(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200310005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: MISC

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1. As always, the Soviets are acting in arms control in five areas of
increasing political sensitivity:
o public statements, as in TASS, et al.
o unofficial bilateral exchanges of views, as in Dartmouth Group, et al.
o official exchanges, as in MBFR, CDE, SCC, etc.
o private or semi-private feelers, as in Dobrynin's "leaks to Boston
Globe, et al.
o official letters between President Reagan and General Secretary
Chernenko.
2. There is not, and probably cannot be, substantive consistency in all five
channels from day-to-day or even week-to-week. It is too hard to
orchestrate all that.
3. The mix of "positive" and "negative" channels varies over time; in some
cases, as today, public statements and official letters are congruent in
substance.
4. In fact, I think it is clear the Soviets are purposely "talking out of
both sides of their mouths."
5. The key question is whether any meaning is there for the US
6. The USSR clearly is looking for US "concessions", such as taking UK and
French nuclear missiles into account somewhere. Such steps by US would
o look good in their own right to USSR.
o let the USSR out of the political box they created when they left
INF and START.
o be useful for any internal arguments in USSR that this leadership
knows how to deal with the US.
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7.
Furthermore, independent of whether a person is first interested
context in the nation's welfare or the first Tuesday in November,
in this
or
both, one has to deal with the private feelers.
8.
And I believe, unlike last autumn in INF, that quickly introducing into
diplomatic channels the substance of these private feelers is not an
obviously good idea. Rather, I would:
o for Dobrynin: use a Burt-Sokolov channel in Washington and a
similar one in Moscow.
o for the intelligence officers: use their social/business contacts
in Washington.
9. If the US uses the private channels, one could:
o say yes to what Soviets are seeking, or
o be silent on that and offer our own ideas.
10. So far, I see no consensus at my level or so in the Executive Branch on
such ideas; OSD hates arms control of all and any kinds the USSR would
ever accept.
11. In any case, the Soviets will be tough bargainers in normal diplomatic
channels or private ones. 1984 will complicate in obvious ways any US or
USSR efforts to:
o identify areas of mutual interest for any progress.
o actually work it out.
12. The price will be steep but I think the odds are good (say, 60%) US can
get some kind of a deal with the USSR this yearif the US wants it and
does it gracefully; probably as early as late spring, more likely in the
June-July period.
-2-
SECRET 25X1
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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR DCI
~rr FV__d ~ - . N i v/vss~
1. Moscow's current policy toward the US is to maximize pressures on
the administration d- ri ng an election year to extract concessions,
especially in arms control.
-- The basic Soviet aim -- admittedly a long shot -- is to
deflect the Reagan Administration from its main foreign policy
course of rearmament and tough competition with the USSR.
-- 1984 offers their best, perhaps last, chance to do this.
2. But they have not, repeat NOT, made any fundamental decisions to
change their own basic po icies to mitigate the competition yet. The notion
that the Soviets are at a basic turning point of policy because of Chernenko
is mistaken.
a. They were moving toward more tactical flexibility before
Chernenko acceded to power.
b. Even if Chernenko is more powerful than he sometimes looks,
the leadership is not in shape to make a major departure from
the strategies of the past decade.
-- Remember, on things that matter most to the US, Andropov
was not that different from Brezhnev.
The Soviets have no reason to embrace a fixed view of the US
now. In the Soviet view ...
Reagan will probably be reelected, but it's not certain.
-- Even if he is reelected, economic and political realities
are likely to make his reach greater than his grasp in
defense and foreign policy during a second term.
The Soviets are very unlikely to hold the view that "it's
better to strike a deal before the election than after."
It will be impossible to sign, much less ratify, a major
"agreement" e.g., INF, before the election.
The appearance of a deal-in-the-offing would probably
help the President's reelection prospects, something
which the Soviets do not want to do, according to all our
sources.
Soviets would see a high risk that a reelected Reagan
administration would break away from a pre-election
agreement in principle.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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SECRET
3. They want to create the appearance, particularly to the top levels
of the USG, that they are'ready for "a deal." But they are not yet ready on
their own part for the concessions necessary to make "a deal" of real or
lasting value for the US.
-- This accounts for the faintest hints of reasonableness in some
public statements (recently turned hard again) and private
encouragement from Dobrynin on prospects for relations.
4. Even this narrow tactical purpose on the Soviet part, however,
makes them willing to engage in an arms-length minuet.
-- This offers the US the opportunity to create the image of
slight immprovement in US/Soviet relations, of benefit to us
with allies and publics.
-- The risk for the US is that the Soviets -- having a more
disciplined system -- will manipulate us more effectively than
we manipulate them.
5. Given the Soviet tactical interest, we can probably keep alive
their willingness to engage in exploratory dialogue, at least to the extent
seen since January, without major concessions on START, INF, and other areas
where we are far apart e.g., ASAT, Chemical Weapons).
-- A cautious US approach would concentrate on CBMs (e.g.,
HOTLINE) and peripheral issues ... at least for some months.
6. To get more dramatic movement we probably have to consider more
costly concessions. The crucial concession the Soviets are clearly To ing
for is a moratorium on INF deployments.
- The Soviets believe that an INF moratorium, and perhaps just
talk about a moratorium, could rekindle the INF controversy in
Europe and stop futher US deployments-permanently.
7. During the election, the Soviets will try to create an atmosphere
in which the two US candidates compete in terms of who can better create
amity with Moscow.
-- This will create pressure for US concessions.
8. If the US holds firm during a period of maximum political
"vulnerability", i.e., 1984, this will go a long way to creating the
conditions for a more genuinely flexible Soviet posture in 1985-1988.
-- During the latter period US political freedom of movement will
be greater.
SECRET
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The results of our defense programs will begin to show.
-? A stronger Soviet political leadership with better prospects
for longevity may emerge and be better equipped to engage in
longer-term planning and genuine give-and-take.
10. Throughout 1984 we have to remember the supreme importance of
preserving the kind of credibility in Moscow that would allow us to manage a
real crisis which could blow up at any time, e.g., in the Gulf.
-- It would be dangerous to create the illusion in Moscow that
the US cannot for political reasons risk a worsening of
relations such a crisis could entail.
SECRET
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Prqoj- e by C/AGIS
Proposed Talking Points for DCI at NSC/NSPG Meeting, 27 March 1984
1. As always, the Soviets are acting in arms control in five areas of
increasing political sensitivity:
o public statements, as in TASS, et al.
o unofficial bilateral exchanges of views, as in Dartmouth Group, et al.
o official exchanges, as in MBFR, CDE, SCC, etc.
o private or semi-private feelers, as in Dobrynin's "leaks" to Boston
Globe, et al.
o official letters between President Reagan and General Secretary
Chernenko.
2. There is not, and probably cannot be, substantive consistency in all five
channels from day-to-day or even week-to-week. It is too hard to
orchestrate all that.
3. The mix of "positive" and "negative" channels varies over time; in some
cases, as today, public statements and official letters are congruent in
substance.
4. In fact, I think it is clear the Soviets are purposely "talking out of
both sides of their mouths."
5. The key question is whether any meaning is there for the US.
6. The USSR clearly is looking for US "concessions", such as taking UK and
French nuclear missiles into account somewhere. Such steps by US would:
o look good in their own right to USSR.
o let the USSR out of the political box they created when they left
INF and START.
o be useful for any internal arguments in USSR that this leadership
knows how to deal with the US.
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7. In any case, the Soviets will be tough bargainers in normal diplomatic
channels or private ones. 1984 will complicate in obvious ways any US or
USSR efforts to:
o identify areas of mutual interest for any progress.
o actually work it out.
8. The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms
control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously
expressing willingness, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet
relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other
areas.
9. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm
on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear
so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate
that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet
relations.
10. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for flexibility on a range of issues,
with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement
in relations or arms control issues before the US elections.
11. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that
significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their
fundamental concerns in START and INF.
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Iq
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied
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i,
cripple the Nicaraquan economy,
but no more.
Fred Francis, NBC News, on the
Nicaraguan border.
Eighteen Marines Killed in Crash
CHUNG: Eighteen U. S. Marines
are believed dead in a helicopter
crash 170 miles southeast 6f
Seoul, South Korea.
The Marines were engaged in
war game maneuvers with South
Korean servicemen. Eleven South
Koreans are also believed killed.
The Marine chopper apparently
went down in rugged mountains
because of bad weather.
This is the second time in a
week these military exercises
have been marred by an incident.
On Wednesday, a nuclear-powered
submarine rammed the U. S.
Aircraft Carrier Kitty Hawk in
the Sea of Japan.
CBS SUNDAY EVENING NEWS
CBS TV 6:00 PM MARCH 25
Arens Denies Weinberger Remark
MORTON DEAN: Israeli Defense
Minister Moshe Arens emphatically
denies some remarks attributed to
him in today's New York Times
Magazine.
The cover article says Mr.
Arens called Defense Secretary
Caspar Weinberger, quote, "a'
prime candidate for psychoanaly-
sis." Mr. Arens also disputes
another point in the article,
that he once offered to return
disputed border territory to
Egypt in exchange for a meeting
with the Egyptian defense minis-
ter.
The editor of the New York
Times Magazine says he stands
behind the story.
ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT ABC TV
6:30 PM MARCH 25
No News of Relevance to DOD
NBC SUNDAY ?NIGI4T NEWS--' NBC' TV
6 30 ;:P4 4 MA'RCH ;2
U.S Soviet Dialoque Unlikely
JOHN PALMER, French President
Francois Mitte.rand called'on the
United States and the Soviet
Union today to. resume their,
'dialogue and end what he called a
period of mutual silence. But as`
Marvin Kalb reports, that silence,
especially on the part of the
Soviet Union, is likely to
continue.
MARVIN KALB: According to U.S.
experts, the new Soviet leadership
has decided not` to respond posi-
`~tively to,; President Reagan's
recent overtures for an improve-
ment in relations.
Just back from Moscow, two
retired generals, BrentScowcroft
and David Jones, with bleak assess-
,ments about resuming nuclear arms
negotiations anytime soon.
Scowcroft had a message from
the President for the new Kremlin
leader, Konstantin Chernenko.
But the Russians never gave him a
chance to deliver it. Jones
`wanted to talk with the Soviet
Chief of Staff, General Nikoli
Agargov. But no meeting was ar-
ranged.
The current view is that
.Chernenko, after earlier indica-
tions that he'd like to improve
relations, has either changed his
mind or been reined in by the
Communist Party and military
bureaucracies; his view now
described as not wishing to help
the President get reelected, but
prepared with half-steps to keep
the lines of communication open.
French President Francois
Mitterand, appearing on NBC's
"Meet the Press," urged the
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U.S. SAYS MOSCOW Moscow Refuses
REFUSED A LETTER From President)
'
PRESIDENT
FROM
PRIVATE ENVOY REBUFFED
Scowcroft, Carrying Reagan's
Note, Wasn't Given Chance
to See Soviet Leaders
By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New YorkTimes
WASHINGTON, March 23 - A pri-
vate American envoy carrying a per-
sonal message from President Reagan!
to Konstantin U. Chernenko in Moscow
was not given the opportunity to meet
with the Soviet leader or any other top !
Soviet official, according to Adminis-
tration officials.
The officials said the envoy, Lieut.
Gen. Brent Scowcroft, retired, the
chairman of the President's Commis-
sion on Strategic Forces, made known
to Soviet officials when he was in Mos-
cow Iwo weeks ago that he had a per-
sonal Presidential letter and some
additional authorized comments, but
never beard anything back and was
never given an explanation.
..U.S. Elections Seen as Factor
In Moscow, Western diplomats who
have talked with Soviet officials say,
they believe the Soviet Union is likely
to remain cool for some time to Ameri-
can overtures because of uncertainty
over the American elections and other
factors. But President Francois Mitter-
rand, ending two days of talks in Wash-
ington, said he believed Moscow may
be reassessing its position on arms con-
trol talks, and he warned against'
"creating new causes of dissension" in
East-West relations. [Page 3.]
American administrations have on
several occasions used private gobe-
tweens known to be respected in Mos-
cow to deliver high-level messages to
Soviet leaders at times of difficulty in
formal Soviet-American relations. Ad-
ministration officials said they could
not recollect any previous instance of
Soviet officials' refusing to receive an
envoy and a message $t appropriate
levels.
Administration officials read this as i
another sign that top Soviet leaders are
either unwilling or unable to agree on
restarting nuclear arms talks or any
Continued on Page 3, Column 1
visible negotiating contacts unrest
Washington first makes concrete ges-'
tures or concessions.
On. Thursday, Arthur A. Hartman,
the United States Ambassador to the
Soviet Union, said in Washington that
the two countries were involved in talks
that "could lead to some kind of
progress on the more serious issues."
He added that he hoped for a resump-
tion of talks on a cultural and scientific
exchange accord that expired in 1980.
The message taken to Moscow by
W. Scowcroft, according to the
sources, was that Mr. Reagan was pre-
pared for serious and wide-ranging
talks and accommodations with the
Soviet Union, including suggestions on,
the'stalled nuclear arms talks, if SovietI
negotiators would return to the bar-
gaining table.
Responses `Pretty Frosty'
This was said to be identical to other
Presidential messages in recent
weeks, starting with Vice President;
Bush's meeting with Mr. Chernenko ai
month ago at the time of Yuri V. Andro-1
pox's funeral. At least two other letters!
A high State Department official
said, "Essentially, we've been telling
them that we're serious and ready to
engage, and their responses have all
been pretty frosty."
Soviet officials were said to have told
Mr. Scowcroft and American diplo-
mats that they viewed these entice-
ments as a trick to lure Moscow back
into negotiations in order to convince
the American public and world leaders
that a serious dialogue is under way,
and thus help Mr. Reagan's re-election
prospects without advancing the ne-
gotiations. They have called for Ameri-
can deeds, not just words, and in
particular some commitment to elimi-
nate the medium-range American mis-
siles recently deloyed in Europe.
Mr. Scowcroft went to Moscow for
four days as a member of a private
group of American foreign policy ex-
perts to engage in informal talks with
Soviet officials. Known as the Dart-
mouth Group, it has, with varying
membership, met with Soviet arms
control experts yearly for almost two
decades. Mr. Scowcroft was out of the
country and unavailable for comment,
but other participants characterized
the exchanges as the most negative
ever.
The sources also said Gen. David C.
Jones, the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and another mem-
a Message,
ber of the group, asked to meet with top
Soviet generals and was refused.
Administration officials said Hans-
Jochen Vogel and Egon Bahr, two lead-
ers of the West German Social Demo-
cratic Party and established advocates
of improving East-West relations, were
in Moscow at the same time as the
Dartmouth Group and were received
by Mr. Chernenko. But, the officials
said what Mr. Chernenko said to them
was no more promising than what was
told to the Dartmouth Group.
3 Theories on Soviet Position
There are three competing theories
in the Administration to explain the
hard-line Soviet position.
One is that Soviet leaders are in
agreement about rejecting any activity
that might help Mr. Reagan's re-elec-
tion prospects and believe his Adminis-
tration's bargaining position would not
be much different in a second term
than it is now. Accordingly, there is not
much incentive to restart talks now.
The second is that a leadership strug-
gle is under way in Moscow, with some !
wanting to resume the dialogue and
others opposed, and as a result they.
cannot agree on doing anything new.
The third is that Moscow means what
it says, that if Washington made con-
cessions first, it would go back to the
Geneva arms control talks, which have
been suspended since December.
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U.. LLLU`I'IUN SLEN
AFFECTING MOSCOW
Surge by Hart Among Several
Factors Cited in Continued
Cool Washington Ties
By JOHN F. BURNS
Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW, March 23 - Despite ef-
forte by the Reagan Administration to
break the impasse in Soviet-American
relations, Western diplomats and visi-
tors-who have talked with senior Soviet
off cials believe that a number of fac-
tors, including uncertainty over the
Pre$idential election, are likely to per-
suade the Kremlin to remain cool to-
ward Washington's overtures for some
time to come. ,
Iri particular, the diplomats say, the
United States is likely to find the Soviet
leadership reluctant to resume the ne-
gotiations on nuclear weapons that
have been in abeyance since late last
year unless Washington offers a prior
concession of the kind the Kremlin has
been demanding on the issues that have
le4 to deadlocks on two sets of weapons
talks.
$ixx weeks ago, after Konstantin U.
Chernenko became the Soviet leader on
th* death of Yuri V. Andropov, there
were hopes that Mr. Chernenko would
break the impasse.
President Reagan's speech on Jan.
l6 seeking a renewed dialogue between
the two countries marked at least a
modest shift on American policy. Mr.,
Chernenko greeted Vice President.
Bush and other Western dignitaries
after the funeral of Mr. Andropov in a
positive manner that was taken by
some Western envoys as a harbinger of
newdiplomatic moves.
? Hart Seen as a Factor
Recently, those hopes have dimmed.
Since early this month there has been a
shift back to the chilly and implacable
mood that set in after the Russians
walked out of the medium-range mis-
sile talks in Geneva in November, and
followed that up by suspending parallel
negotiations on strategic, or long-
range, weapons.
The Kremlin has rebuffed diplomatic
probes from Washington, and has
driven the message home by adopting a
stringent and uncooperative attitude on
a range of lesser issues.
One element that seems to be deter-
ring the Kremlin is the emergence of
Senator Gary Hart as a serious con-
tender for the Democratic presidential
nomination.
Soviet officials and commentators
who were talking a few week ago as
though they regarded President Rea-
gan as odds-on to be re-elected are sud-
denly saying that the election could
hinge on the state of Soviet-American
relations, and that the Democrats
could still win.
Diplomats say they sense that this
has had a major impact on policy to-
ward the United States. As long as Mr.
Reagan was regarded as likely to over-
whelm his Democratic opponent, the
diplomats say, there was a chance that
the Soviet leaders might seek arms
agreements with him before the elec-
tion.
Now many diplomats believe that
Mr. Hart's successes in the primaries
and the emphasis he has placed on a
nuclear weapons freeze is impelling
the Russians in the other direction,
away from any early concessions.
This stance may have attractions for
the Kremlin regardless of whether Mr.
Hart emerges as the Democratic nomi-
nee. As the diplomats view it, the Rus-
sians see the Colorado Senator as push-
ing the nuclear weapons issue into the
forefront of the campaign, thus in-
creasing the pressure on Mr. Reagan to
modify his position. At the same time,
by enlivening the Democratic contest,
the diplomats say, Mr. Hart is seen as
increasing the chances that either he or
former Vice President Walter F. Mon-
dale will give Mr. Reagan a good con-
test in November.
In the meantime, it is plain that the
Kremlin sees a resumption of negotia-
tions with the Reagan Administration
as a political prize that would help the
President's election chances.
What this implies is that an arms
concession of sufficient importance by!
Mr. Reagan would outweigh other con-;
siderations and could prompt the re-
opening of talks.
And there were new indications
today that the Kremlin's price for a nu-
clear agreement would remain high.
Two articles by the official press
agency, Tass, said that there could be
no return to the negotiations on medi-
um-range missiles without prior with-
drawal of the Pershing 2 and cruise.
missiles that the United States began
deploying in Britain and West Ger-
many at the end of last year.
One of the Tass articles rebutted for
the first time a compromise proposal
promoted in some quarters in the West
under which talks would resume on a
Western pledge to freeze further de-
ployment.
One Tass piece also discussed an in-
terview given to a West German news-
paper, Offenburger Tagenblatt, by the
West German Chancellor, Helmut
Kohl.
Tass said Mr. Kohl had predicted
that Moscow would return to the
Geneva talks. But the Tass article
said: "The Soviet Union will not take
part in such a game, and will not have
such talks and discussions. The Soviet
stand on that issue is most explicit and
clear cut. The way to the talks can open
only through withdrawal of the Ameri-
can missiles."
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A20 ... Friday. Ars-e&:3.198S THE WASIiINGTON POST
i Soviet Decision-Making
Paralysis'
alks
Seen Arr~ is C?ntroI T
Hampering
"?'~ ? his col-
AswcaudPrM response to administration critics was "aging and ailing. and
l were themselves
e
.A three-year "paralysis" in Soviet
d4ision-making, brought about by
t?4 leadership changes, has "severely
Isnmpered" U.S. efforts to reach
arms control agreements, a top State
Department official said yesterday.
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, under-
secretary for political affairs, said
that since the Reagan administration
took office, the Soviets have not. had
tie. kind of leadership capable of
mlikiiig difficult decisions and ac-
?ing responsibility for them.
.., "Virtually without exception, each
tilde -the Soviets have been' faced
with difficult choices, we have wit-
en sse l a period of apparent internal
~gbate, followed inevitably by hard-
Hne decisions, clearly dictated by the
r,104 conservative elements in the
` itburo," Eagleburger said.
His assessment apparently was in
ar
who blame President Reagan for the eagu
s failure of Moscow and Washington for the succession.
to reach arms control agreements. Yuri V. Andropov, who succeeded
`'
Eaglebuzgei's remarks were pre- Brezhnev in November, 198~, was
pared for delivery to a foreign policy seriously ill for much of his short
conference in Birmingham, Ala. A tenure, Eagleburger said, and Kon-
stantin U. Chernenko, who became
d b
l
y
ease
text of his speech was re
the State Department. Communist Party leader six weeks.
Eagleburger, the department's ago, "has yet to establish himself."
third-ranking official, said the ad- "This flux in the Kremlin has se-
ministration has worked hard to put . verely hampered the give-and-take
forward sensible arms control pro- of diplomacy in general," Eaglebur-
ger said, "and of our arms control
"Yet , for now, at least, all we have talks in particular.'
to show for it is a Soviet walkout He said the lesson of the past
from the two most important arms three years is that the Soviet deci-
control negotiations," he said, refer- lion-making apparatus-in the ab-
ring to the talks on reducing inter- sence of strong leadership that is
continental and medium-range nu- prepared to exercise its authority-
clear weapons. He said that when "is likely to seek refuge in a bureau-
the administration took office, So- cratically safe but substantively ster-
viet President Leonid I. Brezhnev ile hard line."
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
."All we have is a Soviet walkout"
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Washington Wire
A Special Weekly Report From
The Wall Street Journal's
Capital Bureau
U.S.-SOVIET FRICTION grows over pri.
vate talks to ease tensions.
The two sides dispute the current talks'
significance; analysts detect an election-
year propaganda war. Moscow is peeved by
a Shultz statement touting "private diplo-
matic discussions" to seek possible accord
on arms control and other issues. The Sovi-
ets claim Shultz spreads false optimism.
They deny that a private meeting in Moscow
between Gromyko and U.S. Ambassador
Hartman made any progress.
The-Reagan administration, with eyes on
the election, wants to make relations seem
better than they are. A top official insists
the quiet discussions are continuing "to see
if he can solve some of these problems."
Moscow tries to paint a bleak picture-for
fear that any appearance of progress might
only help Reagan's reelection chances.
Many U.S. officials doubt any break-
through on nuclear-arms issues this
year. But the Soviets will have to deal
with Reagan next year if he is re-
elected.
WS 23l L
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/22 : CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200310005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/22 : CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200310005-1
U. S. Envoy Looks to Soviet Talks
On a New Cultural Exchange Pact
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to Mw New York Time
WASHINGTON, March 22 - Arthur
A. Hartman, the United States Ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union, said today
that the two countries were involved in
talks that "could lead to some kind of
progress on the more serious issues."
He said he hoped for a resumption of
talks on a cultural and scientific ex-
change agreement. Negotiations on ex-
changes and on establishing consulates
in New York and Kiev were about to be
revived last summer when President``
Reagan ordered a suspension in re-
sponse to the downing of a South Ko-
rean airliner by a Soviet plane.
The exchange agreement expired in
1980 and was not renewed by the Carter
Administration because of the % Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. The estab.
lishment of the additional consulates
was also canceled by President Carter.
In another East-West forum, the
European security talks in Stockholm,
the Soviet Union was said to be testing
NATO interest in a statement renounc-
ing the use of force to clear the way for
a resumption of arms talks. [Page A8.]
Ambassador Hartman returned to
Washington several days ago for the,
.second time is less than a month to con- I
suit and to talk to outside groups in an j
effort to promote support for a more i
positive approach to dealing with the
Soviet Union. He has been cautious on
the possibilities because of what he per-
es oisa