NSC MEETING, 30 OCTOBER 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000100220006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET)
26 October 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
FROM SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT NSC Meeting, 30 October 1984
1. You are scheduled to attend an NSC meeting on Tuesday, 30 October
at 3:30 p.m. This will be a principal plus one meeting and we recommend
that you take Bob Gates.
2. Attached you will find:
-- At Tab A is material prepared by Bob Vickers from which talking
points can be drawn on the current situation in El Salvador and
Nicaragua.
-- At Tab B is material prepared by Bob Vickers from which talking
points can be drawn on the Contadora process. This includes a
rundown on the positions of each of the participants in the
Contadora process.
-- At Tab C is a summary of concerns
expressed by the Presidents of the Core Four over the Nicaraguan
0
At Tab D is the updated version of Bob Vickers' paper entitled,
"Negotiations as a Communist Tactic."
At Tab E is a draft Central American monthly article on the
Contradora process.
-- Finally, at Tab G you will find the key judgments from the
recent DDI/ALA paper entitled, "El Salvador: Guerrilla
"
Capabilities and Prospects Over the Next Two Years.
3. We have arranged a pre-brief for you on Monday at 2:45.
will be Bob Gates, Bob Vickers, John Helgerson, and
Included
4. If there is anything else I can do to help in the preparation of
this meeting, please call me.
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NIO/LA
26 October 1984
NSC TALKING POINTS
Overall developments in Central America continue to be generally
favorable to US interests in the region, but problems do remain:
El SALVADOR
In El Salvador, indicate that
the insurgents are anxious to reach a negotiated settlement with the
government because they no longer believe they can win a military victory in
the foreseeable future, and because the future degree of Cuban and
Nicaraguan support is in doubt.
Nicaragua has first
i
priority, and Salvadoran
nsurgency could be renewed
once the Nicaraguan revolution is consolidated.
The Salvadoran insurgents themselves are now hopeful of negotiating
some form of agreement with Duarte that would allow them to rebuild their
damaged political and labor organizations, particularly in San Salvador and
other major cities. Furthermore, if they can obtain a ceasefire which would
postpone or prevent major offensive actions by the Salvadoran armed forces,
it would give them more time to strengthen their military forces while
expanding their political activities.
the insurgents broadcast a
numoer OT -maximum goals or a talks. These goals were much
less ambitious than previous demands, and included such items as
the release of all political prisoners, the right to organize
government workers and peasants into unions, and full access to
the media by all labor and popular organizations.
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Thus although President Duarte now has the insurgents on the military
and political defensive, he will have to be careful not to make any
concessions to the insurgents that weaken his own military efforts and give
the leftists too much political breathing room inside El Salvador. He
especially should not agree to a ceasefire proposal that leaves the
insurgents armed and in control of major base areas, because this would
probably precipitate a revolt by his own military.
Duarte is aware
of these dangers and is prepared to offer few, if any,
concessions in future talks.
Turning to the situation on the ground, the death of Col. Monterossa
is a real loss to the Salvadoran Army and a blow to its morale.
Nevertheless, the appointment of Col. Mendez as a replacement is a good one,
and the Army should be able to resume offensive operations without
significant pause. The insurgents tried to take advantage of the loss by
calling for a popular uprising, but this fell on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the
major insurgent radio station in eastern El Salvador has been shut down as a
result of military action.
-- The guerrillas have tried to focus new attention on the urban
sector to make up for their setbacks in the countryside.
Student groups, labor unions, and other popular sector
associations are preparing for strikes and protests to take
advantage of the political opening. Terrorism probably will
also escalate as the guerrillas, frustrated with their defensive
posture in the field, seek to weaken the government's image and
intimidate the public by fomenting unrest in the cities.
NICARAGUA
In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas also are on the political and military
defensive, and their economic problems continue to mount. They appear
determined to push ahead with their elections on 4 November, despite the
withdrawal of the major democratic opposition party, primarily to legitimize
their regime and reduce US options to interfere in their domestic political
affairs.
I
the
elections were mainly for "show"--to convince the international
community that Nicaragua was a good, pluralistic democratic
country. the Sandinistas had also managed to avoid the
mistakes of Castro by not attempting immediately to collectivize
agriculture or enforce doct
rinaire refo
rms.
however,
SECRET)
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that the ultimate intention was to eliminate the private sector.
they were attempting to create a coherent ruling party on
Marxist-Leninist lines, and had turned to the Soviets for guidance
and assistance. Once a disciplined party was created, it would be
possible to dispense with the temporary supporters of the
revolution.
should dispel any illusions about the ultimate
intentions of the Sandinistas to establish a Marxist-Leninist regime.
Managua may hope that early elections will reduce the options of the US to
interfere in its domestic political affairs by having a "legitimate"
government in place which would not be subject to the subsequent
democratic" election provisions in the draft Contadora Treaty. In effect,
the Contadora Treaty would serve to ratify Nicaragua as a democratic state.
The Sandinistas would then be able to write their own constitution and
consolidate the regime at their own pace.
The greatest Sandinista fear would probably be that the elections fail
to bestow the necessary legitimacy on their regime to gain international
recognition and prevent US interference. In particular, there is a danger
to them that one of the Contadora countries may condemn their elections and
question Sandinista legitimacy to sign the Treaty.
Meanwhile, the anti-Sandinista insurgents continue to carry on
militarily despite the cutoff of US aid.
-- Recently, the insurgents have begun to attack the northern city
of Esteli to demonstrate their continued strength, forcing the
Sandinistas to deploy aircraft tanks, and artillery in
defense. indicate the Sandinistas have
suffered heavy losses, and while the insurgents may not take the
town, they have already shown they remain a major force to be
reckoned with on the eve of the election.
Finally, the Sandinistas continue to get financial aid from various
sources to alleviate their economic difficulties.
-- Although Mexico has suspended shipments of crude oil, it is
continuing delivery of refined products in return for cash
downpayments, and has accepted barter deals to pay off past
debts.
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-- Libya has provided Nicaragua with $100 million recently,~ 25X1
Nicaragua will be the focus for 25X1
Libyan aid to other regional radical groups during the coming
year. Chile, El Salvador, and Colombia will be special targets
for destabilization.
Attachments:
A. Contadora Talking Points
B. Concern of Presidents of the Core Four Contadora
Countries Over the Nicaraguan Elections
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S E C R E TJ
CONTADORA TALKING POINTS
Contadora--because it is a peace initative and because it was sponsored by
respected Latin American democracies--has wide acceptance, but to the Central
American countries most threatened by foreign-supported subversion, the Contadora
initiative has produced a peace instrument of such imbalance that it augments,
not reduces the threat to them. Moreover, the current draft treaty virtually
guarantees the survival of Marxist Nicaragua and, thus, the consolidation of
Cuban/Soviet influence in the Isthmus. Because Contadora is a peace initiative
designed to end the bloodshed in Nicaragua and El Salvador, there is a
reluctance to criticize the draft treaty directly. Nonetheless, there is a
wide variance between the public and private attitudes of the leaders of the
Contadora countries toward the treaty and, with the exception of Mexico, these
leaders believe that the treaty provisions are particularly inadequate with
regard to verification. This concern persuaded the countries of Costa Rica,
Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador (Nicaragua was invited but refused to
attend) to meet and discuss revisions to the treaty. The result of that
meeting was to propose to replace the Additional Protocol with a Protocol
of Guarantor States. The meeting also agreed to have only the four original
countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela) sign the Protocol. The
Guarantor nations would be limited (suggestions are Brazil, Argentina, Spain
and West Germany. France would be welcomed as a guarantor as well).
The following represent an update of our perceptions of the private views
of leaders of the Contadora countries toward the process. It is too soon to
know the reaction to the latest initative by the countries of Guatemala, Costa
Rica, El Salvador and Honduras to replace the Additional Protocol.
Venezuela:
Venezuelan Government officials express their misgivings
about the Contadora process. One official believes the treaty as
written would be "unverifiable" and does not provide sufficient
guarantees against Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan penetration of the region.
Costa Rica:
-- Costa Rican officials have strong concerns about the Contadora
Treaty as originally revised. They believe their country will
have serious problems with Nicaragua, regardless of what happens to
the Sandinista regime. Through the Contadora process, Costa Rica
hopes to impose an "international big brother" on the Sandinistas.
S E C R E T
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El Salvador:
-- The espousal by officials of the Salvadoran Government of the Contadora
process is for international consumption only. The GOES has no
intention of signing an agreement unless signficant changes are made
in the revised acta. The GOES does not trust the Sandinistas to
comply with any agreement in any event.
-- The GOES further believes that a "regionalization" of the Contadora
process would be desirable; its position is that the original
Contadora countries made a good beginning with the initial draft
agreement, but the process should go further and essentially make
Central America responsible for its own destiny.
Honduras:
-- There appears to be a difference in Honduras between civilian and
military authorities over the Contadora process. The civilians
believe that the revised acta represents an improvement and that
it would be acceptable to Honduras with certain changes. In the
aggregate, these changes would signify a relinquishment by
Nicaragua of its current overwhelming military superiority.
-- The Honduran military puts no faith whatsoever in the Contadora
process as a solution to the problems in Central America. The
military believes it will merely buy time for the Sandinistas to
consolidate their regime.
Guatemala:
-- Despite its public stance of neutrality on regional issues, the
Guatemalan Government is privately concerned over the existence of
a Marxist, expanisionist regime in Nicaragua. Guatemala pays lip
service to the Contadora process, primarily because of its dependence
upon Mexico and Venezuela for oil,
Panama:
-- Panamanian officials view the Contadora Process as an important and
irreplaceable initiative but believe that more negotiations are
necessary among the Central American countries. Panamanian military
leaders favor additional changes to make the treaty more restrictive
of Nicaragua.
Colombia:
-- President Betancur of Colombia was a primary proponent of the
Contadora Process and favors its rapid implementation, in part because
of the personal acclaim that he will receive by that action. Recently, he
has become concerned that Nicaraguan intransigence vis-a-vis the
elections will damage the Contadora process and he is urging the
Sandinistas to postpone the elections and become more flexible.
SEC R E I
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TOP SECRETI
26 October 1984
SUBJECT: Negotiations as a Communist Tactic
1. I Castro
and the Sandinistas look upon negotiations, including the Contadora
process, as something they urgently need to relieve the pressure on
Nicaragua. The Sandinistas also hope to
needed to consolidate their regime the
situation on the ground and geopoliticai rea es, suggest a he
Communists are ready to negotiate in El Salvador in order to solidify and
further develop a base in Nicaragua.
2.
-- insurgent military success in Salvador would bring the US
in militarily after the President's reelection;
-- Nicaraguan Contras are geared for a long struggle with
which they can build a sociopolitical structure inside
Nicaragua and develop an opposition that will be very
difficult to dislodge; and
-- the Salvadoran insurgents' best hope of gaining power is to
build a political base inside El Salvador while negotiating.
TOP SECRET
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