has with AID.
ment funds and diplomatic pressure CUi -covertly rhos '-sup plied.
have been used to improve the pros- uacls
~encv:. the
. pects of Christian'_Democratic can-.. Venezuelan Institute for .Po ular
dilate Jose Napoleon Duarte. : -. Education AS done campaign
A significant increase ''.in the past work for Duarte free of charge, ac-
';month in official-U-S:involvement in ' cording to a howled ea le source
-organizing the- voting has led the
who has proved to be reliable in
Duarte's right-wing?opponents in the pis The 'agency, known b_v its
-Nationalist - Republican : Alliance, Spanish 'abbreviation- 1VEPO, has
known by 'its - Spanish abbreviation produced television -and radio com
Arena, to charge that'Washington is mercials for Duarte and 'has made
trying to engineer a fraud. There is available.. to him the results of its
virtually no evidence to support this ' opinion polls, IVEPO officials said.'. .
.accusation. but it appears likely to The source said-;the :CIA was
play a -major -role in-rightist efforts . "lapn eyin" the money by giving it
after the election to discredit the to a Vest German Christian Dem-
vote, if Duarte tins as expected. ocratic oundation that then rovid-
The United States has officially ed it-to IVEPO. The Konrad Ade.
proclaimed its neutrality in Sunday's nauer oundation-has close relations
voting,' but Duarte; -considered *a with IVEPO's principal fund-raiser,
moderate. is 'clearly Washington's but the foundation denied giving
favorite,- and evidence shows he has. money to IVEPO.
benefited from U.S. government in- IVEPO's director here Jose Mi-
voivement in .the following ways: well Fritts denied that any of
? He '} as received critical cam-'
JVEPO's funds came from the CIA
paicn support from the nation's larg-
estlabor union, the Salvadoran -or the US governaieiit; saving, e
Communal Union, which receives source is mistaken" He has said pre-
.the majority of its operating funds viously that foundations and indi-
from the U.S. Agency for Interna- viduals in West Germany, Belgium,
tional _Development. Two-thirds of Holland - and . Venezuela provide
-the peasant union's.600 grass-roots funds for the agency, but he and
organizers have worked full-time in other -IVEPO officials said their
-the past month going door-to-door backers did not wish to be identified.
-to encourage peasants to vote for ? Finally the U.S. government
Duarte, the union's secretary general since -November has twice' denied
Samuel Maldonado said toda visas `to"ATeria ` candidate Roberto
y. He D'Aubuisson in 'actions that Salve-
!mid the organizers had been "lent" dorari politicians-have described as a
.to the party and acknowledged that
significant blow to ;D'Aubuis?on's
ouch union :support violated a law presidential hopes. Duarte's Chris-
prohibiting labor groups from par- tian Democratic -Party ' repeatedly
:aicipating directly in politics. has referred to the visa denials in its
Maldonado added that his union advertisements, and the first visa
:;receives 75 percent of its operating -denial in November even led to an
-budget from -the American Institute . effort in February by some -of the
for Free Labor Development, or
;AIFLD. An AIFLD -spokesman in
nation's wealthiest businessmen to
try to replace D'Aubuisson as the
candidate, diplomats said.-
The . U.S. government - opposes
D''Aubuisson -because- of persistent -
reports by US. officials and Salva.
doran sources linking him to activ
ities by right-wing -death squads.
The administration fears that if
D'Aubuisson were president, Con-
gress would be reluctant to approve
aid to the Salvadoran government.
E Arena already seems to be - laying
the groundwork to complain if it loses
that it was the victim .of U.S.. inter-
ference, vote fraud or both. Party vice
presidential -candidate Hugo Barrera -
comptilained at a-news conference yes.
terday about 'strong U.S. influence"
on the Central Elections Council, the
body that is organizing the elections.
and charged that the "interference"
was "of a fraudulent type."
'While Americans have played an
expanded role at the'-elections coun-
cil in the past month. their efforts
appear to be designed primarily to
help avoid the widespread disorder
that marred 'the March 25 first.
round vote. -
In particular, the council is using .
a detailed plan. drawn up by the
chief U.S. adviser to the elections
council, for distributing ballot boxes
and other voting materials to the
nation's polling places, elections of-
ficials said. Salvadoran officials drew
up the distribution plan for the fast
round., but because of major foul-ups
the voting materials either were late
or never arrived at hundreds of poll-
ing laces..
The U.S. adviser, John Kelley -of -
AID, was called back to El Salvador
by the embassy because of fears of
new organizational difficulties .and
particularly because of his expertise
in handling the council's *U.S.-
funded computers, elections officials
said. He had left the country April
14 after receiving s death threat
from a telephone caller who claimed
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to represent a rightist death squad.
Arena leader Barrera singled out
Kelley for criticism, accusing him of
having issued death threats against
Arena representatives on the council.
Barrera declined to offer proof of his
charge.
The elections council ais& is de-
pending heavily on free assistance
from IVEPO. Jorge Rochac. the coun-
cils elections project manager, said
that I\'EPO was paying salaries of a
total of about 300 persons who were
doing clerical work and staffing phone
banks and information kiosks to ex-
plain to people where to vote. IVEPO
agreed in writing to provide S65,000
worth of manpower to the elections
council in preparation for the second
round, elections officials. said.
,11 don't know who -the bell fi-
nances it (lVEPO]," Rochac said. "I
stay up at night sometimes and won-
der who is writing the checks." .
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ARTICLE APPEARED NEW YORK POST
ON PAGE 4 7 May 1984
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Moderate. got secret CIA
funds for ad campaign
By NILES LATHEM
Bureau Chief _
WASHINGTON - The
Reagan Administration
did everything in Its
power - including
;using covert CIA funds
- to make moderate
Jose Napoleon Duarte
president of El Salvador
despite an official
stance of neutrality, The
Post has learned.
Administration, Con-
gressional and diplo-
matic sources told The
Post the U.S. used a
variety of methods to
help the respected
.Christian Democratic
Party leader win the
election.
Covert
JOSE DUARTE
Reagan backing.
helped pay for radio and
TV ads for Duarte's
campaign, the sources
said.
CIA -funds-. The =administration
ROBERTO d'AUBUISSON
Death-squad links.
'firmly believed Duarte
was more likely to bring
democratic reforms to
El Salvador and but-
tress President Rea-
gan's claim to an in- !
creasingly restless Con,"
gress that U.S. military
aid is not being wasted
on a government com-
mitting human-rights,
abuses.
Duarte was expected
to defeat rightist mili-
tary leader Roberto
d'Aubuiisson, and the
White House was pre-
pared to launch a major
campaign with the U.S.
public for the new presi-
dent.
Senior administration
officials said a Duartre
victory over d'Aubisson,
who has been linked to
.rightist death-squad ac-
tivity, would be a sig-
nificant victory. both for
El Salvador and for
Reagan's hotly con*
tested. Central Amer-
ican program. ,
Duarte, who- during
his first tenure as presir
dent was instrumental
in beginning several
economic and social re-.
forms, Is expected to be
invited soon for a state
visit to Washington.
The purpose of the
visit, officials say, ,is. to
generate support for
Duarte's regime in Con-
gress.
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Intelligence
Mexico: Growing Challenges to
Current Stability
A Report by the Mexico Task Force
of the Directorate of Intelligence
et
DI 84-10017X
May 1984
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Summary
Current Stability
Mexico: Growing Challenges to
The forces for stability continue to dominate in Mexico; expressed
discontent is well below expected levels. President Miguel de la Madrid
Hurtado has skillfully sold his tough austerity program to the nation, and
the resulting economic hardships have been moderated by the extended
family system and the regime's emphasis on limiting unemployment and
providing basic foods and services at minimal cost. Although the business
classes are increasingly alienated by the government's "economic solu-
tions," other major segments of the Mexican population retain confidence
in the regime's ability to turn the Mexican economy around.
The nation is governed by a regime which clearly understands the problems
facing Mexico; its power is respected and feared by the general populace.
The stability of the system also is buttressed by the strong support of the
Mexican military and, surprisingly, by the unsettled situation in Central
America which causes many Mexicans to appreciate their time-tested
political structure. Despite a violent Cuban-backed insurgency in Guate-
mala, southern Mexico remains stable. Moreover, there are no forces on
the scene to replace the present government, which was set up in 1929 as a
one-party system dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI).
If the status quo is maintained in Central America, the Soviets and Cubans
would likely continue their current low-key posture in Mexico, concentrat-
ing on penetrations and influence operations, rather than sponsoring such
active measures as agitation in the slums, guerrilla warfare, and student
demonstrations. The USSR and Cuba maintain a large diplomatic and
intelligence presence in Mexico, which would enable them to exploit
political and economic tensions if they deemed it in their interest. Further
successes by Soviet/Cuban elements in Central America would undoubted-
ly lead the two to reconsider their tactics in Mexico.
Secret
DI 84-10017X
May 1984
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Secret
The regime is undertaking a number of initiatives to improve the quality of
its candidates, but continued economic problems, public concern over PRI
corruption, party infighting, and a potential lack of candidates acceptable
to both the party and the public raise serious doubts about the PRI's ability
to maintain its preeminence in Mexican politics.
As long as incidents remain scattered, we expect the Mexican Army along
with other organized portions of the Mexican Government such as trade
unionists to be able to maintain firm control. However, the military could
find itself seriously tested if it had to face a wide variety of simultaneous
disturbances-for example, disorders stemming from a new round of price
increases for basic foodstuffs or from widespread fraud in next year's
nationwide elections.
If current problems prove too vexing, de la Madrid could go against his
personal preferences and opt for a strident anti-American posture. By
striking out against US foreign and domestic policies, which many
Mexicans feel work against Mexico's interests, the President could hope to
diffuse public concern over economic hardship and mend numerous fences
within his own party.
Even if Mexico avoids serious political dislocations over the next 18
months, it will face a series of persistent long-run difficulties that will
impose still greater strains on the system. Of major concern will be
economic stagflation, rising population, and Communist movements in
Central America. Meeting these challenges will call for some tough choices
by the Mexican leadership--and by US leaders as well.
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NIE 81-84
THE OUTLOOK FOR MEXICO
is
Information available as of 25 April 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Mexican political system is under greater stress today than at
any time in the last 30 years. Ultimately, of course, the preservation of
Mexico's stability will rest on the skill and competence of its leaders and
on the strength of its political fabric. We judge that in the end the Mexi-
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can political system is likely to remain intact.
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During the last several years, Mexicans have grown increasingly
dissatisfied with tlu restricted
nature of, their highly centralized political system. As a result, the
popularity and vitality of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) have sharply diminished. Moreover, political leaders have been
slow to adapt the PRI to the profound changes that have occurred in
Mexican society. The two branches of the party that historically have
been the most important-organized blue-collar labor and the peas-
ants-have been shrinking in size relative to other social and interest
groups. Meanwhile, most of the millions of people who have come from
the countryside to fill the sprawling slums around all of Mexico's major
cities-slumdwellers now constitute between 20 and 25 percent of the
population-may not have been effectively brought into the system.
Thus the informal patron-client relationships that have helped glue the
system together are in danger of breaking. Not surprisingly, opposition
forces have gained strength.
When he was inaugurated President in December 1982, Miguel de
la Madrid inherited a crisis more encompassing than any since the late
1930s. Under conditions of harsh austerity, high unemployment and
underemployment, double- or triple-digit inflation, widespread business
failures, and a crippling shortage of capital, the economy in 1983
contracted by about 6 percent. Virtually all social and economic groups
have had to accept declining standards of living, scale down their
expectations, and compete for benefits and opportunities in a negative-
sum economic environment. De la Madrid has struggled to preserve
social equilibrium and to restore public confidence in the political
system. In particular, he has worked to distance himself from
President Lopez Portillo and of per
?
senior officials of the previous government. By pursuing an anticorrup-
tion campaign that has included the imprisonment of at least one
former high official and revelations of abuses by others, and by
projecting an image of fairness, competence, and probity, the President
so far has provided generally effective and popular leadership.
De la Madrid's most striking success has been in engineering a
turnaround in Mexico's international economic accounts. In a little over
a year, austerity has brought spending in line with available resources,
inflation has begun to decline, and some confidence in the government's
policies has been restored. By slashing imports and public-sector
expenditures, raising the real costs of most goods, and making other
tough adjustments the regime has met most of the stabilization require-
ments of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Interest is being paid
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on the more than $85 billion foreign debt, and by the end of 1983 the
current account surplus reached about $4 billion. With some flexibility
to increase imports of badly needed capital and intermediate goods,
Mexico probably will be able to stem the decline in economic activity
and may perhaps recover this year.
De la Madrid's impressive performance thus far has prevented an
immediate unraveling of the system, but has not been sufficient to
dissipate the long-term threat to Mexico's stability. Although many
variables will be involved, the outlook through this decade and into the
early 1990s will be shaped largely by the interplay of the following
factors.
The most important is probably de la Madrid himself: his outlook,
psychology, skills, and leadership qualities.
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The economy and labor will also be key. Economic growth almost
certainly will be insufficient to create enough jobs for the burgeoning
labor force. Resources probably will not be adequate to maintain
traditional programs that have subsidized working-class groups and
helped to keep them quiescent. Labor has suffered under austerity, and
indefinite sacrifice is not likely. Thus, the President will increasingly
have to make difficult trade-offs among economic objectives that will
tend to alienate some politically important sectors while helping others.
In the unlikely event that economic activity were to continue declining
for another four or five years, the prospects for regime-threatening
instability would rise significantly.
Conservative opposition forces generally will be more assertive.
These forces are concentrated in the center-right National Action Party
(PAN). We believe that the rise of opposition sentiment in the northern
border region reflects the spectacular economic and demographic
expansion there over the last decade or so, as well as dissatisf action with
the regime's economic policies and statist philosophy and tampering
with election results. These trends have been paralleled, moreover, by
indications of dissidence in Mexico's poor and underdeveloped southern
states where Communist, radical, and other opposition groups are
organizing.
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Meanwhile, extreme leftist groups are also active. Leaders of the
Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), a Communist-dominated
coalition, reportedly have decided to increase their recruiting and
organizational efforts in the southern-tier states closest to Central
America. Working through radical peasant, student, and labor groups,
the PSUM could generate increased support for its causes, but it will
most likely pose smaller and more containable challenges than the
rightwing opposition.
Cuba and the Soviet Union maintain contact with and provide
funding and other support to local leftists and revolutionaries from
Central America and elsewhere, but with few exceptions they have
been reluctant to support committed revolutionaries who would employ
violent methods against the Mexican regime. Nonetheless, if levels of
instability were to rise in Mexico, we believe it would be more likely
that Cuba and the USSR would expand their subversive activities, and it
would be easier for them to do so.
As long as relative stability continues, the military would be
disinclined to intervene in the political process. Such intervention
would violate rules that have governed their behavior since the 1940s.
any significant increase in instability or external threat, military
involvement in the policy process would rise as more areas of govern-
mental concern took on a security dimension.
We are reasonably certain that some transformation of the Mexi-
can political system is likely during the period of this Estimate
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Whatever the true course of events, US political and economic
interests will be affected substantially by conditions in Mexico during
the period of this Estimate. The security of the US southern border
depends on the continued existence of a stable, united, and peaceful
Mexican neighbor. Other core interests-such as the level of US
influence on Mexican foreign policy, the flow of illegal migrants and
drugs into this country, the availability of Mexican petroleum, bilateral
trade and investment relationships, and Mexico's continued willingness
to make payments on its foreign debt-will be affected by Mexico's
success in dealing with the challenges facing it.
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Ccntral Intdltgcrxr A ncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 April 1984
IMPACT OF A CUTOFF OF ASSISTANCE TO THE
NICARAGUAN INSURGENTS
Summary
A cutoff of US assistance to the anti-Sandinista insurgents
in Nicaragua would be a major victory for the Sandinista regime.
We believe it would strengthen the Sandinistas domestically and
increase fears within the area over Nicaragua's aggressive
policies. In our opinion, it would also reinforce the traditional
Latin American view that the US is an unreliable partner, a
perception that would have serious ramifications for US policy
We estimate that a cutoff would effectively remove the
military threat posed by the major insurgent group in Nicaragua
within four to six weeks. The other two guerrilla organizations
probably would continue their military operations at reduced
A cutoff would also 1have a negative impact on Honduras, where
the military is currently uneasy following the recent removal of
Armed Forces Commander Alvarez. The Hondurans view the
This memorandum was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence.
It was prepared by the Central America Branch, ALA, with contributions from
the Office of European Analysis, Office of Soviet Analysis, and the Office of
African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated by the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America
It contains information available as of 17 April 1984. Questions and comments
are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
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anti-Sandinistas as a buffer against Managua--in effect, their
first line of defense--and any action perceived as strengthening
.the Sandinista regime would increase military anxiety.
In El Salvador, a cutoff would lead the government and Army
to worry about the reliability of future US support to El
Salvador. The action would boost morale of the Salvadoran
guerrillas while simplifying the resuppy effort of Nicaragua and
Cuba. Assistance to the Salvadoran insurgents almost certainly
would increase and lead to greater guerrilla activity.
The cutoff would also enhance the Sandinistas' bargaining
position at the Contadora peace talks, thus dimming prospects of
meaningful security and other guarantees. Elsewhere in the
hemisphere, the reaction would vary from strong approval in Mexico
to concern in Brazil regarding the ability of the US to implement
a consistent foreign policy.
Outside of the region, most West European governments would
endorse the cutoff, with Socialist elements seeing in the action
some chance of weaning the Sandinistas from Moscow and Havana.
The Soviets would view the cutoff as a possible sign that
Washington would be less likely to use covert actions in the
future to counter Marxist regimes in the Third World. The pace of
Soviet military deliveries to Nicaragua probably would slow as
insurgent activities waned, but they would not be discontinued.
In the event of a cutoff of funds, we estimate the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force--the largest of the three insurgent
groups--would continue to pose a military threat for four to six
weeks. This assumes that they would be willing to continue their
operations, and that at the time of the cutoff they were fully
supplied with food, clothes, ammunition, and weapons.
-- The FDN has not yet established an effective overland
supply route, so it would be totally dependent on its own
airdrops after the aid ended. The lone aircraft being
used for resupply is owned by the FDN but is serviced by
US personnel, and we believe it would not long remain
operational without that maintenance support. If the FDN
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still had supplies in Honduras at the time of a cutoff,
Tegucigalpa probably would not stop the insurgents from
moving them into Nicaragua.
-- The FDN has little or no capability of its own to obtain
new supplies from other sources, so any resupply would be
limited to whatever stocks remained on hand at the time of
cutoff.
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ARDE, on the other hand, probably can hold out much longer
in sparsely populated southern and eastern Nicaragua. It has
large caches of arms, ammunition, and supplies inside the
cquntry, engages in few pitched battles, and has an unknown
amount of support from other sources.
-- We know ARDE has contacts who can tap the international
arms/ammunition markets, but it would have difficulty
getting materiel into Nicaragua on its own.
ARDE leader Pastora, a hero of the Sandinista revolution, has
publicly distanced himself from the US government. Because of
this, he might gain in legitimacy as a result of a cutoff and
might pick up additional manpower and other support from former
The two Miskito Indian guerrilla groups that operate in
indigenous territory in eastern Nicaragua probably could hold out
indefinitely. Neither group would be likely to give up the fight
completely. Without resupply of some type, however, their level
of activity would be severely curtailed. The Misura group does
have overland supply routes in the north, but it is dependent on
the FDN for supplies. In the south, the other Miskito group, the
Misurasata, depends on ARDE for supplies. ARDE probably would
provide support at a reduced level if US assistance were cut
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS IN NICARAGUA
Managua's leaders would view a withdrawal of US support for
the anti-Sandinista insurgents as a major political victory. The
main impact of a cutoff, in our judgment, would be to remove what
the regime sees as a major obstacle to its consolidation of
control. No longer forced to channel its resources against the
insurgents, Managua presumably would increase assistance to the
Salvadoran guerrillas.
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Economically, the result of a cutoff of support to the
insurgents would be a modest plus for the Sandinistas. The
Nicaraguan Army has taken first priority on food and clothing
supplies, and some of these items could be redistributed to the
public, thereby easing popular unhappiness over rationing. This
psychological benefit probably would dissipate fairly soon,
however, because the FSLN could no longer shift the blame for the
country's poor economic performance onto the insurgents.
Although some demobilized troops could return to jobs in
producing sectors and a few delayed development projects mig
NIA
resume. believe the overall economic gain would be small. 5 '25
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HEMISPHERIC REACTION
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Central America
We believe the reaction would be uniformly negative
throughout Central America. Over the last two years, the general
perception of most governments has been one of a growing US
commitment to Central America--a view that was reinforced by the
US action in Grenada last year. Nevertheless, many leaders have
remained uneasy about the depth and duration of that
commitment. They have seen some issues--such as the semiannual
certification of human rights progress in El Salvador--as
foreshadowing a lack of US resolve.,' Their anxiety has been
increased by an inability?to understand the political give and
take in Washington. A cu1toff of US assistance to the
anti-Sandinistas would deepen these anxieties and reinforce
traditional views about US untrustworthiness.
Honduras
A cutoff of aid to the anti-Sandinistas would have grave
military, political, and, above all, psychological implications
for Tegucigalpa. It would come at a time of uneasiness within
the military establishment caused by the recent removal of Armed
Forces Commander Alvarez. The Suazo administration's strong
identification with US policy in the region leaves it vulnerable
to domestic political attacks and Nicaraguan aggression. Many
Hondurans view the anti-Sandinistas as a buffer force, the first
line of defense between the more ,powerful Sandinista military and
their own forces. Should the anti-Sandinistas disintegrate, the
H onduran'perception of betrayal by the US would be strong and
long lasting. President Suazo's left-of-center opponents, who
have been critical of his close alliance with the US, would
intensify their attacks and press for a more benign policy toward
Managua. We believe, however, that Suazo and the high command
would demand large amounts of military and economic assistance;
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they would also press for an increased US military presence and
more frequent joint exercises with US forces.
An immediate problem for Honduras would be coping with a
large number of new refugees if the insurgents in Nicaragua were
forced to withdraw. There are already some 50,000 refugees from
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala on Honduran territory. The
addition of some 9,000 anti-Sandinista insurgents would create a
very heavy burden for the Honduran government and international
organizations. In addition, we believe this influx of armed men,
who have little prospect for gainful employment, would lead to
lawlessness and banditry; security forces, already stretched thin
to patrol Honduras' borders, would have difficulty maintaining
El Salvador
The Salvadoran high command would be alarmed by a cutoff of
US support to the anti-Sandinista insurgents. Tactically,
Salvadoran military leaders would anticipate--probably
correctly--an escalation in insurgent activity, as well as
increased resupply of the guerrillas from Nicaragua and Cuba.
They would also be worried that a cutoff might lead to reduced
cooperation on the part of the Honduran military, which over the
last two years has shown some willingne.ss to participate in
blocking and other occasional operations against the
guerrillas. 1.
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The psycho)ogical ramifications probably would be greater.
Despite continuing US military assistance, the Salvadoran armed
forces have periodically vented suspicions that the US commitment
is tenuous--anxieties that in the past reportedly have resulted
in hoarding of supplies and an inclination to abandon offensive
actions and adopt a traditional defensive mode. These tendencies
would be reinforced by a cutoff. The reduction of US credibility
attendant to the cutoff might also complicate the task of US
advisers in the country.
On the domestic political front, a cutoff would give greater
credibility to extreme rightist political leaders who have long
questioned US resolve. While this would not in and of itself
alter the likelihood that the Christian Democrats will prevail in
the 6 May-runoff election, growing anxieties on the part of the
right could lead to increased polarization and renewed tampering
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Guatemala
Government leaders would be likely to mute their public
displeasure over suspension of the program. They probably would
direct any public criticism at the US Congress, which they also
blame for a failure to restore military assistance to them. In
private, however, Chief of State Mejia and senior military
leaders would condemn the US as an unreliable ally. Termination
of the program would reinforce the Guatemalans' belief that their
counterinsurgency success has been achieved largely because they
do not rely on US strategy, equipment, or training, and are not
subject to political constraints imposed by Washington. We judge
that any improvement in bilateral relations with the Mejia
government would be made more difficult and that Guatemala's
reluctance to become involved in regional military
cooperation--particularly anything relating to problems between
Honduras and Nicaragua--would be strengthened.
Costa Rica
We believe a cutoff of assistance would undermine efforts by
President Monge to continue his tough stance against Nicaragua, a
policy that is already under fire from left-of-center elements in
his own ruling party. More conservative elements, meanwhile,
would intensify pressure on Monge to obtain reassurances from
Washington that it would protect Costa Rica from Nicaraguan
aggression. Pastora's ARDE insurgents along the Costa
Rican-Nicaraguan border wuld feel growing pressure from the
Sandinista military, and tome ARDE units might have to take
Panama
We believe most political and military leaders would react
negatively to an aid cutoff. Nevertheless, President
Illueca--whose strong leftist views sometimes place him at odds
with his military colleagues--probably would hail the decision.
Defense Forces Commander Noriega, who has been supportive of US
policy in Central America, almost certainly would question
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Washington
s commitment to the region.
Mexico
Because Mexican leaders oppose any outside military
intervention in Central America, they would react favorably to a
cutoff in US assistance to Nicaraguan insurgents. From the
Mexican perspective, such a move would serve their interests in
Contadora, ease mounting concern over the chances of US military
intervention in the region, and enhance President de la Madrid's
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domestic and international prestige. Mexico City's deep
commitment to the survival of the Sandinista regime suggests that
de la Madrid is unlikely to abandon his political and diplomatic
support of Managua. A cutoff of aid, however, might cause Mexico
to press Managua to comply with recently stiffened terms for
petroleum deliveries.
South America
The reaction among South American governments to a cessation
of US support to anti-Sandinista insurgents would vary largely
along ideological lines.
-- Colombia's Betancur and Argentina's Alfonsin--both of whom
have demonstrated a strong interest in Central
America--would applaud such a move as likely to strengthen
the prospects for a Contadora-brokered regional peace
settlement.
-- In Venezuela, President Lusinchi would be more
equivocal. He acknowledges that US pressure has been
instrumental in wringing concession from the Sandinistas
and would recognize the dangers of such a cutoff to
achieving a balanced settlement in the region.
-- Brazil, which has less of a,direct interest in Central
America, would praise the cessation as consistent with its
belief in non-intervention. Privately, however, the views
of Brazilian officials--like those of other moderate to
conservative leaders throuqhout South America--would be
tempered somewhat by a concern that a termination of US
support to the anti-Sandinistas would fuel Cuban and
Nicaraguan subversive efforts. Such a move would also
spawn new anxiety about the ability of the US to implement
a consistent foreign policy.
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Impact on Contadora
Over the last few months, the Contadora peace negotiations
have been increasingly dominated by Nicaraguan propaganda and
firm Mexican diplomatic support for Managua. In contrast, the
other Central American nations are haggling and failing to come
up with proposals. Significantly, the recent debate in the UN
Security Council over the mining of Nicaragua's harbors was
accompanied by silence from three of the Contadora
nations--Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia--while Mexico, the
fourth Contadora country, endorsed the Sandinista resolution. We
believe Nicaragua viewed the US veto of the resolution as a
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effectiveness in dealing with the Contadora group.
diplomatic victory which it will attempt to propagandize in an
effort to depict the US as the real aggressor in Central
America. A cutoff of US aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents
would'hand Nicaragua a victory and strengthen the Sandinista
regime. This, in turn, would increase further Managua's growing
Cuba
Cuba, in dire need of a victory after a number of important
foreign policy setbacks in Africa and this hemisphere, would view
a halt to US aid for the anti-Sandinistas as a sign that the tide
was changing in Havana's favor. The use of US military power in
Grenada had caused Castro to adopt a much more cautious approach
in his foreign meddling. We believe Castro--sensing a major
opportunity created by the cessation of US funding--would urge
Managua to deliver a quick death blow to the insurgents; he might
offer more Cuban military personnel to help the Sandinistas. His
inclination to resolve Central America's problems through
negotiations--never very strong--would virtually evaporate,
although he probably would continue to pay lip service to the
need for peace talks to deflect criticism of Cuba's role in
supporting the Salvadoran insurgents. Moreover, he would expand
his propaganda effort on Central America and would point out to
Third World audiences that the.. US is an ally of dubious
loyalty.
INTERNATIONAL REACTION
USSR
ways of thwarting national liberation movements.
The USSR would publicize an aid cutoff as a victory for
international opinion and a setback.for the US Administration,
but it would stress a theme that the US will continue to seek
The Soviets would be pleased with a cutoff because it might
reduce the possibility of a confrontation with the US in an area
distant from Soviet power. At the same time, it might reduce
pressure on Moscow to be seen publicly as doing something to
sustain a Marxist state--pressure that the Soviets have resisted
so far with some apparent discomfort. It might reduce somewhat
the Sandinistas' need--and the Soviets' expense--for military
supplies that the USSR has been sending primarily through Cuba
and Bulgaria. It also probably would make the Soviets believe
that there is a lessened future danger of Washington's using
covert means to try to counter Marxist regimes in the Third
8
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World, and thus partially offset the Soviet unhappiness over
Moscow could be expected to continue military and economic
aid to Nicaragua despite a cutoff. The Soviets' long-term goal
is the consolidation of the Sandinista regime as an example for
other potentially Marxist countries in Latin America and as a
base for future Soviet and Cuban overt and covert operations.
The pace of Soviet military deliveries probably would slow
as insurgent activities waned. Nonetheless, Moscow probably
would continue some shipments--using intermediaries--in order to
complete military buildup plans that presumably exist in secret
agreements similar to those with the Bishop government in
The Soviets would hope that a decline of insurgent activity
would make Nicaragua better able to sustain itself economically,
thus reducing pressure for Moscow to send economic aid. The USSR
has in the past sought to avoid becoming responsible for
sustaining the Nicaraguan economy in the way that it sustains
Cuba, and we believe it will continue to do so. As they have
with recent petroleum shipments, the Soviets will nevertheless
remain ready to fill urgent needs cn what they hope is only-,a
A decision to cut off US assistance to Nicarguan insurgents
would please most West European governments and might slightly
improve Washington's flagging image among their publics.
Socialist governments and opposition parties have maintained for
some time that external pressure has impeded Nicaragua's progress
toward democracy and has pushed the regime closer to the Soviet
Union and Cuba. While conservative leaders acknowledge
Washington's special interests in Central America and to some
extent share US perceptions of the Communist threat in the
region, they also are concerned that US covert action in
Western Europe
Nicaragua hinders the Contadora peace negotiations.
I
Withdrawal of US support for the anti-Sandinista insurgents
might alleviate West European worries about alleged US
involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan ports and Washington's
refusal to recognize the World Court's jurisdiction on Central
America. It might also further weaken the West European peace
movement, which increasingly has criticized US behavior in
Central America to bolster its campaign against INF.
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~.Y xl ? V/V-O
fonfirtr-ins-i f Cl
,;k ,
PAGE 02 OF 04 TEGUCI 83651 12
2
1161 C15/18 003961 NOD62,
ACTION NODS-BB
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
------------------ 010202 1221251 /61
0 122113Z MAR 84 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 0983
S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 03051
NOD I S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: HO, NU, XK
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SUAZO ON SUBJECT OF CONTINUED
SUPPORT FOR ANTI-SANDINISTAS
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT SUAZO BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED
AND INCREASED USG SUPPORT IS NEEDED FOR ANTI-
SANDINISTAS. HE BELIEVES THAT FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADDI-
TIONAL FUNDING.000LD RISK "LOSING EVERYING" IN CENTRAL
AMERICA. CUTTING OFF ANTI-SANDINISTAS NOW WOULD CONVEY
IMPRESSION OF USG WEAKNESS AND LACK OF SUPPORT FOR FRIENDS
IN WAKE OF LEBANON SETBACK. SUAZO SAID THAT COMMUNISTS
ARE SEEKING TO DRIVE HOME HARDER THAN EVER MESSAGE THAT
USG IS UNRELIABLE PARTNER. CUTTING OFF ANTI-SANDINISTAS
WOULD PLAY RIGHT INTO THEIR HANDS. IT WOULD ALSO REIN-
FORCE DOMESTIC CRITICS OF GOH WHO HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT
GOH HAD NAIVELY ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE PUSHED INTO POSTURE
OF SUPPORT FOR ANTI-SANDINISTAS AND WOULD SOON BE LEFT
HOLDING THE BAG. END SUMMARY.
3._-- I CALLED ON- PRES.IDE'NT SUAZO MORNING MARCH TWELVE IN
ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE VISIT BY MYSELF TO WASHINGTON
ON CONSULTATIONS. PRESIDENCY MINISTER CARLOS FLORES
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PAGE 03 OF 04 TEGUCI 03851 122116Z C15/18 863961 NOD622
WAS ALSO PRESENT. ONE SUBJECT WHICH CAME UP WAS THE
SERIES OF RECENT REVERSES TO OUR CENTRAL AMERICA PRO-
POSALS SUFFERED IN THE CONGRESS, INCLUDING THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ACTION ON THE REQUESTED ADDITION OF FUNDS
FOR THE ANTI-SANDINISTAS. SUAZO WAS VERY DISTRESSED BY
THIS LATTER ACTION. HE SAID THAT IF ADDITIONAL FUNDS
ARE NOT PROVIDED AND SUPPORT IS THEREFORE CUT BACK OR
CUT OFF, WE RISK "LOSING EVERYTHING". SUAZO SAID HE
THOUGHT ANTI-SANDINISTAS HAD BEEN THE SINGLE MOST
EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT TO MODERATE
ITS BEHAVIOR. IF GRN WEREN'T TIED DOWN FIGHTING FDN
AND OTHERS, ITS HAND WOULD BE EVEN FREER TO CONDUCT
MISCHIEF BEYOND ITS BORDER. CUT-OFF WOULD ALSO BE
SOURCE OF "DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION" FOR
THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE. WHO HAVE SO FEW WAYS OF EXPRESSING
DISSATISFACTION WITH THEIR PLIGHT.
4. CARLOS FLORES INTERJECTED ANOTHER POINT. WHETHER WE
LIKED IT OR NOT, JUST AS GRENADA HAD CAUSED A "POSITIVE
WAVE" IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE HEMISPHERE,
OUR SETBACK IN LEBANON HAD CAUSED A VERY NEGATIVE
REACTION. EVENTS IN LEBANON WERE BEING CONSTRUED AS A
SIGN OF US WEAKNESS AND UNRELIABILITY. CUT-OFF OF
ANTI-SANDINISTAS WOULD CONFIRM THIS IMAGE AND LET DOWN
US FRIENDS. IT WOULD ALSO PLAY INTO HANDS OF CASTRO
WHO CONSISTENTLY HARPS ON THEME OF US UNRELIABILITY
WHEN SEEKING TO LURE OTHER COUNTRIES AWAY FROM A POSTURE
OF FRIENDSHIP WITH USG. IT WOULD ALSO CONFIRM AND
EXACERBATE CRITICISMS OF DOMESTIC HONDURAN CRITICS WHO
ARGUE THAT GOH WAS PUSHED INTO THIS PROGRAM BY USG AND
WOULD NOW BE LEFT HOLDING THE BAG. CUT-OFF WOULD PRO-
VIDE REAL PLATFORM ("BANDERA DE LUCHA") FOR DOMESTIC
OPPONENTS OF SUAZO GOVERNMENT.
I 5. ' FINALLYI RETURNING. TO POINT ABOUT LEBANON, SUAZO
LOOKED AT,ME POINTEDLY AND SAID THAT "SYRIA IS NOW
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Department of State INCOMING
PAGE 04 OF 04 TEGUCI 03051 122116Z C15/18 003961 N00622
CAPITAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST", CLEARLY IMPLYING THAT
THROUGH LACK OF SUPPORT OF ANTI-SANDINISTA PROGRAM WE
WOULD BEGIN AN UNRAVELING PROCESS WHICH COULD WELL LEAD
TO NICARAGUA BECOMING THE CAPITAL OF CENTRAL AMERICA.
NECROPONTE
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Department of state INCOMING
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ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
------------------ 006312 12291OZ /53
0 1228032 MAR 84
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
10 SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3918
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 SAN JOSE 01905
NOD I S
MOFORN
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, CS, NU
SUBJECT: P-RESIDENT MONGE URGES INCREASED SUPPORT FOR
ANTI-SANDINISTA FORCES
MOSCOW WAS JUST AS IMPORTANT. PRESIDENT AGREED. HE
SAID ALFONS1N OF ARGENTINA AND HURTADO OF ECUADOR
HAD BOTH TOtO fHI THEY HAD SUGGESTED TO NICARAGUANS
(PRESUMABLY DRTEGA) THAT FOLLOWING IN YUGOSLAVIA'S
FOOTSTEPS WOULD BRING PEACE WITH THE U.S. BOTH HAD
RECEIVED EVASIVE AND AMBIGUOUS REPLIES, WITH NICARAGUANS
DENYING THAT THEY WERE A SATELLITE OF HAVANA OR MOSCOW.
"BUT." SAID MONGE,"OF COURSE THEY ARE." WINSOR
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3 ' De artnzent of State
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-09 /000 W
------------------ 006306 1220192 /53
0 1220032 MAR 84
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3917
S E C R E T SECTION 91 OF 02 SAN JOSE 01905
NODIS - NOFORN
E.0. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, CS, NU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MONGE URGES INCREASED SUPPORT FOR
ANTI-SANDINISTA FORCES
1. SECRET/SENSITIVE ENTIRE TEXT. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT
MONGE BELIEVES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON SANDINISTAS
BY FDN AND ARDE IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO ANY HOPE
OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS IN CONTADORA, BUT ALSO TO
POLITICAL STABILITY OF COSTA RICA. :=-tfE IS CONVINCED
THAT IF THE SANDINISTAS WERE FREE OF-'INTERNAL
PRESSURES, THEY WOULD TURN FROM CURRENT DETENTE WITH
COSTA RICA TO ACTIVE DESTABILIZATION EFFORTS. THERE
IS NO HOPE FOR PEACE OR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
MONGE BELIEVES, UNLESS SANDINISTAS ARE REPLACED OR
FORCED TO MODIFY THEIR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL GOALS.
END SUMMARY.
2. DCM (THEN CHARGE) CALLED ON PRESIDENT MONGE AT HIS
HOME SUNDAY, MARCH 11, TO BRIEF HIM ON LATEST CONGRESSIONAL
ACTIONS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.
DGM ASSURED HIM THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS COMMITTED TO
ALL-OUT CAMPAIGN FOR PASSAGE OF BIPARTISAN AID PLAN
AND THAT-SETBACKS- WERE ONLY FIRST-PHASE OF CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION. PRESIDENT NOTED THAT HE HAD SENT HIS
3/ J-U
INCOMI
CrPDCT
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"t'Nfti'T
Q . tom,, ..' SECRET
~ V-7,
S/S-0
INCOMING
?
.
L L BE
N
PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AS LONG AS THEY CONTROL
NICARAGUA. BUT THE NEXT BEST IS TO KEEP THEM
PAGE 03 OF 04 SAN 10 01985 01 OF 02 122008Z C15/18 003955 NOD620
FOREIGN MINISTER TO WASHINGTON TWICE TO URGE SUPPORT
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S AID PROGRAM, WHICH HE REGARDED
AS VITAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRACY, AND THE CHANCES
FOR SPREADING ITS INFLUENCE, IN THE REGION.
3. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER
ONE-VOTE DEFEAT IN SENATE COMMITTEE (OF WHICH HE WAS
ALREADY INFORMED) OF ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR ANTI-
SANDINISTAS. HE ASKED DCM HOW THIS FUNDING WAS LABELLED
IN THE PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS. DCM SAID HE THOUGHT
IT WAS SIMPLY A LINE ITEM IN THE CIA BUDGET. PRESIDENT
SAID IT OUGHT TO BE LABELLED "FUND TO COUNTERACT
(CONTRAARRESTAR) THE ATTACKS OF NICARAGUA ON THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES." HE SAID THAT WAS IN
FACT ITS PURPOSE AND FUNCTION AND WE OUGHT TO MAKE THAT
CLEAR. HE-SAID COSTA RICA'S POSITION ON THIS FUNDING
WAS "CLEAR, WELL-DEFINED AND CATEGORIC (CLARA,
DEFINIDA Y ROTUNDA)" - IT SHOULD BE CONTINUED AT WHAT-
EVER LEVEL NECESSARY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE STRONGLY AND
CONTINUOUSLY ON THE GRN. HE COULD NOT, OF COURSE,
SAY THAT PUBLICLY, BECAUSE IT WOULD AMOUNT TO A
DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA, AND THE PRESENT
STATE OF UNEASY DETENTE WITH NICARAGUA WAS TO COSTA
RICA'S ADVANTAGE. BUT NO ONE SHOULD BE UNDER ANY
ILLUSION THAT THAT RELATIVE CALM WOULD LAST IF THE
SANDINISTAS WERE FREED FROM THE NECESSITY TO COMBAT
THE FDN AND ARDE FORCES. THE ONLY WAY, THE PRESIDENT
SAID, TO MAINTAIN TRANQUILITY IN COSTA RICA IS TO
KEEP THE SANDINISTAS OCCUPIED INTERNALLY. IF THEY
DEFEAT THEIR DOMESTIC OPPONENTS, THEY WILL TURN
THEIR ATTENTION TO UNDERMINING COSTA RICAN DEMOCRACY.
'"THE (DEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE TO FIND SOME WAY TO
REMOVE THOSE PEOPLE FROM POWER
THERE WI
O
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PACE 04 OF 04 SAN JO 01905 01 OF 02 122008Z C15/18 003955
CONSTRAINED BY KEEPING ALIVE THEIR INTERNAL OPPOSITION."
4. PRESIDENT NOTED THAT HE HAD MADE THIS POSITION CLEAR
FROM BEGINNING OF EDEN PASTORA'S OPERATIONS INSIDE
NICARAGUA. ONLY CONDITION HE HAD ATTACHED WAS THAT
PHYSICAL RESUPPLY OF PASTORA'S FORCES NOT TAKE PLACE ON
COSTA RICAN TERRITORY, TO AVOID COMPROMISING COSTA
RICA. BUT ?ARDE WAS FREE TO USE COSTA RICA AS ITS
HEADQUARTERS AND POLITICAL BASE, AND HE HOPED THEY
WOULD GET ALL THE FUNDING AND SUPPLIES THEY NEED.
PRESIDENT HAS TOLD THIS TO HIS FRIENDS IN AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT AND TO A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN WITH
WHOM HE HAS TALKED. (PRESIDENT DID NOT MENTION NAMES
1T cr
,
BUT EMBASSY RECALLS SENATORS DURENBERGER AND WILSON,
AMONG OTHERS, AS AMONG THOSE TO WHOM MONGE HAS BEEN
VERY CLEAR ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANTI-SANDINISTA
EFFORT.)
5. DCM ASKED IF PRESIDENT THOUGHT_ ANTI-SANDINISTA
MOVEMENT IS HELPING THE CONTADORA NEGOTIATIONS ACHIEVE
A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT. PRESIDENT SAID HE THOUGHT IT
WAS. NICARAGUANS MAY HOPE TO GET THE UNITED STATES
TO END SUPPORT FOR THE ANTI-SANDINISTAS IN RETURN FOR
THEIR CUTTING OFF (OR PROMISING TO CUT OFF) SUPPORT FOR
THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. DCM SAID NICARAGUANS WERE
MISTAKEN IF THEY THOUGHT THAT WAS ONLY U.S. CONCERN.
REMOVING THE CUBAN AND OTHER SOVIET BLOC ADVISERS AND
BREAKING THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH HAVANA AND
S/S-O
INCOMING
NOD620
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Secret
25X1
Lebanon: The Failure
of Rationality
meddling for some time.
The standard explanation for the collapse of
reconciliation talks and continuing violence in
Lebanon is that the major confessional groups have
conflicting political objectives. This explanation,
although valid as far as it goes, ignores "irrational"
factors that are an equally important part of the
problem. Personal animosity among factional leaders,
the desire for revenge, and the development of a
culture of violence are playing an increasingly
important role in thwarting efforts to achieve a
political settlement. The rise in prominence of these
factors suggests that genuine national reconciliation
may be impossible in the near term and that Lebanon
will remain unstable and vulnerable to foreign
defined goals.
Intelligence analysts tend to assume that political
behavior is motivated by rational concerns. It is taken
for granted that leaders make decisions on the basis of
whether they advance rational objectives. Political
actions are seen as calculated moves directed toward
grievances against each other.
In many cases, however, political decisionmakers
behave in ways that do not further their stated goals.
In the Lebanese case, factional leaders frequently
seem to be working against the interests of their
constituents. They often are motivated by personality
quirks and hatred-factors on which analysts
generally do not focus-rather than by rational
calculations. These factors have effectively prevented
the Lebanese from seriously addressing their rational
The Rational Explanation
According to US Embassy reporting, the
reconciliation conference at Lausanne broke up
because Christian, Druze, and Muslim leaders could
not agree on how to reform the Lebanese political
system. The Druze and Muslims demanded that more
of their coreligionists be appointed to key government
posts and that the Prime Minister, a Muslim, be given
greater power. In general, they sought to alter the
distribution of political power to reflect the current
demographic realities of Lebanon, in which Muslims
now constitute a majority.
25X1
Christian leaders opposed major changes in the status
quo. They refused to consider any weakening of the
presidency, traditionally held by a Christian. They
also rejected proposals at Lausanne aimed at
balancing the representation of various confessional 25X1
groups in the Lebanese parliament, which is
dominated by Christians.
The rational explanation for Lebanon's political
dilemma postulates that factional leaders refuse to
compromise because they are determined to gain the
maximum political advantage for their coreligionists. 25X1
Christians rationally pursued a policy aimed at
preserving their political predominance in Lebanon,
and Druze and Muslim leaders rationally sought to
increase their share of the political pie. According to
this explanation, reconciliation has proved impossible
because no middle ground exists between the positions
of the confessional groups.
This explanation is valid in that it lays out the basic
structural problem confronting the Lebanese political
system. It does not, however, account for the petty 25X1
quarrels that continually erupt between factional
leaders or their inability to stop the internecine
Secret
NESA NESAR 84-010
27 April 1984
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Lebanon: a dire prognosis
G. H. Jansen Jim Muir
?
the civil war of 1975-76.
fighting even temporarily-problems that have
become key impediments to a political settlement.
The rational explanation neglects the eccentric
personalities and incompatibilities of key factional
leaders as well as the uniquely violent social and
political milieu that has developed in Lebanon since
Incompatibility at the Leadership Level
Personal animosity has become a major obstacle to
reconciliation between Lebanese factional leaders.
Both the Geneva and Lausanne conferences were
plagued by sarcasm and vituperative exchanges
between the participants, most of whom have known
and disliked each other for years. Some are barely on
speaking terms after having spent their lives in blood
feuds and in cheating each other.
Lebanese leaders believe they have good reason to
hate each other. Former President Sulayman
Franjiyah, for example, is driven by hatred for the
Gemayel family because they murdered his son and
daughter-in-law in 1978. As a result, his emotions
prevented him from dealing rationally with Pierre
Gemayel at the Geneva conference. He flatly refused
to speak to Gemayel
There is also no love lost between Pierre Gemayel and
rival Christian leader Camille Shamun, whose
personal enmity resulted in several years of feuding
between their private militias during the late 1970s.
Fighters loyal to the Gemayels eventually decimated
Shamun's "Tiger" militia in 1980.
Druze leader Walid Junblatt suspects the Gemayels
were behind an assassination attempt against him in
1982. Both Junblatt and Shia leader Nabih Barri
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Secret
have developed a strong personal aversion to President
Gemayel, whom they blame for atrocities committed
against their coreligionists by the Lebanese Army.
Hostility between the President and the two militia
leaders at the reconciliation talks discouraged any
Personal animosity also strained the working
relationship between the younger militia leaders-
Junblatt and Barri-and the older generation of
politicians at the reconciliation conferences. Junblatt
and Barri are openly contemptuous of the "old men,"
such as Sulayman Franjiyah, Camille Shamun, Pierre
Gemayel, and Saib Salam, who are all in their
seventies and eighties.
Young street fighters and mountain militiamen have
grown up believing that fighting is natural and
unavoidable. They know no other way to deal with
rival groups. Factional leaders declared cease-fires on
numerous occasions before and after the
reconciliation talks but could not stop their young
supporters from participating in skirmishes. Junblatt
recently admitted to the US Embassy that he was
having great difficulty stopping his tank commanders
Violence has become a way of life in Lebanon,
particularly in Beirut and the heavily populated
mountain areas in the center of the country. Most
Lebanese have grown accustomed to settling their
disputes by force of arms rather than by compromise.
The desire for revenge and retaliation has become
more important to many people than efforts to make
among much of the Lebanese population.
A Culture of Violence
The civil war mentality that has developed in
Lebanon during the past decade has become an
integral part of the reconciliation problem and not
merely a symptom of it. The relentless and often
irrational cycle of violence has developed a
momentum of its own-independent of the wishes of
factional leaders-inevitably hampering attempts to
settle their differences. The war psychology,
moreover, has eliminated conciliatory attitudes
from shelling Lebanese Army positions.
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-It
?
The decade of civil war has also institutionalized a
psychology of distrust and fatalism among the
Lebanese that impedes attempts to achieve a political
settlement. Most Lebanese have grown bitter after
losing close relatives and friends in the fighting. The
massacres and countermassacres have deepened the
suspicion of members of other confessional or regional
groups and strengthened the clan mentality. Factional
leaders do not believe in each other's promises
The endemic violence, moreover, has hardened the
political outlook of most Lebanese into a fatalistic
pessimism toward national reconciliation. The
Lebanese have grown callous and cynical about
prospects for peace, and, therefore, their leaders seem
only to be going through the motions when they
Implications
The irrational dimensions of the problem are likely to
prevent the current Lebanese leaders from reconciling
their differences any time soon even if the rational
grievances of each confessional group are adequately
addressed. A lasting political settlement may at a
minimum require new leadership.
As long as the Lebanese remain unable to put their
house in order, foreign pressure may be the only force
capable of imposing even a temporary accord on the
warring factions. The likelihood of continued
instability ensures that Lebanon will remain
vulnerable to foreign meddling for the foreseeable
?
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