POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000500950008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 31, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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9655
31 October 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Director of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Political Maneuvering in the Soviet Leadership
Within the last two weeks, several new pieces of information
have suggested to us that the Soviet leadership succession
picture may not be as certain as we once thought. 'here are a
number of signs that Gorbachev's status as heir apparent may be
under challenge. This paper lays out the data and then discusses
in speculative fashion three possible explanations or this
development--concluding that the most likely one is a desire to
bolster Chernenko and avoid the appearance of Gorbahev already
running things. We still do not write Gorbachev of and if
forced to choose would bet on him as the likely heir. We plan to
share this memo to other Kremlin watchers around town.
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1. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Kremlin's agricultural overseer,
failed to address the 23 October Central Committee plenum that
dealt with agricultural issues. This is the latest and clearest
indication that the 53-year-old leader's status as heir apparent to
General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko has come into question. It
follows closely on the heels of other recent indications:
o On 18 October at a Kremlin ceremony honoring Foreign
Minister Andrey Gromyko, Secretary Gorbachev ranked below
rival Secretary Grigoriy Romanov, according to Pravda's
leadership photo.
o The television coverage of that ceremony focused on a
quartet consisting of Chernenko, Gromyko, Romanov, and
Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, while Gorbachev was shown in the
company of lower-ranking leaders.
o Pravda reported that on the same day Chernenko addressed the
Politburo on personnel issues, an area in which Gorbachev
reportedly has played a leading role.
o A week before, according to Pravda, the Politburo "discussed
and approved" the results of Chernenko's meeting with a
Third World leader and Romanov's visit to Firpland, but only
"studied" the results of Gorbachev's meeting with a British
Communist delegation.
o On 27 September, Defense Minister Ustinov, not Gorbachev,
presented Chernenko with an order of Lenin, a duty that
under Brezhnev and Andropov had fallen to the party's number
two man.
o Last Friday Gorbachev did not appear at a Kremlin dinner for
the visiting Mongolian party leader while his chief rival
Romanov attended the dinner and participated in the
discussions.
This memorandum explores three somewhat overlapping lines of
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speculation on the political and polic roblems that may have
slowed Gorbachev's march to the top.
Voluntary Retreat?
2. A possible, but unlikely explanation of Gorbachev's
downgrading is that it has resulted from a collective leadership
campaign to bolster Chernenko in which Gorbachev has played a
willing part. Since early September, when Chernenkp resumed public
appearances after a health-related absence of several weeks, some
Politburo members have gone to unusual lengths to emphasize
Chernenko's individual authority. Ustinov, for example, publicly
described Chernenko as "Supreme Commander-in-Chief"--the first time
since Stalin that the General Secretary has been so identified by
another Politburo member. Soviet leaders may have felt it
necessary to insist at the same time on a lower profile for
Gorbachev, who had been described in the Western press earlier this
year as "second General Secretary." The younger leader himself may
have been willing to adopt a less prominent role in~the interest of
party unity and to convince Western governments and'the Soviet
public that Chernenko was firmly in charge. Gorbachev may have
anticipated that, in light of Chernenko's chronic ill health, his
own retreat from public prominence would only be temporary.
3. Self-effacement of this sort, however, would entail risk
for Gorbachev. Although few Soviet observers deny his abilities,
some have questioned whether he has the necessary drive and
ruthlessness to get to the top. Such doubts would almost certainly
be strengthened were Gorbachev voluntarily to withdraw from the
limelight and demonstrate a distaste for the infighting of Kremlin
politics. It is unlikely, moreover, that Gorbachev would acquiesce
in any personal retreat that made it appear he was being upstaged
by Romanov. F-1
Blamed for Agricultureal Performance?
4. It is more likely that Gorbachev's setback was related to
agricultural issues. Some have suggested Gorbachev may have come
out on the losing side in a dispute over agricultural policy. In
his public statements, he has been cool to reliance on land
reclamation, the focus of Chernenko's speech to the Central
Committee plenum this week, and instead emphasized more "cost-
effective" solutions. In a speech on 26 March, Gorbachev
criticized the current approach of the Land Reclamation Ministry
and urged that more resources be assigned to modernizing existing
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5. The agricultural program unveiled at the plenum, however,
does not appear to be inconsistent with Gorbachev's policy views.
Although Chernenko's remarks emphasized increased investments,
Tikhonov's speech--like Gorbachev's earlier statements--criticized
the performance of land reclamation workers and the limited return
achieved from earlier investments. It also highlighted the
collective contract system for teams of agricultural and
construction workers, an initiative Gorbachev has pushed. In fact,
Tikhonov's speech could even have been drafted by Gorbachev's staff
for Gorbachev to deliver. Thus a dispute over agricultural policy
probably was not responsible for Gorbachev's setback.
6. The agricultural issue more likely to have been involved
is agriculture's poor performance. Although Gorbachev's career has
advanced despite a series of below-average grain harvests, this
year's crop--the sixth poor-to-mediocre one in a roW--could be a
different story. Gorbachev no longer enjoys the protection of past
powerful patrons Brezhnev and Andropov, and Chernen]ko as well as
others may have used agriculture's problems against him. In
particular, Gorbachev may have fallen victim to a decision taken
earlier this year to withhold military transport surport from
grain harvest.
Punishment for Running Out Front?
7. Poor agricultural performance alone, however, seems
inadequate to explain Gorbachev's setback. Instead, it seems more
likely that Gorbachev encountered the perennial problem of
succession contenders who move ahead too fast. His frontrunner
status probably made him particularly vulnerable to attack by his
political rivals and may have caused problems in his relations with
Chernenko and the older generation. In such a context, Gorbachev's
elders and rivals could have made use of agricultural performance
to hurt his political standing. They could also have played upon
fears engendered in provincial party officials by the revival this
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summer of the discipline and anti-corruption drive, Gorbachev may
have alienated some important local officials by acting as
Andropov's agent in this area last year,
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His more demanding attitude toward agricultural policy
could also have offended local party secretaries.
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8. Gorbachev also may have been hurt by indiscreet comments
by some of his backers. Pravda editor Afanasyev, talking to
Japanese newspapermen in Moscow in mid-October, said that Gorbachev
could be described as "the second General Secretary," and other
high-level Soviet officials have called him the party's de facto
second secretary. Such an identification, which wo ld not have
gone over well with Chernenko, could have resulted in a Politburo
decision to bring Gorbachev down a notch.
Moreover, since the 23 October plenum, Soviet
diplomats have been shying away from suggesting that Gorbachev has
a lock on Chernenko's job. One even denied that a ormal post of
"second secretary" exists.
9. It is even possible that Gorbachev became incautious and
actively sought to undermine Chernenko. This is unlikely, if only
because Chernenko's poor health has probably persuaded Gorbachev
that time is on his side. Still, Gorbachev may have become
overconfident when filling in for Chernenko and overstepped the
bounds in pushing himself to the fore. In late September, for
example, his signature on the obituary of a retired,senior military
officer, which Chernenko failed to sign, may have made it appear
that Gorbachev was ursurping a function Chernenko would normally
perform. The ceremonies at the opening of Moscow's version of the
Olympic games also gave unusual prominence to Gorbachev, making him
appear--in Chernenko's absence--the Politburo's leader. F____1
Prospects
10. If, as seems likely, Gorbachev's setback is the result of
political factors, his chances for recovery will greatly depend on
the strength and cohesiveness of those forces recently aligned
against him. His downgrading so far has been a plus both for
Chernenko and for other would-be succession contenders, especially
Romanov. It would be premature, however, to speak of a Chernenko-
Romanov alliance. Chernenko is unlikely to find it to his own
advantage to do too much to strengthen Romanov's succession
prospects.
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Romanov is erratic--enough so that Chernenko and the rest of the
Kremlin old guard may doubt his fitness to become General
Secretary.
11. Romanov himself, although undoubtedly benpfitting from
Gorbachev's setback, may also be wary of allying himself too
closely with the aged and sick Chernenko or with other Politburo
elders who may quickly leave the political scene. his reluctance
may be all the greater if he perceives that Chernenko, Tikhonov,
and other Politburo elders are determined to resist any real
sharing of power with younger leaders. In recent weeks there have
been indications that Chernenko's comeback has been'assisted not
only by his traditional allies, but also by Ustinov,and Gromyko,
former Andropov supporters whose antipathy toward Chernenko may
have been overcome by generational loyalties and by their current
enjoyment of unprecedented personal power. It was llstinov who
described Chernenko as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Gromyko
embraced the General Secretary when Chernenko awarded him the order
of Lenin.
12. Gorbachev's setback, therefore, may be only temporary.
According to the French media, Politburo candidate Ponomarev
confidentially told participants at a French Embassy reception last
Friday that Gorbachev had chaired the plenum, a role consistent
with that of "second secretary." Chernenko may still find it in
his interest to cooperate with him, and the younger leader may be
able to profit from divisions among rivals and critics. The early
November celebration of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
and the Central Committee meeting slated for late November will
provide further clues to his political standing and prospects. C
13. Beyond these immediate considerations, Chernenko's
resurgence suggests that pre-succession political maneuvering is
likely to be active. Chernenko's age, health, and dependence on
his colleagues will likely prevent him from ever really
consolidating his power. If his health holds, however, he and his
elderly colleagues--Ustinov, Tikhonov, Gromyko--apparently intend
to stay in power as long as possible. This could pi.t off the
transfer to a new leader until after the next party congress, which
normally would be held early in 1986, and thus the overall
succession process--the selection of a new leader followed by a
period of power consolidation--probably will last for most of this
decade. F~
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