MEMCON: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH CORE FORE, OCTOBER 5, 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000100220003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 8, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

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DRAFTED BY ARA/CEN: NSSMI TH: SLP
APPROVED BY S: SECRETARY
ARA: LAMOTLEY (SUBS)
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S: MBUTLER
S/S: J PCOVEY
005541 NOD988
------------------ 036417 081951Z /60
0 8819971 OCT 84 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T STATE 298926
NOD IS
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, XK -
SUBJECT: MEMCON: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH CORE FOUR,
OCTOBER 5. 1984 (S/S 8427791)
1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SECRETARY OPENED BY NOTING THAT THIS WAS AN
IMPORTANT MOMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GREATER
STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE CONTADORA DRAFT TREATY
WAS GOOD BUT NEEDED FURTHER WORK. THIS WOULD REQUIRE
CLOSE COORDINATION AND INTENSE EFFORT BY OUR FRIENDS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA. INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF CONTADORA
WERE VERY IMPORTANT. THE SAN JOSE MEETING HAD BEEN
REASONABLY GOOD. EUROPE WAS SUPPORTIVE. EXCEPT FOR
FRANCE. HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW MUCH SUCCESS THE CENTRAL
AMERICANS HAD HAD IN SECURING MORE AID BUT HE HAD URGED
THE EUROPEANS TO GO TO SAN JOSE WITH AN OPEN CHECK BOOK
AND MORE OPEN MARKETS.
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3. ON MANZANILLO, THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR DESIRE TO
DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO DIALOGUE. THIS WAS GENUINE;
WE WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON
IMPORTANT ISSUES. WE WERE TRYING TO SUPPORT CONTADORA
AND REINFORCE THE EFFORTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICANS. AMB
MOTLEY AND AMB SHLAUDEMAN HAD MET WITH COMMANDANTE ORTEGA
THAT WEEK AT HIS REQUEST TO DEMONSTRATE FURTHER OUR
WILLINGNESS TO TALK. NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAD OCCURRED.
ORTEGA HAD TAKEN A TOUGH POSITION. THE SECRETARY HAD
REITERATED OUR CONCERNS TO SEPUL'EDA AND WOULD UNDERLINE
THEM AGAIN NEXT WEEK IN PANAMA AND IN MEXICO CITY. THE
SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO RESIST STRENUOUSLY
EFFORTS TO MOVE CONTADORA ISSUES INTO THE UN. IT WAS
IMPORTANT NOT TO TAKE THE FOCUS OFF CENTRAL AMERICA AND
FOR THEIR UN REPRESENTATIVES TO WORK CLOSELY-WITH AMB
KIRKPATRICK. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRADE OF GUATEMALA NOTED
THAT A SPL IT WAS DEVELOPING WITHIN CONTADOTRA AND THAT
PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHARED THE VIEW THAT DEBATE AT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE AVOIDED. AMB KIRKPATRICK SAID
THE IDEAL SOLUTION UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE
FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SIMPLY REPORT ON CONTADORA
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SHE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE
CENTRAL AMERICANS SHOULD TABLE A RESOLUTION TO PREEMPT
NICARAGUA.
4. PAZ BARNICA REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF CONTADORA AND
PROGRESS ACHIEVED. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOW NOT TO WASTE THE
ENORMOUS EFFORT ACHIEVED, THAT COULD ONLY LOSE
CREDIBILITY FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICANS IN EUROPE. HE
NOTED THAT THE OCTOBER 15 DATE WAS ONLY FOR COMMENTS. NOT
FOR SIGNATURE. AS NOW DRAFTED, TIMING PROVISIONS FAVORED
NICARAGUA. EACH OF THE CORE FOUR AGREED IN COSTA RICA TO
EMPHASIZE CERTIAN ASPECTS OF CONTADORA. PAZ REVIEWED
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SEVERAL OF THE DEFICIENCIES ON THE SECURITY SIDE. HE
NOTED THAT OUR JOINT STRATEGY HAD FAILED WHEN NICARAGUA
HAD ACCEPTED SIGNATURE OF THE ACT. FOREIGN MINISTER
D'ESCOTO HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM ON SUNDAY THAT WHEN
NICARAGUA HAD ACCEPTED CONTADORA IT ELIMINATED NEED FOR
FURTHER MEETINGS WITH SHLAUDEMAN. THE SECRETARY
RESPONDED THAT IF NICARAGUA WANTED TO STOP THE TALKS, WE
WOULD STOP THEM BUT THAT AS OF NOW THEY SEEMED TO WANT
CONTINUED EXCHANGES.
5. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED OUR PUBLIC POSITION ON
CONTADORA: THAT WE CONTINUE TO FAVOR IT; THAT IT HAD
ACHIEVED A GREAT DEAL; THAT MORE WORK WAS NECESSAkY TO
MAKE IT OPERATIONAL; THAT THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES WOULD
REVIEW CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMENTS AFTER OCTOBER 15; THAT
HAVING COME THIS FAR IT WAS IMPORTANT TO COMPLETE THE JOB
SUCCESSFULLY. THE WORST OUTCOME WOULD BE A TREATY THAT
DID NOT WORK, WITH NICARAGUA CONTINUING TO 3IIPPORT THE
GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR, WITH SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY
PERSONNEL STILL IN NICARAGUA AND WITH A CONTINUATION OF
THE ARMS FLOW TO THAT COUNTRY. THAT OUTCOME WAS NOT
NECESSARY WITH CONTINUATION OF OUR JOINT INTENSIFIED
EFFORTS AND OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS.
6. IN OUR VIEW THERE WERE THREE CATEGORIES WHERE CHANGE
WAS REQUIRED: (1) SIMULTANIETY OF SECURITY COMMITMENTS,
(2) THE CONTENT OF SECURITY ISSUES SUCH AS ARMS FREEZE,
CEILING LEVELS AND EXERCISES, AND (3) THE PROBLEMS OF
VERIFICATION. THIS MEANT AT A MINIMUM VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS THAT WERE CLEAR SO THAT OTHERS WOULD KNOW WHEN
VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. WITH AGREED PROCEDURES AND
AUTHORITIES TO CARRY THEM OUT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE
AGREED WITH PAZ THAT WE HAD TO SEEK A WORKABLE AGREEMENT
SOON, NOT A PROLONGATION OF THE PROCESS. THE CREDIBILITY
OF ALL WAS ON THE LINE. WE ALL HAD AN INTEREST IN
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GETTING A GOOD TREATY ON THE BOOKS.
C06/17 005541 NOD988
1. FOREIGN MINISTER GUTIERREZ NOTED THAT COSTA RICA HAD
ALREADY RESPONDED TO CONTADORA: THAT IT ACCEPTED THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THE TREATY AS WRITTEN, WITH EMPHASIS ON
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL OF POLITICAL COMMITMENTS; THEY
HAD MADE SOME REFERENCE TO SECURITY PROVISIONS BUT THOSE
WOULD BE HANDLED IN DETAIL BY EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS.
HE HAD EXPLAINED COSTA RICA' S POSITION ON TV AND IT WAS
WELL UNDERSTOOD THERE.
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8. ANDRADE SAID GUATEMALA WOULD RESPOND AT THE LAST
MINUTE. THE BEST STRATEGY WAS FRANKNESS. WE WERE ON THE
DEFENSIVE AND SHOULD RECOGNIZE NATIONAL DIFFERENCES
RATHER THAN CREATE AN IMAGE OF THE "CORE FOUR" WHICH
COULD ONLY LOOK LIKE A FALSE UNITY. EVERYONE RECOGNIZED
THE NEED FOR SIMULTANIETY OF SECURITY COMMITMENTS. THE
BEST STRATEGY WAS FOR EL SALVADOR TO MAKE Tom' SECURITY
POINTS. GUATEMALA WOULD ENDORSE THE DRAFT, NOTING ONLY
"MINOR TECHNICAL REVISIONS". THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL
AMERICA HAD A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN POSITIONS AND
DECIDE THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ANDRADE EXPRESSED
FULL SOLIDARITY WITH EL SALVADOR BUT SAID THE BEST
STRATEGY FOR HIS COUNTRY WAS TO NOTE MINOR RESERVATIONS
NOW AND WORK LATER, BEHIND THE SCENES IN SUPPORT OF
DUARTE. THE SPLIT IN CONTADORA WAS NOW SIGNIFICANT.
VENEZUELA WOULD SOON BE JOINED BY PANAMA, AFTER OCTOBER
11, AND THOSE TWO COULD PREVENT MEXICO AND COLOMBIA FROM
RUSHING THE PROCESS. THE RIO MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST
INTERNATIONAL HAD OPENED EVERYONE'S EYES ON THE
SANDINISTAS. EVENTS WERE MOVING OUR WAY. WE HAD TO
HANDLE PUBLIC RELATIONS WITH SUBTLETY, GETTING
NICARAGUA'S FRIENDS TO PRESSURE IT.
9. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT GUATEMALA
AND COSTA RICA SAY EXPLICITLY AND IN PUBLIC THAT THEY
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SUPPORT THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF EL SALVADOR AND NOT
LEAVE PRESIDENT DUARTE ALONE IN PUBLIC. SILENCE OR
VAGUENESS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL NOW. AMB KIRKPATRICK
NOTED THAT COUNTRIES STANDING TOGETHER HAD A STRONGER
VOICE. THERE WAS NO STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE "FRONT LINE
STATES" OR THE "CONTACT GROUP" ON AFRICAN ISSUES OR
"ASEAN" ON KAMPUCHEA OR FOR THAT MATTER CONTADORA OR THE
EC-1B. NOBODY APPRECIATED IT WHEN BELGIUM OR ZAMBIA TOOK
POSITION SEPARATE FROM THEIR GROUPS.
19. FOREIGN MINISTER TENORIO SAID THAT EL SALVADOR WAS
VERY CONCERNED WITH THE PRESENT DRAFT. THAT WAS THE MAIN
REASON DUARTE WAS GOING TO THE UN. THE RISKS FOR .L
SALVADOR OF THE CURRENT SECURITY PROVISIONS WERE
ENORMOUS. IT WOULD NOT HELP END EL SALVADOR'S INTERNAL
CONFLICT. EL SALVADOR DID NOT SEE THE SLIGHTEST BIT OF
SINCERITY FROM NICARAGUA AND THEREFORE INSISTED UPON
STRICT VERIFICATION AND NO FREEZE ON I TS Oa WEAPONS
PROCUREMENT. DUARTE WOULD EXPLAIN THIS POSITION AT THE
UN IN GENERAL TERMS. ON THE 15TH EL SALVADOR WOULD
PRESENT A DETAILED CRITIOUE. THE SECRETARY AGREED SAYING
THAT EL SALVADOR OBVIOUSLY HAD NO INTEREST IN PRESERVING
A STATUS OUO ON INTERNAL CONFLICT: PRESIDENT DUARTE'S
POSITION WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED.
11. PAZ BARNICA SUGGESTED THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
COUNTRIES RETAKE THE INITIATIVE FROM THE CONTADORA FOUR
BY CALLING A MEETING AMONG ALL FIVE CENTRAL AMERICANS,
INCLUDING NICARAGUA. IMMEDIATELY AFTER OCTOBER 15
COMMENTS WERE SUBMITTED. HE WAS WILLING TO HOST SUCH A
MEETING. IF NICARAGUA REFUSED, THE OTHER FOUR SHOULD
OFFER TO MEET IN MANAGUA. SUCH A MEETING WOULD GIVE THEM
CONTROL OVER THE CONTENT AND PACE OF EVENTS. TAKING AWAY
THE PLAY FROM THE CONTADORA FOUR COUNTRIES. THE
SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT THAT WAS AN EXCELLENT IDEA.
ANDRADE NOTED THAT SUCH A DECISION SHOULD AWAIT FURTHER
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DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN CONTADORA AFTER BARLETTA WAS SWORN
IN, BECAUSE HE SAW A SPLIT CLEARLY DEVELOPING. THE
SECRETARY SUGGESTED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS
STRATEGY WITH AMB SHLAUDEMAN SINCE HE, KIRKPATRICK AND
MOTLEY HAD ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT. (AT THAT MEETING, THE
OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS EXPRESSED' SUPPORT FOR THE
HONDURAN INVITATION AND PAZ AGREED TO CALL A MEETING FOR
OCTOBER 19--IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTADORA REOUEST OF
SEPTEMBER 7, THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICANS CREATE A
MECHANISM OF CONSULTATION AMONG THEMSELVES. LATER
HOWEVER, ANDRADE INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ONLY IN
PRINCIPLE.) THE SECRETARY UNDERLINED THAT ALL OF THEM
HAD A MAJOR STAKE IN THE SUCCESS OF CONTADORA AND
THEREFORE EACH COUNTRY SHOULD IN ITS OWN STATEMENTS GO AS
FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD SUPPORTING THE OTHERS. WHILE
THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCES OF NATIONAL INTEREST, THESE
SHOULD BE PURSUED WITHIN A "WEB OF MUTUAL I T'.-" THE
SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE US WAS NOT ONLY A
GOOD FRIEND OF THE FOUR, IT HOP-ED TO BE A-000D FRIEND OF
EACH; RELATIONS WITH EACH COUNTRY WERE AT DIFFERENT
STAGES BUT WE WANTED THEM ALL TO BE STRENGTHENED. WHILE
THE PROBLEMS WERE OFTEN REGIONAL, WE HAD A STRONG
COMMITMENT TO CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS AS WELL.
SHULTZ
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