TECHNOLOGY TRENDS COLLOQUIUM VOLUME I - RAPPORTEUR'S REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001400080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 93
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Secret
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Technology Trends Colloquium
Volume I Rapporteur's Report
29 March - 1 April 1978
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland
OSD Review Completed
Secret
A Department of Defense Research and Engineering--
IA 100001-78
Intelligence Community Pu ication
June 1978
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TEC:-~NOLOGY TRENDS COLLOQUIUM
Volume I
Rapporteur's Report
29 March - 1 April 1978
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland
JOINT DEFENSE RESEARCEI AND ENGINEERING -
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLICATION
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CONTENTS
Pa e
Foreword .
Summary
Keynote Remarks, Hon. William J. Perry, Under .
Secretary of Defense for Research., Engineering
Technological Futures .
Data Processors
Surveillance
Land Combat
Life Sciences
Naval Combat
Strategic Technologies
Spade Systems
Materials/Physical Sciences
Energy Weapons Applications
Table of Projections
Strategy and Technology -
Overview
Non-Mutual Assured Destruction
Nuclear Proliferation World
NATO War
Information War
Small Unit Operations
Food/Water Crisis
Energy Related Scenarios
Resources and Uncertainties
Soviet Resources
Soviet R~,D Patterns
Resources and Uncertainties - US.
71
Technology As An Equalizer
Numbers Are Important
Ability To Execute
Design For Mobilization
Operations RFD
Innovation In The US
Participants .
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This publication describes presentations and discussions
at a colloquium conducted over a four-day period by a mix of
technologists, systems designers and managers, intelligence
analysts, and operational military. The colloquium was part
of a joint Defense Research ~ Engineering - Intelligence
Community technology forecast to determine what technology
will be most significant for military weapon systems of the
United States and the USSR for the rest of this century.
Technology forecasts are normally strongest in their
statement of technical possibilities; and weakest in their
relevance to political-economic-structural-demographic-human
reactions and in their recognition of cross-impacts or
substitutions. The mix of technical disciplines, future
environment topics, and operational personnel was an inten-
tional attempt to overcome such shortcomings.
The year 2000, or twenty years hence, may sound like
the far future - a realm for wild thoughts. Ur-fortunately,
many people concerned with defense planning are awed by a
rigid ten-year acquisition cycle, and a ten- to thirty-year
life cycle for deployed systems. The future appears to be
known, and indeed no one would suggest that much of the
equipment now or soon to be deployed will not still be used
in the year 2000. In the past, however, major changes in
equipments have evolved within a decade (e.g., the ICBM) to
dramatically change war-fighting capability and significantly
the perception of military strength. Quoting Petex Drucker,
the proper rule is not, "whatever we do we'll cto forever,"
but "whatever we do today will...be a candidate for abandon-
ment within a fairly short period of years." The possibilities
described in this publication should stimulate abandonment
of the "more of the same" viewpoint.
The impetus for this colloquium came from Admiral
Stansfield Turner. He engaged others in his idea and gave
emphasis to the mix of technical and operational people.
The colloquium benefited significantly from the co-sponsorship
and active participation of Dr. William J. Perry, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research ~, Engineering; as well as
the guidance and active participation of the si:eering group
composed of Dr. John Deutch, Director of Energy Research,
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DOE; Dr. Stephen Lukasik, Senior Vice President of RAND
Corporation; and Dr. Frank Press, Presidential Science
Adviser. Ultimately, the fact of the colloquium and its
content rests on all the participants who generously gave
their knowledge and talents to the undertaking.
The text which follows is arranged by logical grouping
of materials from the colloquium exchange. Every effort was
made to give an accurate, though brief, account of main
points. Any errors or misrepresentations contained in this
report are unintentional and regretted. Individual papers
prepared for and given at the colloquium are contained in
the separate volume, and are commended to the reader as a
more thorough treatment of the individual topics.
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SUMMARY
The tasks laid before the colloquium were to identify
where important technologies are going and where the leverage
for military significance is in these technologies--for the
US and/or for the USSR. This was not a comparative assessment
of the United States and USSR. Technological possibilities
were treated as neutral--that is, capable of exploitation by
either nation, depending upon its institutions and purposes.
Forty technologies, systems, and conflict descriptions
were selected beforehand for their likely significance.
These formed the core of the materials presented--and thereby
the future prospects.
These results do suggest priorities. For DOD activities
their importance can be in the opportunities now seen to be
significant, in the possibilities which are not prematurely
foreclosed, and in the stimulation to think about a future
different than a simple extension of today. Their importance
for the intelligence community can be in the recognition of
where US designs may depend upon threat definition or target
signature variations, e.g., cruise missile defenses; in the
identification of future technologies which need to be
watched; in the understanding of the US (blue side) develop-
ment, acquisition and operational strengths and problems;
and in the recognition of research and development fields
where information or solutions found by other nations could
prove helpful in US developments.
Future Possibilities
Flexibility gains, and thereby the capability for
effective application of forces, appeared to the parti-
cipants as the most significant military outcome from a
number of these technologies. The explosion of ~.at,~,.
proc,____sG;ng_.app.lc._t;ons possible through large-scale
integration, processing at the sensor, and cheapness is
foremost in impact. Applications to weapons and to
radar are of course ex ected of hardware designers.
Application to evolve geographically and functionally?
distributed syste~ for tar et loca ion, unit position
location, air defense, an so on will provide for
battlefield portrayal and the survivability of command
and control. Most significantly, application to
maintenance tasks, to multiple purpose maintenance
tools, and to equipments capable of field changes in
function will effect radical r.mnval ~f ic?~;stiral
constraints on fore O~eratinn~,,- ~
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A second source of flexibility gain is expected to be
the wide use of insensitive or "wooden" explosives and
propellants. These, used in smart and barrage weapons,
eliminate the handling, storage and fabrication con-
straints now necessitated by fear of faire or accidental
detonation. VTOL is a third source. VTOL aircraft
equal in range-.payload capability to today's fixed-wing
aircraft can be available in the 1990s. A fourth
source is th.e design of battlefield surveillance and
weapons to explicitly gain t e a van ages o night and
bad weather operations. The millimeter wave radar for
these short-range applications is a likely consequence.
The last of the items identified with flexibility is
the integration of sma~~-~-tae.am-offer-axis and equipments
in a manner analogous to the development of a tactical
aircraft. These teams far both main force and special
operations can thereby realize the protection, the
target kill, and the fire/force direction potential
from new weapons, sensors, computation and communications.
A world-wide surveillance capability is expected
through employment of space systems as well as over-
the-horizon radars. Optical detection of subsonic
cruise missiles, ships, and armor formations is expected
from space utilizing large-space structures. However,
the military significance from these achievements is
unlikely to be realized unless the surveillance re-
sources are organized and integrated with weapons
allocation and handover capabilities; and provision is
made for replacement of combat losses.
The US and USSR are expected to become increasingly
concerned about space access, and the consequent needs
for active and passive defense against both physical
and electronic attack. Active defense systems can
include ground-based lasers for low a:Ltitude kill, both
fly-by and positioned space-borne lasers, and space-
borne lasers used for selective attack upon earth
stations. Survivability for space assets is considered
as achieveable as for anything else, naturally with the
acceptance of payload and .functional penalities.
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? US anti-submarine surveillance is expected to continue
dependence upon passive acoustics with up to 20dB gain
in sensitivity. The USSR is likely to continue emphasis
on short-range active acoustic and non-acoustic sur-
veillance applicable to operations in enclaves and at
barrier points.
? Mini-submarines, employing laminar flow surfaces and
high-density propulsion, are expected for use in numbers
as decoys, interceptors, or The
use of submersible work systems is also expected~to
expand greatly, in part because the technology is being
advanced rapidly by commercial interests. in offshore
exploration and deepsea bed exploitation. Their mili-
tary significance will be in em lacement of sea floor
su 1 caches
? Naval surface vehicles capable of 50 to 70 knots are
expected to serve as platforms for air surveillance,
ASW, and movement of strike teams in crisis intervention.
More significantly they are likely to ful:E?ill new roles
which remain to be defined by exercises and experimentation.
The wing-in-ground (WIG) vehicle may complement or be
an alternate in these roles, or even serve as a launch
platform for cruise missiles or anti-air missiles.
? The life sciences are in a state of vigorous growth,
yet the implications for national security are unclear.
Genetic engineering will not change the combatant of
this century who has already been born. Protective
materials are expected to be more important to the
nuclear-biological-chemical combatant than medical
efforts.
? Silicon will remain the mainstay of electronics.
Optical fiber and integrated optics will be commonplace.
Laser treatment of materials will permit flaw-free
parts, and rapid fabrication in the field.
? Accuracy improvements for strategic ballistic missiles
are likely to be based on reference to global position
satellites, not on inertial guidance improvements.
,Cruise missiles will be capable of CEPS ~};~~~et using
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correlation guidance. Our cruise missiles face a
formidable air defense and for penetration will depend
upon low observable designs and not supersonic or
hypersonic speeds.
Radical Change
? Radical change from the forces and weapons we know
today was suggested by a few technologies. First would
be the assimilation--not simply the existence of--
sensors and processors by all forces. The obvious
changes were mentioned, reprogrammable tools used in
maintenance and logistical support, automatic detection
and decoy of enemy illumination possessed by even
infantry units, and fire-control solutions performed
with a hand-held calculator in lieu of an installed
system. Much more pervasive change in tactics, opera-
tions, organizations, and equipments is anticipated
through the synergism of experimentation and field use.
? Second is the application of mega-power ground-based
laser beams for propulsion. Multitude missile and
spaces'- e possibilities become feasible through the rapid
repeatable launch and the cheapness of launch. Large
structures become economical in space, anti-ballistic
defenses could be placed in space, and mini satellites
or decoys would become a space defense option.
? Third is the application of the particle beam as a
space or ground based defensive weapon offering the
possibility of superseding mechanical systems limited
by inertia, thereby offering response times of milli-
seconds instead of seconds. A non-aimed beam might
also be used as a weapon to produce a large radiation
dose over a tactical area. Critical technical ques-
tions exist, but experimental work is underway in both
the US and USSR on technologies applicable to a practical
beam weapon.
? Fourth is the electromagnetic gun, a projectile pro-
pelled by a magnetic coil. By contrast with current
guns, there would be no gun tube wear, flash, smoke, or
similar signatures.
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New Needs and New Approaches
Technologies were the focus, but beyond identifying
what is technically possible is the question of how to make
it possible. The disparity between the US and the USSR in
fielding of new systems was very much the concern of the
participants. The issue is not whether US technology can
better fill a military need than can Soviet technology; but
whether we can reverse our difficulties of recent years in
choosing, designing, and producing systems which work, are
assimilated, and are of reasonable cost. Effective tech-
nological exploitation was seen as crucial, but not yet in
our favor, in the military competition with the USSR.
Emphasis on operational experimentation and on the intrinsic
quality of numbers were two of the more prominent suggestions
for change in US practice.
Real concern was expressed about the attention given by
the Soviets to continuous, including nuclear-biological-
chemical, warfare in their doctrine, their equipments, and
their training. US shortcomings in, even avoidance of,
preparation for this type of combat makes the d.isbalance
more critical. Obvious actions were discussed; but wider
recognition of the breadth of the disbalance is a necessary
first step.
Continuous warfare was one of the forms of future
conflict discussed in the colloquium; force differences
responsive to a concept of non-mutual assured destruction,
to a world of nuclear proliferation, and to small unit type
actions were others discussed. Inadequate as these were in
covering the spectrum of future needs, they highlighted a
major shortcoming in exploitation of our technological base.
The lag in warfare concepts and strategy means our focus is
upon bottom-up work--which comes from the traditional fields.
Unrecognized is the lack of creative work in technologies
which could be most important to long-term objectives; also
unrecognized are areas of too much effort with low payoff.
A combination of top-down and bottom-up selection was recommended.
Perhaps one of the more pervasive thoughts put forward
in the colloquium was that of information war. Strategic
intelligence is updated in bursts occurring in a matter of
months or years. In a relatively stable regime of technical
collection the capabilities of the collector tend to become
known, and thus culpable to deception. A carefully designed
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sequence of messages can cause reliance upon false input
data and decision logic e.g. a designer is vulnerable to
wrong or deceptive signature data. Furthermore, new vulnera-
bilities to tactical intelligence, and in actual engagements,
result from the explosive use of information to optimize
force and weapon allocation and control precision weapons.
Information warfare is likely to need constant attention in
the future, not the countermeasures afterthought approach so
common in the past.
The colloquium's focus was upon technologies for weapon
systems. Unintentionally, this appears to reflect the im-
plicit assumption that machines and technology determine the
outcome of wars. Those of this persuasion are impressed
with the destructive power of modern weapons and view military
personnel as rather unreliable machine-tenders whose func-
tion is to keep the equipment running. Fortunately, the
operational participants present forcefully challenged this
attitude much to the benefit of the colloquium's product.
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KEYNOTE REMARKS
Dr. Perry gave the keynote charge to the colloquium.
He first drew attention to two aspects of the organization:
that it was a joint undertaking by two elements of the
government, Defense and the Intelligence Community and, more
significantly, that it represented a joining of forces
between the scientific and national security communities,
He noted that the latter communities had worked together in
earlier years--with pride--and expressed his hope that this
undertaking was a harkening of the better things to come.
He identified his two major themes for the colloquium:
first, that of major military competition and, second, what
science and technology has to do with that competition.
He gave examples of the seriousness of the military
competition. The USSR spends 40 percent more on defense
than the United States, but perhaps even more representative
of the asymmetry is that the Soviets expend 30 percent of
their GNP on consumer products while we spend 60 percent.
They have deployed about twice as many pieces of tactical
hardware and are producing at a rate 3 to 5 times ours.
They have moved from marked inferiority in strategic systems
to essential equivalence today and, a?s we see it, are driving
for a position of superiority.
He noted that the competition is not only military, but
is economic and has to do with the quality of life and the
ability to maintain freedom of choice. In these other areas
we are winning the competition. So our question is, what is
necessary and sufficient to meet the military competition if
we accept a 40-percent disadvantage in investment.
He cited President Brezhnev on the significance of
science and technology in this competition. This he agreed
with, noting that we have very fundamental advantages in
this country in our industrial base and in our technological
base. The issue is how to most effectively exploit this
science and technology base--we must be extremely selective.
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Dr. Perry said we have made choices with our R~,D dollars
in the past and that has led to the military capability we
have today. Our technology serves as an equalizer to restore
the quantitative disbalance between our forces and those of
the USSR. In the next two decades we will again be depending
on technology. The choice is even more critical, for while
our resources compel us to be selective, the USSR is making
a blanket approach.
The task he placed upon the colloquium was to identify
where the technology is going and to identify where the
leverage is in that technology and military systems.
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TECHNOLOGICAL FUTURES
The colloquium was a 3-day snapshot of technology
futures and possible military applications. The results are
an input to a forecast, intended thereby to be a starting
point for the harder task of resource allocation.
Dr. Davis in her summary provided a chronological
listing of the technology presentations in terms of radical
changes, incremental changes, and no anticipated changes.
She noted the amazing and spontaneous consensus as to the
constituents of US technological infrastructure for the next
20 or so years. These are: computer and software technology,
distributed information/control networks, automation tech-
nology, materials technology, all weather sensor technology,
and people.
She identified some technologies which need watching
because too little attention has been directed to them,
e.g., chemical/biological warfare technologies, maintenance
technologies, etc. She placed emphasis on maintenance
technology, noting that industry makes maintenance, repair,
and keeping equipment operational a part of their business;
and the DOD must give this greater attention.
Dr. Lukasik said the approach in the systems discussions
had been to focus upon a set of systems that would reasonably
span the future needs and relevant technologies--space
systems, battlefield systems, etc. He related systems and
technologies by a listing of technologies which had come up
in the systems discussions. These include some ovez?laps
with the lists of Dr. Davis, but also some differences. He
emphasized that while these were generally high technology,
the sense of the colloquium had been toward simplicity in
design to achieve reliability and maintainability.
He drew attention at one topic from the systems discus-
sion; namely, the one addressed by Dr. Rona entitled informa-
tion systems (or information war). The future attainment of
higher and 'nigher levels of precision in surveillance,
weapon use, and force allocation carries with it the greater
vulnerability to deception prior to conflict o7? actual con-
fusion and destruction during conflict by targeted actions
against command-and-control links. This topic needs constant
attention, not the afterthought customarily given counter-
measures.
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Many of these technologies offer new or enhanced military
capabilities which will impact--and possibly cause major
change in future forces. The extent to which USSR force
changes are foreseen depends upon both our continued access
to information of USSR developments and our applied knowledge
of how the USSR exploits their technology. The extent to
which such changes are foreseen, and actually occur, in US
forces depends in part upon the stimulation generated by the
materials of this colloquium.
Data Processors
The last decades saw the development and use of the
programmable electronic computer, then the transistor, and
now the present day silicon chip with its large-scale inte-
grated (LSI) circuits. The cost per function has dropped
dramatically so that inexpensive hand .calculators and
related microprocessors and minicomputers are now widely
used commercially. Further integration is part of the
future; but, more significantly, with low-cost processing
many new tasks will be undertaken that today are uneconomical
or not thought of. Large amounts of energy and force can be
controlled in a manner similar to the way the brain directs
the action of the muscles. This technology was thus seen by
those at the colloquium as key, whether the application was
toward separation of signals from clutter, guidance of
missiles, distributed sys-terns operations, or tools for
maintenance and logistics operations in support of combat
teams.
Dr. Dertouzos described the magnitude of expected
hardware changes in memories and processors. By the late
1980s a million-bit chip memory will provide the equivalent
of today's $100,000 computer for a few hundred dollars--
purchasable for the homeowner or soldier. Similarly, by the
late 1980s we will have available logic processors of 1
million to 5 million instructions per second (MIPS) at
today's prices ($50 to $100). The significance by today's
standards is that microprocessors will permeate instrumentation
and control functions, individual use of computers will have
a substantial qualitative impact on the individual's access
to services and overall performance, and geographically
distributed computer-communications systems will become the
rule.
Radically new technologies may further increase memories
in capacity and reduce costs. Single processor machines may
be extended to 200 to 300 MIPS. However, these and even
larger processing rates are more likely to be achieved by
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multi-processors. He saw little advancement in input/output
devices with continued reliance on the cathode ray tube,
printer devices, and the keyboard. He noted that researchers
are still struggling to construct programs that can comprehend
spoken English. The significant exception will be that of
the direct sensor computer interface.
The central processing units with large memories of
today are a natural consequence of the considerably higher
cost of logic switching or computation in contrast with that
of memory storage. Now storing and logic costs are compar-
able, and we have the microprocessor. Mr. Joseph addressed
microprocessors futures. He emphasized the rapidity of
change. Until the late 1960s a new maxicomputei? generation
was developed about every six years, but since 1971 a new
microprocessor generation has occurred every two years--
small enough now and at sufficiently low cost to be inte-
grated into common objects to give them intelligence. The
integration will advance faster because interconnections are
costly in power, maintenance, reliability, etc. Whereas the
penalty for a signal now leaving the chip versus staying on
the chip requires a hundred times more power, in a few years
.the number of circuits on a chip will increase by more than
10 times, and the power penalty will be a thousand to one--
dictating designs where few signals leave the chip/wafer.
Initially microprocessor hardware will be incorporated into
computers and other machines, but he believes that, by 1980,
entire systems will be integrated onto semiconductor wafers.
Dr. Dertouzos said these developments in processing
hardware, the direct interface of sensors and actuators with
processors, and the sizable improvement expected. in bandwidth
cost (glass fibers) bear directly on the instrumentation and
control applications--and will bring about new levels of
performance for individual equipment. New designs in such
things as ships, airplanes, vehicles, buildings will come
about by at least replacing heavy multiwire bundles with few
glass fibers that link packet-oriented processing hardware.
Mr. Joseph added possibilities for dispersed operations
that could be of significant security interest. A machine-
like, nongeographically targetable, microminiaturized factory
will produce end products. A mobile unit will have the
versatility for complete maintenance of military equipments.
Information transfers will substitute for the transfer of
people and things, including where adaptation thereby of an
appliance (tool) at a remote location performs a different
function.
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He gave examples of the lag in defense-deployed systems;
that is, 10 years behind the defense systems state-of-the-
art and 20 years behind the leading edge of the commercial
exploitation. The obvious need is for military-related
systems to upgrade at a faster pace to keep up with commercially
available systems. He foresees the ability to imbed micro-
processor-like logic at the interface of complex systems,
thereby allowing such systems to be used by the uninitiated
and untrained, to aid immeasurably in closing the gap?
Similarly, he saw the significance of the microprocessor
future for the military as offering the elimination of tech-
nological obsolescence for defense systems. These can be
designed for continued/constant piecemeal updating, which
will permit systems, vehicles, missiles, and so on to be
readily adapted to a changed threat or a different physical
environment. This means saving in major system buys, savings
of energy, and savings of materials.
Technology can be the driver for individual equipments.
Dr. Dertouzos noted by contrast that while the technology
will make distributed systems possible, the principal force
behind distributed systems is simply the natural geographical
distribution of the collectors and users. The extent to
which these systems become widespread depends critically
upon the evolution of languages and operating systems designs.
The most dominant application is likely to be clerical and
logistic support automation, that is, the mail and message
systems, text editing and preparation, maintenance of records,
and clerical functions. Other applications include military
intelligence, where inputs can be linked to an informational
structure and retrieved inferentially and associatively
rather than by key words; commands and assessment of forces
issued over widespread formations; and s~tat.ionery and mobile
radars netted.
Dr. Hart joined in to carry the possibilities offered
by greatly expanded memories and processor capabilities to
even more difficult tasks. He contrasted conventional
computer programs with the work in Artificial Intelligence
(AI). Conventional programs ordinarily perform an inflexible
operation upon a rigid set of inputs. Clearly, this speed
and processing power ought to be more responsive to variability
in inputs and unanticipated queries. AI ar_hieves this in
part by incorporation within the system of a substantial
body of knowledge about the problem. For example, a system
for analyzing aerial photographs can contain more than the
visual appearance of trucks; it can contain relations
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between trucks and roads, rivers, and bridges and relations
between buildings and roads and so forth. The AI program
can thereby interpret and analyze inputs such as photographic
imagery, generate and execute a routine to answer the query,
and measure the output against a desired goal.
Within the past few years, AI systems have demonstrated
experimentally that they can provide consultation services
to physicians on problems of medical diagnosis; determine
the structure of large organic molecules from their mass
spectra; analyze aerial imagery to monitor ship movements;
deduce, from the content of data bases, the answers to
questions posed in ordinary ungrammatical English; interpret
continuous human speech about restricted domains of discourse;
and control robotic vehicles and manipulators on the basis
of video and other sensory input. He cited possible future
military applications: the direction of multi.sensors on EW
surveillance platform by verification of anticipated emitter
presence or recognition of gaps in the current. electronic
order of battle; the monitoring of a stream of logistics
data to determine critical exceptions to the execution of a
plan; the interrogation, in ordinary English, of a set of
distributed computerized data bases to form an assessment of
assets or to test the feasibility of a contingency plan.
Dr. Hart saw the growth of AI to depend upon the acquisi-
tion, representation and use of knowledge. TYie discussion
suggested an example. The enormous gain in oceans knowledge
projected by Dr. Wunsch, as exploited incrementally by AI
programs could accelerate knowledge of the oceans and also
be applied to ocean surveillance, surface vehicle weather
avoidance, and sensor designs. He saw the exploitation of
multiprocessors as a further source of AI growth. Designs
involving hundreds of general purpose processors or millions
of simple logic units can provide the large amounts of
computation AI systems typically require. Dr. Dertouzos
noted that multiprocessor systems will be needed to achieve
processing rates of 1,000 MIPS and up for tasks like weather
forecasting, partial differential equation operations, and
speech processing. Unfortunately little development of
multiprocessor organization is under way.
Discussion brought out an issue concerning the growth
of microprocessor systems, distributed systems and multi-
processor systems: namely, the absence of software, the
difficulties and high cost of programming, and the availability
of programmers. Dr. Dertouzos suggested the solutions
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probably will utilize natural-language filters that precede
other programs, and larger amounts of structured knowledge
with relatively few processing rules. Mr. Joseph carried
this point about programming cost a step further suggesting
the future approach would be counterintuitive. Today the
design of future systems must be software compatible with
old systems, since it costs about $50 to develop a single
line of new code. But we overlook the life cycle cost to
maintain that line, which involves thousands of dollars
because the past programs are in low-level languages. In
the future we should throw away the old program and redo in
a higher level language--replaceable dedicated computers on
a chip will further this direction by casting software into
hardware.
This means it will be cheaper to buy a new chip in
order to replace the program. There were c{uestions whether
the military could constitute a significant enough market to
make this approach economical. Mr. Joseph stated his belief
that the costs will indeed be cheap enough to meet the
special purpose needs of the military.
The gap between technology and field operations was
echoed by many. General Dickinson noted the :large computer
had not been compatible with Army operations, but the possi-
bilities for distributed operations and the robustness of
the integrated circuit processors appeared to fit well with
Army operations. Mr. Chapman cited a 1977 ASW exercise
wherein an individual on the bridge of the destroyer was
able to compute the fire control solutions with his HP
calculator more rapidly than the installed system. Yet
there is no provision in current procedures to experiment or
adapt those gains. This example, and those furnished by
others, amplified Mr. Joseph's point that the future can
only be realized for the military by anticipatory design
makes explicit provision for update in the field.
Computers and data processing naturally brought the
discussion to command and control as a topic. The new
technology facilitates local processing. Dr. Rona emphasized
how the analogous biological functions work well independently--
decoupled. Decentralization offers the benefit of local
tasks well done and reduces the vulnerability to counter-
measures by the enemy. Dr. Davis also emphasized in her
summary remarks the group's view of strong neE;d for decentral-
izations.
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Surveillance
The sense of the colloquium was that surveillance
technologies are indeed impressive. Knowledge of the location
and movement of enemy and friendly units is important to
warning, to allocation of forces, and to eventual engagement.
There were important reservations over the military gain from
these technologies. Principal reservations were about the
integration of the information, about the adequacy of handover
to units and weapons for engagement of targets, and about
countertactics such as those presented by Dr. Rona as infor-
mation war. However, neither time nor adequate specifics
permitted more than an expression of these reservations.
Radar is expected to remain the principal surveillance
sensor. Dr. Skolnik identified recent major United States
accomplishments in radar as centered around the processing
of data and extraction of information. He cited improve-
ments in MTI and pulse doppler radar, AEW and AWACS radars,
synthetic aperture radar, high-frequency over-the-horizon
radar, pulse compression, automatic detection acid tracking
(ADT), ECCM, and remote sensing of the environment. The
expected, even more revolutionary,- growth of processing
capabilities within the United States means future United
States radar capabilities will likely develop from these
strengths. Significant examples include: the classifica-
tion of noncooperative air targets as a complement to or
substitute for IFF, expanded synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
imaging of terrain and targets in direct support of military
operations; automatic integration of outputs from multiple
radars as well as the integration of radar data with that
from other sensors; adaptive control of antenna pattern, MTI
and ECCM (sidelobe canceler); highly reliable radar systems;
and further refinement of ADT to overcome the display/operator
weak interface.
Mr. Longuemare added to the list of radar advancements
likely to evolve from processing capabilities with emphasis
on airborne applications. He cited solid-state power
generation, signal processing, and system design as the
driving forces. He estimated a 100-fold increase in solid
state radio frequency power generation by combining output
to function as a direct replacement to conventional tube
units. This output will be coupled with electronic scanning,
adaptive beam-forming antennas. In signal processing, the
received signal will be digitally encoded directly at microwave
frequency and stored in bulk memory for proce~ssi.ng in both
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beam space as well as time-frequency space. By system
design, multiband transmitters will permit coordinated use
of the same hardware for jamming, radar functions, and
secure data link functions. In sum, he expects generalized
programmable hardware which covers multiple bands to be
controlled in real time so as to perform both interleaved
and simultaneous functions.
He also emphasized radar developments for target classi-
fication and identification. Classification of a moving
target such as an aircraft, missile, moving or hovering
helicopter, treaded ground vehicle, or wheeled ground vehicle
will be possible at 90 percent confidence within 10 years.
Identification is more demanding; but with high-range resolu-
tion radar, passive ELINT, and jet engine modulation, he saw
probabilities of 85 percent for correct fighter identification
at ranges of 150 to 200 nautical miles, and probabilities of
99 percent for correct identification by interceptor aircraft
at ranges of 10 to 20 nautical miles. Realization of these
could answer a major long-standing problem of= air defense.
Many were skeptical of its feasibility for application in
the dense NATO area. Further caution was given about problems
that may occur outside the NATO theater because of wide use
of US aircraft sold through military sales programs.
He predicted bi-static?radar use; that is where one
remote transmitter illuminates an area and multiple receiver
systems function simultaneously both for surveillance and
for passive operation of strike systems. Dr. Sko"lnik doubled
the application. He noted that when the bistatic radar is
considered objectively with a monostatic system to perform
the same function, the bistatic radar is found wanting. Mr.
Tachmindji echoed the same negative view in respect to
bistatic (or multistatic) radar application 'to air defense.
Dr. Skolnik drew attention to the need for antenna
developments. Current and future radars are expected to
.employ mechanically rotating antennas. These include lighter
weight antennas and mounts, improved stabilization for
shipboard and airborne radars, faster scan rates, cheaper
multiple-beam antennas, transportable and easily erectable
antennas, and designs less vulnerable to battle damage. He
noted developments of mirror-scanned antennas that may
provide a wide frequency range from a single antenna for
rapidly scanning surveillance and track-while-scan with data
rates competitive with phased array radars. He said the
latter has yet to prove to be a cost-effective solution for
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most radars. IIe identified the HF OTH radar as offering the
most significant advance in military capabilities. Applica-
tions cited were over-the-ocean detection of aircraft,
missiles, ships, targeting of offensive missiles and sea
state measurement. He saw the future of OTI-I to be less one
of technology than of funds and established need.
By contrast, he credited the Soviets with demonstrated
lead in deployed radars such as space-borne radar, shipboard
radar, ABM radar, and the HF OTH radar. Along with the
obvious strengths from such operational experience, he
emphasized their strengths to be in high-power transmitter
tubes, antenna design, and multiple-frequency applications;
and the mature and thriving radar industry developed through
their heavy stress on defensive systems. Emphasis on high
power, selection of frequencies, good design work, special
circuits, deployment practices, and operator training reflect
keen awareness of the need for ECCM in current Soviet radars
and likely future radar systems. He saw the US lag in these
areas as not only a disadvantage for our own design, but
adding to the difficulty of forecasting where the Soviets
are heading. Some examples such as pulse-repetition-period
modulations on a large number of radars, the function of the
Top Steer and other radars on the Kiev, the nature of Head
Lights and its role on "large ASW" ships, the limited scan
of some ABM-related radars, the role of large phased-array
radars, and the oversized radars on Bear D aircraft and
Hormone helicopter escape our understanding of the radar's
parameters or method of operation.
Mr. Longuemare and Dr. Skolnik emphasized expected
improvements in radar reliability and maintainability. Mr.
Longuemare cited 100 hours as the current mean time between
failure (MTBF) for current fire-control radars with 1000
hours technically possible but economically inappropriate.
He predicted systems of the 1990s to operate for years
without functional failure. Emphasis on such achievements
was welcomed by several military participants who characterized
current equipments as non-operable and said most manpower is
now consumed in attempting to keep it operable with subsequent
loss in readiness and training. Skepticism prevailed. The
recent figures provided in writings elsewhere by the Honorable
Norm Augustine (past Under Secretary of the Army) were cited
to the effect that while over the past 20 years the specifi-
cations for electronics equipment have increased exponentially,
the actual reliability has remained at a constant 10 hours
MTBF.
Mr. Justice presented developments in optics, not as a
competitor to radar, but with emphasis toward their eventual
use as complements. He identified the principal technology
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developments under way in electro-optical sensors as large-
scale mosaic focal planes, programmable spectral filters,
integrated on-board signal processing, high-capacity high-
efficiency cryogenic coolers, and adaptive optics. He saw
the principal application of these technologies to be in
satellite-based surveillance.
Current systems, characterized by the Defense Support
Program (DSP), are line scanners designed to see large ICBM
and SLBM boosters burning against the earth background.
Space-looking sensors have the capability o:E detecting most
satellites using their thermal emission viewed against cold
space. By contrast, these new technologies in 10 years can
provide for ICBM/SLBM booster detection and tracking with
sufficient accuracy to determine launch point within one
kilometer, tracking of MIRV bus burns, detection of high-
power aircraft take-off, detection of aircraft in supersonic
flight, detection of tactical munitions such as artillery,
tank firings, and small rocket and tactical missile launches.
Within 20 years, the increase in sensitivity will allow
detection of subsonic cruise missiles, ships, and armor
formations.
He described infrared sensors as having been limited in
performance by their scanning mode operation and the limited
number of detectors that could be employed. The technologies
here will employ millions of detectors and maximum use of
large-scale integrated processing to abandon scanning mode
operation in favor of staring or step/stari.ng modes. The
payoff is an increase in sensitivity by several orders of
magnitude. A nontrivial adjunct to the sensor and processing
technologies, if these large structures are to be used, is
the ability to measure and control disturbance in the optical
systems so that the essentially nonrigid optical elements
can be erected and maintained in individual quality and
alignment (adaptive optics and adaptive structures).
Mr. Justice placed his confidence in these projections
upon the broad program of technology investment by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency :in each of the
fields he described. The discussion brought out his concerns
as well as those of others that the increase in sensitivity
of several orders or magnitude means handling high clutter.
Emissivity and temperature variations in the land and sea
backgrounds and from cloud to land and sea interfaces produce
differences that can far exceed the target signal strength.
Staring mode operation is an inherent help in removing fixed
pattern spacial structure; yet modulation may result from
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shifting weather patterns, sensor line-of-sight. motion,
inherent temporal structure or scintillation may also exist
in the natural background. Significant signal processing
will be rec{uired to extract targets, and to date there has
been insufficient progress in measurement and understanding
the exact nature of fine-scale background clutter. Signal
processing knowledge lags hardware technologies.
Dr. Hyde brought emphasis to ocean surveillance appli-
cations. fie said the US does not expect to regain a clear
naval advantage through fleet platform expansion in the next
25 years. In fact, an increasing numerical gap against an
increasingly sophisticated naval adversary is expected. tVe
must be able to discriminate threat targets from nonthreats.
Standoff capability of Soviet submarine-launched missiles is
expected to be increased beyond 250 to 400 nautical miles
and in effectiveness with improved Soviet ocean surveillance.
The Backfire Bomber will permit very rapid delivery of long-
range antiship missiles. This overall picture provides a
backdrop against which to judge new technologies in ocean
surveillance.
The remarks here pertain to surface ocean surveillance,
AStiV is treated in the section entitled naval warfare. Dr.
Hyde said our current capability for surface surveillance is
provided by multiple passive SIGINT systems. The ~~
~ ore-
based HF/DF, along with sea-based, will be upgraded to
improve net operation and is expected to remain a major
contributor to location identification and tracking of
peacetime commercial shipping as well as Soviet ship and
aircraft combatants in peacetime. These, aided by rapid
data correlation and dissemination, will be the basis for
viable over-the-horizon targeting in the 1980s.
Technology can further these capabilities, recognizing
that ocean surveillance is multitechnology, multimission and
geographically dispersed with individual vulnerabilities to
enemy action. Bistatic intercept processing of emissions
utilizing space-based, large aperture antennas offers the
advantage of better propagation than interceptf;d emissions.
Intercept of unintentional radiation from threat radars is
suitable for target identification within local areas and
may be used over much wider areas by application of such
space-borne antennas. Standoff radar imaging through use of
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inverse synthetic aperture techniques can create a doppler-
range map which approximates the optical image and thereby
provides classification of selected surface targets with the
space-borne radars. Space-based mosaic IR may provide for
over-ocean .detection of radiant objects such as Backfire
Bombers, naval cruise missiles and surface combatants. If
these space-borne concepts prove unfeasible then high-
endurance, high-altitude aircraft offer an alternative
platform.
Land Combat
This topic perhaps received more attention than any
other throughout the colloquium. European theater conflict
was obviously the main interest, although the NATO flank
areas as well as operations in other geographical areas were
introduced from time to time. Aircraft, their survivability,
and RPVs were discussed. Ground vehicles and helicopters
were not discussed. Two large "systems" possibilities were
discussed, that of ground target location and that of air
defense. New explosives and propellants for ground, air and
naval use; and guidance for ground-launched missiles were
discussed. Lastly, the soldier's combat environment and the
significant potential for overall enhancement of combat
teams were major topics of discussion.
Mr. Hedrick described the possibilities for achieving
significant aerodynamic improvements for tactical aircraft
in subsonic, transonic, and supersonic reg mi es. Along with
the natural opportunities for smaller vehicles, less fuel
and lower cost, this will permit introduction of technology
that reduces visibility to enemy sensors without performance
degradation, carriage of weapons without performance degra-
dation, or high sustained maneuverability at all Mach numbers.
Two significant items were cited. First, the most
dramatic improvement expected over current tactical aircraft
is in the application of combined aerodynamics/propulsion
technology to achieve efficient supersonic non-afterburning
cruise for penetration. Combined with the above, the continued
survivability and utility of the tactical aircraft is attain-
able--but with increasing cost.
Second, vertical takeoff (VTO) vehicles, while continuing
to have a weight and cost penalty with respect to conventional
takeoff (CTO) contemporaries will after 1990 have a better
useful load ratio than current CTO tactical vehicles. Thus
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with the expected advances in weapons and avionics VTO
flexibility and survivability will be attainable without
real loss in firepower.
Dr. Hicks cited the technology now available for remotely-
manned vehicles, or more specifically for remotely piloted
vehicles (RPVs). He pointed out that the availa le technology
was well beyond that utilized.. Furthermore, extrapolation
of capabilities from microprocessor and sensors ghat exploit
LSI electronics, from spread-spectrum data links and compres-
sion techniques to resist jamming, and from law-cost mass
producible vehicle structures and propulsion systems that
need not be man-rated all portend the age of the tactical
RPV to be at hand. He described potential military uses as
target acquisition and designation, defense suppression
including harassment, decoys, and active countermeasures in
environments characterized by high attrition. Advantages
attributed to RPVs are those of lower cost and na human
exposure for hazardous or politically sensitive missions.
Yet, there are no clear concepts for RPV use; there are a
multitude of questions about tradeoffs with manned systems,
about reliability, and about vulnerability to jamming and
deception; the image of cumbersome field support also remains.
These block the development of current or future RPV systems.
The situation was characterized as technology looking for a
use.
The discussion brought out specific technological
achievements that could dispel these doubts. Noted was the
capability to accomplish electro-optical detection and
processing within a single chip, the effective operation of
real-time imaging using kilohertz instead of megahertz band-
widths, the reduction in long-endurance vehicle size (and
thereby in field support) to weights of less than 45 kilograms
and landing capture by net.
General Gray noted that while the applications are
exciting, the setting up, support, and camouflage of burden-
some ground equipment remains a drawback even when it involves
only three men and a truck. The direction must be toward
true mini-RPVs, that is to say man-portable.
The sense of the discussion was that although individual
efforts are under way, the case for other than few-of-a-kind
use remains unsold. It seemed highly unlikely to most that
the RPV will be exploited for tactical warfare without the
combination of convincing operational experimentation and
senior-level commitment.
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Mr. Greene described the employment of distributed s stems
for position location, navigation and guidance, an in orma-
tion processing as the significant future for the battlefield.
Distributed sensor inputs such as time-difference?of-arrival
(TDOA) for the location of electronic emissions, wide-area
surveillance and tracking NiTI radars, synthetic aperture
side-looking airborne radars (SCAR), reconnaissance aircraft
and satellites, plus special purpose ground sensors provide
multiple signature data. When these inputs are tagged with
time and location, then large computer capacity on a chip,
coupled with distributed communication networks and advanced
displays, can correlate and display these as time-ordered
pictures of a dynamic battlefield for air and ground users.
This battlefield portrayal can be used for force allocation
and battle planning, and for assignment of units.
Significantly, control of ground- and air-delivered
weapons will also be possible through association with a
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) grid. Area weapons, or
when appropriately matched terminally guided weapons, can be
employed against any target, emitting or nonemitting, which
can be located in the DME grid--by photography, by reference
to DME ground transponders, by reconnaissance aircraft or
RPV equipped with DME transponders, or by transforming MTI
or SCAR radar fixes into DME coordinates. No forward observer
will be required.
Mr. Greene noted the technology of sensors, chip com-
puters, and secure-survivable communications provides this
opportunity. The exploitation can only be achieved through
evolutionary exercise and test with fielded operational
units as the acceptance of the concepts and the evolution of
the tactics are the essential difficulties to overcome.
Mr. Tachmindji identified the future air defense threat
to include low radar cross section missiles, RPVs an decoys,
ECM, physical destruction, and the full complement of tactical
aircraft and helicopters. Radar will remain the principal
air defense sensor for warning, surveillance: and tracking.
Techniques to counter ECM will be developed and employed
which will permit clutter-free tracks or noise strobes to be
passed. The penalty from ECM is of course significant
decrease in radar range. Reduction in the radar cross
section (20 to 30-dB head-on for cruise missiles) also means
a significant decrease in radar range and the possible
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dependence on beam and tail aspect returns. Overcoming the
loss of range and response time means increased reliance
upon shorter range missiles and guns to protect the ground
targets and thus the technology that can make these afford-
able.
Technology also affords the possibility of netting the
air defense system (sensors and weapon systems) as a further
aid to overcoming the loss of range. Netting would involve
ground-based radars and airborne radars with them (Ati9ACS, F-
15, F-16) in order to fill in for ground assets as they are
destroyed. The challenge will be to make fundamental changes
across national and service lines.
He described the problem faced in avoiding attrition of
our own aircraft while performing air defense in the Central
European Theater. A hypothetical aircraft flight from
Ramstein to the Rhine sector (approximately 200 nautical
miles) may pass over territory covered by six different
National structures, 10 different service structures, 40 SAM
batteries, more than 400 surveillance elements and more than
800 short-range air defense systems (SHORADS). Each of
these systems would essentially be identifying the aircraft
autonomously, In another case, SHAPE flew an aircraft over
the British sector at an altitude of 15,000 feet; and at one
instant in time the aircraft was being interrogated by more
than 550 autonomous systems.
Except for procedural solutions, there 'is no present,
technically acceptable solution to the identification-
friend-or-foe (IFF) problem in the European Theater. A
secure communication system similar to JTIDS connecting all
aircraft and helicopters with a netted air defense, able to
pass IFF, would allow a near complete air surveillance
picture to be available at local sites. Discussants re-
mained genuinely skeptical over the possibilities for theater-
wide solution of the IFF problem,
Dr. Kury and Mr. Popolato presented the possibilities
for development beyond Triaminotrinitrobenzene ('TATB) to
highly insensitive (wooden) explosives with energy equal to
or better than our current explosives. These are potential
fill for both smart weapons and for barrage weapons (shells
and bombs) with enormous operational gain, billions in cost
savings, and wide use of industrial facilities. Their
characteristics are the unlikelihood of accidental detonation
and a significantly longer storage life than current fill.
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Production and storage facilities would be less expensive,
transportation by train or ship would be safe, storage in
large Quantities at nonremote sites (such as adjacent to the
aircraft on shipboard without fear of a Forrestal or Enterprise
accident). These explosives when coupled with related
developments in detonators, that will make them safe and
will focus warhead energy, indicate enormous gains can be
achieved.
The explosives are important, but an eQually vulnerable
element is the propellant charge. Significantly, Dr. Fair
identified the possibilities for spinoff development of low-
vulnerability chemical propellants. Analogous gains in
operational use and cost savings to those for explosives can
be expected and, coupled with thermal protective materials
for the gun bore, will offer both safe handling and greater
range.
The point was made that the segment of the US technical
community devoted to explosives is too small and too frag-
mented to achieve these ends. A further obstacle is the
weapon designer's prevalent attitude of selecting the appro-
priate explosive from the existing arsenal instead of including
explosive development into an integrated approach toward
life-cycle cost effectiveness. The significant gains from
insensitive explosives was seen as the possible catalyst
which may reenergize the community activity.
Dr. A4cDaniel began his remarks by suggesting that in
the future our ground forces must not shun limited visibility
conditions but rather use these conditions to advantage to
achieve a series of intense surprise engagements with tanks
and enemy force units. Likely conditions are darkness, fog,
rain, and/or obscuration by dust and manmade smoke. This
means new battlefield missiles.
He expects the millimeter-wave radar, with its unique
Quasiradar/optical propagation characteristics, to be widely
used for short-range command guidance. Optical, infrared,
and laser guidance is unsatisfactory under these conditions.
Millimeter-wave gains are radar-type perfox?mance where
visibility is bad, small volume similar to optical or laser
devices, and narrower beams for imaging and less interference.
Millimeter applications (70 to 300 GHz) will include target-
acquisition-and-identification radar, beam--rider missile
.guidance, semiactive homing guidance, and terminal guided
submissiles. Mr. Longuemare added additional emphasis to
this coming use of millimeter waves.
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Dr. McDaniel then noted optical developments likely to
have wide application to battlefield systems. Mosaic focal
plane arrays employing IR-charged coupled device detectors,
integrated with processing, all on the same chip will make
passible cheap, nonmechanical scanning, software-reprogrammable
correlation trackers. Development then of alignment techniques
for small-field-of-view IR image to FLIR image correlation
under varying conditions of terrain and weather will complete
the possibilities for IR passive acquisition and homing
fire-and-forget capabilities. Separately, the fiber optics
data link offers the possibility of over-the-hill missile
systems using a secure optical data link to transmit video
data from an in-flight imaging sensor to the launcher and to
transmit commands back to the missile.
Dr. McDaniel left no doubt that direct-fire weapons
were a must, but stressed the need to husband these by new
developments for attack upon second and third echelon units.
The thrust of these arguments were toward technologies which
would provide fire-and-target delivery of submu:nitions at 10
to 100 km ranges. IR, and millimeter, and microwave guidance
were all identified as possibilities for terminally guided
submunitions attack on ground surveillance, tanks, artillery,
and vehicles. Delivery by tactical aircraft, tactical
cruise missiles, helicopters, artillery, and general purpose
rockets were all suggested. He saw the pacing technology as
that of location and identification of enemy targets, and
RPVs as the likely platform for these functional tasks.
Mr. Justice drew attention to the theater application
for mosaic focal plane arrays as a natural adjunct to radars.
He suggested beyond space surveillance sensors and their use
in guidance already noted that other theater applications
are IR AWACS, air-defense penetration, interceptor search
and track, perimeter defense, hardsite defense and fleet
defense.
Discussion of land combat technologies and battle
conditions reoccurred throughout the colloquium. Precision
guided missiles (PGM) in use by ground and air units were
presumed throughout the next two decades. Survivability of
our tactical aircraft was a major topic with clear concern
expressed for development of antiradar missiles to strike
enemy defenses and concern expressed for the vulnerability
of our air bases and the protection of the aircraft thereon.
Mr. Greene suggested additional operational and maintenance
crews were needed for our aircraft so that continuous opera-
tions could be maintained. He argued that for high-investment
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items such as aircraft and tanks, crew shortages not equip-
ment shortages were likely to be the constraining factor.
The ever present concern over the adequacy of NATO aix
defenses was the subject of much discussion, but no concensus;
except to affirm that short-range systems will be key.
The importance of continuous warfare and nuclear,
biological and chemical (N.BC) warfare was recognized as
pervasive if real preparations were undertaken. Some
technologies for night vision, for forward repair, and for
protection were cited but no participant suggested that the
magnitude of change was even understood.
The infyonics concept for integral development of small
units, their equipment, and their support excited most
participants as an approach likely to maximize the exploitat-
ion of new technology and thereby gain real leverage for US
land forces. Other than the new technologies two ideas were
central. First, that the small unit be developed in an
analogous fashion as that .of a tactical aircraft instead of
the current practice of appending gadgets onto men in the
unit. Second, that the mission for these units be "engage
and defeat," not "close with and destroy the enemy by fire
and maneuver as currently written. Defeat-:not-destroy
better recognizes the operational concepts within which a
unit can best employ the new technologies--and the support
available to it--while also recognizing "close with and
destroy" is an unlikely task for a small unit facing a tank
or armed helicopter. General Gray cited the Marine Sting
Ray concept, and the ARPA Small Independent Action Force
(SIAF) as past examples of such emphases--but without the
advantages of the sensor, weapons, and processing technolo-
gies soon to be available. Several emphasized that however
appropriate the development of small units was for low-level
conflict, it was equally essential to large-force operations
of the future.
General Dickinson along with General Gray and others
cited what they saw as the tremendous potential from the new
technologies for logistics. Force projection and sustained
operations are dragged down or made possible by logistic
support--now tied up by depots and long logistic trains.
New technologies which can reduce this train are: weapons
which will hit what they are aimed at, the miniaturization
of equipment, the processing available to anticipate and
speed up response, field reprogrammable tools and equipments,
and the insensitive explosives. Dr. Bement's projection of
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battlefield "cloning" of repair parts for existing or captured
equipments added to the excitement for vast improvement in
logistics and maintenance. The radical change in maintenance
and logistics was seen as most significant because of the
freedom thereby created for combat unit. operations.
Life Sciences
Dr. Doty described the life sciences as in a state of
vigorous growth and likely to remain so throughout the
remainder of this century. He noted there have been 5,000
PhDs per year in the life sciences over the past half dozen
years in comparison with declining numbers in the physical
sciences and engineering (3400 and 2400 respectively in
1976). Thus while he could find no consensus on what dis-
coveries will be made 15 to 20 years hence, he emphasized
that the field is alive with the potential of discovery and
utility.
General Augerson characterized the US man in combat.
The soldier is no longer from the small town or farm who is
comfortable out of doors. But rather, few will have worked
with cars, fixed radios or fired a weapon as youth. For
many, all impressive technology is imported (such as Japanese
electronics) and domestic goods are subject to recall.
Typically, equipments are undersupported, and supply austere
in the extreme. If the war is in Central Europe there will
be concern about dependents, if elsewhere, a national consensus
may be lacking. Tactical dispersal, isolation in-fighting
vehicles, and disrupted communications put serious barriers
between the soldier and the supporting group with which he
identifies. The equipment imposes acoustical, acceleration,
thermal and toxic stresses close to tolerance limits.
Intense, sustained around-the-clock combat in fluid and
confusing circumstances can be expected. With no sleep
people become ineffective in about three days, units and
command sooner. Sustained military performance is possible
with three hours of sleep per day.
Regarding lethal, toxic or disabling chemicals and
drugs Dr. Doty doubted lethal agents would become any more
lethal than present nerve gases. Nonlethal toxic or disabling
agents are .somewhat different. Nevertheless for them as
well as the lethal agents he said the problems are not with
the deficiency of the chemical, but with the delivery system.
The uncertainty is in the domain which they wi].1 affect, and
the duration of their concentration (or lethality). Similarly,
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the biological warfare agents--bacteria, toxins and viruses--
already have a high specific lethality roughly comparable on
a weight basis to a fission weapon.
General Augerson said this topic could not be dismissed
so easily. The Warsaw Pact (Soviet) doctrine emphasizes the
offensive with mass breakthroughs, relentless exploitation,
replacement by units and disruption of the enemy rear. The
Pact appears to have an edge in defensive arrangements and
are better prepared therefore to exploit offensive oppor-
tunities of lethal chemicals, toxins, biological agents, and
nuclear weapons. The conventional challenges are formidable
alone; the sudden massive use of nuclear, biological, chemical
(NBC) weapons can be expected to have a disruptive psychologi-
cal effect on US and Allied forces. Earlier studies of
disasters showed no more -than 25 percent of those involved
to be promptly effective, others taking more than a day to
become active.
There has been little success in having NBC considerations
assimilated into US military doctrine and practice. The
equipment status further erodes any confidence. US personal
and collective chemical warfare protective equipment availability
has improved recently, but not up to United Kingdom standards.
Vehicles do not have engineered-in-callective protection
other than filtered air for crew masks, unlike most other
countries. The US acknowledges a retaliatory capability
with chemical weapons, but there are no US biological war-
fare..weapons. The detection kits for chemicals have sensi-
tivities above the level where effects might take place.
There is no BW detection capability. Units have radiation
counters, but they are not standard on vehicles. Limited
amounts of vaccine for certain possible BW agents exist, but
not for all the more promising candidates. Unlike several
friendly countries the US has no deployed prophylactic
systems for chemical agents. There is no deployed radiation
protection drug for US forces.
Offensively he thought attention in the future ma o
to a lications of microenca sulation.
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may be available thereby causing high biological effects
with ver low doses.
Defensively, he noted that protective material will be
more important ultimately than the medical effort. He
foresees a step improvement in current semipermeable protec-
tive clothing, perhaps incorporating neutralizing chemicals
in the fabric rather than absorbers and a more :integrated
protective system, closed or semiclosed, with a helmet that
gives full seal, good vision, and a degree of protection
against fragment, laser, and nuclear flash. Thais will be
more feasible as more personnel operate from vehicles or
shelters. Detection, through advances in instrumentation,
theoretically permit far greater sensitivity, e.g. mass
spectrometer and laser-induced fluorescence, but the problem
is the diversity of the chemical-biological threat. A full
biological system including intact animals would give more
confidence. Prophylactic drugs and vaccines will be pur-
sued--but slowly. The constraint is the penalty in impaired-
operational performance.
Dr. Doty said gradual improvement in drug-:induced
relief from pain could, with the now-serious inquiry into
the mechanism of pain, produce substantial alternatives to
analgesics. Progress in producing extended sle~:p, hibernation,
or even reversible cryogenic arrest is unlikely because so
little advance is being made in understanding and intervening
in the central nervous system in reversible ways.
General Augerson summed his remarks by noting the
adaptability of people to chemical weapons in World War I,
and indeed the ability to continue WWII operations in the
presence of high casualty densities, suggests that we could
be capable of prevailing if. such weapons are used. Today
the difficulty of detecting chemical, biological agents or
radiation without special equipment is a major psychological
problem affecting the way troops feel about such threats.
Defensive, or offensive, developments will be a waste of
money if attention is not paid to training, discipline,
indoctrination and practice on the part of military personnel
and commanders so that NBC operations are drilled to where
they are automatic and assimilated fully into military
operations.
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Dr. Doty addressed the topic of genetic engineering.
He saw genetic engineering in this century limited to ex-
ploiting the transfer of genes from higher organisms into
bacteria and viruses in order to manufacture important
products of the higher organisms, rather than the introduc-
tion of genes from one higher organism into the stem cells
of another. The latter, schemes of significantly changing
humans, seems a very long way off. He pointed out that the
combatants for this century are born or will be within the
next five years.
Dr. Doty said the apparent mismatch between the onrush
of the life sciences and the modest impact in matters relating
to national security was cause for question. There is no
counterpart in the life sciences to the R$D community in the
physical sciences constantly innovating and applying new
developments or discoveries--except in limited areas such as
the pharmaceutical industry. He thought the question serious
enough to be examined in a deeper manner than this brief
forecast permitted.
Naval Combat
Surface ships and submarines are presented in that
order in this section. Not large ships, but rather smaller
advanced surface vehicles were the subject. New possibili-
ties for undersea vehicles for combat and as work vehicles
were presented and discussed, as well as new ideas for sub-
marine operations.
Mr. Mantle presented candidates for advanced naval surface
vehicles for the year 2000. These were hyc~x?o oils, air
cus~n vehicles (ACVs), surface effect ships (SESs), small
waterplane-area twin-hulled (SWATH) ships, planing craft and
wing-in-ground effect (WIG) vehicles. Normally these are
sized in the 1,000-3,000-ton class, with the SES and SWATH
also considered as possible aircraft carriers. Several of
these offer revolutionary performance features such as calm
water speeds up to 100 knots (three times today's displacement
ships), seakeeping features that would virtually eliminate
seasickness, and impressive maneuverability. For example,
the 40- to 70-knot speed of the hydrofoil, ACVs and SESs
offer the opportunity of an ASW vehicle to sprint/listen
ahead of a convoy. The SWATH has the sea-keeping character-
istics of much larger ships and thus could serve as a mini-
carrier since two or three could be constructed for the cost
of one large carrier. However, the small high speed vehicles
cost the same as large medium speed displacement ships
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(3,000-ton displacement, 80-knot high speed ship costs as
much as a 10,000 ton 35 knot displacement ship) and thus new
roles rather than competing roles need to be explored for
such high speed platforms.
Speed, seakeeping, size and cost are the major consid-
erations. Technological opportunities exist to extend
capabilities or overcome some of the recognized shortcomings,
for example a variablegeometry foil can add a 70-knot dash
capability to a 50-knot cruise hydrofoil at no loss in
seakeeping capability, supercritical hull designs can eliminate
pounding at the bow for planing craft, and slim designs can
give the SES an ability to operate at low speeds similar to
that it possesses at high speeds.
He said introduction of these vehicles into the fleet
is unlikely to be the result of a technological. achievement,
but rather the result of experimentation with smaller and
slower versions of these vehicles. Fleet use of ACV and SES
at 2,000 to 10,000 tons, but 40 to 70 knots in lieu of 100
knots, and hydrofoils at 200 to 2,500 tons and 50 to 70
knots would provide the opportunity to test the concepts and
develop military applications. Other navies operate these
type vehicles in numbers greater than the conventional US
Navy fleet today. The Soviets have a large amphibious force
of ACVs together with over 800 hydrofoils combined in Soviet
Navy and civilian operations. Similar experience, rather
than any specific technical development, is likely to develop
a military role for these vehicles.
General Gray drew attention to the advantages these
high-speed platforms could have for a mobile force to land
1,000 miles away, overnight, in weather of our choice.
Support could be provided by platform use for VTOL, surveil-
lance, and communications. Used for a precursor force or
time-limited operation, these vehicles could offer unique
advantages.
The WIG is normally not thought of as a naval surface
vehicle, but it offers speeds of 200 knots near the surface.
Flight over calm water has been demonstrated, but flight
close to irregular seas has yet to be solved satisfactorily.
Design possibilities for reduction of catastrophic results
from wave crashes do exist, as does the possibility for
large-wave avoidance once data of local oceans conditions
are routine. Even though the technology is embryonic, the
WIG is possible by the year 2000.
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The discussion identified military uses for a large WIG
such as rapid transport for crisis teams to -remote locations,
deployable launch platform for cruise missiles, deployable
platform for air-defense surveillance and anti-air missile
launch, and deployable platform for ASW surveillance and
attack. The discussion also brought out additional possi-
bilities for the SWATH vehicle; namely, that because of its
small size and excellent sea-keeping capabilities both at
rest and under way, it has high potential as a support
vehicle for undersea work vehicle operations.
Admiral Martell characterized the differing submarine
philosophies of US and USSR operations. Our Trident program
involves maximum reliance on acoustic concealment and the
incorporation of long-range missiles to expand its effective
area of patrol by almost an order of magnitude. The US is
relying on a strategy of wide ranging concealment; the USSR,
as implied by the Delta design, relies on a strategy of
limited mobility in a protected enclave.
He noted that as a baseline we have the tec}inology in
hand today, if we should choose to apply it, to decimate the
Soviet submarine force if it deploys to the open ocean.
This capability depends on exploitation of signal intelligence
and acoustic detection over wide areas of the oceans and the
capability of ASW aircraft and attack submarines to re-
acquire acoustically and attack successfully with acoustic
torpedoes. Naturally our capability is vulnerable to such
countermeasures as quieting?of Soviet submarines and destruc-
tion of our surveillance assets, air-attack on our ASW
aircraft, and sensors, weapons and speed of Soviet active
submarines in a one-on-one encounter with US submarines.
Technology can be effective in reducing these vulner-
abilities, especially in offsetting quieted submarine designs.
The reduction in cost and complexity of computation should
permit adaptive filtering against noise, wave front discrimi-
nation, or precise compensation for offline arrays, and
practicable airborne or in-buoy beam forming of randomly
positioned buoys. A gain of 20 dB by the year 2000 appears
possible, along with the possibility of rapid replacement of
surveillance assets as they are neutralized. or destroyed.
Continued ability of the US submarine to detect Soviet
submarines locally can be achieved through hull-borne sensors
and the addition of towed arrays. Survivability of ASW
aircraft can be achieved through antiair weapons or reduction
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of on-station time to about 20 minutes for acquisition,
localization, and attack by a high degree of functional
automation and development of fast localization algorithms.
Nonacoustic techniques (including magnetic anomaly
detection, turbulent wake, and electromagnetic emissions),
along with active acoustic devices, are limited to detection
and tracking at a few to tens of miles and have little
prospect of providing wide-area surveillance. These are
applicable to localized protection of enclaves and possibly
to assist area coverage when deployed in barriers or restricted
geographic areas. The Soviets have concentrated on the
nonacoustic and the active acoustic. This does not mean
we should pursue mirror technologies, but it is incumbent
that we actively investigate these thoroughly for protection
of our submarines and against possible deterioration of our
acoustic advantage. He made clear that as the philosophy of
Soviet submarine warfare is difficult to understand so
should it be unsettling.
Discussion did touch upon the strategic, or concept and
operations of nuclear deterrence; and the tactical as it
applied in the past to operations concerned with merchant
convoys, amphibious assault groups, or carrier strike forces.
The difference in antisubmarine operations appears to be
less in any fundamental equipment and methods which might be
employed than in the time, place, and circumstances of the
encounter. The antisubmarine submarine is new acid poten-
tially a powerful antisubmarine weapon system. Inadvertent
attack on strategic submarines or "strategic assets" during
tactical operations would naturally be serious cause for
concern.
Mr. Chapman described the potential for a new type of
undersea weapon--an extended-endurance, high-performance,
extremely quiet, small submersible. One application would
be that of a self-controlled "robot" vehicle for covert
trailing of submarines, standoff ACINT/FLINT, and covert
probes of coastal and harbor defenses. A second is a 20-
ton, one-man fighter that would be launched and z?etrieved by
a larger submarine which could serve to search a broad front
and localize targets for attack by the larger submarine. A
third is that of a 60- to 100-ton, three-man interceptor
that might be based in barrier or forward areas for quick
reaction against any surge deployment of Soviet submarines.
Fourth is the obvious application to a high-speed. torpedo.
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The technologies are those of low drab; laminar flow
hydrodynamics and high efficiency closed cycle chemically
fueled power systems. The latter include the fuel cell, the
closed Brayton cycle gas turbine, the Stirling engine, the
Rankine cycle stem turbine, the lithium seawater cell, and a
variety of high energy density batteries. The benefits of
laminar flow achieving an order of magnitude less drag below
that of conventional underwater bodies are such that propul-
sion for a torpedo could be reduced from 140 horsepower to
-drive the conventional torpedo at 55 knots to less than 20
horsepower. The fundamental appeal of the small submersible
is that it could be produced in large numbers by production
line techniques. The "robot" has approximately the same
complexity as the I~1K48 torpedo--now produced at an incremental
cost of $1 million each. Allowing for greater complexity
and smaller production runs the "robot" could be produced
for $5 million a copy. Similarly, the fighter cost should
be about $30 million a copy and the interceptor about $50
million a copy.
Present application of laminar flow i:s limited to the
forward or nose portion of the torpedo--ar-d potentially the
submarine--in order to reduce the flow noise in the vicinity
of the sonar transducers. Expendable laminar flow targets
and experimental towed vehicles also exist. The extension
to these small submersibles are within grasp. The most
ambitious objective would be application to the full-size
submarine or portion thereof. This is considered well
beyond the state of the art.
Dr. Talkington described the expected increased use of
"~~'~~""'"
the undersea environment and its implications fir
systems.
Key technologies to these uses include optical fibers
with very low volume per length, which will allow totally
new innovation in cable laying and handling to fill the
needs of sea-floor transmission cables, of undersea vehicle
tethers, and of small expendable links to moving vehicles.
Signal processing techniques that will pE:rmit simulated
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km. High-energy density lithium thionyl/chloride batteries
of 300- to 500 watt/lb which will provide long endurance
power for untethered remotely controlled undersea vehicles,
manned submersibles, and remote sensors. Solid-state elec-
tronics, which will not require pressure protection, can be
used to eliminate heavy containers and the problems of
pressure leak failures.
The discussion brought out several important points
relevant to the future undersea environment. First, under-
sea technology is being rapidly advanced by commercial
interests, as well as those of the government, in support of
offshore operations and potential deep seabed exploitation.
Second, both offshore and deep-sea operations create noise
levels in the sea that may shield submarines from passive.
acoustic detection systems. And thirdly, the Law of the Sea
boundary changes restrict submerged submarines from areas of
tactical environmental or intelligence importance, and
thereby create a further need for remotely controlled unmanned
undersea vehicles operating from support platforms at safe
distances. Clearly, the available technology and the need
are likely to give strong emphasis to remotely controlled
undersea vehicles to perform a wide variety of missions.
Strategic Technologies
Strategic systems per se were not presented nor discussed.
Rattier, selected technologies for strategic systems--guidance,
cruise missile penetration aids, and hypersonic flight--were
topics of the colloquium. The implications for strategic
technologies of a non-mutual assured destruction strategy
appeared to be vast. However, time was not available to dis-
cuss these to any extent.
Dr. Shulman contrasted present-day capabilities for
guidance of ICBM, SLBM, and aircraft/cruise missiles with
the potential of future uidance technolo ies. He cited the
lack of agreement between flig t test and theoretical accura-
cies for our ICBM; and the criticality of accuracy given our
relatively low-yield warheads. He argued that there is
little reason to expect significant improvements from today
in all-inertial accuracies, and thus other techniques must be
employed.
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Radio systems used as an aid to the basic missile
inertial guidance can remove initial condition errors and to
a large extent reduce dependence on the performance of the
inertial system. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a
radio guidance aid that differs from 1960 systems only in
that the electromagnetic signals originate from satellites
rather than from ground stations. A dedicated, inverted GPS
system with transmitters placed at random in the northern
half of the US would be less vulnerable to countermeasures
or to direct attack. CEPS through such radio aids can be
reduced to 350 feet for the ICBM. Similar advantage can
accrue to SLBM and aircraft--since the limitations of
initial conditions are removed.
This gain is significant. Further CEP reductions
necessitate maneuverable reentry vehicles and terminal
guidance where the possibility exists to bring CEPS to below
100 feet, but at a cost in weight and volume available for
the warhead and at a further cost of increased complexity
and possibly reduced reliability. He noted the USSR has a
lead over the US today in ICBM PK, achieved by larger
weapon yield with less accurate missile guidance.
Dr. Vander Stoep followed with description of correlation
techni ues for cruise missile terminal homing--that is
gui ance ased on comparisons of ground signatures sensed
over wide areas with stored replicas of t}Le se signatures.
He described three techniques: TERCOM, which uses terrain
height variations measured by radar altimeter; synthetic
aperture radar (SAR), which uses high contrast radar features;
and range measurements made of pre-selectE;d fix sites.
Inertial navigation systems perform primary guidance between
correlation updates. CEPS of 10 to a few tens of feet are
projected for cruise missile applications,.
He identified the key technology as maps prepared with
high accuracy and signature fidelity with errors no greater
than 5 feet--and accomplished in coordination with correlation
algorithms and sensor developments. Deve:Lopments of milli-
meter wave, infrared and optical frequency applications are
likely to have high payoff. He considered current inertial
navigation systems to be adequate for use with the correlation
systems, but reduction in their cost could be of major
importance.
Mr. Nye surveyed several technological possibilities
for future cruise missile developments. Current Soviet air
defenses are estimated to }lave a marginal intercept capability
against today's cruise missiles. Modifications and additions
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to the Soviet surveillance, SAKI, and interceptor systems
over the next 10- to 20 years could significantly change
this picture. Thus he focused on those technolo ies important
for cruise missile enetration and not on t ose a~ range,
accuracy or warhea s.
Penetration by evasive maneuvering is not compatible
with cruise performance; ECM and decoys heavily penalize the
missile with higher signatures and loss of usable volume;
hig}i supersonic/hypersonic speeds have a high co~;t and cause
significant loss of range. More positively, a supersonic
final stage might be employed to carry the warhead through
the terminal defenses; penetration at attitudes of 200 feet
is a partial answer; and on-board passive threat warning
sensors can permit individual missiles to curcumnavigate
defense zones. He said the technology which offers maximum
leverage are those which reduce observables, (IR, radar,
visual, and acoustic) as the cruise missile is particularly
suited to this design.
Radar signatures of one-thousandth of a square meter
are foreseen with designs employing flush inlets, blended
body, and liberal use of radar absorber in the edges.
Considerable IR reduction can be accomplished through cooling
and shielding of the engine, although even heated area
surfaces may be significant sources to advanced mosaic IR
sensors. Critical to signature choices are specifics of
defense systems, experiments and models of suppression
results, and test ranges capable of evaluating real effec-
tiveness.
The discussion brought out counterviewpoints, e.g. de-
scriptions of potential radar capabilities that might be a
match for even these low-observable vehicles. Dr. Skolnik
noted that radars can see birds and that's the size object
being described, the problem is fundamentally one of response
time to intercept. He saw more problem in radar detection
and track of a high speed (Mach 3 to 4) missile. Nevertheless
a cruise vehicle "invisible" within defensive weapon x?esponse
time was acknowledged to be a real possibility for the
future .
Concern over real versus analytically determined pene-
tration possibilities brought the discussion to test ranges.
Test ranges exist, however, these were considered inadequate
to develop the data and to examine the penetration possibilities
and problems applicable to the next generation of cruise
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missiles. Little data exist for low cross section operations
in a multipath environment. Exercises are canned, unlike
true two-sided games where unrecognized problems can be
identified. Range development and use was flagged for
attention.
Arguments were ,nade in favor of supersonic speed as a
necessary complement to low observability in order to ensure
the defensive system could not be responsive. Supersonic
and hypersonic speeds for cruise missiles were discussed.
Speeds of Mach 2 to 3 coupled with low-observable designs
were advocated for solution to penetration requirements, as
were speeds of Mach 4 to 6 even without low-observable
design. The penalties of cost and range were recognized to
be sizable. Furthermore, design for flight at speeds above
Mach 4 would clearly require a propulsion and materials
technology program not now under way. Thus while the possi-
bilities exist for supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles
within the next 10 to 20 years, most doubled this to be a
likely development.
The military uses of manned h ersonic flight were
presented by Mr. Combs to be as a ollow-an to the SR-71
reconnaissance mission during both crisis and postattack, as
a launch platform for supersonic and/or hypersonic maneuver-
ing cruise missiles, and as a launch platform for anti-
satellite weapons. Argument was presented that the SR-71 at
Mach 3.2 with penetration aids may not be survivable against
Soviet defenses beyond the early 1980s, bL~t that an attain-
able vehicle for flight at Mach 4.5 could be survivable in
this mission into the 1990s.
Temperature limits and propulsion designs currently
limit growth of a manned vehicle beyond Mach 4.5. Thus a
focused technology development program was seen as necessary
for attainment of these higher speeds.
Attitudes expressed in discussions were passive toward
technical feasibility and military utility. A hypersonic
flight vehicle was expected to be extremely high cost.
Yet, until there is a clear commitment of military need, no
one knows if the cost would be acceptable or non-acceptable.
Development of a next generation hypersonic vehicle awaits
resolution of these questions.
Space Systems
Dr. Rechtin presented the surprise-free technological
future of space systems as the continued evolution by both
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countries toward increased real-time military support for
strategic and tactical weapons systems--that is, surveillance,
targeting, cuing, navigation, communications, command and
control. This includes optical surveillance of strategic
and tactical systems as described by Mr. Justice; includes
the global positioning system described by Dr. Shulman, as
well as tactical position location in a jamming environment;
and includes communications for battlefield or naval sensor
readout, RPV control, and trooper communications.
This means both the US and the USSR will become increas-
ingly concerned about space access and the consequent needs
for active and passive defense against both physical and
electronic attack. He made the point that survivability for
space assets is probably as achievable as for anything else,
if not greater.
Passive defense measures are already being implemented
by the US and USSR. Examples are nuclear and laser hardening,
protection or elimination of solar cells, encrypi:ed jam-
resistant commands and .communications, spare satellites in
orbit, provisions for satellite maneuvering, tracking of all
potentially threatening satellites, attack-warning systems,
proliferation of ground command stations, satellite cross-
links, and possibly silo-launched space boosters. By 2000,
active defense systems of the US and USSR could include
ground-based lasers for low-altitude kill, both fly-by and
positioned space-borne lasers for satellite kill, and space
borne lasers for selective attack upon earth stations.
Ground or space-borne beam weapons are considered a much
more distant possibility, as is a system of large laser
weapons capable of rapid multitarget kills.
He described several developments which may signifi-
cantly influence space systems--for example, the importance
very large structures can have in space by 2000. They can
provide far the equivalent of an Ati9ACS or BMEWS in space for
radar detection and track of aircraft, cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles and space objects. They can provide for
operation of multistatic detection radar using space-borne
passive reflector arrays. They can provide for spaceborne
jamming of tactical ground radars and communications. They
can provide localized illumination of night battlefields
through reflection of sunlight. Developments in materials,
structures, and cheap transport are needed to realize these
potentials.
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He said the role of military man in space is specula-
tive at this time; e.g. survivable command-control, special
strike/reconnaissance, or as adaptable surveillance/communi-
cations center. The role in the 1980s and 1990s is probably
limited to research, development and support functions based
on the use of the space shuttle.
Dr. Weiss described laser propulsion. Laser propulsion
is a thermal rocket system that uses beamed energy to heat a
low molecular weight propellant, such as water vapor and
nitrogen. The amount of power provided would no longer be
limited by the size or efficiency of the onboard power
supply. Power is dependent upon the ability to focus and
contain energy supplied by the remote source. He projects
for laser power, lOMW in the early 1980s, 100MW by 1990, and
hundreds of megawatts to gigawatts available before the year
2000.
The potential military applications of laser propulsion
are derived from either unique or cost-ef:Eective capabilities.
A megawatt laser propulsion system could :Launch an IRBM
every 1.5 minutes. A 1,000 Mw system cou:Ld make three ICBM
launches per minute--100 launches in the flight time of a
missile. The 100 Mw system could launch 75 400-kg satellites
in one day--to give highly redundant communications or
hundreds and thousands of minisatellites or decoys as counter-
measure to the ASAT threat. Lastly, a 100 Mw system could
launch 10 million kg into orbit each year, making feasible
construction of large space structures such as space defense
systems and solar power satellites, for power transmission
or defensive purposes.
He noted research and development is needed in beam
propagation, extreme pointing and tracking requirements, the
problems of maximum range imposed by diffraction optics,
large scale optical systems, and large electrical power
sources. However, most of the capabilities of this radically
different propulsion technique are expected to be demonstrated
on some scale in the next two decades, with one or two
prototype developments. He considered the prototype develop-
ment equally likely in the US and USSR.
The completeness of the space systems review precluded
further discussion of the systems and their applications.
However, several did note that while workable survivability
may be attainable it would likely involvE; severe trade-off
of otherwise desirable performance and thus might not receive
the obvious emphasis placed upon survivability by Dr. Rechtin.
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The number of Soviet launches and the 4-to-1 launch
rate in comparison with the US were discussed. Dr. Rechtin
presumed for his projection a decrease in Soviet launches
based on the assumption that the Soviets would achieve
greater on-orbit reliability. This view was not contested,
but some suggested that the Soviets do gain a military
advantage through their capabilities for frequent launches.
The discussion contrasted the ready market for tech-
nologies in space systems with the problems of exploiting
technology in other military equipment acquisitions.
Technology as the driver, user dedication, and numerous
other differences were all offered as explanations of the
contrast. However, it was noted that as space systems are
used more extensively in applications such as ocean and
battlefield surveillance, the problems of integrating the
multiple assets and the multiple users may well face assimi-
lation difficulties not unlike those faced in other acquisitions.
Materials/Physical Sciences
Materials science is to a considerable degree driven by
need. Thus extrapolation into the future can proceed
with assurance that many gains are thereby recognized. By
contrast, quantum step progress is more likely from opportunity
driven research. These presentations and discussions of
materials, and even more those of geophysics and ocean
science, should be examined for the opportunities they may
create.
Dr. Laudise reviewed electronics materials research.
He noted that in almost all aspects t e US is leading with
strongest competition usually from Japan, sometimes from
Western Europe, and with rare serious competition from
Eastern countries. Silicon will remain the mainstay of
electronics over the foreseeable future.
The future of computers and microprocessors (diiscussed
earlier) depends on progressing from large scale integration
(LSI) to very large scale integration (VLSI). He said opti-
cal or x-ray exposure through an electron beam mask and
eventually direct electron beam exposure should provide for
this scale of integration, but at likely higher cost.
Magnetic bubble memories, which are expected to entail fewer
process steps and thus fewer fabrication failures, may
eventually provide a cheaper alternative.
r He noted that optical fibers were already at a high
state of development. More recently the emphasis in research
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and development is on highly reliable optical sources beyond
one-micron wavelengths. From this, low-loss optical communi-
cation systems are likely in the 1980s with concomitant
development toward optical integrated circuits. He believes
the move from discretes to integrated optics will not take
as long as it did from the transistor to integrated electronic
circuits.
Basically he described preparation activities as having
become more sophisticated. Molecular beam epitaxy (MBE)
allows the preparation of almost monoatomic layers of programmed
composition. Thus the possibilities for nonequilibrium
structures and materials previously unobtainable are manifest.
The detectors for the space and tactical surveillance described
by Mr. Justice are one obviously important application.
Dr. Bement addressed the matter
of otYier
materials, but
first noted that optical sensors and
dipiasic
composite
materials offer, as undersea acoustic
sensors,
the potential
of order-of-magnitude improvements in
acoustic
response and
greatly extended depths of application. Even such currently
available materials as fiber optic hydrophones can provide
sensitivities far greater than required for underwater use.
He then described structural requirements of large
space optics, where adaptive servo-activators may compensate
for otherwise unacceptable large deflections; but where the
availability of low-expansion high-stiffness optical materials
may reduce these numbers and thereby simplify t}iis system.
He cited carbon-graphite composites, ceramic composites, and
glass-matrix composites as possibilities to satisfy these
materials needs. Similarly, metal matrix composites are
likely to serve the needs of the large-scale deployable and
erectable space structures of the future such as the large
radar antennas.
Dr. Bement drew attention to other materials developments,
especially those of basic power systems. He cited the
completed test of an all-ceramic uncoded turbine rotor
operating at 2,500?F inlet temperature, which potentially
could provide a fuel savings of 8 to 28 percent in cruise
missile gas turbine applications. Moreover the ceramic
materials used to date do not even represent near-term
improvements in the state-of-the-art. He 'noted that for
electrical machinery the system for collection of current
dominates the geometry and size of new equipments. He cited
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developments of monolithic brush collectors for high power
density electrical machinery, which will allow conventionally
cooled machines to match superconducting machines in size
and weight. He cited materials impact upon design simplifi-
cation, or changes not easily seen, such as the increase in
wear-life of splines to the point where they never need to
be replaced in ship or submarine.
Dr. Kear gave an overview of developments, old and new,
in laser materials rocessin technology. Laser welding
alrea y as many applications. The welding of ring frames
to hull sections alone shows the possibility of reduction of
over 60,000 man-hours and thus $1 million per submarine.
Laserglazing (surface melting followed by rapid solidi-
fication) is a relatively new technology with many possibilities.
Bulk structures such as discs and drum rotors can be built
up incrementally by laserglazing one thin layer on another.
This gains a completely homogeneous, flaw-free structural
part, is natural for computer control and near-net shape
bodies, and can be combined with thermo-mechanical treatment
to give material microstructures otherwise unattainable.
In-situ surface treatment to attain high temperature-
corrosion resistance as well as shock hardening to improve
fatigue properties are other examples. Dr. Bement added
that laser treatment of aluminum can gain 30 to 40 percent
in strength and 100?C in temperature use--so it is almost a
new metal. Ultimately, Dr. Kear believes pulse annealing,
ion-implantation, and laserglazing will develop .into an
integrated new technology for the surface treatment of
materials with a wide range of structural and electronic
applications.
Discussion brought out the possibilities four field use
of laser welding (already used for pipelines) and laserglazing
surface treatment. These were seen to be of great potential
for field maintenance. Dr. Bement added further to field
possibilities. He described the possibilities for in-field
"cloning" from polymers or steel of replacement parts for
existing or captured equipments. Three dimensional photography
with autodigitalization would control casting of parts for
automatic weapons, aircraft/missile or orthopedic needs. He
noted this application might be put to intelligence purposes
since similar photos of enemy equipment could be put onto
digital tape for later reproduction.
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Dr. Anderson stated eo h sics is central to a few
specialized military problems, suc as missile guidance
(gravity field) and weapons testing monitoring (seismology),
but is also involved in such general problems as weather
forecasting and control and submarine navigation, detection,
and evasion. He emphasized the advances expected. in geodetic
instrumentation and technology including the multiple satellite
sources. The results will show in missile accuracies, pre-
cision updating of ship and aircraft inertial systems, and
so on. He believes DOD geodetic self-reliance can be expected
to increase and argued for more interaction with others to
pass on the gains in knowledge.
Separately, he identified a number of related develop-
ments of importance to national security but perhaps only
indirectly to military capabilities. The direct detection
of hydrocarbon resources by shear wave techniques should be
industrial practice during the 1980s; and thereby the possi-
bilities for the cheap discovery and early exploitation of
these resources. The routine prediction of major earthquakes
will make possible either disaster preparation or, the
opportunity for covertly testing nuclear weapons. Routine
six- to 10-day weather forecasts will be as good as today's
two- to three-day forecasts; and along with a more basic
understanding of weather modification, may come the tech-
nology to increase precipitation. Lastly, he noted materials
are now being fabricated at one to 10 megabar pressures,
which opens the possibilities that these new materials will
possess unique physical and electrical properties.
Dr. Wunsch cited two major areas where ocean science
relates to national security: the knowledge of the fluff
ocean on the acoustic and operational environment of-the
Navy, and knowledge of the relationship between the ocean
and possible climatic changes. He emphasized the extent to
which we are now ignorant of the ocean as compared to the
atmosphere. Now, a very few observations and a rudimentary
knowledge of physics form our knowledge, but in 20 years he
expects a reporting network much like now exists for the
atmosphere and a real understanding of ocean weather and
climates. Acoustic sounding, satellites, and advances in
computer techniques will make this possible.
He predicted that in 20 years we
will
have the capability
for large-scale global monitoring of
ocean
weather systems
with a forecast ability equivalent to
what
is available
today for the atmosphere. This will
have
an enormous
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impact on vessel routing, ASW (acoustic propagation and
tracking) capabilities, tactics, and upon weather-climate
forecasts. We will also have greater understanding of the
role of ocean circulation in climate change. It is now
believed. the ocean carries as much heat poleward from the
equator as does the atmosphere, but where and by what mechanism?
Clearly with this magnitude, the ocean plays a major role in
regional and global climate flux. The understanding may
enable the forecast of major changes far enough in advance
to alleviate catastrophic outcomes.
Energy Weapons A plications
Two items were presented and discussed as unique energy
weapons applications: namely, the charged particle beam and
the electromagnetic gun. Both offer revolutionary concepts
as killing devices. A third unique energy item, that of
laser propulsion, is contained in the discussion of space
systems.
Mr. Kassel detailed the applications for particle beams
or more specifically charged particle beams (CPB), of high
currents and high energies an related these to research and
development under way today. Particle beam devices may pro-
vide rapid delivery of high energy at high density with
considerable precision either in the form of material par-
ticles (electrons, protons, heavy ions, or neutral atoms) or
after conversion as photons (x-ray, infrared, or microwave
radiation). A number of government and private laboratories
are designing and building large one-of-a-kind CPB accele-
rators and associated equipment intended for a variety of
scientific and technological applications. CPB devices are
a possible alternative to lasers in pellet fusion research
and are unique as tools in the simulation of nuclear weapons
effects and in radiography for nuclear weapons research.
The CPB as a weapon has the potential of superceding
mechanical systems limited by inertia, e.g. response time of
milliseconds instead of seconds. However, he emphasized
that critical deficiencies in the technology exist. These
are switches capable of handling ultra-high-power pulses in
nanoseconds; beam stability within the accelerator; and
external beam conditioning, aiming, propagation and position
sensing. These are serious enough to cast doubt on the
basic technical practicality, yet are feasible :in principle.
Experimental machines capable of producing energy levels of
operational weapons (e.g. 50 MeV) are needed to resolve the
questions. Dr. Davis noted a 100-MeV facility :is in our R~,D
program.
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Other questions or needs of course exist. Beam inter-
action with the target is also unknown although simulated.
The size and weight of the accelerator system must be reduced
significantly for many military applications.
He cited possible nonweapon applications of CPB devices.
An electronic countermeasure system using 'the radiation cone
effects of an electron beam is possible and would require
minimal beam length and aiming accuracy. A nonaimed beam
weapon designed to produce a large radiation dose over a
tactical area is possible and would not require propagation
of the beam in air when used at short ranges. A Soviet has
advocated the use of high-power beams in pipes as the most
efficient means of long-distance transmission of electrical
power. Soviet experiments have used electron beams to test
brittle destruction of materials, during which they found
that qualitatively different physical processes take place
in materials--leading to possibilities for far-reaching phe-
nomena in solid-state technology. Some US researchers have
proposed high-power electron beams as a high-speed rock
drill.
The Navy Chair-Heritage program was described during
discussions. The objective is an aimed short-range (1 to 4
km) CPB weapon projected in air. Mr. Kassel described the
energy to be delivered in a single ZO nanosecond pulse as
equivalent to that delivered to the target by the 105 mm
tank-gun round. Some questioned the beam-target interaction
and the ease of countering the beam. He said enhanced
effects such as removal of material well beyond the beam
radius is expected as well as collective effects within the
material, e.g. secondary electrons. If this is correct then
the CPB can defeat any kind of missile hardening measure
such as a high-Z shield.
Some discussion centered on what we know of Soviet
work. Mr. Kassel said the Soviets do have a major pulse
power program. Furthermore, the Soviet work is strong in
exactly those areas needed for weapons application--whereas
US work to date has not been pointed toward military appli-
cations. Thus while we can surmise the Soviets have a
military program we do not know what type of program it may
be, nor do we know what observables in the atmosphere we
should expect to see.
Dr. Fair initially addressed chemical propellants and
the gains from associated work on insensitive explosives
(see Kury), liquid propellants, and from capitalizing on
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advances in fiber optics and laser technologies for ignition
systems. However, the potential for more than evolutionary
change he identified with the electromagnetic gun. The
concept would employ a projectile wit~i a magnetic coil
propelled out a tube by a linear electric motor. A proto-
type exists. The "Mass Driver" was constructed by an instruc-
tor and students at MIT to demonstrate outer space transport,
but has about one-tenth the energy of a small mortar. The
technology exists to undertake a moderately scaled gun
version.
He cited the potential. advantages of an electromagnetic
gun. Some of these are precise control of projectile energy;
elimination of gun tube wear, flash, smoke, etc.; rapid
fire; ease of supply; and no propellant charge, no propellant
surveillance, etc. The propulsion could be provided entirely
electromagnetically or in a hybrid system where some electro-
magnetic energy is used as an adjustment--with different
degrees of these advantages gained.
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TABLE OF PROJECTIONS
This table presents in bullet form the projections from
the prior pages of this Technological Futures section.
Data Processors
? Million bit memory chip by late 1980s.
? 100 x cost reduction by late 80s.
? 1-5 MIPS @ $50-100 by late 80s.
? Entire systems integrated on chip in 1990s.
? Single processor machines to 300 MIPS by 2000.
? But multiprocessors for 1000 MIPS-application to
weather, oceans, differential equation calculations.
? Input-Output will not advance much by 2000, except
direct sensor-processor interface.
? Distributed processing and fiber optic. links common-
place.
? Microprocessors with piecemeal updating will eliminate
technological obsolescence for defense systems.
? Monitoring execution of a plan.
? Software will be thrown away.
Surveillance
? Radar to remain principal surveillance sensor.
? Non-cooperative radar IFF for air targets--but system
may not be practical.
? SAR imagery of terrain and targets tactically prevalent.
? Concentration on improvement of operator-display
interface.
? Radar systems of 1990s to operate for years without
functional failure.
? Solid state phased-array power increased 100 x by 2000.
? Coordinated use of same hardware for radar, jammer, and
secure data link.
? Microwave digital processing.
? Bi-static radar value questionable.
? Mirror scanned antennas in lieu of phased array.
? OTH radar for over water detections and sea state
measurement.
? Optical scanning replaced by staring mode operation.
? Optical focal plane arrays (with processing), pro-
grammable spectral filters, and adaptive optics will
make possible the spaceborne detection of subsonic
aircraft and small missiles, ships, and armor formations
by 2000.
50
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? Radar satellite in mid-80s will be capable of surface
ship detection, but not classification, and transmission
directly to the tactical requestor.
? OTH targeting of surface ships in 80s.
Land Combat
? Tactical aircraft to improve considerably :in all speed
ranges--with potential for tradeoff with payload, low
observable design, or maneuverability.
? VTOL range-payload performance to be as good in 1990s
as current CTOL.
? Man portable mini-RPVs will be future direction if use
is to be widespread. Needs convincing operational
experience plus senior level commitment.
? Multisensor integration far battlefield target picture.
? No forward observers required for DME directed missions.
? Netted air defense system of both air and ground radars.
? No theater IFF solution in sight.
? Air defense to rely on short range missiles and guns.
? Insensitive explosives and propellants wi1:1 remove
safety constraints.
? Short-range missiles to use millimeter wave guidance to
gain night/bad weather operation.
? Focal plane IR correlation trackers to be used in fire
and forget indirect-fire sub-munitions delivery.
? Continuous operations is the design problem.
? Infyonics concept to maximize exploitation of new tech-
nology.
? Radical change in logistics is biggest gain.
Life Sciences
? Little success in assimilation of NBC considerations in
US doctrine and practice contrasts with emphasis given
by USSR.
? Microencapsulation for dispensing CBW agents.
? Defensively, protective material more important than
medical effort--step improvement in semipermeable pro-
tective clothing.
? Slow progress in prophylactic drugs and pain relievers.
? Genetic engineering not applicable to combatants in
this century.
Naval Combat
? ACV, SES and SWATH surface vehicles depend upon a
concept of employment, not technological achievement.
? WIG possible by year 2000 as transport, missile launch
platform and surveillance platform.
? Acoustic surveillance gain of 20dB by 2000..
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? Rapid replaceable arrays and random buoys to reduce
vulnerability of destroyed assets.
? Non-acoustic and active acoustic undersea search tech-
niques limited to few tens of miles--applicable to
enclaves and barrier operations.
? Anti-submarine submarine new and powerful anti-submarine
weapon system.
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interceptor and covert submarines.
? Fiber optic undersea links in wide use.
? Lithium 300-500 watt/lb batteries in undersea applications.
? Undersea work vehicles to have wide use.
? Noise levels from commercial undersea and offshore
exploitation shield submarines from passive acoustic
surveillance.
Strategic Technologies
? Little improvement in all-inertial guidance.
? Global Position Satellites (GPS) or ground based inverted
GPS will remove initial condition launch errors.
? Terminal guidance versus reduced throw weight and
reliability a questionable tradeoff.
? Cruise missile CEPS of ten feet using correlation guid-
ance, if maps can be made to five feet accuracy.
? Cruise missile radar cross-sections of :LO square centi-
meters.
? Cruise missiles in sustained supersonic/hypersonic
flight unlikely because of range penalty.
? No manned flight beyond Mach 4.5 without technology
program to overcome temperature and propulsion limits.
Space Systems
? Space based support systems will acquire passive and
active defense against physical and electronic attack.
? Space lasers likely, beam weapon not likely.
? Role for military man in space limited 'to research,
development and support.
? Large structures in space.
? Laser propulsion to provide for rapid expansion of
missile and space vehicle launches.
Materials and Physical Sciences
? Silicon to remain mainstay of electronics.
? X-ray and electron beam masking and exposure commonplace.
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? Optical fiber and integrated optics commonplace.
? Molecular Beam Epitaxy to provide near-monolayers of
programmed composition.
? Low expansion, high stiffness composite materials for
large space structures.
? Monolithic brushes reduce size and weight of convention-
ally cooled electrical machines to that of supercooled
machines.
? Wearlife of submarine and ship splines increased to
point where they do not need replacement.
? Infield cloning from polymers or steel or replacement
parts for existing or captured equipments.
? Laser glazing and machining to produce flaw free parts.
? Geodetic accuracies to improve steadily.
? Routine earthquake prediction facilitates disaster
avoidance or covert nuclear test.
? Weather forecasts for 6-10 days as good as today's 2-3
day forecasts.
? Ocean weather forecasting as goad as present atmospheric
weather forecasting.
Energy Weapons Applications
? Charged Particle Beams, if critical technological
advances prove possible.
? Electromagnetic guns will not have today's wear and
signature problems.
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STRATEGY AND TECHNOLOGY
The form future conflict may take is naturally an
important consideration in determining which technologies
are militarily significant. Military requirements and
planning are frequently labeled as "refighting the last
war." Thus conflict considerations were introduced on the
basis of their plausibility without regard to compliance
with mainstream forces planning.
Even then, Dr. Stevens noted that too much of past
analysis has been constrained by overattention .to plausi-
bility. In response, he suggested that the unknowns of the
future, such as those sampled in these discussions, argue
for broad capabilities in US forces.
Ideally, these sessions would have characterized the
environment to be faced. Instead the materials discussed
and recorded represent pieces for consideration, not a full
treatment. However incomplete, they do reflect significant
views of prime considerations far future needs. A few
examples were offered of how technical priorities might be
altered, but much fuller treatment is obviously required.
Overview
Mr. Kahn in his overview of strategy and technology
stated that the level of strategic debate in the US today is
at least an order of magnitude lower than 15 years ago. He
particularly noted US focus on strategic forces as if they
were only to respond to an out-of-the-blue attack upon the
US. Similarly, we think about NATO forces as if the Warsaw
Pact were expected at any day to grab Europe. He argued
that most people consider these the least likely, and they
are corxect; but our planning and force choices have yet to
catch up.
He expressed no doubt that the USSR would like to
control the world, but stressed that while the Soviets may
believe it necessary to push history in their direction they
are unlikely to rush it. IIe saw the Soviets' emphasis on
strength as very basic. First, if a crisis does occur and
they are strong, the other side will back down. Second, if
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they overextend and get into trouble, their large superior-
ity will rescue them. And third, Pinlandization of Europe
is possible through recognition of Soviet superiority.
These indeed are cause for us to be concerned over their
strength; but we need fresh views in our response, especially
as we view the future.
He argued that war, if it is to come about will not be
calculated, nor out of the blue, but rather from a period of
tension, with accidents leading to escalation. He cited two
critical considerations for examination of strai:egic forces;
namely, what is our goal at the end of the war and what is
the importance of evacuation.
He thought for conventional war the most important
consideration was the recognition that~a buildup of tensions,
perhaps even "phony war," would precede major hostilities;
and thus a period for mobilization would exist. His second
point about conventional war was the need to look at our
best systems differently--one side forgets somei~hing, the
winner does not; all fortresses are invulnerable before the
attack, only some are found to be so after the attack.
Dr. Rechtin summarized the sober view toward NATO
warfare taken away by most. He said many past questions and
dilemmas about Soviet directions had been clarified. The
Soviets appear more predictable than we had thought.
The Soviets are thinking about World War II techno-
logically extended; that is, continuous-nuclear-?biological-
chemical warfare. This is what they are set up to do. The
message has yet to be passed to US technologists and systems
designers, but it seems clear that we must responsibly
design to meet this threat.
Non-Mutual Assured Destruction
Dr. Durbin said the contingency of massive Soviet
attack out of the blue against the US, followed by immediate
and massive US retaliation has been the cornerstone of US
planning-for almost three decades. Deterrence is attributed
to this posture of mutual assured destruction (MAD) or
balance of terror, as both populations are thereby held
hostage. Each offense must be overwhelming and the defense
emasculated. This situation may in fact be the correct one
for force sizing and decisions on alert posture; but it is
not the only situation possible and in fact is riot even the
most plausible.
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Limited selective or controlled use of central strategic
nuclear weapons has been publicly discussed. in the United
States since 1974. Yet it is unlikely that. either the US or
the USSR can obtain any meaningful unilateral advantage
through limited use of nuclear weapons against homelands.
Use of these weapons in a local theater, especially on the
Soviet periphery, is likely to be met in-ki.nd in the theater.
Either situation is likely to result in the rapid search for
de-escalation and termination, with concurrent concern for
alert and monitoring.
The threat to use tactical nuclear forces to back up
inadequate conventional forces in Europe has been the basis
of the NATO posture for the same three decades. The rela-
tionship of these forces to those of the strategic forces
has never been explicit even before the current concerns
over the SS-20, cruise missiles and Backfire Bomber. Further-
more, how does the survivability of these theater forces,
their mix, and their use after a massive exchange relate to
the MAD concept?
Lastly, what is the outcome of a massive nuclear war
likely to be? An examination of the capability for a Soviet
first-strike counterforce shows it to be formidable, although
not likely decisive. Examination of survivability and re-
covery of population, industry, and the economy presents
numerous unknowns, but certainly indicates survival of and
recovery from massive nuclear war to be realistic. The
civil defense, hardening, and defensive measures for Soviet
forces indicates they hold the view that nuclear war is
survivable. Then, what is the possibility of continued
hostilities and the role of other countries? What are the
mix of weapons and forces left, the nature and capabilities
of the surviving leadership, the degree of control over
remaining forces, the available communications, intelligence
and reconnaissance, and what is required t.o restore deterrence
after nuclear weapons have once been used massively?
The limited use?of nuclear weapons, the theater-war
relationships and the Soviet recovery, civil defense, and
counterforce capability argue that the MAD strategy is
insufficient for deterrence. A broader perspective, which
ensures the existence of a nuclear war-fighting capability
vis-a-vis the USSR, may evolve as the determinant for stra-
tegic forces. This would provide a deterrence posture more
consistent with views held by the USSR--and thus more likely
to deter. The measures for strategic forces utility would
shift. Correlation guidance for cruise missiles attacking a
badly damaged nation would be examined. 1?ven greater emphasis
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would be given to survivability. New emphasis would be
given to holding capability, reconstitutability, reload, re-
targeting, and reconnaissance. The old concept of an emas-
culated defense might be replaced with the possibilities for
effective defense from space against ballistic missile
attack.
There was some discussion of the technology emphasis
such a shift in posture might engender. The capability for
rapid reprogramming, relaunch, and replacement of space
assets was noted to be of obvious importance. T'he availability
of a hypersonic reconnaissance vehicle was noted as another
possible need.
Woz?ld of Nuclear Proliferation
Mr. Rowen drew upon his prior writings "Life in a
Nuclear Crowd" to describe the likely spread of nuclear
weapons. He noted that despite a good deal of rhetoric
justifying national nuclear weapons programs, few of the
countries with the capacity to make them have done so. Two
developments now promise fundamental changes: one is growth
in civilian nuclear programs and therefore an increased
capacity to acquire nuclear weapons cheaply and rapidly; the
other is a weakening of confidence in American guarantees of
protection of allies.
By 1985 about 40 countries will have enough. fissile
material to make three bombs or more; almost as many are
likely to have enough fissile material for 30 to 60 weapons
or more. The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 may have been
.the crucial "triggering" event between a linear growth in
nuclear weapons acquisition, and an exponential future. The
prospect that many countries will acquire weapons must be
taken seriously, as must the short leadtime within which
these weapons can be acquired.
Most analysis of nuclear stability is based upon a
model of the US-USSR relationship, with exclusive concentra-
tion by the two great powers on deterring attack on each
other's homelands. The possession of nuclear weapons by
third countries is likely to bring about changes such as
restraint by a large power in challenging what might be
construed by the smaller as its vital interests. Between
small powers, the relationships are likely to change with a
race to acquire weapons first, and with support provided by
the large countries in technology, in the reduction of
forces vulnerability, in replacement of nuclear forces
destroyed or in direct use of nuclear weapons against an
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ally's adversary. The nuclear forces of small nations will
be small, probably without reliable systems to warn of enemy
attack, and perhaps weak in safeguards against unauthorized
actions by those in the chain of command, and prone to acci-
dents and mistakes. The large powers will possess many more
resources for information gathering, offensive capabilities,
command and control, civil defenses, antimissile and air de-
fenses, etc. as well as the capacity to rapidly transfer
technologies or information which could rapidly make opposing
forces vulnerable or reduce the dangers of unauthorized use.
The countries most likely to acquire weapons are the
nonaligned and marginally aligned countries, and those that
feel threatened and fear abandonment. India, Pakistan,
Iran, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Israel, South Africa,
Argentina, and Brazil are some of nations with such rationales.
Proliferation will increase the need for alliances among
those countries threatened by rivals acquiring nuclear
weapons. However, it is not clear that the great powers
will be willing to make guarantees to countries with nuclear
weapons on the grounds these weapons are no longer needed,
nor to nations in a region with nuclear powers because it
may be too dangerous. The potential for nuclear spread will
have only been partially realized by 1985; many more poten-
tial entrants will remain during the following decade.
Acquisition will likely depend upon the availability of
materials and technologies, what happens to the countries
that have acquired weapons, and the degree of security
provided by alliance relationships.
US concerns, other than the instability that may follow
from proliferation, are likely to be the intentional or
unintentional use of nuclear weapons against US forces
abroad, the use among third nations to which we may or may
not be allied, the threat to US territory by another country
or terrorists, and the accidental or unexplained incident.
The US may find it necessary to increase i1~s intelligence of
third country nuclear activities, to allocate offensive
forces to third country targets, to build up air, missile,
and civil defenses to cope with these additional threats, to
emphasize nuclear protection for forces abroad, and to
develop a surgical strike capability for use against nuclear
facilities or units. Specific technology relationships were
not identified.
Mr. Rowen made clear that the main task is not just to
forecast, but to try and influence the process toward non-
proliferation. The discussion touched upon policies, prac-
tices, alliance relationships, and providing of nonnuclear
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capabilities and cooperative international efforts to reduce
terrorist possibilities. The prospects for control over
materials and technical knowledge were considered by most to
be too late and too little.
Mr. Emanski drew attention to the characteristics
expected of future land combat in Europe. He emphasized
continuous combat because the Soviets have established it as
their doctrine and equipped themselves to carry it off.
Savkin's "Operational Art and Tactics" establishes the
duration of the continuous offensive to be between 30 days
and 8 weeks. The Soviet concept is to echelon forces so
that the intensity of the offensive can be maintained at the
points of combat contact along the main thrusts.
However, he noted that continuous combat would have
evolved without a Soviet emphasis because it is a logical
projection in the trends of warfare. Trends noted were:
increased mechanization and mobility; technology that enables
effective combat and movement at night; dispersion of forces
required by the threat of mass destruction weapons; emphasis
on force destruction and maneuver--learned in part from the
German blitzkrieg--and the "ideal" toward which innovative
combat commanders have been striving.
The dimensions of continuous combat are far-reaching,
much more is necessary than simply emphasis on night opera-
tions. Fundamental changes in doctrine, organization,
training and equipment are involved. The tempo of operations
will increase as the present discontinuous or intermittent
operating capability is replaced by sustained combat.
Psychological and human factors are a basic considera-
tion. Rotation of forces is necessary. The time available
for decisions will be reduced., requiring changes in present
organizational and logistic planning, the organization of
the forces to be used, and the conduct of the battle. Local
intensities will require replacement and resupply well
beyond current capabilities. Forces will be more highly
mechanized with emphasis on numbers and mobility, in contrast
with a few highly armored vehicles. Forward, highly mobile,
tailored-to-the-situation kind of maintenance and overhaul
will replace production-line, rear base concepts. A vital
shortcoming may be the difficulties of transition from
peacetime to wartime support. Day and night operation will
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rapidly exhaust the high skill maintenance and operational
personnel of air combat units. Dependence upon airbases.for
sustained operations and air supply while under attack by
aircraft, missiles, and heliborne forces is a critical
vulnerability.
Most of the technologies discussed during the colloquium
match well the developments needed to attain a continuous
warfare capability. Today the US has neither understanding
of nor capability for continuous warfare. The consistent
pattern in Soviet thinking and developments to date argues
that the USSR will continue to exploit its technology to
further its capability for continuous warfare.
Mr. Emanski observed that there are not three separate
Soviet doctrines for chemical, nuclear, or conve~itional war.
There is one. Soviet operational hardware :includes protec-
tive garments, chemical warfare antidotes, automatic CBR
alarms, sealed vehicles, a complete family of decontamination/
washdown equipment, protected medical vans, a family of
chemical smokes and aerosol generators, and so on. Nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological,
do not reduce the importance of continuous combat but rather
underscore the reason this is likely to be 'the character of
the next war. The point was brought out in discussions that
while the US developed the neutron bomb, ostensively as a
defensive weapon, it would be in fact a natural weapon for
the Soviet style offensive since rapid movement into the'
target area is one of its desirable characteristics.
Two other characteristics for future warfare in Europe
were identified by Mr. Emanski. First, it will be a coali-
tion war and interoperability of doctrine, equipment, procedures,
communications, and command and control is fundamental. A
team wherein one-fifth of its members are playing one game
while the other four-fifths play a separate game or games
cannot expect to win. Second, military operations in built-
up areas are unavoidable.
Mr. Greene added to the second point noting the continuing
urbanization of Western Europe. This degree of urbanization
will make obsolete NATO's long-standing strategy for forward
defense using tactics designed for operations in open country.
This is particularly evident in the North German Plain,
which has historically provided the best east-to-west route
for invading armies. Three urban complexes alone will cover
40 percent of the total NORTHAG-Second ATAF region by the
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year 2000. These large areas could be an enormous liability
to the defense of NATO, or they offer outstanding possibili-
ties for improved defense if appropriate strategy, tactics,
and equipments are developed and deployed.
Much discussion focused on these concepts for warfare
in Europe. The perspective of Soviet developments leading
toward a continuous warfare capability had clearly gone un-
recognized by many. Also unrecognized was the extent of
Soviet preparations for theater nuclear, biological, and
chemical warfare made pointedly clear in the colloquium by
Emanski, Greene and Augerson.
The result was a sobering appreciation of the situation
likely to be faced in a European war. Mr. Emanski noted
that the most significant benefit from recognition that con-
tinuous combat will be the nature of future battle would be
the unifying purpose this could bring to all combat and
material developments.
Information War
Dr. Rona stressed the conceptual aspects of counter-
measures to make a number of points about the future of
information disruption, manipulation, and misimprinting--
information war. He noted the spectacular advances that
have taken place in military technology--namely, propulsion,
guidance, and warheads--so that whenever a weapon can be
aimed at its assigned target it is highly likely the target
will be destroyed. Protection in the past has depended on
target hardening, target mobility, or timely counterattacks.
Protection in the future will depend more and more on mis-
information or information denial.
Jamming the command link of a surface-to-air missile is
an obvious countermeasure. However, countermeasures can be
applied throughout the development and use of a weapon
system. Strategic intelligence is updated in bursts occur-
ring in a matter of months or years; a carefully designed
sequence of messages can cause reliance upon false input
data and decision logic, for example a designer is vulner-
able to wrong or deceptive signature data. Tactical intelli-
gence, surveillance, or reconnaissance may deal with events
measured in days and hours; the precious few and expensive
weapons may be misallocated. Events related to the terminal
engagement can take place in seconds or even microseconds;
the precision weapon command link may be disrupted.
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The future, as he saw it, will tend to reinforce new
and sophisticated ways to apply countermeasures in their
broadest sense; especially as technology opens possibilities
for and vulnerabilities to transformation of about any
physical phenomenon into electrical signals with the atten-
dant capability for transmission, processing, and display.
He added some predictions. The use of target-connected
observables for high-accuracy terminal guidance of missiles
will be avoided whenever possible. They a.re likely to be
under the control of the enemy and therefore amenable to
relatively inexpensive countermeasures. T'he trend will be
away from high-value, concentrated, mobile platforms, to a
number of relatively small, possibly unmanned platforms,
synchronized by secure wideband data links. (The high asset
concentration represented by the Trident weapon system must
be seen as an anomaly in this respect.) The trend toward a
large number of cooperative elements will permit design of
small but significant individual differences thereby providing
multiple-complexions for the enemy to face. Space-borne
surveillance will reduce or eliminate depending upon emissions
direction-finding and thereby shift the emphasis from silence
(e.g. by ocean vehicle) to one of open broadcast where the
emphasis is upon achievement of confusion and disinformation.
The trend will be toward one-time-use systems such as an
unmanned precursor penetrator to deploy local beacons for
temporary target attack. C-Cubed systems will be adaptable
to rapidly changing combat environments, .including the con-
fusion messages deliberately provided by the enemy days,
weeks, months, or even years before the actual start of
overt hostilities. Finally, equipment for training people
to handle various aspects of information war will be important:,
in particular for the training of military people with
different cultural backgrounds.
During discussion Dr. Rona suggested two changes that
would be an important response to these futures. First is
the imperative need to address the information war-related
moves throughout the whole evaluation and operational life
of newly proposed or upgraded weapon systems. By contrast,
attention to countermeasures is now an afterthought fre-
quently lost in budget cuts. Second, a C-Cubed/intelligence
simulation laboratory is needed to explicitly focus on the
stressed behavior of complex combinations of high-performance
links and human interface under conditions of an unintention-
ally or intentionally distorted reference base. This labora-
tory could aid training as well.
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Sma11 Unit Operations
Nonintervention as a defined or undefined national
policy is perhaps a rationale for inattention to small
combat units. Yet hazardous politico-military operations
such as "surgical strikes" in support of antinuclear pro-
liferation or assurance of energy supplies, the rescue of
hostages from terrorist groups, and selective antiguerrilla
operations are anticipated by many as likely low-level
conflict needs for small units over the next two decades.
Wartime raids against critical high-value behind-the-lines
targets form yet another role for specialized small unit
operations. General Henderson acknowledged these roles, but
presented a broader view of small tactical units applicable
at all conflict intensity levels and in all geographic
environments.
He argued that the expanded combat capabilities which
technology could give the small tactical unit would change
and dictate the nature of ground combat in scenarios fore-
seen and unforeseen. He noted the area controlled by a
large force (approximately 100,000 men) increased by five
between the Civil War and World War I, by 12 between World
War I and World War II, and by 10 since World War II. He
said another gain of this magnitude is possible by the end
of this century, that is, 30 to 50 man units could control a
four-square-mile area against the Warsaw Pact or nearly the
equivalent of today's infantry battalion. But this benefit
cannot be realized if we merely applique modern technology
in a random fashion to present day small combat units and
their operating concepts--the small unit must be developed
as a truly integrated combat system in a manner analagous to
that for a new tactical aircraft.
The small unit can have a terminal in global and local
positioning systems to locate and to direct supporting fire.
It can have the capability to transmit voice, digital and
video to support units. Automatic attention and output
interpretation from line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight
sensors can eliminate constant operator attention while pro-
viding detection and identification of physical. objects and
emitters. Deception and decoy devices can be available for
those most likely to be detected and attacked by an advanced
technology enemy force. Organic multipurpose precision
weapons utilizing nuclear, electromagnetic pulse (EMP),
nonlethal CW and conventional munitions can be carried for
use against ground and air vehicles, structures, area targets,
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and electromagnetic emitters. Development of the combat
unit as a system is the key to realization of these capa-
bilities for large force conventional or nuclear conflict.
It is also the key to the versatility and effectiveness of
modified units for independent operations.- The infyonics
concept, so labeled by General Henderson, prompted exciting
discussion. Many readily appreciated the significance of
small units if the promised gains of new technologies were
to be realized in large force operations. They also appre-
ciated the ready spillover of this focus for development of
small, independent teams. I-Iowever, there was much doubt
that even recognition of these possibilities could overcome
the old habits of emphasizing the hardware.
Food/Water Crisis
Dr. Doty cited the production and distribution of food
as a potential security concern. Vulnerability exists
because of the increased dependence on a relatively few
species which for the most part do not have high resilience
to unusual infections or unusual variations in growing
conditions. The development and nurturing of new genetic
species and the storage of seed stores are logical- defenses.
He foresees these, and vigilance against destructive acts,
as elements of national security in the 1990s.
Dr. Anderson drew attention to water as an essential
natural resource. Historically, the demands on water have
increased and will likely continue to do so. Economic
growth has not only stressed water supplies but, coupled
with land-use practices, water quality as well. We lack
understanding and modeling capabilities of water quality and
its attendant geochemical, biological, and hydrologic con-
trols, particularly regarding persistent toxic substances.
The issues of food and energy will invariably stress the
resources further. Whether climatic shifts will occur,
ameliorating or aggravating the imbalances of supply and
demand is uncertain.
National security has not been defined as an objective
of water planning. Had chance not conspired to end the
1930s drought before the nation entered World Wa.r II, the
consequences would have been harsher. He concluded by
noting that the resource systems evolved during the quies-
cent periods may well lack the resilience t.o respond to the
.demands that might be imposed upon them during periods of
national stress.
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Energy-Related Scenarios
The technologies of energy were not addressed in the
colloquium,_ex.cept for-the charged particle beam, electro-
magnetic gun, and some vehicle propulsion ideas. Energy as
a source of conflict was to have been included in the col-
loquium, however, the speaker who was to have discussed this
topic was unable to attend. A few of the points that would
have been addressed are included here in order to add to the
forecast considerations.
Increased world dependence upon oil through the rest of
this century is accepted even among those with optimistic
predictions for coal, nuclear, and solar power applications.
This creates a number of potential security problems. The
United States itself depends directly on sources in the
Middle East. Military contingencies must protect these
sources and their supply 1-fines from acts by the Soviets, by
hostile Middle Eastern nations, and by terrorist groups.
Our major allies, Western Europe and Japan, are more
dependent on these sources and lines than is the US. Thus
protection of these sources and supply lines is essential to
their economies in peacetime and critical to their existence
and the conduct of defensive military operations in wartime.
Concern over continuous theater war seldom addresses this
vital supply Question. However, far short of war, the more
critical dependence of these nations upon outside sources is
likely to bring about differences with the US which may
alter alliances during these next two decades.
The Soviet Union now exports oil to Eastern and Western
Europe. Many estimate that it will be unable to increase
its production sufficiently beyond the early 1980s to maintain
this favorable position. A further pinch in their economy
may result, as noted in the remarks by Mr. Earle. Reduced
supplies to East Europe may in turn cause these nations to
depend more upon Middle East sources and to seek more Western
hard currency to buy Middle East oil. If the Soviet Union's
shortfall were severe enough, it could become an importer of
oil and thus an active competitor for Middle East oil sources.
Japan, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Korea
are potential competitors or collaborators in t:he development
of oil in the East China Sea. The less developed nations
(LDC} in their attempts to industrialize have no choice but
to depend upon oil and thus to compete with the industrialized
nations for the available supplies. Frustration and insta-
bility are certainly likely.
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Overall, two points were to have been made by introduc-
tion of this topic into the colloquium: first, that energy
supplies, particularly oil, are unquestionably a source of
tension and possible conflict during the next two decades;
second, that access to these supplies may even more impor-
tantly become the cause for change in current alliances and
the creation of formal or informal alliances between nations
now presumed to be neutral or joined in common interests
with the US or the USSR.
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RESOURCES ~ UNCERTAINTIES - USSR
The Soviets' military competition was identified as
serious. Examples of good Soviet design, and of their
impressive match of doctrine and equipment were given
throughout the colloquium. Their nuclear-biological-chemical
capabilities drew special attention.
Dr. Stevens pointed out the inexorable commitment of
the Soviets to expenditures in defense and to maintenance of
a technological capability different than our program-by-
program approach. He noted on the other hand the inertia of
their system and the difficulties which they admit to them-
selves are likely to hinder their application of high tech-
nology. The forecast these may present was debated but
certainly not resolved during the colloquium.
Past analysis has innately assumed the Soviets to be a
mirror image of ourselves. Dr. Stevens noted our knowledge
of the Soviets, as illustrated during these discussions, now
is far greater than during the past decades. Consequently,
we can in fact be more selective in what we choose to pursue
to gain advantage for our forces.
Soviet Resources
Mr. Earle presented an overview of the generally
accepted estimate of decline in the Soviet economy; a decline
in annual growth from 4.5 percent currently to a 3 percent
during the later part of this century. This estimate is
based upon limitations in the work force, insufficient
energy production, along with the Soviets' normal problems
with agriculture. European perceptions are less negative
and tend to project growth of the economy at current rates.
The Europeans do not foresee the energy problems for the
USSR to be as severe as seen by US estimators.
The Soviet leadership does see problems ahead and does
appear to recognize that this means allocation difficulties.
However, it has not developed an economic strategy yet. The
next five-year plan, expected in 1980, might give insights
to the choices. But he thought it unlikely and .suggested
the Soviets would probably wait out the period and make
changes in the subsequent plan.
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Foreign technology is a source of improvement for the
Soviet economy. Thus far the Soviets have concentrated on
achieving bulk additions to their capacity. Difficulties in
absorption continue, but clear gains have been made.
Beyond the question of how much gain, the basic question
is whether the USSR will make a long-term commitment to be
part of the world economy, or whether it will once again
withdraw into isolation. The exports it has developed have
paradoxically been products of high internal demand (autos
for example). however, this may be an example of conserva-
tive planning in that should the products fail in the export
market they can readily convert to fill domestic needs.
Projections of economic growth lead to projections of
defense expenditures. US estimators have previously disagreed
with the low numbers held by the CIA. The higher CIA numbers
now do not resolve the questions, as the shape of the expen-
ditures curve still does not reflect force deployments. It
is one thing to say what a number is not, it is quite another
thing to say what it is.
A decline in the rate of growth of Soviet defense
expenditures is projected. But the actual expenditures are
significant, and Mr. Earle estimated long-term growth of
defense expenditures at 4 to 6 percent annLially; that is
growth faster than their overall economy. The military
sector is also expected to become more productive. He
cautioned that we should not look at the Soviet economy in
our terms. A stable economy, even if sluggish, is desirable
for the USSR. Opportunity costs are not viewed with the
disdain they are in the West, and thus the "burden" of
military expenditures is less troublesome. In comparative
terms, as the Soviets view the current turmoil and problems
of the Western economies they can live with their own
problems more comfortably.
Soviet R$D Patterns
The basic point made by .Earle and Alexander was that in
comparing the US and USSR, we must think more in terms of
Soviet process. Dr. Alexander noted that evaluations of US
and Soviet military RED often begin and uni:ortunately end
-with inputs (budgets, engineers, educational levels, and so
on). However, given a gross comparability of inputs, it is
in the process and choice .that sharp differences emerge
between US and Soviet practice.
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Dr. Rechtin gave examples from his experience with the
DOD where repeated assumptions were made that the Soviets
would use their comparable, or enormous, R~,D investment to
close military technological gaps. Instead they apparently
have not seen our leads as that important for they have used
their resources quite differently than we.
Yet have we been surprised? Many argued that we really
have not been surprised, in great part because we have been
able to observe and obtain data from their testing. We have
not been surprised by the operational effectiveness of their
weapons; but we have indeed been surprised by how they
achieved it--that is by their designs.
Dr. Alexander identified recognized features for the
bulk of Soviet military acquisitions as simplicity in equip-
ment; common use of subsystems, components and parts; incre-
mental growth; and limited performance and mission capa-
bilities. This pattern has been pervasive in the past and
is likely to be so into the future. We have now acquired a
fundamental understanding and data that can enable us to
make sounder judgments of future Soviet capabilities--and
thus to be able to be more selective in our response.
Exceptions have occurred. These exceptions with their
own recognized pattern have included ,.nuclear weapons and
long-range ballistic missiles. Directed energy beams may be
an example of an exception today.
Dr. Alexander described in his presentation the Soviet
process of weapons design. He made several points; principal
among these was that while their weapons technology is on
the whole less advanced than ours, there is considerable
evidence that these technological lags often do not result
in lessor military value.
He noted the common answer to this seeming paradox to
be that the Soviets compensate for technological inferiority
by fielding masses of men and equipment, and by spending
more on its military might than potential adversaries. He
showed this answer to be only partial. In many cases,
Soviet weapons on a face-to-face basis are indeed comparable
to their Western rivals. One comparison of jet engines with
similar performance showed the Soviet engine to have only
one-tenth the parts, one-third the cost, and larger manu-
facturing clearances. While the latter resulted in test-
stand degradation, the engine did not degrade in operations
as did US engines.
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He suggested the additional reasons for Soviet weapon
effectiveness lie in the continuity of design teams and the
continuous construction and test of prototypes; in the
extensive-troop testing of new equipment within large-scale
exercises, which they do as part of the acquisition process;
and in the criteria which they use to evaluate weapons, that
is they use force utility as the measure, not one-on-one
weapon performance.
Skolnik on radar, Bement on materials, Gray on the AK-
47 and others gave examples of good Soviet design, adding
emphasis to the point that we are false to ourselves if we
continue to call Soviet technology inferior. Discussion
moved-back and forth from engineering respect for the design
achievements of the Soviets to concern lest the image con-
veyed of the Soviets is that of "doing all the right things."
The latter is clearly not true. hqually true is that the
technological lags normally attributed to the Soviets need
represent neither lag in military value nor lag in engineering
sophistication. Mr. Kahn summarized for all. by saying that
the Soviets do incredibly well within their limitations, and
we could learn some things from them--some f~eatuz?es of
Soviet acquisition practices could be beneficially applied
here.
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RESOURCES ~ UNCERTAINTIES - US
Concern was expressed throughout the colloquium that
the threat and problems not be overstated--but be credible.
The United States possesses fundamental economic, techno-
logical, industrial, and military strengths. More generally,
the industrially more advanced Western nations (NATO) have a
population of 560 million in contrast to the Warsaw Pact
population of 365 million and have a combined GNP over twice
as large as that of the Warsaw Pact. Clearly, adequate re-
sources are available.
Clear as well is that we in the United States have much
technology across all fields. The state of the art is high.
The presentations and discussions covered an impressive
array of our technological capabilities. Priorities likely
to maximize the leverage for the United States were suggested
for DOD technical resources.
Dr. Davis said the colloquium showed the military
systems to be beneficiaries of many technological options,
and not the captive of shortfalls. The presentations in 26
areas of technology provided reasonable comfort that desired
competition in technology will occur and is adequate for
intelligent selection of a few system efforts with a high
probability of operational success.
She emphasized that continued competition within the US
in technology is inexpensive; and should be proportional to
potential payoff, scientific uncertainties, and the quantity
of systems/components planned for procurement. Demanding a
winner before beginning RED encourages a stifling conserva-
tism in contrast to a stimulating innovativeness.
The unsatisfactory capability to place anal use our
technology in the field was not an agenda topic. Our depen-
dence upon technology to equalize the Soviets numerical
advantage, as identified in the keynote remarks, brought the
topic to the fore. The contrast of the attractiveness of
future technological possibilities, with examples of our
failures to exploit today's technology, was natural cause to
project that these future possibilities might not come
about.
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Technology As An Equalizer
Dr. Davis cited some group opinions that had evolved.
She noted that in t}ie view of many we have fewer problems
generating new technology than in translating that technology
into fielded equipment. Dr. Lukasik noted that the time
between technology "generations" in a number of important
areas cited as less than the DOD procurement cycle. The DOD
acquisition process was seen to unwittingly degrade our
technological advantage and thereby equalizE~ the iJS and
Soviet military prowess. We wish to meet the threat by
using high technology; and thus we must be concerned by
impediments.
Dr. Berenson echoed the. keynote charge--the key question
is what technological initiatives should the US take in the
near term to make the maximum increase in relative total
deployed military capabilities in the next 10 to 20 years.
An important part of this problem is the fart that the
Soviets are outproducing us in most major weapons systems
which means they can modernize their forces faster even
though they may start out with a technological disadvantage.
We need to develop ways to decrease the time from the avail-
ability of technology to full operational capability of the
system. Dr. Berenson emphasized that production, training
and maintenance technologies are important :in addition to
the weapons system level of technology.
None doubted the fundamental technological strength of
the United States or in a larger context that of the West as
a whole. The USSR's "worship" of science, coupled with their
respect for Western technology adds to our basic strength.
Recognition of the seriousness and character of past and
current failings, and corrective actions, were seen to be
critical to the national security and to realization of the
benefits from our technological strength.
The colloquium discussions offered insights both for
significance of technologies and therefore selection.
Insights for more rapid assimilation of technology are
recorded in this section. The point made vividly by several
operational personnel was that our technological superiority
is not obvious to the man in the field. We cannot gain the
leverage we desire from our tec}inology by selection alone,
we must focus on its assimilation into military operations.
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Numbers Are Important
This message was one that most participants pint forward.
No one doubted the need to use the US technological advantage
to overcome the numerical advantage of the Soviets today--
and in the future. The fear was that technological superiority
or Quality versus quantity has been for too long a cliche
preventing necessary investment in mass. Extracts from a
1976 speech by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia expressed this
point for most:
--At some point numbers do count.
--At some point technology fails to offset mass.
--At some point Kipling's "thin red line of heroes"
gives way.
The approximately 3 to 1 ratio of procurement to research
and development was cited as clearly disbalanced--with note
that industry figures are more like 10 to 1. Some concluded
the technology investment was about right and the procurement
should therefore be increased. Others said the need for
numbers was serious enough to warrant sacrifice from the R~,D
budget so equipments could be procured for the field. This
emphasis does not mean to buy ships to counter ships, tanks
to counter tanks, and aircraft to counter aircraft--although
that is indeed part of the answer. Clearly it also means a
skeptical examination of the purported claims for one-on-one
performance, where the alternative is more of a cheaper
version, and it also means emphasis upon surveillance and
command-communications where these can affect appropriate
massing or avoidance of disadvantageous combat.
A more fundamental point was made regarding numbers and
the exploitation of technology. The lack of large procure-
ment, and thus numbers deployed to the field, means that our
military forces are not able to gain experience in the use
of these equipments. The research and development community
can hypothesize the use of these equipments, but they really
do not know.
US hardware and software R~,D has outrun what may be
termed operational R~,D--or learning what it is good for.
Furthermore, we know that equipment by itself is not the
answer, but rather the combination of the right tactics and
the equipment as used by men. The development of tactics,
or assimilation of the technology, depends upon the existence
and use of numbers.
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Ability To Execute
Criticism of unreliable and/or unsupportable deployed
equipment recurred throughout the colloquium. Examples were
given of field personnel unable to keep equipment in com-
mission. A failure ascribed to design, to training and to in-
adequate spares. Consequently, operational units have no
confidence in their equipment and, because it is not in
commission, they are unable to train. The fact that this is
an old complaint should make it even more deserving of
attention.
New technology and new equipment carries for the opera-
tional commander the image of more headaches. The promise
of higher reliability of integrated circuits, the ease of
operation and maintenance by use of processors, the low
maintenance promises of materials developments, etc. must
overcome this hostility. Reliability maintainability programs
remain ever present, but never up to the task.
Those present put forward three intez?related answers
for this old problem. First, the new technologies do offer
real opportunity to reduce reliability-maintainability
difficulties of the past. Second, major design emphasis
must demand reliability-maintainability acid stick to it.
And third, both money and time for reliability, maintainability,
and producability in design must be explicitly provided and
treated as sacred within the acquisition cycle for future
equipments. Normally, these are secondary to weapons perform-
ance features and eventually are pushed to the side to gain
an early operational date or budget savings. Reliability
and maintainability?of equipment is a means, not an end
itself; the end as General Gray stated is the survivability,
efficiency, and ability to execute of the soldier, sailor or
airman.
Design For Mobilization
Mr. Kahn drew upon history to make a major point. The
debates of June 1950 were whether the United States could
afford a $14 to $18 billion defense budget. The Korean War
began and Congress authorized $60 billion. The consequence
was that we were able to afford such systems as the B-47,
B-52 and Minuteman, none of which singularly would have been
affordable under the expected service allocation of $5
billion annually. Our military superiority sprang from this
jump .
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Nobody in 1950 studied big budgets, all thought within
$5 billion annually. The precedent of a sudden jump in
defense spending should not be ignored--the Soviets certainly
fear our mobilization. A sufficient scare could cause us to
commit a trillion dollars to defense; we should now spend $1
to $2 billion per year to prepare for this event. He argued
that our highest priority should be to look upon, and design,
our forces today as a minimal force--a basis f'or expansion.
This priority would mean investment in long lead items.
More importantly it would mean experimentatior- and design
with a view to rapid expansion of our capabilities. That
very well could mean deemphasizing from "ultimate" designs
in favor of simpler designs, and deemphasizing from one-for-
one replacement of ships, tanks and aircraft i.n favor of the
command and support systems. Other answers exist--Mr.
Kahn's point was that the capability for force expansion not
only is historically sound, but would generate desired
design directions.
Operations R~,D
Dr. Lukasik described one of the more important suggestions
put forward for change in the acquisition processes as
"operations R~,D." The concept is to achieve evolution
through operational exercises and use; and while obviously
not applicable across-the-board, it could be instrumental in
the development of many new uses, new doctrine, and the
actual assimilation of new technology.
This change was suggested to address what many saw as a
major failing of the acquisition system. That is, the pre-
sumption that each system is forever, and the7?efore its
characteristics must embody all? future requirements--and
axiomatically all the latest technologies at its IOC.
The technologies of the future lend themselves to
incremental update of systems. The conflicts of the future
are likely to require adaptation. A point, already noted,
was that while the research and development community can
hypothesize the use, it really can not know. These, most
participants argued, are cause for explicit emphasis within
acquisition for field evaluation and experimentation with
many new equipments in order to learn of their use and to
feed back design changes. Innovation and rapid assimilation
of technology were seen as the gains; but time and money
needs to be explicitly provided within the acquisition cycle
in order to achieve these gains.
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Two points were then made with respect to technology as
an equalizer. First, that the United States should possess
great advantage for leverage from the processing explosion
in contrast with the USSR. But second, that this potential
is unlikely to be realized unless we can focus on experimenta-
tion and evolution along the lines brought out throughout
the discussions: infyonics, distributed systems, life
sciences, naval surveillance, microprocessors, and so on.
Adm. Martell suggested further gains. He agreed with
the view of many that the most likely events of the next
decades were those of crisis, incidents, and challenges. He
related future responses to new challenges, in possibly new
geographical areas, to Mr. Kahn's point about emphasis upon
experimentation and designs for rapid expansion of capabili-
ties. He gave an admittedly parochial example: the need
not to buy for the fleet, but to experiment. with droppable
sonar buoys which could be read out by satellites.
His fundamental point was that normal budget activities,
which focus on platforms, on mission definitions, and on
life-cycle costs, leave no room far such small quantity
experimentation and learning. These procedures force a
"commitment" to buy and deploy--after a cost-effectiveness
comparison with other future buys--even before the experi-
mentation takes place. Cheap learning, and possibilities
for expansion to meet new contingencies, are thereby forgone.
Rather, money, labs, test organizations, firms and opera-
tional units must be pulled together and given the oppor-
tunity, or even the explicit assignment, to undertake the
test for operational possibilities and problems before .
commitment.
Innovation In US
The incentives and disincentives for innovation in the
US were the topic of an evening session at which Mr. Oliver
Boileau, President of Boeing Aerospace Company, and Dr.
Robert Noyce, Charman of INTEL, spoke. However, discussion
was not limited to this session, as the contrast between the
technically possible and the deployed prevailed throughout
the colloquium. Both a strong sense of frustration and some
suggestions for new directions were recorded. The topic is
particularly apt, since a long list of the technical possi-
bilities cannot comprise a forecast; but rather these possi-
bilities must be overlayed with trends that will bring
forward or constrain them.
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Mr. Boileau cited the fundamental advantages this
country has in its industrial and technological base. {{e
then addressed the inability to move technolagy into inven-
tory from a defense contractor's viewpoint. He identified
the government as the greatest inhibitor today, both the
regulations and the management processes. The latter is
best illustrated by the question of who is the customer:
the Service program office and boards, the DSARC, the Defense
Secretary, OMB, the President or the Congress. These com-
prise a hydraheaded buyer, any mouth of which can say no
before a system can be put into production long enough to
make money for the firm.
He addressed a common misunderstanding. Government
funding of developmental work does not cover all costs. If
-you are innovating, industry must dip into its own resources.
BAC invested $50 million of its funds in the recently can-
celed Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST); but increasing
losses from cancellations make it tougher to justify future
investments. Boileau's point was not to create a taboo
against program cancellation; but rather that this intoler-
able lack of common purpose and apparent national will to
maintain a strong defense undermines innovation.
Innovation funding, or the problems associated with
obtaining these, recurred throughout 'discussions. Mr.
Boileau contrasted the commercial marketplace incentives
with those of defense. The former have been substantial
enough in the past for Boeing to periodically risk its
entire net worth to bring out the next-generation product.
He noted that in current dollars, Boeing put 1.7 billion
into the 747. The point is real even though the contrast of
defense and commercial incentives may not be as drastic.
BAC does invest heavily in IR~D for defense; and a recent
Fortune article noted the potential sizable Northrop commit-
ment but not its entire worth to the F-18. Funds for
commercial innovation are not readily available either, as
Dr. Noyce made clear, citing the trend over the past five
years. This problem stemmed from tax disincentives, from
available money going into short-term returns, and from
investment houses unwilling to put money behind technology
without assurance of Xerox-like performance.
Others maintained that cautious attitude within govern-
ment laboratories inhibiting both innovation activities in
the laboratories or the funding of innovation outside.
Freedom to expend at least limited sums and manpower without
defendable mission results or assurances of success-has
disappeared. This was seen in part to be the lack of
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"great directors," but likely more attributable to the
hyperactivity of budget and "exposure-minded" reviewers and
media. Lastly, note was made of the difficulties for uni-
versities to obtain research funding. The expenditure of
time and money to obtain a research dollar have become
excessive to the point where they inhibit active research.
Dr. Noyce made a strong pitch for increased government
funding of university research--but with greatly reduced red
tape. He argued that this is where the future innovative
industries, such as that of semiconductors, must begin. By
contrast, research within private firms is inadequate, their
research is not shared, nor is it directed at other than
short-term interests, e.g. defensive in nature. Further-
more, the technologists trained through research in the
universities are the source of our innovative manpower.
Different viewpoints were given on the problem of
government regulations and procurement practices. Mr. Dale
Church (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ft~,E for Acquisition
Policy) described the effort under way to rewrite the pro-
curement regulations, the ASPRs. Simplification and incen-
tives for industrial motivation, including profits, are
sought through these changes rather than relying on regulations.
Several discussants expressed caution over the expectation
that changed instructions, by themselves, would have much
effect without extensive re-education for all throughout the
government involved in the administration of procurement.
Dr. Rechtin pointed out that much government regulation
has come about because some in industry lobbied for the
regulation and cited a number of examples. He pointed out
that if less constriction is to come about, an industrywide
willingness to operate in a more competitive environment
will be necessary.
Mr. Boileau's example of the AMST cancellation brought
out another point. The Soviets announced their intention to
produce their smaller version of the AMST about the time the
US announced cancellation. It apparently uses the upper-
surface blowing technique developed by Boeing, it has the
same engine placement, landing gear, and so on. Thus the
Soviets are gaining experience with our innovation, while
our knowledge rests in file drawers.
Dr. Alexander separately noted one of the reasons for
Soviet weapon effectiveness lies in the extensive field
testing of new equipments within large-scale exercises as
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part of the acquisition process--that is, the explicit
determination of the military utility of the equipment and
its features. Many expressed the belief that the US could
accelerate the choice of and assimilation of new technology
for military equipment if similar emphasis were given to
operational unit evaluation and experimentation. US unwill-
ingness to explicitly provide funds and scheduled time for
such experimentation was seen as a major impediment to both
useful innovation and effective assimilation of new technology.
The 10-year acquisition cycle was repeatedly cited as
outrageous because it means much of the technology embodied
is at least a decade old by the time it's deployed, because
it means stretch-out costs are unavoidable, a.nd because a
malaise sets upon those in the technical and systems fields.
Dr. Noyce noted that in the commercial market you do not
tell the customer about your future line, or you will not be
able to sell your current line. Many thought this version
of "the best is the enemy of the good" explained much of the
long acquisition cycle. Military requirements were seen to
be less real than a statement of future technical promises.
Designer-managers of military systems were seen to de-
emphasize design simplicity and thus unable to reject attempts
to incorporate all advanced elements at once. Suggestions
included the clear demarkation of technology efforts from
those of systems development, more competitive and shorter-
term systems development, and explicit use of field experi-
mentation with new technology where the military utility
needs to be shown.
Mr. Boileau returned several times to the point that
when a need is seen to be serious someone steps forward and
quickly separates the vital from the unimportant, the criti-
cal from the unessential, priorities are set, and red tape
is cut. He and others cited examples drawn from wartime, a
national purpose--such as putting a man on the moon--or a
"skunkworks" type operation. However, the point many made
is that the problem is not how to exploit technology for one
project, but how to exploit technology across the spectrum
of military activities. Industrial approaches were suggested,
but caution was advised as to which experience should be
drawn upon. General Henderson suggested that: AT~T, not the
Soviets nor the aerospace nor the automakers, might be a
good model for the DOD to examine as applicable to its
across-the-board activities.
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Mr. Kahn outlined his view that economic growth could
slow down, or even stop, not because of resource scarcities,
pollution problems, nor complex organizational difficulties
but solely because of indifference or even hostility to eco-
nomic growth and advanced technology--a cultural change.
Understanding the direction of cultural changes requires a
grasp not only of how people conduct their everyday lives,
but also of the aspirations and visions of various influen-
tial groups. As these visions are shared by more and more
people then personal, public, social, and economic policies
are altered to conform to these new directions. He cited 12
"new" emphases and trends in the US that are becoming in-
creasingly influential and threatening economic growth:
avoiding the risk of doing something positive by innovation
because it cannot be evaluated and the development of general
antitechnology, antieconomic attitudes wez?e two of the more
obviously appropriate to the discussion.
Mr. Boileau noted, that the media, playing to these
attitudes, are responsible, directly or indirectly, for much
of the delay in getting technological innovation into the
field. They spread inordinate caution among t}ie decision-
makers--what Arthur Kantrowitz calls a period of "timidity's
triumphs." He saw the growing disbalance in US-USSR strength
as sufficient cause for immediate attention. Waiting for a
crisis to suddenly change these cautionary attitudes and
then saying "go" to technology exploitation is not the
answer. Suggestions included a major national effort to cut
away government-created disincentives; an honest comparison
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces and the inevitable
consequences of the Soviet ICBMs; and an honest campaign to
demonstrate the positive gains of American know-how and
entrepreneurial ability to advance the economic good and
stability of the world.
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PARTICIPANTS
(Authors denoted by *)
*Alexander, Arthur J.
Senior Analyst, RAND Corporation, engaged in studies on
research and development in the US and the Soviet Union.
*Andersan, Don L.
Director, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute
of Technology.
*Augerson, William S. (Major General, USA)
Commander, US Army Medical Research ~ Development Command.
*Bement, Arden L.
Director, Materials Sciences Office, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, on leave of absence from MIT.
*Berenson, Paul J.
Staff Assistant, Office of Under Secretary of Defense
RAE (Long-Range Planning). .
Deputy Director for Research ~ Engineer?ing, NSA.
Boileau, Oliver C., Jr.
President, Boeing Aerospace Company.
Cacioppo, Anthony J.
Chief Scientist, Foreign Technology Division, Air Force
Systems Command.
*Chapman, Robert M.
Director, Marine Systems, The Garrett Corporation.
*Combs, Henry G.
Manager, Hypersonic Vehicle Programs, :Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation.
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 UNCLASSIFIED
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Creedon, James S. (Brig. General, USAF)
Deputy Director for Tactical Information, DCS Plans ~,
Operations, IIQS USAF.
Davis, Ruth M.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense RF~E for Research
and Advanced Technology.
*Dertouzos, Michael L.
Director, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science.
Deutch, John M.
Director, Office of Energy Research, Department of
Energy.
Dickinson, Hillman (Major General, USA)
Commander, US Army Communications Research ~ Development
Command.
Dirks, Lester C.
Deputy Director for Science ~ Technology, CIA.
*Doty, Paul M.
Director, Center for Science ~ International Affairs,
Harvard University.
*Durbin, Eugene P.
Manager of the RAND Corporation Strategic Assessment
Program.
Earle, M. Mark, Jr.
Director, Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford
Research Institute
*Emanski, John J., Jr.
Senior Operations Analyst, Stanford Research Institute.
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 UNCLASSIFIED
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*Fair, Harry D., Jr.
Chief, Propulsion Technology, Army Munit:i,ons Command.
Foxgrover, James H. (Rear Adm., USN)
Commander, Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River.
Frieman, Edward A.
Chairman, JASON Committee.
Gra Alfred M. (Brig. General, USMC)
Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command -
Atlantic.
Greene, Terrell E.
Manager, Tactical Programs, RED Associates.
*Hart, Peter E.
Director, Artificial Intelligence Center, Stanford
Research Institute.
*Hedrick, Ira Grant
Senior Vice President, Grumman Aerospace Corporation.
*Henderson, F. Paul (Retired Brig. General, USMC)
Senior Consultant, RCA.
Hermann, Robert J.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense R$E for Communications,
Command, Control and Intelligence.
*Hicks, Donald A.
Senior Vice President, Northrop Corporation.
Huberman, Benjamin
Assistant to the President's Science Advisor.
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 UNCLASSIFIED
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*Hyde, David W.
Staff Specialist, Office of Assistant: Navy Secretary
for Research ~ Engineering.
*Joseph, Earl C.
Staff Scientist-Futurist, Sperry Univac.
*Justice, James W.
Founder and President of Center for Analysis.
*Kahn, Herman
Director and Chairman, Iiudson Institute.
*Kassel, Simon
Senior Staff Leader, RAND Corporation, for comparative
analysis of Soviet applied science and engineering.
*Kear, Bernard H.
Senior Consulting Scientist at United Technologies
Research Center.
*Kur John W.
Leader of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Non-Nuclear
Ordnance Program.
*Laudise, Robert A.
Director, Materials Research Laboratory, Bell Telephone
Laboratories.
*Longuemare, R. Noel
Manager of Engineering, Aerospace Di.visian of Westinghouse
Defense ~ Electronic Systems Center.
Lukasik, Stephen J.
Senior Vice President, RAND Corporation.
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 Approved For Release 20~~/tP,~ICf~RDP86B00269R001400080001-7
MacDonald, Gordon J. F.
Director of Environmental Studies and Policy,
Dartmouth College.
*McDaniel, John L.
Senior Consultant, Hughes Aircraft Company.
*Mantle, Peter J.
President of Mantle Engineering Company, Inc.
(Manager, US Navy Advanced Naval Vehicles Concepts Project).
*Martell, Charles B. (Retired Vice Adm., USN)
Industrial consultant.
Chairman, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee.
No ce, Robert N.**
Chairman of the Board, INTEL Corporation.
*Nye, Howard H.
Manager of Advanced Airborne Missile Systems Development,
Boeing Aerospace Corporation.
Perry, William J.
Under Secretary of Defense for Research ~ Engineering.
Press, Frank
Science and Technology Advisor to the President of the
US.
*Popolato, Alphonse
Senior Engineer, Engineering Design, Los Alamos
Scientific Lab
**Dinner Speaker Only
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*Rechtin, Eberhardt
President Aerospace Corporation.
*Rona, Thomas P.
Senior Analyst, Corporate Strategic Planning and
Technology Investment, Boeing Aerospace Company.
STAT
Deputy Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence,
National Foreign Assessment Center.
*Rowen, Henry S.
Professor of Public Management, Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University.
STAT
Senior Staff Member, Office of Scientific Intelligence,
National Foreign Assessment Center.
*Shulman, Hyman L.
Senior Staff Member, RAND Corporation.
*Skolnik, Merrill I.
Superintendent, Radar Division, Naval Research Laboratory.
Smith, Gordon S. (Rear Adm. , USN)
Vice Commander, Naval Electronics Systems Command.
Stevens, Sayre
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center.
Stever, H. Guyford
Industrial Consultant. Former Presidential Science
Advisor.
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STiAT
Sullivan, Gerald D.
Project Director and Rapporteur of Technology Trends
ColloQuium, DOD.
*Tachmindji, Alexander J.
Vice President, METREK Division of the MITRE Corporation.
*Talkington, Howard R.
Head, Ocean Technology Department, US Naval Ocean
Systems Center.
Thurman, Maxwell R. (Major General, USA)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate,
Office of Vice Chief of Staff, US Army.
Turner, Stansfield (Admiral, USN)
Director of Central Intelligence.
*Vander Stoep, Donald R.
Manager, Terminal Sensor Evaluation, The Analytical
Sciences Corporation (TASC).
Vezza, Albert
Senior Scientist, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science.
Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Walsh, Thomas E.
Staff Assistant, Office of Deputy Unde1? Secretary of
Defense R$E (Research ~ Advanced Technology).
*Weiss, Robert F.
President, Physical Sciences, Inc.
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*Wunsch, Carl I.
Chairman, Earth Sciences Department, MIT.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP86B00269R001400080001-7
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 :CIA-RDP86B00269R001400080001-7
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 :CIA-RDP86B00269R001400080001-7