THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000701360005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 19, 1983
• Content Type: NIE

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C
Presidential Meeting re ASAT
2C June 1984
At a minimum you should read Tabs A & C before
this meeting.
Please return to SA/DCI/IA
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lOP SECREI
Table of Contents
Item
Background
Press articles:
o US Considering Control on Use of Arms in Space;
Washington Post, 16 June 84.
o US Debating Bid by Soviet to Open Space Arms Talks;
New York Times, 17 June 84.
o Soviets Reported Ready to Discuss Limits on ASATs;
Washington Post, 19 June 1984.
o 'Star Wars' and the ASAT Projects: Wares and Whys of
Space Defense; Washington Post, 23 June 1984.
DCI Talking Points
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 4-entrai
Intelligence
The Soviet Space Program
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National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments
Secret
NIE 11-1-83
19 July 1983
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NIE 11-1-83
THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
KEY JUDGMENTS
Information available as of 19 July 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate describes current Soviet space capabilities, identifies
elements of the space program in various stages of development, and es-
timates how these will affect future Soviet capabilities in space through
the 1980s and into the 1990s in the absence of space-related arms
control agreements. Volume I presents the Key Judgments and a
summary of how expected Soviet space developments will affect
political, military, and economic competition as well as Soviet prestige.
Volume II provides a more detailed discussion of the missions and
capabilities of the Soviet space program.
For purposes of this Estimate, we have judged the likelihood of
various Soviet space developments as ranging from very low to very
high. These judgments, stated in terms of probability of occurrence,
would be:
Very low =less than 10 percent
Low = 10 to 40 percent
Moderate = 40 to 60 percent
High = 60 to 90 percent
Very high = more than 90 percent.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe the principal goals of the Soviet space program are to:
- Provide global support to Soviet military forces.
- Enhance the worldwide influence and prestige of the Soviet
Union.
Deny enemies the use of space in wartime.
- Contribute to the Soviet economy
Military activities account for more than 70 percent of the current
Soviet space program in terms of annual launches and the estimated
total cost of the program. Moreover, from the Soviet military perspec-
tive, space is viewed as an extension of theaters of operations rather
than as a separate arena of conflict,
The current Soviet space program includes about 110 active
satellites that provide communications, intelligence, targeting, warning,
navigation, mapping, weather, research, and other functions. In addi-
tion, research and reconnaissance are conducted from a manned space
complex. Current Soviet antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities are limited and
fall short of meeting the apparent requirement to be able to deny
enemy use of space in time of war. The USSR has an operational ASAT
orbital interceptor, ground-based test lasers with probable ASAT capa-
bilities, and the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare
(EW) against space systems
Although their current space program lacks some of the capabilities
found in the technologically sophisticated US space program, the
Soviets' space systems adequately satisfy most of their current require-
ments. The space program, moreover, has several unique features,
including ocean reconnaissance satellites for naval targeting, orbital
interceptors for the destruction of satellites in low orbit, and long-
duration manned space missions that have increasingly emphasized
military research and applications
The Soviet space program is expensive-the dollar cost equivalent
is more than $20 billion. Currently this amounts to more than 1.5
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percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP). Part of this high cost
is due to the high launch rates-about 100 per year-necessary for the
Soviets to maintain their systems in orbit. Average lifetimes of Soviet
satellites are quite short, and many have experienced reliability prob-
lems. Moreover, Soviet satellites are concentrated primarily in low-
altitude orbits that generally require more frequent replenishment.
Soviet space expenditures will continue at high levels during the
next 10 years, and the rate of growth in military space investment will
continue to outpace the rate of growth of the Soviet economy and
overall military spending:
- Seventeen new Soviet space systems that have been identified in
various stages of development are likely to undergo testing in
the next 10 years. (See figure 1.) Most of them are expected to be
deployed by the early 1990s. This will result mainly in improve-
ments to current capabilities.
- Major new capabilities in the next 10 years will result from the
successful introduction of a reusable space transportation sys-
tem, a space tug, a military space plane, and a heavy-lift launch
vehicle. Any delay in development of the heavy-lift launch
vehicle will seriously affect several other Soviet space systems.
- The reliability of Soviet space systems also will improve, but
some reliability problems will remain because of poor product
engineering, limitations in technology, and inadequate quality
control. Newer satellites should achieve an average lifetime of
three years, nearly doubling the average lifetime of older
systems
The most significant result of the increased effort in space will be
the extension of the Soviet military reach by providing global support to
military operations:
- Command and control communications will be available on a
global basis, providing an expanding number of military users
with continuous, secure, and reliable communications.
- Intelligence collection, targeting, global navigation, and weather
data will be more accurate and timely.
- As satellite data relay systems become available, intelligence
and target information will be increasingly available to tactical
commanders.
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Figure 1
Major New Soviet Space Systems in Development
Early orbital Limited initial Full operational
prototype testing operational capability capability
I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
For the rest of this century, Soviet space-related weapon systems
will probably be limited to ASAT roles:
- We do not expect significant improvements in the capabilities
of the nonnuclear orbital ASAT interceptors. We do not antici-
pate the development of a high-altitude conventional orbital
ASAT capability.
- Potentially, the most serious threat to US space systems is active
EW, especially against high-altitude satellites. An additional
view holds that, if a Soviet active EW capability against
satellites does exist, brute force jamming would be the most
likely EW technique. On the basis of available evidence, it is
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difficult to judge with any confidence that a Soviet technologi-
cal capability would include more complex forms of jamming.'
Although potentially capable, we believe that Soviet interconti-
nental ballistic missiles and direct-ascent antiballistic missiles
(ABMs) are unlikely to be used in ASAT roles. Nevertheless,
unprotected satellites will remain vulnerable to the long-range
and persistent effects of nuclear detonations in space.
We believe there is a high probability that a prototype high-
energy laser ASAT weapon will be tested in low orbit by the
early 1990s. A high-altitude version may be tested by the end of
the century. A space-based laser of the 1-megawatt class could
be tested in the late 1980s at the earliest, but prototype testing is
more likely to occur in the early 1990s. If testing proves
successful, an initial operational low-altitude system consisting
of a few satellite weapons, having an ASAT range of hundreds
of kilometers, could be available by the mid-1990s. The psycho-
logical impact of the first test of a space-based laser in a
weapon-related mode would be greater than the actual military
significance of such a weapon in its initial applications.
Space-based weapons for ballistic missile defense (BMD) will require
greater technological advances than those needed for an ASAT mission.
Thus, the Soviets are unlikely to have a prototype space-based laser
BMD system until at least the mid-1990s or an operational system until
after the year 2000.
In a transition to war, we believe the Soviets would expand the de-
ployment of naval targeting and photoreconnaissance systems to reach
full operational potential. Short of direct US-Soviet conflict, it seems
unlikely that the Soviet leadership would risk physical destruction of US
satellites, whereas it could perceive nondestructive interference as a
somewhat less risky option. Should war occur, the use of active
electronic warfare against space systems would probably be the initial
ASAT activity. We do not believe that any ASAT activity would be un-
dertaken merely for warning or demonstration purposes. The likelihood
of their launching orbital ASAT interceptors against selected US
satellites probably would be high during a NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict. In such a conflict, the Soviets may perceive an operational
advantage if both sides experience significant satellite losses. In addi-
tion, the USSR's quick-launch capabilities provide an advantage over
the United States in restoring satellite capabilities, assuming its launch-
pads remain intact.
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In a nuclear war, Soviet space systems would have key vulnerabili-
ties. Their launch and control sites are not hardened, and their satellites
probably have limited protection. In the future, key satellite systems
could be replaced either by using reserves stored in orbit or by
launching satellites from mobile facilities. However, the development of
smaller communications and photoreconnaissance satellites would be
required for use with a mobile launch capability.
Manned space activities are receiving increased emphasis in the
Soviet space program:
- By 1986 manned space activities, which are predominantly
military in nature, will account for more than one-fourth of
Soviet space expenditures.
- The Soviet leadership has announced the national objective of
establishing a continuously manned space station, which we
believe will be achieved by about 1986.
- Beyond research and development, the military purposes of
manned space stations remain unclear, but reconnaissance, to
include ocean surveillance, is likely to be the main military
mission. In addition, a military space plane is under develop-
ment. The space plane mission also is unclear, but is likely to in-
clude reconnaissance.
Increased Soviet space activities will offer potential economic
benefits:
- The USSR will be able to offer a variety of space services at
competitive prices. These services, particularly telecommunica-
tions and space launches, could provide sources of hard curren-
cy earnings.
- Manufacturing and materials processing in space is another area
of potential economic benefit to the USSR. Soviet experiments
are sufficiently advanced to begin production in space within
the next few years. The Soviet space shuttle will enable regular
harvesting of products manufactured in space. (s NF)
Increased Soviet space activities will also enhance Soviet prestige:
- A visible, highly publicized, continuously manned Soviet space
station will receive frequent worldwide attention.
- A manned Mars mission or the establishment of a manned lunar
base could be undertaken in the mid-to-late 1990s. If actually
undertaken and successful, such activities would demonstrate
Soviet scientific and technical prowess.
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Unmanned lunar and planetary exploration, such as the coming
Venus-Halley's Comet mission, will enhance the USSR's desired
image as a peaceful and technologically advanced nation. (s NF)
Our ability to anticipate deve opments in the Soviet space program
is hecominiz increasingly difficult
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Therefore, unanticipated developments will be increasing-
ly possible. Our perception of the Soviet space threat would increase sig-
nificantly if breakthroughs occur in:
- Space-related weapons.
- Submarine detection.
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