PROPOSED FBI REPORT ON HR 4681

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000300400016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 28, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300400016-0
Proposed FBI Report on HR 46M
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Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300400016-0
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27 August 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Liaison CIA
Attn:
FROM: Chairman, SECOM
SUBJECT: Proposed FBI Report on HR 4681
REFERENCE: OLL-84-2750/1, dtd 22 Aug 1984
1. Regarding the proposed FBI response to Rep. Wolf's inquiry on the
Brooks Bill, the following observations are offered:
a. The statement that the polygraph can be abused is negative and
should be omitted. The concept that sanctions are not imposed based
solely on polygraph results or a refusal to participate needs to be
further developed if it is used at all. If it is used, the concept of
resolving unexplained reactions through conventional investigative
techniques should be discussed. Emphasis should be placed upon existing
controls to ensure against abuse and on the use of the polygraph as an
adjunct to investigation, not the sole means.
b. The theme that the FBI and other agencies share in sensitive
intelligence collected by CIA and NSA is extremely useful. It is
important that members of Congress realize that tighter security in CIA
and NSA is not a panacea. They must understand that people in other
agencies often have access to the same highly sensitive intelligence as
CIA and NSA employees. There have been proposals to apply significantly
lesser standards of security to accessed people in other agencies,
apparently in the mistaken notion that they do not receive truly sensitive
intelligence.
c. The implication that CIA might inhibit the flow of intelligence to
agencies without polygraph programs has two flaws: first, it is highly
unlikely to occur, second, it portrays CIA in a less than favorable
light. A better approach would be to emphasize that depriving other
agencies of the option of using the polygraph would adversely affect their
capability to provide appropriate security to the sensitive intelligence
they receive. This would detract from the protection of the nation's most
vital secrets affecting intelligence sources and methods.
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d. The positive aspect of prepublication review as a service to the
writer needs to be portrayed. Employees who do not wish to damage the
national interest need guidance on what disclosures can be harmful.
Through prepublication review, the government provides a way to avoid
illegal and damaging disclosures which are potentially harmful to the
individual and the nation.
2. The proposed letter is essentially a good response, but it has a
negative tone in the key areas identified in reference. Reworking the letter
to accentuate the benefits to the national interest of a more even approach
throughout the government to the security of sensitive intelligence would be
helpful. A
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300400016-0