NSC MEETINGS ON CHINA, 16 & 17 APRIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000100290004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 13, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council 11CApri 111984
MEMORANDUM FOR: DeputyoUi~ectortoflCentral~intelligence
VIA: Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
l
FROM: David D. Gri es ~.!"~.^
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: Your Attendance at Two Principals Only Meetings
Relating to the President's Trip to China
1. Your Monday Lunch Meeting
On Monday, 16 April you are invited to a White House luncheon from
1200 to 1s30. The first 45 minutes will be occupied with a review of
issues expected to arise during the President's trip. These are
enumerated at Tab A in a draft NSDD. The second 45 minutes has been set
aside for a "walk through" of the President's schedule.
2. Secretary Shultz will take the lead in putting the visit in
perspective--the purpose of the visit, how tl~e Chinese view it, and what
it means to Sino-US relations.
The President will have unprecedented TV coverage in China, witF~
the time in most cases adjusted to meeting US network
deadlines. The Chinese people will see more of him than any
previous American leader. Given his abilities on TV, his three
7V presentations are likely to become the high points of the
trip.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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In my view, tie President is spenuing ~~~ore time with the three
senior Chinese leaders than is really sensible. Even allowing
for translation time, I~~e has many hours to use in what has got
to be fairly serious conversation. Accordingly, when his
talF.ing points pass through the NS% mechanism, they should be
examined to make sure there is enough content to use up the
available time. Shultz may foreshadow their conl,ent in his
presentation.
3. Your Tuesday Meeti iig
On Tuesday, 17 April you are invited to a rt~eetiny in tiie White House
Situation Room from 1100 to 1200.
second 30 minutes of the Tuesday meeting will
policy toward tiie Korean peninsula and Taiwan,
likely to arise during the President's s ecial
X1aoDlnQ. and an update b ou
4. After) (there will be
a discussion on Korea Taiwan t e resi~en s separa e, restricted
The 25X1
be devoted to: a review of .25X1
discussion of issues
small meeting with Deng
25X1
25X1
meeting with Deng and
-- The discussion on Korea is important in that the President may
not be aware of probable North Korean motives in making some
recent yestures towards South Korea. At Tab B is a memorandum I
was separately preparing for you but which now seems appropriate
for this book.
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SECRET
THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO
THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Over the past year, we have witnessed an improvement in U.S.-
China relations. The recent visit to the United States by
Premier Zhao Ziyang and my return visit to China are in themselves
strong indications that the relationship is progressing well,
despite some proble~s, and that the Chinese appreciate the value
of the relationship and will continue to cooperate with us to
advance the relationship in areas of~mutual interest. We want my
,visit to continue ~ ome~um ~ recent months. (S)
~i
~~
~Because of the importance of this relationship and the sensitive
aspects of managing our relations with both the People's Republic
of China and Taiwan, it is essential that our strategies and
policies be coherent and that our actions be consistent and
mutually reinforcing. The public perception of these discussions
at home and abroad will have an important bearing on the course
of our relationship, and therefore, in addition to ensuring that
our private statements to the Chinese are consistent, we must
ensure that our public statements and briefings to the media
about the visit are consistent, coordinated, and supportive of
our goals. (S)
Objectives
In our relationship with China we seek:
- To promote a China that remains independent of the Soviet
orbit. (S)
- To encourage China's efforts to modify and liberalize its
totalitarian system, introduce incentives and market forces in
its economy, and continue expanding its ties with the major
industrialized democracies. (S)
~ - To help China modernize, on the grounds that a strong,
},i, stable China can be an increasing force for peace, both in Asia
and in the world, if the two objectives above are realized. (S)
To achieve these overall objectives we should emphasize the
following themes during this very important visit:
SECRET
Dec~ssify on: OADR
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Political/Diplomatic Relationship
First, on political/diplomatic issues we should aim:
- To reaffirm our commitment to regard China as a friendly,
non-allied nation and to consolidate and advance our bilateral
relationship on that basis. (C)
- To enhance Chinese understanding of the United States and
carry the message of American friendship directly to the Chinese
people by further developing the rapport between U.S. and Chinese
leaders, and by direct talks to the Chinese people, carried over
Chinese television and radio, as well as in the press. (C)
- To reaffirm our intention to live up to the various joint
communiques we have signed with the Chinese, including the one of
August 1982 on arms sales. At the same time we should reconfirm
our moral and legal commitment to maintain unofficial relations
with the people of Taiwan, including the continued sale of
defensive arms. 'We believe the "resolution" of the Taiwan issue
is a matter for the Chinese people to settle themselves, and our
only concern is that it be done peacefully. A continued peaceful
approach by Beijing to Taiwan is fundamental to our position on
Taiwan arms sales and to the whole framework of our relations.
(S)
- To send a quiet signal to our friends in Asia, as well as
to the Soviets and others, that U.S.-China ties can prosper on a
foundation of realism, mutual interest, and mutual respect,
despite differences arising from the nature of our societies and
political systems. (S)
- To seek ways of expanding and perhaps institutionalizing
regular U.S.-Chinese consultations and coordination on issues
where our interests are similar or parallel (e.g., Korea, Afghanis-
tan, Kampuchea). (S)
Economic/Trade/Scientific and Technological/Cultural Relationship
Second, in this area we should seek:
- To articulate our readiness to lend support
to
China's
ambitious modernization effort, especially through
our
liberalized
technology transfer policy.~e also need to work
for
legislation
~
that protects our ability to implement existing olicy
against legislation which restrict or inhibit it~ (S)
and
II - To make every effort between now and the end of my visit
,,,~`A to conclude an agreement of cooperation on the peaceful uses of
'~ nuclear energy, so that it could be announced or initialed while
I am in China~ti This will require imagination and persistence in
persuading the Chinese to meet our needs with respect to consent
~Un rights on the ultimate disposition of spent nuclear fuel. A
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nuclear cooperation agree ent will represent a milestone in
advancin O.S. non-prolifera Ives, ringing China into
the _roup of nations pursuing these objectives, and in opening
the extensive Chinese market to the U.S, nuclear industry. (S)
- To express our disappointment over the Chinese failure to
abide by the terms of our bilateral grain agreement in 1983 and
our expectation that they will henceforth abide by the terms of
the agreement. (C)
- To encourage the Chinese to look beyond immediate problems
in some areas to the longer-term potential of their economic
relationship with the U.S. (C)
-`To attempt ~to create an atmosphere in which we can conclude
as early as possible the various bilateral agreements and treaties
still pending, especially a comprehensive bilateral investment
treaty (BIT), and a renewal of the Maritime Agreement. (C)
- To build on the substantial trade benefits that both
countries have derived over the past few years. (C)
- To work for the removal of U.S. legislative language
formulated in earlier years, lumping China together with the
USSR, which restrict our ability to provide technical assistance
or low-interest loans to China. while we have no plans now for
programs in either area, we want to be in a position to propose
them should future policy formulation make such moves desirable.
(C)
- To promote greater industrial and commercial cooperation
by urging the Chinese to expand the areas of cooperation under
the new Technological and Industrial Cooperation Accord through
the establishment of protocols in specific industrial sectors,
especially energy, transportation and telecommunications; and by
the announcement of several Presidential Trade Missions to China
to take place over the next two years, sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. (C)
- To dramatize our cooperation in Scientific and Technological
areas by offering the Chinese a program of cooperation in space
research ~,~hich would include the possibility of a Chinese astronaut
accompanying a Chinese experiment on a flight of a U.S. Space
Shuttle. (S)
- To increase the already large student exchange program,
and to seek improved access for American scholars in China to
research materials, more commensurate with that enjoyed by
Chinese scholars in the U.S. (C)
(C)
w
- To increase cultural exchanges in athletics and the arts.
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Strategic/Military Relationship
Third, in the area of strategic and military relations, we should
strive:
- To attempt to stimulate greater Chinese interest in
raising the level of strategic dialogue and in expanding U.S.-PRC
cooperation against the common threat posed by the USSR. To
brief Chinese leaders on Soviet military expansion in Asia, their
' likely future weapons development, on Soviet efforts to expand
their influence throughout the world, and on arms control matters.
?n0 (S)
- To discuss the need to take new st
~
eps to insure the
~,,
stability of the Kozean peninsula. This should include briefing
the Chinese on our~view of the threat posed by North Korea,
discussing ways to bring the North into bilateral talks with the
Republic of Korea to reduce tensions and begin confidence building
measures, and discussing ways to make North Korea more responsible
and more interested in joining the community of nations. (S)
- To restate our determination t
o work together with them to
,(~ upgrade their defensive military capabilities. Transfer of
U1~' appropriate levels of technology, civilian and military, consistent
klr~with other strategic interests and international obligations, is
necessary and desirable in pursuit of this objective. (S)
- To expand the exchange of military VIP's and specialist
delegations. This should include setting a date for the visit to
the U.S, of the Chinese Minister of Defense, and public announce-
ment of this date, during my visit to China. (S)
Our overall strategy should be to develop our relationship by
highlighting the areas of agreement and potential cooperation,
while maintaining a firm but auiet stance on issues involving our
own principles and commitments not subject to compromise. (S)
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