TALKING POINTS FOR NSPG MEETING RE NEXT STEPS IN VIENNA 18 SEPTEMBER 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200380001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #05341-84
17 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Update on Reagan-Gromyko Outlook
1. The weekend has produced new developments which stir up the waters
and leave the outlook for Gromyko's visit more uncertain. On balance,
however, the outlook is still pretty negative.
Soviet solicitation of a meeting with Mondale is an effort to mute
the political benefit to the President of his meeting with
Gromyko. It would not seem realistic to an American observer, but
the Soviets may harbor some illusion, or at least, hope that they
can help the challenger in some way. Over the past year they have
repeatedly underestimated the backfire potential of their own
tactics.
The very unusual TASS story about the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939
has been incompletely, and probably mistakenly read in our media as
heralding a "deal with the devil." The parallels between the
language used in the article to describe Nazi Germany and Soviet
rhetoric on the Reagan administration invites this reading. Yet
the opening message is different: "Exactly 45 years ago, on
September 15, 1939, the newspaper Pravda wrote in its leading
article devoted to a call up of Soviet citizens to the Red Army:
'The Soviet Union, its armed forces should be in full combat
readiness so that rapidly developing events should not take us
unawares.' A fortnight later...the German-Soviet treat[ies were]
signed... Many international observers at that time overlooked
Pravda's warning and concentrated the attention exclusively on the
two treaties..." The allegorical implication would seem to be that
a softening of Soviet policy is not to be expected.
Meanwhile, an extremely nasty piece in Sovetskaya Rossiya appeared
on 16 September linking Washington and German "revanchism" and
claiming "a third world war is coming to a head."
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The Soviet public has still not been informed about the
Reagan-Gromyko meeting.
-The Ogarkov story has gotten more complicated.
that he's been assigned to head the Voroshilov General Staff Academy
It's a demotion for sure, but still a prestigious post that keeps gar ov in
Moscow able to pronounce on doctrinal matters, and possibly on hold for a
resumption of his career. Victor Louis now adds his voice to those claiming
Ogarkov will head a new Western Military Theater command. Whatever the
future fate of Ogarkov, some powerful people in both the military and the
KGB want us to believe that Ogarkov is down, but not out. Somebody may be
protecting him for a future turn of political fortunes.
3. The only indication about new things Gromyko
might raise at the UNGA is a Lomeiko press conference statement giving
somewhat unusual attention to the nuclear non-proliferation theme. He
mentions Israel as a proliferation threat. But this coincides with a new
and especially heavy air attack on Pakistan at a time when the Paks are
clearly worried about an Indian attack on their facilities, and the Soviets
have knowledge that the US has been concerned. This suggests to me that
Gromyko may unveil some new "plan" to address Indo-Pak tensions on the
nuclear front, to seize a diplomatic initiative before the US does, and to
put pressure on Pakistan's Afghan policy. The Soviets might go this route
if they had reason to believe the Indians would not attack Pakistan but know
everyone is worried that they might.
4. Finally, Soviet custody of the American ship Frieda-K and its crew
on Chukotsk gives some elements in the Soviet leadership, including the KGB
which apprehended them, leverage over the course of US-Soviet relations in
the next several weeks.
5. Any comprehensive interpretation of all this is bound to be mostly
guesswork. But my hunch is that Soviet foreign policy and control over it
are falling victim to the top-priority concern of all Soviet leaders: the
succession struggle.
~ ~01
F z W. Ermarth
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SOVIET STRATEGIES IN THE "SOUTHERN THEATER"
The future of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the East-West power
balance, and the chance of a major US-Soviet conflict in the next two
decades are likely to be determined, more than anywhere else, in the region
south of Soviet borders stretching from India to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Does the USSR have a coherent strategy in this theater? There is no
question that the men in the Kremlin today, as did their predecessors, have
keen ambitions to dominate this region. It presents them with compelling
vulnerabilities as well as obstacles; they are clearly active or trying to
be active throughout it. Their strategy in the region is in some ways
analogous to their military doctrine. Pressing on a broad front, they seek
to "break through" on key "axes of advance" which can be turned to decisive
advantage throughout the theater. Simultaneously applying several
operational tools, they are tactically oportunistic and will try to
reinforce success as it comes.
The Strategic Importance of the Southern Theater.
This region is potentially the key to overturning the East-West
geopolitical balance that has emerged since 1945. Its strategic importance
to the USSR is vastly understated by defining it as access to warm water
ports. The single most important element in the region is its oil, which
promises to be vital to the health of West European and Japanese societies,
as well as to many LDCs, for the rest of this century and beyond. The
region is also the heart of the Islamic world, potentially able to exert a
cultural and spiritual influence which, like European civilization, may come
to undermine essential parts of the Soviet system at home if the Soviets do
not eventually control it.
The geography of the region is itself of strategic importance. Soviet
dominance of all or additional parts of it would greatly ease the ability of
the USSR to project power in Africa and Southeast Asia. No doubt Soviet
controlled port facilities on the Arabian Sea, especially if linked by
secure land routes to Soviet territory would be of great military value. By
the time the Soviets were able to create such facilities, however, the
political effects of the process would have long since revolutionized the
whole environment.
The Southern Theater is by far the most important major region of the
Third World to the Soviets, rivaling the strategic status of East Asia and
even Europe in some ways. This is because its dominance, or the high
likelihood of its dominance, by the USSR would help extend Soviet influence
in the other Eurasian regions.
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Despite several decades of persistent effort, the Soviets have not
expanded their influence in the Southern Theater steadily or with ease.
Barriers of culture, countervailing Western and local power, tactical
clumsiness on the Soviet part, and the shere unpredictability of the region
have all posed obstacles.
Nevertheless, several "megatrends"-in the region on balance favor the
long-term expansion of Soviet influence. Political volatility within and
among the region's states continues to afford penetration opportunities.
The political and economic development of the Islamic countries of the
region could strengthen over time the obstacles to lasting Soviet
penetration. But development is equally likely to produce social turmoil
that encourages it.
The Soviet military buildup has made the USSR the strongest military
actor in the region, greatly outweighing with its regional forces on Soviet
territory any combination of quickly available local and Western forces and
also undermining the ability of the US to offer credible strategic
guarantees. Soviet military forces are not capable of simply walking over
the regions to the south; its distances and terrain are more difficult than
Europe. The US may try to put in place forward military capability to deter
Soviet power projection, such as bases and small deployments. Yet theater
equivalence between Soviet military power and that of the West and its
partners is even less likely in Southwest Asia than in Europe. A key task
for Soviet regional strategy is to turn their military preponderance "in
being" into an effective geopolitical lever at acceptable risk. As
elsewhere, the USSR has lacked the political, economic, and cultural appeal
that could ease this task.
Among the "megatrends" which could eventually attenuate the pressure of
Soviet power on the Southern Theater, perhaps the most important in the long
run is the development of the Soviet system itself. Before the region
witnesses a decisive expansion of Soviet power, it is possible that stresses
within Soviet society combined with Soviet failures in international affairs
could lead to a turning inward of Soviet policy which reduces the
challenge. This is an exceedingly long shot prospect. It cannot be taken
for granted. It depends on sustained and coherent resistance to Soviet
power by the US, by its allies, and by local states.
Soviet strategy in the Southern Theater can best be addressed in terms
of Soviet policy toward several sub-regional problems or relationships, each
of which links to others, often in contradictory ways. The one which weighs
most heavily on the Soviet leadership today is the war in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan
As of now, the USSR aims to win the war. Its strategy is to keep at bay
and grind down the resistance, to isolate it from the mass of the population
or drive larger numbers out of the country, and to slowly build up a
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civil-military infrastructure through training, indoctrination, and
cooption. We do not know how long the Soviets believe this strategy will
take. Its composition suggests a 5-10 year time horizon.
In the meantime, although the Soviets may believe that vast national
power and proximity guarantee their ultimate success, they cannot point to
impressive progress on the ground. On.the contrary, numerous reports.
suggest a mood of mounting anxiety and frustration about the war in the
Soviet leadership, especially within the Soviet military leadership. They
have the physical strength, but they may doubt that they have the time and
political staying power to make their protracted strategy victorious. The
low morale of Soviet troops clearly has adverse operational consequences;
and we see more evidence of Soviet popular and elite discontent about the
war than in past years.
If the Soviets do win in Afghanistan, or are seen to be on the road to
ultimate victory at costs they can easily bear, the political and strategic
impact on the region will be considerable. The countries of the region will
increasingly be persuaded that Soviet power must be accommodated; and the
Soviets will gradually assemble new assets for intruding upon the region,
such as military bases and points of local political-economic contact. It
is unlikely that a gradual Soviet victory will itself galvanize regional
resistance since the drama of the original invasion did not do so.
To the extent the Soviets face a "no-win" situation, however, there are
two possibilities. They may be persuaded to escalate their military
campaign and forces inside Afghanistan and also to increase significantly
their pressure on Pakistan. Evidence of Soviet frustration in Afghanistan,
reporting of Soviet pressures on Pakistan, and evidence of Soviet efforts to
stimulate Indian initiatives against Pakistan all raise the near-term
probability of this development to a very dangerous level.
If neither patience nor escalation get the Soviets out of a "no-win"
predicament in Afghanistan, the longer term implications could be in the
opposite direction. Prosecution of the war could increasingly distract the
Soviet leadership from other initiatives in the region, as it seems to have
in recent years. And, most important, popular -- and especially
professional military -- displeasure with the war could join other internal
problems to pose more serious challenges to the regime's policy priorities
and, ultimately, to its stability.
Because Soviet power is so heavily engaged, the war in Afghanistan is
today the keystone of future Soviet power in the region. Failing some
dramatic and easily exploited new opportunity elsewhere, such as a
pro-Soviet regime emerging "naturally" in Iran following Khomeini, the
Soviets must win, rapidly or slowly, but steadily, in Afghanistan to
progress elsewhere. Alternatively, unless a phalanx of strong US-supported
states, including Iran, arises to oppose them, the Soviets must lose in
Afghanistan if the long-term expansion of their power in the region is to be
prevented. The outcome is still in question.
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India and Pakistan
Size and prominence in the Third World give India an importance to
Soviet foreign policy quite apart from regional considerations. Although to
a much lesser extent, Pakistan is also important in its own right to
Moscow. India is the model of a real alliance relationship between the USSR
and a major noncommunist (some Soviet documents say capitalist) Third World
country.
India has long been a part of Soviet strategy for the containment of
China. Now India is increasingly a part of Soviet strategy toward Southwest
Asia because of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war.
The Soviets can never be completely at ease about their relationship
with India, Afghanistan implications aside. Indian domestic politics are
not controllable or easily influenced by the Soviets. India could well
intensify its efforts to improve relations with China. It can always turn
more to Western sources for high quality military systems. India's
tolerance toward the Soviet position in Afghanistan is grounded primarily in
its aims to dominate Pakistan, its anti-US attitudes, and its need for the
Soviet alliance. But India does not give unequivocal applause to Soviet
expansionism in South Asia.
The critical question here is whether the Soviets can make India party
to a decisive squeeze play against Pakistan which substantially alters the
geopolitics of the region and gives the Soviets the possibility of winning
the Afghan war quickly by cutting off the resistance and thoroughly
discrediting the US as a regional ally. The Soviets very much want
Pakistan's support of the Mujahedin to be stopped. They appreciate that
saber rattling and an occasional bombing of a border village will not change
Zia's policy. Direct Soviet military threats on the border are most likely
to bring in additional US support and conceivably US military presence.
Getting Pakistan out of the Afghan war equation requires internal
destabilization or an Indo-Pakistan war or both to bring down Zia, change
his policies, or, in the extreme, dismember Pakistan.
India would rather dominate than dismember Pakistan. It is not so clear
that India would rather tolerate an independent Pakistan than see it
dismembered. The Soviets would prefer a unified but friendly Pakistan, and
would tolerate Indian domination if that is required to achieve the desired
result. There is limited but convincing evidence that the Soviets would
prefer Pakistan's dismemberment to a hostile, unified Pakistan allied with
the US, even though the latter serves Soviet-Indian ties.
Could Soviet need to win the Afghan war quickly and Indian desires to
dominate Pakistan, and specifically to terminate the Pak nuclear program,
lead to concerted Indo-Soviet action? The current trend of events raises
this probability. In any event, the Soviets would surely prefer to persuade
India to attack Pakistan in some way than to do so themselves because of the
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political difficulties posed for Washington by Indian initiative. At this
moment, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets will
take action against Pakistan entirely on their own, even though this would
be easier for Washington to react to.
The Baluchistan Option
Baluchistan is frequently cited as some kind of key to Soviet strategy
in the region -- which it probably is not. It is, however, an example of
one facet of Soviet strategy in the "great game" of playing on tribal
rivalries within primative states of the area, a subject which deserves a
lot more attention than it normally gets. The Soviets have long cultivated
ties to political and regional groups in Pakistan that might be mobilized to
overthrow the regime or dismember the state. Afghanistan gives them both a
motive and a place from which to operate. Baluchistan is one target of
Soviet attention.
Amidst much uncertainty as to what the facts are, there is controversy
about the significance of Soviet interest in Baluchistan. The inflated
claims of some that it is the USSR's final stepping stone to the Indian
Ocean are often countered by an less founded insistence that "there is no
evidence" of a Soviet penetration effort. A clearly incomplete body of
evidence supports the following:
-- Since well before the Afghan war the Soviets have sought influence
with all manner of Baluch, from traditional tribal leaders at home
and in exile to radical urbanized students. These efforts have
included supplying arms and military training for separatist
elements.
Some Baluch elements have reportedly been useful in interfering
with Afghan Mujahedin operations and supplies. The extent of this
help to the Soviets is probably very limited, however. Most Baluch
elements appear to have a very healthy suspicion of Soviet
activities, and they tend to be regarded by Afghan resistance as
allies.
-- Soviet ability to exploit Baluch separatism has probably been
reduced by Zia's more tolerant policies since 1977. But the Baluch
factor could become significant again if Pakistan goes unstable for
other reasons.
-- The slow outmigration, urbanization, and economic development of
Baluchistan's people probably increases, rather than decreases,
Soviet potential for troublemaking at Pakistan's expense.
More generally, Soviet interest in Baluch separatism should not be
viewed as a fifth column ready at some point swiftly to open the road to the
Indian Ocean coast. It reflects rather, and in a particularly strategic
place, a Soviet tactic of buying into the separatist forces which could abet
the destabilization of two vital barrier states of the region, Pakistan and
Iran. Other cases of comparable interest are the Azeris and the Kurds.
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Against both Pakistan and Iran the Soviets simultaneously seek a) to
exert influence on the central government; b) to cultivate potential
alternatives to the central government, e.g., oppositions; and c) to
penetrate and stimulate separatist movements.
Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf
Iran and the Gulf are the prizes of the region. The Soviets have long
believed that they should, by right of proximity and historically "objective
trends", exert a dominant influence over the area's security affairs and its
resources. The withdrawal of British influence, the fall of the Shah, and
the difficulties the US faces in positioning countervailing power should,
the Soviets believe, give them opportunities to advance their long-standing
interest. But their advances have not been commensurate with the apparent
opportunities. They are wrestling with how to shape a more effective
strategy for this critical part of the theater.
Khomeini's Iran has not afforded the Soviets great opportunities to
advance at the government level. Yet the Soviets do maintain diplomatic and
varied economic ties to Iran. Twenty percent of Iranian imports come via
Soviet territory and Soviet allies/clients are an important source of Iran's
arms. Tehran does not treat the "second (Soviet) devil" with quite the
disdain and hostility reserved for the "first (US) devil." Moreover, in
recent weeks Tehran, after some internal dispute, actively sought to plead
its case on the Gulf war with the Soviets at a high level; hence the
Gromyko-Sadr talks. We don't believe either side achieved much, but we can
conclude a) the diplomatic relationship is not without some promise, b)
there are elements in Khomeini's regime likely to survive him who are ready
to treat with the Soviets, and, therefore, c) the Soviets tactic of playing
both sides still works to some extent, despite the pronounced tilt to Iraq.
We have recent reporting to the effect that the Soviets now regard the
Iran-Iraq war as tending to play into their hands because the security
problems it has engendered encourage Iran and other Gulf states to seek
Soviet favor, including Soviet arms, permitting the Soviets to penetrate
politically without jettisoning their tie to Iraq.
The decimation of the Tudeh and the leftist Mujahedin in Iran have
sharply reduced Soviet prospects for developing a congenial alternative to
the Khomeini regime at the center. But it's very hard to tell what Soviet
influence assets are still available. they
never were very abundant, but his knowledge may be incomplete. a is
demonstrably ill-informed on Soviet efforts to penetrate non-Persian
nationalities. Moreover, as indicated above, some Iranian leaders today are
more willing to entertain ties to Moscow than is Khomeini.
There is ample evidence that, over the years, the Soviets have sought to
penetrate and, occcasionally, support potential separatist groups in Iran,
notably the Azeris of "southern Azerbaidzhan", probably the Khuzistan Arabs,
the Kurds, and the Baluch. We have enough evidence to detect activity, not
enough to establish the magnitude or strategic direction of Soviet
involvement. Up to now, it is probable that Soviet investments have
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represented a fairly routine hedge for the future. Soviet priorities have
been on those ruling at the center and on the central opposition in Iran.
There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviets may increase their
attention to the minorities, especially in Azerbaidzhan. We don't yet see a
shift of Soviet strategy toward exploiting the minorities to destabilize the
country. But this is a possibility. Present and expected gaps in our
intelligence make it likely our detection of such a shift will be tardy and
uncertain. And their is strong resistance on the part of many analysts to
the idea that the Soviets would follow a destabilization strategy toward
Iran or any other major state of the region.
Although it still offers them strategic opportunities, the Iran-Iraq war
has been a net negative for the Soviets so far. They have tried, but not
yet succeeded in parlaying their relations with both sides into a major
advance in Iran or the region as a whole, and they still fear that the US
will exploit the war to establish a permanent military presence in the Gulf
area. As suggested above, however, the Soviets may be getting more
optimistic about their prospects.
The Soviets would surely like to preside over a settlement of the
conflict along the lines of their mediating role between India and Pakistan
at Tashkent in 1965. The basic political requirement for such a role has
been absent, namely, a shared interest between the belligerents in
compromise. That interest could possibly arise fairly suddenly, however.
Khomeini's death could lead to a reduction of Tehran's demands. The Soviets
might be willing to promote the removal of Sadam Huseyn if they can identify
a successor regime in which they have confidence.
While probably not committed for all time to Sadam Huseyn, the Soviets
do not want to jeopardize their Iraqi connection seriously for uncertain
gains with Iran. Iraq is their one substantial entree into the affairs of
the Gulf now, and it usefully diversifies their engagement on the Arab side
of the conflict with Israel, notwithstanding Iraqi-Syrian tensions.
In the rest of the Gulf and with the Saudis, the current Soviet formula
is very quiet diplomacy -- which is all they can get away with. Basically,
they are trading on Gulf awareness that, sooner or later, the Soviet Union
is going to be a bigger factor in the area which must be taken into
account. Meanwhile, the most discreet reception to Soviet approaches gives
the Gulf states some leverage with Washington. This formula is unlikely to
carry the Soviets very far beyond their current relations with Kuwait,
however, barring some other change in the politics of the area, e.g., some
development which dramatically discredits the protective role of the US
(e.g., our leaving Pakistan in the lurch), and builds the image of the USSR
as very powerful but sufficiently benign to work with.
What, then, will be Soviet strategy toward this sub-region? The odds
seem to favor continuation of present policies because they are not without
promise and the present Soviet leadership appears disinclined to try major
policy departures in the face of risk and uncertainty. At the same time, we
see a significant increase in Soviet political activity recently. They are
clearly working harder on the opportunities they think they have.
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A significant shift of Soviet strategy cannot be ruled out. One
possibility would be substantially increased aid to Iraq coupled with severe
pressure on Iran, including military pressure in the north, to force a new
consensus in Tehran for ending the war under Soviet sponsorship. Success at
this surely risky venture could leave the USSR the dominant superpower
protector of the Gulf. Failure could bring in the US and lead to much
deeper Soviet-Iranian hostility. On balance, it seems unlikely that the
Soviets would use this approach unless the Iranians look like they are
enjoying dramatic military successes against Iraq -- an unlikely prospect
according to most analysis.
Another option would be a longer-term Soviet shift toward reliance on
minorities to promote destabilization and fragmentation of a post-Khomeini
Iran. This course might seem less risky in the short term because it could
be explored gradually. But if it begins to prove successful, the risks
start rising sharply. Iran might at some point begin to fall apart; but it
won't happen quickly and cleanly. The Soviets would have to threaten
intervention on behalf of their favored minority, the Azeris probably. The
worst outcome would be a still unified Iran, nudged closer to the US by
Soviet actions.
Recitation of these uncertainties and risks should not be taken to mean
that, after all, the Soviets have no prospects around the Gulf. The
"megatrends" of superior military power, deep strategic interest, and local
instability continue to favor them. And the outcome in Afghanistan (and
closely related Pakistan), so critical to everything else, is still up for
grabs.
Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
Israel's attack on Lebanon and defeat of Syria's forces inflicted a
major setback to the Soviets. But they have recovered through persistence
in rearming the Syrians and US inability to sponsor a settlement in Lebanon.
The visits of Politburo member Gaydar Aliyev to Syria and Central
Committee expert Karen Brutents to Lebanon and Syria earlier this year
suggested that the Soviets might be reconnoitering for new diplomatic
initiatives in the area. After the US pullout from Beirut, the opportunity
seemed inviting. Until very recently the Soviets have been in somewhat of a
waiting posure, rather like the US at present. They have acted to protect
their position in Syria against the vagaries of political intrigue in
Damascus, particularly Rifat Asad's unreliability. They appear to be
leaving Lebanon largely to the Syrians, but the impending Polyakov visit and
other signs indicated that they want to play a hand of their own there as
well. They are making sustained, but low key, efforts to restore some
degree of cohesion to the PLO; here too they have left the initiative to the
Syrians and noticeably distanced themselves from Yasir Arafat.
Moscow is clearly pressing for movement in relations with Jordan,
exploiting King Husseyn's need for arms and his desire to pressure
Washington with a live Soviet option. A tie to Jordan is always of value to
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the Soviets because it diversifies the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli
confrontation and could open doors to the conservative states of the
Peninsula..
It is not apparent at present that the Soviets have a longer-term
political strategy for this portion of the region other than sticking with
clients they have, cultivating new relationships where possible, and waiting
to see what happens. Something new is bound to happen before long, however,
and the Soviets are positioning themselves to act on new opportunities.
The formation of a new government in Israel may be the next break point
for Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli nexus. Should a coalition government
in Israel start casting about for new paths of compromise, the resulting
fluidity may give the Soviets new diplomatic opportunities, even the
prospect of relations with Israel. Although there is not much novelty in
it, the lastest Soviet proposal for "comprehensive peace" in the region
represents, at a minimum, a marker for a Soviet role in the near future, and
an effort to appeal to Arab moderates frustrated by the inability of the US
to get any movement. If prospects for movement on Arab-Israeli issues do
reappear, however, the main Soviet problem will stem from the US resuming a
much more active role on the basis of its superior political position as
Israel's guarantor and the security partner of many Arab states. The Soviet
Union can only deliver arms; the US just might be able to deliver Israeli
concessions. Should a revival of the peace process take place, the Soviets
may concentrate, as in the past, on backing the most radical Arab demands
and even pushing events toward another confrontaton.
The problem for Soviet diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli context, as
elsewhere in the region, is that the USSR's great military muscle "over the
horizon" to the north and its local instruments of subversion and intrigue
are not easy to use constructively, to build political order among and
within nations who have autonomous political vitality. To exploit its
military power effectively for political ends in a region constantly beset
by war, the Soviets must credibly threaten to use direct force. This is
risky. In countries with a very unformed internal environment, the Soviets
try to build a disciplined Marxist-Leninist core on which to rely. But most
nations of Islam resist this. Short of direct military intervention, the
Soviets must exploit arms supply and the myopic tenacity of local conflict
to insinuate their influence. When the region's governments begin to think
seriously about ways out of their age-old conflicts, the US tends in the end
to be the more congenial partner. Should policy blunders or strategic
retreat from the region reduce US leverage, or renewed confrontation magnify
the relative disparity of US and Soviet military capabilities in more
extreme scenarios, then the Soviets will have new prospects to advance.
Egypt
Egypt deserves special treatment, apart from the Arab-Israeli context,
not only because it assumed at Camp David a special stance toward that
conflict, but because, unlike the other Arab states, Egypt is a nation. It
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has a national heritage and future more cohesive and substantial than any
other Arab country.
The Soviets would certainly like to return to a position of influence in
Cairo. They sought the recent exchange of ambassadors toward that end. But
they probably have no illusions that this step alone puts the relationship
even tentatively on a course back to the status they enjoyed under Nassar.
No doubt they expect that an improved diplomatic relationship with Egypt
will enhance their bargaining leverage throughout the region, although
perhaps not as much as it will enhance Cairo's leverage in. Washington and
Jerusalem. They probably also expect that it will give them increased
access to Egypt's internal politics, which are sure to face turbulent times.
A return to the past Egyptian dependency on Moscow for arms is highly
unlikely given the US supplier role that has developed in the last decade.
Nevertheless, the cost and political uncertainty of relying on the US for
arms may encourage the Egyptians to turn again in a limited way to the USSR
for less sophisticated weapons.
The Soviets probably look to a limited arms supply relationship,
increased diplomatic influence, and the possibility of internal
discontinuities in Egyptian political and economic development to provide
them new opportunities downstream. In any case, the location, size, and
long-term political gravity of Egypt in the Arab world makes the investment
worthwhile.
The Yemens and the Horn of Africa
The Soviet positions in Ethiopia and the PDRY, to a lesser extent also
in North Yemen; offer the potential of backdoor access to the Middle East.
They offer physical advantages in terms of basing for military,
paramilitary, and various covert activities against neighboring states such
as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Sudan. They also present to the governments of
the region an image of encircling Soviet power which, if it cannot be
contained reliably, must be accommodated.
Soviet policy toward Ethiopia is at present aimed primarily at
consolidation and stabilization of the Soviet position. The Mengistu regime
is beset by serious insurgencies and severe economic problems. At the same
time, it is not eager to build a strong Marxist-Leninist party apparatus
Moscow has long been lobbying for because it could eventually challenge the
power of Mengistu's military junta and give the Soviets a more viable base
of support inside the country without him. In short, making sure that the
Soviet position in Ethiopia is not reversed gets more Soviet attention now
than efforts to exploit that position regionally. Nevertheless, the Soviets
continue to develop and use the military base access they have in the
country.
more pro-Soviet figures have advanced their power
in the PDRY recently. This may give the Soviets new tactical options. Some
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fear that the Soviets may step up their subversive activity against Oman and
Saudi Arabia from the Yemens. But there is no strong evidence on this as
yet. Since these outposts of Soviet influence are more means than ends in
themselves, future Soviet policy toward them probably turns on developments
in the vital sub-regions of the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli neighborhood, and
Afghanistan.
Turkey
Geography and culture make Turkey an important target of Soviet policy
toward the Southern Theater. Historic animosities and its membership in
NATO obstruct Soviet influence. Turkey's sense of vulnerability, the
Ottoman political tradition of evading confrontational relationships where
possible, and the enduring potential for internal instability give the
Soviets recurrent prospects.
The military significance of Turkey to Soviet strategic planning is
enormous. It controls Soviet maritime access to the Mediterranean,
notwithstanding the permissive conditions of the Montreaux Convention. It
lies astride the most direct air routes into the Middle East. Depending on
the fulfillment of plans for its air and land force modernization, it is
potentially one of the most formidable military powers in NATO. And it is a
potential base from which US military power can act to interfere with Soviet
operations toward the Gulf region. Whether Turkey would permit US access to
its bases during a Gulf or Iranian contingency involving the Soviets is
uncertain. That very uncertainty must weigh heavily in Soviet strategic
calculations, however. If Turkey could somehow be dislodged from NATO the
potential for Soviet military access to the region would be vastly improved
and the political impact would be revolutionary.
During the 1950s and 1960s the Soviets pursued a policy of diplomatic
and economic detente toward Ankara. In the 1970s the Soviets activated the
"second path" of destabilization through wholesale and indiscrimminate
terrorism. While some find the evidence inconclusive, the role of Bulgaria
as source of arms for sustained domestic violence in Turkey makes Soviet
complicity apparent.
Because the organizational base of terrorism in Turkey was so anarchic,
the military which seized power in 1980 was able to quell it very
effectively. Whether the Soviets might at some time in the future be able
to reopen this path to destabilizing Turkey depends a great deal on the
political and economic effectiveness of the present Turkish regime. Given
the picture only five years ago, the present outlook for Turkish stability
and development is promising, but not conclusive.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have returned to the first path of seeking
government-to-government detente, inhibited by their tilt toward Greece on
Cyprus, their occasional badgering of Turkey about INF and other NATO
initiatives, and, above all, the deep cloud of suspicion left by the era of
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mass terrorism. The present Turkish government is strongly committed to
NATO and to the US tie. It enjoys wide public support for this stance.
Yet, like other NATO members, Turkey has its own reasons for a more nuanced
policy toward the USSR than the US might wish to see it pursue. US support
for Turkish interests in Cyprus and for military modernization has been
disappointing to Ankara. Turkish interests in the Middle East frequently
oblige a certain distance from US policies. Underlying is Turkey's
persistent sense of exposure with insufficiently reliable backing. the
Soviets can be expected to exploit any opportunity these circumstances might
give them to increase their influence in Turkey.
Conclusion
The hallmarks of the Soviet posture toward the Southern Theater are:
Abiding ambitions to dominate the region for both offensive and
defensive reasons.
The military potential for strategic dominance created by the
buildup of Soviet regional and intercontinental forces over the past
twenty years.
Multilayered tactical tools -- from arms supply to terrorism -- for
exploiting the internal and interstate instabilities of the region.
Persistent and severe obstacles to the expansion of Soviet
influence arising from the limits of Soviet political and cultural
appeal, the risks of using military power, and the desire of the
region's people to avoid domination by a real imperialist.
To the extent the Soviets can be said to have a region-wide strategy it
is opportunistic and flexible: defend what you have, press where openings
appear, and keep a variety of options simultaneously in play. Specific
policies toward the major sub-regional issues addressed above will probably
continue to dominate Soviet strategy toward the region as a whole.
How hard can the Soviets be expected to press in the years ahead? The
foregoing discussion has tended to focus on Soviet policy problems and
obstacles. Will they persist? Or will favorable "megatrends" of the
regional power balance and local instability play into Soviet hands?
In retrospect, Soviet behavior during the early 1980s represents a kind
of strategic underachievement. Given what appear to have been their
opportunities after the fall of the Shah, they did not move very decisively
or actively to exploit them, but appeared to adopt more of a defensive or
holding posture. The obstacles already discussed account for this only in
part. Other factors weighing on Kremlin decisionmaking also played a major
role:
-- The unexpectedly high cost of the Afghanistan commitment.
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-- The distracting effect of turmoil in Poland.
-- The high degree of US commitment to the region after 1980.
-- The onset of conditions within the top Soviet leadership
conducive to risk avoidance and indecision.
The total effect of these factors on Soviet policy may persist for
several years, but is unlikely to last indefinitely. Even now Soviet
diplomacy in the region is getting more active, and a the results of a
crisis over Pakistan -- especially whether it magnifies Soviet power or
underscores US credibility as an ally -- will resonate powerfully throughout
the region. Sooner or later and perhaps quite suddenly given the volatility
of the region, the historic Soviet aim to dominate it is very likely to be
pressed with increased determination and initiative. It is next to
impossible that the countries of the region will, by themselves, become
united and strong enough to pose an insurmountable obstacle to Soviet
advances in the long run. Those advances are most likely to be thwarted if
the next generation of Soviet leaders, now in the process of emerging, is
persuaded that the "great game" in the Southern Theater is not worth the
candle of cost and risk. What will persuade them is a combination of
failure in Afghanistan, an unfavorable regional correlation of forces based
on US commitment, and their own pressing internal priorities. Otherwise the
next phase of the struggle over this strategic region is likely to be more
lively and potentially more explosive than the recent past.
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i I
DDI - 05301/84
ACIS - 582/84
14 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Science & Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Douglas George
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
SUBJECT: Tuesday's NSPG Meeting
1. This joint ACIS-NIO memorandum transmits your briefing book for next
Tuesday's NSPG meeting at 1100.
2. This meeting, as best I can determine, is intended to address several
interrelated issues:
-- Next steps by the US for ASAT arms control and, conceivably, other US
initiatives. (This earlier had been scheduled for an NSC meeting on 7
September.)
-- The President's speech at the UNGA.
-- The Schultz-Gromyko meeting and the President-Gromyko meeting.
The operational issues are whether and how any policy decisions can be
introduced into the speech and/or the two meetings. The thrust of this
meeting is strategic; specific tasking will flow from decisions made during or
after the meeting.
3. Talking points (Tab A), and the remainder of the Table of Contents,
are listed on the left.
4. If there is more we can do to help you here, please call.
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TALKING POINTS FOR NSPG ON ARMS CONTROL/GROMYKO"VISIT, 18 September 1984
Soviet Calculations, Objectives
Gromyko is probably coming to the US to continue the policies of the recent
past, to try once again to put the Administration on the defensive, to air
the Soviet indictment of its policies, and possibly to set up events that
will hurt campaign prospects.
There is some chance that he's under instructions to explore for some
beginning of a better relationship to be developed after November. But the
burden of evidence is against this.
Gromyko is more influentual now than ever in shaping the Politburo
guidance he'll be operating from. He's unlikely to have an interest in
repudiating his recent policies.
We have reporting that the Soviets are lining up their Pact allies for a
common effort at the UNGA to discredit Administration policies to the
extent that it will tell in November.
If the Soviets were planning a positive tack in US-Soviet relations,
they would be preparing various constituencies for it, especially in
East Europe. We see no evidence of this; the Zhivkov and Honecker
cancellations run in the other direction. So far, they haven't told
their own people about a Gromyko-Reagan meeting [Look out that this has
changed by 18 September].
There is some possibility that a positive tack is planned.
Chernenko has hinted at the wider progress some movement on space might
stimulate.
In discussion with a number of our Soviet watchers, we came to a rough
calculation of the odds:
70% that Gromyko will emerge from the meeting with the President with a
downbeat story.
20% that he'll cancel the Washington visit on some pretext or other.
10% that the whole scenario will end on a positive note.
In his UNGA speech and discussion with the Secretary, Gromyko is likely to
present the complete, but familiar recitation of all Soviet arms control and
regional security proposals. The Soviet Middle East Plan will get prominent
mention. He'll offer an elaborate indictment of US positions and
insincerity.
that Gromyko will offer a new arms 25X1
proposal, but no evidence on what it might be. One guess is that a US INF
deployment moratorium would restart the nuclear weapons talks.
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Soviet Leadership
The current state of the Soviet leadership has to be a factor in shaping the
Gromyko game plan, but we do not have a clear view as to how.
Chernenko and Gorbachev have a recent record of slightly more positive
statements on US-Soviet relations if the US makes concessions. But
there is an overall tendency for all the members of the Politburo to
seek political safety in a hard line.
Gromyko's personal authority over the shaping and execution of Soviet
foreign policy is great. But he has to operate from a Politburo
consensus, and, given the succession struggle, has to be wary of
uncleared initiative.
The removal of Ogarkov remains to be convincingly explained. We doubt
he was removed over policy, although policy dispute may have
contributed. More likely he was suspected of embodying the possible
threat of future military intrusion into succession politics. We know
he'd acquired the image as the USSR's leading professional soldier. At
the same time, we have evidence that the Soviet military are unhappy
with the internal state of the USSR and possibly with its weak
leadership. In any case, the Politburo has to worry about military
attitudes.
Protecting Sources and Methods
Negotiating limitations on ASAT and other space weapons will present sources
and methods problem. In principle, it is possible to minimize the risks
through the exercise of extreme care and discretion. Secial steps would
have to be taken to accomplish this.
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Background
Foreign Minister Gromyko normally visits the UN General Assembly each
autumn and gives a major speech. This year's visit to the UN and to
Washington will be unusual because last year's annual visit did not take
place. US public reaction to the Soviet downing of the Korean air liner was
such that state authorities in New York and New Jersey refused to allow
Gromyko's plane to land. The Soviets refused to accept alternative
arrangements offered by the US Government.
Arms Control
In late-1983, the Soviets suspended bilateral arms control negotiations
following the deployments of US Pershing II and GLCM in NATO countries. Their
current position is that negotiations on offensive arms can resume only if the
US removes these weapons from Europe.
On June 29, the Soviets proposed to begin negotiations with the US in
Vienna on September 18 on banning weapons in space. They also proposed a
moratorium on space weapons tests commencing with the beginning of the
talks. Although the US indicated its willingness to meet in Vienna to discuss
the Soviet proposal, the US also proposed broadening the talks to include
offensive systems. The Soviets rejected the idea of meeting to discuss,
rather than negotiate limitations, on space weapons. They also have insisted
on a moratorium on testing and refused to discuss offensive systems.
Subsequently, Chernenko has stated that proceeding with negotiations on
space weapons (as proposed by the Soviets) could provide the basis for
resumption of talks on offensive arms reductions.
Meetings
C/ACIS was told that the idea for a Reagan-Gromyko meeting was given to
the Soviets through Assistant Secretary Burt a few weeks ago along the lines
of "if Gromyko would be interested in such a meeting . . ., Secretary Schultz
would try to set it up . . . ." About a week later, the Soviets told Burt
that Gromyko was interested in such a meeting. The US has taken that for a
yes, but my sense is that the record, in fact, does not support an explicit
invitation and an explicit "yes".
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C/ACIS was told on Thursday privately that the White House Staff has
already pretty much decided that the President's UN speech would not contain
any significant US initiatives or concessions. We were also told that the
present attitude of the White House Staff is one of willingness to conduct a
meeting with Gromyko, readiness to be flexible, desire to be cordial, with the
US being prepared to broadly talk with the Soviets on how the US and the
Soviet Union can make our arms control negotiating fora active again.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #05299-84
14 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Assessment of Gromyko Visit for NSPG Meetin
18 September 1984.
1. This memo recaps the arguments and evidence about why Gromyko is
coming to Washington and the outlook for his meetings with the President and
Secretary of State.
Does Gromyko's acceptance mean the Soviets are trying to pave the
way to a better relationship in the next term?
Or is it another tactical twist in the hardline policy we've seen
since last winter, possibly aimed at creating a "failure" to hurt
the President in November?
2. As of now the evidence is not conclusive and the Soviets may not
have settled finally on how to play these meetings. But the weightier
evidence and arguments are on the negative side.
3. It cannot be excluded that Gromyko will come under instructions to
attempt laying the ground work for an improved dialogue.
The Soviets probably see Reagan as the almost certain winner and
would want to make some effort now to assure that his current
interest in a better relationship -- which the Soviets ascribe to
short-term politics -- will persist into a second term.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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Even if he's favored to win, the Soviets probably see that the
President and his political advisors would like a positive note on
the US-Soviet front and may be willing to pay for it with some arms
control concession, especially in the space area.
There have been several points in the last year where it appeared
the Soviets were trying to get out of their nasty, inflexible
posture toward the US, most recently for a very brief period
following their space weapons initiative in June. We may be seeing
another such attempt. Chernenko has recently referred to the
positive developments overall which could follow movement on the
space front.
Although Gromyko is primarily responsible for Moscow's dominant
hardline, he may feel his authority over foreign policy has reached
the point where he can sponsor an attempt at flexibility.
In any case, he has to work from a Politburo consensus which may
now finally appreciate that Soviet negativism has not gained much
or hurt the Administration decisively.
Finally, the Soviets remain deeply concerned about the technical
and strategic threat from emerging US space/SDI programs, and they
may be willing to shift their short-term tactics to have another
shot at thwarting them either through agreement or a political
process that inhibits them.
4. The evidence and arguments on the other side are stronger. It is
more likely that Soviet acceptance of the invitations and the way they play
the visit are intended to continue the recent policy of trying to put the
Administration on the defensive, of burdening the White House with the fact
of and blame for frigid US-Soviet relations and the arms control deadlock,
and, at a minimum, showing that the President cannot successfully reconcile
basically anti-Soviet defense and foreign policies with arms control and
reasonable bilateral relations.
We have reporting that the Soviets are organizing their Warsaw Pact
allies for a UNGA performance designed to discredit the
Administration's foreign policy.
The Soviets are not laying the propaganda groundwork to prepare
their political constituencies at home and in East Europe for the
slightest positive tack in US-Soviet relations. A divided and
indecisive leadership especially would feel the need to do this.
They have not yet revealed to Soviet publics that Gromyko is
scheduled to visit the President.
There are a few hints
that the visit to Washington may not
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It is hard to see how Gromyko would favor or gain politically from
a significant shift of diplomatic tactics now away from those he's
sponsored over recent months, although he does stand to gain
j- politically from coming to New York and castigating the US.
However hedged, US acceptance of Moscow's June proposal for space
talks gave the Soviets an opening for further maneuver which they
quickly rejected. It is unlikely that something has changed in
Moscow to shift this calculus in the direction of flexibility. In
fact, Chernenko's weakness would probably strengthen the hand of
those favoring tougher tactics.
The President's political strength has become more vivid in recent
weeks. But the Soviets have long thought him favored to win, yet
persist in the line that the election remains open and that the
Democrats are the lesser evil. They have not given any evidence of
thinking now is the time to start doing business.
On the contrary, the dominant view in Moscow seems to be that,
precisely because the President may win big, he -- and the
Congress, publics, and allies -- must not be allowed to believe
throughout a second term that Washington pressure tactics, as the
Soviets see them, eventually bring flexibility and concessions from
the USSR.
The experiences of Gromyko and other Politburo members would not
lead them to the view that a nasty phase in US-Soviet relations,
for which they take some blame, necessarily precludes any progress
in a second Reagan term. They believe they are more patient than
we and there will be opportunities for movement in a second term no
matter what happens now.
The Soviet concern about US space programs is serious and durable.
But it is long term. Even if we test ASAT systems, they know that
development and deployment of all the threatening technologies must
go through many political wickets which they can influence in the
years ahead.
5. The prognosis for Gromyko's performance in New York and Washington
may be shaped by new evidence over the next ten days. There could be hints
from the US side which affect it, such as the delay of ASAT tests and
release of the GAC report on Soviet noncompliance in arms control, although
I do not believe these, by themselves, swing the prognosis in a positive
direction.
6. In his UNGA speech Gromyko will certainly lay out a broad and
vigorous defense of Soviet policy and an indictment of US behavior on all
fronts. We should be prepared for a pretty sarcastic tone. Whether and how
he mentions the President personally will be a good clue as to what happens
next.
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7. He will recite the whole menu of Soviet arms related proposals: No
first use, nuclear free zones, freeze, INF and START positions, prevention
of space militarization, etc., as evidence of Soviet reasonableness, and
describe US positions as unfair or mendacious. He will review Soviet
positions on regional security issues, with special emphasis on the
Middle East plan recently revived.
8. We still have no evidence about a "new arms control proposal"
myk
~
- -
will be some version of an INF deployment moratorium as the price of
restarting the nuclear talks. In the charged political environment, there
will be a lot of press and allied pressure on us not to reject it out of
hand. But you can expect Gromyko to react very quickly and critically to a
US response that says we'll consider it in principle in the context of
resumed dialogue on the whole arms agenda.
9. The meeting with Shultz will be a critical point if the Soviets
have not yet made up their minds on how exactly to play the rest of the
scenario. In any case, this is the point at which Gromyko might possibly
cancel his trip to Washington. I have a hunch that a cancellation is
but it's only a hunch. If Gromyko judges that the
recooked
ad
l
,
y p
re
a
Administration is defensive and very hungry for some sign of progress, I
believe it will tend to increase the likelihood of a downbeat visit to
Washington and perhaps cancellation, because the Soviets will conclude they
can do the Administration real harm.
10. Gromyko's line with the President is likely to follow the script of
his performance in New York, although he is likely to be less pugnacious
than in public or with the Secretary. If he comes, he will want to take a
personal and political measure of the President, especially as to how likely
he is to stick to his basic policies in a second term versus his
susceptibility to being drawn off those policies by the desire for a more
positive legacy in US-Soviet relations and arms control. It is unlikely, in
my view, that Gromyko will offer concessions in private not broached in his
public speech. Even if every step has been vetted with the Politburo, there
are too many back in Moscow who might jump on him should any hint of
"uncleared" moves emerge subsequently.
11. As we discussed in our meeting, the most likely pattern is for
Gromyko to emerge from these meetings with a sour look, possibly articulated
in a press conference where this old warrior can sometimes be pretty
effective (recall how his March 1977 performance embarrassed Vance and
rocked the Carter SALT policy back on its heels).
12. The question has to be addressed as to whether any proposal or
concession the President might offer -- in the next ten days, at the UN, or
in the private talks -- could guarantee a positive meeting. The Soviets
must have some price. Certainly our offer of an INF deployment moratorium
or an ASAT test moratorium would whet their appetites. Yet despite the fact
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that these would be major concessions indeed, I believe the Soviets are in a
frame of mind where they would read such concessions as 1) signs of tactical
weakness and vulnerability, and at the same time 2) as only temporary,
retractable offers designed to get us through November.
13. What this assessment means from a policy point of view, it seems to
me, is that we should do the following:
Make sure that US policies and priorities are clearly aired in
public and private so neither Gromyko nor his colleagues can be
confused about them.
Consider all proposals and offers on their intrinsic merits for the
long term, to the extent possible not in the light of short-term
political calculations about the US or the USSR.
Remember that the odds of actually doing anything constructive with
the USSR at present are very poor. Inevitably we are talking
through Gromyko and the present Politburo line-up to a successor
generation. If I understand the objectives of this Administration
toward the USSR, it seeks to encourage a signficant shift of Soviet
priorities away from international power outreach. It has a better
chance of doing this than any Administration in the past generation
if it stands firmly on its original mandate, especially in the
midst of a reelection campaign it is strongl"avored toin.
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enttrral Intelligence Agency -
14 September 1984
SUBJECT: What To Expect From Gromyko
Andrey Gromyko will come to Washington at the peak of his
political career and with 45 years of experience in negotiating
with the United States. Neither his increasing influence in the
Kremlin nor his long exposure to US leaders--he has met every
President since Hoover--has mellowed the Soviet Foreign
Minister. Westerners who have met with him over the years report
that, if anything, he has grown more suspicious of the United
States.
Gromyko will come as an emissary of the Soviet leadership as
a whole and will report fully to his colleagues on his meeting
with the President. At the same time, he personally is a
principal architect of the tough Soviet line toward Washington
and has a stake in proving that it will lead eventually to more
moderate US policies. His strong-minded instincts will color his
presentation and his perceptions of what the President will tell
him. His recommendations upon returning to Moscow will do much
to shape the Soviet approach to bilateral relations for months
and even a year or so to come.
Operating Style
He does not like small talk and prefers a no-nonsense
approach in negotiating situations. He rarely couches his
comments in ideological terms or engages in discussions about the
relative merits of the Soviet and American political systems. He
is a dour, sober-sided person and delivers his remarks without
enthusiasm. He is cagey about starting a substantive discussion
and likes for his adversary to show his hand first. As in
previous conversations with recent US Presidents, Gromyko is
likely to be tough--even abrasive--in presenting Soviet
positions. He has long been unwilling to make even small
concessions in the interest of getting to the heart of an issue
or finding common ground.
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Soviet Motives for Agreeing to Visit
Gromyko will be intent especially on making a personal
assessment of the President and gauging how his personality and
convictions affect US policies. He will probe in various ways to
estimate the prospects for doing business during his second
He may seek to evoke the President's reactions both by
delivering a strong presentation of Soviet views and by
occasionally hinting at flexibility. He is unlikely to use the
meeting with the President, however, either to provoke a further
deterioration in relations or to offer a quick deal.
He may expect the President to raise the possibility of a
summit. Given Chernenko's health, he is likely to hew to the
standard Soviet position that such a meeting must be well
prepared and based on some degree of mutual understanding on
Bilateral Issues
Gromyko's remarks probably will home in on bilateral issues,
particularly arms control. He will criticize US defense and arms
control policies, harping on two major allegations:
-- That the United States seeks to upset an existing
military balance and achieve superiority through a
massive buildup of arms. To support this charge, he
will refer to US defense programs for strategic and
space systems, reject any notion that the USSR has upset
the military balance, and staunchly assert that
sufficient Soviet military programs will be undertaken
to offset US defense efforts.
That the United States is not serious about arms control
and puts forward proposals deliberately designed to be
unacceptable and to camouflage a continued arms
buildup. He may charge that the United States is
setting preconditions for space talks, holding up
ratification of existing nuclear testing treaties, and
refusing resume negotiations on a comprehensive test
Gromyko probably will devote a substantial portion of his
remarks to the issue of space talks. He is likely to argue
strongly for a moratorium on the testing of space weapons,
claiming that talks would be meaningless if such tests
continue. He may reiterate the statement in Chernenko's early
September Pravda interview that progress in the area of space
talks could "facilitate" progress on limiting and reducing
"other" strategic arms, possibly hinting that US agreement to a
moratorium on ASAT testing might lead to a resumption of
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strategic arms talks. He probably will reject any suggestion,
however, that space talks be combined with INF and START talks in
a single-negotiating forum. In broad terms, Gromyko is likely to
argue that US ASAT and ABM testing threatens to undermine the
basis of strategic arms agreements and that it will create a new
strategic, political, and psychological climate.
Gromyko will maintain that arms control agreements are
needed by the United States no less than by the Soviet Union and
must be based on the principle of equality and equal security.
He may complain that US charges of Soviet SALT violations
demonstrate US ill will, and he is certain to claim the USSR is
fulfilling all its obligations under past agreements. He is
likely to assert that US questions regarding treaty compliance
should be addressed confidentially. If pressed on this issue, he
will lay out counter-accusations of US violations. In an effort
to probe US intentions, he may ask about US willingness to
continue to abide by SALT limitations, particularly the ABM
Treaty.
He is likely to claim that preventing nuclear war is the
cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy and refer to a laundry list
of Soviet proposals. In this regard, he may:
-- Reiterate the standard Soviet pledge not to be the first
to use nuclear weapons and criticize US reluctance to
assume a similar obligation.
-- Call for a mutual freeze of the nuclear arsenals of both
sides.
He also likes to recall the 1946 Soviet proposal to ban nuclear
weapons--a proposal he tabled while Ambassador to the United
Nations.
Regarding Moscow's position on reductions in nuclear arms,
Gromyko probably will highlight the Soviet proposal at START that
called for a 25 percent reduction of the strategic armaments of
both sides. Concerning INF, he probably will contend that US
missile deployments in Europe have created a new situation and
maintain that negotiations cannot resume while such deployments
continue. He may hint that a moratorium on further US
deployments in Europe might be sufficient basis for resumed
negotiations. In meetings this summer with UK Foreign Secretary
Howe and Senator McGovern, he avoided an explicit call for the
removal of US missiles already deployed in Europe. He will
continue to insist, however, that British and French missiles be
taken into account in any agreement.
Gromyko probably will refuse to discuss the situation of
dissident Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov although he may state
that he is alive, well, and working. In May, when Australian
Foreign Minister Hayden brought up Sakharov's treatment, he cut
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off conversation on the subject and said that Moscow would not
talk about Sakharov with "anybody."
Public Followup
Gromyko's public comments after the meeting are likely to be
reserved or downbeat, designed to defeat any expectation of a
breakthrough in relations. Moscow is well aware of the impact of
this meeting on the US elections. Gromyko's public comments are
likely to be carefully crafted to maintain pressure on the
President from domestic constituencies eager to see an easing of
US-Soviet tensions and tangible progress toward a renewed arms
dialogue. We consider it somewhat less likely that Gromyko will
assail the Administration in harshly critical terms in an effort
to embarrass the President. Gromyko personally is clearly
capable of such a performance, but Moscow's agreement to the
meeting and the apparent Soviet assumption that the Kremlin will
be dealing with the President for the next four years suggest
that Gromyko will adopt a more measured public posture.
Foreign Policy Issues
Although Gromyko will concentrate in substantive discussions
on exploring the President's intentions on bilateral issues, he
probably also will raise a number of global issues that have been
irritants in relations. In addition to Arab-Israeli issues,
there are other possible areas of dispute:
-- He will reject criticism of Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan and rule out the possibility of Soviet
withdrawal until external assistance to the insurgents
is terminated and the Communist regime in Kabul is
accepted as legitimate. He may repeat the proposal that
a political resolution must be fashioned by the states
in the region (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) with
appropriate guarantees of non-interference by the United
-- On the Iran-Iraq war, he will argue the USSR has
regional interests it must protect and might insist on
international guarantees of freedom of navigation in the
Persian Gulf. He will reject any US claim of special
-- Moscow has argued consistently that Nicaragua is not an
East-West issue, but should Central America come up in
the talks, he would condemn US military activity in
Central America and the Caribbean and question whether
Washington is serious about negotiations with Managua
and the Contadora group.
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- The Soviets have signaled privately that Southern Africa
need not be a cause of Soviet-US conflict, but he may
--Choose to raise the subject, portraying South Africa as
the cause of the region's troubles and berating
Washington for encouraging Pretoria to take an
"aggressive policy" in-the area.
He is likely to be most defensive in those areas where he
perceives US exploitation of Soviet weakness, particularly the
Sino-Soviet dispute. He might attempt to probe US intentions
toward Beijing and might warn against providing the Chinese with
modern technology and military equipment.
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United States Department of State
Director, Bureau of Politico -Military Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520
September 7, 1984
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Memorandum To: See Distribution
Subject: Recirculation of Interagency Paper on
Preparing for Vienna: Category II Paper
As the principal reference for an NSC discussion meeting now
scheduled for next Friday, September 14, 11:00 a.m., and in view
of subsequent coordination (which permits the deletion of
previously bracketted material in the first Con tic of page 3) I
am recirculating the attached September 4, 1984 paper entitled
"Next Steps in Preparing for Vienna".
JW
John T. Chain, Jr.
Lt General, USAF
Attachment:
As stated.
Distribution
CIA -{
OSD - Mr. Perle
JCS - MGen Aldridge
ACDA - Dr. Cooper
START Negotiator - Amb. Rowny
INF Negotiator - Amb. Nitze
EUR - Mr. Burt
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OAD R
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International: Key Issues at 39th UN General Assembly
The Daily today presents a look at issues likely to come up during the 39th United Nations
General Assembly session opening on Tuesday.
Background
Prospects
announce an "important" new arms control proposal. No
reporting available on subject matter.
hints Gromyko will
Arab-Israel Gromyko certain to press Soviet proposal resurrected
initiative earlier this summer. Proposal designates Security
Council-or at least its permanent members-as
guarantors of settlement and calls for International
conference on Middle East. PLO said to be planning to
request Security Council meeting on initiative later this
month or in October.
Soviets may again repackage
ban on weapons in space,
nuclear freeze, or ban on
CW. Anything new on INF is
more likely to be saved for
bilateral meetings.
Similarity to Arab Fez plan
probably guarantees
widespread support,
although General Assembly
members recognize
conference is unlikely.
Third World debt Argentina will push for political dialogue between debtors Bound to attract sympathetic
and industrial countries. Aim is to keep alive process audience in General
begun at Cartagena in June. Assembly.
International Developing countries will push for conference with Most countries have little
monetary universal participation and decisions through consensus interest in issue and few will
conference rather than weighted voting. choose this one to challenge
the US.
Iran will again spearhead the effort to expel Israel. Cuba No chance of Israeli
may challenge Grenada. expulsion. Grenada also
appears safe.
Pacific Trust Soviets likely to resume urging General Assembly to Most countries have little
territories consider the Pacific islands entrusted to the US. Soviets interest in issue and few will
contend the US plans to annex the islands and use them choose this one to challenge
as military bases. the US.
Puerto Rico Cuba may call for self-determination, but avoid anti-US Most Third World nations will
rhetoric that cost it votes in past. see move as an effort to
embarrass the US.
Antarctica Malaysia pushing to scrap treaty and consider Antarctica Treaty members, including
as "common heritage of mankind." US and USSR, should be
able to block action.
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