STATEMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 8, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
STATEMENT ON
THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
BY
GEROLD YONAS
CHAIRMAN, DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS PANEL
DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES STUDY TEAM
DIRECTOR, PULSED POWER SCIENCES
SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
98TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
MARCH 8,1984
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
As Chairman of the Directed Energy Weapons Panel of the Defensive
Technology Study Team (DTST), I, along with my colleagues from industry,
government, and national laboratories, had the opportunity to review and
evaluate the status of the threat and our present defense technology research
programs, and then to prepare a plan for the future. This plan described a program
of research, technology development, and demonstrations to provide future
options for achieving enhanced deterrence through defense against ballistic
missiles. Many of us were skeptical about our present state of defensive
technology, but were equally skeptical about our apparent commitment to assured
retaliation for the indefinite future. We sought a combination of technology and
strategy that could lead to a more stable strategic equation. Until now, offensive
initiatives have caused further responses involving increased off. ensive capabilities.
With truly credible defensive technology, we could, hopefully, make a shift to a
strategy that would make further offensive escalation unattractive.
We began by evaluating not only the present threat, but assumed that the
threat would be modified in a responsive way. We were forced to postulate not
only a robust defense, but also a very capable and determined offense. The
difficulty was to evaluate the moves and counter-moves in a complex scenario that
might lead to a favorable solution. The optimists and pessimists among us saw
things quite differently, but we did agree that there were stilt too many unknowns
to shift away from an offensive dominated strategy now. The program we
developed was, therefore, not one of early deployment, for we concluded that
their initial response would be to successfully countermeasure our near term
defense capabilities. We considered responses that included the following:
proliferating boosters, RVs, and penetration aids; extensive hardening; modifying
boosters to burn out earlier and at lower altitudes; and attacking our space
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
defenses. We knew that a capable defense would introduce enough uncertainty in
the success of an offensive strike to serve as a deterrent; however, a capable
defense would require very substantial increases in the capability of all elements of
our ballistic missile defense technology.
The study team defined the key technology building blocks and identified the
highest leverage aspects for early emphasis:
1. Target acquisition, discrimination, and tracking; weapon pointing, and kill
assessment.
2. Battle management computers and software; C3.
3. Survival of space assets and verifiable lethality against hardened targets.
4. Kinetic energy weapons; directed energy weapons and power supplies.
5. Utility and cost exchange assessment including implications of
countermeasures and arms control.
As one can readily see, although beam weapons get a great deal of publicity,
they only constitute one portion of the program. Nevertheless, directed energy, or
"speed of light," weapons are on the critical path to a successful capability to
counter missiles shortly after they are launched, the boost phase. Because of the
limited time for engagement over vast areas, an ideal booster kill weapon should
have long range, high rate of fire, and provide a "low cost" and verifiable kill. A
favorable cost exchange is needed to discourage further increases in the number of
boosters. Fortunately, a burning booster is a bright object, difficult to decoy, and
may be difficult to harden against a capable beam weapon. The following types of
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
beam weapons were considered: (1) space based lasers, (2) ground based lasers,
(3) space based particle beams, and (4) nuclear directed energy weapons.
For each of these approaches, there were critical unknowns that demanded
additional experimental and theoretical research in order to defeine their present
limitations and ultimate potential. The figure of merit that applied to all of these
concepts was the beam brightness, i.e., that power or energy that could be directed
in a pencil-thin beam. For a laser, this is determined by the power of the laser, its
wavelength, and the size, quality, and pointing accuracy of its optics. We found
that there was considerable room for improvement in many of these
characteristics. Optimistically, we concluded that we could achieve the needed
parameters, but only a concerted effort would give us the definite answers. For
particle beams and nuclear driven weapons, there were similar as well as new
questions and the program plan was developed to resolve the key technical issues.
Thus, we envisioned pursuing a broadly based, but highly goal-oriented science
and technology program. The activity will take several years and will make severe
demands on our technical creativity and dedication. It is likely that there will be
surprises including setbacks as well as favorable discoveries of new and innovative
approaches. The implications of this evolving technology and its relation to
strategy and policy will also have to be reevaluated as we proceed. As we learn
the limits of the technology and the threat response, there will be a constant
winnowing process. Our emphasis will focus on the optimum approaches as the
design objectives become fixed and the technical elements are proven at a suitable
scale. The desired approach will be to avoid costly mistakes in the engineering
prototype phase through a complete assessment at theend of the present research
phase.
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9
We cannot now make the decision to deploy or even to begin to produce a
defensive weapon system, but we should work toward an informed decision on
whether to embark on the engineering phase in the next decade. We don't see
fundamental reasons why it can't be done, and with the enthusiastic involvement
of our technical community in meeting this challenge, we may even find that
nature will make the road easier than we now envision. If that happens, then we
can, before this century ends, begin to construct a more stable future wherein
assured retaliation is constrained and balanced by systems which are defensive.
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260006-9