BRIEFING BOOK FOR NSPG MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000400890003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 28, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP SECRET
DDI - 06690/84
ACIS - 762/84
28 November 1984
Copy I of 9
without us.
6. In the meantime, if we can do more to assistnyou, please call.
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IAL/NOFORN
CUNVITE~
This MEMORANDUM is
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TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Briefing Book for NSPG Meeting
1. This memorandum transmits your briefing book for the National
Security Planning Group meeting, now scheduled for 1:45 on Friday, 30
November, in the White House Situation Room. This book contains products by
NIO/USSR, NIO/SP, NIO/EUR, and ACIS.
2. The Table of Contents is on the left. A set of proposed
talking points is at Tab A.
3. This meeting is the first in a series leading to the session on 7-8
January 1985 between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The
purpose of this meeting is to discuss Soviet near-term and long-term interests
in arms control arrangements with the US. A second NSPG meeting appears to be
intended for the week of 3 December. My understanding is that this second
meeting will address comparable US interests.
4. With your concurrence, my plan is to update this book by COB
Thursday, 29 November, after the meeting with you and several NIO's in your
office Thursday afternoon.
5. Also with your concurrence, my plan is to have NIO/SP and NIO/USSR in
the briefing with me in order to answer any detailed questions the attendees
might have. Moreover, I believe strongly that once the briefing is over, the
three of us should leave the meeting and allow the NSPG members to continue
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
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Proposed DCI Talking Points for NSPG Meeting, 30 November
-- The substantive keys to renewed strategic arms control talks with the USSR
are :
o US objectives, near- and far-term.
o The linkage the US uses between nuclear weapons and outer space
activities (ASAT, SDI, and other uses--such as reconnaissance, et al).
USSR:
-- Gromyko probably will arrive in Geneva with specific ideas about the
modalities of the renewed negotiations and a politically-based agenda,
including a strong effort "to halt the arms race" in space, possibly
hinting that progress in nuclear arms reductions will only be possible if
SDI and ASAT are limited.
-- The Soviets will have a concept ready on modalities but will seek US ideas
first. The Soviets probably envision separate negotiations on space and
nuclear weapons.
-- Gromyko will probably use his March visit to Holland to feed Dutch anti-INF
sentiments. He may press for a moratorium on INF deployments, possibly in
exchange for a freeze or even unilateral reductions in INF systems in
Europe and the USSR. The Soviets will manipulate the SS-20 force to
influence the Europeans.
Europe:
-- The West Europeans welcome the probable resumption of US-Soviet arms
control talks. Their primary objective will be to ensure that INF talks
not lag behind START.
-- The possible resumption of INF talks, however, complicates anew INF
deployments and will probably result in maneuverings by various governments
(e.g., Netherlands and Belgium) and arms control constituencies-to pressure
us into a quick agreement with the Soviets.
-- The exact course taken by European governments, however, will depend
primarily on the US management of the Alliance; e.g., presentation of its
positions in Allied councils.
US
-- Moreover, the Soviets are aware the talks will begin just prior to a new
Congress convening. The Soviets know the Administration's political margin
has decreased slightly.
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Overview of US Policy Work
A working group chaired by Lt. General Chain (State/PM) has been meeting
privately to prepare papers for the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) and
NSPG. By next Monday (3 December) the working group will provide a paper from
the following outline:
I. US national security objective 1994 (prepared by OSD)
II. Soviet Goals and Expectations at Geneva (prepared by CIA)
III. US approach to Geneva
a. Introduction
b. General US Arms Control Objectives
c. Summaries of Current US Objectives on Specific Issues
1. Strategic Systems
2. Theater Nuclear Systems
3. ASAT
4. SDI
5. Chemical Weapons
6. Nuclear Testing
7. Conventional Arms
IV. Process - what do we do at Geneva
At this time negotiating options will not be included in the paper.
The paper will be handled in a special access program (SAP) established
and operated by State/PM at Bud McFarlane's request. The details of the SAP
will be handled separately later.
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Soviet Goals and Expectations at Geneva
While they have agreed in principle to begin new arms control talks, the
Soviets appear concerned that the US is interested more in the appearance of
negotiations than in addressing specific Soviet concerns, particularly in the
area they have identified as a priority concern--outer space. Moreover,
having reversed their intransigent position of refusing to enter into further
arms control negotiations until US LRINF are removed from Europe, and, in
their perspective, taken the initiative for beginning talks, the Soviets may
now believe that they are once again well- nsitioned to nut t e US on the
political defensive in the public arena.
Thus, the Soviets most likely view the Geneva meeting as an opportunity
to ascertain whether the US is prepared to engage in substantive bargaining on
terms that Moscow can live with. In particular, Gromyko will want to
determine whether the US is prepared to discuss concrete limitations on space
weapons before mmittin the USSR to formal negotiations on offensive arms
reductions.
Gromyko will also expect to hear a clarification of the US proposal for
"umbrella" talks. While cautiously exploring US proposals, Gromyko likely
will have his own ideas as to the modalities for the negotiations and a
politically based agenda to include the goal of halting the arms race,
particularly in space weaponry. A key objective of the Soviet emphasis on
"demilitarizing" space is to undermine support for US strategic defense, in
general, and the SDI, in particular. The Soviets probably see a distinct
possibility that through a combination of arms control efforts, their active
measures campaign, independent political and budget pressures within the US,
and pressure from US Allies, the Administration's efforts to obtain
ronaressional fundi all_~ or SDI will be impeded and the program curtailed.
Gromyko will give priority to negotiations on space weapons. He will
seek further clarification of the Administration's offer to consider
"appropriate mutual restraints" during the negotiations and seek US commitment
to an ASAT moratorium before specific negotiations begin. He probably will
indicate that progress on the demilitarization of space will facilitate
reaching an agreement on offensive nuclear arms and may go as far to suggest
that an agreement on strategic nuclear arms cannot be achieved absent an
agreement on space weapons. The Soviets probably view the goal of blocking US
ASAT testing, which they consider integral to the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), as being more urgent than reaching an agreement on limiting offensive
nuclear arms. They may hope to use US interest in a strategic arms control
accord as bargaining leverage to achieve their negotiationing objectives on
space weapons. Gromyko may argue that the implementation of SDI will
undermine the ABM Treaty and he might assert that any future arms control
agreement depends on maintaining the integrity of this agreement.
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observe the treaty constraints until a new agreement can be negotiated. He
may indicate that a new strategic arms agreement is possible, providing that
The Soviets are well positioned in the near term to compete militarily in
the arena of strategic offensive arms. Nonetheless, we believe they still
attach priority, both for political and military reasons, to the maintenance
of negotiated constraints on US nuclear forces. They have expressed concerned
that the US might abandon SALT II restrictions when the treaty expires next
year. Gromyko may seek a mutual reaffirmation that the sides will continue to
basic framework of the SALT II Treaty is taken as point of departure.
While the Soviets may offer some adjustments to their current strategic
arms control proposals, they are unlikely to demonstrate significant
flexibility on the fundamental issues which divide the US and USSR in the
START and INF negotiations unless perhaps the US makes a significant
concession on SDI or ASAT. They are likely to insist that French and British
nuclear systems must be taken into account "somewhere" in the negotiations, to
resist US attempts to reduce their heavy ICBM missile force, and reject
proposals calling for on site inspection. On INF, they have dropped their
precondition that US INF missiles be withdrawn before negotiations begin but
are likely to press for a monitoring on further deployments and a committment
that a reversal of those deployments can be negotiated. Gromyko may suggest
that a ban on long range sea-launched cruise missiles (SCLMs) is no longer
feasible in light of US deployments and press for a US agreement to negotiate
The Soviets will have a clear-cut idea of their own as to the format and
modalities of the negotiations. Gromyko may wait for the US to show its hand
and describe the "umbrella" proposal but the other "concrete ideas" we have
told them we are prepared to discuss before making concrete counter-
proposals. The Soviets may envisage two sets of negotiations--one on space
weapons and one on nuclear arms--the characterization which they used in the
joint communique. Chernenko has stated that these are "interconnected"
issues, possibly hinting that negotiations will be successful only if progress
a limit on these systems.
is made in both arenas.
Until the Soviets are stisfied on the subject and objectives of further
negotiations, the Soviets may see some utility in having an extended series of
foreign ministers meetings in lieu of formal negotiations. They might
calculate that under these circumstances, public expectations in the United
States and Western Europe would increase pressure on the Administration to
make "good faith" gestures of unilateral restraint.
-- The Soviets may hope to stimulate further domestic and congressional
pressure to postpone ASAT testing in the interest of reaching an ASAT
agreement with the Soviet Union.
-- The Soviets may view the Dutch basing decision in November and recent
political discord in Belgium over the INF issue as offering
opportunities to derail US deployments in those countries.
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-- Gromyko is scheduled in March to visit the Netherlands and possibly
Belgium and the FRG, and he may propose a moratorium on further US
INF deployments in return for a freeze or possibly unilateral
reductions in the Soviet SS-20 force in the European USSR.
At this meeting with the Secretary, Gromyko may touch on other arms
control issues, possibly calling for the ratification of existing treaties on
nuclear testing and a resumption of the comprehensive test ban negotiations.
He will also probably revive the Soviet call for a "freeze" on nuclear weapons
testing and deployments, during negotiations and call on the US to sign a no
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC #06641-84
26 November 1984
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: The Soviets Grab the Umbrella
1. The Soviets have decided to engage in the umbrella arms control
exchange in a remarkable, but not surprising, tactical switch from the
stone-wall policies followed with almost uniform consistency since the end
of last year. Their aim is no less than to encourage a substantial
redirection of the Administration's policies in its second term. Soviet
commentaries -- the most recent and comprehensive current example is
attached -- lay out for internal audiences why this is worth a try:
The stress on "new talks", not resumption of the old ones, makes it
possible to resume negotiations without explicitly repudiating past
positions, such as no talks on INF without reversal of US INF
deployments.
The world has learned that the "language of force" and "positions
of strength" will not force Soviet concessions. Read: Moscow's
hanging tough for the past year paid off after all.
President Reagan is being pulled in the opposite directions of
"playing the peacemaker" or "returning to the course of
confrontation". He currently leans toward the former role.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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Washington is in the throes of political battle which will
determine the future US line, whose outcome cannot be assured, but
which, by implication, ought to be influenced by active Soviet
political tactics.
Meanwhile, US allies, domestic opinion, and economic conditions
have generated pressure that could modify Administration behavior
in the next four years.
Firm Soviet pursuit of "its principled line" has contributed to
this pressure and created a potentially new situation. Resumption
of talks does not represent a Soviet concession, but response to
opportunity -- which will be very cautiously explored.
2. There is a certain amount of rationalization in these arguments.
They are crafted to reassure skeptics within the Soviet elite, among whom
there are surely many, that these talks will not put Moscow on the slippery
slope to unnecessary concessions, but offer the chance of coaxing Washington
onto it. It is unlikely that these rationalizations will be entirely
persuasive. We can expect in coming weeks to see implicit questioning on
the part of such skeptics as to who is going to take advantage of whom ("kto
kovo", or "who gets whom" as Lenin put it) in these talks and the process
that follows.
3. Underlying these arguments is the pragmatic recognition that you
can't make money at political poker by staying out of every hand. With the
President massively reelected and the Soviet bureaucracy convinced,
according.to many good reports, that the previous policy had run its course,
it is now time to rejoin the game.
4. It is worth note that a Soviet Politburo evidently beset by
vigorous internal politicking over succession has been able to make this
tactical adjustment quite handily. It is equally significant that the
process of adjustment coincided with the reassertion of Chernenko's
political status. This coincidence should not be read as proof of
Chernenko's detentist proclivities, at least for the moment. Rather his
reemergence damped prospects for an immediate succession and permitted the
Politburo to get some other business done. All reporting about his current
authority indicates that Gromyko must have had a decisive voice in the
Soviet decision.
5. The Soviet decision to reengage the Reagan Administration does not
represent a fundamental or strategic change of foreign policy line. So far,
it is a sensible tactical shift in dealing with a US administration that
will be around for another four years and clearly wants its second term
marked by better US-Soviet relations or, at least, earnest attempts to get
them. The Soviets have certainly heard Bud McFarlane's assurance that the
President is committed to getting arms control results before he leaves
office. This sets them up for playing hard to get.
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6. In the months ahead, we can expect the Soviets to be more active on
many fronts to influence the political setting in which the US decides its
negotiating positions in new arms control talks and, equally important, the
contents of the rest of its national security agenda: military budgets and
programs, and policy toward regional security matters such as Nicaragua and
Afghanistan. With arms control.talks once again in prospect or progress,
the Soviets expect they will have better prospects to influence this agenda
than they did over the past year, or possibly the past four years.
7. Playing this game does not require a lot of decisiveness in Moscow
given its advantages of secrecy and its ability to pursue several seemingly
contradictory tactical lines at once. Chernenko has made plain that the
larger objective of the game -- admittedly a long shot, but worth a try --
is to get back to the "experience of the '70s" and to detente as "the
natural state" of US-Soviet relations. Such a condition would tend to spare
the Soviet leadership the necessity of more fundamental choices in foreign,
military, and domestic affairs, or at least to delay the need for
fundamental choice. That would be tailor made for thiy Soviet lo4dership.
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NIO/USSR
DCI/NI0 MEETING
21 NOVEMBER 1984
SOVIET DESIRE FOR ARMS TALKS TO INFLUENCE US DEFENSE PROGRAMS
A primary Kremlin objective in the near term will be to elicit US
participation in arms control talks. In the context of the Soviets' long
term strategy of using arms control as another instrument to gain and
maintain advantages, they probably believe the next six months are a
particularly important window for influencing US defense programs. The
neo-Brezhnevite leadership, which regularly recalls with fondness detente as
practiced in the early 1970s, probably believes that a positive arms control
dialogue can influence the Congress and others to treat US defense issues
with lesser urgency.
o They now want to maximize pressure on the Congress to cut defense-
spending as we come to grips with the deficit.
o They may believe SDI and the MX are particularly vulnerable.
o They probably hope that a setback to US military spending this year
would halt and even reverse the momentum of the Administration's
defense program over the next several years.
The Soviets are further interested to undermine US defense spending at
this time because of their serious economic problems and aversion to major
economic restructuring. They are at or near the end of a long economic
policy cul de sac, and the implications for their defense goals are bad.
Saturday's Washington Post article relating that Chernenko called for a
boost in Soviet defense spending at last week's expanded Politburo meeting
was wrong.
o What was noteworthy about Chernenko's comments was how little he
said about defense spending and the near backhanded treatment he
did give it.
o The speech was replete with lamentation about Soviet economic
difficulties and exhortation to overcome these problems.
o Chernenko's preaching on behalf of consumers denotes considerable
concern to improve living standards and, implicitly, even some
anxiety about public feelings toward the regime.
o Editorials in Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda in September suggested a
leadership dec s3 io agains ver ng resources from consumer
programs to defense, and a more recent Novo ye Vre a article
explaining the Soviet defense budget had d a ensive tone.
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Arms. talks. leading to reduced US defense ' programs would reduce the
pressure on the Soviets to divert .scarce resources to'defense and-allow the
Soviets greater leeway to deal with their economic problems.
Moscow, in:its desire for a:negotiation on: SD!, 'probably Is resigned to
talks that also include INF. Because the Soviets now want to improv
e: the
East-West climate and prospects for talks, they did' hot, claim -that .` the US
'ASAT test last week violated the terms of their` current. test moratorium or
otherwise condemn At vitriolically. Insofar as their momentary concern is
to restart and politically utilize the arms talks process, they.:-probably are.:
not now focussing.as.much on possible outcomes.' This may be oarticularly
anu the more recent one with NBC -- nal1:alrectly fromthe_,Brezhnev
of moderate, placating rhetoric.
The Soviets also ,are 1 i,kel Y". to' utilize hi g h level -visits and exchanges:
o foster a positive climate. These may include.
"A possible..visit'to Moscow by Secretary Shultz.
-:A visit to Moscow by a US trade'delegation"in January.
A corollary, to Soviet interest in arms talks and other diplomatic
instruments as a means of influencing US.defense.programs,-and relatedly..US.
domesticattitudes'toward international affairs generally, is a probable
l
a
oc
e
.,
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the US.,
.to Nicaragua.
This might be a-good time for the Allies 'to press the Soviets to.:.
curtail their restrictions on access to Berlin.
This would seem to be a time when the Kremlin would not send MiGs
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Nation
Back on Speaking Terms
Hinting at a thaw, the U.S. and Soviets agree to meet in Geneva
I n nature. when masses of ice begin to
melt. then fissure. they can make a sort
of thunder. a great bass popping that
echoes for miles. It is a startling noise.
In Washington and Moscow last week
there was a similarly surprising noise that
sounded, just maybe. like the first tremors
of a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations. It came
Thanksgiving Day, with officials in each
country reading identical statements to
reporters. At the White House. National
Security Adviser Robert McFarlane de-
livered the tidings deadpan. "The United
States and the Soviet Union have agreed
to enter into new negotiations." he report-
ed. "with the objective of reaching mutu-
ally acceptable agreements on the whole
range of questions concerning nuclear and
outer-space arms."
One year after the Soviets abandoned
parallel sets of negotiations in Geneva on
strategic arms (START) and intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF). they have de-
cided to come in from the cold. On the first
Monday in January. Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State
George Shultz are to sit down together in
Geneva and begin working out the basic
ground rules and agenda for a whole new
set of weapons talks. Said a senior West-
ern diplomat in Moscow: "There are pow-
erful interests on both sides in having
these negotiations succeed."
It is just a beginning. a first step to-
ward determining how substantive arms-
control talks might proceed. All the hard
parts come later. When the two sides get
down to particulars. they might again find
themselves in a deadlock, the Soviets as
intransigent as ever on the issue of medi-
um-range Euromissiles, the Americans as
uncompromising as before on land-based
missiles. Declares one Administration
arms-control advocate: "What is impor-
tant is the details. the specifics of ap-
proach from January on. What is the U.S.
ready, willing and able to put on the ta-
ble?" A moderate colleague is also pessi-
mistic. "Reagan wants to see it as a thaw.**
he says of the Geneva get-together, "but
unless we can show them we are serious
about the arms-control process, then this
isn't the beginning of anything." In fact.
the Reagan Administration is profoundly
divided over how to handle arms talks,
and has not yet fashioned anything like a
clear and coherent negotiating strategy.
That process is complicated by a furious
debate within the Administration over So-
viet compliance with existing arms trea-
ties (see following story).
Nevertheless, the Shultz-Gromyko
meeting. with its explicit goal of getting
arms control back on track, is the single
most hopeful bit of progress in U.S.-Soviet
relations since the now moribund START
discussions got under way more than two
told about the Geneva plans last Monday
at his Santa Barbara ranch. recalls
McFarlane, his response was simple and
apt. "This is good news." Reagan said.
ndeed. for the President the news
should be especially welcome. since it
seems to vindicate. for the moment.
his 1984 hard-liner-turned-peacemak-
er approach. The Kremlin had declared
repeatedly that unless newly deployed
Pershing II and cruise missiles were re-
moved from Western Europe. there would
be no further Soviet participation in nu-
clear-arms-control talks-period. Despite
the threat, however, nearly 100 of the
NATO missiles have been installed this
year, and deployment continues. Says
Assistant Defense Secretary Richard
Perle: "The Soviets made the key conces-
sion by returning to negotiations without
preconditions."
Their return required a semantic
sleight of hand. The Soviets would not
simply rejoin the suspended Geneva talks,
so last week's announcement very careful-
ly called the impending talks "new negoti-
ations." What about START and INF? "As
far as those negotiations go. the situation
has not changed." said Soviet Foreign
Ministry Spokesman Vladimir Lomeiko
at his Moscow press conference "The)
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41
reaucracy, the White House received a let-
At noon on Tha*sgtving Day, McFarlaie delivers the good news to Wasldngton reporters
are only possible given the removal of the
American missiles." He was emphatic.
"This is not a renewal of negotiations.
These are absolutely new talks." Explains
a U.S. official: "The Soviets had painted
themselves into a very public corner. We
wanted to give them an easy way out."
Not that the Soviets have crumpled. In the
past year they have deployed almost 100
SS-20s, capable of hitting targets through-
out Western Europe.
Nuclear weapons are the central fact
of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But incipi-
ent entente. although modest, is also show-
ing up elsewhere. Mikhail Gorbachev,
heir apparent to Soviet Leader Konstantin
Chernenko. will visit Britain for a week in
December (see box). As Shultz arrives in
Geneva in January. a U.S. Commerce offi-
cial will be in Moscow for quieter talks
about how to expand U.S.-Soviet trade.
This week Soviet Minister of Agriculture
Valentin Mesyats will begin a twelve-day
tour of the American heartland: aside
from Gromyko, no Soviet minister has vis-
ited the U.S. since 1979. Last week Pop
Singer John Denver embarked on a con-
cert tour of the Soviet Union, the first by an
American entertainer in years. When
Denver appeared at the U.S. Ambassa-
dor's Thanksgiving dinner in Moscow and
sang We're All in This Together, one Soviet
guest. Foreign Ministry Official Alexan-
der Bessmertnykh, sang right along.
It is no rush of good-fellowship that
has the Soviets packing for Geneva again.
Rather, the past year made it plain that
their attitude of aggrieved peevishness
was getting them nowhere. When the
NATO governments were staunch in their
determination to install new Pershing 11
and cruise missiles, the disarmament
movement in Europe withered, and with
it a good part of Moscow's hopes for fore-
stalling the deployments. The Soviets
meanwhile heard increasingly come-hith-
er talk from the President and realized by
summer that his re-election was all but
certain. "They faced four more years of
Ronald Reagan." .explains a U.S. policy-
maker. "So the time had come to find a
way back to the negotiating table."
A few days after re-election. Reagan
sent an earnest note toChernenko. A week
later, surprisingly swift for the Soviet bu-
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Gromyko conference. "There had been
positive signals." says a presidential advis-
er, "but nothing this explicit." Perle, prob-
ably the most influential arms-control
critic in the Administration, had his calcu-
lations thrown off. Said he: "I'm amazed
the Soviets came back to the table so soon.
I hadn't expected them until spring."
The breakthrough came after Reagan
suggested vaguely, during his speech in
September to the U.N. General Assembly.
that new arms talks might take place un-
der an "umbrella." implying a unified
forum without separate negotiations for
medium-range missiles and long-range
missiles. The START talks had concerned
the warheads. mostly loaded on ICBMs.
that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have
pointed at each other from their respective
territories and from submarines. The iNr
talks focused exclusively on missiles based
in Europe and aimed at European targets.
Umbrella talks could treat those different
weapons as parts of a single negotiating
equation. together with emerging space-
based weapons. The technical complexity
of the talks would be increased, yet the
comprehensive approach offers consider-
able advantages: negotiators would be able
to barter the putative U.S. edge in space
weaponry, for instance, directly with the
Soviet surfeit in ICBM megatonnage.
What kinds of specific offers might
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Nation frIf
the U.S. make for openers? Shultz could
agree to a slowdown in the deployment of
cruise missiles or a moratorium on testing
antisatellite devices. The hard-liners in
Washington, unwilling to.forgo the U.S.
buildup in either area, would merely sug-
gest that the Soviets send monitors to
watch U.S. underground nuclear tests and
that an American counterpart go to the
U.S.S.R.
The Administration's internal split on
arms control remains so deep that signifi-
cant progress may not be possible despite
the President's accommodating inten-
tions. On one side are the skeptics: Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Perle and
other Pentagon subordinates. Arrayed
against them are the arms-control moder-
ates: Shultz, his underlings and the White
House staff. Even at the White House
meetings last week to shape the U.S.-Sovi-
et joint statement, admits a Pentagon offi-
cial, the hawks practiced "constant skir-
mishing" to slow the momentum.
For their separate political reasons,
the principal moderates and hard-liners
agree that no arms-control czar should be
appointed. But McFarlane talked last
week of finding someone "to advise, to
troubleshoot and to be a designated hitter
that could assure momentum is sus-
tained." The White House favorite for the
job is Paul Nitze, the chief negotiator at
the INF talks. Yet he is opposed by the
Pentagon hawks. In Msscow, one Soviet
expert on U.S. relations smiled at the
Washington jargon-czar-but said with
a sigh, "When Kissinger was making
these decisions in the Nixon years, then
we were able to move ahead. Maybe what
we need is a new Kissinger."
Nixon met three times with Leonid
Brezhnev, first in 1972 to sign the
SALT 1 pact. McFarlane said it was
"premature to speculate" that the
January meeting might lead to a Reagan-
Chernenko encounter. Before last week's
announcement, Chernenko told NBC
News in answer to written questions that
he did not think "conditions now are ripe
for a Soviet-American summit meeting."
Still, U.S. officials have bandied about the
idea of a summit next fall.
? Before any such grand encounter can
occur, though, Reagan must involve himself
in the arms-control process more directly.
Specifically, he will have to give Shultz and
the moderates his unequivocal endorse-
ment, or make it clear to the hard-liners that
An Opening to London
W ord that the superpowers would hold
talks early next year in Geneva was
the second sign that the Kremlin is looking
for a diplomatic opening to the West. The
first was that Mikhail Gorbachev, 53, the
fast-rising heir apparent to President Kon-
stantin Chernenko, will lead a Soviet dele-
gation to Britain in mid-December. Gorba-
chev's trip will mark the first visit of a
top-ranking Soviet leader to Britain in eight
years. For Gorbachev. who has already
seen more of the West than all but a few Po-litburo members, the visit might be the
dress rehearsal for a later trip to the U.S.
Gorbachev accepted Britain's invita-
tion in his capacity as chairman of the for-
eign affairs commission of the Supreme So-
viet, the US.S.R.'s largely ceremonial
parliament. Last year he led another parlia-
mentary delegation on a two-week tour of
his commitment to negotiating nuclear
arms reductions is genuine and urgent.
Even if the President manages to es-
tablish a single negotiating strategy for his
Administration, arms-control agreements
will surely be elusive. Chernenko's health
and his mastery of the Soviet state remain
uncertain. The Kremlin may simply want
to observe the forms of negotiation for
propaganda purposes. "We're not there
yet.' concedes a White House adviser.
with epic understatement. "It may take
the whole second term to get there."
In Washington. Moscow and Europe-
an capitals last week. the general reaction
was the same, a kind of prudent hopeful-
ness. positive but well short of jubilant.
The distance between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union had become vast and worri-
some. Even an uncertain plan to re-en-
gage is better than hostile solitude. "The
main thing is that the talks are taking
place," sums up Sir Geoffrey Howe, the
British Foreign Secretary. "But don't let's
have any terrifically high expectations of
sudden change. lt's going to be a very long
business. It will require a lot of patience
from all of us."-By Kit Andersen. Reported
by Eric Amfltheatof/Moscow and Johsma
MccGeary/Wash ngton, *ft otherbureaus
Gromyko early in 1985. Said Thatcher: "We shall hope during
these visits to take forward the search for ways to reduce the
burden of armaments." Acting in concert
with Washington. the British may use their
time with Gorbachev tosound out the open-
ing Soviet position in Geneva and to hint at
' Washington's. "The Russians know per-
fectly well that anything they say to us will
go straight back to Washington," said a
British diplomat in London. "We will be
acting as a two-way conduit."
The unexpected acceptance of Lon-
don's invitation by Gorbachev recalled an-
other Soviet foreign policy initiative staged
Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai
Bulganin came calling. opening a cam-
paign of personal diplomacy in the West
that culminated in Khrushchev's 1959 tour
of the US. That was also a period of
progress in arms-control negotiations be-
tween the US. and Soviet Union, though no
major agreement emerged until the limited
test-ban treaty of 1%3.
Gorbachev was conspicuous by his ab-
intelligence and the ability to listen careful-
ly. British diplomats were delighted with his latest travel
plans. "If he really is the Kremlin's No. 2 man, we want to see
as much of him as possible," explained a British diplomat.
"And we want him to see as much of us as possible."
Gorbachev is likely to do just that, given the limitations of
a one-week stay. Besides attending parliamentary functions,
he will presumably want to inspect some farms and agricultur-
al-equipment factories; agriculture is one of his responsibil-
ities in the Kremlin. Most important, he will be received at 10
Downing Street, possibly more than once. Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, who has been hinting publicly for 14
months that she would welcome talks with the Soviet leader-
ship, noted that Gorbachev's visit will be followed by one from
sence from a Nov. 15 meeting of the ruling Politburo. A Soviet
journalist joked that Gorbachev was busy taking an intensive
tea-sipping course in case the Queen Mother invited him over.
"Whether or not to use the strainer, how to put the napkin on
your knee, and all that," the journalist mused. More serious
Soviet officials went out of their way to assure British officials
that Gorbachev was merely on vacation and that his British
travel plansremain unchanged. Theirexplanation was plausi-
ble: Gorbachev filled in for Chernenko during the President's
extended summer vacation and remained at his desk through-
out the fall. As fui Gorbache'. s plans beyond December. noth-
ing is firm. But Western diplomats have lately been speculat-
ing about w possible Gorbachev trip to the U.S. in 1985.
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eWSW" = NATIONAL AFFAIRS /
Back to the Table
Reagan and Chernenko agree to arms talks, but the road will be long and tough.
T urkeys were already browning across down-complicating matters for the Penta- high-level "special envoy" such as arms ne-
the country last week when Washing- gon hard-liners who will oppose the talks. gotiator Paul Nitze. The moderates already
tonandMoscowsuppliedtheirownThanks- So far, the results have vindicated Rea- are pondering ways to keep the Soviets talk-
giving Day treat. In simultaneous press gan. He resisted election-year pressures to ing. To that end, the United States might be
briefings, the superpowers announced that lure the Soviets back to the bargaining table willing to compromise on its proposal that
Secretary of State George Shultz will meet with U.S. concessions. Instead, his predic- the two sides merely resume the stalled Stra-
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromykoin Gene- tion proved correct: the Soviets came back tegic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and
va on Jan. 7 and 8. The surprise was that the anyway. The Thanksgiving Day accord the negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear
two sides had already agreed to revive nucle- foresees negotiations on "the whole range" Forces(INF)inEurope.Theadministration
ar arms talks; they left their emissaries to .of nuclear and space weapons. That meshes would consider merging the START and
dicker over an agenda. John Denver even with Washington's preference that offensive INF talks-and even tacking on negotia-
showed up at the U.S. ambassador's home in and defensive weapons alike be discussed. tions on space weapons.
Moscow to sing we re At least for now, it ignores Moscow's de- On substance, as well, the moderates are
all in this together"-as mand that space weapons top the agenda. considering the kinds of gestures that Penta-
the ambassador, a Soviet The formula even setsaside the most explicit gon hard-liners vigorously oppose. Instrate-
Foreign Ministry official Soviet precondition: that talks cannot re- gic-armstalks, some officials areurging that
and other Thanksgiving sume until the United States removes its new the United States bend toward the Soviet
guests chirped along in NATO missiles from Europe. formula for measuring strategic forces-
harmony. If Reagan's stress on arms control proves that is, counting launchers, an easier chore
And with that accord, a political winner, it will ease congressional than counting actual warheads and,mega-
the Kremlin leadership passage of his hard-line defense budgets and tonnage. In the talks on intermediate-range
blinked: they ended a MX missile program. But it will also shift forces, furthermore, some State Depart-
year of frosty confronta- stewardship of his foreign policy to moder- ment expertsadvocatea three-year, bilateral
tion, buried their pre- ates like Shultz, national-security adviser freeze on deployment of new missiles aimed
conditions-and handed Robert McFarlane-and perhaps a new at targets in Europe pending negotiations;
Ronald Reagan his first on the Soviet side, the freeze would cover
postelection diplomatic. triple-warhead SS-20s, the main threat, as
coup. Even at best, the well as shorter-range SS-21s and SS-22s.
Thanksgiving Day sur- Thesemoderates also propose a similar morMW LML
the beginning of the tunnel. In Geneva,
Shultz and Gromyko must somehow script
negotiations on long-range strategic mis-
siles, European-based warheads, space
weapons or some combination of all three
(chart). Gromyko will likely table a familiar
Soviet wish list-including a demand that
the United States stop deploying its new
NATO missiles in Europe. Needless to say,
Washington has a quarrel with every point.
A senior administration official emphasizes
that "these are going to be long, tough nego-
tiations, with no guarantee ofsuccess."
Allies That renders no less dramatic Rea-
gan's own late-blooming commitment to
arms control. He spent most of his first term
lambasting the Evil Empire. He launched
his futile first-term talks more to please the
allies than to reach agreement. But by re-
election time he was meeting Gromyko in
person to demonstrate that term two will
belong to arms control. After his victory, I STATUS. Soviets have refused to
Konstantin Chernenko that he is serious.
Next, in forums large and small, Reagan
persuaded his own administration that he
intends to break the impasse with Moscow.
The message: in term two, the impetus for
arms control will flow from the president
MAJOR DIFFERENCES: The U.S.
wants to concentrate on heavy,
multiple-warhead missiles. Soviets say
this disaiminates against their
reliance on such missiles.
26 NEWSWEE L/DECEMBER 3, 1984
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 I -,_ I. I . , I I
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atorium on testing antisatellite weapons. I as much to internal politics as to strategic
With the president and the political winds philosophy. The tough talk that pervaded
favoring the moderates, Defense Secretary the spring and summer months came at a
Caspar Weinberger, his Assistant Secretary time when and summer
and Defense Minister
Richard Perle and other arms-certtrol crit-
ics itry Ustinov played particularly have kept a low profile. As they see it, the promi-
nent roles. But in recent months, the Army's
policy battle will heat up when the adminis-
tration must face tough choices. In the near
term, the hard-liners hope they can derail
any proposal to forgo American antisatellite
.tests during negotiations. In the long run
they believe that the trends work in their
favor. For one thing, negotiators will have
trouble keeping up with the rapid expansion
of weapons technology. Even if they ham-
mer out some agreement, the hard-liners
believe its provisions will prove impossible
to verify-and that any arms-control deal
will turn out to be fatally flawed.
Snub: There is another uncertainty: the
Soviets agreed to nothing on Thanksgiving.
that they could not undoby Valentine's Day.
The Kremlin may intend simply to rail at
Reagan from across the table rather than
from afar. But the fact isthat Moscow's snub
treatment utterly failed to prevent the
NATO buildup or Reagan's re-election.
And it did not address Moscow's more seri-
ous anxieties-including the U.S. lead in
space weapons, its highly accurate D-5 mis-
siles launched from Trident submarines and
the proliferation of U.S. Pershing 11 missiles
in Europe. In the circumstances, Moscow
might be genuinely ready to give negotia-
tions another chance. "Of course, Ronald
Reagan will remain Ronald Reagan," wrote
columnist Fyodor Burlatsky, "but for all
that, one mustn't exclude the possibility of
certain correctives in the realization of this
line... Weshallsee."
The Kremlin?'s softer line probably owes
SUBJECT: Limiting the deployment of
medium-range missiles aimed at targets
in Europe.
STATUS: Soviets walked out of talks in
November 1983.
MAJOR DIFFERENCES: The Soviets have
refused to consider any agreement that
would pemtit NATO to deploy Pershing 11 or
anise missiles, and have insisted that British
and French missiles be "taken into accamt"
in the talks.
NEWSWEEK/DECEMBER 3, 1984
aggressive Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov
has been ousted, and Ustinov himself has
taken ill. More important, President Cher-
nenko has asserted himself after a summer of
poor health-and history shows that only a
strong Soviet leader can unite the nation's
bureaucracy behind an arms-control agree-
ment. In fact, the future of U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions now lies in the hands of elderly presi-
dents in Moscow and Washington alike.
Each has been criticized as "disengaged."
Neither has ever before shown much interest
or enthusiasm for arms control. Now each
has taken a big first step.
Reagan and Chernenko still have to prove
that they can walk the last mile to arms
control, In exhorting his own team to pur-
sue an agreement, the American president
has acted less the take-charge leader than
the "benevolent, loving, caring father figure
trying to get these very strong personalities
to work together," as one aide put it. As last
wed. -s drama unfolded, Reagan gave most
of his attention to the 800-foot irrigation
system he was digging in the pasture beside
his ranch home. Reagan has always pre-
ferred sketching the big picture to slogging
through details-the fatherly chat to
knocking heads together. Now he has com-
mitted his prestige to the most dangerous,
arcane reaches of the superpower relation-
ship. He still has to prove that his style of
laid-back diplomacy can produce progress.
But knowing Reagan, nobody's betting
against him. .
STEVEN STRASSER with JOHN WALCOTT
in Washington and ROBERT B. CULLEN in Moscow
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Questions About Soviet Cheating
Future talks could hinge on compliance with old treaties
D oes the Soviet Union cheat on the
agreements that Leonid Brezhnev
signed with Richard Nixon and
Jimmy Carter during the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks of the 1970s? Should the
Reagan Administration feel bound by
those agreements?
Those questions, and their answers,
are closely linked, and President Reagan
must face up to them squarely-and very
soon. By the end of this week, the White
House is required, under a Pentagon au-
thorization bill, to give the Senate Armed
Services Committee a report on So-
viet compliance with past agree-
ments. By early next year, the Ad-
ministration must decide on the
second question, whether the U.S.
should continue to abide by the old
SALT agreements while it seeks to
negotiate new treaties in the talks
that Secretary of State George
Shultz plans to propose to Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
in January.
As on most other arms-control
issues, the Administration is sharp-
ly divided over what these reports
should say. Hard-liners, whose
most determined and skillful repre-
sentative is Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard Perle, are press-
ing for the most damning. categori-
cal interpretation of any available
evidence that the Soviets have
flagrantly violated SALT. Their
charges of Soviet cheating buttress
their broader case that arms con-
trol, at least as practiced tradition-
ally, is not in the national interest.
Moderates, centered at the State
Department, are inclined to a more
equivocal-and, they believe, a
more subtle and accurate-reading
of the Soviet record. They tend to
avoid stark references to violations
and talk instead about "question-
able activities." The State Depart-
ment, according to one of its offi-
the same time, Congress and public
opinion will be extremely skeptical
about the wisdom of continuing to do
any business with convicted cheaters.
Caught in the middle of the intramu-
ral debate is the intelligence community.
Its photoreconnaissance specialists and
weapons analysts are the gumshoes who
stake out the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces. But these detectives are con-
cerned about protecting their "sources
and methods" as well as catching the
crooks. The CIA is anxious that the Penta-
pant, has been "a knock-down. drag-out,
blood-on-the-floor free-for-all."
There is plenty of room for honest
disagreement on the issue of Soviet com-
pliance. Judgments depend on close calls
over esoteric technical matters and fine
points in treaty language. The whole
problem has been complicated by the de-
terioration of political relations between
the superpowers, the stagnation of the
arms-control process and the onrush of
technology. New weapons systems tend
not to fit neatly into the definitions and
stipulations drafted as long as
=twelve years ago. Says Michael
Krepon, an expert on ,compliance
issues at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace: "The Sovi-
ets usually exploit ambiguities in
treaties, and arms-control critics
immediately label these Soviet
practices as violations."
Since 1972, the U.S. and the So-
viet Union have been exchanging
private complaints about whether
their military programs comply
with SALT. They have been doing so
behind closed doors in Geneva, in a
joint Soviet-American body called
the Standing Consultative Commis-
sion. Before Reagan came into of-
fice, the U.S. had taken many chal-
lenges of Soviet practices to the SCC:
the Soviets either adequately ex-
plained them or discontinued them.
Recently, however, the Soviets
have been playing closer to the edge
of what is permissible. and have
perhaps stepped over that edge.
Two examples are particularly dis-
turbing. and they are Exhibits A
and B in the hard-liners' case:
Test tauxh of an MX from Air Force base In California
One new missile is allowed, but does Moscow have two?
cials, "has been seeking a report that
raises tough questions without overstating
the answers."
Shultz and his advisers have an ulte-
rior motive. They want to protect the
President's diplomatic options. Reagan
has said repeatedly that he hopes to
reach an arms-control agreement with
the USSR. in his second term. But if
his Administration officially renders a
guilty verdict against the U.S.S.R. on
the issue of compliance, the prospects
for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting and fu-
ture negotiations and agreements may
be bleaker than ever. The Soviets will
take the accusations as proof that the
U.S. is looking for a pretext to scuttle
arms control once and for all, while
making the Soviets take the blame. At
gon hard-liners, in their zeal to prosecute
the Soviets in public, will give away sensi-
tive intelligence secrets about how much
the U.S. knows and how it knows it. Some
intelligence experts also interpret the
data about Soviet activities as being more
ambiguous than the hard-liners want to
assert.
As chairman of an interagency re-
view process, the President's National Se-
curity Adviser, Robert McFarlane, has
had the difficult task of trying to hammer
out a consensus on Soviet compliance that
will balance these conflicting bureaucrat-
ic interests and be responsive to the Sen-
ate while not undercutting the President's
stated desire to resume serious arms-con-
trol negotiations with the U.S.S.R. next
year. The process, according to a partici-
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The Krasnoyarsk Radar. Under
the SALT I treaty of 1972. neither
side is allowed to develop a nation-
wide system of antiballistic-missile
defenses. The reason for this rule is
that mutual deterrence rests, rather
perversely, on the principle of mutual vul-
nerability: if each superpower knows the
other has the ability to retaliate against a
first strike, neither will launch such a
strike.
By 1983, American spy satellites had
spotted a huge construction project near
Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. It looks
suspiciously like a giant radar station that
would be useful for providing early warn-
ing against a missile attack and could also
help shoot down the incoming warheads
with ABMs. Its location deep inside the
U.S.S.R. would make it a clear-cut viola-
tion of SALT if it is used for early warning.
since the ABM treaty says that such facili-
ties must be near the periphery of the
country.
The Soviets claim that the radar,
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nation
which will not be completed until 1988
or 1989, is not for looking outward to-
ward the pacific Ocean for enemy mis-
sile warheads, but for looking upward to
track satellites and manned vehicles in
space, a function permitted by SALT.
Whenever the U.S. presses them on the
Krasnoyarsk radar, the Soviets say two
new early-warning radars that the U.S.
is building in Texas and Georgia violate
SALT because their wide sweep covers
much of the continental U.S. and there-
fore could be part of a nationwide de-
fensive net: The Soviets' countercharge
is weak because the new American ra-
dars are on the periphery of the U.S., as
the treaty requires.
New Missiles. The SALT 11 treaty of
1979 permits each side one new
type of intercontinental ballistic
missile. The U.S. has chosen as its
new type the MX, a ten-warhead
successor to the three-warhead
Minuteman III, although the MX
program has been the object of in-
tense controversy and may be
killed by the Congress. The Soviets
are developing a roughly compara-
ble rocket called the SS-24, and
they have officially notified the
U.S. that this is to be their one new
type.
But the Soviets are working on
another ICBM. It is smaller than the
SS-24 and may be armed with only
one warhead. They claim it is a
"modernization" of an old 1960s-
vintage ICBM. the SS-13. The U.S.
intelligence community has been
monitoring the testing program
and is convinced that there are too
many improvements for the rocket
to qualify as a modernization. It is,
say U.S. experts, definitely a sec-
ond new type, which they have
dubbed the SS-25. But the defini-
tion of a new type. in SALT Il is im-
precise, and some analysts think
you want, it's an arms race you're going
to get.' "
Kenneth Adelman, Qirector of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agen-
cy, believes that t the if must there press
harges against
to be any progress in arms control.
"There's no question," he says, "the So-
viets are violating commitments they
have undertaken. Their violations are to
various degrees and in various areas. To
be serious about arms control. we have
to be serious about compliance. When
one side abides by its commitments but
the other side doesn't, then what's really
happening is unilateral disarmament by
the first side, under the guise of arms
control."
invisible, protagonist in the battle over
arms control as an adviser to three con-
servative Republican Senators: James
McClure and Steven Symms of Idaho
and Jesse Helms of North Carolina.
Last January, largely in response to
pressure from that group, the Administra-
tion issued a report on Soviet compliance.
It detailed seven Soviet "violations and
probable violations" but cautioned that in
three of the seven cases the evidence was
inconclusive.
A variety of outside experts chal-
lenged those findings, arguing that the ev-
idence was less than conclusive in all sev-
en cases. But the hard-liners felt that the
Administration had let the Soviets off
easy. Perle stressed at the time that the
report was "illustrative only," sug-
gesting that there were many more
charges to come. Sullivan told TIME
last week, "We were pleased that
for the first time a President for-
mally charged the Soviets with vio-
lating a strategic-arms treaty, but
we thought the report could have
been stronger."
In October, the trio of right-
wing Senators engineered the re-
lease of a much more hard-hitting
report prepared not by the Admin-
istration but by a panel of outsid-
ers-the President's General Advi-
sory Committee on Arms Control
and Disarmament (GAC), composed
of private citizens, most of whom
are hawks and arms-control skep-
tics. Their study, based heavily on
data gathered and interpreted by
Sullivan, found the Soviets guilty of
17 "material breaches" of nine trea-
ties and four international commit-
ments. The GAC also cited ten "sus-
pected violations."
Reagan had sat on the GAC
report for ten months. When he
finally forwarded it to Capitol Hill
in October, he stopped short of
endorsing its conclusions. He said
The Administration has been at odds
with itself over compliance since its first
days in office. In his initial press confer-
ence as President, on Jan. 29, 1981, Rea-
gan said the Soviets "reserve unto them-
selves the right to commit any crime, to
lie, to cheat." Among the newly appointed
officials who took that statement very lit-
erally was David Sullivan, a former CIA
analyst who had made a career of docu-
menting alleged Soviet violations of SALT.
He served briefly in the ACDA in the State
Department building.
Sullivan was an ally of Perle's in the
bureaucratic struggle, but he was on the
wrong side of the Potomac. He ran
afoul of colleagues in ACDA and State
when he tried to get the Administration
to sanction what one official recalls as
"a laundry list of every Soviet misdeed
since the birth of Lenin, all of them
branded as arms-control violations." He
was fired from ACDA in March 1981 but
has remained an active, though largely
the Soviet rocket may fit through a loop-
hole that allows a second new type as
long as it is sufficiently similar in size and
other characteristics to an existing ICBM.
A Soviet diplomat in Washington re-
cently argued that the US. is in no posi-
tion to be a stickler on this issue, since the
Administration and Congress are talking
about developing a second new-type of
ICBM: the small, mobile, single-warhead
Midgetman.
t is important to separate the real
compliance issues from the red
herrings," says Thomas Long-
streth of the Arms Control Association, a
private educational group in Washington.
"The Krasnoyarsk radar and SS-25 are
real issues. I don't think there is any
doubt that the Soviets are playing hard-
ball with us, showing us what they can do
if arms control breaks down completely.
By some of their actions, they are saying.
in some crude way, 'If it's an arms race
1
116
in a covering letter that the report
had been neither reviewed nor approved
by the Government. "The GAC report
was a hot potato," recalls a White
House official. "We couldn't embrace
the thing even if we believed it, because
to do so would be the kiss of death for
arms control, to which the President is
really committed. How can we continue
trying to negotiate with the Soviets if
everything that the GAC report says
was true?"
That, in a nutshell, is a dilemma the
Administration still faces. The report
due this week is a congressionally man-
dated update on the one the Adminis-
tration released in January. Sullivan last
week warned that his patrons would not
be pleased if McFarlane tried to delay
the new study or "distance the President
from it the way he did with the GAC re-
port. We expect a larger menu of SALT
violations than we got in January. We
hope not to see a report that is watered
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down and full of divided opinion."
Congress requires another report
from the Administration in February on
the related issue of whether the U.S.
should continue to comply with SALT
while it tries to negotiate better agree-
ments. There, too, opinion is divided. The
hard-liners would like to see SALT dead
and buried, while the State Department
and its allies argue that the US. will be
worse off, both diplomatically and mili-
tarily, if it pulls the plug on the treaty.
Both superpowers are hedging their
bets by proceeding with new military pro-
grams that will confront them with stark
choices about whether to maintain even
the pretense of compliance. The U.S. is
facing that dilemma almost immediately.
The nuclear-powered submarine U.S.S.
Alaska is due to be launched by the Elec-
tric'- Boat Division of the General
Dynamics Corp. in Groton. Conn.,
next month: it will begin sea trials
in the fall. With that boat in service,
the US. may, for the first time, be
definitively and deliberately in vio-
lation of SALT.
Among the ceilings established
by SALT Il is a limit of 1,200 launch-
ers for long-range ballistic missiles
with multiple independently target-
able re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The
Alaska 's 24 Trident rockets, each
with eight thermonuclear war-
heads, would put the American to-
tal of MIRVed ballistic-missile
launchers at 1,214.
To avoid violating SALT ii, the
U.S. would have to take out of ser-
vice one of its 31 older, smaller Po-
seidon submarines or remove some
land-based Minuteman III ICBMs.
In the past, as new U.S. weapons
have been deployed, older ones
have been dismantled or converted
to other uses. For example, the five-
year SALT I agreement on offensive
weapons, which Nixon signed in
1972, limits the number of subma-
rine tubes each side can have. Dur-
ing the 1970s, as the U.S. Navy
built Poseidons, it would dismantle their
predecessors and display the pieces on
docks so that Soviet spy satellites could
see proof that the US. was staying within
the SALT I limits. This practice continued
even after SALT I expired in 1977. The So-
viets have done much the same.
Compliance with SALT 13 is a trickier
matter for the Reagan. Administration.
The Senate never ratified the treaty, and
even if it had done so, the pact would ex-
pire at the end of next year. Reagan cam-
paigned against SALT n as "fatally
flawed." Throughout his first term, infor-
mal observance of the expired SALT I
agreement on offensive weapons and the
unratified SALT II treaty was explained as
an "interim restraint," a stopgap that
would give the U.S. a chance to negotiate
new agreements and to head off what mil-
itary planners call "breakout." That is
what happens when one side unilaterally
declares itself no longer bound by arms
control and suddenly fields large numbers
of new, threatening and hitherto prohibit-
ed weapons.
In 1982 Reagan hoped to improve on
SALT in what he called the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks. But after 18 months of
mutual stonewalling in Geneva, those net
gotiations collapsed a year ago when the
Soviets went home and refused to set a
date for resumption. With START stalled,
the interim restraint has turned out to be
open-ended, and it may have to last for a
long time to come-well beyond the expi-
ration of SALT 11-if arms control is to sur-
vive. Some hard-liners seem to be hoping
that a tough compliance report this week
will set the scene for an Administration
recommendation in February not to abide
by SALT.
There is good'reason to worry about
what will happen to the military balance
if that view prevails. The Soviets have
shown a menacing eagerness to accelerate
the buildup of their own arsenal when the
arms-control process breaks down. Since
leaving START, they have deployed new
long-range and intermediate-range weap-
ons against the US. and its allies. Wheth-
er those deployments prove irreversible or
whether they turn out to be bargaining
chips that might be traded away in future
negotiations, they have complicated the
prospects for arms control. .
A Iso, the Soviet Union, like the U.S.,
is bumping its head against an im-
pprtant SALT II ceiling. Each side is
allowed under the treaty 820 launchers
for ICBMs with MIRVS. The Soviets have
818. Their new ten-warhead SS-24 may
be ready for deployment next year. There
is concern among American planners
over whether the Soviets will put the SS-
24 in existing underground silos, replac-
ing the older ones already there, as SALT 11
requires, or whether they will keep all
their old rockets and build new launchers.
for the new missiles. They could also de-
ploy their other new missile, the smaller
SS-25, by building new launchers for it
rather than retiring older missiles. They
would be doing so in defiance of SALT but
gaining a major military advantage in the
process. These would be classic cases of
breakout. The Congressional Research
Service, which supplies members of Con-
gress with background reports and analy-
sis on policy, has estimated that with SALT
still in force. formally or otherwise, the
Soviets would have increased their strate-
gic weapons from about 10,000 today to
about 14,000 by 1994 while without SALT
they could have about 30,000. The Feder-
ation of American Scientists estimates
that the breakout figure would be closer
to 40.000.
Soviet decisions could depend
in part on American ones. The U.S.
is continuing with a number of mil-
itary programs that the Soviets re-
is the Trident submarine program,
of which the Alaska is the seventh
boat in an open-ended series. An-
other is the President's Star Wars
plan for a space-based system to
defend the U.S. against a Soviet nu-
clear attack. The Administration
has said that it will accelerate its
research on Star Wars in a way that
does not contravene the 1972 ABM
treaty, which is the only strategic
arms-control agreement still for-
mally in force. But that treaty pro-
hibits the development as well as
the testing and deployment of
space-based defenses. The chief So-
viet negotiator in START, Viktor
Karpov, complained to his Ameri-
can counterpart, Edward Rowny,
last year that the very announce-
ment of the Star Wars program was
a violation of the spirit of the ABM
treaty.
The Soviets have a vigorous
ABM research program of their own,
including work on technologies like laser
beams. Their radar at Krasnoyarsk could
very well turn out to be part of an ABM
network. They are poised on the starting
line-and perhaps ready to jump the
gun-if the U.S. seems committed to a
space race.
That is just what worries many critics
of Star Wars: the quest for an impenetra-
ble defense will provoke the Soviets into
adding offensive weapons while at the
same time trying to develop extensive de-
fenses of their own.
Thus the arms race and the attempt to
regulate it are at a turning point. in 1985
either the superpowers will continue to
observe SALT as they negotiate toward
something better, or the combination of
military pressures and political ill feeling
will bring the already shaky arms-control
edifice crashing down. The choice could
be between a continuation of interim re-
straints and a massive case of breakout on
both sides. -8y Sbrabe Ta1otf
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.S, Delays .kelease or ne
On Soviet Arms Compliance
WASHINGTON, Nov. 37 - White .the report was made by the specialists. -
c, House officials said today that they had I oz !the National Security Council staff, .
aeciaea to put on tne reiease w a new
report until next February on overworked in having to prepare for i
ported Soviet arms-control violations the Shultz-Gromyko meeting
that was scheduled to be made public The report that was due on Dec.1 bad
on Saturday. been called for In a conference report
This means that the report, said to of the House and Senate Armed Serv-
detail some 19 possible Soviet viola- ices Committees on the fiscal year 198 5
tions, will not be released before Secre- military authorization bill. It was sup-
tary of State George P. Shultz meets posed to detail Soviet violations as they
with Foreign Minister Andrel A. might affect the deployment of a new
Gromyko of the Soviet Union in Geneva American MX missile that is due to be
t March
'
b
C
.
ongress nea
y
on Jan: 7-8: voted on
But the White House officials, aware f Because the request is only in the
conference report and not 1n the lellis-
that they would be accused of trying to
the Soviet violations to im- lation itself, there was no legal req
cover u
p
prove the atmospheip for the Shultz- meat for the Administration to comply,
Giomyko meeting, denied strongly Administration , and 'Congressional delaying the repot for SOUrCes said. rk.Lv.
requested by the Senate and House
send to Congress additional studies on
Soviet compliance with previous arms
control accords on Feb. I and Feb. l5.; =..
'he Most Logical 'lbing to Do', Because of the multiple requests, a
noon, "it would appear that the most
t.( logical thing to do and the most doable
L
th
~r
bi
'~
g
e
to n
ne
with the other mandated Congressional
requests and to report in one rather
"
comprehensive report in February.
Earlier, a Senate aide said the White
House was under pressure from the
i
te House
Grvmyko meeting. But a Wh
official said that "lest anyone think it is
State Department pressuring the White
House, we would have more concern
about the atmosphere being poisoned
once the. ating process starts."
He insis~that the decistpn to put off
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Reagan Said to See SEar Miii's
Ctwbii.ig Nuclear Offensive
President Reagan hopes to per-
suade the Soviet Union in renewed
arms-control talks that his Star
Wars defense initiative is a feasible
way to sharply reduce or eliminate
nuclear offensive arms by making
them obsolete, his chief spokesman
said yesterday.
Presidential spokesman Larry
~Speakes .also said that the United
States and the Soviet Union now
o
e
s.
Critics of the Star Wars initiative
future arms talks should cover "the
argue that it is technologically im-
entire complex of interconnected'
possible and would violate the 1972
questions of nonmilitarization of
anti-ballistic missile treaty.
Y.
outer space" and reductions in both
At the Pentagon, spokesman Mi-
strategic and medium-range nucle
c i Burch said the initiative "is a
Iael g
ar missiles "appears to be consist
concept that we are looking at."
tent" with the U.S. approach. "We don't think it interferes with
The Soviets have expressed in-arnis control," lie said.
appear to be on the time general
arms-control track.
Speakes told reporters that a
statement Monday by Soviet Pres-
tense interest in stopping the
spread of nuclear weapons into
space while the Reagan administra-
tion has pressed forward with re-
search aimed at demonstrating
whether a space defense system
could protect against a nuclear at-
tack.
Speaker was asked whether the
United States intends to try to per-
suade the Soviets that an effective
space-based defensive system holds
out the prospect of greater nuclear
stability.
"That is certainly our position,"
he replied. "And we will make those
views known to the S
vi
t
"
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 640 TUESDAY. NoApproved For Release 2009/10/20: CIA-RDP86B0042OR0004008900033 mNGTON POST
chernenko
Dellneat(S.
Arms Talks
Soviet Includes
Medium-Range,
Strategic Weapons
By Celestine Bohlen
W ~on Pat Foreign Service
MOSCOW, Nov. 26-Soviet Pres-
ident Konstantin Chernenko today
said future arms control talks be-
tween the United States and the So-
viet Union should cover both stra-
tegic and medium-range nuclear
weapons, the two areas in which the
Soviet Union broke off talks with the
United States almost a year ago.
Chernenko's statement, made
during a meeting today with British
Labor Party leader Neil Kinnock
and published by the Soviet news
agency Tass, was his first since the
announcement last week that So-
viet Foreign Minister Andrei Gro-
myko and Secretary of State
George P. Shultz will meet in Ge-
neva in January.
Chernenko said the Soviet Union
wants "to start negotiations on the
entire complex of interconnected
questions of nonmilitarization of
outer space, reduction of strategic
nuclear arms and medium-range
nuclear weapons."
He noted that the Soviet Union
'is prepared to search for the most
radical solutions" in order to
achieve "the complete prohibition
and ultimately ... the liquidation of
nuclear arms.*
. This, be said, was ilia thrust of a
Soviet proposal recently sent to
president Resasn.
By explicitly citing strategic and
medium-range weapons, Chernenko
supanded on a Foreign Ministry
statement four days ago . that WO
lily that the Soviets were wilting to
discuss "the entire complex of qua-
pons Concerning nuclear and space
weapons." And by specifically wen-
Unning Soviet willingness to bate on medium-range audesr VOW
ons now, Chernenko's statement
broke with previous Soviet declara-
tions that demanded that American
cruise and Pershing II missiles be
withdrawn from Western Europe as
a condition for new talks.
The Soviets broke off negotia-
tions on medium-range weapons in
Geneva last December after the
deployment in Western Europe by
the North, Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation of Pershing D and cruise
missiles. Strategic arms reduction
talks were suspended by the Sovi-
ets the same month.
In his comments today, Cher-
nenko made no mention of with-
drawal of the missiles or other con-
ditions. However, he noted that the
question of Soviet missiles deployed
in Eastern' `Europe as a counter-
measure "can be decided only with
taking into consideration the fur-
ther actions of the U.S. side."
A ban on nuclear weapons in out-
er space has long been a top Soviet
priority. But a proposal this sum-
mer for negotiations on space weap-
ons collapsed after the Soviets
balked at U.S. efforts to broaden
the scope of the talks, and after the
United States objected to Soviet
demands for a moratorium on test-
ing.
Chernenko's call for talks on "the
entire complex" of arms control is-
sues closely parallels Reagan's sug-
gestion at the United Nations last
September for "umbrella talks" on
wide-ranging arms issues.
Kinnock and other opposition La-
bor Party figures, who met with
Chernenko for 1 / hours and more
briefly with Gromyko, said later
that the Soviet leaders seemed to
emphasize a new approach to U.S.-
Soviet relations.
'The new thinking seemed to be
an effort to make very broad initi-
atives in order to try to restore re-
lations to where they were in the
late 1970s," Kinnock told a group of
British journalists.
"What is new is their readiness to
talk without conditions," he said.
Denis Haley, a foreign secretary
under:* Labor government, said
the Soviets are looking for a "fresh
start," according to reporters
present.
Chernenko also told the Labor Par-
ty leaders that. the Soviet Union
would g crap its missiles aimed at
Britain V a future Labor government
cacried put the party's pledge to dis-
mantle puclear weapons there.
A similar offer was extended to
Labor,Party leaders by the late So-
viet president Yuri Andropov in
1983. Pie Labor Party adopted its
policy bf unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment last September.
Staff ' writer Ion OhrRlorfer re-
ported from Waskington:
Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Burt, discussing the'Shuhz-
Gromyko talks, said on the NBC
program "Today" that "we'd like to
get the negotiations actually started
in Geneva in January" and "we will
be working to that end."
His statement suggested a more
ambitious aim for the talks than the
search for "a common understand-
ing as to the subjects and objec-
tives" of arms control negotiations.
as set forth in Thursday's joint
U.S.-Soviet announcement.
2
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TUESDAY, NOVEWER 2t $084
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Arms control
last Novethber's walkout
to this month's `let's talk'
Nov. 23, 1983: Soviet negotiators walk out of intemmediate-
range nuclear force (INF) talks in Geneva.
iDsc. 8, 1983: US and Soviet negotiators hold last session of
strategic arms )eduction talks (START). Soviets set no date for
resumption.
Dec. 15,1963: NATO-Warsaw Pact mutual balanced force re-
duction (MBFR) talks In Vienna' adjourn with no date set for
resumption.
ML 1,1984: British defense ministry announces that the first
NATO cruise missiles deployed in that country are operational-
ML 10, 1984: Soviets call for NATO-Warsaw Pact talks aimed
at banning chemical weapons in Europe.
iaa. 22, 1984: US Secretary of State George P. Shultz an-
nounces that MBFR talks will resume In March.
ML 23, 1984: President Reagan submits to Congress a re-
port ing Soviet violations of past arms control pacts
tan, 29 1984: Soviets accuse US of arms control violations.
JwL 30, 19". US START negotiator the US is ,prepared 10 consider" merging Edward y ys
INF and START
talks.
Feb. 21,1984: Soviets sa they would allow continuous verifi-
cation of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks if a pact.
is reached to ban chemical weapons.
Apra 2, 1984: President Reagan tells Congress he sees little
use In trying to negotiate a comprehensive ban on antisatellite
n weapons with Soviets.
April 2, 1884: NATO cruise missiles based In Sicily become
operatoinal.
ApiS 18, 1984: US Vice-President George Bush unveils draft
treaty on a comprehensive worldwide ban on chemical weap-
ons
Ilia Danish parliament votes to stop paying for
y 10, I
NATO c rinse and Pershing II missiles, becoming the first ooun-
try to withdraw from NATO deployment plan.
May 20, 1984: Soviets.announce they have Increased the
number of missile-carrying submarines off the US coast and
pledge to increase deployment of SS-20 medium4ange nu-
clear missiles in Europe to counter NATO deployment.
May 21-22, 1184: West German foreign minister visits Mos-
cow and reports that there Is no chance of resuming arms talks
until after VS elections. Soviets cal for remove) of cruise and
Pershing X missiles from Europe and a halt to future deploy-
ment as a priccondition t6resumpton of INF talks.
inre 1, 1984: Dutch cabinet votes to delay a decision on de-
NATO cruise missiles in the Netherlands until
Myme=5
1,Am 27, 1984: US Navy announces deployment of first brmg-
range cruise missiles at sea.
laws 29,1984: Soviets propose formal talks with US on bon-
ning weapons in outer space and says both sides should tn-
poee a moratorium on testing such weapons when4he labs
open. US expresses its interest, but says such talks should be
Inked with a resumption of talks covering nucear arms
reductions. . .
key 1, 1984: Soviets reject linkage, but keep offer open for a
September starting date for talks on space weapons.
lady 14,1984: Reagan administration officials say US accepts
September starting time for space weapons talks, but offers to
ahem until after the elections, If the Soviet desire.
17, 1884: US and Soviets initial anap reement to update
the crisis "hot tine" between the two countries.
lady 21, 1984: USSR submits a draft statement formally com-
mitting both sides to begin space weapons talks.
key 24,1984: The US responds with its own draft statement.
lriy 27, 1984: Soviets reject US -draft statement, saying It
lacks specific on what Is tote discussed.
Sept. 1, 1984: Soviet President Konstantin Chemenko says
agreement on-space weapons "would facilitate.the solution of
questions of limiting and reducing other strategic armaments"
but criticizes the US for not'agreeing. t4 a, mutual moratorium
on testing and deployment of space Vieapon~ including
ASATS.
Sept. 9,1984: Secretary of State Shultz rejects Soviet calls for
moratorium on space-weapons testing In advance of talks.
Sept. 24, 1984: President Reagan addresses UN General
Assembly and says the US and Soviet Union need "to extend
the arms control process to build a bigger umbrella under
which it can operate - a road map, If you will, showing where
in the next 20 years or so these Individual efforts can lead."
Sept 28.29,1984: President Reagan meets with Soviet For-
eign Minister AndreiGromyko. They discuss Reagan's "um-
brella'sconcept for arm* control Wks am agree on a process
for future meetings. Reagan indicates the US would be willing
1D accept restraints on testing if space weap-
ons talks were tneldbut~ the need to focus on
all areas of arms control.
Oct. 16,1984: Chemenko reiterates cuffs fors ban on space
weapons, a mutual freeze on building nuclear weapons, US
ratification of test-ban treaties the two countries signed in 1974
and 1976, and a US pledge not to be the first to launch a nu-
clear attack.
Oct. 10, 1984: The White House issues another report on
Soviet trre~atty or violations, repeating much of the material in the
January Nov. 22, 1984r US and Soviets announce d ~ td, resume
smarts
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S
 Approved For Release 2009/10/20: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000400890003-8
hif11u1t d~cisi~~1W~heatt' 7- 0
t/r
.AM BOSTON GLOBE FRIDAY. NOVEMBER?23. 1984 A-1
vw". w.v? v.. ..... ..v.-
11011100011
reement to en VIEW? m. p epdHAN 0
an
n a
c
g
ca
~.1 Italks on nuclear and space: weap ready UV:'
ors represents, po- it the most difficult presiden-
NRW$ tentlally. a mile- - tial decisions have not been made.
ANALYSIS stone in efforts to and those undoubtedly will be the
curb the arms race. subject of fierce intramural strug-
But Washington and Moscow gle over the next several weeks by
will have to make difficult decd- a number of determined players
slons and compromises if the who have very different Ideas d
! romipe d a resumption of talks Is what will best serve US national
to lead to succmeful negotiations. Interests. Pentagon would prefer . to stick
gy agreeing to meet in Geneva While most elements of the bu- ' with an offer to cut way back on
to enter r
Wng
wi
ep- systems where the United States
ary px policy discussions resucra cie
eta
s
ntisatel
e
d
U
tns ovr a- to conclude the agendas for tech- arate neg has an advantage - bag range
-oical arms control negotiations. late weapons there is a wide diver- bombers carrying cruise missiles
each side already has compro- of opinion over what might - for a deep reduction in the force
mired. be prudently limited. of larger Soviet SS18 intercontin-
Late last year When the,Soviets But much more difficult is an ental ballistic missiles, which
walked out of separate Geneva internal debate over whether the ? could be armed with two or three
talks on medium range and strate- United States should be willing to times the number of warheads
gic missiles. they vowed not to re- eve. enter negotiations over limits now permitted.
turn to the barppintng table until on new technologies for space de-
the United States pulled out the fecrse that could destroy the other a of limits
Pershing 2 ballistic and' Tema- side's missiles and warheads In The State Department. howev-
er, would prefer to offer a package
hawk cruise missiles being Britain de- .Shia research into high ener- of Mmiis and sublimits on nuclea
ployed in West t Germany, Britain and charged particle launchers and warheads, which
and Italy. nearly 100 such medl- r
um range missiles, out of a pre game Is still in ft ,*pry stages, would be similar to the siproach
jected force of 572. are installed. ;ft WOW Dees tent has been taken in SALT 1 and SALT 2. on
I the premise this would be closer to
ssia= de
In addition the Ru adamantly opposed negotiating
rind last summer to meet the constraints on systems before
United States in Vienna for Sovi- their feasibility has been deter-
ot-proposed space weapon neg-ia- mined. Other officials, both in the
#. when the United States in- ? White H..... and State Dep rt-
*Aeld. The Russians could well
argue that the essence of the
Arerican swition -.to substan-
tially cut down' the number of
warheads and missile payload -
would diminish the additional
warheads that the Russians
might need to penetrate the heavy
American defense.
Similarly. the President has
not made a choice between two
very different approaches to Stra-
tegic Arms Reduction Talks. The
the Russian preference and would
offer a greater chance of being
successfully negotiated..
Fu rtbermore. no decision has
th
h
ng
ere ...??? mment. favor discussing sane per-
riffs on SEM
sume separate negotiations an to-
give as well as defensive weapons hapB negotiating with the Rus-
and offered to discuss. but not ne- sians some modification of the late-range Neckar Forces
gotiate. antisatellite weapons Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of governing the Pershing 2, Toms-
without any reference to space de- 1972 to permit limited defenses of hawk and Soviet SS20 medium
fence weapons. which are a great- missile silos. range missiles. or try to fold those
er Soviet concern. - into START talks.
The Soviets now appear Lobe , President's choice The Russians. who since 1979
their stand. But. the : ; From all the public utterances have pursued a strategy aimed at
softening on "w the Da _4,4_# stn- his star preventing deployment of any US
-
appear to .Instinctively favor the
10%" ' -, -O"--? ---
discuss but also to set up negotia- Pentagon approach. both not
tions on 'outer space arms." Giv- app
en President Ronald Reagan's de- wanting to forgo heavy nation-
sire to pursue so-MW star wars I wide defenses if the technology
defensive weaponry and the Pen- shows they are feasible. affordable
tagon's previous unwillingness and - if deployed mutually - stabs-
even to discuss such weapons at Illut the Soviets an fearful of a
the bargaining table. yesterday's
announcement suggests a per- technological race in space in
bly large step forward. which their offensive missile arse-
nal, built at great expense over the
Robert C. McFarlane, the Presi- last two decades, might be ineffec-
dent's national security adviser teve in free of a suasive, multi-
who announced GIe'~teasrent. ' layered American defensive
told reporters the URA111 iss
Aft
aging anunucuear m ovmnmu. fn
Western Europe. would have to
concede the total failure of that
strategy by coming back to INF.
talks while missiles continued to
be .
Pollitl iccaally. the admission of
such a failure would seem to be a :
faiWM for powerful Politburo fig-
ures. such as Foreign Minister
Gromyko and Defense Minister
Dmitri Ustlnov, who are among
its most prominantauthors- That.
in turn, could have significant tm-
1n The rtru .for badership
00 the Koemba. k.:.' i
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29,1984 / PAGE 3A- -
19 Soviet violations
The White House will inform Con of the 12 additional "issues",.would:be
gress this weekend that there have been included in the letter or even would
a total of 19 Soviet violations of nuclear .,,accompany it. The, analysis has not yet
.arms control agreements -'a dozen,, 'been completed, Mr.* Sims said. He;said
more than were reported in January; ? the additional violations would be'offl-
administration officials said yesterday. cially reported to Congress in February.
The report will reinforce the January . ' Since-the Dec. ?1 deadline was
conclusion that there has been "a dis- included only in a conference report and
turbing pattern" of Soviet arms control not in legislation, it did not have the
violations through the years, said the -force of law, and was more ofa"request"
officials who spoke on condition of ano- by Congress, Mr. Sims said.
nymity. In the authorization bill itself, which
In a letter being prepared for delivery has the force of law, Congress required
by a Saturday deadline requested by the administration to inform it by Feb.
Congress, White House national secu-. 15 of Soviet compliance with the 1972.
rity adviser Robert McFarlane will ABM treaty and. the 1979 Salt II
inform Congress of the violations, the , agreement. (Both nations have said they
officials said. ' would comply with Salt II even though
Congressional sources said the letter it has never been ratified by the. U.S.
will be accompanied by a classified Senate as a formal treaty.) L'! - i
"interim report" of the violations, which .Mr. Sims said the administration felt
will not be made public until February. it was therefore complying with the'law
The conference report on this year's and demonstrating a good faith effort to
defense authorization bill called for a meet the request of Congress:'.'.- - - : '
report to be made public by Dec. 1. .;.Other officials described the 12 addi-
The new administration report is in ". tional violations being analyzed as:'''`:
addition to one done by a White House -? Limited test. ban treaty violations.'
sponsored panel of outside experts ? The ; building,'of:' movable 'anti-
the General Advisory Committee on , "'..ballistic : missile radars; not 'allowed
Disarmament. under the.1972 ABM treaty.'..'
Made public last month, the, GAC..? The testing of surface-to-~ir'missile
committee report found 17 violations radars' and ,interceptors in'an' ABM
over the last 25 years and 10 further'. ' mode' also forbidden' undei,the"1972
"suspicions of material breach." Many treaty..
of the GAC violations overlap those .. ? The prohibited "rapid reload" of
found in the official administration missile interceptors.
reports, officials said. ? Production of Backfire 'manned
bombers at a rate above the'30"per
month called for in the Salt .11
.State.. ... feared the report, agreement..
WOUId lessen support for ? Provision for more than the 10 war-
heads on the giant SS-18 missile agreed
arms control agreements,;; on in the Salt Il accord;' =
? Soviet failure to dismantle the total
number of nuclear delivery' vehicles
Release of the new violations report; . ? `called for in Salt' l][.
the congressional sources said, ' has"t" ? ? The testidg'of a"heaby"subm rine-
been fought by the State Department'-'.launched ballistic missile. -the
which feared the report would lessen ", SSNX-23-inviolationof.Salt
congressional and public support for'';` ?The? statidning'and'-refueling of
new arms control agreements with the:' 'Backfire bombersinthe'rlrcticinvibla-
Soviets. ~ - lion of Salt ?': .... '
Even though the Saturday .deadline.? Plans to station 'ihe Backfire "in
has not been met completely, some con- Cuba in violation 'of, the so-called
gressional conservatives see the letter ' Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement after
and the secret report as a victory. the 1963 Cuban missile crisis.:':
"The White House response repre S Violation of the Salt 11 multiple war-
sents a solid victory for the senators'*. head ceiling by the recent deployment.
who have insistently lobbied for the ' , . of the new SS-25 ICBM, capable of car-
report for several years now," said Sen. ry ing three warheads, and the antics-
Steve Symms, R-Idaho, in a,statement. .,peted .deployipent..soon of, the SS-24,
He said the American people deserve which will be,able to carry 10 nuclear
to know if the Soviets have been meeting .;' warheads.
their obligations to world peace. ? The jamming of'U.S. satellites and
White House spokesman Robert Sims radars monitoring Soviet missile tests,
confirmed that a letter is being pre- monitoring needed to verify the number
pared for Mr.. McFarlane informing of warheads a missile can carry as well
Congress that an analysis of 12 addi- as other characteristics.
tional possible violations is underway. - Walter Andrews
ouse : , report
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/20: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000400890003-8
MEMORANDUM FOR: 't)
Attached are revised pieces of the DCI Briefing
Book for the NSPG meeting on 30 November. Please
remove the older materials and replace them with the
new materials in the appropriate place. Thanks.
STAT
768/84
Date 29 Nov 84
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