A HOT FALL IN CENTRAL AMERICA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200430002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 14, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Nicaraguans, Cubans,
and Soviets may be preparing to undertake various military initiatives in
Nicaragua and El Salvador this fall.
On the basis of the tenuous evidence currently available we cannot say
with confidence what, if anything, the Soviets and their allies now intend to
do in the fall. Instead, this n~e~norandum postulates and examines several
scenarios, considers their congruence with current information, and explores
their advantages and drawbacks fram the Soviet perspective.
This memorandum was prepared in the Third World Activities
Division. SOVA- Ouegi-ions or commeni--- should bin irected to
The memorandum 25X1
has not been coordinated outside SOVA and is intended only to
stimulate discussion.
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The Evidence
The evidence consists of the following:
Nicaragua had negotiated with South Yemen to purchase 10 MIG-117s.
-- A Nicaraguan newspaper editorial on 12 June stated that the National
Directorate of the FSLN "had resolved" to employ high performance
combat aircraft to "repel the aggressors." 25X1
states that Nicaraguan and Bulgarian construction 25X1
officials say that the Caribbean port of El Bluff has to be ready to
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receive Soviet shipping by October. Soviet vessels previously have
delivered military support equipment to Nicaragua's Pacific ports.
Bulgarian ships have unloaded tanks and other heavy arms offshore from
El Bluff for transshipment to Rama, where port facilities have been
improved.
-- Since January, Soviet ships have delivered to Nicaragua about 2000
metric tons of communist military equipment. This represents a two-
thirds increase over deliveries during the same period last year.
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However, there is some ambiguous evidence:
-- The US Interests Section (USINT) in Havana has been told by a third
party that the Cuban leadership recognizes that the insurgents in
El Salvador are not winning. (USINT speculates that this could be a
Cuban ploy to delay military aid to the government of El Salvador
and buy time for Cuban resupply and suppport of the insurgents'
reported fall offensive.)
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-- Open
reporting indicates considerable disarray and
lack of coordination in the Salvadoran rebel ranks, raising doubts
about the feasibility of concerted military action any time soon and
suggesting that a rumored offensive planned for June or July will be
postponed at least until August.
"Window of Opportunity" Scenarios
The feature common to reports suggesting
future actions in Nicaragua or El Salvador appears to be a desire to
exploit the US election campaign in one way or another. The campaign, of
course, could in principle be viewed as either (1) a "window of
opportunity" to do things that might be perceived as more likely to evoke
US counteraction following the election, or (2) a chance to politically
weaken or unseat President Reagan. The two are not mutually exclusive, but
they could have different practical implications. Our first two scenarios
fall into the former category, our second two into the latter.
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Scenario I:_ Consolidation of the Sandinista Regime
Top priority in this scenario would be assigned to defeating the
"contras" and consolidating a pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Nicaragua.
Tactics urged by Moscow would include:
-- Rapid but unprovocative buildup of Sandinista military power.
-- Avoidance of actions toward El Salvador that could weaken US
Congressional pressure on the Executive to terminate support for the
rebels in Nicaragua.
-- Adoption by the Sandinista leadership of a relatively conciliatory
public diplomatic posture combined with a limited display of
moderation internally designed to buy time for dealing with economic
problems and coping with political opposition.
-- Public support for the Contadora process.
From the Soviet perspective, the Scenario I approach would have a
number of advantages. It would:
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-- Help-guarantee an expanded base for exercising Soviet influence in
the Western Hemisphere with minimal risk.
-- hike dealing with either a Republican or Democratic administration
following the election less difficult than under other scenarios.
-- Avoid jeopardizing Soviet standing among moderate elements in Latin
America, and for that matter, in Europe.
But it would also have little potential for inflicting near-teen political
damage on the Reagan administration at home or abroad, although it might
cause certain problems in Western Alliance.
Scenario II: Steady Pursuit of Defeat of the Insurgency in Nicaraguan and
Victory for the Insurgency in El Salvador.
The main Soviet objective in this scenario would be simultaneous
consolidation of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and overthrow of the
US-backed goverrrnent in El Salvador. Here, the "window of opportunity"
would be utilized to promote:
-- Rapid buildup of Sandinista military power.
-- An accelerated but still covert strengthening of guerilla forces in
El Salvador.
In this scenario, the Sandinista leadership would be encouraged to
adopt a flexible public diplomatic posture intended to limit damage from
greater support of the insurgency in El Salvador. The key feature of the
scenario would be that the timing and tactics of the offensive in
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El Salvador would be constrained by prudential calculation of realistic
military possibilities; if the chances for success of an offensive launched
before the US election appeared unpromising, the Soviets would discourage
it.
From Moscow's perspective, Scenario II would:
-- Accelerate the pace of revolutionary change in Central America.
-- Enhance the impact of the Soviet-Cuban presence in the region on
moderate governments, without driving them into the arms of
Washington.
-- Keep the risk of direct confrontation between the United States and
the USSR or Cuba rather low.
-- Not foreclose the possibility of administering a heavy pre-electoral
blow to the Reagan administration.
Moscow might calculate that this strategy could weaken resistance in the
United States to forceful US counteraction, but it would probably also
calculate that the adoption of stronger measures by Washington would be
compensated for by intensified West European alienation over US policy in
Central America.
Political Provocation Scenarios
While our first two scenarios are driven by the primary goal of
victory on the ground in the Central American military-political theater,
our second two are motivated more immediately by reaction to the Reagan
administration. Here, we postulate that Moscow's primary aim is to
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manipulate conflict in Central America in a manner calculated to:
-- Keep the United States tied down and reduce its ability to exploit
current Soviet vulnerabilities, reinvigorate the "peace" movement,
increase strains in the stern Alliance, weaken European commitment
to INF deployment, and strengthen pressures for US concessions to
the USSR on arms control issues.
-- Ebel anti-Americanise throughout the Third World.
-- Revive the "Vietnam syndrome" in the United States.
-- Promote President Reagan's electoral defeat and a weakening of
Republican representation in the Senate.
The strategy in both scenarios is--by possibly exposing allies to higher
risks of near-term military setbacks--to place Washington in a "non-win"
situation in which US failure to respond to provocation would ensure Moscow
of large bonus gains on the ground in Central America.
Scenario III: The MIG-21 Lure
Washington has privately warned Moscow that introduction of MIG-21s
into Nicaragua would have serious consequences. The aim in this scenario
would be to exploit the warning by inducing the White House to engage in-an
"act of war" against Nicaragua or accept the -delivery and risk harsh
domestic political attack for weakness rather than belligerence. The
tactic pursued would be to have Nicaraguan pilots fly the MIG-21s from Cuba
to Punta Huete or another airfield in Nicaragua. If this move elicited a
US strike, the Soviets would reap a major propaganda victory. If it did
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not, the USSR would not only have improved the Sandinista's chances of
success as well as the climate for insurgency elsewhere in the region, but
also demonstrated for US and international audiences the ineffectiveness of
US policies in constraining Soviet intervention in the US sphere of
influence.
The key hoped-for gain from this maneuver--one that would canpensate
for all its risks--would be the defeat of Ronald Reagan by an electorate
fed up with either "trigger happy" use of US military power or the
demonstrated failure of foreign policy. But the risks would be high:
-- To induce Managua to accept the MIGs under conditions of likely US
attack, Moscow might have to give security guarantees that it has
been loathe to offer to clients far more important to the USSR than
Nicaragua, and that it probably could not honor in the event of
imminent armed confrontation with the United States in the latter's
back yard.
-- Destruction of the MIGs, if not followed by electoral defeat of the
pagan administration, could impair Soviet credibility among leftist
elements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and serve as a
tonic to friends of the United States.
-- Predicting that this maneuver would evoke public outrage directed at
the White House, rather than backfire in a patriotic rallying around
the President (who, Moscow would assure, would 1y assert Soviet-
Cuban orchestration of the action), would probably be viewed by
informed Soviet advisers as a big political gamble indeed.
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-- Regardless of how the White House chose to deal with this
provocation, the maneuver could be seen likely to severely undercut
congressional resistance in the future to demands for a more
militant US policy in both Nicaragua and El Salvador.
To complicate the US reaction and opportunity to assure the
availability of MIGs to Managua for actual combat purposes, the MIGs could
be delivered a few at a time in crates to the newly dredged port of
El Bluff or to the west coast. Such crates could be shipped from and
delivered by a Third World Soviet arms recipient (for example, South Yemen)
to further distance Moscow and Havana from the action. once in Nicaragua,
crated aircraft could be stored or dispersed for later assembly.
Such a piecemeal introduction would have several advantages over
flying aircraft in directly from Cuba, which would publicly tie the Cubans
only slightly less than the Soviets to the action and leave open the
question of whether the squadron was really "Nicaraguan." With piecemeal
insertion:
-- It would be easier for Managua to portray the aircraft as arms
purchases no different in principle than the deliveries of land
armaments that have been taking place-recently.
-- Aircraft crates could be initially dispersed and perhaps held in
crowded civilian areas, putting off the possibility of a "surgical
strike." Such a strike would of course still be a threat once all
the aircraft were assembled and deployed at an airfield. But
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delaying their assembly and introducing than into service slowly
would give the Sandinistas time to make their possession of the
fighters a fact of life, and to build up international pressure
against a US military response. The US would be forced to choose
between making repeated strikes as each few aircraft became
operational, or wait out the process until the target reached full
squadron size. Managua would probably believe that time worked in
its favor.
Seaborne deliveries of crates--perhaps on a Bulgarian carrier--would
make it easier for Moscow and Havana to deny "foreign intervention"
charges, and also take than off the hook for some response in the
event the United States did take military action.
Simultaneously, the new port capacity at El Bluff would be used to expedite
deliveries of other arms.
Scenario IV: A "Tet" Offensive in El Salvador
The objective of this final scenario would be to administer a sudden
shock to 4b shington in the runup to the US election that would force the
White House to choose between the large-scale military intervention it had
heretofore disavowed, or acceptance of possible-even likely--collapse of
the Salvadoran goverrment. To minimize the appearance of Soviet-Cuban
involvement, MIGs would not be demonstratively introduced in Nicaragua,
although a high level of Sandinista military activity would be in order and
more risks would have to be run in funneling arms to El Salvador.
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The advantages Moscow might see in such a strategy, compared with
those anticipated in the MIG-21 Lure, would probably include:
-- Less overt Soviet-Cuban exposure, less likelihood of military
confrontation with the United States, and less loss of credibility
in the event of a successful Salvadoran-US response.
-- Greater certainty of polarization of the American body politic.
-- Reduced likelihood that President Reagan could turn the strategy to
his own electoral advantage.
-- Greater likelihood--barring a total collapse of the insurgency in
El Salvador--of deeper embroilment of America in the Central
American struggle, of a polarization and intensification of
political strife in the United States, and of widening cracks in the
Atlantic Alliance regardless of the success of the offensive.
There would, of course, be risks:
-- "Political" determination of the timing of the offensive could lead
to premature action, a major ("Tet") setback for the insurgency, and
recriminations against their comradely advisers by the Salvadoran
guerrillas.
-- Failure of the offensive would inevitably have some effect on
Moscow's credibility in the region. -
-- Whether successful or not, the offensive could only be seen as
certain to impair the prospects for improvement in the bilateral US-
USSR relationship and US flexibility in arms negotiations.
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Further Contingencies
This paper does not attempt to predict what strategy the Soviets will
support over the next six months, nor even whether--in the crunch--they
would back even the lowest-risk "October surprise." Our scenario analysis
ignores the question of the degree to which Moscow can influence the
choices of its allies in the region (or the extent to which the latter
might trigger the scenarios on their own), and it implicitly postulates a
"rational actor" model of Soviet and Cuban decisiormaking that could--for
example--underestimate Castro's desire for revenge for Cuba's humiliation
in Grenada or a Soviet desire to retaliate for difficulties in pacifying
Afghanistan. It could be argued that Soviet support for a bold military
move in Central American would run counter to Moscow's past advice to the
Nicaraguan leadership to avoid antagonizing the United States
unnecessarily, and would be inconsistent with Soviet strategy elsewhere in
the Third World aimed at consolidating leftist regimes without attracting a
Western military response. But it could also be argued that upping the
ante in Central America would nicely complement Moscow's current strategy
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A basic reason why we eschew prediction this far in advance is that
Soviet choices will probably be affected by contingencies that have yet to
occur. These would presumably include at least:
-- What the polls say about the likely outcome of the US Presidential
and Congressional elections.
-- Possible US diplomatic and military initiatives between now and the
fall.
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-- Developments in the Western Alliance.
-- The strength of the insurgencies in both Nicaragua and El Salvador.
-- Other developments in the Central American-Caribbean region.
-- Whether the trend of leadership politics in the Polithoro encouraged
or discouraged risk-taking and escalation of conflict with
Washington.
A Politboro decision to proceed with one of the more provocative strategies
discussed above, in the context of full Soviet awareness of US sensitivity
to the Soviet hand in Central America and the backlash effect of Soviet
expansionism of the 1970s, would probably mean that Moscow had discounted
the likelihood or desireability of any significant improvement in US-USSR
relations for at least some years ahead.
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