LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 142
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Prepared by
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL.
25 July 1967
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD ......................................................
5
CHAPTER I: EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT. .......... -
Initiative .......................................... 5
Coordinator of Information ........................ . . . 6
Office of Strategic Services ................. . . . . . . . . . . 7
OSS Authorities ...................................... 8
Central Intelligence Group ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Background "Principles" ........................ . ..... 12
"Plan" .............................................. 13
Joint Chiefs' Consideration ............................ 14
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy Consideration....... 16
Secretary of Navy .................................... 16
Secretary of War ..................................... 17
Secretary of State .................................... 17
Recommendations to the President ..................... 18
Presidential Directive ................................ 19
Achievement through Executive Action .................. 22
CHAPTER II: LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS - EXECUTIVE BRANCH.... 23
CIG Consideration.......?....? ...................... 23
Presidential Recommendation to Congress ..:.......... 30
CHAPTER III: CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.. ................ 33
Background ......................................... 33
Legislative Processing .............................. 36
Legislative Record on CIA ........... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ?. 37
CHAPTER IV: NEED FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ............... 40
Senate Armed Services Committee ............ . . . . . . . . 41
House Committee. ... ................?..?????????45
Committee Reports ....................... ....... 46
Floor Discussion .................................. 47
CHAPTER V: POSITION WITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH .............. 52
NSC Relationship .................................... 53
Relationship with Intelligence Community .............. 58
DCI Relationship with NISC ............................ 63
Summary ........................................... 65
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CHAPTER VI:
FUNCTIONS .......................................
67
Senate ............................................
68
House Committee ..................................
69
Summary .........................................
73
CHAPTER VII:
COLLECTION ................................... .
75
Background .......................................
75
House Committee ....................... ...'......
75
Summary .........................................
81
CHAPTER VIII:
CIVILIAN STATUS OF DCI..........................
82
Background ......................................
82
Senate ................................a..........
84
House Committee .................................
85
House Floor ..................... ....
91
Conference Committee ............................
99
Summary .........................................
101
CHAPTER IX:
INTERNAL SECURITY ...............................
103
House Committee Executive Session .................
104
House Published Hearings ............ ............ . .
113
House Floor .........................................
115
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ...................
116
Conferees .........................................
i22
Summary .........................
123
CHAPTER X: NATIONAL SECURITY ACT of 1947 ...................
124
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INTRODUCTION
This legislative history of the Central Intelligence Agency has
been compiled in the interest of'. p o a better understanding of
1
the structure and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
As a function of Government, foreign intelligence lies within
the province of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. Not only
does Congress possess the power of the purse but it has the power and
responsibility to provide "... for the common Defense and general. Wel-
Ja
fare of the United States. .. "2 Roots of relationship are ?e-ven found in >
w
the powelb-declare war`since ". . . the surest means of avoiding
"olo
3
is to be prepared for it in peace... "
Equally clear is the responsibility of the Chief Executive to take
executive action, not barred by the Constitution or other valid law of
the land, which he deems necessary for the protection of the nation's
security.
As a matter of fact, the Central Intelligence Agency is a product
of both Executive and Legislative action. This partnership of action
is seen in the major evolutionary stages that occured during the period
1941 through 1949:
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Executive Action
11 June 1941
Forerunner of national intelligence service established by
Presidential Order (6 Fed. Reg. 3422). (Key Elements:
Office of Coordinator of Information; Government-wide
collection of information bearing on national security; direct
reporting to the President; inter-departmental committee
system.)
23 July 1941
Coordinator of Information authorized to expend funds for
certain limited purposes by Presidential letter.
13 June 1942
Office of Coordinator of Information redesignated as Office
of Strategic Services and its functions (exclusive of certain
foreign information activities transferred to Office of War
Information) transferred to Office of Strategic Services
(16 Fed. Reg. -34-x). (Key Elements: Joint Chiefs of Staff
jurisdiction; Director of Strategic Services appointed by the
President.)
1 September 1942
Certain contracting latitude ".. without regard to provisions
of law... " granted to Director, Office of Strategic Services
(Executive Order 9241). 7 ;--,A ? 7/~
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22 January 1946
First Government-wide foreign intelligence service estab-
lished by Presidential directive. (Key Elements: National
Intelligence Authority at Secretary-of-Department level;
participation by personal representative of the President;
the office of the Director of Central Intelligence (appointed
by the President) Central Intelligence Group; within limits
of appropriations available to Secretaries of State, War,
Navy; precursor of Central Intelligence responsibilities
and authorities later enacted into law. )
Legislative Lction
28 June 1944
First independent appropriations for Office of Strategic
Services (National War Agency Appropriations Act of 1945).
(Key Elements: Appropriations in Title I covering the Executive
office of the President; expenditures "for objects of a
confidential nature;" certain accounting by certificate of
Director of Strategic Services.
26 July 1947
Statutory basis for centralized foreign intelligence service
prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947. (Key
Elements: National Security Council, Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; foreign
intelligence service on a Government-wide basis.
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20 June 1949
Statutory basis for the administration of the CIA prescribed
by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. (Key Elements:
Enabling authorities for the administration of the CIA on an
independent basis.)
Executive correspondence and orders and Congressional material,
including hearings and reports and Congressional Record reporting
of floor discussions on bills specifically relating to CIA are the primary
sources of material used for this paper. Secondary source material
and other comment are used for continuity and completeness.
Iri.connection with past and on- oing efforts to commit the
ILLEGIB
Agency's history to writing, is paper provides a c rono ogy and
bibliography of legislative actions affecting the Agency, and collects the
issues concerning central intelligence which were put before Congress
for resolution; the alternatives considered by Congress in resolving
them; and the reasons or rationale for the choices or compromises
Congress ultimately approved.
It is recommended that the existing CIA publication on statutes
specifically relating to CIA (in text and explanation form) be reviewed
in connection with this work.
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CHAPTER I. EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT
Interest in the structure of the nation's foreign intelligence effort
was of primary interest to the Executive Branch during the 1941 to 1946
period. In response to the pre-war, war, and post-war events spanning
this period, the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations saw the establish-
anent of the Coordinator of Information, the Strategic Services, and
finally the Central Intelligence Group. Each served as a buir`ding block
for its successor organization.
Initiative
The deteriorating international situation in the late 1930's sur-
faced a number of problems outside of the responsibilities of any one
department. Yet, it was becoming increasingly urgent that the Presi
dent receive coordinated information.
The Reorganization Act of 1939 provided a basis for handling both
of these problems.4 Under it, the Executive Office of the President was
established. 5
The Executive Office, as a central staff, was organized into six
principal divisions. One was reserved for emergency management
".. , in the event of a national emergency or threat of a national emer-
gency. 116 This was in September of 1939. Eight months later and under
a "threatened national emergency, " the Office of Emergency Management
(OEM) was established.
OEM was concerned with clearing information and securing
maximum "utilization and coordination of agencies and facilities...
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In keeping with its duties to ... advise and assist the President in
the discharge of extraordinary responsibilities imposed upon him by
an emergency arising out of war, the threat of war, (or) imminence
8
of war... ", the functions of OEM were further refined in January
of 1941. Clearly, the events which foretold the advent of the Second
World War were also propelling the organization of foreign intelli-
gence on a Government-wide basis.
Coordinator of Information
The responsibilities of a Government-wide informational
channel to the President became more explicit on 11 July 1941 when
the Office of Coordinator of Information (COl) was added to the Execu-
tive Office. Colonel William J. Donovan was named to the position.
The functions prescribed for the COI and those eventually enacted
as duties of the Central Intelligence Agency were quite similar:
!'Collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear
upon national security; to correlate such information and
data, and to make such information and data available to the
President and to such departments and agencies as the Presi-
dent may determine and to carry out, when requested by
the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate
the securing of information important for national security
not now available to the Government. "9
Authority to fulfill this commission included the right of access
to information and data within various departments and agencies as
long as the duties and responsibilities of the President's regular: mili-
tary and naval advisers were not impaired. 10 The COI was also
empowered to obtain assistance through the appointment of various
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departmental committees. While no compensation attached to the
office, transportation, subsistence, and other incidental expenses
were authorized. 11 Operating expenses were funded out of the Presi-
dent's Emergency Fund. Under this simple but broad mandate,
Colonel Donovan began building a foreign intelligence service.
Office of Strategic Services
Following the Declarations of War against the AXIS powers,
Congress enacted the First War Powers Act, 1941, (P. L. 77-354) and.
conferred upon the President the authority ".. , urgently needed in order
to put the Government of the United States on an immediate war footing. "12
Title I of the Act authorized redistribution of the functions of the
various agencies to facilitate the prosecution of the war effort.
With the nation on a "war footing, " it was clearly desirable to
provide a closer link between the tested and developing capabilities of
COI and the Armed Forces. On 13 June 1942 the President, as Commander
in Chief, issued a military order re-designating the COI as the Office
of Strategic Services (OSS) under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs. 13
(Foreign information activities of COI were transferred to the newly
created Office of War Information. 14) The charge for OSS was to:
"a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be
required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. "
"b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. "
The President appointed Colonel Donovan as Director of Strategic
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Services ". . . under the direction and supervision of the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff."
OSS Authorities
OSS was forced to adjust to a number of problems which had not
faced COI. COI had received .secure support in the form of funding,
contracting and other services from the Executive Office. This arrange-
ment could not be continued indefinitely. Consequently, OSS needed
and was granted certain specific authority.
The President extended to OSS the same privilege to enter into
contracts "... without regard to the provisions of law relating to the
marking, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts...
as had been earlier granted to the War Department, the Navy Department,
and the United States Maritime Commission under the First War Powers
Act of 1941.15
During the first Fiscal year of operation (1942-43), OSS was
supported out of allocations from the President's Emergency Fund.
Significantly, and to the extent determined by the President, these Funds
could be expended "... without regard to the provisions of law regarding
the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of persons in
the Government service... " In addition, the President could authorize
certain expenditures "... for objects of a confidential nature and in any
such case the certificate of the expending agency as to the amount of the
expenditure and that it is determinded inadvisable to specify the nature
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thereof shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum therein
expressed to have been expended. ""
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on December 30, 1942; exchange of funds without regard to
section 3651. Revised Statutes (31 U. S. C. 543); purchase and
free distribution of firearms, guard uniforms, special clothing,
and other personal equipment; the use of and payment for
compartments or other superior accommodations considered
necessary by the Director of Strategic Services or his desig-
nated representatives for security reasons or the protection
of highly technical and valuable equipment; $35, 000, 000 of
which amount such sums as may be authorized by the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget may be transferred to other depart-'
ments or agencies of the Government, either as advance pay-
ment or reimbursement of appropriation, for the performance
of any of the functions or activities for which this appropriation
is made: Provided, That $23, 000, 000 of this appropriation may
be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regula-
tions relating to the expenditure of Government funds or the
employment of persons in the Government service, and $21, 000, 000
of such $23, 000, 000 maybe expended for objects of a confiden-
tial nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the
certificate of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services
and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for
the amount therein certified.
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.From its inception, OSS operated under two unusual rules
relating to the expenditure of Government monies. One permitted
latitude concerning the purpose for which funds could be expended.
The other protected against the unauthorized disclosure of the pur-
pose and details of certain expenditures. The Director of OSS enjoyed
the confidence of Congress in the exercise of this broad grant of
authority and this confidence in him was sustained in subsequent
appropriation acts.
Central Intelligence Group
While the Office of the Coordinator of Information and the
Office of Strategic Services were forerunners of a Government-
wide foreign intelligence service, the Presidential Directive of 22
January 1946 was the capstone of Executive action, It established
the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group,
and the position of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Nearly two years of study and discussion preceded the issuance
of the Directive. While a number of different approaches were advo-
cated, the need for a fully coordinated intelligence system was never
questioned.
The influence of the Presidential Directive of ZZ January 1946
on what was eventually enacted in the foreign intelligence secion of
the National Security Act of 1947 cannot beoveremphasized.
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Background "Principles"
In October of 1944 Donovan, by now a General, presented
President Roosevelt with a document entitled "The Basis for a
Permanent United States Foreign Intelligence Service. " The need,
as seen by General Donovan, was an organization "which will procure
intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same
time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence
objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all
Government agencies. "19 General Donovan formulated ten governing
principles in this presentation:
"That there should be a central, overall Foreign
Intelligence Service which (except for specialized intelli-
gence pertinent to the operations of the armed services
and certain other Government agencies) could serve
objectively and impartially the needs of the diplomatic,
military, economic, and propaganda service of the
Government.
"That such a Service should not operate clandes-
tine intelligence within the United States.
"That it should have no policy function and should
not be identified with any law-enforcing agency either at
home or abroad.
"That the operations of such a Service should be
primarily the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence on the policy or strategy level.
"That such a Service should be under a highly
qualified Director, appointed by the President, and be
administered under Presidential direction.
"That, subject to the approval of the President,
the policy of such a Service should be determined by the
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Director, with the advice and assistance of a board on
which the Department of State and the Armed Services
should be represented.
"That such a Service, charged with collecting
intelligence affecting national interests and defense,
should have its own means of communication and should
be responsible for all secret activities, such as:
(a) Secret intelligence
(b) Counter-espionage
(c) Crypto-analysis
(d) Clandestine subversive operations
"That such a Service be operated on both vouchered
and unvouchered funds.
"That such a Service have a staff of specialists,
professionally trained in analysis of intelligence and
possessing a high degree of linguistic, regional, or
functional competence to evaluate incoming intelligence,
to make special reports, and to provide guidance for the
collecting branches of the Agency.
"It is not necessary to create a new agency. The
nucleus of such an organization already exists in the
Office of Strategic Services. "
The document was returned to General Donovan on 31 October 1944
with a comment that an adviser had informed the President that a
better and cheaper intelligence system was possible. However,
there was also an accompanying request that General Donovan con-
tinue his work on a post-war intelligence organization.
In keeping with the President's request, General Donovan
submitted a more detailed plan to the President. In transmittal,
Donovan recommended that "... intelligence control be returned to
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the supervision of the President (with a) central authority reporting
directly to you (the President), with responsibility to frame intelli-
gence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence
material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying
out national policy and strategy. "20
The plan took the form of a draft directive and incorporated
the principles General Donovan had earlier prescribed and several
additional functions and duties including: "Coordination of the functions
of all intelligence agencies of the Government... ; collection, either
directly or through existing Government departments and agencies,
of pertinent information... ; procurement, training, and supervision
of its intelligence personnel; subversive operations abroad, and
determination of policies for and coordination of facilities essential
to the collection of information. "21
Certain administrative authorities were also included in the
Donovan Plan, "to employ necessary personnel and make provision
for necessary supplies, facilities, and services ' (and) to provide for
the (Agency's) internal organization and management... in. such man-
" 22
ner as its Director may determine.
Joint Chiefs' Consideration
The Donovan plan of 18 November 1944 was distributed to
various Cabinet officials and the Joint Chiefs. On 24 January 1945,
the Donovan plan and an alternate proposal by the Joint Intelligence
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Committee were covered in a report of the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee to the Joint Chiefs. 23
Approximately a month after the war had ended, the recom-
mendations in that report were incorporated into a Joint Chiefs of
Staff report. 24
The Joint Chiefs disagreed with Donovan's concept that the
centralized service should exist under the direct supervision of the
President. They felt that this would "over-centralize the National
Intelligence Service and place it at such a level that it would control
the operation of departmental intelligence agencies without responsi-
bility, either indivi'.ually or collectively to the heads of departments
concerned.' 25
The structure recommended by the Joint Chiefs included a
National Intelligence Authority (NIA) composed of the Secretaries o.'
State, War, and Navy and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Authority was to be responsible for overall intelligence planning
and development as well as the inspection and coordination of all
Federal intelligence activities.. It was to assure the most effective
accomplishment of the intelligence mission as it relates to national
security. A Central Intelligence Agency with a Director appointed by
the President was to be responsible to the NIA and assist in its mission.
An Intelligence Advisory Board made up of the heads of the principal
military and civilian agencies having functions related to the national
security was to advise the Director of Central Intelligence.
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With one e.cception, an independent budget for the National
Intelligence Authority, the substance of the Joint Chiefs' report
was to be eventually recommended to the President by the Secretaries
assure that "... the formulation of national policy both in its political
of State, War, and Navy.
LY~? `rtEtii~~~~s_~+l?le.~_.11'ar, an(l_Navy Consideration
To General Donovan the task of central intelligence was to
of State, War, and Navy, was needed before further progress could
other nations. "26 Consideration by the customers, the Secretaries
ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, intentions, and policies of
and military aspects is influenced and determined by knowledge (or
be made.
viduals as a group. I think this is a subject which should have our close
charged with the working responsibility functioning under these indi-
supervision by the War, State, and Navy Departments, with a director
organization, the general outline of which provides for intelligence
made a recommendation to the President for a national intelligence
including: "Joint Intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as you know,
dated 13 October 1945, commented upon subjects of mutual interest
the Navy, James Forrestal, in a memorandum to the Secretary of War,
Following the release of the Joint Chiefs' report, Secretary of
Secretary of Navy
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attention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff paper seems to me soundly con-
ceived and, if you agree, I think we should push it vigorously at. the
White House. "
Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary Robert Lovett vas placed in charge of a
committee in the War Department to study the matter. After consider-
ing the opinions of a number of people experienced in wartime intelli-
gence, 27 the Lovett Committee submitted a report 28 to the Secretary
of War for a centralized national intelligence organization similar
to that which had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs six weeks
previously.
Secretary of State
As a parallel development and in keeping with his preeminence
in the field of foreign affairs, the Secretary of State was directed by
the President to "take the lead in developing the comprehensive and
coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies
concerned with that type of activity... through the creation of an inter-
departmental group, which would formulate plans for (the President's)
approval. 1129 The Secretary of State submitted his plan to the. Secretaries
of War and Navy on 10 December 1945. 30
The State plan provided for a National Intelligence Authority
consisting of the Secretary of State (Chairman) and the Secretaries of
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War and Navy. Heads of other departments and agencies would be
subject to call to participate in matters of special interest to them.
While the State plan did not preclude "centralized intelligence
operations" its primary emphasis was on interdepartmental committees
and organization. It did not envisage an independent agency with a
separate budget. This approach was advanced as one which would
... avoid publicity and... reduce competition among the central agency
k
and the intelligence organizations of existing departments and agencies."31
The State plan fitted a group, not an agency, concept. Under
it, if the Authority determined that a centralized intelligence opera-
tion was necessary the Authority would appoint an executive and hold
him responsible for the effective conduct of the operation. Operational
support would be shared with "... personnel (includin? the Executive),
funds and facilities... provided by the departments and agencies par-
ticipating in the operation, in amounts and proportions agreed by
them and approved by the Authority, based upon the relative respon-
sibilities and capabilities of the participating departments and agencies.',32
Recommendations to the President
On 7 January 1946 the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
jointly recommended that the President establish a National Intelligence
Authority and a Central Intelligence Group. 33 The recommendation
was identical to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee report which had
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been submitted almost a year earlier to the Joint Chiefs with one
major exception: the Secretaries did not recommend an independent
budget. While an independent budget had been basic to the proposals
advocated by the Secretary of War and Navy, the apprehensions
advanced by the Department of State prevailed and "it seemed to be
the consensus... of the three Secretaries that an independent budget
should be avoided for security reasons. "34 Funds for the National
Intelligence Authority were to be provided by the participating
departments in. amounts and proportion agreed upon by the members
of the Authority. Within the limits of funds made available, the
Director of Central Intelligence was to "employ necessary personnel
and make provisions for necessary supplies, facilities and services. "35
The National Intelligence Authority, the office of the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group were
established by Presidential Directive on 22 January 1946.. The Direc-
tive was substantially similar to the Secretaries' proposal although
it contained no specific reference to the collection of intelligence by
the Director. It has been suggested that this function was omitted
solely to avoid mention of. intelligence collection in a published docu-
36
ment.
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COPY
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON January 22, 1946
To The Secretary of State,
The Secretary of War, and
The Secretary of the Navy.
1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign
intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to
assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission
related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with
another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as
the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.
2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each
from time to time assign persons and facilities f:-om your respective
Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelli-
gence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central
Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director
of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible
to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting
member thereof.
3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction. and control
of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director, of Central Intelli-
gence shall:
a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of
intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In
so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities
of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.
b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities
of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate
to the national security and recommend to the National
Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all
policies and objectives as will assure the most effective
accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such services of common concern as the National
Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.
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d. Perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the Presi-
dent and the National Intelligence Authority may from time
to time direct.
4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions
shall be exercised under his directive.
5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of
your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence
Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent
approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of
said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director
of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.
6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate depart-
mental intelligence.
7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by
an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the head.,; (or their
representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence
agencies of the Government having functions related to national
security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.
8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential direc-
tives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of
the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence information
relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as
the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request
pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.
9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making
of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and
its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.
10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence
Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods.
Sincerely yours,
Is / Harry Truman
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S L` C) T
Achievement throu, h Executive Action
The 22 January 1946 Directive was a major breakthrough for
the concept of a Government-wide foreign intelligence system. Respon-
sibility for national intelligence had been clearly fixed on the office
of the Director of Central Intelligence. It provided for direction and
control from the President's chief advisers in international and mili-
tary affairs. It provided a focal point for the correlation of foreign
intelligence, its proper coordination and dissemination, and for all
other needs affecting national intelligence. Clearly, central intelli-
gence as an entity now existed.
The Directive was a compromise of diverse views which had
been articulated for two years within the Executive branch. While the
fledgling organization was deprived. of certain attributes of independence,
i. e. independent budget and authority to hire personnel, its charter
was sufficiently flexible to permit it to "feel its evolutionary way and
handle obstacles only in such order as it deemed best. "37 The details
of the organization were to be worked out in the first instance by the
officials responsible for its performance. 38
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As early as 1944, legislation for a permanent post-war intelligence
organization was seen as desirable. 39 In 1946 the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy believed that the preparation of organizational plans to
"include drafts of all necessary legislation"40 should be the first order
of business following the establishment of central intelligence by Executive
action.
Si,: months following the Presidential directive, Clark M. Clifford,
Special Assistant to the President, was reviewing draft enabling legisla-
tion for a proposed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). General Hoyt S.
Vandenberg, USAAF, then the Director of Central Intelligence, in trans-
mitting a revision of the draft to Mr. Clifford, wrote that the "current
draft has been expanded in the light of the experiences of the last ten
months and the administrative facilities available. However, it does not
materially change interdepartmental relationships conceived in the original
Presidential letter of January 22, 1946. "41
The CIG's comprehensive legislation proposal contained a state-
ment of policy that "foreign intelligence activities, functions, and
services of.the Government be fully coordinated, and, when determined
in accordance with the provisions of this act,* be operated centrally for
the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United
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SEA, I
States." The CIG proposal referred to programs for collecting
11. . . foreign intelligence information by any and all means deemed
effective, " disseminating "... to the President and the appropriate
departments and agencies of the Federal Government of the intelli-
gence produced, " and for planning and development 11... of all
foreign intelligence activities of the Federal Government. "
Further, the National Intelligence Authority was to be statutorily
V
prescribed and the Director of Central Intelligence was to sit as a
non-voting member. The CIA was to provide the Secretariat. This
followed the structural relationships established under the 22 January
1946 Directive.
The CIG proposal also sought administrative authority sufficient
to the autonomy envisaged. The authority to hire personnel directly
and an independent budget had been denied GIG. These were important
deficiencies to be overcome. 4Z Other key elements were:
a. appointment of the Director from either civilian or military
life at $15, 000 per annum (equivalent to the salary estab-
lished by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 for the Commisioners).
b. a Deputy Director who "shall be authorized to sign such
letters, papers, and documents, and to perform such
other duties as may be directed by the Director... and to
act as Director in the Director's absence... "
c. authority to. employ personnel including retired personnel
of the Armed Forces.
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SLU 11 CI
d. authority for the DCI "in his absolute discretion to,
notwithstanding the provisions of other law, terminate
the employment of personnel in the interest of the United
State..." (The latter was in keeping with a.similar
provision in the Department of State- Appropriation Act
of 1947, also 50 USC 1156, 1940, Secretaries of War and
Navy, P. L. 79-470.)
e. control of information in line with Section 10 of the Atomic
Ene .-gy Act of 1946. (At the time the Department of
Justice was also reviewing a proposal to revise the
espionage laws as recommended by the War and Navy
Departments and the FBI.)
f. appropriations authority.
The proposed draft was fully representative of a permanent authoriza-
tion for a Central Intelligence Agency. As events transpired, provisions
relating to CIA's functional responsibility as well as its structural
relationship within the Executive Branch would be enacted in 1947, while
administrative authorities, for the most part, would be enacted in
1949.
Comprehensive enabling legislation for a Central Intelligence
was accorded the highest priority within the Executive Branch.
obtaining unification of the military departments. Unification legislation
Agency was subordinated in early 1947 to the more pressing need of
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SL. ELI
The concept of central intelligence was not overlooked in the
unification proposals, however. President Truman's second plan for
military unification envisioned a single defense establishment served
by a number of coordinating agencies, some for inter-military
departmental coordination and others for military-civilian coordination.43
The existing National Intelligence Authority was -seen as the mechanism
for linking military and foreign policy and it followed that its subordi-
nate agency, CIG, would serve as mechanism for coordinating civilian-
military intelligence.
A team for drafting the National Security Act of 1947 was
assembled within the White House. It included Mr. Clark M. Clifford
(Special Counsel to the President), Mr. Charles S. Murphy (Adminis-
trative Assistant to the President), Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman
(Deputy Chief for Naval Operations), and Major General Lauris
Norstad (Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General
Staff). The team's prime objective was unification. While there was
support for prescribing the Central Intelligence Agency in the National
Security Act, it was felt the administrative authorities for the Agency
should be dealt with in separate legislation.
The second White House draft of the proposed National Security
Act of 1947, dated 25 January 1947, covered the CIA as follows:
"SEC. 302 (a) There is hereby established under the
National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a
Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof,
to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President,
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by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Director shall receive compensation at the rate of
$15, 000 per annum.
(b) Subject to existing law, and to the direction
and control of the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency shall perform foreigni4 telligence
functions related to the national security.
(c) Effective when the Director first appointed
under subsection (a) has taken office -
(1) The functions of the National Intelligence
Authority (established by Directive of the President,
dated January 22, 1946) are transferred to the
National Security Council, and such Authority shall
cease to exist.
(2) The functions of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the functions, personnel, property,
and records of the Central Intelligence Group,
established under such directive are transferred to
the Director of Central Intelligence appointed under
this Act and to the Central Intelligence Agency, and
such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended
balances of appropriations, allocations, or other
funds available or authorized to be made available
in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
In a 28 January 1947 memorandum to Mr. Clark M. Clifford,
.General Vandenberg summarized earlier exchanges of views on
language for CIA in the National Security Act as "(a) setting forth a
working basis for a Central Intelligence Agency to the merger; and
(b) eliminating from the proposed National Security Act any and all
controversial material insofar as it referred to central intelligence_
which might in any way hamper the successful passage of the Act."
While deferring to the higher priority of military unification,
General Vandenbi rg urged the incorporation of three additional
provisions in the final draft. First, ". . . the DCI shall serve as the
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adviser to the Council on all matters pertaining to national intelligence
and in this capacity, will attend meetings of the Council at its discretion
but shall take no part in the decisions thereof. " (It is recalled that
the 22 January 1946 Directive provided that the Director sit as a
non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority.) Second,
rather than merely transferring the functions of the DCI and GIG under
the Presidential Directive to the DCI and CIA under the proposed
legislation through incorporation by reference, General Vandenbiirg
recommended making at least a specific statement on CIA's functions
such as: "... the CIA shall coordinate the Nation's foreign intelligence
functions which can be efficiently performed centrally." An earlier
draft had included a provision that CIA "... subject to existing law...
shall perform foreign intelligence functions related to the national'
security. " However, this provision was dropped because of the
confusion surrounding the meaning of the introductory qualification
"subject to existing law."
Third, General VandenbAeg wanted a Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence to be appointed from civilian or military life by the
President and with the advice and consent of the Senate "... to provide
continuity of action in the absence of the Director or should there be a
vacancy in that office. The Deputy Director should be a man of such
caliber and stature as adequately to serve as operations deputy to
the Director. "
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29
SECT
While General Vandenberg's recommendations were not included
in the proposed "National Security Act of 1947, " the points were
discussed. Excerpts follow from a memorandum45 covering the
discussion at the time:
DCI as intelligence Adviser
In a CIG conference preceding the first meeting
with the White House drafters--
". . . the Director also indicated his desire to have
included a provision that he would serve as the adviser to
the Council on National Defense (later changed to National
Security Council) on matters pertaining to intelligence,
and that in this capacity he would attend all meetings of
the Council. It was agreed that the Director should take
no part in the decisions of the Council as this was a policy-
making body, and it had long been agreed that central
intelligence should not be involved in policy making. "
At the White House meeting with the drafters--
.. General Vandenbgrg stated that he was strongly
opposed to the Central Intelligence Agency or its director
participating in policy decisions on any matter. However,
he felt that he should be present at meetings of the Council.
To this General Norstad voiced serious exceptions, as he
felt that the Council was already too big. He thought that.
the Director should not even be present as an observer,
as this had proven to be cumbersome and unworkable at
meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Sherman
suggested, however, that the Director should normally
be present at meetings of the Council, in its discretion.
General Vandenberg concurred in this, as did General
Norstad, and it was accepted with the additional proviso
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also attend meetings
at the discretion of the Council. "
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"... the Army-Navy conferees felt that the position
of the Director as the Ingelligence Adviser was inherent
in the position itself, and that it would not be proper to
provide by law that the head of an agency under the Council
should sit on the Council. "
Specific Statement of Functions of CIA
... General Vandenberg indicated the difficulties
which he had had in having to go to the N. I. A. on so many
problems. He felt that the difficulties of his position would
be multiplied, as he would have to ask policy guidance and
direction from the Council on National Defense, which
consists of many more members than the N. I. A. He was
assured that the intent of the act was that the CIA would
operate independently and come under the Council only
on such specific measures as the Council may, from time
to time, desire to direct. It would not be necessary for
the Agency `? ask continual approval from the Council. "
"...It was the final sense of the meeting that the Director
of Central Intelligence should report to the Council on
National Defense. As General Vandenberg indicated it would
be necessary to report somewhere; that neither the
President nor he was anxious to have another agency
"free wheeling" around the Government. However, it was
thought that the agency should have sufficient power to
perform its own functions without it being necessary to
have specific approval from the Council on each action. "
Presidential Recommendation to Congress
On February 26, 1947, President Truman submitted to the
Congress a draft entitled "National Security Act of 1947." Under
Title II - coordination for National Security as it pertained to CIA -
it read as follows:
"SEC. 202. (a) There is herebT established under the National
 Approved For Release Q6(`~} CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3 31
Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency, with a
Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head
thereof, to be appointed by the President. The D A-ector
'k U
shall receive compensation at the rate of $14, 000 a year.
(b) Any commissioned officer of the United States
Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Air
Force may be appointed to the office of Director; and his
appointment to, acceptance of, and service in, such office
shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade
he may occupy or hold in the United States Army, the
United States Navy, or the United States Air Force, or
any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit
incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank,
or grade. Any such commissioned officer on the active ,.
list shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive
the military pay and allowances payable to a commissioned
officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid,
from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency,
annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which
$14, 000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and
allowances.
(c) Effective when the Director first appointed under
subsection (a) has taken office-
(1) The functions of the National Intelligence
Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946)
are transferred to the National Security Council, and
such Authority shall cease to exist.
(2) The functions of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the functions, personnel, property,
and records of the Central Intelligence Group are
transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence
appointed under this Act and to the Central Intelligence
Agency respectively, and such Group shall cease to
exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations,
allocations, or other funds available are authorized
to be made available in like manner for expenditure
by the Agency.
In retrospect, it is recalled that the White House drafting
co :lrnittee's prime concern was the unification aspects of the legislation.
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f L
P4t
S
In this connection, there was a general feeling that any unnecessary
enlargement of the CIA provision would lead to controversy and
would affect the legislative processing of the National Security Act
of 1947. In addition, it was believed that detailed administrative
provisions for CIA could not be adequately presented as part of the
National Security Act of 1947, simply because of the lack of time.
As events transpired, however, Congress was to delve into
ti
the CIA provisions at some length. In fact, during the floor discussion
of the bill in the House chamber, Mr. Carter Manasco, (D. , Alabama),
a member of the House Committee which marked up the bill, said:
"This section on central intelligenc3 was given more study by our
48
Subcommittee and the Full Committee than any other section of the bill."
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CHAPTER III. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF TIIE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Background
On 26 February 1947 the President transmitted a draft bill
entitled "National Security Act of 1947" to the President of the Senate pro
te.npore and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and recommended
its enactment by the 80th'Congress. Prior to this date consideration
had been given in both Houses to the need for a Government-wide
foreign intelligence service and the structure it should take.
House: During the 79th Congress, the House Committee on
Military Affairs had issued "A report on the System Currently Employed
in the Collection, Evaluation, and Dissecnination of Intelligence
Affecting the War Potential of the United States. "49 The report
recognized the need for strong intelligence as the "nation's final line
of defense, " and made nine very specific recommendations:
Recommendation 1: That the National Intelligence Authority,
established on January 22, 1946, by Presidential directive,
be authorized by act of Congress.
Recommendation 2: That the National Intelligence Authority
shall consist of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy,
or deputies for intelligence.
Recommendation 3: That the Central Intelligence Group receive
its appropriations direct from the Congress.
Recommendation 4: That the Central Intelligence Group has
complete control over its own personnel.
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Recommendation 5: That the Director of the Central
Intelligence Group be a civilian appointed fora preliminary
term of two years and a permanent term of 10 years,
at a salary of at least $12, 000 a year.
Recommendation 6: That the Director of the Central
Intelligence Group be appointed by the President, by
and with the consent of the Senate.
Recommendation 7: That the Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall (1) accomplish the correlation and evaluation
of intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
resulting strategic and national policy intelligence, and
in so doing making full use of the staff and. facilities of
the intelligence agencies already existing in the various
Government departments; (2) plan for the coordination
of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of
the various Government departments as relate to the
national security and recommend to the National Intelli-
gence Authority the establishment of such over-all
policies and objectives as will assure the most effective
accomplishment of the national intelligence mission;
(3) perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies,
su.:.h services of common concern related directly to
coordination, correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as
the National Intelligence Authority shall determine can
be more efficiently accomplished centrally; (4) perform
such other similar functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the Congress
and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to
time direct. It is specifically understood that the Director
of Central Intelligence shall not undertake operations for
the collection of intelligence. (Emphasis added)
Recommendation 8: That Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10 of the Presidential directive of January 22, 1946,
relating to the establishment of a National Intelligence
Authority be enacted into law, with such revisions in
wording as may seem necessary.
Recommendation 9: That the Army be requested sympa-
thetically to examine further the question of the establish-
ment of an Intelligence Corps for the training, development,
and assignment of especially qualified officers.
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Senate: In terms of legislative processing during the 79th Congress,
the Senate got further than the House. The Senate Committee on Military
Affairs reported out a bill proposing a National Security Council outside
of the national defense establishment and a Central Intelligence Agency
for the purpose of coordinating nilitary and civilian programs, policies,
50
and plans in the foreign intelligence field. This bill was introduced ~..
S. 2044 by Senators Lister Hill (D. , Ala. ), Elbert D. Thomas (D. , Utah),
and Warren R. Austin (,R., Vt.)
on 9 April 1946, pursuant to President
Truman's unification message of 19 December 195.
The need for "national intelligence" was underscored by General
George C. Marshall in hearings before the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs:
"Intelligence relates to purpose as well as to military
capacity to carry out that purpose. The point, I think, is we
should know as much as we possibly can of the possible intent
and the capability of any other country in the world... Prior
to entering the war we had little more than what a military
attache could learn at a dinner, ::tore or less, over the coffee
cups... Today I think we see clearly we must know what the
other fellow is planning to do, in our own defense... The
important point is that the necessity applies equally outside
of the armed forces. It includes the State Department and
other functions of the Government, and it should therefore be
correlated on that level. " 1
While S. 2044 was favorably acted upon by the Senate Military
Affairs Committee, the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, which had
concurrent jurisdiction, did not report it out.
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Thus, the crucible for central intelligence was carried over
to the first session of the 80th Congress in the Presidential draft of
the National Security Act of 1947. Title I of the draft concerned the
"National Defense Establishment. " Title II, entitled "Coordination
for National Security, " provided for the National Security Council and
the Central Intelligence Agency. 52
Legislative Processing
Faced with a complicated and vital legislative task related to
the nation's future security, Congress deliberated on the National
Security Act of 1947 for nearly five months.
Senate: Introduction of an bill incorporating the President's
draft was temporarily delayed while the Senate determined which
standing committee would have jurisdiction over the bill. The Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (now the Committee on
Government Operations) questioned the decision of the President pro
tempore, Arthur Vandenburg (R., Mich.) in referring the measure
to the Armed Services Committee. 53 The Senate upheld the President
pro tempore's ruling on 3 March 1947 and Senator Chan Gurney (R., S. D. ),
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, then introduced
the measure as S. 758. The Senate Armed Services Committee held
"\
hearings for ten weeks, went into executive session on 20 May, and
54 4~The bill was
reported out an amended version of S. 758 on 5 Ju.~le.
considered by the Senate on 7 and 9 July and was approved by voice vote.
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House: The measure eventually reported to the House was
introduced on 28 February 1947 as H. R. 4214 by Chairman Clare
Hoffman (R., Mich.) of the Committee on Expenditures in the Execu-
tive Departments (now the Committee on Government Operations).
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This bill was the subject of hearings which commenced on 2 April
1947 and concluded on 1 July. A favorable report was issued on 16
July' On 19 July H. R. 4214 was considered by the House, amended
and passed by a voice vote. Immediately following this action, the
House passed S. 758 after substituting the provisions of its own
measure.
Conference: S. 758 emerged from Conference Committee oa
-sq cc-)
24 July 1947. The Senate accepted the Conference Report the same
day by a voice vote and the House followed suit on the 25th of July.
Legislative Record on CIA
The legislative record on CIA in the National Security Act of
1947 consists of testimony before committees, committee reports,
floor discussions, amendments proposed and the provisions which
were ultimately adopted. Overall, this record identifies the issues
raised, the alternatives considered, and the reasons or explanations
for the choices or compromises ultimately approved.
Of the many factors having a bearing on the type of legislative
record made on CIA, two seem especially deserving of mention. First,
security inhibited the full development of the public legislative record
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interest in providing for a CIA was clearly underestimated. Probably-
reducing the CIA section down to "minimal provisions. " Congressional
wrong in assuming that extensive deliberation could be avoided by
the CIA section had the potentiality for being controversial but it was
The White House drafting team was correct in estimating that
readily identifiable in the public record.
rationale for CIA related legislative action is, for the most part,
record was made on the CIA section. Further, the reasons and
Considering all of these factors, a fairly extensive public
tions concerning the CIA.
however, is not meant to imply the absence of independent reserva-
also engulfed other provisions of the Act, including CIA. This,
The controversy. surrounding the "National Military Establishment"
versial legislative proposal dealing primarily with military unification.
on CIA. In opposing an amendment on the floor in the House, Mr.
Manasco (D. , Ala.) underscored this handicap by revealing that
"Many witnesses appeared before our Committee. We were sworn
to secrecy, and I hesitate to even discuss this section, because I
am afraid that Imay say something, because the Congressional
Record is a public record, and divulge something here that we
received in that committee that would give aid and comfort to any
55
potential enemy we have. "
Second, CIA was only one aspect of a complicated and contro-
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t 2)
39
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the most striking aspect of the Congressional interest in CIA was the
overwhelming support for institutionalizing the Agency in statute as a
positive step towards providing for the nation's future security.
With this introduction the legislative record on the CIA section
in the National Security Act of 1947 is developed and organized according
to the five dominant legislative themes which evolved:
(1) Need for a Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) Position of CIA within the Executive Branch;
(3) Statutory specification of functions for CIA;
(4). Civilian status of the Director of Central Intelligence; and
(5) Relationship to internal security.
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CHAPTER IV. NEED FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The need for institutionalizing central intelligence was established
in certain committee findings during the 79th Congress and was to be
stressed again during the 80th Congress.
In anticipation of hearings on S. 758, Senator Thomas 56 made a
major address to the Senate on the "President's" bill and emphasized
the need for a Central Intelligence Agency:57
"Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department
had an intelligence service adequate to our needs when the war
broke out. The intelligence agencies in each Department
operated separately for the most part, except for the exchange
of routine military and naval attache reports. There was no
real integration of intelligence at the operating level, and no
established liaison with the State Department. Though funds
were inadequate, there was much duplication of effort by the
services.
"The war brought substantial appropriations and
drastic reorganization. The Office of Strategic Services was
finally set up under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and acted as the central coordinating agency in intelligence
matters. Later, the Joint Intelligence Committee and its
subcommittees made further provision for the coordination
of intelligence activities. In spite of these and other changes,
however, much unnecessary duplication existed in the intelli-
gence services of the State, War, and Navy Departments.
The significance of the collection, analysis, and evaluation of
information concerning foreign countries is no less great now than
it was during the war. The effective conduct of both foreign
policy and military policy is dependent on the possession of full,
accurate, and skillfully analyzed information concerning foreign
countries. With our present world-wide sphere of international
responsibility and our position among the world powers, we
need the most efficient intelligence system that can be devised.
Organization, of course, is not the whole story. We do know,
however, that there is no returning to the prewar. system,
where the War, Navy and State Departments went their respec-
tive ways. We have now a central intelligence agency estab-
lished by executive action. Provision for such an agency should
Ar,-r,-d Cnr Palance onnnrnsztoa - f,i.a Rr1PRRRnn7FGRflp1rinnn10001 3
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be made in permanent legislation. It seems entirely logical
that such an agency should be placed in the framework of any
agency that might be set up to coordinate military and foreign
policies. "
Senate Armed Services Committee
The theme so strongly stated by Senator Thomas was reiterated
and amplified before the Senate Armed Services Committee dur.ing the
hearing on S. 758: (Excerpts follow)
Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman (member of the White House
drafting team and detailed by the Secretary of Navy to work
with the Military Affairs Committee on the Common Defense
Act of 1946): "I consider the Central Intelligence Agency to
be a vital necessity under present world conditions. Its
necessity will increase with our greater international respon-
sibilities as the power of sudden attack is amplified by further
developments in long range weapons and weapons of mass
destruction.,, 58
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (Director of Central Intelli-
gence):59 I sincerely urge adoption of the intelligence provisions
of this bill. Section 202 will enable us to do our share in main-
taining the national security. It will form a firm basis on which.
we can construct the finest intelligence service in the world.
"In my opinion, a strong intelligence system is equally
if not more essential in peace than in war. Upon us has fallen
leadership in world affairs. The oceans have shrunk until
today both Europe and Asia border the United States almost as
do Canada and Mexico. The interests, intentions, and capabili-
ties of the various nations on these land masses must be fully
known to our national policy makers. We must have this
intelligence if we are to be forewarned against possible acts of
agression, and if we are to be armed aginst disaster in
an era of atomic warfare...
"I think it can be said without successful challenge that
before Pearl Harbor we did not have an intelligence service
in this country comparable to that of. Great Britain or France
or Russia or Germany or Japan. We did not have one because
the people of the United States would not accept it. It was felt
that there was something un-American about espionage and
even about intelligence generally. There was a feeling that
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all that was necessary to win a war-if there ever were to be
another war-was an ability to shoot straight. 'One of the
great prewar fallacies was the common misconception that,
if the Japanese should challenge us in the Pacific, our
armed services would be able to handle the problem in a
matter of a few months at most.
"All intelligence is not sinister, not is it an invidious
type of work. But before the Second World. War, our
intelligence services had left largely untapped the great
open sources of information upon which roughly 80 percent
of intelligence should normally be based. I mean such
things as books, magazines, technical and scientific sur--
veys, photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers, and
radio broadcasts, and general information from people with
a knowledge of affairs abroad. What weakened our position
further was that those of our intelligence services which did
dabble in any of these sources failed to coordinate their
results with each other.
"The Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate
the Pearl Harbor Attack reached many pertinent conclusions
regarding the shortcomings of our intelligence system and
made some very sound recommendations for its improvement.
We are incorporating many of these into our present thinking...
"The committee showed that some very significant
information had not been correctly evaluated. It found that
some of the evaluated information was not passed on to the
field commanders. But, over and above these failures were
others, perhaps more serious, which went to the very struc-
ture of our intelligence organizations. I am talking now of the
failure to exploit obvious sources; the failure to coordinate
the collection and dissemination of intelligence; the failure
to centralize intelligence functions of common concern to more
than one department of the Government, which could more
efficiently be performed centrally.
"In the testimony which has preceded mine in support
of this bill- by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, General
Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, and General Spaatz, among
others- there has been shown an awareness of the need for
coordination between the State Department and our foreign
political policies one one hand and our National Defense
Establishment and its policies on the other. Similarly with
intelligence, there must be coordination and some central-
ization, so that no future congressional committee can
possibly ask the question asked by the Pearl Harbor Committee:
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'Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our
history- why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?'
"The committee recommended that intelligence work
have centralization of authority and clear-cup allocation of
responsibility. It found specific fault with the system of
dissemination then in use- or, more accurately, the lack
of dissemination of intelligence to hose who had vital need of
it. It stated that' ... the security of the Nation can be insured
only through continuity of service and centralization of
responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence.
"It found that there is no substitute for imagination and
resourcefulness of the part of intelligence personnel, and-
that part of the failure in this respect was '... the failure
to accord to intelligence work the important and significant
role which it deserves. '
"The committee declared that '... efficient intelli-
gence services are just as essential in time of peace as in
war. '
"All of these findings and recommendations have my
hearty concurrence. In the Central Intelligence Group, and
in its successor which this bill creates, must be found the
answer to the prevention of another Pearl Harbor.
"As the United States found itself suddenly projected
into a global war, immense gaps in our knowledge became
readily apparent. The word "intelligence" quickly took a
fashionable connotation. Each new wartime agency- as well
as many of the older departments- soon blossomed out with
intelligence staffs of their own, each producing a mass of
largely uncoordinated information. The resultant competi-
tion for funds and specialized personnel was a monumental
example of waste.
"The War and Navy Departments developed full
political and economic intelligence staffs, as did the Research
and Analysis Division of the OSS. The Board of Economic
Warfare and its successor, the Foreign Economic Adminis-
tration, also delved deeply into fields of economic intelli-
gence. Not content with staffs in Washington, they established
subsidiary staffs in London and then followed these up with
other units on the Continent.
"When, during the war, for example, officials requested
a report on the steel industry in Japan or the economic conditions
in the Netherlands East Indies, they had the reports of the
Board of Economic Warfare, G-2, ONI, and the OSS from which
to choose. Because these agencies had competed to secure the
best personnel, it was necessary for each of them to back up
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U: ----
its experts by asserting that its particular reports were the
best available, and that the others might well be disregarded.
"As General Marshall stated in testifying on the uni-
fication bill before the Senate Military Affairs Committee .
last year, ' ... Prior to entering the war, we had little more
than what a military attache could learn at a dinner, more
or less over the coffee cups.'
"From this start, we suddenly had intelligence
springing up everywhere. But nowhere was its collection,
production, or dissemination fully coordinated- not even in
the armed forces. General Marshall pointed this out in his
testimony when he mentioned ' ... the difficulty we had in even
developing a Joint Intelligence Committee. That would seem
to be a very simple thing to do, but it was not at all. "
"There are great masses of information available to
us in peace as in war. With our wartime experience behind us,
we know now where to look for material, as well as for what
to look.
"The transition from war to peace does not change
the necessity for coordination of the collection, production,
and dissemination of the increasingly vast quantities of
foreign -intelligence information that are becoming available.
This coordination the Central Intelligence Agency will supply...
"President Roosevelt established the Office of
Strategic Services for the purpose of gathering together men
of exceptional background and ability who could operate in
the field of national, rather than departmental, intelligence.
In weighing the merits of the OSS, one should remember that
it came late into the field. It was a stopgap. Overnight, it
was given a function to perform that the British, for instance,
had been developing since the days of Queen Elizabeth.. When
one considers these facts, the work of the OSS was quite remark-
able and its known failures must be weighed against its successes.
Moreover, it marked a crucial turning point in the development
of United States intelligence. We are now attempting to profit
by their experiences and mistakes.
"Having attained its present international position of
importance and power in an unstable world, the United States
should not, in my opinion, find itself again confronted with the
necessity of developing its plans and policies on the basis of
intelligence collected, compiled, and interpreted by some for-
eign government. It is common knowledge that we found our-
.
selves in just that position at the beginning of World War IT..
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"For months we had to rely blindly and trustingly
on the superior intelligence system of the British. Our successes
prove that this trust was generally well placed. However, in
matters so vital to a Nation having the responsibilities of a
world power, the United States should never again have to go
hat in hand, begging any foreign government for the eyes-
the foreign intelligence - with which to see. We should be
self-sufficient. The interests of others may not be our
interests. . .
"The need for our own coordinated intelligence pro-
gram has been recognized in most quarters. The Pearl Harbor
disaster dramatized that need and stopgap measures were
adopted. As the war drew to a close, the President directed
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the problem and draft recom-
mendations for the future.
"By the assignment of primary fields of intelligence
responsibilities, we are - in the fields of collection, production,
and dissemination - preventing overlapping functions - that is,
eliminating duplicate roles and missions, and eliminating
duplicate services in carrying out these functions."
Testimony before the House Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments provided additional insights into the need for
structuring foreign intelligence functions on a Government-wide basis.
General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, Army Air Force:
- 11
"The bill provides the basic elements of security of which we
may mention five... Fourth, correct intelligence. The bill
provides for enlargement of our capacity to know the capabili-
ties of our possible enemies, how they can attack us, and
gence with its own trained attaches abroad. The CIA will
coordinate information from all the services, as well as
from other branches of the Government. r,60
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz: "The bill will establish a Central
Intelligence Agency with the responsibility for collection of
information from all available sources, evaluation of that
information and dissemination thereof. This Agency is
intended to secure complete coverage of the wide field of
intelligence and should minimize duplication. The bill recog-
nizes that military intelligence is a composit of authenticated
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and evaluated information covering not only the armed forces
establishment of a possible enemy but also his industrial
capacity, racial traits, religious beliefs, and other related
aspects. 1161
Secretary James V. Forrestal (Secretary of the Navy; 62 listed
the CIA second among the essentials of the bill, after the
National Security Council): "The need for that (CIA) should be
obvious to all of us. Is 63
Rep. W. J. Dorn (D., S. C.): "With regard to the Central
Intelligence Agency - I may be wrong, but I have always felt
that if Admiral Kimmel had had proper intelligence from
Washington the attack on Pearl Harbor would not have occurred,
or at least we would have been able to meet it better. From
your experience, do you think that this Central Intelligence
Agency -alone would warrant passage of this bill?"
Vice Admiral Arthur Radford: "Of course, I think it is most
important. Actually it is in existence now. It is already functioning.,64
Committee Reports
The Senate Committee. report on S. 758 concluded. "To meet
the future with confidence, we must make certain... that a Central
Intelligence Agency collects and analyzes that mass of information
without which the Government cannot either maintain peace or wage
war successfully.,,65
The House Committee report on H.. R. 4214 was equally clear
and succinct in its conclusion: "The testimony received by your com-
committee discloses an urgent need for a continuous program of close
coordination between our domestic, foreign and military policies so
that we may always be able to appraise our commitments as a Nation
in the light of our resources and capabilities. This, your committee
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SECRE I
feels, can be accomplished by the Central Intelligence Agency...
In order that the Council (National Security Council), in its delibera-
tions and advice to the President, may have available adequate infor-
mation, there is provided a permanent organization under the Council,
66
which will furnish that information. "
Floor Discussion
Senate: The Senate Armed Service Committee findings and
report were re-echoed in floor statements during the Senate's dis-
Senator Chan Gurney (R. , S. D.) (Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee): "As an important adjunct to the National
Security Council there is a provision for a Central Intelligence
Agency, which fills a long recognized demand for accurate
information upon which important deciggj~ons, relating to
foreign military policy can be based. "
Senator Raymond Baldwin (R., Conn.): Under the Council
there is established a central intelligence agency to provide
coordinated, adequate intelligence for all Government agencies
concerned with national security. When one reads the record
of the past war in regard to that field it is found that there
was much to be desired in the way intelligence was covered, and
there was great conflict about it. I say nothing here in depre.
cation of the men who were engaged in the intelligence service,
because some remarkable and extremely courageous things
were done. Nevertheless, we demonstrated from our experience
the need of a central intelligence'agency...
Senator Lister Hill (D. , Ala.): "It would (S. 758) provide
security measures at all times, rather than only when hostili-
ties threaten. It creates... a central intelligence agency
which is so essential for the Government to maintain peace
and wit)iout which the Government cannot wage war success-
fully.
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House. The need for centralizing national intelligence drew
wide support from many members of the House during the floor
discussion of H. R. 4214:
Rep. James Wadsworth (R., N.Y.): "This (H. R. 4214 and the instru-
mentalities it establishes) links the military policy with foreign
policy, all measured by our resources and the potentialities
of other people. "70
Rep. Fred Busbey (R., Ill.) (although troubled with certain
features of the CIA section): "I am not opposed to a central intelli-
gence agency. ...You remember Pearl Harbor. They had intelli-
gence, but it was not correlated and evaluated correctly. 01
Rep. Walter Andrews (R., N.Y.): "On the next level above the
National Military Establishment there is provided the National
Security Council with the President as chairman, which will
effectively coordinate our domestic and foreign policies in the
light of sound information furnished by the Central Intelligence
Agency."72
Rep. Robert Sikes (D., Fla.): "During the intervening years
between wars we have never had a proper balance between our
foreign and military policies... We have never been fully informed
of the capabilities, potential or intent of likely enemies... This
is another time when we can well say, 'Remember Pearl Harbor.' "73
Rep. Dewey Short (R., Mo.): "Mr. Chairman, on every score
and by every count we should vote adequate funds for... our
Central Intelligence - which has been lamentably weak - .. .
These (including Central Intelligence) are the things above all
74
others which will guarantee our security."
Rep. W. J. Bryan Dorn (D., S. C.): "Mr. Chairman, one of the
most important features of this bill is' the Central Intelligence
Agency. I would like for you to turn back with me this afternoon
to the most terrible period preceding World War It. Why, you had
most of the newspapers and people in this country thinking that
Adolf Hitler was a comic character, that a war in Europe could
not last through the winter - I remember those editorials quite
well - that Germany would not last through the winter of 1939.
I remember officers of the Navy coming back from observation
posts in the Pacific and saying that the Japanese could not
Annrnwarl Prr Balance 7f fl if1RI7Q ? f IA-Rf1PRARD0269e.flal.rifld0100O1-
 Approved Fqr Release 2006/08129: CIA-RDP86B00269R0{] 1500010001-3
last 3 weeks in a war with America. The Government in
very important part of this bill. "75
the committee that your central intelligence agency is a
to destroy American democracy. I tell you gentlemen of
lack of knowledge of those forces that were marshalling
he was only bluffing. Around the world there was a total
People were saying that Mussolini would not attack; that
intelligence as to the potential power of our enemies.
would knock them out of the war. What a woeful lack of
still serving in that body, said that a few bombs on Tokyo
"An important Member of the other body, who is
suddenly realized that Paris and France would fall.
Washington was stunned and shocked beyond belief when it
Rep. Chet Holifield (D., Calif.): "I want to read to'you some
of the conclusions of the Pearl Harbor Committee, as follows.
Their conclusions were: 'That the Hawaiian Command failed
to discharge their responsibility in the light of the warnings
received from Washington, and other information possessed
by them and the principal command by mutual cooperations.
(B) They failed to integrate and coordinate their facilities
for defense, to alert properly the Army and Navy Estab-
lishments in Hawaii, particularly in the line of warning
and intelligence available to them during the period Novem-
ber 27 to December 7, 1941. They failed to effect liaison on
a basis adequately designed to acquaint each of them with
the operations of the other, which was necessary to their
joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelli-
gence, and they also failed to appreciate and evaluate the
significance of the intelligence and other information available
to them.' "76
national security. "77
an Agency as we are now considering is essential to our
and fixed policy. Now, however, I am convinced that such
and strategic information in time of peace as an announced
never before officially resorted to the collection of secret
bold departure from American tradition. This country has
defined and limited. Please bear in mind that this is a
that the scope and authority of this Agency be carefully
Along with other members of the Committee, I insisted
first proposed I confess I had some fear and doubt about it.
Central Intelligence Agency. When such an organization was
Rep. Robert A. Harness (R., Ind.): "Now a word about the
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Rep. Wadsworth (R., N.Y.): "... In addition, under the
Council there would be another element which is to advise
the Council, subject to regulations made by the Council,
in the field of Intelligence, in the foreign field; and there is
established a central intelligence agency subject to the
Council headed by a director. The function of that agency is
to constitute itself as a gathering point for information com-
ing from all over the world through all kinds of channels
concerning the potential strength of other nations and their
political intentions. There is nothing secret about that.
Every nation in the world is doing the same thing. But it
must be remembered that the Central Intelligence Agency is
subject to the Council and does not act independently. It
is the agency for the collecting and dissemination of informa-
tion which will help the President and the Council to adopt
wise and effective policies. So with the information of that
sort concerning other nations and information coming in
with respect to our own resources, both of which are available
to the Council and President, we will have for the First time
in our history a piece of machinery that should work and it
is high time that we have it. We have never had it. before..
During this last war all sorts of devices were resorted to,
obviously in great haste, to accomplish a thing like this.
You may remember the huge number of special committees,
organizations and agencies set up by Executive Order in an
attempt to catch up with the target. We have learned as a
result of the war that we should have some permanent organi-
zation, and that is the one proposed in this bill. "78
Rep. Manasco (D. , Ala.): "If we had had a strong central
intelligence organization, in all probability we would never
had had the attack on Pearl Harbor; there might not have
been a World War II... I hope the committee will support
the provision in the bill, because the future security of our
country in a large measure depends upon the intelligence we
get. Most of it can be gathered without clandestine intelli-
gence, but some of it must be of necessity clandestine
intelligence. The things we say here today, the language we
change, might endanger the lives of some American citizens
in the future. "79
Thus, there was a consensus of agreement, almost reaching to
unanimous proportions, that the concept of central intelligence should
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be ratified and embodied into statute. However, beyond this point
of almost total accord, differences of opinion would arise as more
specific consideration relating to CIA was undertaken.
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CHAPTER V. POSITION WITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The position that should be prescribed for the CIA within the
Executive Branch was understandably of considerable interest. This
was the very narrow of the central intelligence concept and an antece-
dent to its disposition was an appreciation of the "supra-depart-nental"
nature of the relationships which had been established within the
"intelligence community" under the National Intelligence Authority.
It is recalled that the 22 January 1946 Presidential Directive 80
placed the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence
Group under the control of the President's chief advisors in international
and military affairs, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the
personal representative of the President. The DCI was a non-voting
member of the NIA.
Following this pattern, the proposed National Security Act of
1947 simply established ". . , under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence,
who shall be the head thereof... " and transferred "... the functions
81
of the National Intelligence Authority... to the National Security Council.
These functions were to plan, develop, and coordinate all Federal
foreign intelligence activities "... to assure the most effective accomplish-
82
"
ment of the intelligence zission related to the national security.
The functions of the DCI and the CIG under the NIA were transferred
also to the DCI and the CIA Act.
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In pursuing the meaning of these relationships three major
questions were considered. First, could central intelligence operate
effectively by reporting to a group (National Security Council) rather
than to an individual? Second, would satisfactory relationships be
maintained between CIA and the departments and their intelligence
agencies? Third, what relationship should exist between the DCI
and the NSC?
NSC Relation ship
House. During Committee hearings in the House, Representa-
tive Walter Judd (R., Minn.) pursued the respective merits of the CIA
reporting to the NSC or to an individual:
Rep. Judd: "I have concern as to whether the intelligence
agency provided in the bill is given anywhere near the impor-
tance it deserves... it seems to be a joint and hydra-headed
agency which will weaken our intelligence rather than
strengthen it. "
Dr. Vannevar Bush (Director of the Office of Emergency
? Management, Scientific Research and Development): 11.. . The
Central Intelligence Agency provided for (in the bill) links
the military establishment and the State Department, and
hence cannot logically be placed under the Secretary of
National Defense. It is a joint matter. It might be reporting
directly to the President... "
Rep. Judd: "I have never seen a hydra-headed organization
which functions as well as one headed by a single man. If we
were caught flat-footed without proper intelligence at the out-
break of another war, it might be disastrous.
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Rep. Judd: "Regarding the CIA, do you think that it ought
to be under the National Security Council, or directly under
the Secretary of National Defense, on a par with the National
Security Resources Board, the Joint Research and Develop-
ment Board, the National Security Resources Board. The
CIA is put under the National Security Council so that it
has a dozen heads. It seems to me that this is. so important
that it ought to be on a par with those other agencies."
Vice Admiral Radford: "I feel that the CIA should be under
the National Security Council. "
Rep. Judd: "You don't think that its reports will make the
rounds and never get any action? " A.
Vice Admiral Radford: "I hardly think so. I think its handling
of reports gan be controlled. by the Director. I am sure it
would be. "
Senate. In a statement before the Senate Committee, Mr.
Allen W. Dulles, who made extraordinary contributions to the success
of. the OSS and who eventually was to become the first civilian to be
appointed Director of Central Intelligence, questioned the desirability
of the Director reporting to a large National Security Council: 85
".. , this (National Security) Council will have at least
six members, and possibly more, subject to Presidential
appointments. From its composition it will be largely
military although the Secretary of State will be a member.
If precedent is any guide, it seems unlikely, in view of the
burden of work upon.all the members of this Council, that it
will prove to be an effective working body which will meet
frequently, or which could give much supervisory attention
to a central intelligence agency. It would seem preferable
that the Chief of Central Intelligence should report, as at
present, to a smaller body, of which the Secretary of State
would be the chairman, and which would include the Secretary
of National Defense, and a representative of the President,
with the right reserved to the Secretaries of State and of
National Defense to be represented on this small board by
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deputies, who should have at least the rank of Assistant
Secretary. And this board must really meet and assume
the responsibility for advising and counseling the Direc-
tor of Intelligence, and assure the proper liaison between
the Agency and these two Departments and the Executive. "
However, under no circumstances did Mr. Dulles want CIA
86
to be organized under an individual policy maker:
Secretary of National Defense. In line with this interest he arranged.
the National Security Council or to an individual, particularly the
became particularly interested in whether the CIA should report to
Chairman Gurney of the Senate Armed Services Committee
there in time. "
"The State Department, irrespective of the form in
which the Central Intelligence Agency is cast, will collect
and process its own information as a basis for the day-by-
day conduct of its work. The armed services intelligence
agencies will do likewise. But for the proper judging of the
situation in any foreign country it is important that informa-
tion should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to
weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts,
without having either the facts or the conclusions warped
by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose
duty it is to determine policy and who, having once
determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts
which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. The
Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with
policy. It should try to get at the hard facts on which others
must determine policy. The warnings which might well have
pointed to the attack on Pearl Harbor were largely discounted
by those who had already concluded that the Japanese must
inevitably strike elsewhere. The warnings which reportedly
came to Hitler of our invasion of North Africa were laughed
aside. Hitler thought he knew we didn't have the ships to do
it. It is impossible to provide any system which will be
proof against the human frailty of intellectual stubbornness.
Every individual suffers from that. All we can do is to see
that we have created the best possible mechanism to get the
unvarnished facts before the policy makers, and to get it
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for Mr. Charles S. Cheston, a former Assistant Director of the
Office of Strategic Services, to meet with Admiral Roscoe Hillen-
koetter, who.succeeded General Vandenberg as DCI on I May 1947.
Mr. Cheston's viewpoint was subsequently made a matter
of record in the Senate hearings:87
"... It has been amply demonstrated that problems of
peace and war in modern times require total intelligence.
Each of the principal departments and agencies of Govern-
ment requires information for the determination of basic
questions of policy, the collection and analysis of which
are entirely outside the scope of its own operations. It
does not solve the problem to create a kind of clearing house
for information gathered in the ordinary operations of the
several departments. What is needed is an effective,
integrated, single agency with clearly defined duties and
authority to analyze and correlate information from all
sources and, wherever necessary, to supplement existing
methods of collection of information. Such an agency must
serve all principal departments of the Government and also
bring together the full and comprehensive information upon
which national policy must be based. It should not supplant
existing intelligence units within the several departments.
Every effort should be made to improve and strengthen these
units wherever possible. The problem is national and not
departmental. And it will not be solved by having the policies
and operations of such an agency determined by a committee
of Cabinet members, whose primary duty is to discharge
the full-time responsibilities of their own offices."
Following a meeting with Mr. Cheston in Philadelphia on
Memorial Day, Admiral Hillenkoetter wrote a letter to Senator Gurney,
from which the following is excerpted:
"The third point (advocated by Mr. Cheston) is that the
mmittee.
Director should report to individual
the Senate Appropriations
As I previously stated before Committee, I feel that this is a matter to be determined by
the Congress rather than by me. On purely theoretical
 Approved For Release 2006/08/2?: CIA-RDP86B0026 F 001500010001-3
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.6rt to one indi-
grounds, it would, of course, be best to/ep'
vidual rather than a group. However, I can work with a
Council equally well, and see no great difference in either
solution that Congress may determine. There may be some
question as to the wisdom of having the Director of Central
Intelligence report to the Secretary of National Defense.
This, in effect, might be considered as placing the Agency
within the military establishment, which would not, in all
probability, be satisfactory to the State Department. They
have a great interest in the operations of the Agency, and
their contributions in the intelligence field are particularly
important in time of peace, when the Foreign Service can
operate throughout the world.
"As General Donovan stated in his memorandwrn to
you of 7 May 1947, intelligence 'must serve the diplomatic
as well as the military and naval arms. ' This can be best
done outside the military establishment. As General Donovan
stated further, '... Since the nature of its work requires it to
have status, it should be independent of any Department of
the Government (since it is obliged to serve all and must be
free of the natural bias on operating Departments).' "
the President. It was only collaterally related to central intelligence.
of Defense the coordinator of national security and immediately under
emphasis behind this amendment, however, was to make the Secretary
board, and over the entire military establishment as well. "88 The
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources
a position "... where he will be over the National Security Council,
elevating the Secretary of National Security (Secretary of Defense) to
of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed an amendment
When this matter came to the Senate floor, Senator Robertson
Council... "89 The amendment was defeated.
a superior position, the conclusions which emanate from the Security
that the (Secretary of Defense) should in any way control, by means of
Senator Gurney, in opposing the amendment, said, "We do not believe
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Relationship with Intelligence Community
While the CIA was established under the National Security Coun-
cil as proposed by Administration, Congressional consideration helped
to illuminate the supra-departmental nature of the Agency's function
as much as it did to ratify earlier Executive Branch action.
The second concern relating to the establishment of the CIA
under the National Security Council was whether this arrangement
would support satisfactory relationships between the CIA and the depart-
ments and their intelligence agencies, This concern was brought out
in the following colloquy during the Senate Committee hearings: 90
Senator Tydings (D., Md.): ". . . when you get down to the
Central Intelligence Agency, which certainly is one of the
most important of all the functions set forth in the bill, I
notice that it reports directly to the President and does not
seem to have any line running to the War Department, or the
Navy Department, or to the Secretary for Air. And I was
wondering if that rather excluded position, you might say,
was a wholesome thing. It seems to me that Central Intelli-
gence Agency ought to have more direct contact with the
Army and the Navy and the Air Force; and as I see it on the
chart here, it is pretty well set aside and goes only to the
President. What is the reason for that?"
Admiral Sherman: "Well, sir, this diagram shows the pri-
mary control of the Central Intelligence Agency through the
National Security Council which, of course, is responsible
to the President. But, of course, the Central Intelligence
Agency, by its detailed directive, takes information in from
the military services and also supplies them with information.
"In other words, it is a staff agency and controlled
through the National Security Council, which is supported by
the military services, and in turn, supports them. "
Senator Tydings: "It seems to me that of course they would
diffuse such information as a matter of orderly procedure
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to the Army, Navy,. and Air Force, as they collected the
information and as they deemed it pertinent. * But I would
feel a little more secure about it if there were a line
running from that agency to the War Department, the Navy
Department, and the Air Force, rather than have it go up
through the President and back again. Because the Presi-
dent is a rather busy man, and while he has control over
it, one of its function s, it seems to me, ought to be to
have a closer tie-in with the three services than the chart
indicates."
Admiral Sherman: "Well, sir, that is the trouble with the
diagram. Actually, the Security Council, placed directly
under it, has members of the three departments, the
Secretary of National Defense, the Central Intelligence
Agency, who collaborates very closely with Military and
Naval Intelligence, and there are a good many other cross-
relationships. "
Senator Tydings: "I realize that, but even so, I think intelli-
gence is about as important a part of running a war as there
is, as I know you will agree. And it is rather set off there
by itself, and is only under the President; which is all right
for general direction purposes, but I do not feel satisfied
in having it over there without some lines running to 'che War
Department, the Navy Department, and the Air Force, even
though that might follow and they might do it anyhow."
Admiral Sherman: "Well, in a further development of this
chart, we might show a line of collaboration and service and
so on, extending from the Central Intelligence Agency to the
three departments, and to those others."
Senator Tydings :_ "To the Joint Chiefs of Staff anyway. "
Admiral Sherman: "They serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
a matter of fact. We have a Central Intelligence (man) in
the Policy Council of the Research and Development Board at
the present time. "
Senator Tydings: "If you ever do another chart, will you do
me the favor of connecting that up with those three departments
and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Because it looks like it is
set up in that way to advise the President, more than to advise
the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; which, of course,
is not the intention of it at all, in my opinion."
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Admiral Sherman: "We tried, in this particular chart, to
show only the primary line of control, with th?e exception
of the dotted line from the President to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, which is there for constitutional reasons."
Senator Tydings: "Well, I hope that my comments will
cause us to find some way that we can make sure that
someone will offer an amendment from the War Department
or the Navy Department that the Intelligence Agency is to
have direct tie-in with the Joint Chiefs and the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. Otherwise, we may have another
Pearl Harbor controversy, with the question arising,
'Who got the information?' And the reply, 'It was not
transmitted.' That is one thing that should not happen
again. And as this is set up, it would lend the layman
the opinion that it was more or less detached, rather than
an integral part of the three services.
Senator Tydings: "Admiral, that is an awfully short bit
of explanation, under the caption "Central Intelligence
Agency," the way it is set up here, separately, to be
appointed by the President, and superseding the services
now run by the Army and the Navy, I respectfully submit
to you and to General Norstad that it might be wise to put
an amendment in there, in order to make certain that the
thing is understood; that this Central Intelligence Agency
shall service the three departments and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and have some tie-in. with the three departments,
rather than to leave it hanging up there on a limb all off
by itself. I do not think that would change anything mate-
rially, but it would clarify it, and make it plain that we are
setting up something for the purposes for which we conceive
it to be set up. "
Admiral Sherman: "Well, sir, I would like to make a comment
on the language as to the Central Intelligence Agency. At
one time in the drafting we considered completely covering
the Central Intelligence Agency in the manner that it should
be covered by law. "
Senator Tydings: "Admiral, my point is simply this: that
under the wording as to the Central Intelligence Agency which.
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begins on page 20 and ends at the top of page 22, it deals more
or less with consolidation and not with the duties that devolve
upon that office. It seems to me there is a void in the bill
that ought to be eliminated. "
Admiral Sherman: "Well, we considered the matter of trying
to cover the Central Intelligence Agency adequately, and we
found that that matter, in itself, was going to be a matter of
legislation of considerable scope and importance.
Senator Tydings: "A separate bill?"
Admiral Sherman: "A separate bill. And after consultation
with General Vandenberg, we felt it was better in this legis-
lation only to show the relationship of the Central Intelligence
Agency to the National Security Council, and then leave to
separate legislation the task of a full and thorough develop-
ment of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator Tydin s: "Well, now, for the record, is it safe for
this Committee to assume that during this session it is likely
that a bill will come along dealing with the Central Intelli' t~
gence Agency in the particulars we have under discussion?
Admiral Sherman: "It is my understanding that that will
take place. "
The Chairman: "How about that, General Vandenberg?"
General Vandenberg: "The enabling act is prepared, but
we do not want to submit that until we have reason for it."
Later, General Vandenberg reviewed for the Senate committee
the relationships which had been developed between the Director of
Central Intelligence and the intelligence community under the 22 January
1946 Presidential directive:91
"In order to perform his prescribed functions, the
Director of Central Intelligence must keep in close and inti-
mate contact with the departmental intelligence agencies of
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the Government. To provide formal machinery for this pur-
pose, the President's Directive established an Intelligence
Advisory Board to advise the Director. The permanent mem-
bers of this Board are the Directors of Intelligence of the
State, War and Navy Departments and the Air Force. Pro-
vision is made, moreover, to invite the heads of other
intelligence agencies to sit as members of the Advisory Board
on all matters which would affect their agencies. In this
manner, the Board serves to furnish the Director with the'
benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience, viewpoints
and over-all requirements of the departments and their
intelligence agencies. "
The responsibility to support the departments and their intelli-
gence agencies was a function of the DCI under the President's
Directive of 22 January 1946 and was carried over into the CIA section
of the President's proposal by providing that "the functions of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the functions... of the Central
Intelligence Group are transferred to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence appointed under this act and to the Central Intelligence Agency
respectively. However, in keeping with the House Committee's view9z
-~... that it is better legislative practice to spell out such (CIA's)
duties in the interest of clarity and simplicity..." the CIA section
was amended to specify these supporting functions. This provided
the basis for the following colloquy on the House floor:93
Rep. K ersten (R., Wis.): "It seems to me from what the
gentleman has said that the Central Intelligence Agency is one
of the very important parts of this entire set-up. I wish to
ask the gentleman if there is a definite coordination provided
for between that Agency and, say the Department of State?
For I feel that certain information of the Agency would affect
the activities of the entire system."
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Rep. Wadsworth (R. , N. Y. }: "The gentleman is correct.
May I point out that under the provisions of the bill the
Central Intelligence Agency in effect must cooperate with
all the agencies of the Government, including the State De-
partment. It is the gathering point of information that may
come in from any department of the Government with re-
spect to the foreign field, including the State Department,
of course; including the War Department, through G-2;
including the Navy Department, through ONI. That. informa-
tion is gathered into the central agency to be evaluated by
Central Intelligence and then disseminated to those agencies
of Government that may be interested in some portion of it."
DCI Relationship with NSC ?
The third and final consideration relating to structural rela-
tionships concerned the position of the Director with respect to the
National Security Council. As background it is recalled that prior
to submission of the proposal act to the Congress, General Vanden-
berg, stroungly opposed participation by either CIA or its Director in
policy decisions but felt that there should be a provision providing
for the Director's presence at the meeting of the Council. The 22
January 1946 Directive provided that the Director sit on the National
Intelligence Authority as a non-voting member. However, the draft-
ing team felt that the position of the Director as the intelligence
advisor to the Council was inherent in the position itself, and that it
would be improper to provide by law that the head of the Agency, under
the Council, should sit on the Council. 94 While being present at the
meeting of the Council did not necessarily constitute sitting "on" the
Council, General Vandenberg's recommendation was rejected.
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However, during a hearing of the House Committee with
Secretary Forrestal testifying the issue was reopened:95
Rep. Boggs (D. , La.): "The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency would work under the National Security
Council. "
Secretary Forrestal: "That is correct."
Rep. Boggs: "He is not a member of the National Security
Council; he is an independent appointment of the President,
but he works under, on this chart -- he is not a member of
the Council, the heavy line drawn here, but he is more or
less an executive secretary on intelligence matters for the
Council.
Secretary Forrestal; "Well, it is obvious, Mr. Boggs, that
the results of his work would be of essential importance to
the Security Council. "
Rep. Boggs: "I think so, and I agree with you, but be a member tofethe uht
that I have in mind was that he should
Council himself. After all, he is dealing with all the informa-
tion and the evaluation of that information, from wherever we
can get it. It seems to me that he has knowledge and informa-
tion of matters which the National Security Council would
consider more information at hand and the evaluation of that
information than any other member of that Council. He
should be put on an equal basis. "
Secretary Forrestal: "I think that there is always some limit
to the effectiveness of any organization in proportion to the
number of people that are on it. The services and the intelli-
gence information of the Director of Intelligence would be
available, and certainly no man who is either the Secretary of
National Defense or the Chairman of the Security Council,
would want to act or proceed without. constant reference to the
sources available to this Central Intelligence Dire confident a But
again, I would not try to specify it by law, so
that the practical workings out of this organization would
require his presence most of the time. "
Rep, Boggs: "I can see -- I do not know that I can see -- I
can visualize in my mind, even if this bill becomes a law,
as presently set up, a great deal of room for confusion on
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 Presidential action. 96
intelligence matters. Here we have the Director of the Central
nation's chief intelligence advisor, as confirmed by subsequent
Forrestal help to shed further light on the role of the DCI as the
although discussions such as that held between Mr. Boggs and Secretary
Central Intelligence on the National Security Council as a member,
There was to be no further proposal to place the Director of
Approved For Release 2006/0
is now."
more opportunity to put the blame on, somebody else than there
functions there without a great deal of confusion, and really
I just cannot quite see how the man is going to carry out his
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of State, and so forth.
of Government in addition to our national defense agencies, the
the Secretary of National Defense, and all the other agencies
he has to get all of his information down through the chair of
cil, and yet the Director is not a member of that Council, but
Intelligence Agency, responsible to the National Security Coun-
Secretary Forrestal: "Well, if you have an organization, Mr.
Boggs, in which men have to rely upon placing the blame,
and this is particularly true of Government, if you once get
that conception into their heads, you cannot run any organiza-
tion, and it goes to the root,' really, of this whole question.
This thing will only work, and I have said from the beginning
it would only work, if the components in it want it to work. "
Rep. Boggs: "Right, I certainly agree with that... "
Summary
The relationships which had existed for central intelligence
within the intelligence community and to the policymakers under the
National Intelligence Authority were for the most part ratified by the
Congress in the National Security Act of 1947. The Director of Central
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Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency were placed under a
National Security Council, whose membership was expanded to include
the President.
As finally enacted, the "Central Intelligence Agency with a
Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof... " was
97
established "... under the National Security Council. " The respon-
sibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence to the departments
and their intelligence agencies under the 22 January 1946 Presidential
Directive were made specific duties for CIA "under the direction of
the National Security Council" as follows: -
"1(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
the national security, and provide for the dissemination of
such intelligence within the Government using where appro-
priate existing agencies and facilities...
"(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelli-
gence agencies, such additional services of common concern
as the National Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally. "
The Congressional discussions leading to this enactment helped
to publicly clarify the role of the DCI and the CIA and the nature of the
supra-departmental tasks facing central intelligence.
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SKU# It
CHAPTER VI. FUNCTIONS
The basic functions of a national foreign intelligence organization
`/Y were prescribed as early as 1941 in connection with the appointment of
the Coordinator of Information; continued in 1942 in the case of OSS in a
form tailored to the war effort; reviewed in 1944 within the Executive
Branch as "Donovan's 10 Principles"; reaffirmed in 1945 in the plan of
the Joint Chiefs' and the recommendation of the Secretaries of State, War
and Navy; and in 1946 directed by the President as responsibilities of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
In 1947 the basic functions of a national foreign intelligence
organization were approved by the Congress of the United States in
.Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947:
(d) For the purpose of coordinating .he intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies
in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council--
(1) to advise the National Security Council in
matters concerning such intelligence activities of the
Government departments and agencies as relate to
national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National
Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence.
activities of. the departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to the national security, and provide for the appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the Government
using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena,
law-enforcement powers, or internal- security functions:
Provided further, That the departments and other agen-
cies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence:
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And provided further: That the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelli-
gence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing
intelligence agencies, such additional services of com-
mon concern as the National Security Council determines
can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security as
the National Security Council may from time to time
direct.
Thus, with slight modification and with a birthright back to 1,941, the
responsibilities of the Director of Central Intel.ligence99 under the
22 January 1946 Presidential Directive were specified in the National
Security Act of 1947 as duties for the CIA and imposed upon the DCI as
the head of the Agency.
The approval of Section 102 involved more than placing a statutory
capstone on six years of prior development within the Executive Branch.
For a number of reasons already suggested, 100 Congress was to show
deep interest in the functions of CIA.
Senate. It is recalled that the President's proposal sought to incor-
porate the 22 January 1946 Presidential Directive by referencing the func-
tions of the DCI and GIG under it and transferring them to the DCI and the
CIA under the proposed Act. This procedure caused some discomfiture
within the Senate committee in connection with CIA's responsibilities to
the departments and their intelligence agencies. Senator Tydings registered
his concern over the lack of specificity on this issue and remarked that
the CIA section as proposed by the President "deals more or less with
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consolidation and not with the duties that devolve upon that office. It seems
101
to me that there is a void in the bill that ought to be eliminated."
While the Senate committee and the Senate were willing to await
the early submission of enabling legislation for CIA to correct what was
viewed by some as a deficiency, Senator Edward Robertson (R., Wyo.)
commented when the measure reached the Senate floor, "It is necessary
to go to Executive Order to find out what the functions and the powers of
the Central Intelligence Agency are to be. Many. . .have taken the trouble
to do so -- and I comment parenthetically that it should not be necessary
?IQ2
to go to Executive Order to interpret a statute.
The functions of the CIA were eventually spelled out in the
National Security Act of 1947 in line with a determination that 11... it is
better legislative practice to spell out such duties in the interests of
?1Q3
clarity and simplicity.
House Committee. The interest of the House Committee on
Expenditures Departments in the functions for the CIA is illustrated in
Mr. Busbey's questioning of Secretary Forrestal:104
merely for telligence
Rep.Busbey (R., Ill.): "Mr' Sthe tbill, this Central
Group, as I understand it under of gathering, disseminating, and evaluating information to the
National Security Council, is that correct?"
Secretar Forrestal: "That is a general statement of their activity." e Rep. Bushey: "I wonder if there
Cent al rumors
that foundation
that have come to me to the ofeet
Intelligence Agency, they are contem plating operational activities?"
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Secretary Forrestal: "I would not be able to go into the details
of their operations, Mr. Busbey. The major part of what they
do, their major function, as you say, is the collection and colla-
tion and evaluation of information from Army Intelligence, Navy
Intelligence, the Treasury, Department of Commerce, and most
other intelligence, really. Most intelligence work is not a mysti-
cal or mysterious character; it is simply the intelligent gathering
of available data throughout this Government and throughout our
consular services, from our military attaches. As to the nature
and extent of any direct operational activities, I think I should
rather have General Vandenberg respond to that question.
"I should like to add this, however, that in the democracy
in which we live, and which we certainly intend to keep, intelli-
gence activity is a difficult task. By the nature of its objectives
it ought not to have publicity, and yet that is one of our difficult
problems--just as, during the war, one of our greatest problems
was the making available of the news that should be available,
and yet denying to the enemy the things that would lend him not
only comfort but substantial and effective help; and the same is
true of intelligence. We do need a central intelligence agency,
and we do need access--we do need to have some machinery
for collecting accurate information from the rest of the world,
because, as I said earlier, the speed, the tempo, and the fluidity
of events in the world today very definitely require some central
source here that is trying to evaluate those events for the various
departments of Government that are charged with our security.
This line of questioning was continued by Rep. Brown, who
participated in the hearings as a member of the Rules Committee:105
_Rep. Brown (R. , Ohio): "...How far does this central intelli-
gence agency go in its authority and scope?
"You mentioned that they combine and can use the agen-
cies within the Treasury, I believe, within the Department of
Commerce, and the like.
Secretary Forrestal: "I said they had available to them, and
should have available, and should gather all information that
bears upon our national security, from every agency of Govern-
ment.
"Take, for example, the question of raw material. "
Rep. Brown: "Do you limit it to national security? "
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Secretary Forrestal: "I might read from the paper that
created the authority. "
Mr. Brown: "As I understand, this original authority was
created by directive of the President?"
Secretary Forrestal: "That is correct, sir. "
Rep. Brown: 'Rather than a law passed by the Congress of the
United States.
"The provisions of this bill dealing with Central Intelli-
gence would, I assume, supplant this Executive Order? "
Secretary Forrestal: "May I respond to your questiorr thusly:
The purpose of the Central Intelligence Authority was directed
solely to the necessary intelligence activities that dealt only
with our national security. "
Rep. Brown: "I understand that.
"Please look on page 21, line 7, or line 13 of the bill;
you will notice by statute you transfer the function of the
National Intelligence Authority to the National Security Council
and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the functions of
the Central Intelligence group are transferred.
. "However, the functions are set up nowhere that I have
knowledge of in the statutory law of the land, and your statute
refers back so some Federal Register of February 5, or some
other'date, and some directive issued by the President of the
United States, under what I still think is questionable authority.
Nobody can tell from that statute, from this bill, if enacted
into law, what power or authority this fellow had. "
Secretary Forrestal: "While it is not specified in this bill, Mr.
Brown, the intent is, should this bill become law, to implement
specifically, by statute, that part of it that deals with the reference
to the Central Intelligence Authority. "
Rep. Brown: "Do you not think it should be done all at once before
you pass a thing like this? Do you not think this should be set
out in the statute?
"Intentions are fine things, but intentions make good pav-
ing blocks, too."
Secretary Forrestal: "Well, it could be done simultaneously. I
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of this bill."
would rather not try to have that bill incorporated as a part
Rep. Brown: "Do you not think this bill should come first,
then, and have an agency legalize and authorize the law and
put it in here? "
Secretary Forrestal: "There is no reason why you could not have
it a part of this bill, and I think General Vandenberg, as a matter
of fact, is now preparing a statute which could either be incor-
porated in this bill or dealt with as a separate act.
"Either way would be quite all right, as far as I am
concerned."
Rep. Brown followed up his questioning of Secretary Forrestal
concerning the functions of the Agency with Admiral Sherman. After
getting Admiral Sherman to admit that he believed the outline of our
national security structure should be established by statute:106
Congress passed an adequate organic law for the Central
is President Truman's letter of January 22, that it would
freeze that letter and make it permanent until such time as the
My understanding of the effect of this bill in that regard is
that it would freeze the order specifically referred to, which
optimum settlement of the matter, for the time being...
compromise between opposing views, and I believe it is the
As I said in my prepared statement, this bill represents a
Admiral Sherman: "I think that this bill does it properly.
Intelligence Agency. "
Later, during the same session, Admiral Sherman pointed out
11... it was not the Central Intelligence Group which wanted to
defer their legislation until a later time; it was General Nor-
stad and I who were charged with preparing a draft for this
bill. We felt that if we attempted to get all the duties of the
Central Intelligence Agency in here, then there would be a
demand to put all the duties of the Navy, all the duties of each
agency, in great detail, and we would wind up with a very
bulky volume. "
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Rep. Harness (R., Ind.) then asked if that was
... the only reason given why you preferred to simply transfer
the Security Agency under the Executive order rather than to
write in the act, the functions of the Agency?"
Admiral Sherman replied:
"That was the only reason from my point of view, sir. I felt
that that was rather a large subject by itself, and that it would
unduly complicate this other legislation. "
Rep. Harness concluded by observing:
"But at the same time you proposed later on to ask the Congress
to enact a law that would do that very thing ? "
Summary
The Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946 was entered into
the'Record-in the Committee hearings107 and the basic functions of the
Director of Central Intelligence under that directive were described by
General Vandenberg before both committees in the following terms:108
"The Director of Central Intelligence is presently
charged with the following basic functions:
1. The collection of foreign intelligence information of
certain types - without interfering with or duplicating the normal
collection activities of the military and naval intelligence
services, or the Foreign Service of the State Department.
2. The evaluation, correlation and interpretation of
the foreign information collected, in order to produce the
strategic and national policy intelligence required by the
President and other appropriate officials of the Government.
3. The dissemination of the national intelligence produced.
4. The performance of such'services of common con-
cern to the various intelligence agencies of the Government as
can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
5. Planning for the coordination of the intelligence
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activities of the Government so as to secure the more effective
.accomplishment of the national intelligence objectives."
It was clear that the correlation, evaluation and dissemination
of intelligence relating to national security was an inherent part of
central intelligence and that these functions were widely recognized and
supported by the Congress. Four of the five functions as seen by General
109
Vandenberg are clearly recognizable in Section 102 as enacted. The
first, collection of foreign intelligence of certain types, was not to be
specified in the Act but understood to be one of the services that the
National Security Council could direct the Agency to perform.
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CHAPTER VII. COLLECTION
Background
Certain elements within the intelligence community had feared
from the outset that a centralized organization would so dominate the
intelligence field that it would encroach upon departmental collection,
evaluation, and dissemination functions. In the interest of assuaging
these fears, the Presidential Directive provided that "The existing
intelligence agencies of your Departments (State, War, andNavy) shall
continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental
intelligence. "
Not withstanding this qualification, however, a House report110
of the 79th Congress, apparently again reflecting the reservation of
certain elements in the intelligence communicy, recommended that the
Director of Central Intelligence "... should not undertake operations for
the collection of intelligence. ~~111 Prior to the issuance of this House
report, the National Intelligence Authority, in furtherance of its respon-
-sibility to insure "the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence
mission relating to the National security, " had directed that:
... the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed
to perform the following services of common concern, which
this authority has determined can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally: Conduct of all organizaed Federal espionage and
counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its
possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information
required for the national security..."
House Committee
Therefore, when this issue was again raised during the 80th
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Congress, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy constituted as the
National Intelligence Authority, sent a letter to Clare Hoffman, Chairman,
House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, which
referred to the 8 July 1946 directive and denied charges appearing in the
press that the GIG had usurped various departmental intelligence functions
and had forced established organizations out of the field. Excerpts from
that 26 June 1947 letter follow:
"It has long been felt by those who have successfully
operated clandestine intelligence systems that such work must
be. centrali.-sed within one agency. As a corollary to this
proposition, it has likewise been proven that a multitude of
espionage agencies results in two shortcomings: first, agents
tend to uncover each other or block each other's funds or
similarly neutralize each other, being unaware of identical
objectives; second, each agency tends to hoard its own
special information or attempts to be the first to deliver a
choice piece of information to higher authorities. This latter
type of competition does not permit the overall evaluation of
intelligence on a given subject, as each agency is competing
for prestige...
"The Central Intelligence Group should be free to
assume, under our direction, or the subsequent direction of
a National Security Council, the performance, for the benefit
of the intelligence agencies of the Government, of such services,
of common concern, including the field of collection, as this
Authority or a subsequent Council determines can be most
efficiently performed centrally."
In keeping with the precedent of not publicizing espionage as an
activity of the United States Government, almost all discussion relating
to the clandestine collection function was deleted from the printed
committee hearings. However, the day after Chairman Hoffman had
received the 27 June letter from the National Intelligence Authority,
the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments
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met in executive session to hear testimony on whether or not the respon-
sibility to collect certain foreign intelligence should be assigned to the
112
Central Intelligence Agency.
Rep. Wadsworth (R., N. Y.)- "... in view of this paragraph con-
cerning the existing intelligence agencies of your departments,
which are G-2, ONI and the appropriate agency of the State
Department, which paragraph reads:
'The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate
departmental intelligence.
"Apparently the issue arises around the meaning and
interpretation of that paragraph along with paragraph 'C'
which directs the Central Intelligence to perform such
service of common concern as can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally. "
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg: "... The Intelligence Advisory
Board, which consists of the three departmental intelligence
organizations, State, War, and Navy, in consultation with
the Director of Central Intelligence, made an exhaustive
study of the best way to centralize, both from the point of
view of efficiency of operation and cost, certain phases of
the national intelligence.
"They all felt, together with myself, who was Director
at that time, that a very small portion, but a very important
portion, of the collection of intelligence should be centralized
in one place. Now, the discussion went on within the Intelli-
gence Advisory Board as to where that place should be. "
Rep. Brown: "...In other words, you proceeded under the
theory that this Central Intelligence Agency was authorized
to collect this information and not simply to evaluate it?"
General Vandenberg: "We went under the assumption that...
that part that says that we should ' perform such other
functions and duties as the President and the National Intelli-
gence Authority may from time to time direct,' and 'recommend
to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such
over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective
accomplishment of the National Intelligence mission 'gave us
that right. "
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Rep. Brown: "In other words, if you decided you wanted to go
into direct activities of any nature, almost, why, that could
be done?"
General Vandenber : "Within the Foreign Intelligence field,
if it was agreed upon by all of those agencies concerned.
Rep. Brown: "And that you were not limited to evaluation?"
General Vandenberg: "That is right, sir. "
General Vandenberg: ". . . Nov, the difficulty we ran into in
the Intelligence Advisory Board was this: It is almost universally
agreed that the collection of clandestine intelligence must be
centralized some place; because if it is disseminated among
several organizations without one head, the agents who are
operating expose each other. We saw that ourselves during
the war inthe Balkans.
"The British have had their experience, and the Germans
in their report of the war indicate that that was one of the
causes of their failure. We believe that the Russian expose in.
Canada had something to do with the numerous agencies up
there. Universally, among the heads of the intelligence
organizations in the government, the belief is that clandes-
tine intelligence should be centralized.
"Then the point came: Where should we centralize
it? If we put it in G-2, that made an organization which had
particular points of view and priorities responsible for
collecting the clandestine intelligence for the State Department
and the Navy Department, and that would immediately cause
a furor, because neither State nor Navy could have assurance
that the proper priority would be given to the collection of their
intelligence.
"The same thing was true if we put it in State, and
the same thing was true if we put it in the Navy Department. "
Rep. Wadsworth: "And did the head of G -2 and the head of ONI
agree to this proposal?"
General Vandenberg: "Yes sir. "
Rep. Brown: "... one of the big questions in my mind is whether
or not we should not set forth in the statute, as a law-making
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body is presumed to do, what the functions of an agency it
creates may be. "
General Vandenber: "I would agree with that, except for
this one point. Today we are tyros in this game of foreign
intelligence. We are trying to overcome in two or three
years sometimes hundreds of years of experience.
"People will tell you that we know believe of that the there answers and
this is the right way to do it. I do not banybody in the United States today who can tell you that; and
I would prefer to let this thing grow in the hands of people
who are primarily interested in getting this intelligence. "
Rep. Brown: "You can write these functions in the statute
and you can change them?"
General Vandenberg: "I do not think anybody knows."
_Rep. Brwn: "We are supposed to say what an agency of this
Government can do. "
General Vandenberg:_ "If we had had the Central Intelligence
Group 300 years ago, or 200 or 150 years ago, we could
come in and tell you what, in our opinion, was our best
advice on how those functions should be delineated. I do not
think that we can do that today. "
Rep. Brown: "You think we should delegate to a Security
Council, then, the authority to fix functions and to change
them as they may see fit, which might possibly endanger
the rights and privileges of the people of the United States?"
General Vandenberg: "No, sir, I do not think there is any-
thing in the bill, since it is all foreign intelligence, that can
possibly affect any of the privileges of the people of the
United States... My feeling is that the limit:::tions, as trans-
ferred from the President's letter, are sufficient to protect
the people of the United States, but that is my personal P opinion,
and that in the hands of the Security Council the collection
of foreign intelligence can be properly administered and will
be given enough of a broad policy ein order to set this thin al national in ell genceg uI
so that we will have, some day,
can see no reason for limiting it at this time. "
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Rep. McCormack (D., Mass.), "Do you think the CIG should do
collection work? "
Mr. Allen W. Dulles: "Yes, I do. I would like to get into that
point, and I realize it is a contentious point, and it is a difficult
point, and there are arguments on both sides. There is a lot
of misunderstanding about secret intelligence."
"In the first place, secret intelligence and clandestine
intelligence is only one relatively minor segment of the whole
intelligence picture. There are several branches of secret
intelligence, and some one agency has to do that. I think it
is impossible to continue with a series of agencies engaged in
the work of secret intelligence. You are going to cross wires,
and you are going to find that these various agents will become
crossed. You will find that, because it is very delicate and
difficult field which requires the greatest amount of coordination.
I do not know where else it can be put...
"I feel very strongly that there must be a central directing
agency of that with the power to do the secret collecting, using
such agencies as that Central Agency desires, including its
own. That has been the experience of most other countries...
"The argument has been raised that if you have both the
functions of collection and analyses and reporting, that you are
likely to put undue weight on the information you collect your-
self as against the information that comes to you from other
agencies. Well, that is a human failing. I think if you have a
good man, that is not the case. Personally, I would not, myself,
put a tremendous amount of weight on clandestine intelligence. It
has got to be proved before it is any good.
Later in the same session Rear Admiral Thomas Inglis gave the
committee three supporting reasons for centralizing certain responsibili-
ties: economy, effectiveness and plausible denial.
Admiral Inglis: "... I hold the view that covert operations should
be controlled centrally and divorced from the departments having
intelligence agencies for the following reasons'
(a) Central operation is more economical because it
avoids duplication, reduces overhead, and assures
that the needs of all departments requiring covert
intelligence are equitably niet.
(b) Central operation is considered more effective because
it can cover the entire field of covert intelligence __
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a field which for its full exploitation must be world-
wide and closely integrated, with no competing
agents working at cross purposes.
(c) Covert activities are occasionally exposed by foreign
governments. It is desirable that no embarrassment,
such as exposure may entail, -should fall upon the State,
War, or Navy Departments which must protect the
diplomatic standing of their missions and attaches."
There is no record of any subsequent challenge to either the
authority or the desirability of the Agency engaging in certain espionage
and counter-espionage activities.
Summary
In connection with the 22 January 1946 Presidential Directive,
it was determined that it was not in the interest of the United States to
113
refer to clandestine collection (espionage) in public documents.
? Apparently following the precedent thus established, the House Committee
did not specify the collection function in the legislation. Instead, the
House Committee inserted language essentially identical to both the com-
mon concern and catch-all provision of the Presidential Directive:
"Sec. 102 (d) (4) to perform, for the benefit of the
existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of
common concern as the National Security Council determines
can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as
the National Security Council may from time to time direct. "
Thus, the authority and indeed the responsibility for certain intelligence
:oilection was deferred to the general authorities and responsibilities
Section 102 (d) with the knowledge of the manner in which these general
4uthorities. and responsibilities had been implemented in the past and
Would be implemented in the future.
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CHAPTER VIII. CIVILIAN STATUS OF DCI
The civilian status of the Director of Central Intelligence became
a central issue in the Congress. Undoubtedly, the language of the Presi-
dential proposall14 contributed to the doubts of members concerned with
retaining civilian control over the armed forces: "...we have constantly
kept a civilian in the positions of Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy,
and this bill provides that the Secretary of Defense shall be?a civilian.
I think it is for the same reason exactly, (to have a civilian DCI) to safe-
guard and to make certain there is not to be any usurpation of power. "115
An amendment requiring a civilian Director passed the House in
line with "... a legitimate fear in this country lest we develop too much
military control of an agency which has great powers and operates in
secret... ,,116 While the requirement was eliminated in conference, the
House conferrees pointed out the compromise provision seeks ".. .to
divorce the head of the agency from the armed services if a man in the
service is appointed. "117
Three months earlier General Vandenberg was succeeded as
Director of Central Intelligence by Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter.. The
Washington Post, in a 3 May 1947 editorial, observed:
...General Vandenberg's resignation points up a funda-
mental weakness in our intelligence set up which is carried over
in the new Central Intelligence Authority (sic) envisioned under
the armed forces merger bill. That is the weakness of permitting
a military man to retain his active duty status while serving as
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Director of Central Intelligence. Inevitably this results in a
tendency on part of the incumbents to regard the job as merely
a stepping stone in an essentially military career. Hence,
it invited the trading back and forth between the Army and
Navy evidenced by the appointment of two admirals and one
general in 16 months. What is needed is to develop the concept
of long-term career service in this highly important job. We
hope Congress will see to it that the merger bill is amended
to establish a specific term of office 118 and to require that the
Director be in fact a civilian. This need not militate against
Admiral Hillenkoetter if he is sincerely interested in an intelli-
gence career, for he can relinquish his active Navy status and
retain the Directorship as a civilian..."
Conceeding that the position of DCI should be held by a civilian,
it was also true that the nation did not have extended experience in the
foreign intelligence field. The few men who had the experience "...have
gained their experience in the Army and Navy, and are still in the
service. 11119
The. provision 'concerning the DCI in the Presidential draft
sought to overcome the existing legal disability running against certain
officers of the Armed Services from accepting a civil office. 120 The
results of this legal disability would have required certain officers to
vacate their commissions.. Consequently, one of the prime objectives
of the Presidential language in the proposed act was to overcome this
legal disability and otherwise to provide benefits and protection to
assure that such a career officer in the position of the DCI would have
the requisite freedom from control by his parent service.
With the exception of requiring the advice and consent of the
Senate to the appointment of the Director, the language pertaining to the
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Director of Central Intelligence approved by Congress did not substan-
tially vary from the Presidential proposal. However, the result was to
further amplify the importance of freedom from departmental influence
and the other side of that coin, the non-political and non-policy nature
of the position of the DCI and the Agency which he heads.
Senate
The only amendments proposed to the CIA section by the Senate
121
Armed Services Committee related to the Director of Central Intelligence.
The proposed language, "... with a Director of Central Intelligence, who
shall be the head thereof, to be appointed by the President... was
amended to read, "... with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall
be the head thereof, to be appointed from the armed services or from
civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
122
Senate. "
The Senate Committee thus adopted language which substantially
was the same language carried in the White House draftl23 as late as a
month before the final proposal was submitted to the Congress. The
Committee explained in its report:
"In view of the fact that certain officers of the armed
services have had wide experience in handling the type of
intelligence with which this agency will be largely concerned,
the provision of the bill to permit the Director of Central
Intelligence to be appointed from the armed services as well
as from civilian life is most desirable-. During the Agency's
formative years, it is essential that its Director be technically
the most experienced and capable obtainable, regardless of
whether he is appointed from civilian or military life. "124
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Senator Robertson (R. , Wyo.) cited the language relating to the
Director of Central Intelligence in the President's proposal as evidence
of the military control being established under the bill, thus creating a
"military empire. "
". . . The bill really goes further. than this; by its emphasis
on provisions relating to a. military director, it suggests that the
Director should be a military officer. Originally, the bill required
a military director; the modification to permit a civilian to serve
as Director was inserted only after opposition to such an obviously
improper requirement. The mere fact that the bill still permits
a military officer to serve as Director is sufficient indication,
to my way of thinking, that the draftees of the bill still expect the
President to appoint a military officer to the Director's job. 11125
On the last day of Senate debate on the bill, Senator Robertson.
"... With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency, I
shall leave to other critics of the bill the problem of writing into
law a proper set of functions to replace the bland reference to
present duties under executive order. As a minimum step in
the protection of civil liberties it should be made mandatory,
however, that the Director of Central Intelligence should at all
times be a civilian who can make such a position a career. ?126
However, these remarks by Senator Robertson were only a pre-
lude to more extensive discussion on the floor of the House some ten days
later, which culminated in an amendment requiring that the Director be
House Committee
The House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments vigorously explored the question in executive session:127
General Vandenberg (replying to a question as to whether the
Director of Central Intelligence should be appointed from
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will continue to flow. "
military or civilian life): "...It makes not one bit of difference,
except for this fact: Initially, the military are very loath to
trust their top secret information to someone over whom we
do not have the ability to penalize by court action if they
divulge some of this. We do not have an official secret act
with teeth in it, but we do have within the Army and the Navy
the ability to court martial anybody.
". , .Nov, if we can put a military person in there
initially and let him organize this thing and let the flow of infor-
mation get fully established, after that period it makes no dif-
ference whether it is civilian or military, and the information
or former military man."
Rep. Manasco (commenting on General Vandenberg's recom-
mendations): "...would you object to an amendment to the bill
providing that, say, in the next 8 or 10 years the person at the
head of the GIG must be a civilian, and that will give you an
opportunity then to take the civilian and train him like Mr. Hoover
was trained and make a career man of him? A change every
four years weakens our intelligence."
General Vandenberg: "I would prefer not to see it written in. It
is now left up to the President and Congress under this bill to
pick the man, and if he happens to be a military man, I think
they ought to be free to put him in.
there is a fear amonor
The Chairman: "Do you
military
a great number of our people that
men getting in? For instance, Marshall is Secretary of State
and so on down, and everywhere we look, we see an Admiral
General Vandenberg.: "Yes, sir."
The Chairman: ''Would not the law work better and be more
acceptable if the fears, justified or not, on the part of the people
were sort of allayed?"
General Vandenberg: "I anticipate, Mr. Chairman, that after
Admiral Hillenkoetter, who the Secretary of War has stated to a
Senate Committee intends to make this a career, that after
him, I would anticipate that probably the next man to be appointed
would be a civilian; I would just guess that. "
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Rep. Judd (reading from a letter from a person whom the Congress-
man described as a Governor of a state who was formerly with
OSS): "Let me read the second part of this. This gentleman
says most emphatically:
'The Director should be a civilian. The experience
of the last few months shows the complete futility of
placing other than a civilian in charge of the Central
Intelligence Agency. A man from the services will be
subjected to pressure for his own particular branch.
Unless he is a weakling, he will ardently desire to
leave Intelligence. He will never wish to make a career
of the securing of intelligence. I
'In the past 15 months there have been three heads
to the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the set-up in
the bill as now it will serve as a stop-gap position for
officers being moved up to other assignments. Intelli-
gence today is not primarily military. It is political and
technological, as essential in peace as in war. No
career officer is likely to look on it this way. '
"I would like to have your comment on that. He is the
man who has been immediately in charge of the prototype for
the first experimental efforts in this field."
General Vandenberg: "I feel that up to this time, the change of
directors at Central Intelligence has been a healthy thing.
Rep. Judd: "Three times in 15 months?"
General Vandenberg: "I think that is right. Now, we have gotten
the diversified ideas of Navy, Army and State, and we have had
different people viewing this, and it has been shifted and tried
with new points of view, which has been very healthy in its
formative stage."
Rep. Judd: " You would not recommend that as a regular policy? "
General Vandenberg: "If that continued, it would be very detri-
mental. I pointed that out, I believe, when we appeared before
the Senate Committee. At that time, however, Mr. Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy, stated that Admiral Hillenkoetter intended
to make this a career. From that viewpoint, I think that he is
a very fine choice to head this organization, and I agree with
what the gentleman said in the letter, if you will take it from
this time on. "
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Mr. Allen W. Dulles (commenting on the need to construct-the
centralized organization on a permanent basis): "...I feel that
the important thing if we are going to build up an Intelligence
Agency is permanence. We have got to make sure that the fellow
that goes in there as head of the Central Intelligence Agency is
going to stick to it. This is a job not of one year but of five or
ten or fifteen years. I think J. Edgar Hoover's prestige and
the prestige of his organization is due to the fact that he has
been there for twenty-five-odd years. That is true, I think, with,
the British Intelligence Service, too. The fellow that has been
there, I think has been there for twenty-odd years. It takes time.
"Now, I do not think, and I believe therefore that the
person who acts as head of that agency should act in a civilian
capacity. I do not say that he should be a civilian, I mean he
should become a civilian, and make that his life work and not look
forward to promotion in the Army or the Navy or the Air Corps.
"It might well be that the best person to head up that
agency might have had military training up to the time he takes
that job, but when he takes that job it is like going into a monastery.
He has got to devo":e his life to that, and to nothing else. "
Mr. Dulles (commenting on the curtailment of benefits should the
Director of Central intelligence return to his parent service):
"I do not think I would put any prohibition on that. I think it is a
pity if the fellow that does that feels after two or three years he
can go back and be an admiral or vice admiral or the other. That
is unsettling. The President has got to be satisfied that when a
fellow goes into this job that he is going to make that his life work
and perform his duties to the satisfaction of the Authority under
which he works."
Rep. Manasco: I was thinking now, since we have no civilians in
this type of work, we should have for the next 10 years a military
man as head of it, if he continues to serve from now on and does
not go back to the Army. "
Mr. Dulles: "I would not affect his retirement, but I would make
him operate as a civilian while he is there. Later he may want to
resign if there are provisions for his going back in the service,
but I am skeptical about that because I am afraid if you open that
door too wide, you are going to defeat the essential purpose we
are trying for."
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icCorivack (D. , Mass. ): "I do not think there is too much
ijagrcelllent, except at the outset, Mr. Vandenberg felt that
0 .'-erc might be a military man at the outset."
Dulles: "I have the highest regard for General Vandenberg
nd the others, as far as individuals are concerned. They are
:non of a very high type.
McCormack: "What'would be your opinion at the outset?"
.\I r. Dulles: "I think that you have got to start now, if you are
going to develop this thing, and develop it with the utmost serious-
ness; and the fellow that takes it on, who is appointed now, I
think ought to make it a life work. "
Admiral Thomas Inglis (presenting assets that military men
would carry over into the position of Director of Central Intelli-
gence): "Civilian vs. military appointee as Director of Central
Intelligence: The Director of Central Intelligence should be the
man best qualified for the job, whether he be civilian or military.
This is wisely provided for in the bill under consideration. I
have heard many arguments on the merits of a civilian director,
and I have no objection to the appointment of a competent civilian
to the post, but there are also advantages to the appointment of
a military man to the post.
"In the first place his loyalty would be unquestioned, for
any conceivable military appointee would be a man who had served
his country faithfully for a long period of years under close obser-
vation. There can be no question but that absolute loyalty to the
Government of United States is the first requirement of a Director
of Central Intelligence.
"Secondly, a military appointee would be politically non-
partisan. His complete independence from political ties or
commitments would give assurance that the conclusions of the
Central Intelligence Agency will be entirely objective.
"Finally, a military appointee would be readily available,
whereas the best qualified civilian might hesitate to accept a
government post requiring almost certain financial sacrifices,
or the abandonment of an established civilian profession. It is not
recommended, however, that an officer, no matter how well
qualified, be ordered unwillingly to the position of Director of
Central Intelligence. A Director, whether civilian or military,
should assume the post voluntarily with the intention of devoting
to intelligence the rest of his useful career.
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"I have on occasion heard the objection that a military man
would be partial, that he would attach too much weight to reports
from military sources. It may be answered that a military officer
will be more sharply aware of military developments which impose
a threat to our security. It may be similarly argued that a civilian
would over estimate reports from civilian sources. Impartiality
is not an attribute of either the civilian or military mind alone.
It is a quality to be sought in a Director regardless of his past
training or career. The practice of other democratic nations has
almost invariably been to assign a military director to foreign
intelligence and to make him responsible either to his country's
General Staff or to its civil Premier. That is true, for instance,
in Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the
Scandinavian States.
"There has been a lot of confusion in the statements that
have been made about that, and very often when they say that the
Director of the intelligence service of some country is a civilian,
they are referring to the counterpart of FBI, rather than to the
counterpart of the Director of Central Intelligence here. "
Rep. Judd (following up in detail with Admiral Inglis on distinction
between "retiring" and "resigning" in connection with the employ-
ment of a military officer as Director of Central Intelligence):
"Let me ask you one more question. It is on this question of
whether the Director should be a civilian or a military man.
"Do you think that if the best man for the-job is a man from
the Army and Navy, and he is appointed as director of Central
Intelligence, that he should resign so that he gives his whole -
undivided attention without any possibility of being influenced
either by his former associations or present associations or his
own hankering perhaps to get back into the service where he spent
most of his life?"
Admiral Inglis: "Yes, sir; do you mean resign or retire?"
Rep. Judd: "Either one. I think in any case, perhaps I should
qualify the question, that he should resign or retire with full protec-
tion of his personal rights. "
Admiral Inglis: "He should certainly enter that job with the idea
that he has burned his bridges behind him professionally, that he
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91
has given up any ambitions of becoming Commander in Chief of the
l frame of
i
ca
Pacific Fleet, and so forth, and he is in the psycholog
mind that he will devote the rest of his life, assuming his service
continues to be desired, to the national intelligence authority, to
that particular job. "
Rep. Judd: "And as a civilian, after he assumes it."
Admiral Inglis: "To all intents and purposes. If Congress believes
that that is not sufficient, if they believe that however psychologically
he might be prepared then.for that, still two or three years later
he might get a little disgusted with the way things are going, and
he might have a return of a hankering to get back into the Navy,
if they believe that, they would have to have some protection against
that eventuality, then I would suggest that Congress write into
the law that the individual must retire, not resign...
"I want to make that distinction between retiring and
resigning. Once he has retired, he can never entertain any
ambitions from then on of ever getting back into the swing. 11
Rep. Judd: "Do you feel that if the individual's personal rights
are properly protected, that it would be better, he would be able
to approach the thing with a greater detachment, if, as one
witness here this morning testified, he ought to approach it as a
man going into a monastery, 'This is the place where I can make
the greatest contribution to my country in my remaining days. '
Admiral Inglis: "I have precisely that same philosophy about it."
House Floor
The language pertaining to the position of the Director of Central
Intelligence reported out by the House Committee was the language which
was eventually adopted by both Houses. 128 Rep. Harness explained that
the committee had taken special pains in drafting language pertaining to
the Director of Central Intelligence to assure on the one hand that the
nation would not be deprived of the services of a military officer in the
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position and on the other, that any officer serving in that position would
be free from undue departmental influence.
Rep. Harness: "There has been insistence that the director of
this agency be a civilian. I believe we should eventually place.
such a restriction upon the authority we are proposing to create
here, although I say frankly that I am not convinced of the wis-
dom of such a restriction at the outset.
"Prolonged hearings and executive sessions of the com-
mittee behind closed doors lead me to wonder if we have any
single career civilian available for this job as a few men who
might be drafted from the services for it. Understand, please,
that I want to protect this very influential post against-the undue
military influence which might make of this agency an American
Gestapo. If we can find a well qualified civilian career man able
and willing to handle this post, I would readily accede to this
limitation. Let me repeat, however, that this Nation is without
extended experience in this field; and that we actually have com-
paratively few men qualified by experience to head this agency.
Most of these few qualified men have gained their experience in
the Army and Navy, and are still in. service. Before we deny
ourselves of the service such military men may be able to render
the country in this capacity, let us be very sure that there are
civilian candidates qualified by training and experience available
to serve us equally well, or better.
"Again let me say that I have no objection to a restriction
in this measure which will require a civilian head in this agency.
I merely want reasonable assurance that such a restriction will
not deny us of the services now of the best available man if
this plan becomes operative. It wrote into the bill provisions
that should allay any of their suspicions or fears as to what
might happen if this bill is enacted into law. I feel their appre-
hensions are without foundation. "129
When the proposition was opened to amendments, Rep. Judd,
explaining that he had lost out in committee by a small majority, offered
a floor amendment requiring that a military officer appointed as Director
of Central Intelligence must either resign or be retired. The colloquy
which this amendment sparked and which eventually led to the adoption
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of a substitute amendment by Rep. Brown requiring that the Director of
Central Intelligence be appointed from civilian life underscores the
concern with the permanency of the position of the Director of Central
Intelligence and its freedom from departmental influences:
Rep. Judd: "Much of the testimony before us from people with a
great deal of experience in this field was to the effect that the
director should be a civilian. On the other hand, the committee
did not think it ought to exclude a man who is now or at some
later time may be in the military service from being appointed
as director of the Central Intelligence Agency if he should be
the best man for the job. It was agreed that he should`not have
the job unless he first becomes a civilian so that he will have
no 'divided loyalties, will not be standing with one foot in the
civilian trough and one foot in the military tro a.gh.
"Under the present language of this bill. which the com-
mittee has drawn up, it was trying to accomplish the same thing
I am after; but I do not believe it goes far enough. On page 8,
line 10 is the following:
if a commissioned officer of the armed services
is appointed as director then-
(A) in the performance of his duties as director,
he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction,
or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be
operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no
way connected with the department of the Army, the de-
partment of the Navy, the department of the Air Force,
or the armed services or any component thereof.'
"Now that sounds all right, but all of us, being human beings,
surely know that if a one-star general is Director of Intelligence,
and a two-star general or a three-star general talks to him, it is
wholly unrealistic to imagine that they will not have an influence
over him, despite the law.
"The man who had charge of our secret intelligence in
Germany during the war was a civilian, Mr. Allen Dulles. He
did such an extraordinary job that he was in contact with the top
men in Hitler's secret service. Hitler had to execute his top
five men because they were double-crossing him and playing ball
with our people. Mr. Dull-es told us that the man that takes this
job ought to go into it as a man who goes into a monastery. He
ought to take it as J. Edgar Hoover has taken the FBI job- make
it his life's work. He certainly ought to be cut completely loose
from any ties or responsibilities or connections with any other
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brancy'of the Government - civil or military - except the Presi-
dent and the National Security Council.
"All this amendment does is to provide that if a commis-
ioned officer of the armed services is nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate as Director of Intelligence, then he
shall be ineligible to accept such appointment and take office
until he has either resigned his commission or has been retired.
The amendment provides further that he can at his own request
be retired in order to accept this appointment, but his retirement
rights are protected so that when he is through as Director of
Intelligence he will have the same perquisites and retirement
benefits as does a major general or rear admiral, upper half. "
Rep. Harness: "Does the gentleman think it makes any difference
whether he is retired or whether he has not retired? "
Rel. Judd: "Yes, I do. "
Rep. Harness: "His sympathies and his heart will be with what-
ever branch of the service he was connected with."
Rep. Judd: "Certainly, his heart will always be with that branch,
but his organic connection with it will be broken. In no sense will
he be under its control or influence. Under the bill as it is written
now he is always tempted to regard himself as what he still is,
an officer of the armed forces. When he gets through as Director
of Intelligence, or if he does not like the work, or does not do
too good a job and is let out, well, never mind, he can always go
back to active military service. To do that, he has to keep his
bridges intact, his military fences in good repair. That is, his
mind may not be single because his interest are divided. We do
not want that.
"Under the amendment he will still have his retirement
rights; his family will be protected, and yet he is retired and
completely separated from the military service, free from any
possible influence so that he does not need to consider what
might happen if the time should come that he wanted or needed to
go back into the military service."
Rep. Harness: ". . , the bill itself says: 'In the performance of
his duties as Director he shall be subject to no supervision, control,
restriction, or. prohibition, military or otherwise.' "
Rep. Judd: "That is correct. "
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Rep. Harness: "Nov, how much stronger can you make it?
have a civilian. ' "
The only way you can change it is to say, 'You are going to
Rep. Judd: "The only way to make it stronger is to have the
man resign or retire. I do not want to make him resign and
lose the benefits accumulated during his military life. I want
him to retire so he can go, as it were, into a monastery; but
at the same time to preserve what he has earned as an officer
in the armed services so he and his family have that security.
It seems to me that this is the middle ground between the two
extremes. It will give us civilian-directed intelligence, and at
the same time will protect any commissioned officer, if one is
I hope the Committee will support the amendment. "
appointed because he is thought to be the best man for the job.
Rep. Manasco (rising in opposition to the amendment): ".. this
section on central intelligence was given more study by our sub-
committee and by the full committee than any other section of
the bill. It was a most difficult section to write. All of us
had the same objective in view, yet we had different ideas on
it. I think personally that the compromise we reached adequately
protects the position. Eventually I certainly trust that the head
of this intelligence agency will be a civilian who is trained in
the agency. It takes years to train that type of man... " -
"We did our best to work out language here that would
protect that position and keep from building up a so-called mili-
tary hierarchy. A bill will be introduced soon after this legislation
becomes law that will be referred to the Committee on Armed
Services, where more study can be given to this most important
subject. I sincerely trust that the amendment will be voted down. "
Does the gentleman recall that? "
deal of doubt when we. finished whether we were right or not.
committee did its best. Yes, we did our best, but we had a great
Rep. Hoffman: " I note the gentleman's statement that the sub-
Rep. Manasco: "We did, and still have. "
Rep. Hoffman: "We are not seeking to impose our judgment on the
Members of the House. "
Rep. Manasco: "That is right. I am just trying to show that we
were all honest in our efforts to accomplish the same objective."
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i s
Rep. Holifield: "If the Members read this section carefully they
will see that we did everything possible to divorce any military
person from this position without taking away from him his
perquisites, emoluments, pension expectations, and so forth, and
also the rights of his family."
Rep. Busbey: "Mr. Chairman, I trust the committee will give
the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota (Rep.
Judd) very careful consideration, because I think it is extremely
important. There was considerable discussion in the committee,
and by a very, very narrow vote it was decided not to include
the amendment in the bill as reported by the committee.
"I call the attention of the committee to one thing that
I believe the gentleman from Minnesota failed to emphasize
due to the fact that he did not have enough time. This agency
has been running less than a year and a half. We have had three
directors of the Central Intelligence Agency in that time. No
one is criticizing Admiral Hillenkoetter, the present director
of the agency, but there is nothing in the world to prevent him
from being removed next week or next month and replaced with
someone from the War Department or the Navy Department. The
main point in the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minne-
sota is permanency and the effort to work toward a civilian head who
is not influenced by any department of our Military Establishments..
"It is true that you can refer to the language of the bill
where it states he is relieved from this and he is relieved from
that, but you cannot write into legislation that human element
which enters into the Military Establishment of our country of a
subordinate officer fearing that some day he might come under
the direct command of a superior officer somewhere along the
line.. .
"The committee as a whole was agreed that it would be
fine to have a civilian head of the Central Intelligence Agercy.
But they did not want to include (sic) a qualified military or-naval
man from occupying such a position. The amendment offered
by the gentleman from Minnesota corrects this situation, and I
hope the Committee will adopt it."
Rep. Hardy (D. , Va. ): "Under the present language of the bill,
assuming that the admiral now in charge continues in his present
position,. he would still be in the Navy, would he not?"
Rep. Busbey: "He would absolutely be in the Navy, and he could
be transferred at any time. "
Rep. Hardy "That is my point. He certainly could be transferred,
and he could work it out with the Navy Department and get any
other assignment that he wants. "
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Rep. Busbey: "A.bsolutely. He is still a naval officer."
Rep. Holifield: "I know the gentleman wants to be fair. Section
(A), page 8, line 12, continuing to line 19, and then in section (B),
expressly states that no superior officer of any of these depart-
ments shall have any control over the gentleman once he is
appointed by and with the consent of the other body. He could
not be shifted or given a tour of duty. There is absolutely no
control over him. The gentleman knows that that language is in
the act. "
Rev. Busbey: "I am sorry, but the gentleman, I believe, did not
understand my reference to human nature when it comes to mili-
tary officers."
Rep. McCormack: "...I have a few observations to make on this
very important question. I want no member to underestimate the
importance of this. Whatever action the Committee of the Whole
takes will be most agreeable to me because if we were not con-
fronted with a very practical situation, in the subcommittee and
in the full committee, I would have voted to provide for the appoint-
ment only of a civilian. I would have taken that action at the out-
set. But we are confronted with a very practical situation where
the present director is an officer in the United States Navy with
the rank of read admiral...
"It seems to me if we are going to keep any language in
here, the language contained in the bill is preferable to that pro-
posed by the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Judd. I agree that
whoever is appointed should be permanent. But what is permanency,
unless it is appointment for life, with removal as provided for in
the case of judges? We cannot give any man any assurance of
permanency as far as an administrative position is concerned. The
best we can do is as in the case of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover: A man
by his personality, a man who impresses himself so much upon
his fellowmen that permanency accrues by reason of the character
of service that he renders. But J. Edgar Hoover has no tenure
for life. He has earned it because of his unusual capacity. "
Rep. Brown: "Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment
which I have sent to the desk. (Substitute amendment follows:)
'On page 8, strike out lines 5 to 52, both inclu-
sive; on page 9, strike out lines 1 through 18, both in-
clusive, and insert in lieu thereof the following: "head
thereof. The Director shall be appointed from civilian
life by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation
at the rate of $14, 000 a year." '
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"Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a simplifying amend-
ment. This amendment is offered for the purpose of settling
the differences between the members of my committee, the
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. It
simply eliminates any quarrel or discussion about just how we
take care of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency if
he should be a commissioned officer by providing very simply
that the Director shall be a civilian.. Then as a result you can
strike out all of subsection (b) and on down to line 18 on page 9. "
Rep. Judd: "I may say to the gentleman from Ohio and the Com-
mittee that I myself prefer his amendment and have from the
beginning. I have one exactly like it which I intended to offer
if the one I have offered were to be defeated. In it I was trying
to go halfway between requiring that the man to be appointed
be wholly a civilian, and giving a chance for men now in the
military service to take the job .as civilians, but without losing
their retirement rights."
Rep. Brown: "I remind the gentleman from Minnesota that at
times one comes to the place where one has to go all the way,
where one cannot go halfway.
"In my mind the people are afraid of just one thing in
connection with this bill and in connection with many other mat-
ters that have come before this Congress in recent months and
recent years, and that is they are afraid of a military government,
some sort of a super-dictatorship which might arise in this coun-
try. They are afraid, in this particular instance, over the
possibility that there might be some sort of Gestapo set up in
this country.
"I will agree and I will admit to you very frankly that it
is entirely possible that you might have a military officer who
would like to do that; but I know one thing, that if you require a
civilian to be the head of this agency then you will not have any
danger within the agency of military influence or military dicta-
torship. I do not believe the present occupant of that office would
ever abuse it; I have the highest confidence in him, but-I do not
know who may succeed him. We have had three different military
officers in charge of this central intelligence group or agency in
the last 15 months, and we might have more. I say to you that we
need a civilian of the type of J. Edgar Hoover in charge of an
agency like this, and the appointment of a civilian would at least
be a partial guaranty to the people of the United States that this
agency is not going to be usurped by any branch of the armed
services at any time...
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"A resigned military officer is no longer under the
control or direction of the military branch. A retired military
officer is subject to recall in time of emergency, still has to
take certain orders and instructions from the military branch
of the Government. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Judd)
in his provision to permit a military.officer to hold the post,
set up certain safeguards. My amendment goes the whole way.,'1130
Conference Committee
Congressman Judd's amendment as amended by the substitute.
offered by Congressman Brown, requiring that the Director be a civilian
when appointed, was adopted by the House. However, the committee of
conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on S. 758 recom-
mended on 24 July 1947 the identical language which had been reported out
by the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments:
"Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National
Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with 'a Director
of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The
Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned
officers of the armed services or from among individuals in
civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the
rate of $14, 000 a year.
(b) (1) If a commissioned. officer of the armed services
is appointed as Director then--
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director,
he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction,
or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would
be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian
in no way connected with the Department of the Army,
the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air
Force, or the armed services or any component
thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any super-
vision, control, powers, or. functions (other than such
as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise,
as Director).with respect to the armed services or any
component thereof, the Department of the Army, the De-
partment of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force,
or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with
respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of
any of the foregoing.
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(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appoint-
ment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the
armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such
office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade
he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument,
perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising
out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commis-
sioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director,
receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as
the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade
and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available
to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at
a rate equal to the amount by which $14, 000 exceeds the amount
of his annual military pay and allowances. 11131
On the 25th of July, 1947, Chairman Hoffman, in recommending
that tie House agree to the Conference Report, 132 explained:
"You will recall that when the House passed on this
legislation it amended the bill H. R. 4214, which the committee
reported, with reference to the Central Intelligence Agency. The
committee had written into the bill a provision that the head of
that agency might be a civilian or a man from the armed serv-
ices. The House amended the bill to provide that he shall be
a civilian. During the debate the gentleman from Minnesota
(Mr. Judd) offered an amendment which provided that if a man
from the armed services was appointed he should be required to
relinquish his rank and his authority in the Army...
"... when we went into conference, the conferees for the
other body flatly refused to accept that amendment. They had
made certain concessions to which your attention will be called
later on, but on that one they stood pat. They refused to accept
the House amendment to the committee bill so your conferees
compromised by accepting the language of the bill, 4214, as
reported by your committee to the House, thus discarding the
amendment written into the bill by the House which would have
required that the head of that agency be a civilian. My own
choice, and I think the choice of six of the seven members of
the House subcommittee who were conferees, was that the head
of that agency should be a civilian, but we could not get it, so
we went along with that compromise. It seeks to divorce the
head of the agency from the armed services if a man in the
service is appointed. "
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Chairman Hoffman also went on to point out that the appointment
of the Director of Central Intelligence was one of the "three more
important points" (in the National Security Act of 1947) as it went to
Congressman McCormack, a minority member of the conference
committee, then took the floor to further explain:
CnaileugG 61166
human angle. We felt, since enabling legislation was going to
- ___-4-4-__ .,f tha Nnuse--
viewpoints. Sub-section 102 (a) permitted the President full discretion
entleman from
d the
i
f
"
so
g
en
r
My
I think I might advie the Director of Central Intelligence, and
on
d u
p
the House that that was the last question that we passe
ion of the
i
s
in conference. The Senate accepted the House prov
bill as reported out of the House committee.
? __ ^ the fInnr we
frankly advised the Committee of the Whole at that time that
Executive Depart-
h
e
es in t
the House Committee on Expenditur if not favorable to, a
d
,
ments was strongly inclined towar
ituation that
t
e s
civilian director, but in view of the immedia
- .. - - ?? 1; tn rv
- - . ,
in
in the
confronted us we put r- - .
man, a career officer of the Army or the Navy, was appointed
a civilian
ffect
i
,
n e
that he would have to occupy what would be,
ld be free from
position. We tried to protect him so that he wou
re to argue or say it
if one we
a dual influence. I recognize,
ould not
I
c
did not completely eliminate a dual influence, that
,_ _ _
, r ,,1.1 from a
t
Come iii LCl6G1
and we know that; we were advised and saw a copy of the pro-
posed bill--that that question, with the other questions that
would arise in connection with this Central Intelligence Agency,
r committee
t
h
t
ou
a
a
should be left to the standing committee, and t
"
should try to meet the immediate problem.
The language in the National Security Act of 1947 pertaining to
the position of the Director of Central Intelligence was a compromise of
in the exercise of his appointment power over the position and provided
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U
an opportunity for Congressional impact on the position through the
Senate confirmation proceedings. Subsection 102 (b) assured, in so
far as possible, that any commissioned officer of the armed forces
appointed to the position vxould be free from outside control. The delibera-
tions leading to the enactment of these provisions made further contri-
butions to the understanding of the position of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the agency he would head by underscoring the non-
political and non-policy nature of the tasks to be faced and the freedom
from departmental influence that would be needed to assure their
accomplishment.
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I..
IX. INTERNAL SECURITY
As early as 1944, a statement of principles formulated for the
President maintained:
"That such a Service (Permanent United States Foreign
Intelligence Service) should not operate clandestine intelligence
within the United States.
"That it should have no policy functions and should not
be identiflil with any law-enforcing agency either at home or
abroad.
The Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946 reinforced and
implemented these principles by providing that:
"4. No police, law enforcement or internal security
functions shall be exercised under this directive, " and
"9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the
making of investigations inside the continental limits of the
United States and its possessions, except as provided by law
and Presidential directives."
Thus, the issue of internal security had received attention from
the outset, and a clear and complete divorce between internal security
functions and foreign intelligence functions had been explicitly irnple-
m ented.
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee and
House Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, General
Vandenberg pointed out that the President's directive:
... includes an express provision that no police, law
enforcement, or internal security functions shall be exercised.
These provisions are important, for they draw the lhe ines very
sharply between the CIG and the FBI. In addition,
bition against police powers or internal security functions will
assure that the Central Intelligence Group can never become a
135
Gestapo or security police."
Ar,nrnwcrl Prir RCIC'acp 9flflR/fP.i9f.Ct^1d-_- nPRARClfl2A9R(1C11.Gi(1C101ft)C11_-3
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-R DP86B00269R001500010.001-3
It is recalled, however, that the CIA section of the Presidential
draft of the National Security Act of 1947 relied upon the legislative
technique of establishing the functions of the DCI and CIA. by reference
to the 22 January 1946 Presidential Directive. Consequently, the spe-
cific language of proscription of the Presidential Directive did not
appear in the CIA section. This lack of specificity together with the
overall concern with the general subject of internal security led the
House Committee to insert a provision in the Act "... prohibiting the
Agency from having the power of subpoena and from exercising internal
?1.36
police powers, provisions not included in the original bill nor in S. 738.
House Committee Executive Session
The House Committee considered the issue of internal security
from two different aspects. The first related to simply prohibiting
the Agency from engaging in internal security functions. The second
concern related to the Agency's relationship with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in the interest of assuring the integrity of "domestic
'information" in the files of the Bureau. The issue of internal security
from both of these aspects was developed before the House Committee
as brought out in the following colloquies during executive session:
General Vandenberg (in replying to a question as to whether
the Central Intelligence Group operated in foreign or domestic
fields): "The National Intelligence Authority and the Central
Intelligence Group have nothing whatsoever to do with anything
domestic; so whenever we talk about the Central Intelligence
Group or the NIA, it always means foreign intelligence, because
we have nothing to do with domestic intelligence."
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Rep. Holifield: "That was my understanding, and I wanted it
confirmed. "
General Vandenberg (later in commenting upon specific pro-
scription language): "I very strongly advocate that it have no
police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal-security
functions.,, 138
General Vandenberg (in replying to a question as to whether
the Central Intelligence Agency might endanger the rights
and privileges of the people of the United States): "No, sir;
I.do not think there is anything in the bill, since it is all
foreign intelligence, that can possibly affect any of the privi-
leges of the people of the United States."
Rep. Brown: "There are a lot of things that might affect the
privileges and rights of the people of the United States that
are foreign, you know. "139
Rep. Hale Boggs (D., La.) (in obtaining Mr. Dulles' opinion):
"As a private citizen, sir, and with your experience in this
field, do you have any suggestions or do you think there is a
necessity of putting in additional safeguards on this Central
Intelligence Agency to protect us, as citizens of the United
States, from what this thing might possibly be or develop into?"
Mr. Dulles: "I do not really believe so. You mean having a
Gestapo established here in the United States ? "
Rep. Boggs: "Will you clarify that question? May I just add
this? Under this Act the authorities and functions of the
Central Intelligence Agency would be based entirely upon an
Executive Order issued by the President which could be
changed, amended or revoked or anything else at any time..
"Now, the real question comes down to whether or
not we should write into this Act the limitations and restrictions
or define the functions and the activities in which they should
engage, rather than depend upon a rather nebulous thing called
an Executive Order, which is here today, but may be gone in
three minutes, if the President decides to sign some other
paper."
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Mr. Dulles: "I would prefer to see the Congress, not in too
much detail, however, define the nature and functions of the
Central Intelligence Agency. "140
States."
States. They would have their headquarters in the 'United
They would have to exercise certain functions in the United
Mr. Dulles: "I do not think there is any real danger of that.
Now could they raise a Gestapo in this country with that?"
do you think that that would tend to confine their activities?
limits of the continental United States and in foreign fields,
the Central Intelligence Bureau are confined out of the
Rep. Wilson: "May I ask a question?
"With the provision in the bill that the activities of
Rep. Wilson: "But their activities would not be here, would
they?"
foreign, except to disseminate information, of course."
within the confines of this country. Their operations are
right away from them, any police power or anything else
Rep. Wilson: "My understanding is that this bill takes that
single individual. "
have no police powers. They cannot put their hands on a
is different. They have no police powers, and they should
extremely little likelihood of any danger here. The field
has not become a Gestapo, it seems to me that there is
well, and I do not think it is a Gestapo; and if the F. B. I.
Mr. Dulles: "We have lived along with the F.B.I. pretty
Mr. Dulles: "They cannot exercise police powers."
Rep. Wilson: "It is a secret situation. Let us not try to rule
anybody. " 1
LaGuardia Field. He lands there on Saturday. Well, any
Rep. Busbey (in asking certain questions relating to the
FBI and the CIA): "I have one other point. They do not operate,
as brought out, in the United States. For instance, here on a
Saturday some foreign agent takes a plane out of Paris for
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agent of that kind has to come under the F. B. 1. in this country.
They drop him when he leaves France, and I do not think the
present set-up is adequate to handle the situation. Then they
follow him here
in the United tates for whatever and then he probably would go toe Mex co.
time he has here, ,
Well, the F.B.I. drops him at the border and some other de-
partment of Central Intelligence picks him up down there in
Mexico. "
Mr. Dulles: "On the second point, I believe thoroughly there
the
must be a close coordination between the new agency and the
F.B.I. , and I think that that has been working pretty
far as I know.
You are perfectly right that if the Intelligence Service
picks up a dangerous agent and finds he is coming to the United
States, that ought to go to the F.B.I. like that, and the F.B.I.
ought to pick the fellow up or watch him when he arrives. Ther.,
if he leaves this country, the F. B. I. ought to notify the Central
Intelligence Agency that he has gone. That is a question of
coordination, and I believe wi.:h the right kind of people, there
is no reason why you cannot have close cooperation between
this agency and the State Department and the G-2 and the ONI
and the F. B. I.
"If you have that, you have something; and if you are
going to have all of these agencies f kiting among themselves,
you are not going to get anywhere. '1 2
Rep. Manasco (in discussing the meaning of certain language):
'evaluate
"Mr. Dulles, would not the language to or disseminate
intelligence' cover almost anything in the world that they wanted
to do?"
Mr. Dulles: "But, then, you get into the question of what is to be
the relationship with the others."
Rep. Manasco: "So far as giving GIG authority to gather intelli-
gence, that language could not be expanded on any by Congress."
Mr. Dulles: "I was looking over this. I do not know what the
status of the other bill was."
Rep. Bender (R. , .Ohio): "It was introduced by the Chairman of
the Committee because certain recommendations
Committee, I understand.ae by
individuals appearing before
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Rep. Manasco: "I think that language would include everything
in the world. "
Rep. Judd: "The question is whether you should have some
limitations on it. You would have three things. You want the
objective and, second, its power and, third, the powers it
does not have."
Rep. Manasco: "Limit it to foreign countries, of course. "
Mr. Dulles: "There is one little problem there. It is a very
important section of the thing, the point I raised there. In
New York and Chicago and all through the country where we have
these business organizations and philanthropic and other
organizations who send their people throughout the world.
They collect a tremendous amount of information. There ought
to be a way of collecting that in the United States, and I
imagine that would not be excluded by any terms of your bill. "
Rep. Manasco: "The fear of the committee as to collecting infor-
mation on our own nationals, we do not want that done, but I
do not think the committee has any objection to their going to
any source of information that our nationals might have on
foreign operations. Is that your understanding?"
R--!p. Wadsworth "Yes."
Rep. Manasco: "They could go to Chicago and talk to the presi-
dents of some of the machinery firms that have offices all over
the world. "
Mr. Dulles: "That must be done."
Rep. Manasco: "I think we would have no objection to his getting
on a plane in France and following a man around the United States. "
Rep. Brown: "He might follow one or two of these boys that we
brought over to see how we did the war work.
Rep. Judd: "As to Russian agents in this country, only the
F.B.I. watches them."143
Admiral Inglis ( in a statement of overall views): "Domestic.
Security: It is my view that the activities of the Central Intelli-
 _.__.App~au~d- r? Re 2-?O8/08tt~9 CtA-RDF'*F6S"Q0269R001500010001-3
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gence Agency should be confined to the field of foreign intelli-
gence and that it should have no police powers and no domestic
security functions other than those connected with the. security
of its`own establishment,? It is imperative not only for the pro-
duciion-of good intelligence, but for the defense of the American
principle of Government, that there be no confusion between the
pursuit of intelligence abroad and police powers at home. It is
significant that the merging of these two fields is characteristic
years intelli-
of totalitarian states. Domestic
hands in foreign
gence gence were controlled by the same
the Nazi state; they have always been in the same hands in the
Soviet Union.
"Parenthetically, what I have in mind is a distinction
between the function intention of doing ethat,l and do not think encroach
on the FBI and have no
it should be authorized at all. We do not want to build up a
Gestapo or a super organization which will have potentially a
sinister control of the lives of American people."
Rep. HardyL "May I interrupt there? By that same token,. then,
you say that we should not permit the FBI to do any intelligence
work in foreign countries?"
Admiral Inglis: "Not except in connection with their law enforce-
ment work here in this country, and as a correlary to that, sir,
I think I know what you have
to keep the two sys
spy networks, from getting in each other's hair, there must be
either a very fine and efficient coordination with full information
between the two organizations so where (sic), as in Washington,
or else we must rely on one organization to serve the needs of
the other abroad, and the second organization to serve the needs
of the sister service at home."
Re~Manasco: "Let me ask you at that point, suppose the FBI
had been directed by the Attorney General to make an investi-
gation of an opium ring operating from, we will say, China
and San Francisco. The FBI investigators might run onto
( some information that would require one of their agents to go
into China. You would not prohibit him from going there?"
Admiral Inglis: "No, sir, I would not. However, that should
be coordinated so that the CIG agents over in China would not.
be crossing wires with this fellow when he arrives from the FBI."
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Rep. Manasco: "The CIG agent would not necessarily be
interested in the criminal actions that go on in the United States.
Rep. Manasco: "It would be purely security. "
Admiral Inglis: "I admit without any argument that there are
difficult problems that are going to come up in that connection,
and my only solution that I have is men of good will to sit around
the table and work them out. "
Rep. Judd: "Of the two alternatives that you have delineated,
you prefer the former, good coordination. " w
Admiral Inglis: "I prefer the latter. I prefer to leave the organized
spy networks abroad to CIG and any information that they get
which is pertinent to FBI's work at .tome in the law enforcement
field, let it be turned over to FBI by CI.G.
Rep. Judd: "By the same token, could FBI call on CIG for
information regarding the source of opium that was coming
from where we did not know, Iran or China or somewhere?"
Admiral Inglis: "Absolutely. "
Rep. Hardy: "Granted that there' is a possibility that operatives
representing different agencies, operating in the same area might
get in each others' hair, might they not get slightly different
slants on a particular piece of information they are trying to
secure so that put together it would make a better picture than
the one-sided view that would be gotten from a single individual
agency?"
Admiral Inglis: "That is conceivable, yes, sir. Of course, any
information that we get is usually checked from two or more
different sources. For example, we may get from the broad-
cast which the Russian Government is making to the Russian
people an indication that some political move is afoot. We get
the idea that they are preparing the Russian people psycholog-
ically for some important political move in the international
field. We will want to have that deduction confirmed by some
other source. This source is the Russian Government propaganda.
to its own people.
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"Well, now, perhaps we will ask CIG to get some infor-
mation, if they can, from their agents, bearing on that particular
problem, to confirm or not what we have deduced from these
Russian propaganda broadcasts."
Rep. Hardy: "The point I was trying to make, though, is if
you have more than one agency securing information in a par-
ticular locality, are you not more likely to be able to get some-
thing you can rely on than you have a single one there, because
it has got to be acknowledged that a lot of the information they
get is deliberately planted for them. "
Admiral Inglis: "That is right, sir. I do not think so, sir. That
is an imponderable, and in a certain case what you say might
work out that way. "
Rep. Hardy: "It might cost more money; it would cost more
money. "
Admiral Inglis: "It would cost more money, and it would lead.
to more difficulty, I think, than it is worth, because as I say,
these people would not know each other's identity, and they
would be spending their time chasing each other, instead of
going after the real antagonist, the real intelligence target. "
Rep. Hardy: "You are presuming there that you would have
direct employees over there, rather than that you might be
working on local contacts, are you not?"
Admiral Inglis: "Well, whatever you are doing, you have to
have some men over there who are operating this spy network,
and if you have two of them, they are going to get their wires
crossed, and your men are going to devote a good deal of
their energies uselessly to either keeping out of the hair of
the other operatives, or else unknowingly they are going to be
chasing each other, and not producing the information that you
want. " -
Rep. Hardy: "Thank you."
Rep. Chenoweth R. , Colo.): "Are you talking about the FBI yet?"
Admiral Inglis: "Not particularly; any two organized spy networks. "
Rep. Chenoweth? "I thought you were making a distinction. "
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Admiral Inglis: "We started out that way, but I thought your
question was more general."
Rep. Hardy: "It was."
Rep. Chenoweth: "You could not refer to the FBI as a spy
organization; they are a law enforcement agency. "
Admiral Inglis: "Yes, sir. "
Rep. Chenoweth: "They have an entirely different function,
no conflict whatever. "
Rep. Chenoweth "They should not be in each others' hair at
any time. "
Admiral Inglis: "They might be in the field of counter-espionage
because that is also a function of FBI."
Rep. Chenoweth "So far as the foreign activity is concerned,
there is no excuse for them operating in foreign countries that
I can see."
Admiral Inglis: "No, sir, I do not mean that. "
Rep. Chenoweth "That is your contention. "
Admiral Inglis: "That is my contention, but that has not been
the case. "
Rep. Chenoweth "I was surprised when I learned today that
they were operating in foreign countries. I did not know that.
I thought they confined their activities exclusively to the
United States. "
Admiral Inglis: "Their responsibility is confined to the United
States, but in meeting that responsibility, they do have interests
abroad. It is a question of whether they are going to send their
own people abroad to do that, or whether they are going to let
GIG do that.,, 144 .
 Approved Eor Release .2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
House Committee Open Hearings
The House Committee on Expenditures' concern with the internal
security was also brought out in public hearings:
Rep. Brown (in questioning the Secretary of the Navy): "This
Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director, should
he decide he wants to go into my income tax reports, I presume
he could do so, could he not?"
Secretary Forrestal: "I do not assume he could.
? "I think he would have a very short life--I am not
referring to you, Mr. Brown, but I think he would have a very
short life." I
Rep. Brown: "Well, he probably would, if he sent (sic) into mine,
but I was wondering how far this goes.
"This is a very great departure from what we have done
in the past, in America.
"Perhaps we have not been as good as we should have
been, and I will agree with that, either in our military or foreign
intelligence, and I am very much interested in seeing the United
States have as fine a foreign military and naval intelligence as
they can possibly have, but I am not interested in setting up here
in the United States any particular central policy agency under
any President, and I do not care what his name may be, and
just allow him to have a gestapo of his own if he wants to have it.
"Every now and then you get a man that comes up in
power and that has an imperialistic idea. "
Secretary Forrestal: "The purposes of the Central Intelligence
Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this coun-
try, except the collation of information gathered by other
Government agencies.
"Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is working at all times in collaboration with
General Vandenberg. He relies upon them for domestic activities."
Rep. Brown: "Is that stated in the law?"
Secretary Forrestal: "It is not; no, sir. "
Rep. Brown: "That could be changed in 2 minutes, and have the
action within the United States instead of without; is that correct?"
Secretary Forrestal: "He could only do so with the President's
direct an spec is approval. "
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
Rep. Brown: "I know, but even then it could be done without
violation of law by the President or somebody who might write
the order for him and get his approval, and without the know-
ledge and consent or direction of the Congress.
"Do you think it would be wise for the Congress of the
United States to at least fix some limitations on what the power
of this individual might be, or what could be done, or what should
be done, and all these safeguards and rights of the citizen may
be protected?"
Secretary Forrestal: "I think it is profitable to explore what
you need for protection, and I am in complete sympathy about
the dangers of sliding into abrogation of powers by the Congress.
"On the other hand, if you had limited Mr. Hoover, for
example, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to operations
only domestically, he might have been very greatly hampered
in this last war. "
Rep. Brown: "I am not talking about domestically, and interna-
tionally alone, but I am talking about how far he can go in his
-studies and investigations, especially of individuals and citi-
zens, and for what purposes he can conduct his investigation.
"Now, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is under
certain restraints by law. "
Secretary Forrestal: "That is correct."
Rep. Brown: "The Secret Service has certain duties and respon-
sibilities written out, word by word, in the statutes."
Secretary Forrestal: "It is a problem for the Congress and the
Executive DepartHie`nts, Mr. Brown. As I say, exploration
certainly could be profitable.
"However, there is not the slightest question, and I can
assure you from my own experience and knowledge that you need
someone in this Government who is going to be charged with
that aspect of national security. "145
Admiral Sherman (on answering a question on greater specificity
on the bill): "Well, sir; in my opinion, that is simply a problem
in the convenience and handling of legislation. I would like to
comment that in the existing directive to the Central Intelligence
Group, their appears this. provision, 'no police, law enforcement,
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 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
or internal security functions shall be exercised under this di-
rective, ' and I felt that that was fairly concise about the matter
that has been discussed here."
Rep. Harness: "Of course, that can be changed, can it not?"
Admiral Sherman: "I would not think so under this legislation;
but I am not a lawyer. If there is concern about it, it seems
to me that it is something that could be rectified with very few
words. "
Rep. Harness: "Well, did you have anything to do with the draft-
ing of this bill, Admiral?"
Admiral Sherman: "Yes, sir; I had a great deal to do with it.. , .,146
Dr. Bush (in answering a question concerning the danger of
the Central Intelligence Agency becoming a Gestapo): "I think
there is no danger of that. The bill provides clearly that it is
concerned with intelligence on internal affairs, and I think this
is a safeguard against its becoming an empire.
"We already have, of course, the FBI in this country,
concerned with internal matters, and the collection of intelli-
gence in connection with law enforcement internally. We have
had that for a good many years. I think there are very few citi-
zens who believe this arrangement ailll get beyond control so
that it will be an improper affair. "
House Floor
In line with the House Committee's overall desire for specificity
in provisions relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, H. R. 4214, as
reported out, contained the provision "...that the Agency shall have
no police subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security
148
functions. "
Thus, Congressman Holifield could explain durinthe floor dis-
c,
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
"I am very zealous, as I have said time and again, of the
.civil liberties of our people, but I believe this.agency has had
written around it, proper protections against the invasion of
the police and the subpena powers of a domestic police force.
I want to impress upon the minds of the Members that the work
of this Central Intelligence Agency, as far as the collection of
evidence is concerned, is strictly in the field of secret foreign .
intelligence, what is known as clandestine intelligence. They
have no right in the domestic field to collect informationloo9 a
clandestine military nature. They can evaluate it; yes. ,9
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
That aspect of the internal security issue relating to access by
the Central Intelligence Agency to information in the possession of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was not so easily resolved.
Under paragraph 5 of the Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946,150
the intelligence received by the Departments of State, War and Navy's
intelligence agencies was to be made' "freely available" to the Director
of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, or dissemination.
Further, the operations of these three intelligence agencies were to be
opened to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence in connec-
tion with his planning for coordination function, 151 to the extent approved
by the National Intelligence Authority. These provisions were carried
over into H. R. 4-214 as reported in committee:
"Sec. 105. (e) To the extent recommended by the National
Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence
operations of the departments and other agencies of the Govern-
ment as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspec-
tion of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence
as relates to the national security and is possessed by such depart-
ments and other agencies shall be made available to the Director
of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemina-
tion. ?152
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Whereas the 22 January 1946 Presidential Directive by its terms
applied solely to the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, War,
and Navy, the language reported out by the committee applied to all Federal
departments and agencies. When the matter was opened to amendment
during the floor discussion, Congressman Judd pointed out that this would
authorize the Agency to inspect the operations of the FBI and he offered an
amendment to eliminate this possibility. This amendment was approved by
the House and its thrust was incorporated in the Act as it emerged. from_
conference. Excerpts of the House floor discussion on the amendment follow:
Rep. Judd: "Mr. Chairman, to reassure the committee let me
say that this is the oily other amendment I shall offer, and I
present it now because it also has to do with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. If the members of the committee will look on
page 11 of the bill, line 16, subsection (e), and follow along with
me, I think we can make it clear quickly. The subsection reads:
'(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security
Council and approved by the President, such intelligence
operations of the departments and other agencies of the
Government as relate to the national security shall be open to
the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence.
"The first half of the amendment deals with that. It
strikes out the words in line 18, 'and other agencies.' Why?
Primarily to protect the FBI. I agree that all intelligence
relating to the national security which the FBI, the Atomic Energy
Commission, and other agencies with secret intelligence activi-
ties develop should be made available to the Director of Central
Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination.
The second half of my amendment provides that their intelligence
must be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence.
But under the amendment he would not have the right to go down
into and inspect the intelligence operations of agencies like the
FBI as he would of the departments. I do not believe we ought
to give this Director of Central Intelligence power to reach into
the operations of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, which are in the
domestic field. Under the language as it now stands he can do that.
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iveness."
their nets are, how they operate, and thus destroy their effect
coming in and finding out who their agents are, what and where
Commission and the FBI from the Director of Central Intelligence
it to stand as it is. Surely we want to protect the Atomic Energy
when we were studying it in committee we would have allowed
believe that if we had realized the full import of this language
at home, but. also the power to inspect its operations. I do not
have not only the results of the FBI's intelligence activities here
intelligence activities abroad. But without this amendment he will
with all possible threats to the country from abroad, through
"The Director of Central Intelligence is supposed to deal
security ? "
Rep. Busbey: "Under the present language of the bill, is it not
the gentleman's judgment that the Central Intelligence Agency
has the right, the power, and the authority to go down and inspect
any records of the FBI which deal with internal security,
whereas the Central Intelligence Agency deals only with external
Rep. Judd: "Yes; not only inspect its records but also inspect
its operations, and that includes its activities and its agents.
We do not for a moment want that to happen. I hope the members
of the committee will accept this amendment."
section out?"
gence authority to collect intelligence in this country and dis-
seminate it to the War Department and Navy Department, the
Air Force, and the State Department, why not strike the entire
Rep. Manasco: "If you do not give the Director of Central Intelli-
for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination.' "
'shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence
Rep. Judd: "We do under this amendment give him that power.
We say: 'Such intelligence as relates to the national security
and is possessed by such departments, and other agencies of
the Government'--that includes the FBI and every other agency--
that should be made available."
Rep. Manasco: "If the FBI has intelligence that might be of
benefit to the War Department or State Department, certainly
Rep. Judd: "Under this amendment it will be made available.
I do not strike that part of the section out. All the intelligence
the FBI has and that the Atomic Energy Commission has must
be available to the Director of Central Intelligence if it relates
to the national security. But the Director of Central Intelligence
 Approved.For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-R DP86B00269R001500010001-3
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will not have the right to inspect their operations, which is
quite a different thing. I do not think we ought to give the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence the right to go into the operations
of FBI."
Rep. Stefan (R. , Neb. ): "In setting up the Central Intelligence
group it was agreed that the FBI was a part of the organization.
Now, what would the gentleman's amendment do?"
Rep. Judd: "Does the gentleman state that the FBI is a part
of the Central Intelligence Agency?"
Rep. Stefan: "Certainly. As I understand it, as it was explained
to our committee, the FBI information would be part of the
information secured by the CIG."
Rep. Judd: "That is right. The FBI information would be avail-
able to the Director of Central Intelligence, but under my amend-
ment the FBI operations would not be part of the Central Intelli-
gence as they would be under the present language of the bill. "
Rep. Stefan: "But the CIG could draw any information from
the FBI it wanted?"
Rep. Judd: "Yes, it would be made available, if relating to
the national security. "
Rep. Stefan: "But what would the gentleman's amendment do
other than what this is doing?"
Rep. Judd: "It would merely withdraw the right of the Director
of Central Intelligence to inspect the intelligence operations of
the FBI. It would still make available to him the intelligence
developed by FBI. "
Rep. Stefan: "Does the gentleman feel that this section on Central
Intelligence makes it possible for the Director of the GIG to
go into Mr. Hoover's office?"
Rep. Judd: "That is right."
Rep. Stefan: "And supersede his direction of FBI operations?"
Rep. Judd: "Well, it says plainly that 'Such intelligence opera-
tions of the departments and other agencies of the Government
as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection
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of the Director of Central Intelligence. ' 'Other agencies'
certainly includes the FBI.
-Rep. Stefan: "And the gentleman objects to the inspection of
it, does he?"
Rep. Judd: "The inspection of its operations; yes."
Rep. Stefan: "I agree with the gentleman. "
Rep. Judd: "Then the gentleman will support my amendment."
Rep. Stefan: "I certainly shall. "
Rep. Judd: "Under it, the information is all available, but the
operations are not open to inspection. "
Rep. Johnson (R. , Calif. ): "I want to get this straight. If the
FBI has information about fifth-column activities and subversive
information affecting the national defense, would that be open
to the Central Intelligence Agency?"
Rep. Judd: "Yes. It must be made available under this sub-
section,. but the Director of Central Intelligence under my amend-
ment could not go in and inspect J. Edgar Hoover's activities
and work. Central Intelligence is supposed to operate only abroad,
but it will have available all the. pertinent domestic information
gathered by the FBI. It should not be given power to inspect the
operations of the FBI. "
Rep. Holifield: "The gentleman realizes that the limitations in
the first lines would limit his ability to go in and inspect any
operation. "
Rep. Judd: "That is true."
Rep. Holifield: "I do not think it is necessary for him to inspect
the operations in order to set up his own intelligence unit in the
way that he wants to, and I point out that the National Security
Council is composed of the Secretaries of State, of National
Defense, of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the
National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence
Agency, so it seems to me that the protection of the National
Security Council is a check and the President is a check. I hardly
think that the man could exceed his authority. "
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Rep. Judd: "Well, I believe the FBI operations should be protected
beyond question. It is too valuable an agency to be tampe red with."
Rep. Thomas (R. , N. J. ): "I want to say to the gentleman from
Minnesota that I am wholeheartedly in favor of his amendment.
If we open the doors to the Central Intelligence Agency to go in
and inspect the operations of the FBI, you are starting to do the
thing that is going to be the end of the FBI in time, because you
will open it to this agency and then you will open it to somebody
else. I think we will make a great mistake unless we accept the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota. "
Rep. Judd: "I thank the gentleman. I think we will all agree he
knows what he is talking about. "
Rep. Busbey: "In reference to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Holifield), when he states that we can assume that this
National Security Agency will do this and do that, I just wish to
remind the membership that the trouble in the past with legislation
has been that we have not taken the time to spell out the little
details. It is these assumptions we have had that have gotten
us into trouble. I think it is very important that the gentleman's
amendment be adopted. "
Rep. Andresen (R. , Minn.): "Is there anything in here that
permits the FBI to inspect the personnel of the Central Intelligence?"
Rep. Judd: "No; there is not. "
Rep. Andresen: "I understand that some of the men in Central
Intelligence at the present time are certain foreign-born persons
who might need some inspection, and they hold some very impor-
tant positions with Central Intelligence. "
Rep. Judd: "I have had no information on that one way or the
other. I must assume the Director of Central Intelligence is
going to exercise utmost care in choosing his personnel. I hope
this amendment will be adopted because I cannot see how it can
hurt the Central Intelligence Agency in the slightest and it
certainly will protect the intelligence operations of FBI and the
Atomic Energy Commission., 153
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Conferees
The language adopted by the House and Senate conferees in con-
nection with the intelligence of other departments and agencies of the
Government provided:
"Sec. 102. (e) To the extent recommended by the National
Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence
of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as
hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be
. open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence,
and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is
possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Govern-
ment, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to
the. Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation,
and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written
request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the
Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national
security. ,,154
Thus, the inspection role of the Director of Central Intelligence
was identified with "intelligence" as contrasted with "intelligence
operations." The correlation, evaluation, and dissemination functions
were preserved by directing that intelligence relating to national security
be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Section 102 (e) applied to all departments and agencies of the
Government. However, in the case of the FBI, institutional disengage-
ment as well as functional disengagement between the Central Intelligence
Agency and the domestic intelligence of the FBI was achieved.
SECR 11-7 T
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SEU R ET
Summary
A clear and complete divorce from internal security functions
had been a constant principle for a Government-wide foreign intelligence
service since its early conceptualization.
Clearly, however, a Government-wide foreign intelligence
service had a legitimate interest in using domestic sources for obtaining
intelligence information originating outside of the United States. This
was fully appreciated by the Congress in establishing the cleavage between
the intelligence functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and the domes-
tic functions of the other departments and agencies.
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 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
CHAPTER X. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Public Law 253, 80th Congress, the National Security Act of
1947, was approved by the Congress on the 25th of July 1947 and was
signed by President Truman the following day. The provisions relating
to the Central Intelligence Agency became effective 18 July 1947, the
day after Mr. James Forrestal took the oath of office as the first
Secretary of Defense.
Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 established the
position of th~~ Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. It also established functions and executive branch rela-
tionships for central intelligence. Congress provided the Agency with
a definitive charter which did not unduly circumscribe, curtail, or
interfere with functions of other agencies and departments of Government.
During the almost five months of Congressional deliberation a
significant number of issues concerning CIA were resolved, this despite
the fact that CIA was only one segment of a highly complicated and con-
troversial legislative proposal.
Controversy surrounding the Agency which was prompted primarily
by a misunderstanding of the functions to be performed was resolved
for the most part to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. On a more
general level the legislative history surrounding CIA bespeaks of over-
whelming support for institutionalizing foreign intelligence to serve the
needs of the President and his policy advisors. In so far as it is possible
 Approyed ,or Release; 200.6/08/29 CIA-RDP-96W0269R00-15000.10001-3
SE C R E T
equal to the important national responsibility levied upon it.
Agency to get on with the demanding job of building an organization
permit those charged with the responsibility for administering the
tive Branch of Government had been statutorily prescribed. This would
of business, central intelligence as an integral function of the Execu-
for the Central Intelligence Agency would become the next pressing order
While an enabling act setting forth administrative authorities
functioning of central intelligence, in all its elements.
authority and responsibility for both the comprehensive and effective
to achieve an executive objective through legislation, Congress provided
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 Approved For, Rel,ease2006t08t29 : CIA=RDP86B00269R00150001000-1-3
CHA-P-T-r-R-I;
1. For a brief summary of the authorities of Central Intelligence, See L.
Kirkpatrick, "Origins, Missions, and Structure of CIA" in Studies
In Intelligence, Volume II, No. 1, Winter 1958. 1 -
2. Article 1, Section 8.
3. Story Commentaries on the Constitution, II, Sec. 1185, 4th Ed. , 1873.
4. 53 Siat. 561 C ) ^{:_ : ~.
5. Reorganization Plan No. 1, 1 July .1939, 4'F. R,. 2727, 53 Stat. 1423.
6. Executive Order 8248, 8 September 1939, `F. R.
7. Administrative Order of the President, 25 May 1940.
8. Administrative Order of the President, 7 January 1941.
9. Presidential Order of 11 July 1941, 6 'ed. Reg. 3422.
10. Actually the President had earlier, on-25 June 1941,. drawn a
military order as Commander in Chief, designating this office
as the Coordinator of Strategic Information to include the
performance of duties of a "military character" for the President.
The preeminence of the President's regular military advisors
for military matters was corrected in the 11 July order.
11. Presidential letter dated 23 July 1941.'
12. House Committee on the Judiciary, Report No. 1507, 15 Dec. 1941.
13. Military Order, 16 Fed. Reg. 3422. For establishment of Joint
Chiefs of Staff and description of its functions and duties. See
Federal Records of World War II (1951), II, pp. 6-9. National
Activities and Records Service, and Ray S. Cline, Washington
Command Post: The Operations Division (United States Army in
World War II series), pp. 98-103.
14. Executive Order 9182.
 Approved Eor Release-.2006/08129: CIA-RD.P86B0026 00450001000-1-3
15. Executive Order 9001, 27 December 1941, Fed. Reg. Doc. 41-9798,
and Executive Order 9241, 1 September 1942, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787.
16. 56 Stat. 704..
17. 57 Stat. 526.'.
18. National War Agencies Appropriation Act of 1945 (58 Stat. 533),
and National War Agencies Appropriation Act of 1946 (59 Stat. 483).
Also see OGC regarding internal requirements to
assure the full satisfaction of this high trust.
~9. Need Oct 44 Donovan Memo to Pres.
20. Memo for the President from William J. Donovan, Director, OSS,
dated 18 November 1944, with attached directive "Substantive
Authority Necessary in Establishment of a Central Intelligence
Service. "
L/ . Ibid. 20.
23. Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, "Proposed
Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service. ",,24 January 1945).
24. J. C. S. 1181/5 (19 Se-)tember 19451-
25. Ibid. 23. (Ibid. 24? )
26. Letter from Director, OSS, to Director, BOB, dated 25 August 194-
27. Including an extensive "Report on Intelligence Matters" from
Brig. Gen. John Magruder, Director, Strategic Services U
(26 October 1945).
28. Memorandum for the Secretary of War, "Preliminary Report -o
Committee Appointed to Study War Department Intelligence
Activities" (3 November 1945
ILLEGIB
Letter from Presi en terry of State, dated 20 September 1945.
30. Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, from
Secretary of State, Subject: National Intelligence Authority.
31. Letter. from Secretary of State to Secretaries of War and Navy,
National Intelligence Authority, 10 December 1945.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
32. "Establishment of National Intelligence Authority, " Attachment to
10 December 1945 memorandum from Secretary of State to
Secretaries of War and Navy, Subject:' National -Intelligence
Authority.
33. Letter to President from Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
dated 7 January 1946.
34. Memo from Special Assistant for the Secretary of State to the
Secretaries of War and Navy, NIA, 15 December 1945.
ILLEGIB
ence r'
lli
f I
t
g
e
n
35. Draft "Directive Regarding the Coordination o
Activities," Paragraph 8.
36. S. B. L. Penrose, Jr. , Collection of Background Papers-on
Development of CIA, dated 15 May 1947.
37. Memorandum to General Magruder from Commander Donovan,
General Counsel, OSS (23 January 1946).
38. Letter to the President from Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
dated 7 January 1946.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29 CIA-R PCB 86?,002k9R00150001.0001-3-
CHAPTER II.
39. Memo for the President from William J. Donovan, Director,. OSS,
dated 18 November 1944, with attached directive, "Substantive
Authority Necessary in Establishment of the Central Intelligence
Service. "
40. Ibid. 38
41. Memo for Clark M. Clifford, dated 2 December 1946, Subject:
Proposed Enabling Legislation for the Establishment of a CIA.
42. Authority to hire personnel directly and independent budget were
needed most. Fortunately BOB, GAO, State, War, Navy, and
Treasury recognized the problems and made arrangements which .
enable CIG to operate. See 1 OGC 117 regard~lworking fund for
DCI.
43. Letter from President Truman to Senator Thomas Walsh, Repre-
sentatives May and Vinson. 15 June 1946.
44. This section was deleted from final draft. CIG had urged that
phrase "subject to existing law" be eliminated as it adds nothing
and many of the functions and authorities of this Agency are
excepted from existing law. " (Letter to Charles Murphy, 27
January 1947.) While Admiral Leahy, the President's personal
representative to the NIA, agreed, Mr. Murphy suggested that the
entire clause be omitted and CIG agreed. (Page 4, Proposed
legislation for CIG, Chief, Legislative Liaison Division Memo-
randum for the Record.)
45. Memorandum for the Record, Proposed Legislation for CIG, Chief, `
Legislative Liaison Division, CIG.
46. The salary was lowered from $15, 000 to $14, 000 by the White House
drafters on basis that incumbent would be a military or naval ILLEGIB
officer whose salary should not be greatly in excess of that of
Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, and it was established
at the same level as that of Director, Military Applications of AEC.
(Proposed GIG Legislation Memo
Legislative Liaison Division.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
47'. Proposed GIG Legislation Memorandum for the Record, Chief,
-dated
Legislative Liaison Division, u
48. Con ressional Record, p. 9606, 19 July 1947
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
CHAPTER III.
49. House Report 2734, 79th Congress, Second Session (1946).
50. Senate Report 1.327, 79th Congress, Second Session.
51. New York Times, 19 October 1945, p. 3, col. 1.
52. See Page 30 supra for the wording of the CIA section. Title II
was changed to Title I since it provides "... on the high rst
level, under the immediate supervision of the President, the
establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the
departments, agencies and functions of the Government rela-
ting to National Security... (S. Report 239, 80th Congress,
First Session). Further, Coordination for National Security
".... was outside, separate and apart, from the Defense Estab-
lishment (and) in an effort to bring a realization to the
members of the Committee that we were seeking a national
security organization and not a national military establishment,
I was able to have the Committee amend the bill.. thus at
leat placing first things first." (Senator Robertson, Congress-
ional Record, p. 8475, 7 July. )
53. The Legislative Reorganization Plan of 1946 combined the Com-
mittee for Naval Affairs and the Committee for Military Affairs.
54. On 1 May 1947, the DCI, General Hoyt Vandenberg, was succeeded
by Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter.
55. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9605.
~; ICJ
 Approved For,Relpase 2066/b8/29-:--C-
CHAPTER IV.
56. Senator Thomas had worked on the Common Defense Act of 1946
which was reported out of the Military Affairs Committee but
57. Congressional Record, 14 March 1947, p. 2139.
58. Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 and 2
April 1947.
59. Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, 29 April 1947.
60. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2139, 13 May 1947.
61. Ibid., 15 May 1947.
62. Secretary Forrestal was to be appointed the first Secretary of
Defense.
63. Ibid. , 10 June 1947.
64. Ibid. , 26 June 1947.
65. Se-iate Repo-rt 239, p. 2, 80th Congress-, First Sessief, 5 June 1947.
~St
66. H?tt-se. Report 961, p. 3, 80th Congress, First Sessier, 16 July 1947.
67. Congressional Record, 7 July 1947, p. 8466.
68. Congressional Record, 9 July 1947, p. 8677.
69. Congressional Record, 9 July 1947, p. 8671.
70. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9565.
71. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9569.
72. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9573.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-R DP86B00269.RO01500010001-3
73. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9579.
74. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9581.
75. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9582.
76. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9590?
77. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9576.
78. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p.
79. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p.
 2006/08129: CIA-REP 85B002 9R001500010001-3
CHAPTER V.
80. Page 20 supra.
81. Page 31 supra.
82. Page 20 supra.
83. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2139, 24 June 1947.
84. Ibid. , 26 June 1947.
85. Hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, p. 526.
86. Ibid., p. 669.
87. Ibid. , p. 527.
88. Congressional Record, 9 July 1947, p. 8688.
89. Ibid.
90. Hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758,
pp. 173-176.
91. Ibid., p. 497.
92. House Report 961, 80th Congress, First Session.
93. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p.
94. Page 29 supra.
95. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2139 (1947).
96. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kenned ,
1961, Item 485. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965,.. Item 209_?(Note1, Letter from the President
of the United States to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated
September 24, 1965.
97. P. L. 80-253, Section 102(a).
98. Ibid. , Section 102(d).
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B0026:9R001500010001-3
t
Chapter VI.
99. P. 20 supra.
100. P. 38 supra.
101. Hearings before Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 758,
104. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2139, 80th Gong. , 1st Sess., p. 120 (1947).
11,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 176 (1947).
102. Congressional Record, 7 July 1947, p. 8486.
103. H. Rep. 961, 80th Cong.,_lst Sess., p. 3 (1947).
105. Ibid. ,' p. 125.
Q-f,^~&UAAA--Z ljkd~-~
106. Ibid. , p. 170.
107. Statement of Lt. Gen. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence,
before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments (1 May 1947),and Hearings before Senate Armed
Services Committee on S. 758, 80th Cong. , 1st Sess.
108. Hearings before Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 758,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 496 (1947).
109. P. 67 supra.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-R DP86B00269R001500010001-3.
tive Departments on H. R. 2319, Unpublished classified transcript,
112. Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Execu-
Chapter VII.
110. Footnote 49 supra.
111. P. 34 supra.
27 June 1947.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001-3
Chapter VIII.
114. P. 30 supra.
115. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
4
7).
Departments on H. R. 2139, 80th Cong. , 1st Sess., p. 439 (19
116. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9604.
117. Congressional Record, 25 July 1947, p. 10271.
118. Fixed term appointment of up to 10 years had been suggested.
119. Rep. Robert A. Harness (R., Ind.).
120. 10 U. S. C. 576; R.S. sec. 1222; 14 Op. Atty. Gen, 200.
121. As reported out of Senate Committee, the salary of the position
was reduced from $14, 000 to $12, 000 per annum in line with an
across the board reduction for certain positions under the National
Security Act of 19-17.
122. Congressional Record, 7 July 1947, p. 8458. Admiral Sherman sug-
gested before the Senate Committee that addition of the phrase "from
military or civilian life" or vice versa would clarify the intent
that a civilian could be appointed Director.
123. P. 26 supra.
124. S. Rep. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10 (1947).
125. Congressional Record, 7 July 1947, p. 8486.
126. Congressional Record, 9 July 1947, p. 8664.
127. Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2319, 80th Cong. , 1st Sess., Unpublished
classified transcript, 27 June 1947.
128. The House Committee on Expenditures in-the Executive Departments
set a salary of $14, 000 for the DCI, $2, 000 more than approved in
S. 758. The salary of the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board was set at the same level. (See footnote 46 supra.) The salaries
of the Service Secretaries were set at $14, 500. Cabinet members at
the time received $15, 000 per annum.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/39: CIA-R D.P86B002G9,R001.500010001-3
129. C ?essional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9576.
130. Co.- -cssional Record, 19 July 1947, pp. 9605 - 9607.
131. H. Rep. 1051, 80th Conn., 1st Sess., National Security Act of 1947,
pp. 3 - 4.
132. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 10271.
133. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 10272.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R001500010001_-3
134. P. 12 supra.
135. Statement of Lt. Gen. Vandenberg before Senate Committee on
Armed Services. Hearings in the 80th Cong., 1st Sass., on S. 758,
p. 497 (1947).
136. Additional views of Chairman Hoffman on H. R. 961, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 11 (1947).
137. Hearings before Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments, H. R. 2319, 27 June 1947, p. 15.
138. Ibid., p. 28.
140.
Ibid., pp. 57
- 58.
141..
Ibid., pp. 59
- 60.
142.
Ibid. , pp. 61
- 62.
143.
Ibid., pp. 65
- 66.
144.
Ibid. , pp. 149
- 154.
145.
Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in Executive
Departments in the House, 80th Cong., 1st Sass., H.R. 2319,
National Security Act of 1947, pp. 127 - 128 (1947).
146.
Ibid., p. 172.
147.
Ibid., p. 559.
148.
H. R. 4214, Sec. 105 (d) (3).
149.
Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9591.
150.
P. 21 supra.
151. Presidential Directive, 22 January 1946, para. 3B (see p. 20 supra).
Annrnvar1 Fnr Ralaaca 70.fl/(lei/7Q r.IA-RnP86R(1()7('igRppl.ri00010001-3