AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 230
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SEP
STUDY GROUP PAPER
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE
NSA and NR8pregierdirstycliftifilmelp05/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
VtitIR ET,2
Approved For Release 2005/01/1,, : .,-,-k.,,,,61300269R001200210001-4
PART I
INTRODUCTION:
Political Imperatives and Management Needs
The Central Intelligence Agency and a national intelligence capability
were created by the National Security Act of 1947. They grew out
of a consensus among a national elite--in Congress, the Executive,
and the national media?that the experience of World War II and the
emergence of the United States as the first superpower required the
creation of a permanent national intelligence structure--"No more
Pearl Harbors. " Today that system is under examination by the
Congress and the media, and the consensus out of which it grew has
been seriously eroded. Moreover, 28 years of experience suggest
that the intelligence provisions of the Act are obsolete and too weak
to carry the large and complex system that has evolved over that
period. It is the purpose of these papers to examine some of the
problems that beset American intelligence today and to i-ecommend ways
S):(31:111r
Approved For Release 2005/0I/10'-: mDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10S EI T6B00269R001200210001-4
in which consensus might be restored and the intelligence structure
modernized. Both are necessary, and the latter cannot be achieved
without the former.
In 1947 Congress had in mind the creation of a small super-agency,
independent of any major arm of Government, to "correlate and
evaluate" the product of the existing, largely military, agencies in
the field of strategic intelligence, a term which it understood to cover
primarily military intentions and capabilities of potential enemies.
It placed on the Director of Central Intelligence what it thought were
modest responsibilities and provided him with authorities that appeared
commensurate. Nearly 30 years later, however, although the
contribution of America's intelligence organizations has been
immeasurably important, it is apparent that the responsibilities are
enormous and the authorities less than adequate.
It was not possible in 1947 to see:
-- That by 1975 the national intelligence effort would
become a central part of Government, probably larger in the peace
of 1975 than in the war of 1945.
2
T
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/F3ECIR-E;86B00269R001200210001-4
-- That the definition of national intelligence would expand
to cover diplomacy, commerce, economics, and sociological
?and political trends worldwide, as well as the more traditional
military disciplines.
-- That the extraction of intelligence from closed societies
would require the development of large, complex, and expensive
collection systems; and that efficient employment of these systems
in the national interest would require central, unified management.
-- That the interests of the Department of Defense, particularly
in these major collection systems, would grow substantially in
relation to the DCI'authority to influence their design and direct
their use.
-- That the onset of the Cold War would create a critical
need for a national covert action arm, and that a CIA so manned
would fill this need at some further cost to its original mission
and would come to be publicly identified with covert action rather
than with "correlation and evaluation."
That the silence and total secrecy traditionally maintained
by Governments over their intelligence activities would prove
impossible to maintain for a system grown so large and so complex
3
cFrprj
Approved For Release 2005/0'Inft-:tlIk-KIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 20SgaTIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
in its technology, and inappropriate under the American Constitution
for a system playing so pervasive and so critical a role in
decisions vital to the national interest.
In hindsight; the last may have been the fundamental error.
The framers of the Act evidently believed that the British intelligence
tradition of silence and discretion could be maintained in America;
the OSS-trained cadre of CIA were encouraged to follow a path that
was natural to them. Total secrecy was established, but at significant
cost: it prevented the education of the public and all but a few Congress-
men in the realities of intelligence and helped to protect intelligence
itself from the oversight that would have required of it a greater
sensitivity to public interests.
In these circumstances, intelligence had as its political base
only a small group of senior Congressmen who both protected it from
and blocked its exposure to their more liberal colleagues. Thus,
when the national elite of the 1940-1965 period was undercut by the
Vietnam War and by Watergate, and these Congressmen grew too
few to maintain their control, intelligence was exposed tp a rapidly
growing new generation of national leadership that shared neither
its traditions nor its view of the world. The oversight of intelligence
became one battlefield for the generational struggle in Congress.
4
Approved For Release 2005/041/10(sT:p..-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
); -1, t_
aKApproved For Release 2005/01/ . -;1 P86600269R001200210001-4
This new generation, rejecting many of the doctrines of its
predecessors, has tended to return to the doctrines of an earlier
generation yet. The more extreme of its members, attracted by
doctrines rooted in our innocent past and rejecting any suggestion of
realpolitik, would have us reestablish a foreign policy of goodwill
to all. To the revisionist,intelligence seems of little value. Worse,
secrecy seems intrinsically immoral. Thus, some of the new elite
in Congress and the media initially approach intelligence from a
hostile position.
The national turmoil that has fostered these new attitudes has
also had a damaging effect on intelligence security, and this in turn
has created a distorted public image of intelligence. Resistance
to the Vietnam War led to some breakdown in intelligence discipline,
as intelligence was leaked for advantage in partisan debate. When
exposed to the investigative reporting in vogue since Watergate,
some intelligence activities were exposed for the sake of exposure,
or at the behest of a "higher morality." Many skeletons--real and
imagined?were dragged from the intelligence closet. The disclosure
that some activities had in fact been illegal and others injudicious
5
.6** 1:61.-a
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 P86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/RTICR:6TRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
gave ammunition to those hostile to intelligence itself, and a public
encouraged by recent events to believe the worst of its Government
has been tempted to accept at face value the wildest exaggerations and
the most far-fetched imputation of impropriety to legitimate activities.
The American people have thus been given a picture of their
intelligence system that stresses its most lurid aspects and
exaggerates its weaknesses.
Of course, public attitudes toward the problems posed by an
intelligence service in a free society are not homogeneous or even
necessarily consistent. Much of the public gives scant consideration
to the problem of intelligence. Furthermore, the most articulate
segments of the public are not always fully representative of public
attitudes. To the limited extent that generalizations are meaningful,
"the public" probably:
6
Approved For Release 2005/01/0-:ct 4R10p86B00269R001200210001-4
:;4P
Approved For Release 2005/05) . eEIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
-- Wants the benefits and protections of a strong intelligence
structure, though there may be little real understanding of what
that desire implies in specific terms.
-- Wants to be reassured that US intelligence is not a
"rogue elephant," but is both accountable to and effectively
controlled by the public's elected representatives, the President
and the Congress.
These public attitudes are to a degree mirrored by the Congress.
Congress also speaks with a multiplicity of voices. To the extent
that we can generalize about congressional attitudes, they appear
to include the following:
-- A desire for the benefits of a strong intelligence system.
-- A major difference of opinion with the Executive as to the
structural requirements for attaining these benefits, and especially
of the degree of secrecy essential if they are to be attained.
-- A desire for a "correlation and evaluation" entity
independent of any Cabinet department, especially of the Defense
Department and the military services.
-- A recognition of the need for clandestine collection and
covert action operations, at least in some contexts, and an
apparent desire for a larger voice in the approval of covert actions.
7
Approved For Release 2005/01,11-0rc -RiDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005SEZIRDP861300269R001200210001-4
-- A desire for greater access to the intelligence product.
Against this backdrop, the US Government's need for high-quality
intelligence remains acute. For the intelligence officer, the revisionist
idea of a United States foreign policy rising above national interests
has been obsolete ever since the Industrial Revolution set the world
on the road to strategic warfare, economic interdependence, and
ideological struggle unmatched since the Reformation. He knows
the United States needs intelligence, and he knows that today US
intelligence systems must be both large and secret.
To the intelligence officer, if Pearl Harbor was a valid reason
for creating a national intelligence system in 1947, the possibility of
a Soviet first strike is an equally valid reason for strengthening it
today. The argument that nuclear war is unthinkable, or that the
construction of nuclear armaments is driven by the military-industrial
complex, is to him largely irrelevant; as long as the USSR continues
to build and improve its strategic forces, the US must know how and
why.
To the intelligence officer, the knowledge that the world's resources
are finite, and that population growth is rapidly overtaking food and
8
JALA
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/018ECA1P86B00269R001200210001-4
energy supplies, means that national interests once considered
important will soon become vital. When there is not enough to go
around, intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of producers
and consumers becomes as essential to the survival of the United
States as intelligence on Japanese intentions was in 1941.
To the intelligence officer, the turmoil afflicting most of the
world in many cases directly affects American interests; he sees in
this new demands for intelligence on the political and social forces
in foreign societies.
This, then, is the dilemma for American intelligence in 1975.
We see the nation's requirement for foreign intelligence as greater
than ever, yet we have failed to win public acceptance, partly because
public attitudes have changed, partly because our own secrecy has
prevented us from educating the public to the need for intelligence
and to the costs, moral and monetary, of getting it. This, however,
is not the whole problem.
Since 1947, we have evolved procedures and developed techniques
and programs far beyond any conceived at that time. We have added
a new dimension to the concept of intelligence, and have demonstrated
9
..,
Approved For Release 2005/ I
dAC6 -RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0/cCPREIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
to the satisfaction of the Executive--over a number of Administrations--
that a copious flow of quality intelligence is central to the conduct of
national security policy in today's complex world. But our efforts
have sometimes been wasteful and our product sometimes less than
?
optimal, to a considerable extent because the organization and
management of the national intelligence system have kept pace neither
with the complexity of its techniques nor the scope of the requirements
placed upon it. The Act of 1947 provides the DCI with authorities and
an administrative structure quite inadequate for the fulfillment of
his assigned mission under the conditions of 1975. He attempts
therefore to fulfill that mission through an accretion of independent
jerry-built structures, lacking statutory basis, over which he
exercises varying degrees of influence. In short, the Act of 1947
would be out of date even if the system had total public acceptance.
We believe these two sets of needs--to restore public confidence
and to establish an acceptable statutory basis for American intelligence
for the immediate future--are not irreconcilable in any fundamental
way. The President, in meeting congressional requirements for
reforms in the conduct of intelligence, can at the same time meet the
Executive requirement for fundamental improvements in its management.
10
r.:C
Approved For Release 2005/01140 .)01A-FkIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
---- -
Approved For Release 2005/015:QURIP86600269R001200210001-4
Any President will probably:
-- Want a strong intelligence system, including a responsive
covert action capability.
-- Want reassurance that the system is under control--meaning
his control and not anyone else's.
-- Want the system run efficiently, with due regard for
budgetary considerations.
-- Want intelligence activities not to be a source of political
difficulty or embarrassment.
-- Want independent advice, particularly in time of crisis,
from capable people primarily loyal to the Presidency and
independent of the departments that execute policy.
-- Need a system that can function well in both peace and
war, although the problems involved here--e.g., the national/
tactical question--have not been thought through clearly.
The specific attitude of a particular President will be shaped
by his own personality, working style, and confidence in his associates.
Given the formidable efforts involved in being elected President,
holders of this office will likely be strong-minded men inclined to -
place a premium on loyalty in their subordinates. No President is
likely to be charitably disposed toward or extensively use an intelligence
Approved For Release 2005/0'kfl (1? P86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2006)CFP1CREF-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
?
organization--or head thereof--that does not clearly acknowledge
the primacy of its, or his, responsibilities to the Executive Branch
and the President.
This President has an additional requirement. He has already
suffered political embarrassment through revelation of past intelligence
activities today considered by many to be unacceptable. These are
not of his making, a fact that makes it both easier and more necessary
for him to "do something" about intelligence, to show that he is
responsive to the public and congressional mood. He also has an
opportunity. His predecessors saw to varying degrees a need for
structural reform in the intelligence system, reform they were unable
to carry out without amending the National Security Act, which they
were unwilling to consider. Now, however, the Act will be reopened
by Congress in any case.
The problem has two parts. Our intelligence structure must be
made more responsive and efficient to enhance our ability to provide
the best product at least cost. It must also be made more acceptable.
This means that efficiency cannot be achieved simply by rationalization
and centralization of authority. Rather, structural improvements
Approved For Release 2005/
12
-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
?
Approved For Release 2005/018E*ERTP86B00269R001200210001-4
must be accompanied by provisions for external controls and internal
checks and balances, perhaps at a cost in efficiency, in order to
develop public confidence. The public must be satisfied not only
that a computer-driven monster does not threaten the state from
within, but that such a monster cannot be created.
At the same time, the public must be brought to accept the need
for secrecy for those intelligence operations that cannot succeed
without it. This is not impossible. The public accepts--because it
understands--the need for secrecy in a wide range of private and
public matters, from the lawyer-client relationship to the protection
of information about the Federal Reserve's interventions in the
nation's monetary systems. It accepts--when it understands--the
need to commit large public funds to purposes that give at best only
indirect benefit to the taxpayer.
We must seek to reestablish both understandings.
13
Approved For Release 2005/01P1 E4P86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1a4g861300269R001200210001-4
PART It
SECRECY
The introduction above discussed the need to make American
intelligence both more acceptable and more responsive. Responsiveness
is considered in Parts III and IV dealing with the organization and
management of intelligence. Here we are concerned with a major
aspect of the issue of political acceptability: How to reconcile the need
for secrecy in intelligence with increased desires for disclosure and
accountability.
THE SECRECY DILEMMA
The development and maintenance of an American intelligence
structure adequate to the needs of a great power in a thermonuclear
age is beset with a fundamental problem?long latent but now, in the
current climate of political and public opinion, sharply acute.
An intelligence structure cannot function without some measure
of secrecy. Much of what intelligence does must be accomplished in
secret if it is to be accomplished at all. Precisely how much secrecy,
14
Approved For Release 2005/01/1(0 RWRi.)
k
86600269R001200210001-4
VcRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/* (dm-irtoP86B00269R001200210001-4
and of what kinds is a subject open to legitimate debate; but an
intelligence service which cannot keep some things secret--and which
potential foreign collaborators, individual or institutional, do not
consider capable of protecting their secrets--will not be able to function
at all.
Secrecy, especially governmental secrecy, however, runs
against the grain of our cultural traditions. As individuals and as a
nation, we have a strong penchant for openness and an instinctive
aversion to reticence. This cultural penchant--highly sensitized by
the past two years' events--provides a strong competetive incentive to,
and a justifying rationale for, our press in its zealous investigation
and exposure of facts or programs that appear to be hidden or concealed.
The right of public discussion and journalistic disclosure is of course
protected by our Constitution, laws, and courts. Keeping anything secret
in today's climate--especially anything so imperfectly understood and
in some contexts as intrinsically suspect as "intelligence"--is not
fashionable, popular or easy.
15
Approved For Release 2005/0ikgeaA-ADP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
In addition, the reasons advanced for the protection of some
secrets rest on an inadequate and outdated conceptual base. This
sometimes exposes the Government to ridicule and threatens to impair
our ability to protect what must be protected.
TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUAL BASIS
On the whole issue of governmental secrecy, the past two
decades?and particularly the past two years --have seen a major
change in the climate of public and congressional opinion. Until
recently, there would have been widespread agreement among most of
the articulate molders and reflectors of public opinion?including a
predominant majority of Senators and Congressmen--that information
on, about, or related to some subjects fell more or less in the generic
category of "state secrets. " There was continuing debate over the
limits of that generic concept, but there was also widespread agreement
that it encompassed subjects related to, or whose revelation might
adversely affect, the "national security."
For many years, intelligence matters were almost universally
accepted as falling within the "national security" rubric. If anyone made
16
Approved For Release 2005/01116::
4i4P861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0SE1CREIDP86600269R001200210001-4
a specific challenge, the concrete defense for intelligence secrecy was
the need, assumed to be virtually self-evident, to protect intelligence
"sources and methods," a phrase included in the National Security Act
of 1947. The latter concept was even less subject to critical analytic
scrutiny because it clearly lay well within the protective cocoon of what
was, by most definitions, "national security."
Now, however, much has changed. Relatively few people
would publicly defend the existence of a generic class of "state secrets."
The rubric of "national security" is more likely to evoke suspicion, if
not contempt, than automatic acquiescence. As a result, progressively
more attention has been focused on the concept of intelligence "sources
and methods."
Unfortunately, that concept, today, cannot stand much critical
examination. Partly this is because it has been overtaken by technology
and is now outmoded. Prior to and during World War II, a "source"
was generally an individual agent covertly reporting to a government
other than that against which his intelligence activities were directed.
17
Approved For Release 2005/01/14-:\CiAIRDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/S:EcRUP86B00269R001200210001-4
A "method" was also something relatively concrete?e.g., the means
(a secret writing system, a code or cipher, or a secret radio transmitter)
by which the source and his case officer communicated. These once
near-universal meanings, however, are now but limited specific cases.
Many aspects of intelligence that now clearly require protection
from disclosure are impossible to shoehorn into the old "sources and
methods" rubric. To cite but one obvious example, there is an evident
need to protect the resolution and swath width of the cameras in our
reconnaissance satellites. But in so doing, are we protecting a "source"
or a "method?"
Actually, "sources and methods" has become an umbrella
concept covering at least five separate thoughts. These need to be
distinguished if we are to develop a defensible basis for necessary
secrecy in today's climate.
First, there are those aspects of intelligence activity which
truly require secrecy for their protection and which, if known, would
enable those against whom intelligence activities are directed (whether
collection or covert action) to take countermeasures that would hamper,
18
Approved Far Release 2005/010p irciFfeTP86B00269R001200210001-4
AT') EURL
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/16: CIA:RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
or prevent, the conduct of these activities. This concept encompasses
those things traditionally, and properly, defined as "sources and
methods"--e.g., the identities of agents and their techniques of
clandestine communication. It also includes, however, the resolution
and swath width of cameras.
Second, there is information about generic methods of collection,
support, processing or analysis which, if known, could reduce the
effectiveness of existing or future sources of intelligence, compromise
their usefulness, or reveal new ways of handling, collating and analyzing
data. Examples might include cryptologic methods, specifics about a
Third, there is information about research and development
activities which, if known, could suggest to an opponent of the US new
and unthought of ways of collecting, processing or analyzing intelligence
data. Examples include certain research and development activities
25X1
19
r --
Approved Far Release 2005/01/10S EAAIWIT6B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 205EggIlA-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
Fourth, there is information which conveys official views,
perceptions or policies concerning another country which could reveal
to that country the extent of our understanding of its internal parties,
foreign policy, military forces, economic strategies or technology.
An example might be a document which revealed the USG's failure to
perceive the importance of the Soviet cruise missile effort.
Finally, there is information about US intelligence relationships
with a foreign government or intelligence about that country which if
publicly available could cause internal political dissension in that
country; or which, if available to the intelligence service of another
country, could be used to cause the government of the second country
serious political embarrassment. The existence of a CIA station in a
given foreign country is an example, even though the station's existence
is declared to the host government and well known to all or our major
adversaries. This example illustrates an aspect of the secrecy problem
today. Trying to defend US official silence about the station's existence
on "national security" or "sources and methods" grounds in the current
climate is difficult. It leaves the defender open to such awkward questions
20
Approved
-
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/014ZIP86B00269R001200210001-4
as "what justification is there for concealing from the American
people something well known to the Russians?" The "fact of"
satellite reconnaissance is another example. Discretion?and official
reticence--about such matters is defensible, but the defense has to
be based on the need for adhering to the unwritten conventions governing
intercourse between nations or the sensibilities of a given nation
without whose benevolence certain essential activities cannot be
conducted. An attempt to defend such reticence on the broad ground
that protection requires secrecy only serves to damage the plausibility
of the secrecy argument where it is truly applicable.
Enough has been said to demonstrate that there is a fundamental
need to rethink what precisely it is about intelligence that needs protection
and to identify the level of protection needed.
We believe that work should begin now on a legislative proposal
to develop a sounder basis for the classification and protection of intelli-
gence information, the proposal should be applicable to the entire
Intelligence Community,* and it should establish a statutory basis for
*We recognize that this issue extends beyond intelligence
information and thus, raises issues relating to the
classification of information in other areas.
Approved For Release 2005/01 rIlettIWP86B00269R001200210001-4
k .1AL
Approved For Release 2005/01/1u : ..,u-k-ruir86600269R001200210001-4
the protection of intelligence information. Most important, it should
be characterized by logical, defensible, and easily applied criteria for
classifying information which requires protection. The basic need is
to develop criteria which do not rely directly upon the concept of
"national security, " a basis which, because it is no longer widely
accepted, endangers our ability to protect what must be protected.
Such an approach should also provide for regular declassification, with
sufficiently long time periods to protect human and technical sources,
and some means of enforcing the protection of information.
. Consideration should be given to the concept that a determination
to protect information because it may reveal "the fact of" a certain
program is not a matter of intelligence concern, but rather relates to
the President's conduct of foreign relations. Thus, determinations of the
need for classification of such facts or activities might be made by the
National Security Council, with the advice of the DCI.
Because we need to reach a new consensus on this issue, it is
important that this problem be addressed in law. This will encourage
22
Orr P!-?
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1STfTT86B00269R001200210001-4
public debate and help to produce an agreed-upon basis for future
consideration of issues of secrecy. Tactically, there could be major
advantages to the President in taking the initiative on this problem.
Although it may be argued that the possibility of Congress
acting on such legislation now is slight, the ensuing debate would be a
giant step forward in informing Congress and the American people of
the problems of intelligence gathering for a free society. The real
issues could be isolated and clarified, a set of groundrules better than
those provided in Executive Order 11652 could be written, and Congress
might be brought to accept the pertinence of this issue.
23
Q r2LTS
- Approved For Release 2005/01/10):Luk-mui-r86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0101TMETP86B00269R001200210001-4
01? ,
PART III
? ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
PROBLEMS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
For many laymen the "intelligence problem" today is one of
combatting an assault on civil liberties. For the professional intelligence
officer, who believes that domestic civil liberties are not seriously
threatened by US foreign intelligence activities, the problem is
different. For him, the problem is that the US has a good foreign
intelligence system, but one that could be better. This paper addresses
then the organization and management of US intelligence from the
point of view of the professional, describing the present state of
US intelligence and cataloguing some of its problems. It cannot be
too strongly stated that, because we are proposing changes, our
emphasis is necessarily on those things we think need to be changed,
and not on the many strengths of American intelligence. Equally
important, it must be noted that our concern with the organization
and management of intelligence is based on a conviction that these
issues are important determinants of the ultimate quality of the
Z4
Approved For Release 2005/010p1WRIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
OLA,CCILI
Approved For Release 2005/01/W-C,R-UP861300269R001200210001-4
intelligence product: its scope, perceptiveness, timeliness and even
availability. The paper discusses:
-- The central role of the DCI as it is on paper.
-- His relations with the Department of Defense: why his
role on paper is more than it is in practice.
-- The management of CIA: why it competes for his attention
with his responsibilities toward the Community.
-- How various DCIs and Administrations have handled the
job, and how it appears at the time of writing.
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE DCI
Statutory Basis
The present American intelligence structure derives from the
National Security Act of 1947, particularly that Act's Section 102.
Laying the foundation for a national intelligence structure was neither
the primary purpose of that legislation, however, nor the topic on
which its drafters focused the bulk of their attention. Their main
purpose was to merge the old War and Navy Departments into a new
Department of Defense, establish an Air Force as a separate service,
and sketch the outlines of a National Security Council. The intelligence
25
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2U/c1RUCIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
portions of the Act were secondary. The Act's legislative history
suggests that those who wrote its intelligence sections knew they were
venturing into uncharted waters without a clear idea of where they
wanted to go or the practical implications of their legislative
pronouncements. There is also a suggestion that they planned a
second look at the intelligence portions of the Act in a few years to
make more permanent arrangements in the light of experience.
They certainly do not seem to have thought that they were laying a
foundation which would last without significant legislative change for
more than a quarter of a century.
The Act implicitly makes the DCI the leader of something that
has come to be called the "Intelligence Community. " It does not,
however, specify his functions beyond providing that he should "correlate
and evaluate" and "perform...services of common concern...[that] can
more efficiently be accomplished centrally. " Nor does it provide him
with specific authorities over the agencies that make up the Community.
The President's letter of November 1971 elaborated and made
explicit certain responsibilities only implicit in the Act., In so doing,
it increased the DCI's responsibilities without increasing his powers-.
26
Approved For Release 2005/0 104C1ARDP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Nue He was directed to:
-- Prepare and advise the President on a consolidated intelligence
budget, and advise on the allocation of intelligence resources.
-- Produce "national intelligence."
-- Chair and staff all Community boards and committees
which were now only to be advisory to him.
411
The Three Roles of the DCI
On the rather frail skeleton provided by these two documents*
there has grown by accretion a congeries of bureaucratic mechanisms,
doctrines, and the equivalent of common law that centers on and
depends on the institution that we call the DCI. To understand it,
one must first define some terms. First, what is the national
intelligence that the DCI is supposed to produce? Second, what are
the functions he must carry out to produce it? Third, what is the
Much of the following discussion is in terms of formal responsibilities
and authorities. It should be recognized, however, that the effective-
ness of each DCI has been directly proportional to the confidence
placed in him by the President and Congress and the belief of
his collegues in the Community that he had that confidence.
27
n
Approved For Release 2005/01/4iJibIA-ROP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1S KAU 86600269R001200210001-4
Community he is supposed to lead? Fourth, what management tools
are available to him as leader?
-- National intelligence is here defined simply as that foreign
intelligence needed by the senior levels of Government to do their
job in making and implementing policy. (NSCID #1 defines it
as intelligence that transcends the concern of any single department
or agency and that is fully coordinated among all of them; this
remains on the books but is no longer a particularly useful concept.)
-- For the purpose of this paper six functions related to
the production of national intelligence are postulated: collection,
processing, analysis*, the presentation of analysis, R&D, and
support. Of these collection, analysis, and presentation are
primary, and appropriate slices of processing, R&D, and support
can be allocated between them. Covert action, broadly defined,
is a seventh function. It cannot be directly related to the production
By "analysis" here is meant the process of transforming raw data
into the finished intelligence that is delivered to the consumer. The
process is often called "production, " and it is in this narrower
sense that the word "production" is used elsewhere in these papers.
28
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/6ECREIDP861300269R001200210001-4
of national intelligence, although it is thoroughly tangled up
with the collection aspect.
"The Community" is usually thought of as the membership
of USIB, but this question is considerably more complicated.
There could be said to be four communities, each with a few
primary members and several peripheral ones. These are the
communities of collectors, of producers, of consumers, and of
resource managers. The membership and structure--if any--of
each community is different. (While the membership of the
40 Committee could be considered a fifth, or "action" community,
it would be more accurate to describe the DCIls action function as one
carried out through a chain of command from the President to
the Assistant for National Security Affairs to the DCI. ) A
detailed discussion of the various communities is included in
Annex A.
-- Management tools or controls can be direct or indirect.
Direct control of course means line authority. For intelligence,
we have identified four possible instruments by which authority
can be exercised indirectly: (a) the management of resources,
including manpower, money, and?peculiar to intelligence--cover;
29
?V;:14:
ccioi
Approved For Release 2005/01/1'0' 14) 86600269R001200210001-4
SFCRT
Approved For Release 2005/1't : C -RDP86600269R001200210001-4
(b) collection management, by which we mean the allocation of
collection resources to substantive problems, tasking and re-
quirements, the continuing review and assessment of collection
results, and the establishment of requirements for new systems;
(c) product review, which includes both the final shaping of the
intelligence product to match the needs of the national consumer
and a continuing evaluation of the product against those needs;
and (d) inspection. Note that all of these except inspection are
interdependent and operate at the interfaces between the various
communities.
It is apparent that the DCI is a member in some sense of all the
communities identified above. It is also apparent that he wears three
hats--as Presidential adivsor, as head of "the Community" (Chairman
of USIB, IRAC, and EXCOM), and as Director of CIA--but his hats
by no means correspond fully with the four functional communities.
Moreover, he has responsibilities to the Congress that represent
another complicating factor. (The DCI's congressional responsibilities
are discussed elsewhere but introduced here because they are closely
related to his Executive roles.)
30
Approved For Release 2005/019.(ce rAP861300269R001200210001-4
SNRET
Approved For Release 2005/w1/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
-- The DCI as Presidential advisor. In this capacity he is
the primary source of national intelligence for the President and
the NSC. He personally advises the President and the NSC on
all intelligence matters, including budget, and serves on the
various NSC sub-Committees. (To a considerable degree, it
is on his access to the President int hese capacities that his
ability to carry out his other functions in practice depends.)
If the President wishes, the DCI can also advise on broader foreign
policy matters.
-- The DCI as head of the Community. This DCI is the
primary source of national intelligence for the Federal Government and
is its senior intelligence advisor. He coordinates to varying
degrees administrative and operational matters that concern more
than one agency. He advises the President on the Community
budget. For the Congress, he provides intelligence, defends
the Community budget, and advises on all foreign intelligence
matters.
-- The DCI as Director of CIA. As DCLA, the DCI is a
line officer administering a large independent agency under the
31
nFrr)r,,'
Approved FOr Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RD 86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10: CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
NSC. He is a producer of intelligence for the mechanisms over
which he presides wearing his other two hats. Quite distinct
from these roles, he has a specialized line function as the agent
of the President, or of the NSC, in the conduct of foreign
policy through covert action. For the Congress, this DCI too
is a source of foreign intelligence. Congress expects him to
present and defend CIA's budget, and to account for its per-
formance. He is required to inform the Congress of covert
action programs and defend them as required.
32
rriDVT
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0'141-) dl*RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Schematically, the DCI's various roles and
functions can be illustrated as follows:
Executive
Congressional
s Presidential
dviser
s leader of
ommunity
S Director of
IA
-Provides national
intelligence
-Advises on intelligence
-Can advise on foreign
policy
-Produces national
intelligence
-Advises on Community
budget
-Coordinates Community---
-Produces intelligence---
-Runs Agency
-Carries out covert
action programs
-Acts as Presidential
agent to foreign
governments.
Provides intelligence
Defends Community
budget
Advises on intelligence
Provides intelligence
(Defends Agency Budget
(Accounts for its
(activities
Informs on (and defen7....
covert action programs
It should be noted that in several ways his Executive and Congres-
sional roles do not match up.
33
Cbc'
Approved Far Release 2005/01'11OVR P86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10:
g00269R001200210001-4
Authorities of the DCI
Charts such as this are misleading, for they suggest the DCI
has great authority. This is true more in principle than in fact.
The DCI has direct or line authority only over those elements of
the collection and production communities that are part of CIA.
USIB is, on paper at least, only advisory to him as its Chairman,
but USIB in fact is concerned only with National Estimates, etc.,
and even the "observers" have the right to dissent. Beyond this
point the DCI can only persuade or appeal to the President, a sanction
that must be used sparingly.
Managers within the Community thus are responsive to their
own line superiors or to those who control their budgets. It is
in fact possible for a staff officer who controls resources to exert
as strong an influence over an organization as its nominal
superior at least on some issues, viz. ASD/I over NSA. In intelligence
as elsewhere, money talks.
There is no single manager for an enterprise so complex and so
expensive as the national intelligence system we have evolved. The
existing machinery is so encrusted with the scars of old bureaucratic
34
-ECRET
r
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/K1 RELTRDP86BOO269ROOI200210001-4
wars as to sometimes make it inflexible in meeting new challenges,
and there is some duplication and inefficiency. The DCI lacks the
power to rationalize this structure. Not only does he lack direct
authority, but his ability to use the indirect management devices we
have identified is at best limited.
-- In the resource field his nominal authority to advise
is further reduced by Defense's
intelligence budget and sometimes by the DCI's inability to
acquire important information on resource issues in timely
fashion. A full discussion of this problem follows in the next
section.
-- In collection management, the DCI has no single mechanism
cutting across systems. As head of the "Community" he has
a set of USIB Committees, developed ad hoc and operating
independently, to administer individual systems. They range
from the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX) which is elaborately developed and in which he has
strong influence, to the Human Sources Committee which is
rudimentary and through which his influence over Foreign Service
reporting is much less strong. It should be noted also that
35
Approved For Release 2005/01/1.1 Ii861300269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
important collection management decisions are often made outside
this structure, in IRAC, in EXCOM, although with the DCI's
participation, or between individual producers and collectors,
or by individual system managers acting on their own. AnnexB
deals in greater detail with these matters.
-- The DCI's authority in product review is more fully
established than in any other field, probably because it was so
clearly the intent of the 1947 Act to give him this power. He
exercises it through USIB's consideration of National Estimates,
through the less formal procedures of current intelligence, and
through his contribution to the NSC and its sub-Committees.
The Act that set up the DCI also authorized the continuing production
of departmental intelligence, and the distinction between departmental
and national gets exceedingly blurred at senior policy levels.
Departmental views regularly bypass the national system.
Mechanisms for the evaluatory, or consumer response, aspect
of product review are less structured and much less effective.
A further analysis of national intelligence production appears as
Annex C.
36
(J- r-C1114
0- 1
Approved For Release 2005/0111:. I - P86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01gTRIP86B00269R001200210001-4
The DCI has never asserted, much less exercised, the
right formally to inspect, in the traditional sense, intelligence
agencies other than CIA, although such a right is implicit
to some degree in the basic statutes and directives.
We believe it is clear that at the national level resource management,
collection management, and product review and evaluation should
all be parts of an integrated system. In fact, although a beginning
has been made in relating these functions systematically to one
another, they are fragmented.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Through the preceding discussion runs a common thread: the
difficulty the DCI has in dealing with the Department of Defense.
The drafters of the Act did not address this squarely in 1947, and
it remains a fundamental problem in 1975, one that has blocked the
creation of a coherent national intelligence system. In the absence
of a clearly understood and mutually agreed broad relationship between
the DCI and Defense, the best each side can hope for is compromise
and improvisation to bridge fundamental differences of view affecting
a wide range of issues.
37
Approved For Release 2005/(14zti s IMIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
?, , i
FACRrET
Approved For Release 2005/01/1u : Clm-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
These differences fundamentally affect the overall management
of national intelligence and, ultimately, the intelligence product.
The responsibility d the Secretary of Defense in peace is to prepare
the forces needed to defend the nation; in war to fight and win it.
These responsibilities dictate certain organizational, programmatic,
and other needs. The responsibility of the DCI in peace is to produce
intelligence for a variety of national purposes, a responsibility which
is also mirrored in his programs and priorities. His responsibility
in war is nowhere defined.
It has been argued that this difference is irrelevant, that in
peacetime missions can be made more or less compatible given a
certain amount of goodwill and that major war, in the unlikely case
it ever comes, will make any extant arrangements meaningless
in any event. This argument misses the point, however. Wartime
requirements have for Defense a critical impact on peacetime
priorities and organization as do peacetime requirements on the
DCI. Defense must plan for war, regardless of its likelihood or
consequences, if only to prevent it, and must assure itself in peace
that it will have the intelligence capabilities it will need in war.
Defense takes this responsibility seriously; it would be derelict
38
Approved For Release 2005/0107 ITFRIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/019ENDRP86B00269R001200210001-4
in its duty if it did less. In so doing, however, its interests often
run counter to the broader interests of the DCI.
Different Customers
The basic difference in mission and responsibility outlined above
is reflected in differing perceptions of the ultimate customers of
the intelligence product. The DCI must serve the President, National
Security Council and its staff, the senior economic policy officers, and,
to the extent he is invited, the leadership of State and Defense.
Defense intelligence, on the other hand, must serve a clientele that
is both narrower and broader. It must meet the needs of the National
Command Authority (NCA)--the single chain of command reaching
from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff--and of the entire range of field commanders.
For his customers, the DCI must provide intelligence across
the entire spectrum of national interests. He recognizes the importance
of major strategic questions and must also give attention to the large
economic and political issues which will be central concerns of our
foreign policy for the rest of the century. For the NCA? however,
military questions must be paramount and must be considered from
39
r,..Trpt:T
Approved For Release 2005/01/1O-:'-OlAtRIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 206EGRETA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
both the strategic and the operational viewpoint. The field commander
at every level needs intelligence in great detail on the forces and
weapons that might oppose him. Moreover, he must amass it in
peacetime if he is to be effective in war. He believes he must
exercise the collection assets that will support him in war, both to
collect intelligence and to train them for their wartime missions.
These institutional differences are reinforced by the attitudinal
ones that are standard to civilian-military relations. There is
understandable resistance in Defense, particularly in the uniformed
military, to the concept that civilian outsiders should provide independent
analyses to the President which affect decisions regarding US military
11111 forces.
Thus, there is a divergence of national and departmental intelligence
interests writ large. This can be seen in what we have called
the "transition problem" which is our shorthand description of the
fact that Defense fights hard to assert control over certain technical
collection assets in peace because it will need them in war. It can
be seen in the closely related "national-tactical problem,." where,
40
(17
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SCRET.L
Approved For Release 2005/utiu : CIA-KDP86B00269R001200210001-4
because tactical intelligence needs must increasingly be met by centrally
controlled national systems, Defense must try to assert effective
control over those systems. It can be seen with respect to the
"crisis management problem, " and particularly recent Defense efforts
to establish an Extended National Military Command Center. Finally,
it can be seen in the resources world where the DCI's attempts to
assert a staff responsibility with respect to Defense intelligence
budgetary matters finds some resistance.
The Transition of National Intelligence to War
The transition problem arises from the absence of a coherent
national plan for the evolution of control over intelligence systems
from peacetime through crisis to war. In peacetime, centrally managed
technical collection systems such as the NRP and the CCP are tasked
by a variety of mechanisms?in which the DCI's voice ranges from
dominant to marginal. In wartime, it is generally understood that
these systems should be responsive to military needs.
There are however large grey areas in times of peace and
particularly in times of "crisis. " At what point in a crisis should
control be passed to Defense?
41
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2008ECRETk-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Defense naturally seeks to define this point as far toward the peace
end of the spectrum as possible. The DCI, however, must insist
that political and even economic considerations remain at least as
important to the President as military ones until the actual outbreak
of hostilities. Independent political assessment is essential if the
door is to be kept open for negotiations and war to be avoided. To
turn intelligence support of the President to an organization for which
intelligence is secondary to operations, i.e., fighting a war, is to make
military considerations overriding. There is a grave danger that in
the absence of independent assessment of enemy intentions the actions
and reactions of opposing forces will acquire a momentum of their own.
This is clearly a dilemma. In the absence of a basic understanding
between Defense and the DCI, both wage bureaucratic guerrilla
warfare to extend their control over individual collection systems
in peace. Should a major crisis arise, various assets would be
transferred to Defense piecemeal, in confusion and bitterness, and
with a sharp drop in efficiency at the time the nation needs efficiency
most. Again it may be argued that this eventuality is too far-fetched
to matter in the light of real present-day national concerns. Perhaps
it is, but because Defense takes it seriously, it will continue to block
42
Approved For Release 2005/01/10-: ulm-KuPd6B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
the development of an efficient, coherent peacetime system directed
at those concerns until the civilian authorities accept Defense's wartime
concerns as equally valid.
The Merging of National and Tactical Intelligence
The question of national versus tactical requirements, while
as much a problem for the Secretary of Defense as it is for the DCI,
gives a new dimension to their wartime-peacetime dilemma. Until
a few years ago, tactical intelligence was collected for the field
commander by assets under his control. The more significant of ?
this intelligence was passed to the next echelon above and by successive
steps of selection and aggregation became an input to national
intelligence. In return, general conclusions on enemy doctrine,
tactics, and weaponry were passed clown through the chain for the
background use of the field commander.
In such a system the DCI had neither responsibility nor great
interest. He was only brought into the problem formally in 1971
when he was made in some way responsible for budgetary aspects of
tactical intelligence by the President's letter. This was done partly
because, given the growing capability of tactical intelligence assets,
43
r
Approved For Release 2005/6 k
/1 14DP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 1-Sl1'86B00269R001200210001-4
it was thought necessary to consider whether money could be saved
by using these assets in peacetime for national purposes, a concept
that put the DCI squarely at odds with the military from the JCS
on down. Even if he had not been given this budgetary responsibility,
however, we believe the DCI will increasingly be forced to involve
himself deeply in tactical questions, because these questions have
become thoroughly entangled with national ones.
To fight an enemy equipped with nuclear weapons, misslies,
and sophisticated electronics, the field commander needs equally
sophisticated intelligence support, often of the kind that can only be
provided by national collection and analytic assets. Moreover, the
kNitiore rapid pace of modern war means that this support must be provided
in something approaching real time.
On the other hand, the perspective from the national view has
changed as well. When even the most minor incident can rapidly
escalate into strategic warfare, the national authorities must have
timely and accurate intelligence on activities which in the past would
have seemed purely local and tactical in character. (Events in Berlin
in 1961 when the President was directly following by radio the actions
44
p
Approved For Release 2005/01110?:\CIALRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/SEGIRUP86B00269R001200210001-4
of individual Soviet tanks are instructive in this regard.) Moreover,
local military activities can be of great political significance at the
national level.
The
opens an era in which many, if not all,
centrally managed collection systems essential for national purposes
will have capabilities equally essential for tactical support.
These considerations suggest that, if the US is to field effective
military forces in the next few years, it will have to develop an
integrated military intelligence system incorporating both strategic
and tactical interests and serving both the NCA and the field commander.
It can be argued that development of such a system is a departmental
responsibility for Defense. This is true as far as it goes, but because
of its scale and because of the many overlaps with national concerns
and with national intelligence assets, such a system will tend to
displace the national one unless it is incorporated within a larger
system devoted to all national intelligence purposes including the tactical.
This is obviously a responsibility of the DCI, and he is already being
forced to deal fragmentarily with some of its aspects--a, danger in
itself to comprehensive national planning. The questions of
45
Approved For Release 2005/0191iCaRCDP86B00269R001200210001-4
%NW
25X1
F r.
Approved For Release 2005/010r:tALEP861300269R001200210001-4
Crisis Management and the Extended National Military Command Center
Many of the issues between the DCI and Defense are illustrated
by Defense's current plans for the "Extended National Military
Command Center" as the national center for crisis management.
The ENMCC, which is to incorporate a "National Military Intelligence
Center," is to serve the NCA. There is no provision for the Secretary
of State, the DCI, or the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs in Defense's emergency plans.
The concept of the ENMCC is of course valid for the conduct
of military affairs in wartime. It is not well adapted, however, to
national security policy making in conditions short of general war.
Here, as we have noted, most decisions have political and often
economic, as well as military, dimensions. The Secretary of State
and the DCI both have a not inconsiderable role to play. This is presently
reflected in the membership of the NSC and its sub-Committees and
in the flow of intelligence to those bodies. In established practice,
46
f
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005LEC: RDP86600269R001200210001-4
the arena for crisis management is one of those Committees, Vv-SAG,
and the DCI is responsible for its intelligence support.
Defense is proposing that the ENMCC serve this function and that
all intelligence be directed to it. Such an arrangement would have
the effect of excluding the Secretary of State and DCI from Presidential
consideration of policy, not only in general war but in a broad range
of politico-military crises. Again, when does a situation become
a crisis? At what point in a crisis does the military security of the
nation override political considerations? And can such a system be
effective in crisis if it is not functioning effectively when no crisis
exists? The ENMCC concept, intentionally or not, will sharply
reduce the influence of the DCI in crisis situations if accepted as
designed.
Another potential related problem is in the area of tasking
collection systems. The NMIC is to contain a central tasking facility
which in crisis is to control
NSA's assets, CIA's stations, and all other collection systems
in support of the NCA. These plans are moving forward, with minimal
reference to the DCI. Again the fact that a system is being developed
47
rij t.
Approved For Release 2005/01Y161:X-RbP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01SEGRELP 86600269R001200210001-4
I
to function in general war is acting to distort arrangements for serving
the broader national interests in times of peace or crisis short of
general war.*
The DCI and Defense's Budgetary Process
Our final point about the overall DCI-Defense relationship concerns
the DCI's staff resource review responsibilities with respect to all
intelligence activities.
We have noted that the DCI has a responsibility under the November
1971 letter to propose solutions, balancing national and departmental
interests, to the problems catalogued above. It is difficult to strike
such a balance when the resources of a single department far outweigh those of
all the others combined, including those which the DCI can himself
marshall. We can identify at least four ways in which the DCI's
ability to exercise the responsibility he has is limited in practice.
It should be noted that the creation of NMIC, as a mechanism for
focusing military intelligence requirements and for supporting the JCS
and the CINC's, meets long-established and important needs. The
problem is how to make it compatible with the DCI's interests and fit
it into national decision-making machinery.
48
Approved For Release 2005/01311:1MAARUP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1CSSIR
6600269R001200210001-4
First, the November 1971 do.4y changed none of the legal authorities
which charge the Secretary of Defense with sole responsibility for
decisions on Defense programs. Regardless of what any DCI may
conclude about how Defense allocates its intelligence resources,
it is the Secretary of Defense who is in the last analysis responsible
for these decisions and accountable to the President and Congress
for them. Clearly, the November 1971 letter was not intended to
change the SecDef's line authorities. Rather, the intent of the letter
was to give the DCI a staff responsibility to the President on Intelligence
Community matters, a role which is of course compatible with
Defense's continued exercise of its line responsibility for budgetary
matters. However, Defense has, from time to time and not unreasonably,
been reluctant to share information about resource recommendations
with the DCI in sufficient time to enable him to have significant impact
on the decision-making process. In fact, the DCI has no machinery
to force rational decision making about a large number of problems
in which both he and Defense have important interests. The
establishment of the NMIC and
examples.
49
are good 25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 ? PAIRPIP861300269R001200210001-4
SEUAr-1
Partly this is due to the fact that final congressional decisions
on the current year Defense budget have, at least in the recent past,
been made in November and December after extended negotiations
between the Executive Branch and Congress. The need to pull together
a current year program halfway through the fiscal year and to present
a rational budget for the following year, given the enormous size
of the Defense budget, the literally thousands of decisions which must
be made, and the very short time available to finish the task, forces
reliance on a process in which fairly arbitrary numbers are handed
out to a variety of program managers and the related Service components
late in the year. The program managers themselves and the Services
must decide how they will live with the levels they have been given.
It has proven extremely difficult for the DCI to involve himself or
his staff effectively in this important part of the decision-making process
which is generally compressed into a very short time period.
25X1 Also, Defense expenditures for intelligence,
represent
only about 5 percent of the total Defense budget. Any decision about
intelligence within the total Defense budget is relatively minor in
50
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0) FIC:
REIDP86600269R001200210001-4
comparison with major issues relating to weapons procurement,
the overall size of our standby military forces, and so forth. It
can be difficult for top Defense management to give major attention
to an issue which looms large in the Intelligence Community but
which is of very minor consequence when considered in the context
of the total Defense budget.
Finally, the cumulative action of many Congresses over decades
has contributed to the problems which face a DCI, or a Secretary of
Defense, in trying to involve himself deeply and effectively in the
myriad details which characterize the USG's intelligence programs.
The various intelligence programs described above are funded from
a variety of different appropriations made to different organizations
within the Pentagon. The numbers of people who must participate
in the decision making about the Consolidated Cryptologic Program,
for example, make difficult the conduct of a comprehensive review
of the resource requirements of the total program and will always
frustrate an outsider who lacks the necessary time or information
to do much more than monitor the process by which these programs
are "shoehorned" into the arbitrary overall totals.
51
RE. 1
Approved For Release 2005/0gPCIA-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/05g.g1DP86600269R001200210001-4
Consequences of the DCI-Defense Impasse
The DCI's responsibility to provide national intelligence argues
that there be established a system in which national needs can be
balanced against the departmental needs of Defense, including those
of the tactical commands, but Defense's control over the bulk of
the Community's collection resources helps prevent this. On
the other hand, it is also true that the DCI's statutory authority and
influence has helped prevent Defense from establishing unilaterally
a coherent departmental system. This situation serves no one.
52
C Cr
Approved For Release 2005/0'%0 . /r- DP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1S Erri86B00269R001200210001-4
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The DCIls relationship with the Secretary of State is less
complex than that with the Secretary of Defense. (We speak here
of the general relationship, not of the unusual situation created by
the dual responsibilities of Dr. Kissinger. ) It is also less troublesome,
but there are nonetheless a number of important and persistent problems.
-- As Defense resists independent intelligence assessment
and reporting on matters affecting the military, State resists
on matters affecting diplomacy. On the other hand, the DCI needs
State support to strengthen the civilian hand in intelligence
assessment.
-- The most important single source of political and economic
intelligence is Foreign Service reporting. State does not consider
this to be intelligence and will accept only a loose linkage between
it and intelligence requirement mechanisms.
-- Covert action is, or should be, the subject of close
coordination with State both in Washington and in the field.
53
Approved FOr Release 2005/01/111-::.0414086B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : Clfkft-
01.
1170269R001200210001-4
-- The Intelligence Community must work with State through
INR, but INR has little influence over the operational arms of
State that control most matters of vital importance to intelligence.
Some of these problems would undoubtedly yield to the increased
general authorities we propose for the DGI. There does not exist,
however, any mechanism by which the entire range of Community-
State relationships can be regulated at a senior level. We believe
there should be an arrangement whereby the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs is charged with these matters in the
Department, and the DCI is charged with coordination between
him and the Community elements concerned.
THE DCI AS MANAGER OF CIA
Production
Managing the Community against the weight of Defense would be
by itself an overwhelming responsibility, but the DCI must also
54
?ucpt.r
Approved For Release 2005/011 k: blAZROP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1S FOLI861300269R001200210001-4
manage CIA. For CIA, like the Community is not the organization
Congress thought it was creating in 1947. CIA did not evolve its
present structure by reasoned design, but through pragmatic response
to challenges as they arose.
Congress, working with its investigation of Pearl Harbor freshly
in mind, was seeking to ensure through CIA that never again would
the US Government be disadvantaged because it failed to consider
as a whole all the information available to its parts. An agency
set up for this purpose could however serve other necessary purposes
as well, and the rest of Section 102(d) authorizes CIA to carry out
a number of additional functions largely unspecified beyond "correlation
and evaluation." It is clear, however, that for those who wrote th.c
Act these other purposes were secondary.
Seen in the context of Pearl Harbor--and of Hiroshima--Congress
obviously meant by "intelligence relating to the national security"
political and military intelligence of a strategic nature with emphasis
on its military aspects. (Peacetime applications of national intelligence
in support of diplomacy or of economic policy were apparently given
little if any weight. ) Moreover, Congress was acting in response
55
nerTITT
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1S FOLI861300269R001200210001-4
manage CIA. For CIA, like the Community is not the organization
Congress thought it was creating in 1947. CIA did not evolve its
present structure by reasoned design, but through pragmatic response
to challenges as they arose.
Congress, working with its investigation of Pearl Harbor freshly
in mind, was seeking to ensure through CIA that never again would
the US Government be disadvantaged because it failed to consider
as a whole all the information available to its parts. An agency
set up for this purpose could however serve other necessary purposes
as well, and the rest of Section 102(d) authorizes CIA to carry out
a number of additional functions largely unspecified beyond "correlation
and evaluation." It is clear, however, that for those who wrote th.c
Act these other purposes were secondary.
Seen in the context of Pearl Harbor--and of Hiroshima--Congress
obviously meant by "intelligence relating to the national security"
political and military intelligence of a strategic nature with emphasis
on its military aspects. (Peacetime applications of national intelligence
in support of diplomacy or of economic policy were apparently given
little if any weight. ) Moreover, Congress was acting in response
55
nerTITT
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 SCKFRELB00269R001200210001-4
requirements to tasking or to R&D and the resource decisions whicit
both flow from and control this process have come more and more
to depend on an independent substantive evaluation capability. Over
time, therefore, CIA developed an analytic and production capability
in virtually all fields of major national importance.
Operations
Long before this had been achieved, however, CIA had become
a powerful arm of Government through the rapid development of its
espionage and covert action capabilities. This came about because
the CIA Congress created seemed a convenient place to lodge the
remaining operational elements of OSS. Almost by accident, therefore,
a CIA supposed to concentrate on correlation and evaluation was
staffed with a cadre of clandestine operators steeped in the security
discipline and no-holds-barred tradition of World War II. The
onset of the Cold War and the clear need for extensive covert action
programs if Communism was to be contained gave a tremendous
impetus to an organization already inclined in that direction, and
successive DCI's devoted much attention to this aspect of their
responsibilities. Their preoccupation had an important impact both
on the DCI's bureaucratic position--the more he was seen as leader
57
Approved For Release 2005/04ffiflpP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01K3REfr86B00269R001200210001-4
of a single operating agency, however strong, the less he could claim
to preside over the entire intelligence effort--and on the public image
of CIA?clandestine operations are sexy; correlation and evaluation
are not.
58
c_r_
Approved FOr Release 2005/01/10):LCM-HOR86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
4101.0,
Approved For Release 2005/01/1EECCIAT86600269R001200210001-4
Science and Technology
A third major influence in the growth of CIA--also unforeseen
in 1947--has been technology. Beginning with a modest analytic
effort against Soviet science on the one hand and with the development
of the U-2 on the other CIA has over 20 years developed major national
assets both for technical analysis and for technical collection. These
two aspects were tied together in the early '60's by the creation
of the Science and Technology Directorate.
Management
The three Directorates, of Intelligence, Operations, and Science
and Technology developed virtually independently of one another and
came to have quite distinct and perhaps introverted characters.
(The Support Directorate too has its individuality, but is better integrated
with the others. ) In effect, CIA has largely been managed at the
directorate level, with all threads ultimately coming together in
the office of the DCI, an institution that has traditionally, been very
leanly manned indeed.
59
%Eca4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 . I R P86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
This is not to imply that the directorates do not cooperate but
rather that close cooperation is achieved through treaties among
virtually independent entities. The DCI is in effect a feudal lord
over four baronies. He, and only he, can adjudicate among them.
(For a number of reasons, no DCI has yet found it possible to dele-
gate in any meaningful way to his deputy.) The result is a further
burden on the DCI.
DCI'S AND THEIR MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY, 1947-75
Their Approaches
Faced with such a bewildering array of functions and organizations,
each DCI has chosen to concentrate on a part of his responsibilities.
Dulles saw himself primarily as director of the Government's
covert arm. McCone saw himself as Presidential advisor*,
and found CIA a useful instrument for that purpose. Raborn never
decided what he was. Helms concentrated on the management of the
Agency; under Johnson, he functioned to some extent as advisor but
* Significantly, only McCone chose to do battle with Defense on
resource matters, and even he was not notably successful.
60
Q,Frjlit
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 P861300269R001200210001-4
li
Approved For Release 2 cETSE.t ? 1A-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
resisted asserting his authority over the Community. Schlesinger
appeared in the short time he served to be putting the Community role
first. Colby has sought to give equal weight to his Community and
Agency responsibilities. More broadly, he has sought to bind both
these responsibilities together, in their collection, production,
and resource management aspects, through the National Intelligence
Office (NIO) and Key Intelligence Question (KIQ) concepts.
The Schlesinger study of 1970-71 attempted to redefine the
role of the DCI with two stated objectives: saving money and improving
the product. It suggested several possible organizational/managerial
structures for the Community, some quite radical, and analyzed them
in terms of the bureaucratic equities and substantive realities
involved. As noted above, the President's letter of November 1971
ultimately selected the least traumatic of these options, one that might
be characterized as "status quo plus." The DCI was to go on wearing
all three hats and was to receive limited additional responsibilities
in the resource field. He was to have a larger staff for managing
the Community, and devices were to be created by which the assess-
ment of senior intelligence consumers could be brought to bear
on the product.
61
GCP14
Approved For Release 2005/01 " P86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 200ZREL-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
Whether under Helms*, who quietly sought and received agreement
from Senator Stennis that he not tackle the most difficult aspects of
the President's letter, or under Schlesinger, who set about to implement
the plan he helped write in a manner that set his newly formed
Community staff in sometimes bitter opposition to his own CIA,
or under Colby, who has been too involved in dealing with the external
problems he inherited to give full attention to the problem, the
letter only marginally changed power relationships and therefore
solved little. And to the two objectives pursued by Schlesinger,
recent events have added two more: the need to build effective
internal and external oversight, and the need to develop public
confidence in the effectiveness of intelligence that will permit it
to function.
Does the Community Need a Manager?
No DCI or anyone within Defense, before the Schlesinger study,
considered that his Intelligence Community responsibilities included
* Helms clearly did not have the confidence of or the access to
President Nixon that would have been necessary to carry out
the full intent of the letter.
62
(? RET
Approved For Release 2005/011'10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
making recommendations on all the various resource questions arising
within the Intelligence Community. Should there be such a role at
all? For the reasons above, we conclude that the role is important.
The need for an effective overall management mechanism in
the Intelligence Community was clearly recognized in the 1971 Schlesinger
study; the need is no less important today. The Intelligence Community
of 1975 is larger and vastly more complex and sophisticated than
anything con-itemplated in 1947 with passage of the National Security
Act. Evolving technology is increasing, not reducing, both the need
for effective central management over all intelligence and the difficulty
of that management task. In addition, the size of the Intelligence
Community and the demonstrable need to balance the contributions made
by all of the various components argue strongly for a leader.
And the compartmentation which characterizes many individual intelligence
programs increases the likelihood of unnecessary duplication of effort.
This requires that a special effort be made to insure that someone
in the Community, who is knowledgeable about the various programs,
coordinates the allocation and use of resources. There are signs that
if the Executive Branch cannot find an effective way to carry out this
responsibility, the Congress will.
63
c,r,(ADET
Approved For Release 2005/01410 1/4. d1A-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0g)CRELP86B00269R001200210001-4
The question, in our view, is not whether there ought to be some
such role within the Community, but rather how that role should be
defined, how it should be exercised, and by whom. On some elements
of the role there is probably little disagreement. Most would agree,
for example, that one individual should present a total Community
budget to Congress and help defend what has been agreed to, and there
would be little quarrel with respect to presenting a unified recommendation
on Intelligence Community resource requirements to the President.
There is, however, little agreement within the Community that the
DCI, the statutory head of an agency in his own right, should have
a significant role in the decision-making processes of other intelligence
programs for which he has no legal responsibility in other than the
staff capacity in which he now serves.
The DCI in 1975
If the role of the DCI as manager af national intelligence was
seen in 1971 as too weak to accomplish these objectives, he is even
weaker relative to his problems of today:
-- As Presidential advisor, he is physically and organizationally
removed from the President lie is supposed to advise. Moreover,
64
D r? 1"
Approved For Release 2005/0SkCitVGFIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
-7cr
Approved For Release 2005/01/1-I . A- DP86600269R001200210001-4
the fact that he is head of a clandestine organization under
political attack for "improprieties" forces the President to ke:_q)
him at a distance. The budgetary authority he has been given is
only advisory.
-- His position as leader of the Community lacks real
substance in the absence of the stronger position that a closer
Presidential relationship would give him. It is effective only
within the USIB structure where dissents are institutionalized.
The lines linking him to, or defining his powers relative to,
the three functional communities are tangled indeed.
-- As Director of CIA he has too many responsibilities
beyond CIA to give it proper attention. Moreover, the Schlesinger
experience showed the difficult situation created when a DCI
as head of the Community seeks to move in a direction antagonistic
to his interests as DCIA.
65
RET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
sgc,ig
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : A-1-x 6B00269R001200210001-4
PART 4
THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Based on the analysis presented in preceding sections, this
chapter outlines two basic options for change in the current management
arrangements and organizational structure of the Intelligence Community.
Change is not suggested for the sake of bureaucratic neatness. Rather,
it is intended to lead to improvements in the quality of the intelligence
production. Before discussing the two options, however, we examine
the possibility of creating a unitary national intelligence agency, either
independently or under Defense, and reject both alternatives in favor of
a system, under an independent senior intelligence officer, that can
balance national and departmental needs. In addition, we set forth the
conditions under which this officer can be effective, and propose some
new organizational concepts for making him so. Finally, we deal with
the impact adoption of these concepts would have on his handling of specific
organizational problems.
66
S[nRgiApproved For Release 2005/01/1'61: -RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/S1EIRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
BASIC APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
Broadly speaking, there would appear to be three basic approaches
which the President, in collaboration with Congress, might take. He
could:
--Transfer most intelligence activities out of the Department
of Defense into a reconstituted and renamed Central Intelligence
Agency responsible for servicing the fundamental intelligence needs
of both the nation's civilian and its military leadership.
--Absorb the Central Intelligence Agency within the
Department of Defense, eliminating the DCI's role as it has
been conceived since 1947 and placing responsibility for
effective coordination of all American intelligence with a
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence who would absorb
the Community responsibilities now exercised by the DCI as
well as those exercised by the present Assistant Secretary of
Defense /Intelligence.
--Leave mostly unchanged the division of labor between
Defense and CIA which has evolved since 1947, while making
a series of changes to enhance the ability of the DCI to play a
67
Approved FOr Release 2005/011,1TRIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0SEOCRE4DP86B00269R001200210001-4
more effective role in the overall direction of the Intelligence
Community and at the same time reducing his direct involve-
ment in managing CIA.
The first of these basic approaches was considered in the original
Schlesinger study. It would involve consolidating all or most existing
25X1 US intelligence into a large, new independent agency
people) under one individual responsible to the President or the National
Security Council. This approach is appealing in that it would create an
organization with control over all aspects of the intelligence process,
establishing the preconditions for solution of the management problems
outlined above. One man could be held accountable for rationalizing
existing structures, creating effective management processes, and
getting results. There would be far fewer barriers to effective decision
making across the Community, and the head of this new organization would
have effective authority to resolve those which did arise.
In the real world, however, we believe this basic approach is a
"loser, H for several reasons. First, we doubt Defen,se (for good reasons)
could be persuaded to give up all control over the intelligence programs
68
Approved For Release 2005/0 kIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005SEREIRDP861300269R001200210001-4
now conducted within Defense. Military leaders who are entrusted with
our nation's defense must have a measure of control over their "eyes
and ears, " in peacetime as well as wartime. If all existing intelligence
organizations were to be consolidated under a new head of foreign
intelligence, we believe that many both inside and outside of Defense
could argue with justification that a parallel though perhaps smaller
intelligence apparatus would need to be reconstituted under direct
Defense Department control. Second, over the short term (and probably
for many years to come) the manpower needs of the programs now carried
out in Defense but incorporated by this approach into a new agency could
probably only be met by military personnel, except at extraordinary cost.
Thus, some continuing Defense involvement would be required in any
event. Finally, and most fundamentally, there is the political problem.
We doubt either the President or Congress could agree to the establishment
of a very large organization that we feel certain would be widely characterized,
however unfairly, as the beginning of a Gestapo.
We have argued that there should be a strong overall leadership
function exercised within the Intelligence Community. The alternative
discussed above is one (extreme) approach toward meeting this objective.
69
?FiQB1-0P
Approved For Release 2005/01/ . - 86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/0S/KgEIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
At the other end of the spectrum, it can be argued that this responsi-
bility should be lodged not within a new and independent intelligence
agency but within the Department of Defense, perhaps under a Deputy
Secretary for Intelligence. The CIA program would in effect become
part of the Defense intelligence program and budget. CIA would no longer
be an independent agency in the full sense of that word, and the DCI's role
as Community leader would be eliminated in favor of an appropriate
Defense official. After all, as has been pointed out many times, the
bulk of the dollar resources in the Intelligence Community belong to
Defense in any event.
This approach too would allow control over all US intelligence to
be consolidated in the hands of one individual, though it is questionable
how "real" such control would be unless all existing intelligence
organizations were placed under his line command--a remote possibility
at best.
There are, however, more fundamental disadvantages to this
approach. First, it would effectively repeal the most basic provision,
70
Approved For Release 2005/0111 p- ? CliA-RIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0HCCRIEFDP861300269R001200210001-4
insofar as intelligence is concerned, of the 1947 Act: the establishment
of an independent CIA. We doubt anyone would seriously consider this a
good idea. The need for an independent intelligence view seems well
accepted everywhere.
The argument for an independent CIA is based upon the need in
policy councils for an "objective" voice on policy issues. Objectivity
in this sense does not necessarily mean that CIA perceives "truth" more
clearly than do others. In the real world objectivity means that CIA's
views on substantive issues are communicated to the ultimate decision-
makers; that is, these views flow upward and are not prevented from
being expressed by senior management of an organization which may
have other interests at stake, or simply an entirely different world
view.
If CIA were integrated into Defense, steps could be taken to
assure a continuing degree of independence for it by providing (in law)
that the DCI would continue to report to the National Security Council
or even the President on all but resource matters (in 'arrangements
similar to those under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have continued to
71
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/eV:005D861300269R001200210001-4
--
report independently to the President). But in the real world this
authority could not be maintained.
One early task of the newly created Deputy Secretary for
Intelligence would certainly be to examine and rationalize the diverse
production elements for which he would now have a responsibility.
Resource and other pressures would make sensible an effort to combine
the existing DIA service and production organizations with the newly
transferred DDI and DDS&T production entities. We doubt this process
could be completed without perhaps irreparable damage to the CIA
production entities and to their independence of view. There would
also be statutory and bureaucratic problems: different legal authorities,
personnel systems, etc., would need to be made consistent with other
Defense authorities or explicitly excluded from them if CIA is to remain the
flexible instrument it is.
Second, we do not believe that intelligence as a discipline would
receive the attention it ought to have in Defense, where it always; has
been and always will be (legitimately) regarded as a support function.
Quality in intelligence, as in other matters, can best be achieved by an
organization which regards this as its sole mission.
Approved For Release 2005ett
-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 lifig861300269R001200210001-4
The third broad approach--finding a way to assert greater
control over the whole intelligence process while leaving both Defense
and CIA in the intelligence business?seems to us the only practical
one. Fundamental political problems preclude classical organizational
solutions placing command and control over all or most intelligence in
one individual, either the Director of Central Intelligence, or an appro-
priate Defense Department official. In addition, and more important,
there exist important arguments for the continuing existence of an
intelligence organization (CIA) not subject to the control of any other
line department or Agency within the USG. At the same time, the
Department of Defense, charged with responsibility for defending the
nation, requires (or will not relinquish without a fight no one will be
willing to start) a measure of control over important collection, processing
and other intelligence activities which also contribute in major ways to
the solution of problems faced by CIA.
Put another way, we believe that the Community leadership function
is important and that it should fall upon the Director of Central Intelligence.
To carry out that function, the DCI should be given stronger voice in
decision making on fundamental issues in the Intelligence Community.
At the same time, however, we believe that individual program managers
Approved For Release 2005/01Q1q ijRJ P86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005SMRENRDP861300269R001200210001-4
in Defense should retain considerable latitude and flexibility in tl-e
conduct of day-to-day operations. Both goals can be met by increasing
the DCI's voice in the processes which determine how resources--
money and people--will be allocated in the Community, while preserving
an independent CIA and continuing Defense responsibility for actual
operation of most present programs.
Within this broad general approach there are potentially two
different DCI's of the future. The first of these, slightly but significantly
changed from present practice, contemplates a DCI with line responsi-
bility over CIA and a staff role with respect to the balance of the Intelligence
Community as now. But his ability to influence decision making on
certain important issues would be enhanced by creation of an Executive
Committee, under his chairmanship, for the Consolidated Cryptologic
Program, along the lines of the present management with respect to the
NRP. And his line responsibility for management of the CIA program
would be reduced somewhat by creation of a statutory civilian deputy
director charged with this responsibility. This approach is discussed
as option one below. The second option analyzed here would establish
the DCI in a line relationship to major portions of the Intelligence
Community with respect to resource allocation matters, and would
eliminate his direct responsibility for management of CIA. Under both
74
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SftRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
options we propose that the DCI be made a member of the NSC and
senior advisor to the President on major intelligence issues.
The distinction between these two broad options is fundamental:
the DCI of option one is very different from the DCI of option two.
Implementation of the first option would require relatively minor
adjustments to the current structure which could be carried out by
Executive Order along with some modifications to existing legislation.
Achievement of the second option would require considerable effort)
for it involves fundamental change including a major rewrite of
intelligence portions of the National Security Act.
OPTION ONE
This option is based upon the premise that it is not feasible to
increase substantially the DCI's legal authority with respect to resource
matters within the Intelligence Community but that steps can be taken
to improve his ability to exercise the Community aspects of his
responsibilities while clarifying responsibility for management of
the CIA. The following ideas then are designed to strengthen the
system at the points we believe are weakest:
75
Sr
icL
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : tIA-RDr861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0g.CCELIDP861300269R001200210001-4
-- Accept the Rockefeller Commission concept of a deputy
director of CIA responsible for line management by amending the
Act to provide the DCI with two deputies, a civilian to run CIA
and a military officer to preside over the Community. Make the
DCI a member of the NSC. Amend the Act to spell out the
DCI's responsibilities within the Intelligence Community, and the
deputy director's management responsibilities to CIA. This
would help to establish the concept of a DCI independent of
CIA, which would in turn strengthen the DCI's hand in exercising
a staff role with respect to resource issues in the Intelligence
Community, and it would help to ease the management problem
within CIA presented by a DCI who wears "two hats. "
-- By statute, clarify the relationship between the NSC
and the National Command Authority.
-- Charge the DCI with providing the President each year
an evaluation, based on the knowledge available to CIA production
elements, of the contributions made by various collection systems,
to the solution of intelligence problems. Include language establish-
ing the DCI's staff responsibility to the President los- Intelligence
76
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005SWEIT-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Community resource matters in the amended Act. The proposed
annual evaluation would supplement the report to the President
required under the November 1971 letter calling for an independent
DCI recommendation on the overall Intelligence Community Budget.
This recommendation is discussed at greater length in Annex F.
-- Create an Executive Committee for overall policy direction
of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). The largest
and most important program in which the DCI now has no formal
management role is the CCP. An Executive Committee arrangement
would increase his voice in overall program direction. As in the
case of the NRO, the DCI should chair the ExCom, but final
decision-making authority would of course be retained in Defense.
To increase the DCI's awareness of military requirements for
cryptologic support, JCS representation on the Executive Committee
should be considered. An NSC presence would also be desirable
to balance the JCS representation.
-- Form a National/Tactical Planning Board under the
DCI's military deputy. Charge it with considering how to better
use centrally managed national collection to support tactical
requirements and with developing plans for the transition of the
national intelligence system from peace to war.
77
Approved For Release 2005/01Meirtm-p86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/ac:IgDP861300269R001200210001-4
-- Consider transferring responsibility for the NRO to CIA.
Otherwise, retain the present basic ExCom policy establishment
and management structure. This issue is discussed in greater
detail in Annex J.
-- Establish an Intelligence Coordinating Committee to deal
with problems between the Intelligence Community and the
Department of State other than in the production area. This Committee
would be chaired by the DCI and would include the Under Secretary
for Political Affairs as its principle member.
-- Reconstitute USIB as an Intelligence Production Board
under the DCI, with its membership reduced to include only the
major production organizations. All other functions of USIB
would be assigned to the other bodies proposed in those recommendations
or directly to the DCI.
-- Make the DCI Chairman of NSCIC.
Under this option, the statutory relationship of the DCI to CIA
would remain unchanged. The DCI would be given a modest increase
in authority in the Community, and he would be freed to the extent
he permitted himself from his responsibility for administering CIA.
78
Approved For For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/E2ETRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
He would be provided more rational coordinating machinery for the
Community, and he would be given an opportunity to increase his
influence in the management of the CCP.
Implementation of this option would make an important contribution
toward improving the overall management arrangements which
currently exist within the Intelligence Community. It is our belief,
however, that the need for change is more fundamental, and the
opportunity for it is greater than is represented by this option.
Our suggestions for more basic changes are spelled out, in considerable
detail, in our second option.
OPTION TWO
Many have perceived for some time the necessity of new legislation
to establish a viable basis for intelligence in the future. There is now
little doubt that there will be new legislation. At issue is the shape
of that legislation.
A National-Departmental Balance, and What is Needed to Achieve It
To provide the authority the DCI needs, we believe three essential
conditions must be met.
79
Approved For Release 2005/04
14IDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/05/EX.RELDP86B00269R001200210001-4
The first is a point that has been made before but that bears
repeating. The DCI need not be a close friend and confidant of the
President, but he must have the President's confidence and support.
Especially, he should have--and be seen to have--regular, frequent
personal access to the Oval Office.* This is, however, a delicate question.
The DCI should not be so close to the President as to be politicized. He
should not be a Presidential staff officer located in the White House.
Rather, he must keep some distance from the President, physically
as well as organizationally.
Presidential support, however, is not enough. It is reasonable
to expect that the Secretaries of Defense and State will similarly have
the Presidential ear, and can outweigh the DCI unless he is placed
on equal footing by establishment of a framework that provides
him stronger statutory authority. The main girder of this
framework should be resource management. The stronger the DCIts
voice in the allocation of funds, the easier it will be for him to
impose rationality on other aspects of his job.
* Gen. Smith was able to be effective as DCI where Adm. Hillenkoetter
was not largely because the members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee knew he had a weekly appointment with the President.
80
Approved For Release 2005/0rpfladlotTP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 200n1/191:ff-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
3t.C11
The third condition is equally impo rtant. There should be an
agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, ratified
in statute, that clarifies their respective roles in the management
of intelligence and encourages their subordinates to cooperate rather
than compete.
Toward a Solution: Three New Concepts
To meet these conditions we propose under this option three
major changes:
-- A new concept for the funding of most intelligence programs.
-- A new concept of the DCI's role in relation to the Community.
-- A new concept of the DCI's relationship to the Department
of Defense.
In resource management, our concept is simply stated, although
we are fully aware that it is a major step, controversial and exceedingly
complicated. It is that the bulk of the intelligence budget now appropriated
to Defense be instead appropriated to the DCI for further allocation
to the various existing program managers* in the Community. At
Such an arrangement is unusual in Government practice but by no
means unprecedented. During the 1960's, for example, certain funds
were appropriated to the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity
but then delegated to the Department of Labor for acutal program operation.
Approved FOr Release 2005/01/10a1CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SEGHT
Approved For Release 2005/0SECRETDP861300269R001200210001-4
the same time, the DCIts responsibility for line management of the
CIA would be eliminated. IRAC and the position of Assistant Secretary
of Defense/Intelligence?created to help the DCI exercise his resource
review responsibilities under the November 1971 letter--would be
abolished.
? To emphasize the new role of the DCI and his changed relationship
to CIA, the DCI would be renamed the Director General of Intelligence (DGI)
and CIA the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA)*.
This option would not involve placing operational control over all
Community programs in the DCI or, in the case of the Defense programs,
*ftro, moving those programs out of the Department. Indeed, this option
would eliminate the existing command relationship of the DGI to CIA.
The concept of a unitary command structure for intelligence, either
under an independent Director of National Intelligence or within
Defense was considered and rejected above. Rather, we have in
* Hereafter, in speaking of the future, we will use the terms DGI
and FIA; in speaking of the present and past, we will Use DCI and CIA.
82
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
r
Approved For Release 2005/010t@RETP86B00269R001200210001-4
mind a new concept of the DCI, one that would exchange his present
powers (variously to command, advise, and persuade) for effective
but less conspicuous management powers at key points in the system.
We have earlier identified "communities" of resource managers,
collectors, producers, and users of intelligence. In the simplest terms
these communities are inter-linked as follows; funds flow from resource
manager to collector and producer; raw intelligence flows from collector
to producer; finished intelligence flows from producer to user; the
user then determines whether his needs have been met and states
new needs to resource managers and producers; and, finally, producers
state new requirements to collectors, or resource managers provide
funds to develop new collection capabilities.
Under this option the DGI would sit astride this system, controlling
these linkages rather than exercising line authority over any of the
communities or their constituent parts.
-- We have already stated that funds should flow through
and be allocated by him, in broad categories, to the individual
program managers. These funds should include those presently
appropriated to CIA, and to the Department of Defense for the NRO,
25X1 the CCP,
and selected portions of the GDIP.
83
Approved For Release 2005/01414) yi+RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
3C 't r
Approved For Release 2005/01)/ggilDP861300269R001200210001-4
-- He and his staff should carry out and integrate the collection
management functions now assigned to COMIREX, the SIGINT
and Human Sources Committees, and the Collection Guidance and
Assessment Staff now in DDI.
-- He should continue to coordinate ("correlate and evaluate")
finished intelligence production as he now does.
-- He should seek consumer reaction to his product, evaluate
it, and through this process identify gaps to be filled by
tasking existing collection systems or by developing new ones.
Each of these functions is closely related to and dependent on
the other three. (See sketch next page. )
84
SITT?3:-
r.);?13.:
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 -: CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
RESZTICE
MA';.:1,3E RS
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/Z ERFEF86B00269R001200210001-4
Proposed changes of this magnitude raise a question about
whether we are in fact considering amendments to the existing
National Security Act or an entirely new Act chartering the National
Intelligence Community. There are arguments in favor of both approaches,
though we are inclined to believe it preferable to amend the existing
Act. Such amendments should in addition to establishing the DGI
and the FIA and establishing their responsibilities provide a legislative
charter for all intelligence activities conducted under the DGI's
umbrella.
A proposal to transfer substantial funds and authority from
Defense to the DGI would obviously meet resistance. Defense would
have to be convinced that it would benefit from such an arrangement.
We believe that Defense could be persuaded of the value of the
suggested approach but that this would need to be based on the establish-
ment of a new relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense, based on a recognition of the impact of planning for war
on practice in peace. It has been noted that the failure to deal with this
problem has frustrated the creation of a truly national intelligence
system for almost three decades. We propose now to consider the
86
Approved For Release
0210001-4
r CjRDP86B??269R??1
Approved For Release 2005/01/16ERRE86B00269R001200210001-4
question from the wartime end rather than, as we have since 1947,
from the peacetime one. A "Gordian knot" formula then suggests
itself. The National Security Act of 1975 might read more or less
as follows:
The DGI shall be a member of the National Security Council
responsible to the President, except that in the event of
major hostilities he shall be responsible to the President
through the Secretary of Defense, unless the President
directs otherwise. When he is subordinate to the Secretary
of Defense, he shall retain the right to render substantive
assessments independently to the President.
Such a formulation would help to cause the interests of the
Secretary of Defense and DCI to converge where they are now adversary.
The Secretary would be more interested in seeing that the DGI built
a strong intelligence system in peacetime, while the DGI would be
more concerned that the system be designed to meet Defense's needs
in peace or war. The DGI would be de facto a part of the National
Command System, and his relationship to the National Command
Authority would be clearly established. Theoretically, in the
event of war the entire system, including the DGI, would move to
87
Approved For Release 2005/03/1.cf?RIFFDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01R,CE@RgP86B00269R001200210001-4
Defense as a unit with less disruption of internal command mechanisms
than would take place under such understandings as now exist. Much
more important in today's world, this formulation would help open
the door to devd.opment of a more coherent overall intelligence system,
with a unitary budget, in peace. This should, over the long run, make
possible improvements in the ultimate quality of the intelligence
product at lower overall cost. At the same time, the Congress could
be assured that the peacetime DGI was in fact independent of the
Department of Defense.
Out of this arrangement Defense would gain as well as lose.
The same disagreements that have prevented development of a
'411.01 truly national intelligence system have also handicapped development
of the military system. With the DGI clearly responsible both for
wartime support of the military and for rational organization of that
support in peace (in collaboration with Defense) a serious problem
for military planners could be reduced. Defense could also expect
national intelligence production to be more responsive to its needs.
(This does not mean less objective.)
88
-T
SFC[31'k.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : Clm-FkuP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/018tMERFP861300269R001200210001-4
The extent to which the intelligence structure can be rationalized
and its management strengthened depends directly- on the de_gree to which
the DGI-Defense relationship can be clarified and made compatible.
Improvements in this relationship should ultimately be reflected in the
final product of intelligence.
Specific Problems in the Community
The Central Intelligence Agency.
A DGI who could with Defense cooperation effectively regulate
the linkages among the various communities would have acquired
greatly strengthened management powers at a time when there
are political pressures to weaken him. Thus, there must be a
balancing decrease in his line authority over CIA for this and for
other reasons as well.
Separation of the DCI from direct management of CIA has been
suggested before and rejected. It has been argued that:
-- The National Security Act would have to be changed.
-- The President could no longer look to one man for
intelligence and covert action.
-- The DCI would need a substantial staff.
89
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/&EGRE86B00269R001200210001-4
The first two of these reasons seem no longer valid. The third
is true, but not a fundamental argurre nt for maintaining the status quo.
On the other hand, the reasons for such a separation are
stronger than before.
-- Both the 1947 Act and the President's letter of November 1971
give the DCI important responsibilities in the Community as a
whole. His ability to exercise these responsibilities has been
compromised by his role as head of CIA in the Community where
he is seen as head of a competing agency with its own vested
interest in certain programs and policies. It is also compromised
by the fact that, as the head of an independent agency, he must
devote considerable attention to management of it and its programs.
-- CIA continues to be widely criticized. A DGI/DCI not
closely identified with it would be more politically acceptable
as the senior national intelligence officer. A president would
find it easier to give a DCI the access and confidence upon
which his power must ultimately rest if the DGI were not
himself considered an intelligence operator.
-- Present arrangements already require the DCI to carry
a number of very complex responsibilities; if his overall
90
Approved For Release 2005/04/1P :LAlik--RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
OLiAlr.1
Approved For Release 2005/01/1
? E:g
T86600269R001200210001-4
management and budgetary role is increased further, his
management span must be reduced in other ways. These arguments
support the case for a Director General for Intelligence, replacing
the DCI as Presidential adivsor and leader of the Community.
An Administrator/Foreign Intelligence Agency, separately appointed
and confirmed, would replace him as Director of CIA. The A/FIA
would be responsible to the NSC. We believe the DGI should
be a statutory member of the NSC, both to increase his status
relative to State and Defense and to clarify his relationship to
the A/FLA..
The DGI and the Production of National Intelligence.
A major issue under this option is the extent to which the DGI
should be responsible for the present production responsibilities of
CIA. Should the DGI be directly responsible for all present CIA
production programs (broadly including the functions exercised by
the NI0s, the DDI, and the production elements of DDS&T) or only
the production of national intelligence as carried out under the NIO
andUSIB Committee structures?
If the DGI were to be given direct control over CIA's production
function, his ability to be the President's principal foreign intelligence
91
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP.,86B00269R001200210001-4
SECLE1
Approved For Release 2005/0$/Vgli1DP861300269R001200210001-4
advisor would remain undiminished, and continued direct access to
information about the substantive contribution of the various collection
systems, available through the production process, would contribute
to his ability to do the resource allocation task.
On the other hand, this responsibility would detract from his ability
to focus on Community issues and could be perceived by State and
Defense .as giving this aspect of the production process a favored
position--thus adding an undesirable element of devisiveness to the
Community's production effort. In addition, existing desirable
close relationships between CIA production, collection, and R&D
programs in certain sophisticated technical areas would suffer.
If, in contrast, the DGI's production responsibilities were limited
essentially to national intelligence, he could remain well informed
on the key substantive issues and well grounded on the contribution of
each of the various collection systems to these issues. Moreover,
this move would tend to strengthen the NIO and USIB Committee
structures and thereby result in better national intelligence products.
It could also lead to a rationalization of CIA's production effort,
presently split between two directorates, in order to provide more
timely and more broadly disciplined contributions to NIO and USIB
intelligence projects.
92
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01iCREEDP86600269R001200210001-4
On the other hand, the DGI's ability to "coordinate" contributions
by State and Defense to estimates could be reduced by the relative
distance of his own staff from the basic collection and production
activities which supply information and suggest insight, and this could
lead to pressures to duplicate the CIA production capability under the
aegis of the DCI.
The DGI and Covert Operations.
In Annex E we examine at some length the knotty questions of
clandestine operations. What is covert action? Should the US engage
in it and if so should the covert action apparatus be separate from
that for espionage? Where should these elements be housed within
the USG? \
it is
inconceivable that the US should deny itself the capability to conduct
such operations. It may of course be expedient for the US to
limit its actual operations for some time to come.
93
SEC R Erj
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RuP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-rwP86B00269R001200210001-4
A good theoretical case can be made for the separation of covert
action from espionage on the grounds that operations should not contaminate
intelligence. It is very difficult, however, to untangle the assets
used for action purposes from those used for information. A valuable
intelligence agent may be the best person to carry out a discrete
covert action. The experience of 1950-52, when the two functions
were carried out by separate organizations, demonstrated to all who
had a hand in it that separation is grossly inefficient if not actually
damaging. The practical case for keeping the two clandestine functions
in the same organization is overwhelming.
94
Approved For Release 2005/01140 : -14IDP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
The A/FIA, placed in a clearly subordinate position, need not be
as conspicuous--or to the press and public as great a "threat"?
as the present DCI.
Defense Technical Collection Programs.
We have dealt above with the broader question of the DGI's
relations with Defense. There remain, however, more specific
questions relating to the two major technical collection systems
under Defense management.
NRO. A DGI armed with budgetary powers and a better defined
relationship with Defense will be in a position to manage technical
t'vompo, collection more efficiently, to make more sensible choices, and
to respond more flexibly to new requirements. Better arrangements
will be needed, however, to link him with technical program managers.
The NRO in its current form is an anomalous patchwork originally
constituted in a period of bureaucratic strife. Competition within the
NRP is not as useful now, nor will it be in the future as it has been.
in the past, and the coordination problems within a structure designed
to accommodate competition are becoming increasingly difficult.
95
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
rfl
f".F
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :-biJk?ITP 86B00269R001200210001-4
vNiatir, More important, the need for military commanders to derive direct
support from satellite collection resources is becoming increasingly
important, and it is questionable whether the current NRO organization,
with the Under Secretary of the Air Force as director, is well suited
to meet this problem.
Consideration should be givento reorganizing the NRO as an
integrated operating organization under the A/FIA, jointly staffed
by FIA and Defense. This would create an organization in some ways
analogous to NSA which has under NSCID 6 a clear line of command
over the CCP. It would remain however subject to the broad guidance
of an ExCom chaired by the DGI. This issue is discussed further
in Annex J.
NSA. The strengths of NSA are also its weakensses. Unitary
organization coupled with physical separation produces a self-contained
organization isolated from and resistant to legitimate external interests
in its business. NSA is the hair shirt of any DCI seeking to exert
any authority over it or even to extract the information needed to
form balanced judgments as to its responsiveness to national needs.
96
g 1071'
Approved For Release 2005/01/ 0 :" lA-KuP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/6EC:RETRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
For reasons valid in the past but less so today, NSA continues to
be dominated by the military though military influence has declined
over the years. It is controlled by Defense, many of its personnel
25X1 are in uniform,
25X1
25X1
25X1
Continued enhancement of civilian influence is desirable
if NSA is to be fully responsive to the growing political and economic
needs of national intelligence.
Under this option, in addition to funding through the DGI, we
believe that the CCP should be placed under the guidance of an ExCom
chaired by the DGI as in option one. The ExCom would be charged
with developing a program to "civilianize" NSA and with studying the
possibility of separating the functions of a civilian NSA from those
of the military combined Crypt?logic Service.
97
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/18 86600269R001200210001-4
RECOMMENDATION
If fundamental change could be at least contemplated in 1971,
it can be the more so now. -\Current political developments suggest
that the National Security Act of 1947 will be rewritten; our analysis
of the Act and the intelligence structure it established convinces us
that it should be. It is not an exaggeration to observe that we are
fast approaching a historic moment and associated unique opportunity to
recharter the Intelligence Community to meet future needs for
effective intelligence support. It may be another 25 years before
events provide another opportunity for major reorganization and reform.
On both substantive and tactical political grounds, we suggest
consideration of legislation to establish the arrangements envisioned
under the second option above. This proposal, together with an attempt
to rethink the secrecy issue from scratch, could serve as a point of
departure for constructive debate within the Executive Branch and,
ultimately, the Congress on the future legal and political basis
for the conduct of American intelligence.
9
Approved For Release 2005/01/10:*!ff86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0/L : EITDP86B00269R001200210001-4
In summary, we recommend the following steps:
-- Amend the Act to create a DGI separate from the FIA
and to establish a working relationship between him and the
Secretary of Defense. Make him a member of the NSC.
-- Provide the DGI with a staff capable of performing the
"linkage" functions outlined above ani with an inspection group
as proposed in our paper on external oversight (Annex ).
-- Charge the DGI with preparation of a total intelligence
25X1 budget/
\ Appropriate funds for the programs covered by
his budget to the DGI for allocation according to procedures to
be developed. Abolish IRAC (retaining its useful R&D Council)
and eliminate the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence within Defense.
-- Charge the DGI with responsibility for better support of
the needs of Defense in peace and in war through use of centrally
managed collection programs, and with planning for the transfer
of intelligence assets to the Department of Defense in time of
war. Charge Defense with cooperating in this endeavour by
providing access, staff support, and quality personnel. Charge
Approved For Release 2005/01/,
99
k-ffP86B00269R001200210001-4
:@
25X1
crinrT
Approved For Release 2005/0i/16-trMIRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
the DGI with establishing a National/Tactical Planning Board,
on which the U&S Commands would be represented, as the
regulating mechanism for this program.
-- Create a new A/FIA appointed by the President and confirmed
by Congress. Place under Mrn the present CIA minus the DGI's
staff. Make him responsible under law to the NSC though in
practice he would report through the DGI.
-- Reconstitute ExCom with the DGI in the chair and the
? Deputy Secretary of Defense and a senior White House official
as members. Charge it with broad budgetary and policy guidance
-- Reorganize NRO as an integrated organization reporting to
the A/FIA and jointly staffed by FIA and Defense.
-- Make the DGI Chairman of NSCI.. The best way to get
consumer response is to give the interested party control over
the mechanism designed to develop it.
-- Lastly, establish an Intelligence Coordinating Committee
to regulate relations between the intelligence system and State
(except for substantive production). Reconstitute T.MIB as an
Intelligence Production Board under the DGI as chairman with its
100
Approved F6r Release 2005/OSKR/FIVDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005EORET-R0P86B00269R001200210001-4
membership reduced to include only the major production or ganizations.
The Board would retain the present substantive responsibilities
of USIB. All other functions of USIB not otherwise reassigned
in these recommendations would become responsibilities of the DGI.
101
Approved FOr Release 2005/01Pie10-1111i1D86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For. Release 2005/01/1SECARET861300269R001200210001-4
ANNEX A
The Intelligence Community
The United States Government has an intelligence structure whose
shape and functions have been dictated far more by pragmatism and
accident than by conscious design. This structure is sometimes
called the "Intelligence Community," but that term, in practice,
is elusive. It means different things to different people. In the
broadest sense, the American "Intelligence Community" encompasses
those components of the US Government responsible for the collection
and processing of intelligence information, the production of finished
intelligence, the provision of various kinds of intelligence support
(including, for example, covert action) within our Government's
. Executive Branch and certain types of support (largely in the substantive
field) to the Congress.
This description may be confusing, but others are even more
confusing or, if clear, are inadequate. Consider, for example,
the common notion that the Intelligence Community can be defined
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Qr:onr-T
, . ?
Approved For Release 2005/01/gURIP86600269R001200210001-4
by the membership of the United States Intelligence Board. At the
outset, one has to face the question of whether USIB consists of its
full members (CIA, NSA, DIA, State/INR, and the Treasury, plus
ERDA and the FBI); or these plus the three military services' intelligence
components which are technically only observers at USIB; or this
larger group plus those other entities which from time to time attend
USIB meetings.
Even the broadest application of the USIB rubric does not encompass
organizations such as the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division
(FTD) which is not a member of USIB but which has a strong claim
to be considered a member of the Intelligence Community.
Even the more limited task of attempting to define the intelligence
production community quickly leads one into a swamp. There is
general agreement that the principal producing organizations are
CIA, State, DIA, and the Service intelligence agencies--plus ancillary
entities such as FTD, the Army's Missile Intelligence Agency, and
the Naval Intelligence Support Center. After this point, however,
distorting anomalies emerge.
2
Approved For Release 20058?1@RF4-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/WINIP86B00269R001200210001-4
NSA, for example, is a major collector and processor of intelligence
information and also has an associated analytical capability. The
latter, however, is not applied to an "all-source" environment
since NSA's analytic focus is primarily keyed to signals intelligence.
The rest of the Community, therefore, does not tend to regard NSA
as a producer of finished intelligence, especially in the political and
strategic areas though NSA is an important producer of tactical
intelligence for the three military services.
ERDA (formerly part of AEC) is unique in a different way.
Though a full member of USIB, ERDA neither collects intelligence
nor has a significant analytical effort. It owes its Community membership
Noe to the fact that it represents a unique and exclusive body of nuclear
information.
The FBI is considered a member of the Intelligence Community,
and of USIB, by virtue of its counterintelligence, counterespionage,
and (to a lesser extent) law enforcement responsibilities in the national
security field. The FBI does not perform any meaningful substantive
intelligence analysis, however, nor does it play a major role in
collecting positive foreign intelligence.
3
Approved For Release 20051SliGRaRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Defining the Defense Department production community poses
other problems. One set lies in the ill-defined and hotly debated
nature of the relationship of DIA to:
-- The three Service intelligence components (the Office of
Naval Intelligence, ONI; Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Army),
ACSI; Air Force Intelligence, AFIN).
-- The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS.
(Opinions differ on whether the Director, DIA, is equally subordinate
to both or subordinate to the former through the latter.)
-- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) who sits
at the USIB table but whose right to sit there is debated.
Though Treasury is now a full member of USIB, many do not regard it as
a member of the Intelligence Community. Primarily a consumer of
intelligence, Treasury has become a member of USIB by virtue
of its increasingly important requirements for intelligence support.
Though Treasury does both collect and analyze information in the
course of its business, opinions differ on whether what Treasury
does is "intelligence." With the rising importance of economic considera-
tions in what have been traditionally regarded as intelligence judgments
(focused largely on military and political factors), this whole area
is now in a process of change.
4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SFCP?FT
Approved For Release 2005/01/SECRIEDT86600269R001200210001-4
The Department of State adds its own complexities. It is represented
on USIB by its Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). INR,
however, is not regarded by many in State as being within the main
stream of the Department, though the current head of INR happens
to be a trusted, valued member of the Secretary of State's personal
staff. and, hence, plays a key role in assisting him in his dual capacities
as Secretary of State and a Presidential Assistant.
Also within the Department is the Foreign Service. Most of the
Intelligence Community regards the Foreign Service as a prime
source of collection of primarily political information; but many
FSOs would be aghast at being included in anyone's definition of the
"Intelligence Community. "
The Intelligence Resources Advisory Council (IRAC) includes
another collection of entities which are clearly part of the
intelligence process and, therefore, merit consideration as members
of the Intelligence Community, even though IRAC's primary focus
is resource management, not production or collection.
IRAC is chaired by the DCI and includes among its formal
members the DDCI (representing CIA), the Assistant Secretary of
5
Approved For Release 2005/0 /10_; CIA-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
ECRJ
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :gcrig81B00269R001200210001-4
Defense for Intelligence, OMB's Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs, and the Department of State's
Director of INR. The NSC Staff's Director for Intelligence Coordination,
the Director of DIA, and the Director of NSA also attend IRAC
meetings but as observers, not full members. In addition, others--
including the Director of NRO--also usually attend the IRAC meetings.
Collectively, those who attend IRAC meetings control almost
all of the personnel and dollar resources associated with the United
States intelligence establishment.
IRAC also has links into the R&D community, another heavy
consumer of intelligence-related resources. Under the chairmanship
of the Department of Defense's DD/R&D, IRAC has established an
Intelligence Research and Development Committee whose members
include the heads of the principal R&D organizations represented
on IRAC, the Service Assistant Secretaries for R&D, the Director
of ARPA, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications.
Though these entities certainly fall outside usual definitions of the
"Intelligence Community, " it is nonetheless clear that there is a
strong bond of common concern and technical affinity tying these
entities into the Intelligence Community.
6
Approved For Release 2005/0/We Mata:RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
01...0 I_
Approved For Release 2005/01/1SECP1 T86B00269R001200210001-4
The above considerations demonstrate that there is not any single
intelligence community easily definable as such. Instead, we need
to recognize and frankly acknowledge that there are at least four,
perhaps five, "communities" with intelligence-related responsibilities
and interests, which interlock and overlap. These include:
a.
The collectors of
intelligence information and providers
of intelligence
services.
This community would include CIA's
25X1
Directorate of Operations
25X1
NSA, the NRO, the
25X1
members of State's Foreign Service
officer corps,
Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce a ttach.es, the military
Service attaches, elements of DIA, plus elements of ACSI, ONI,
and AFIN (plus certai n other DoD entities--to the extent that
they run collection operations), and the FBI.
b. The analysts and producers of substantive intelligence.
This community encompasses CIA's Directorate of Intelligence,
certain parts of the CIA Directorate for Science and Technology,
elements of DIA and the three Service intelligence agencies,
other Defense Department components (e.g., FTD), NSA (sometimes
in some fields), State/INR, and occasionally ERDA and the Treasury.
Approved For Release 2005/01/aEGR-6L86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1dS. QRETIT86B00269R001200210001-4
c. Mention of the Treasury raises the additional or "fifth"
community issue. Treasury does not really fit within the framework
of intelligence as traditionally defined within the US Government.
d. The resource managers. For openers, this community
can be defined in terms of the whole IRAC family, a family with
its own branches and subordinate clans reflecting varying degrees
of kinship.
e. The consumers. The consuming community is itself
complex and has several distinct components within the Executive
Branch. These include the President, the members of the NSC,
and the senior staffs and subordinates. They may also include
the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture
and their senior staffs and subordinates, as well as the economic
policy community (CIEP, CEA, the Special Trade Representative,
Governors of the Federal Reserve, Chairman of the Ex-Im Bank, etc.).
8
Approved For Release 2005/win_w iulta-KDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0SVRELP86B00269R001200210001-4
The above are consumers of (primarily) national intelligence.
The consumers of tactical intelligence (primarily military) constitute
an additional galaxy of consumers within the Executive Branch.
Within the Legislative Branch there are additional sets of consumers
whose position, interests, responsibilities, and (hence) intelligence.
needs are now very much in a state of transitional flux and very much
the subject of debate as discussed in Annex H.
9
Approved For Release 2005/01/5E1I4-OP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0SECRELP86B00269R001200210001-4
ANNEX B
Collection Management
Collection management tries to match collection capabilities to
intelligence problems. Collection management, therefore, deals with
the communications process between collection managers and the intelli-
gence production community. The critical feature of this process is the
translation of intelligence problems into specific requests for information
on which collection managers can take action and on which basis collected
raw data can be meaningfully manipulated into a form useful to intelligence
analysts. While related generally to resource management, collection
management concerns itself with existing resources and their best use
to collect data to solve a given problem. Resource management will not
otherwise be covered here.
Current collection programs can be classified into seven
categories dealing with: Human Sources; COMINT (communications
intelligence); ELINT (electronics intelligence);
Approved For Release 20051EREIRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CSEe 0269R001200210001-4
Human Sources collection is concerned with people getting
information from other people. Dominant in this category is the CIA
Clandestine Service. The military services also do some collecting of
information from people as do the DIA attaches and the State Department
Foreign Service. However, the attaches and the Foreign Service are
mostly concerned with the overt gathering of information while CIA and
the much smaller efforts of the military services concern themselves
primarily with the recruitment of agents.
The National Security Council
(NSCID 6) has given NSA the dominant role in the tasking of all SIGINT
resources and the processing of SIGINT data for dissemination to all
consumer organizations. NSA has an almost exclusive role in the
2
Approved For Release 2005/0141.0;,CIA-RpP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005SEGIREII-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
collection of COMINT since all the Service Cryptologic Agencies are
25X1 under its direct control.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
NSA also plays a major part in collection and processing
ELINT, although several other organizations do so also. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD (I)) manages some aircraft-
and ground-based ELINT collectors which are assigned to the Services
Corporations./
that while NSA plays a major role, it is not the exclusive manager.
3
Approved For Release 20058)ERET-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/019EPRW86B00269R001200210001-4
At one time aircraft were universally used for imagery collection,
mainly photography, but now most photography of importance comes from
25X1 NRO operational satellites.
25X1
4
Approved For Release 206iiQ110 FiA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
4141.01
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Collection from open literature (books, magazines and other
periodicals) is done both by subscription at home and abroad by purchase
or subscription by any and all interested parties. C/A, serving as a
central service of common concern, has however the primary responsibility
in this field. Reporting on the press is done by the Doreign Service, by
the attaches/
vigerro
25X1
Another way of looking at collection resources is through the four
25X1 major intelligence program budgets: CIAP, CCP, GDIP, and the NRP.
The CLA. Program (CLAP) contains I
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
NPIC as well as an internal CIA Imagery interpretation group. The
Consolidated Cryptographic Program (CCP) includes the budgets of
NSA and the Service Cryptologic agencies. The majority of the CCP
is applied to COMINT collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.
However, there are also significant resources dedicated to ELINT
The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funds a number
of aircraft activities. None of these collect COMINT, but substantial
amounts of ELINT and Optical Signature data are collected as well as
some photography. In addition, the GDIP funds several ground-based
radars used to track Soviet vehciles, principally strategic ballistic
missiles.
The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) is devoted
25X1 exclusively to satellite collection.'
6
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/SEGRi1p86600269R001200210001-4
The table on the following page relates the principal collection
categories to the principal intelligence budgets. In the body of the
table, "Primary" indicates that the principal collection assets are
funded and managed within the indicated budget. "Contributory"
indicates collection assets which make a substantial contribution.
"Supplemental" indicates collection resources which make a useful,
but not necessarily unique, contribution.
7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1SEMT86B00269R001200210001-4
All of the above comprise resources that cost about
dollars per year. Included is a worldwide network of human beings
focused on intelligence collection and covert action. Included also is
a technology that puts almost every conceivable sensor on every
possible kind of platform. The collection management problem is
to orchestrate these diversified resources to gather data on important
intelligence problems quickly and efficiently. This job includes
deciding where and how more than one collector can make a
contribution. This task is complicated by the need to bridge the gap
between collector and producer who may, with equal justification,
see the problems in different ways.
At the current time there is no single, simple channel that
connects the analyst with the processor and the collector. At the one
extreme are collectors tied to the production community through
relatively formal mechanisms which have evolved over the years,
some of which have reached a high degree of elaboration--e.g.,
COMIREX in the imagery field. At the other extreme are the
operational managers who direct day-to-day operations. Typically,
many of these know little about their consumers and may or may not
have an up-to-date understanding of today's real intelligence problems.
In between these two extremes there is a potpourri of formal and
informal arrangements and individual contacts between analysts
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 ;)CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005SEMRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
? and their operational counterparts. At the formal end of the spectrum
are the Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). These attempt, at the
highest level, to coordinate and to rank by priority the most important
Community intelligence problems. Although new, the process of
generating KIQs shows signs of being an effective mechanism to
facilitate communications between collectors and analysts. From
the point of view of the collection manager, however, this is only
a first step. He does not "collect" the accuracy of the SS-19 ICBM
or the projected yield of the Soviet wheat crop. He collects raw
data or information to which other data may be added from sources
outside his own collection responsibility. KIQs, for example, must
40150/ thus be further translated into specifics for collection.
COMIREX is the single most elaborate and formal mechanism
that attempts this translation. COMIREX reduces general requirements
for imagery into detailed statements in terms of geographic coverage,
image quality, and frequency of coverage for 15,000 or so currently
active targets and 10 million square miles of area. Since most
overhead photography is today collected by satellite and managed in
the NRO, COMIREX has a simple, direct line to the collector who
then takes COMIREX requirements, adds other technical data such
10
Approved For Release 2001?ek-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0SECICRIEFDP86B00269R001200210001-4
as weather forecasts and takes pictures from his satellites. In this
case, tasking is a relatively straightforward matter.
Nonetheless, the problems associated with this process have been
and are significant. Most frequently, COMIREX must deal at arm's
length with the real, substantive intelligence problem. Furthermore,
COMIREX gets its requirements through an elaborate mechanism for
aggregating, distilling, expanding the needs for photographic coverage.
This process generally dilutes any substantive information that may
have been in the original requirement. This formalization of data
begins deep in Service intelligence organizations, in DIA and in CIA,
and flows through numerous tiers of aggregation and translation before
**41110.* COMIREX can begin assigning priorities listing. COMIREX must
do this with a staff which has no time to involve itself deeply in
substance. Nowhere, or almost nowhere, in this process is there
a point where intelligence analysts and collection system analysts,
who understand photo-satellite collection capabilities and have a
good perception of intelligence problems, come together to decide the
best way to use this very expensive resource. It is a tribute to the
process, however, that the end result has been judged by most to
be both significant and important.
11
Approved For Release 2005/001/11:1n14DP86B00269R001200210001-4
f
Approved For Release 2005/01/1S:
r6B00269R001200210001-4
The process of generating requirements and detailed tasking for
the SIGINT machine has some parallels with the photographic community
but is very different in its essential elements. Analogous to COMIREX
there is a SIGINT Committee. The SIGINT Committee, however,
functions with a much smaller staff and is much removed from the
operations of SIGINT collection. The SIGINT Committee concerns
itself with periodic reviews of SIGINT collection requirements and
periodic evaluation of the performance of selected SIGINT collectors.
NSA is a dominant organization in SIGINT. The National Security
Council has in NSCID 6 given NSA a virtually exclusive charter for
the management of SIGINT collection, as well as for processing
and disseminating the collected information. In almost every case,
NSA must start with extremely general statements of intelligence
needs flowing either from USIB or the Services and must then orchestrate
the SIGINT collection machine accordingly. Besides supporting the
SIGINT collection needs of national and departmental intelligence,
NSA must also provide SIGINT support to military commanders.
The military commander wants to know hour by hour or even minute
by minute the status or disposition of opposing forces. SIGINT,
particularly COMINT, is a very important source of information
12
Approved For Release 2005/91(1pN:r9tATRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
"tE.
Approved For Release 2005/0SEBEIDP861300269R001200210001-4
? on military forces. Moreover, these same SIGINT resources which
generate, from the military commander's vantage point, what is
essentially finished intelligence also generate raw data for the national
analytic community. This leads to a paradox which greatly complicates
NSA's management function. While an appreciable portion of the
SIGINT world is of no direct and immediate interest to military
commanders and another equally appreciable portion provides little
information of interest to the national analytic community, there
turns out in fact to be considerable overlap. NSA thus serves two
masters who compete for NSA's resources and attention.
Through the Central Security Service, NSA directs at various
levels of detail almost all of the worldwide COMINT receiving positions.
This direction may leave operations to the local operator's discretion,
may set a range of general tasks and guidelines, or may dictate specific
hour-by-hour procedures.
While NSA has a clear charter and direct authority over money
and people, it nonetheless must oversee a vast worldwide empire
not easily coordinated. The COMINT collection process is moreover
complicated by difficulties in evaluating results. There is no general
methodology for measuring the value of raw COMINT. And at times
13
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
CRET
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/10SE6
:41*.
6600269R001200210001-4
SIGINT as managed by NSA exemplifies the collection program
whose mission is well defined, but which operates on the basis of
general statements of needs and priorities from those it is charged
with supporting. In principle, the CCP is the resource with which
NSA must fulfill intelligence needs. The principal feedback is
via two routes: first, direct feedback from those agencies and or-
ganizations which get SIGINT support; and second, through the budget
review cycle as NSA recommends and defends its specific operating
program. In principle, one man, the Director of NSA, is charged
with a job and given resources to perform that job. There are
mechanisms, more or less formal, for feeding back to him a measure
of how well or how poorly he is performing. He has under his control,
again in principle, the right set of people, authorities, and
responsibilities to discharge his tasks. In many ways this is an
ideal arrangement. In practical fact, however, -there are a number
of problems.
15
Approved For Release 2005/6 'il-111-IRVDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Unlike COMINT, NSA is not the sole collector and processor
25X1 of ELINT
25X1
There are a number of Service programs which
are only loosely coupled to NSA. Additional programs are managed
within the GDIP and still others are under the management of the
The NRP funds satellites which collect all forms of SIGINT.
In general, the initiative for NRP collection programs does not come
from NSA but comes from within the NRP as it perceives what appear
to be collection gaps and as it views evolving collection technology.
NSA, however, also can task NRP systems and processes and
disseminates the derived pr oduct.
There is another category of technical collection systems funded
in the GDIP and managed through ASD(I) although daily operations are
25X1 run by the military services.
16'
Approved For Release 2005fi4:01:11-RDP. 861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01SENgP86B00269R001200210001-4
Human sources are an important and in many cases a unique,
source of information. As in the case of COMINT, it is difficult to
devise a quantitative measure of value. But at least by simple
statistical measures, human sources make major contributions to most
categories of important national intelligence.
The human sources collection manager is concerned with the
long-range development of human sources of inf_ormation by country
and by general area of intelligence interest. It is difficult for him
to predict the degree of success that will be achieved or the amount
of time required to develop a given level of coverage. While he
can improve his chances of acquiring suitable sources, he is often
at the mercy of circumstances beyond his control because of the
unpredictability of human behavior and the fact that many target
countries restrict opportunities for contact with potentially knowledgeable
sources and can easily discourage such sources from establishing
17
Approved For Release 2005/01iit)41TRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10SEcza6B00269R001200210001-4
relationships with case officers. Unfortunately, the higher the
priority of a target country and subject area generally the more
difficult it is to conduct human collection.
As in the case of COMINT collection, it is in general not possible
to ask human sources collection managers to produce a given piece
of information at a given time, for at any point in time, it is generally
not possible to be sure that there will exist a source who can answer
a specific question of interest to the production community.
The Clandestine Service of CIA dominates such clandestine
collection from human beings. Collection is structured through
a management-by-objectives system which includes the requirements
of the Community. Formal Community mechanisms, such as KIQs,
play an important role, but the main concern of the manager is to
allocate resources by country and by intelligence problem area
to the development of sources with long-range potential. Additional
supporting insight flows to him through numerous informal contacts
with the production community.
State Department Foreign Service Officers also have functions
which can be classified as human collection. However, FSOs are,
18
Approved For Release 2005/0040-1 g. I z`FDP86B00269R00120021000I-4
25X1
4swoo
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/16KAT861300269R001200210001-4
at least officially, concerned only with overt collection. In addition
to the collection of information, FSOs often are called upon to perform
other duties such as the negotiation of agreements or the resolution
of specific problems and therefore are not usually fully dedicated to
the collection of information. The FSO, understandably, also tends
generally to respond more to State Department requirements for
information than to the requirements of the Intelligence Community.
The DIA attache system is a third component in the human sources
area. The attaches are predominately concerned with the collection
of intelligence information and are managed by DIA but are generally
responsive to national priorities
While in some broad sense USIB has the responsibility for
defining collection requirements for human sources, USIB has not
until recently tried seriously to perform this function. At this
writing the Human Sources Committee is still in the process of
defining exactly how to get on with its assigned tasks. At best,
applying the collection requirements approach to the human sources
category of collector will be difficult, and it remains to be seen where
the mechanism of the USIB Committee will serve a useful and constructive
function.
Approved For Release 2005/01/19(j CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Q,11-MRF
Approved For Release 2005/01S EGRUP86600269R001200210001-4
Although to examine the relationships of the collection community
to the production or analytical community is to uncover the diversity
and casualness of these relationships, two basic approaches are
evident. One of these can be called the "NSA model" and the other the
"COMIREX model." The NSA model is characterized by a tightly
structured management chain with a single senior individual, Director/NSA,
responsible for a large collection and processing resource and who
operates with only general guidelines for collection. The COMIREX
model focuses on a committee which is a creature of the production
community and which concentrates on developing extremely detailed
tasking of appropriate collection systems. In these terms, the two
somewhat idealized models represent two extremes as mechanisms
for relating intelligence problems to collection resources.
The NSA model has several positive features: (1) its tight,
highly integrated management control has the potential for flexible
resource trade-offs and responsiveness to changing intelligence needs;
(2) feedback from processing and preliminary analysis to operation;:
is closely coupled and within a single organization; and (3) authority
for decisions can be allocated through the total organization and, in
principle, be established at approprl.ate points. On the other hand,
20
Approved For Release 2008'. 1.44Zialf-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1SE -F86B00269R001200210001-4
there are several weaknesses: (1) NSA is exclusively concerned
with SIGINT and would find it difficult to judge when SIGINT is the
most efficient collection resource for a given problem as opposed
to other collection resources; (2) this management approach tends
to develop a large monolithic organization which becomes a closed
community; and (3) because of its closed community character there
is a tendency to relate more to the resource manager in Defense than
to the intelligence production community and USIB.
The COMIREX model also has pluses and minuses. On the plus
side: (1) the COMIREX product is a specific detailed set of tasks
which are easily understandable by the collector; (2) structures
of this type are in principle closely coupled to intelligence production;
and (3) there is total production community involvement in the evolution
of specific collection tasking. On the other hand: (1) because
of the many and diverse interests in the production community,
a "committee" approach is inevitable, which in search of
consensus and a common denomination, tends to defocus important
issues; (2) there is an endemic and perhaps fundamental problem
in holding together a high-quality staff; and (3) it is virtually impossible
to establish responsibility for collection performance.
21
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 ? CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/UGIREL86B00269R001200210001-4
A pivotal issue in the consideration of collection management and
the relationship between collection assets and the user of the collected
information is the meaning of the term "requirements." An essential
question that needs to be answered is whether the process is best
served by (a) a definition and prioritization of intelligence problems by the
user community with accompanying tasking, or (b) by providing
collection guidance in the form of detailed, highly structured statements
of the particular elements of information which the collector should
try to provide. For either approach, the minute-by-minute operation
of technical collection systems requires in the end specific and
detailed guidance.
The question is: who is in the best position to work from general
problems and priorities to the specific and detailed tasking statements
needed to drive the collection machinery? In the case of technical
collection, if users are to perform this function, the user community
must have a detailed understanding of the characteristics of the
technical devices and devote the appropriate technical and analytical
resources to the task. Mechanisms must be identified to ensure that
the user community has a current and detailed understanding of the
collection environment which, in many circumstances, is changing
rapidly.
22
Approved For Release 200ktOptOD gl4C-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
01"..kui \LI
Approved For Release 2005/01/1SFSAKL6B00269R001200210001-4
On the other hand, if collection managers are to start with
statements of intelligence problems, the collection manager must
have a staff which understands intelligence and has experience in
intelligence analysis and production. In this case the collection manager
must be responsible for, or at least work closely with, the data-
processing function so that he has a detailed and current assessment of
the quality and utility of the collected information. In examining the
best way of bringing together the collectors and the users of data,
a number of practical considerations must be examined. The character
of the various segments of the user community are of critical
importance in this matter. For example, the military commander
by the nature of his organizational structure is in a poor position
to have a sufficient understanding of technical collection assets
to deal effectively in terms of detailed requirement statements.
He perforce must resort to general problem statements and encourage
collection managers and processors to deal with him on these terms.
However, in other segments of the user community better arrangements
are feasible, at least in principle.
Also, the specific characterisitics of the collection asset must
be considered. A Collection system
23
Approved For Release 2005,01(1 0 WID.P86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 SEGREB00269R001200210001-4
environment, where feedback of collected data to operations must
occur on a timely basis to ensure efficient collection, means that the
collection manager must understand the user community and be in
a position to deal with more general problem statements. Certain
collection operations must by their nature operate with broad
intelligence problems and broad guidance or priorities and cannot
deal with detailed specifics. The best example of this class of collector
is covert human sources collection. In this particular case,
the program manager programs his assets accordingly to
broad collection guidance. On the other hand, some collectors
can function equally well with detailed tasking statements or with
broader intelligence problems and priority statements.
A key element which is required at a high level in the Community,
independent of the specific management patterns for relating collection
resources to users, is evaluation. Collection assets and collection
managers need to be regularly examined to assess efficiency and effective-
ness. This function is important both to provide feedback so that
improvements can be identified and to provide a continuing measure
of the utility of collection assets to support resource allocation decisions.
By the same token the performance of the user community in
24
Approved For Release 2005/01)\:_p1,AIRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
W... I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RurooB00269R001200210001-4
articulating information needs requires review to ensure that collection
guidance is being properly formulated and prioritized. Again, both
feedback to the performer--in this case, the user community?and
evaluation information for Community management are important.
It is this evaluation process which relates the day-to-day process
of collection management to the larger problems of resources management.
25
Approved For Release 2005/01TirCp*MID86B00269R001200210001-4
UR r.
aVET
Approved For Release 200 ! %.,1,-.-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
ANNEX C
Problems in the Production
of National Intelligence
1. When Congress conceived a central agency
devoted to final correlation and evaluation, it
expected something small and simple. The reality
...r.d.s,large and complex. Congress did not give
the DCI the tools he now needs because it could not
foresee that he would require them. He has improvised
some from the vague wording of other authorities in
the Act; he has simply done without others.
2. Because correlation and evaluation define
the DCI's primary duty, and the one most specifically
directed by law, there is in fact a formal working
mechanism for producing coordinated national estimates.
Through it, the bulk of the information and expertise
available to the federal government is assembled and
weighed. Conclusions are drawn, dissents are attached
when appropriate, and the results are forwarded to
the national policymaker. Similar mechanisms, less
structured, govern to varying degrees the production
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
LLEGIB
Approved For Release 2005/01?IEWP861300269R001200210001-4
of current intelligence and other less formal monographs.
On the surface,
the mechanism appears to be
precisely what Congress wanted, and it seems to work.
3. The appearance is deceptive, however, because
the DCI in fact suffers from responsibility without
authority as much in production as he does elsewhere.
The USIB production machinery works because the partic-
ipating agencies know they need not take it seriously
when they do not want to. A DCI who independently has
access to the President can extract a serious product
from USIB and personally ensure that this product will
be read by the right people. Simply being named
DCI does not give him this standing; he must have
earned it elsewhere.
4. The fundamental weakness of the DCI's statutory
position shows up across the whole range of his pro-
duction responsibilities (Section A), but most seriously
in his inability to establish the primacy of national
product over departmental (Section B). On the other
hand, the departmental agencies are unable either to
compete with or contribute fully to the national
-2-
SECEEt
Approved For. Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
? ,ISECR1T
product (Section C). Finally, USIB itself is a hybrid
body not particularly well configured for handling
production (Section D).
A. The DCI's Production Responsibilities
5. If one looks at what a DCI needs to "correlate
and evaluate"--i.e., to provide a comprehensive, accurate,
coherent flow of policy-oriented intelligence reports
and assessments to the national policymaker--one sees
how inadequate today are the tools Congress gave him.
To do the job the DCI needs:
Independence, to prevent the warping of
intelligence by policy objectives.
-- Feedback, so he can be aware of policy
concerns and actions, and judge the quality
of his output.
?
Access to all information available to the
federal government.
Analytic resources under his control to do
the final stage of the job.
-3-
Approved For Release 2005/0:1)/i0 : -hDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0Wr P861300269R001200210001-4
i
6. Independence. Congress, by making the DCI and
CIA subordinate to "the NSC," intended (clear from
the legislative history) to make them independent of
State and Defense. In practice, the DCI within the
bounds of discretion has been able to maintain his
independence, although no DCI can be totally independent
of the President.
7. Feedback. The DCI keeps track of policy through
his participation in meetings of the NSC and its sub-
committees, and through his access to cable traffic.
In fact, his participation in meetings is virtually
complete, but his freedom to share what he learns is
limited. His access to cable traffic of State and.
Defense, especially concerning sensitive policy matters,
is intermittent and never complete,.
Thus, in many matters of greatest
national concern, national intelligence is not privy
to the policy context in which it must assess the
capabilities and actions of other states. Theoreti-
cally, the DCI receives consumer reaction through
-4--
off:Rai
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005S RURDP861300269R001200210001-4
NSCIC, created by the Presidential letter of 1971.
NSCIC was born moribund and has not improved since.
8. Access. The Act specified that the DCI was
to have access to all intelligence held by other agencies,
and indeed his right to it has generally been observed,
There have been exceptions, however, especially in
intelligence contained in Foreign Service reporting
("not intelligence at all"), in some NSA materials
("technical information"), and in certain naval matters
("operational intelligence"). There are implications
to the DCI's right of access, however, that go beyond
the words of the Act.
-- There is, for instance, other intelligence
that the DCI believes is needed and that can be
collected by existing means if they are properly
targeted. Thus he must be able to translate
feedback into requirements, and requirements
into tasking of systems to meet these require-
ments; he should be able to enforce this
tasking, in other words to manage collection.
-5-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
?
SECRET
-- The legislative history of the Act shows
that Congress intended that the DCI could
collect (under "services of common concern")
as well as evaluate, and of course he has done
so when other agencies have not.
-- Finally, there is other intelligence that
is nee-oled but that cannot be gotten' by
existing means. This means the DCI should
be able to develop or stimulate the development
of new collection systems and methods.
B. The Muliple Channels Problem
9. The most serious problem in the production
of national intelligence is the DCI's inability de jure
to force his message home. Although the Act is
explicit that the DCI and the agency are to be the
central mechanism, DCI's have been somewhat ambiguous
about it, (in one famous case a DCI dissented from his
own--CIA's--estimate), and other agencies tend to reject
the notion altogether. The more the DCI separates
himself from the CIA production elements in presiding
-6-
r:
Approved For Release 2005/01/48-:ZIA1RDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2003
REC.F-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
over national intelligence estimates, the more he
weakens his ability to shape them and the more he is
pushed toward creating another substantive mechanism
under his personal control as a substitute for CIA.
The more he uses CIA as his staff, the more he is
seen by the other members of the Community as short-
changing their interests, and the more they feel
justified in pleading their views through other
channels.
10. National vs. Departmental. Channels free
of the DCI are readily at hand. The Act envisages
the DCI delivering neatly packaged national intel-
ligence, complete with dissenting views, to the NSC.
It also authorizes, however, the continuing production
and dissemination of departmental intelligence. Thus
the DCI is responsible for intelligence support of
the Secretaries of State and Defense as members of
the NSC; but, INR and DIA are respectively responsible for
support of their department heads and thus have a
channel for direct dissemination of their product to
the White House. Moreover, while both agencies
-7-
C prI,V11-
Approved.For Release 2005/01/10.PktClAMOR86B00269R001200210001-4
SECREIT
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
?
insist that CIA's national product be coordinated with
them, neither hesitates to issue uncoordinated views in
conflict with a national position. The result is a flood
of overlapping papers, of varying degrees of validity,
unleashed on the policymaker. No DCI has felt strong
enough to bring a halt to this practice, or even to offer
his services in bringing coherence to it.
11. Just Another Agency. The policy officer is
not acutely aware of the delicate distinctions we draw
between national and departmental. To him, an NIE is
simply a CIA paper, and has no more standing than one from
DIA. This attitude is reinforced by the ambiguity of the
DCI-CIA relationship and encouraged by bureaucratic opposition
to CIA's claim to a first-among-equals role. CIA, in turn,
has been able to establish that role only by the recognized
excellence of its product in the competition of the market
place. But because that product does not carry a bureaucratic
cachet, it often does not reach the consumers who could
use it best. The intelligence agencies of DOD, for
instance, feel no requirement to distribute the CIA
product within the department.
-8-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/ kj:T DP861300269R001200210001-4
EGR
C. The Competition
12. We have noted the tendency of departmental
agencies to seek independent channels for their own
views. These views obviously overlap broadly what we
consider national intelligence. Thus CIA, DIA, INR,
and to some extent other agencies to varying degrees
produce intelligence that is duplicative or competitive.
Obviously, sheer duplication is to be avoided (Must
every intelligence organization have a current intelligence/
briefing shop?), but competition is something else again.
13. The normal tendency in reorganizing government
is to decide what group is best equipped to do a partic-
ular job and then assign that job to that group alone.
This should not apply to intelligence production. In-
telligence analysis seeks to know the unknowable and
penetrate the impenetrable. When evidence is insufficient,
or ambiguous, or absent, the more minds and the more
lines of analysis pursued, the greater the chance of
approximating the truth. Each organization is stimulated
by the critical work of others; none can afford to stand
pat on the conventional wisdom. Moreover, analysis is
cheap relative to the other costs of intelligence.
-9-
Approved For Release 2005/01/16:- P86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0Z.13IEIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
14. CIA. Of all US intelligence agencies, CIA has
the broadest range of analysis capabilities. Its
resources are too thin to provide comprehensive coverage,
however; on some topics of lesser importance it relies
totally on other agencies, but it is able to produce in
depth on all questions that are of major importance to
US national security policy (in some cases with the aid
of contractors). On these questions CIA is able itself
to produce and to evaluate and correlate a national product,
and it is also able to check the production of other agencies
and to goad them out of long-held positions and into new
lines of attack on stubborn problems. To get the best
national product, however, it is necessary that the competing
analysis centers be strong enough to play the game and to
keep CIA on its toes. At present, neither DIA nor INR
is strong enough.
15. DIA. This Agency has many weaknesses. DIA's
production elements are divided between Arlington Hall and
the Pentagon. It is beset with a staff system
that is not designed to attract and hold quality civilians. It
suffers from frequent reorganizations and reversals of doctrine,
10
Approved For Release 2005/C14FQ1?pp-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
and from a penchant for mechanistic solutions to
philosophic problems.
16. The greatest problem for DIA, however, is
its dual mission. ? It is responsible for support both
of the Secretary of Defense, his office and of the
Joint Chiefs and their field commanders. The require-
ments of these two sets of customers are not the same,
and they add up to considerably more than DIA can
accomplish. The Secretary is clearly not served to
his satisfaction, and we doubt that the JCS and the
CINCs are satisfied either. In his dealings with
the DCI, the Director of DIA represents two masters;
his efforts to serve the national authorities are often
undercut by the necessity that he look downward to the
field commander as well as upward to the NCA. Thus,
it is fair to say that acquiescence in DoD's proposals
regarding the National Military Intelligence Center
(NMIC) (check) amount to turning national responsibilities
over to an organization that cannot handle its
departmental ones very well.
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
oECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
17. INR. Prior to the present Director's appointment
to INR, State was on the verge of eliminating INR as an
intelligence production organization (but not as its
voice in other intelligence matters). CIA took the
position that it preferred a strong INR as a counter-
balance to DIA in the production field and as a
potentially useful national analytic center; if INR were
to be abolished, however, CIA could perform most of that
bureau's intelligence support functions for the
Department at a considerable savings in total positions.
We also note that acquiring the SecState as a client
would considerably strengthen the DCI vis-a-vis DoD.
18. The Service Intelligence Agencies. To some
these agencies appear to be vestigial and duplicative,
but they do useful-work that contributes to national
intelligence. As long as this work is done by them
or by DIA, whether they continue to exist or not would
appear to be a departmental problem for DoD,
not a national one.
12
Approved For Release 2005/01/W:
cCiliERIP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
D. USIB as Regulator of Production
19. The DCI's role as correlator and evaluator
is manifest in his chairmanship of USIB. As noted above,
the formal mechanism under USIB works reasonably well,
but the DCI's real authority is measured by the closeness
of his personal relationship with the President and
the degree of his access to inner policy circles. To
the extent he can use such access to gain acceptance
for USIB's product as the voice of national intelligence,
the other members will take him, and their work there,
seriously.
20. USIB has other problems stemming from the
effort to combine in one board too broad a range of
problems. For production matters, CIA, DIA, and INR
are the primary players, and all are present. But
so are the service agencies, ERDA, Treasury, FBI, NSA,
and sometimes ASD(I). The service agencies are
classed as observers, and as long as they make sub-
stantive national contributions should continue to
participate in production matters, but should be limited
to areas of their specific technical competence. ERDA
is a member, but should be reduced to the same limited
observer status as the services. Treasury is primarily
a consumer; it belongs on NSCIC rather than USIB. FBI
has no role in production matters. NSA andthe Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)) are special
cases discussed below.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :19A-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/8C
P86600269R001200210001-4
21. NSA's problem as a producer is that national
intelligence is all-source, and NSA is one-source.
Occasionally, for operational use or for highly special-
ized analysis problems, NSA's product can stand by
itself, but NSA has neither the analytic resources nor
the access to information that would put it in a
class with the three primary producers. On the other
hand NSA is more than a collector and processor; in
this its situation is not unlike that of NPIC. The
traditional view of the producing analysts has always
been "just give us the facts. NSA is to diagram the
nets. NPIC is to count the trucks and buildings. We
will integrate these into a national product."
22. Under budgetary pressure, however, and faced
with ever-larger amounts of data, the analysts have given
way and are, in fact, looking for help. They are now
encouraging NSA and NPIC to go muchA.eeper into such
subjects as order of battle, reserving for themselves
only the final aggregation and analytic interpretation.
Moreover, they now recognize that an NSA analyst develops a
feel for his source that enables him in a fast-moving and
complex situation to draw useful intuitive conclusions
that are beyond the competence of the analyst further
removed from the traffic. For these reasons NSA might
-14-
Approved For Release 2005/010?-:(c..KpRpP861300269R001200210001-4
t.A.A St i
Approved For Release 2005/01 al-Up 86600269R001200210001-4
'1Sit
well have observer status in production matters.
Perhaps the contribution of the photointerpreter could
be similarly recognized.
(1)
22. ASD was invited to USIB primarily because
of his responsibilities in the resource field and in
NRO matters generally. He has no role and should have
no voice in production matters. But ASD(I)'s experience
is instructive in any reconsideration of the DCI's
responsibilities. To handle his resource decisions he
finds he needs substantive capabilities, and as these
grow he finds himself running athwart DIA.
E. What Needs To Be Changed
24. It is clear from this discussion that the major
problems in the production of national intelligence are
external to the .production process itself. In general,
the more powerful the DCI is in real terms and the more
he is perceived to have the President's ear, the better
the process will work, and the less weight will be put
on uncoordinated departmental views. Making him more
powerful, however, can be accomplished only by extending
his authority in other fields; his nominal authority over
production already exists. A DCI who has the strongest
voice in resource management, in collection management,
and in production management could use the interplay
among them to produce better national intelligence,
-15-
Approved For Release 2005/01/1(p:3 6600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/08ENgDP86B00269R001200210001-4
perhaps at less cost. He will be unable to do this,
however, unless he has the President's confidence and
the President's ear.
25. Beyond this fundamental problem, there are
others that need attention.
--It should be decided whether national intel-
ligence should be the product of competing analytic
centers. If it is decided that competition is
desirable, as we recommend, then DIA and INR should
be reconstituted and strengthened to enable them
to compete effectively. If these measures are
considered impossible, then it would be best to
end the pretense of competition. This would greatly
simplify the system and save some positions.
--If a way could be found to enable DIA to
serve only the JCS without creating another in-
telligence agency to serve the SecDef, or vice
versa, DIA could be made more effective.
--The DCI must have more access to NSA's
internal operations.
--The membership of USIB for consideration
of substantive production should be reconstituted
as suggested in Section D above
by eliminating ASD(I),
Treasury and the FBI, clarifying the observer status of
ERDA and adding NSC and. perhaps NPIC as observers
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CM-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
:1;ECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 V1'
11 6600269R001200210001-4
?
Annex D
The National/Tactical Problem
Until recently there has been a general view
that a useful distinction could be made between national
intelligence and tactical intelligence. National military
intelligence was presumed to be of interest to the President,
policymakers, and planners and to be strategic in character--
i.e. concerned with long-range weapon systems, the effectiveness
of weapons, weapons R&D,
overall force structures, and military budgets.
A separate category of intelligence information, called
tactical, was presumed to be primarily of interest to military
field commanders.
Although a meaningful distinction between national or
strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence no doubt
did exist in the past, it is no longer a useful distinction.
The field commander, faced with sophisticated modern weapon
systems with nuclear capability needs equally sophisticated
intelligence support. He needs a current and detailed
understanding of the fighting capability of the weapon
systems arrayed against him. He needs to know the disposition
Approved For Release 2005/01110 ? plERDP861300269R001200210001-4
(s r
SECRET
Approvbd For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
of opposing forces, and he must have good understanding
of the vulnerability of these forces. The long range and
flexibility of modern weapons make warning of the imminence
of hostilities both more important and more difficult to
achieve. Once hostilities have commenced, the field
commander needs to have the means for following the rapid
course of battle. These requirements for field commander
all demand a level of collection and analytical sophistication
which historically has been associated primarily with national
strategic intelligence.
The distinction between national and tactical intelligence
has been further blurred as the perspective from the national
viewpoint has changed. Even the most minor theater skirmish
has the potential for rapidly escalating into an exchange
of strategic nuclear weapons. Heightened military tension
can be of great political significance. This means that
what used to be local theater intelligence, is now national
intelligence. The President must have timely and accurate
intelligence covering activities which in the past would
have been considered purely tactical in character and there-
fore of little interest at the highest levels of government.
-2-
QrrRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
OGIJriti
APiebvtadteRelaassia00191 th9vi filtrIWM WI RV? Title I aj or
categories of intelligence which are relevant in the current
and future time frame: National Intelligence, Military
Departmental Intelligence, and Military Field Commander
Intelligence Support.
For purposes of this paper the emphasis is on military-
related subjects, so the multi facted character of non
military national intelligence is suppressed. There clearly
is a range of subjects which are military and have high
national interest and priority. These include the major
strategic military questions having to do with threats
against the United States and the planning for the US
military capability needed to maintain an acceptable defense
posture.
In addition to these national-level military interests,
there is a range of departmental military interests. These
include many of the same subjects that are of interest at
the national level, but also include more detailed issues.
At the departmental level, intelligence supports weapon-
system design for both offensive and defensive weapons and
associated tactics such as electromagnetic countermeasures
and force deployment.
The military field commander is, in the end, the
beneficiary of much of the national intelligence, and in
principle, of all of the departmental intelligence in that
it has a significant influence on the capability given to
him to conduct his operations.
- 3 -
Approved For Release 2005/01'0M0 SVHIMP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1=86B00269R001200210001-4
CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
National Military Departmental
Intelligence Intelligence
Nonl- lltary Military
if
Advisory Military
Policy & Budgets
Advisory Military
Capability
Advisory Force Structure
and General Deployment
Strategic Weapons
Counterforce Weapons
Military R&D
crtcis Nuvro",
4t
Detailed Weapons
Vulnerability
Doctrine
- 4 --
Nalitary Field -GeRi:
Intelligence Support
Performance Opposing Deployment
Readiness Status
OperationalCapabilit>
Reliability
Logistical Status
Reserve Status
Operational Plan
Warning
Combat Support
?
Approved For Release 299F94119....p1A-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
.
Approved For Release 2005/SECREDP86B00269R001200210001-4
On the other hand the military field commander has a
number of special requirements having to do with the nature,
structure, and status of the military forces deployed in
direct opposition to him. His intelligence support require-
ments in the face of present and future
weapon environments far exceed the limited connotations of
. the term "tactical intelligence." A rethinking
of the total intelligence structure is required if the
United States is to maintain a viable and credible military
field posture.
In the past, theater intelligence has been largely
in the hands of the field commander. He has acquired his
information through aircraft, foot patrols, forward radar
installations and, in more recent times, COMINT collection
operated under his direct command authority. Intelligence
derived in this manner was (and is) called "tactical
intelligence." Even when there were no hostilities,
the field commander's need for strategic intelli-
gence support was small because of the relative
simplicity of the opposing weapons.
The term "tactical intelligence" is still in common
use, but the situation facing the field commander in the
last ten years has undergone important changes. Tactical
-5-
(1CPCX?
Approved For Release 2005/0111 . DP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
aircraft supporting military ground operations now
operate with guided weapon systems and
have an operating radius of several hundred miles.
Tactical ballistic missiles are a key element in the
opposition force structure. These "tactical" ballistic
missiles have ranges from a few tens of miles to hundreds
of miles, thereby forcing a rethinking of the concepts
of "local" and "theater." Helicopters have enhanced
mobility and revolutionized fighting tactics. Man-carried
guided weapons have altered the once dominant character of
armored vehicles, particularly tanks, in the
fighting force. This vast array of complicated and
flexible weaponry has in turn impacted on the military
doctrine and fighting strategies of opposing forces.
Most of the important weapon system characteristics
To,
are not derivable by the field commander with, resources
under his control. Furthermore, the reaction
time to intelligence on new weapon systems and changing
oppos4n% force capabilities is measured in years, not weeks
or months. This factor places a heavy demand on strategic
and departmental intelligence if effective and timely
countermeasures or counterforces are to be available when
needed by the field commander. Strategic intelligence,
including detailed weapon system characteristics, is
-6-
-
Approved For Release 2005/01/02, Irk P86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/91/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
derived from national strategic collection tools such as
photographic satellites, SIGINT satellites, COMINT, and
human sources--supported by intelligence analysis.amt
peolue-t-ieft-res.varc.e-,. With the evolving effectiveness
a7tt?s-crpirit-t-?c-at-i-eja of modern weapon systems, the need for
strategic intelligence has been well understood and effectively
dealt with by the intelligence community.
Recently, however, it has become clear that the field
commander- is in trouble when he has
to deal with a hot war where modern weapon systems are
.used. The intelligence resources under his direct control
remain as they have been for many years.- The
intelligence support derived from the national community
has been useful but limited, For national intelligence
frequently has not focused on the weapon systems character-
istics and vulnerabilities of most interest to a field
commander. His limited collection. and analytical
resources- cannot provide him with good
measures of opposing force deployment and status or
warn him of impending hostilities. There are serious
question about the field commander's ability to track
events after the outbreak of hostilities and to couple this
intelligence to his own tactical decisions.
-7-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/
86600269R001200210001-4
In response to this intelligence gap, two things
have happened. First there has been increasing priority
placed on real time collection resources. This is parti-
cularly true of SIGINT, where there is currently a massive
effort under way to integrate SIGINT collection resources
inclAing satellites and provide processed information
directly to military commanders at the theater level and
below. /
- 8 -
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
a", r -T:T
? L. ?
5? k
Approved For Release 2005/01/M-HP86B00269R001200210001-4
Within
the next five years, all critical collection resources
which are essential to support national intelligence will
have capabilities which are equally essential to support
field commanders.
The implications of this suddenly changed situation
are profound. Resource decisions and collection management
in the future will be more complex because of the broader
range of needs which are competing for attention. New
factors must be considered, such as the vulnerability of
collection systems and the rapid forwarding
of intelligence information to those who need it. The
field commander can no longer be regarded as an independent
entity who must and can have his own self-
contained intelligence apparatus. Complicated
weapon
systems and associated doctrine and tactics require equally
complicated- intelligence apparatus,if the nation is to
maintain a viable military capability. Intelligence can
no longer be left in the hands of military
officers primarily trained for conduct of military field
operations. Intelligence is becoming, increasingly
specialized and must rise above its historical second-
class status in the military establishment,
-9-
Approved For Release 2opAtoggy,R,IA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
t
Approved For Release 2005/01SEGREFFP86B00269R001200210001-4
All of this implies that, as leader of the Intelligence
-Community, the DCI must deal with a broader range of
intelligence problems and requirements than have been of
concern to him in the past.
commanders are excellent examples of
questions which are extremely important from a military
force standpoint but can only be addressed and resolved
it the national level.
While the Department of Defense and the Military Services
must play a key role in providing intelligence support to
military field commanders, many
stantive issues,
across a far wider
relevant resource and sub-
range of considerations. Further,
Cut
because of the deep substantive background which is available
in the Intelligence Community at large, the DCI is in a
key position to guide and influence the course of development
in this relatively new intelligence area. However, if the
DCI is to play the key role which he must in these matters,
it is essential that he take steps to provide himself with
the background and support which he will require.
-10-
Approved For Release 200
DP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
Q Dr-r
4 Approved For Release 2005/0/44PloR4-1RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Annex E
The Deputy Directorate for Operations
The Clandestine Service
1. The Deputy Directorate for Operations (DDO) is
the Clandestine Service (CS) arm of the CIA. CS activity
began during World War II with the Office of the Coordinator
of Information and later the Office of Strategic Services.
The CS has two roles: clandestine collection of information
and covert political action.
2. Following World War II, the OSS was disbanded and
the United States began to wrestle with the problem of
collecting intelligence in foreign countries. The National
Intelligence Authority (NIA) was established in January
1946 with an action arm called the Central Intelligence
Group (CIG). Both were holding actions until the postwar
leadership could devise a permanent intelligence organization.
A centralized foreign intelligence service, the CIA, was
formed by the 1947 National Security Act, and later the
decision was made to give CIA its own collection mechanism,
the Clandestine Service.
Finding a legal basis for intelligence activities has
bothered many governments. The very real political problem
Approved For Release 2005/0111(),: 14-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/0gEe4DP86B00269R001200210001-4
2
always arises of whether a nation can have amicable relations
with countries - while maintaining, as part of its legal
establishment, an organization committed to illegal actionwhich
could conceivably be carried out in one or more of these
countries. Generally nations have avoided this
problem by simply not admitting to an intelligence capability
and refusing to comment on intelligence matters; this has
CIA, however, is
legally constituted in both the 1947 and 1949 legislative
acts. The United States, therefore, accepted in the inception
of its intelligence apparatus the paradox of having an
the Government
organization undertaking activities / is not prepared to
admit, while legally recognizing that the organization
exists. Since CIA has other responsibilities (the collation
and analysis of intelligence, collection of overt information
and many others), we have been able to hide the CS to some
extent under the CIA.
FrpFr
Approved For Release 2005/04:-CIARM86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
)ir:-.?-:;
Approved For Release 2 AY11/10.:!CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
3
4. Presumably the Clandestine Service would have con-
tinued its slow, careful growth had not a covert action
responsibility been placed on CIA in 1948. Thinking about
covert political action had been going on since early 1947
and various units were established within CIG for psychological
warfare. By early 1948 a small group of policy planners
in the State Department, headed by George Kennan, decided
that the Soviet Union planned to use the organizational
weapon of the Communist Party system to subvert and ultimately
Noir' conquer the world. They reasoned that they would not be
able to thwart Soviet intentions without a clandestine
political mechanism that could counter the Communist effort.
The only legally constituted organization in the United
States Government with a clandestine capability was CIA.
Therefore, on 18 June 1948, NSC 10/2 was issued tasking the
CIA to take covert action against the Soviet threat. It
was first thought that the clandestine collection mechanism
Npie
and the covert action organizations should be kept separate.
Parallel offices were created. Clandestine collection
was done by the Office of Strategic Operations (OSO) and
covert action by the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).
These offices were consolidated in 1952.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10,;,p1A-RDP86B0026r001200210001-4
T
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2 AltrIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
5
? 25X1
\By 1952 the clandestine
operations were unified and the separate offices of OPC and
OSO formed into one Clandestine Service which exists today
as the DDO. During the brief period the offices were
separate, they fought each other for control
of resources, communications, andA influence with senior
officers. There was redundancy- since you could not undertake
covert action without immediate supportive intelligence to
tell you what to do. This proved true in all phases of
25X1 clandestine activity.'
I
Approved ForRele segp0a0Filp_:CylA=RDPUBBIII726"9Reftt2002+000-1-4-
ar operations a real-time
ii.P.PPT i
%we
%me
25X1
SECRET
? Approved For Release 2005I0110 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
intelligence capability became vitally necessary. It was
seen that covert action cannot succeed without timely and
in-depth intelligence support; intelligence information-, on
the other hand, breeds a desire to take action.
8. The CS faced a number of organizational problems
in its first years. Because of the intense expansion in
1950 it was not surprising to find four or five separate
units operating in a given city or a country. Between
1950 and 1952 many units were working at cross purposes
and this became known to other elements of the
United States Government and to the host governments. The
1952 consolidation stopped this and for a period of approxi-
mately three years the clandestine service attempted to
establish a unified command structure at home and overseas.
Approved For Release 200M1Vf90-RDP861300264R001200210001-4
?L:4)..L..42,; A
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/SCECREr 86B00269R001200210001-4
12
14. Clandestine Collection and Covert Action.
Strangely enough, it is difficult to define clandestine
-71/
although the dictionary defines it as something kept secret or hidden.
Clandestine collection operations might be
defined as those being carried out without the source
case officer,
necessarily knowing the true identity of the the
nation he serves, the organiza tion he represents, or the
customer to whom the information will go. In many collection
operations, however, our sources know they are talking to CS
case officers and they know that their information is going
to CIA and the U.S. Government. What is hidden is the fact
that the source is giving secret information to the case
'4114mv' officer. Clandestine reporting, moreover, can also be
defined as information which a source or a subsource would
not give to the case officer if he knew the true identity of
the recipient of the information.
Such operations are
called false flag operations. There
types of clandestine operations, and
intelligence officer to appear to be
unique while conducting an operation
formance in secrecy and in alias is the essence of clandestine
activity. Covert action attempts to follow the same rules.
There is a basic contradiction, however, A well-hndled spy
can report, virtually forever, if his communications channels
sou, are not compromised. For the most part, covert action is
are, therefore, many
it is the art of the
doing nothing particularly
of this nature. Per
suAiggit5Qi-diaorzRektutstt2005i0tifeiCtonaDIt
Q17PD17
01)2.61101)12110214101314tat e
3CUllt I
13
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
7,ainst whom or which it is directed knows that the opera-
tion has succeeded or failed. The result of covert action
is discernible. Political action is the most important
element in covert action and can be defined as action taken
by the United States Government clandestinely to affect
events in a foreign country or foreign countries
foreign policy of the.United States,
in pursuit of the
It is?
difficult to select the individual phyla of political action,
since intra-action and inter-reaction within the state
and between elements of the state are common phenomena of
25X1 political action. Let us discuss some of these.
Approved For Release 05,?
CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/(1 FOQIELP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1 "
E. Paramilitary operations: In the past, CIA
has undertaken paramilitary operations to respond to the
use of paramilitary forces by a Communist or Marxist group
in an effort to destroy the infrastructure of a target state.
The establishment of a national liberation front in 1960
was followed by the inauguration of paramilitary activity
in South Vietnam, Laos and later Cambodia by the North
Vietnamese. Ultimately this activity escalated to the use
of regular forces, but our response was at first paramilitary
in nature in Vietnam and in Laos and remained largely a
paramilitary effort throughout. Paramilitary operations are
not clandestine but they are covert and often remain so by
the express agreement of both sides. Such operations re-
quire their own information-gathering-infrastructure, communi-
441.0,1 cations control, personnel and munitions support and substantial
Approved For Release 2005/91-tiftrWikl2pP86B00269R001200210001-4
k
N. - ?
?
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
funding. They are by far the most expensive covert opera-
'4,416,00,tions. 25X1
25X1
'too,
--r-
S,11:L:C/Fdr 1;
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 200agEC1A-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
19A
?
I. One special overseas program is security-
related and extends into many fields. The most important
sloe work supports counterintelligence. We must examine our own
people to determine their own continuing loyalty. One
might consider this a housekeeping chore, but the maintenance
of communications security can be compared to protecting
25X1 the main artery of the body/
Approved For Release 2005/0,71f ilTP86B00269R001200210001-4
?
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
SECRUApproved For Release 2005/01/10 : C -RDP86600269R001200210001-4
19 C
"%sie
15. Covert Action and U.S. Policy: All of the means
of covert action are used to one end--to support U.S. policy
overseas. U.S. policy in the first instance is defined by
Approved For Release 2005/01/19 :_CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
. 0. tEl. -r
Or.J
? SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/0M0 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
the President'and then later by the Secretary of State.
'?1010, Covert action is reviewed by both officials. American
policy overseas is largely an overt matter devised by the
Secretary of State and'his staff of Foreign Service officers
and carried out by the overt agencies of the government:
the State Department, the United States Information Agency,
and the other departments of our government. Covert action
by the CS is a very small part of America's overseas
effort. It should be used only when overt remedies cannot
suffice.
%me
The rapid growth
of independent states since the Second World War has created
a volatile political situation on three continents: Asia,
Africa, and South America. These continents could be
ignored by the United States if they did not have populations
that look to the United States for world leadership and if
they did not control vast natural resourCes. Two types
of clandestine activity are continually arrayed against U.S.
interests throughout the world: The Communist Party system
either at the direction of the Soviet Union (as in the Eastern
European satellites)or by independent growth within in-
dividual states such as in China, the Vietnams and Cuba.
The second type is political terrorism directed against the
establishments of a number of countries. Terrorism can
form a part of-national policy, as in Libya, an organized
political effort, as the FLN, or an expression _of modern
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00269R0012ouzio-4
,P-CT
;
Approved For Release 2005/01S[CM1586B00269R001200210001-4
21
anarchical action as it is in Western Europe and Japan.
Terrorism is on the rise and may one day be a greater threat
to the United States than any other form of hostile political
clandestine activity. Since the terrorists keep secret all
planning for the execution of most of their political
activities one
way to handle them is the
development of clandestine intelligence penetration opera-
tions to determine their plans and clandestine political
action to hamper their activity. The most modern municipal
police forces have a very difficulttime controlling random
Perhaps the best
acts of terrorism. I remedy is long-term penetration
4111,0,operations to identify the terrorists and provide the police
with the knowledge and evidence to apprehend them.
Should we abolish covert action? This suggestion has
been made many times. Let's look at the advantages and
disadvantages.
Advantages:
A. The United States would be able to publicly
disavow covert action and condemn other nations for en-
gaging in such practices.
B. Those citizens who feel that engaging in
covert action may lead the United States Government into
actions which might in some ways deprive the individual
American citizen of his fundamental rights would be reassured,
knowing that no governmental agency has the legal right to
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
undertake such activity.
SCREJ:
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : IALmon-vd6B00269R001200210001-4
22
C. Without covert action the United States would
not be tempted to meddle in other nations and would,
therefore, not inadvertently draw the United States into
other national affairs accidentally or by happenstance.
D. The United States would be saved the funds
which would otherwise have been spent on covert action.
The arguments for continued covert action might be
as follows:
A. The United States and its President are provided
a means short of direct military activity, to influence
political affairs in other nations without committing the
United States to treaty obligations or to armed conflict.
B. The United States should be given a proved weapon
to use against the organizational tactics of hostile powers.
C. The United States needs a means to encourage
democratic political forces in other countries, particularly
in the development of political parties, the interplay of
which ensures some measure of political choice and
political independence for the populace.
D. The United States needs means to work covertly
against national and international terrorism.
E. The United States can undertake small operations
today which forestall the need for much larger ones downstream.
F. The costs of political action are very small
when compared with the costs of overt aid and assistance
programs and particularly with the costs of military action.
Approved For Release 2005/91/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
c'RE
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
23
16. Should covert action continue? Our answer would
be a tentative yes. It is hard to say whether covert
action should be defined in any statute other than by inference
as has been done in the Foreign Aid Assistance Act of 1974.
Our brief review of the action responsibilities of CIA as
a whole. suggests that it would be almost impossible to
define covert action in a statute. The legislative back-
ground does not refer to covert actions and of the pre-
decessors to those gentlemen who drafted the 1947 act, only
Gen. Donovan who wrote to the need for the capability for
"subversive action" appears to have comprehended such a
future requirement for the United States.
If there are no precedents in the thoughts of the
Agency founders, there is, however, twenty-five years of
history, of executive orders and related policy documents.
If it is difficult to exactly define covert action, it is
equally difficult to define just where such action oversteps
the mark. The key appears to lie in establishing an appro-
priate oversight capability which has the confidence of the
American people and the support of all three branches of
the government. It appears doubtful that an oversight
capability administered solely by the Executive Department
will any longer fit the bill. At this stage in our history,
oversight must be shared by the Executive and Legislative
branches and understood and supported by the Judicial Branch.
Approved For Release 200w1iip Cift-RDP86B00264R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : ?Ark-rwr86B00269R001200210001-4
24
17. Should Covert Action and Clandestine Collection
be Separated? There have been suggestions that covert action
and clandestine collection should be separated. There is the
assumption that virtually all nations engage in intelligence
collection whether or not they admit to it but considerably
less engage in covert action and, therefore, the U.S. should
not,.or at least in a veTy limited way. Thus covert action
?
should be much more restricted, highly selective, and totally
secret. The pro's and con's of this might be as follows;
Against separation:
A. The two are so closely related as to be in-
separable. Clandestine collection suggests the vulnerabilities
inherent in a political situation; covert action provides the
means to exploit these vulnerabilities.
QFPUT
Approved For Release 2005/01-110 : eIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 200IE,t0,FCIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
?
25
B. Both are clandestine activities and can
exploit the same support structure; that is, the use of
the same communications
facilities, budget and audit staffs, logistics and personnel.
D. One government officer can be held responsible
for both types of activities so that the President, the NSC,
and the Congress have only one senior official with whom
they must deal on clandestine activity. To have two such
officials, one for each activity, would lead to involved
coordination problems in the best of circumstances and
constant argument in the worst..
The advantages of division of the two activities appear
limited but might include:
A. Personnel in the clandestine collection service might
security when they
lid not have to perform the inherently less secure covert action.
25X1be able
Approved For Release 20Q51,0100ttIA-RDP86B00269,R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/071/Vga86B00269R001200210001-4
26
B. The clandestine covert action officer might
gain more security if he were not identified to the clandestine
collection service. This advantage seems doubtful since the
covert action service would have to develop its own clandestine
collection activity to carry out its covert action.
We conclude that the two activities belong within the
same service for the reasons given above. It is not the
purpose of this papr to review in detail the 1949 to 1952
period, but it should be noted that virtually every professional
intelligence officer who lived through this period and emerged
to serve in the unified service voted against a redivision
into two separate services.
Assuming we agree that the clandestine service would
remain one organization, the question remains where in the
government it should sit. There appear to be only three
options: in the State Department, in the Defense Department,
or continue to be a part of the overall American intelligence
25xiserv1ce. 1
4ftie
18. Let us pause to see how the Clandestine Service
is now supported by the rest of CIA. The Directorate of
Administration provides the Clandestine Service with the
best communications capability in the world, assistance in
preparing and organizing its budget, physical security
Approved For ReleasiFrifit: CIA-RDP66B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
25X1
SEOET:
Approved For Release 2005/0 : ..,IA-RDP861.300269R001200210001-4
for its personnel and its buildings, computers and other
data storage, transportation, the recruitment and retirement
of its personnel, a host of housekeeping advantages and a
me Deputy Director for Intelligence provides the Clandestine
Service with 7 finished intelligence papers to be
used by.the CS and with .foreign intelligence services, It also provi2es
guidance Ffor the collection
of intelligence, guidance and assistance in relationships
with other departments particularly in communications intelli-
gence and other related fields, and a unique sounding board
for an exchange of ideas on worldwide political events.
The Directorate for Science and Technology provides the
Clandestine Service with sophisticated tools of the trade
in all branches of technology. Without this assistance the
CS would have to develop its own capability in this field
which would be highly expensive and duialiCative. The DDSU
also provides unique information to the CS to assist the
latter in collection activities. The CS, in turn., supports
other, elements of Central Intelligence, sending virtually all of its
th-Odsands?E,f-reports-eaCh year to the Intelligence Directorate.'
The CS assistance to the Scientific Directorate has been
discussed earned
Approved For Release 2qa,s/94 3:10A-R0P66B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 20aragIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
19. If the Clandestine Service is to be placed else-
where than in the intelligence service, it will be necessary
to develop such support either within the Clandestine Service
itself or within the host U.S. department. Some aspects
of organization are germane= to all organizations but a
secret organization with clandestine responsibilities is
far more difficult to handle than a relatively open organiza-
tional effort.
20. The State Department Option: It is difficult to
judge just how the Department would react to such a suggestion
'441111,Or how they would
include the Service organizationally
were the order to be given. Nevertheless, we can see the
following advantages in such a union:
A. The coordination of covert action should be
easier. The Department of State is responsible for the
foreign policy of the United States and works at this job
daily. Were the covert action officers immediately available
for assignment by the Foreign Service, there would be close
coordination of officer deployment. Planning would be
easier since the Department would draw up a policy document
for a ,given area and include a covert annex for covert action,
25):41.1
Approved For Releaa'ORReffkii*9 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
,R
SECRET
Approved For Release 200eg1 ffG::CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
C. There would be educational gain on both sides.
The F50 would come to better understand the methodologies
of the Clandestine Service. The Clandestine Service
officer, in turn,, would receive a wider education and a
broader knowledge of foreign affairs.
21. We see, however, the following disadvantages to
placing the CS in the Foreign Service:
A. The Foreign Service officer would find it
difficult to accept the concepts and methodologies of the
CS. Foreign Service officers view their role as policy-
formation, reporting and policy-implementation in the dip]o-
matic world. They would resent officers fully integrated
into their organization who would have separate communica-
tions channels and separate duties.
B. There would be a tendency to bottle up the
Clandestine Servite and keep it from carrying out its
activities because these might endanger the diplomatic
equities of the U.S. in any given country.
C. There would be great difficulties in attempting
to keep a separate line of command, separate communications
channels and an appropriate regard for need-to-know if both
'Noe organizations were integrated.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/049) : CIA-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
D. Budgeting would present a problem since it
would be difficult to hide within the State Department's
budget funding for the Clandestine Service.
E. Social problems would result from the differing
types of officers chosen for both efforts. The State
Department is careful in its choice of officers - selecting
them for their general educational backgrounds, intellectual
aptitude and maturity. The Clandestine Service selects
officers for their imagination, ability to play roles,
technical qualifications, and for their willingness to accept
and
a somewhat dangerous/anonymous life.
? 22. The Department of Defense option: At first blush
this seems a more logical choice since the Defense Department
81'11W includes organizations with intelligence responsibilities,
and it is traditional that the military services are the prime
customers of intelligence product. The Defense Department
is a large organization with many functions into which the
Nese
25X1 Clandestine Service could be se uestered.
25X1
25X1
?
Advantages:
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 200V91/10 : CtA.1RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
B. Much of the support available to the Clandestine
Service in CIA would also be available in the Defense
Department without building separate capability.
et Closer coordination with the Defense Depart-
ment intelligence organizations could be achieved since
the officer corps could be integrated.
The disadvantages might be considered as follows:
B. There would be a tendency for the Clandestine
Service to be directed to military objectives and collection
of national level intelligence would gradually dissipate.
C. Current close working relationships with the
Department of State would gradually fall off. The unique
role that has long existed with the CS as a third party
acting on behalf of both
Approved For Reiease 20051u1i1u : u'artirri6b&dalqi6liiaitlioaf-4
4
leaving the CS as a Defense .Department adjunct.
*tile
SECRET,
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :VA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
32
D. The ability to serve the production elements
of CIA would be severely circumscribed because of the heavy
military influence that would result. It would be difficult
for the CS to keep a balance reporting capability. It is
doubtful that much saving would be affected through joint
budgeting. CIA's current flexibility and economy in the use
of funds 'would disappear when the Clandestine Service was
forced to adopt military procedures in carrying out its
activities.
23. It could also be further argued that CIA would
lose some, or most of its objectivity as a collector
of intelligence should it be moved into either of the two
large customer organizations. Over the years a tradition
has developed in the Clandestine Service that it serves
everyone--the President, the National Security Council, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, other Depart-
mental Secretaries, the working Foreign Service officer,
his counterpart in the military and anyone else the President
so directs. As such the CIA has become a service organiza-
tion available to virtually everybody, but responsible to
itself.
24. We conclude that it is probably best to leave it
as it is--a component part of CIA and covered in the United
States by the Agency. The problems which have developed
Ivor the years appear to be more the result of overzealous
Approved For Release 20,ctorriri 1A-RDP86B0049R001200210001-4
,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005301/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
policy direction to the Clandestine Service than to any
run-away activities by the CS as an independent element
of the Government. Relatively simple steps can be taken
to more thoroughly control and circumscribe CS authoritieJ
without, however, changing the organization, its officer
corps or its means of going about its business,
Approved For Release 200
rirtritti:;ZelgRDP861300269R001200210001-4
-
Approved For Release 2005/SECRETRIDP86B00269R001200210001-4
ANNEX F
A Product Review Concept of Resource Allocation
This approach would involve making some organizational,
procedural, and other changes within CIA to provide the President
each year an evaluation, based on the knowledge available to CIA
production elements, of the contributions being made by various
collection systems within the Community to the solution of intelligence
problems. In concept this approach would draw heavily on the present
Kay Intelligence Question concept and associated evaluation process.
This annual evaluation would supplement the report to the President
required under the November 1971 letter calling for an independent
DCI recommendation on the overall Intelligence Community budget.
It would have the effect of suggesting to Defense and to the President
(OMB) the desirability of certain decisions about Intelligence Community
resource matters without significantly extending the DCI's direct role
in decision making.
Under this approach, we would expect the DCI, with the aid
of an independent product review group in contact with CIA and other
production analysts, to supply to the President around July of each year
a report identifying those collection assets in the Community which
have contributed in important ways to the solution of problems
Approved For Release 2005/040yr14114"-RDi P86B00269R001200210001-4
? .1.)1 I
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : SlEeftETB00269R001200210001-4
in the past year and identifying systems or programs with
great potential for solving future problems. This report
would be made available to Defense and OMB, and they would
use it as a tool to help shape resource decisions relating
to various intelligence programs.
This approach would have the advantage of giving the
DCI a responsibility which he could at least to some degree
carry out, and it would raise few troublesome questions
about direct involvement on his part in Defense decisionmaking--
that role being reserved to the Department itself and to
OMB, which has recognized legal responsibilities in
assisting the President to develop his overall budgetary
strategy.
The DCI's focus in this evaluation would be essentially
limited to collection programs for which he has the best
substantive information base. As these include the most.
costly activities in the Intelligence Community, this
approach is not unreasonable. On the other hand, there
would be many resource issues within the Intelligence
Community on which the DCI would have no basis for
effective comment. He would not, for example, using this
approach, be easily able to comment on the numerous important
resource issues which arise within the various .expensive
-2-
Approved For Release 2005/k1/10?4ATRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
SECRET,
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
intelligence-processing or support programs in the Community.
The issues which arise between CIA and Defense in the
processing area need attention. They are among the more
complex and difficult problems which confront us jointly.
On the other hand, one can question whether resource
issues in the support area ought to be his responsibility
in any event. During consideration of the 1976 budget,
for example, there was much discussion as to whether the
DCI should support DIA's attempts to fund a new DIA building.
It is unclear, however, whether a DCI view on an issue of
this kind is of any real consequence to Defense, the
President, or Congress.
There are other difficulties inherent in this "product
review" approach which can be most graphically illustrated
in the Comprehensive Crypto logic Program (CCP), although
they can be seen in some measure in other programs as well.
In the case of the CCP, if the DCI determined in any given
year that five particular facilities made an outstanding
contribution to the solution of certain intelligence problems
this would in all likelihood not constitute any effective
basis for making decisions about resource levels for those
or any other CCP. It is extremely difficult to tell when,
or if, any particular CCP facility will make a contribution
-3-
Approved For Release 2005/01/10.: CIA-RDp861300269R001200210001-4
Ay-'01
Approved For Release 2005I01I11Xpp-0
;
6600269R001200210001-4
in a given year. Also, so often the CCP "contribution" on a given
problem results from the combined efforts of a number of facilities
over a period of time, each piece of raw data being important but none
being essential. The same problem arises in attempting to draw con-
clusions about which CIA Operations Directorate stations overseas
contribution next year.
The fact is that with respect to both problems, no one can
predict which of many facilities (and the people in them) will yield
the hoped-for result. The nature of the problems which become
important at a particular time, tend to determine which particular
installations make a noteworthy contribution in any given year. For
this reason resource decisions for these programs tend to be dictated
by the desirability of maintaining the existence of an overall apparatus
or capability as conditioned by cover, working environment, and other
shifting concerns, and the "product review" approach would be of
little real value. However, there are judgments that may be made
from year to year or over a longer time on which country or area
may become more or less important to US policy. From these
qualitative assessments some resource decisions are possible.
-4--
Approved For Release 2005/01q) WI-DP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10SFIR-RET6B00269R001200210001-4
On the other hand, on some of the largest issues which face the
Community, the "product review" approach could enable the DCI to
develop a coherent view for implementation by others. For example,
Such a long-term trend ought to be discernible under the basic approach
outlined in this option, and thus, the DCI would be able to comment that
new assets have made a large portion of an existing program irrelevant.
It is also true, however, that such a conclusion could be reached by
others.
Carrying through this approach would suggest changes in the
DCI's Intelligence Community Staff to emphasize the "product review"
function. It would also suggest development of procedures requiring
production components within CIA to report periodically on the contributions
being made by various collection systems to the solution of intelligence
problems. Finally, there would need to be improvements in the flow
of information from collectors as to which programs provided which
information. The latter vould be difficult to achieve, particularly in
the case of NSA and the CIA Operations Directorate, which have strong
traditions of resistance to this basic approach.
-5 -
Approved For Release 2005/01/(1iZT P86600269R001200210001-4
' ?
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : it*-4R600269R001200210001-4
We believe the "product review" function would need to be
organizationally separate from production components within CIA.
This would help overcome the proclivity of analysts to continue to
require all information, no matter how marginal, on problems of
interest to them in the belief that such information may someday prove
essential. Organizational separation would also help to overcome the
potential problem created by suspicions in Defense that CIA analysts
would follow a "party line" with respect to collection assets managed
by CIA. In addition, a small group attached to a reconstituted Intelligence
Community Staff to investigate major issues (such as the
issue noted above) would probably be desirable to carry out one or two
studies of large Community-wide issues each year.
Approved For For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-Br86B00269R001200210001-4
r 1")'_
Approved For Release 2005/0SERtI0P86B00269R001200210001-4
ANNEX G
External Oversight Over Intelligence
As a result of allegations of improper activities conducted by
the CIA and other elements of the Intelligence Community and
congressional dissatisfaction with existing oversight mechanisms,
there is clearly a mood to strengthen such mechanisms. Conceptually,
the answers to such questions as "what sort of oversight is required"
and "how will it be accomplished" are easy; in practice, however,
they may prove very difficult to implement particularly in the
Congress when they raise fundamental organizational and other issues.
The first question to be addressed is precisely what oversight
should involve substantively. Oversight over what? In a broad sense,
intelligence oversight has come to mean the review of intelligence
activity to insure its general propriety and conformance with law.
It has already been observed, however, that the statutory base for the
conduct of many intelligence programs is quite general. The
Rockefeller Commission Report noted that in "Determing the law-
fulness of particular (Central Intelligence) Agency conduct...in
Approved For Release 20011/10 _C4A-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
L I
Approved For Release 2005/01(ilEGRaP86B00269R001200210001-4
*we many instances the only appropriate test is one of reasonableness."
(page 58). Nevertheless, at least three specific areas are likely to
be the subject of increased attention by whatever mechanisms may be
established. First, it is reasonable to expect, in the Community
and the Agency, increased attention to the budgetary and financial
management aspects of intelligence. The House Appropriations Committee
has pursued thses issues vigorously this year and the current investigations
seem certain to increase, rather than reduce, Congress' interest
in the uses to which public funds are being put. Second, the current
investigations would suggest a continuing concern with the details
of any programs which impact upon the rights of American citizens.
*owe Finally, growing out of our Southeast Asia experience, it is likely
that covert action or other activities which show potential for deeply
involving the USG or the American people in foreign conflicts will
be the subject of continuing scrutiny. Other specific areas will, of
course, emerge as the world situation--and our role in it--evolves
and as new subjects become objects of congressional interest. At
this time, however, continuing attention to these three aspects of
oversight seems predictable.
2
Approved For Release 2005/91/10 : clA7RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
"
Approved For Release 2005/01(F.LIP861300269R001200210001-4
The problem of oversight is closely related to the secrecy
question discussed in Part II of our overall paper. To lend perspective,
consider the question of oversight by Congress and the Executive over
a "normal"--i.e., nonintelligence or defense-related Federal agency--
which operates with unclassified information and programs. A
variety of processes contribute to keeping such an organization focused
on its most important missions, within the letter and spirit of the law.
These include a relatively public appropriations process, and frequently
an authorizations process as well, within the Congress; the process
by which the President develops the Federal budget; public congressional
hearings in which interested citizens can present their views; media
reporting on the utility and effects of programs; and scholarly evaluations
and critiques of the effectiveness and propriety of specific Government
programs or practices. Examination of and public debate about an
agency's programs and policies in Congress and within the Executive
Branch contributes to the free exchange of ideas and constructive
criticism necessary to the development of new, or the revalidation of
old, policies or programs. Thus, congressional oversight in the cafe
of a normal agency is greatly assisted by the "oversight" of many
other interested observers.
3
Approved For Release 2005(01110 .?DP86B00269R001200210001-4
.) k
Approved For Release 2005/01/FOEGIR-ETP86B00269R001200210001-4
The need for secrecy in the conduct of intelligence programs requires
a different approach to oversight over intelligence, however. Secrecy
means above all a limit on the number of people who can be knowledgeable
about certain activities or even about their existence. This limits
the quantity of information available to the Congress on sensitive
activities by limiting the number of people who have any effective
knowledge of those activities. It aLso probably tends to limit the quality
of the information available on sensitive programs by reducing or
eliminating productive debate between informed proponents of
different points of ivew. This practical effect of secrecy can probably
be overcome, but it, in our view, imposes a special responsibility
on both the Executive Branch and the Congress which will always
require an unusual effort if it is to be overcome.
Oversight within the Executive Branch
One approach to the need for external oversight over intelligence
is for the Executive Branch to improve its efforts in this regard.
There are at the present time within the Executive Branch three
organizations or mechanisms which have from time to time contributed
to Executive Branch oversight over the Intelligence Community.
None of them appears, however, at this time to consider oversight
4
Approved For Release 2005/41414argherRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
.1:\[
Approved For Release 2005/01 200210001-4
(in the senses in which this word is defined above) its primary
responsibility, and each suffers from a de facto conflict of interest.
The National Security Council and the related 40 Committee
which considers covert action activities can be considered oversight
mechanisms. Specifically with respect to CIA, the National Security
Act of 1947 provided that the Director of Central Intelligence and the
CIA be constituted under the National Security Council. Thus,
implicit in the law is the concept that the NSC will oversee the activities
of CIA. Often, however, the members of the Committee themselves
are deeply involved in developing the policy recommendations being
considered; particularly in the case of covert action, 40 Committee
members may be advocates of the programs they are reviewing.
Both the Council and the Committee have served to insulate the
Presidency from participation in decision making on some programs.
The NSC has in general not considered its oversight responsibilities
to the members of the Intelligence Community as central as its policy-
making responsibilities, however. The same comment applies to
the 40 Committee which has not generally considered itself as primarily
concerned with investigating the Intelligence Community's conduct
of, as opposed to the need for, the various programs carried out.
There would seem to be conflict of interest in giving a vigorous
5
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
ST:ICRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/1g E4i)W.T861300269R001200210001-4
oversight role to either institution whose purposes and functions are,
at least as presently constituted, quite different. Nevertheless, within
the framework of the present law, it is the NSC which should primarily
be held responsible for oversight within the Executive Branch.
Another organization which could exercise oversight, within
the Executive, over intelligence is the Office of Management and
Budget. OMB's function and normal processes give it access to
much information about how the intelligence agencies spend public
funds. Its recommendations directly affect the financial resources
available to the various members of the Intelligence Community, and
thus, the programs and activities which are carried out. In the
last analysis, however, OMB too is an instrument of the President,
charged with helping the President carry out policy and programs,
and it is unreasonable to expect it to exercise a vigorous oversight
role in at least two of the three specific areas identified above.
Another possible oversight mechanism within the Executive
Branch is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB). This Board, made up of distinguished citizens, has
tended to see its responsibility as that of stimulating improvement
6
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
n ri
,)LURF
?
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : ste
:
+00269R001200210001-4
in the quality of intelligence, rather than exercising oversight over the
wisdom or propriety of specific actions or programs. Board members
are generally extremely busy individuals, and the Board itself
has a very small staff. There is no particular reason, however,
why it could not take on a unique oversight responsibility, system-
atically considering important policy issues of propriety and
adherence to law arising within the Intelligence Community and giving
the President the benefits of confidential outside advice on numerous
sensitive subjects. Such a role for the Board would probably require
a full-time Board as well as a substantially increased staff.
The Rockefeller Commission Report contains a recommendation
to strengthen the role of PFIAB to carry out a broad oversight
responsibility. A similar recommendation was repeated by the
Murphy Commission. Implementation of these recommendations vo uld
help provide effective oversight over intelligence within the
Executive Branch. There is a need for an Executive Branch mechanism,
responsible to the President, probably with public members, whose
principal concern is oversight;to the maximum degree possible,
this mechanism should not be burdened with any other responsibilities
over intelligence which tend to create a conflict of interest.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : icIA-lpFF,B00269R001200210001-4
fj,
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 ?g-F2ROSTB00269R001200210001-4
The Need for Effective Congressional-Oversight
Until very recently it seems to have been sufficient for those
charged in Congress with oversight of intelligence, the members
of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, to acquaint
themselves broadly with the various intelligence programs and to
remonstrate with the DCI on a direct basis when they took exception
to Executive proposals or programs. This basic approach seems
no longer to be acceptable in the eyes of many members of Congress,
and it seems unlikely, at least in the short term, that Congress will
return tc its former broad concept of oversight. It is however
equally unclear whether an acceptable new approach can be developed.
The past absence of an effective working oversight mechanism
is now being felt. It has helped create a situation in which many
congressional committees now feel it is their responsibility to ascertain
in great detail precisely what activities have been, or are being,
engaged in within the Intelligence Community. We are not speaking
only of the special committees which have been established. There
are other examples. The Subcommittee of the Government Operations
Committee of the House is attempting to conduct what amounts to a
wide-ranging investigation of CIA activities under the guise of reviewing
Approved For Release 200
r -
/11 Cl-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Niue,
Approved For Release 2005/01/10SE2EFI6B00269R001200210001-4
the Agency's performance under the Freedom of Information Act
and its intended performance under the provisions of the Privacy Act.
Perhaps more important, the past absence of an effective
oversight mechanism has helped to create a situation in which the
Intelligence Community too often itself decided what constituted
"reasonable" activity under law. This has allowed the Executive
Branch great flexibility; it has also gotten us into trouble.
The requirement for congressional oversight is rooted in the
system of checks and balances articulated by our founding fathers.
The Congress' role is to define and limit the Executive authorities.
Congress must assure itself that laws are effectively discharged by
Executive departments, and it must further assure itself that funds
are being expended rightfully and properly, i.e., for the purposes
intended and for no other purposes. It is self-evident that oversight
of intelligence in a democracy is vital and that it is essential to
public confidence in the Government's intelligence programs.
9
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
r rrNr
T
SFcREI
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : ookouu269R001200210001-4
Basic Oversight DilemmaS
The existence of an Intelligence Community and the need for
oversight pose a basic political dilemma to those who would oversee
within the Congress. The overseer can be credible only if he is
aware of the total
spectrum of intelligence activities. However,
secrecy requirements limit him to silence about these activities.
Such silence can be construed as acquiescence in the conduct of the
activities even though he may have privately taken vigorous steps
to oppose them. If the activities prove to be failures or unpopulac,
his knowledge and his attendant silence can politically affect him adversely
in his relationship viith his constituents. Although it cannot resolve
the basic dilemma, a viable way of dealing with this problem is for
those who exercise oversight to consciously and deliberately adopt
a policy of "no comment" with regard to all intelligence matters.
There is a second and more difficult dilemma which faces Congress.
Let us return for a moment to the "normal" Federal agency discussed
above, and the nature of the congressional oversight over it and its
programs. A particular member of a congressional committee over-
seeing our hypothetical agency may feel strongly about the propriety
or efficacy of a given activity. If his views are not supported in his
10
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
71-'1)77
1--a6C1
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :-CI ogoB00269R001200210001-4
own committee, he is free to lead an attack in Congress on his committee's
judgment. He may be characterized as a poor loser, but this need
not stop him if he feels strongly enough about an issue. Nor however
will such an effort stop the policy or program from being carried outs
if Congress ignores his arguments and approves the program.
Now consider this same individual as a member of an oversight
committee on intelligence. The situation is somewhat different.
A decision by an individual member to oppose publicly a specific
intelligence program or activity will certainly cast the activity in
grave jeopardy, and it may make further such activity untenable.
Thus, one member with authoritative information about a specific
Noir" project can acquire the ability to flaunt the will of both the Executive
Branch and even the Congress, as represented by the committee to
whom authority over intelligence activities has been delegated.
Because of this, , we doubt that Congress can ever exercise effective
oversight over intelligence until it develops procedures for handling
dissent in private. This will mean finding ways to insure that there
are acceptable means by which members can be assured an adequate
voice in the decision-making process within the responsible committees and
ii
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
R F
Approved For Release 2005/08ECRfr P86600269R001200210001-4
possibly developing a confidential "appeal channel" outside the
committee. If such procedures cannot be developed, there are
strong pressures on committee chairmen to hold the most sensitive
information to themselves. Chairmen will be loath to share this
information with the full committee; DCIs will acquiesce in such
procedures, and oversight will be reduced.
In addition, there is the organizational issue. The idea of a
joint committee on intelligence may be viewed with merit because
of the success of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. If that
model is followed, and because of the jurisdictional problems, a
joint committee on intelligence could be added to the existing committee
structure. That conceivably could require members of the
Intelligence Community to report to a total of seven congressional
committees who would view themselves as having an oversight
responsibility.
These would be the two committees on foreign relations, the
two committees on armed services, the two appropriations committees,
and, in addition, the joint committee. Reporting to so many committees
would be impractical. It could be a barrier to efficient management.
And it could tend to reduce, not increase, oversight by blurring line::
of responsibility for it.
12
Approved For Release 20 0)TC7fA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-Ku .861300269R001200210001-4
ANNEX H
Consumers and Users--The Multiple Masters Dilemma
To what degree can or should substantive intelligence information
(as opposed to information about operational matters) be shared with
the Congress or others outside the Executive Branch?
Given the nature of our Government and society, there are
different possible consumers of the substantive product of intelligence
-which need to be kept distinct:
-- Though intelligence is normally thought to be a
governmental .function designed to assist those with governmental
responsibilities, our Federal Government has three distinct
branches: the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial.
As the Judicial Branch is not generally a consumer of intelligence,
we are concerned here only with the Executive and Legislative
Branches.
-- Our media, the press, radio and television, often claims
recognition as. the spokesman of the people. Indeed, under the
? First Amendment, the press is virtually a fourth branch of Government.
Approved For. Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
r-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
The Executive Branch
Within the Executive Branch, a description of those who "consume"
intelligence products, begins with the most important consumer--the
President. He is closely followed by the other members of the
National Security Council, their senior subordinates and staffs,
and the NSC staff itself.
? Another important set of consumers includes subordinate officials
in those departments or components of the Executive Branch?military
and civilian--responsible for the formulation and execution of foreign
and national security policy. This clearly includes the NSC Staff
and the Departments of State and Defense. It can also include the
Treasury, the economic decision-making community, Agriculture,
Commerce, and others.
Certain Executive Branch officials?military and civilian--
serving abroad are also consumers of national intelligence products
at some times in some contexts, e.g., Ambassadors, the commanders
of major US military forces or units and their subordinates.
Another important, but easily overlooked, set of consumers
of intelligence products are the members of the Intelligence Community
itself.
Approved For Release 2005/011TOMPFRDP861300269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/1
,E.cchenfr
6600269R001200210001-4
Finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other components
of the Justice Department--including (at times) the Attorney General--
are consumers of certain "products" including counterintelligence
or other information indicating that certain US laws or statutes may
have been violated by foreigners within the United States or (in
certain special situations) by US citizens abroad. This might include
intelligence on citizens engaged in espionage on behalf of foreign
governments, in terrorism, or international traffic in arms or
narcotics.
The Legislative Branch
Within the Congress, the situation is less clear cut. The
?0111100? intelligence requirements of "Congress" are, of course, a function
of how the two houses of Congress choose to organize themselves.
Even more, they are a function of how Congress or its leaders
or significant members view or define the constitutional role of
Congress in the formulation or even execution of foreign and national
security policy.
Two additiona considerations complicate the picture. There can
be sharp differences of opinion between Congress and a given
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
-
Approved For Release 2005/013f:METP86B00269R001200210001-4
Presidential administration over the constitutional issues of Congress'
responsibilities, rights and prerogatives in the foreign policy and
national security arenas. ? And there can be an adversary relationship
between a given Congress and a given Administration caused or
fueled by: control of Congress by one political party and of the
Administration by another; sharp differences over major, politically
charged policy issues between an Administration and Congress, or
key, influential Congressmen; or the political ambitions of some
Congressmen.
Parallel complexities are engendered by the increasing size,
strength and asserted prerogatives of the members of congressional
staffs (including both personal staffs and committee staffs). The
rights and authorities of staff members are largely derivative and
dependent on their success in persuading elected members of Congress
to adopt their viewpoints. But some congressional staffs, and
individual congressional staffers, clearly have their own concepts
of their intelligence needs.
Burgeoning congressional staffs are a developing political
phenomenon of no small consequence. Those who serve on them not
4
Approved For Release 2005/0lIpnWIRDP86B00269R001200210001-4
k,,
'44118,1
SOCgI
Approved For Release 2005/01/ : - DP86600269R001200210001-4
only have their own requirements and ideas, but also their own
aspirations, constituencies and, sometimes, ties with members
of the press.
The problem of identifying appropriate congressional consumers
(actual members or staffers) of the national intelligence product
and, further, identifying their legitimate needs for various specific
products, is complex. It is a graspable problem when there is a
basic harmony between both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue (e.g. ,
when both Capitol Hill and the White House are controlled by the same
political party); when there is basic agreement on Congress' role in
foreign and national security policy; when Congress itself is an
organized, structured body with effective leadership; and when
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue share the same basic view of the
world beyond our borders and America's proper role therein. The
problem becomes more difficult to address when none of these conditions
apply.
Recognizing that Congress, or certain members thereof and some
staff members, have a legitimate need for--and right to--some
national intelligence products, from the standpoint of a DCI and a
national intelligence structure, the problem is further complicated
by three considerations:
5
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005SE1G RE4RDP86B00269R001
I. Sensitive information is not going to be protected or
kept out of the public domain if it is widely disseminated on
Capitol Hill.
2. In a situation such as that which now prevails, there are
likely to be sharp, profound differences of opinion between,
on the one hand, a President and his senior subordinates, and
on the other, "Congress" over what members of Congress are
proper consumers of what intelligence products.
3. No President will be happy about any component of an
Intelligence Community that regularly gets him in political
hot water or abets opposition to that President and his policies
by furnishing information to his political opponents which the latter
use as ammunition.
Two basic problems have to be faced by all involved--including
Congress--in determining what intelligence products should be provided
to what members of Congress.
The first is the problem of maintaining that secrecy necessary
to protect the fact that the US Government has certain information and
the means to acquire it (which, in some cases, knowledge of our
6
Approved For Release 2005/01/1-009-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
?% .4._
'4%ov
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
possession of the information itself goes a long way toward revealing);
and--perhaps most important of all--to protect our ability to convince
people or institutions, at home or abroad, whose cooperation we
need to discharge our responsibilities that the US Government is both
willing and able to keep secret that which it assures them will not
be publicly revealed.
The second is the problem posed by the need for an intelligence
structure whose informational products are comprehensive,
candid, objective and apolitical. The Intelligence Community's
ability to be objective and candid can be threatened if it is drawn
into partisan political controversy. The Community will be drawn
into that arena if its products are disseminated so broadly that
they are easily available for use as ammunition in domestic political
debates over governmental policies, programs and budgets.
The Public and the Press
It is felt by many that the US Intelligence Community has at
least some responsibility for contributing to the information base
of the citizenry--whose taxes, ultimately, support that Community
and its activities. This responsibility can be discharged directly,
7
Approved For Release 2005,,1 MXRDP861300269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
by means such as the publication of intelligence information and/or
analysis in unclassified form (CIA's China and Middle East Atlases
are examples); the provision of materials to scholars; appearances
by intelligence officers before public groups; and participation by them
in university-sponsored symposia or seminars, etc. It can be
discharged indirectly through the press by providing information for
use by newspaper, radio or TV correspondents or by providing background
data designed to give journalists and broadcasters perspective in
their interpretation and understanding of trends and events abroad.
Precisely what the Intelligence Community's responsibilities
are in this sphere are matters of sharp dissagreement within the
Intelligence Community itself. The problems and dilemmas inherent
in servicing members of Congress, and their staffs, as consumers
all reappear--often in intensified form--in addressing the matter of
servicing the public's information needs, either directly or through
the press. As is the case with Congress, many of these problems
are rooted in one unalterable, inescapable fact: access to American
publications and American television is not confined to loyal American
citizens. US television and the press are watched and read by
representatives of all interested foreign governments and groups.
Approved For Release 2005/.01/1,8 ? CIA-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
i
k)
Approved For Release 200SOF1CRET-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Information put into the public domain within the United States is thereby
put almost instantaneously into the public domain throughout the world.
The Dilemma
The dilemma posed by the multiplicity of those who claim a
right to be consumers of intelligence products provided to the
Executive Branch is rooted in the truism that institutions and
individuals cannot easily serve more than one master. No intelligence
service, or intelligence officer, can equally serve our Government's
Executive and Legislative Branches when controversy and conflict
among these is a staple of American political life. Some hierarchy
of responsibilities and loyalties is essential if an intelligence service
is to serve anyone well or, indeed, to be able to function professionally.
An intelligence service which is by law compelled to serve or report
equally to two masters will end up with reduced capacity to serve
either.
Individuals and institutions can, of course, be of assistance
to many without harming or endangering their ability to support those
who have first claim on their professional services and loyalty;
and this must be, as it always has been under our three-branch form
9
Approved For Release 200tpj'I1plA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/04ACZETP86B00269R001200210001-4
of Government, the basis upon which some accommodation is reached.
There is no real answer to the dilemma, but there can be workable
accommodation. To a degree every Federal department or agency
faces the problem of serving two masters under our system of
Government. A decision is made within the Executive, and Congress
demands access to the information upon which it was based. Congress
becomes aware of information held by a department which will affect
an Executive Branch policy decision and demands access to that information.
In the last analysis, the information will probably be made available.
More at issue is the manner in which it is made available--formally
or informally, instantly or after some delay, and so forth.
We believe that any attempt to write into law a requirement
that intelligence information be systematically shared with Congress
should be avoided. However, more can and probably should be done
to insure that production elements of the Intelligence Community,
particularly those in DIA and CIA, give systematic, formal attention
to congressional information needs and attempt to meet those needs.
10
Approved For Release 20,9,5/01/10 : qIA-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
I
25X1
configuration of, and the management
25X1
Nfto, photographic search system
program issues were the focus of the
fundamental issues. Defense at that
achieve total control over satellite
other hand, the history to that date
SEMIApproved For Release 2005/01/ ? . ?1--P86600269R001200210001-4
ANNEX J
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
The current National Reconnaissance Program organization
is based on a Memorandum of Agreement dated August 1965 and
signed by the DCI and the Deputy. Secretary of Defense. That
agreement was born out of strife between the CIA and the
Department of Defense over the future shape of the NRP. The
strife centered at that time on two program issues: (1) the
desirability, technical feasibility and program management
responsibility for
, and (2) the requirement for, the
of an improved satellite
. Although these two
strife, there were more
time was striving to
reconnaissance. On the
(1965) had demonstrated
that Defense was both
national intelligence
unwilling to give proper weight to
needs and unable to effectively carry
forward large, high risk programs.
The then DCI felt that he needed a measure of control
over a program as essential to intelligence as the National
Reconnaissance Program and further in order to achieve this
objective, he felt that CIA would have to be a direct,
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP861300269R001200210001-4
;:'3.F:CRET
25X1
(?t:
Approved Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIAL
16B00269R001200210001-4
operational participant in the NRP. He was strongly supported
by the White House, in particular the President's Science
Advisor; and it was generally agreed, at least outside Defense,
that CIA expertise, both technical and management, was an
essential ingredient to assuring a satellite reconnaissance
program capable of meeting the perceived intelligence needs.
Although many of the particulars of the 1965 agreement have
been set aside by subsequent events, it remains the chartering
document for the NRP.
By this agreement an EXCOM was established consisting of
the DCI, the President's Science Advisor and the Deputy Secretary
of Defense who acted as chairman. It also established a
National Reconnaissance Organization. The Secretary of Defense
appointed the Director/NRO who was selected from the senior
civilian officials of the Air Force Although the first D/NRO
under the 1965 agreement was the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force/R&D, subsequent D/NRO's have occupied the position
of Under Secretary of the Air Force. The operating elements of
the NRO were four programs: Program A, organizationally
established as Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects
(SAFSP) with an Air Force Major General as Director; Program B,
in CIA with the Deputy Director/Science and Technology as
Director; Program C, as a Navy element responsible for
and Program D, established
in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an. Air Force
- 2 -
Approved For Release 2005114/1-Qnl4-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
25X1
*me
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : C0N-F5T0269R001200210001-4
Colonel as Director charged with an operational responsibility
for several aircraft programs and a logistic support mission
serving other NRP programs.
With the phasing out of aircraft as important national
reconnaissance assets, Program D has been abolished. Program C
Programs A and B were established as competitive
organizations with no clearly distinguishing charters. The
motivation at the time was to insure that alternatives and
options were developed for final decision unconstrained by
the limitations of a single organizational view. However,
more to the point at the time, the two program approach was
principally motivated by the need to resolve conflict between
CIA and Defense over control of the NRP. Although Program A
has carried forward projects without CIA participation, the
reverse has not been true in that all Program B projects have
to one degree or another been jointly pursued with the Air Force.
The 1965 agreement also charged the Air Force with launch
vehicle procurement, launch vehicle operations and Satellite
Control Facility management.
Although the workings of the NRP have been, as might be
expected, sensitive to particular personalities in key positions,
in general these arrangements have worked well and have led to
- 3 -
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10SECO6B00269R001200210001-4
an effective and efficient NRP. However, today at the tenth
anniversary of the original agreement, much has changed.
There is no longer a Science Advisor and therefore the EXCOM
now has two instead of three members. The DCI is the chairman.
The Defense member is the newly (since 1965) established
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The role of
satellite reconnaissance in intelligence is far larger now
than even the most imaginative futurist perceived in 1965.
The complexity of intelligence as driven by SALT, increasing
sophistication and proliferation of strategic weapon systems,
and increasing pressure on U.S. overseas facilities as well
as many other factors, have established satellites as central
in the Intelligence Community. At the same time, the growing
convergence of military and national intelligence needs together
with dependency upon satellite collection have introduced new
and as yet not fully understood factors in program and resource
management. In the future military field commanders will need
direct support from intelligence satellite programs; but it is
impractical for each military service to have its own satellite
collection activity as they have in the past had their own
aircraft and ground based collection activities. These factors
have led to increasing pressure from the services for attention.
The Navy wants more of the satellite action, the Army wants to
establish a degree of equity in satellite collection, and the
Air Force wants a larger and different role. The regular Air
- 4 -
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA.-RDP86B00269R001200210001-4
c117,0Ds,T7
HUE
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-rwr86B00269R001200210001-4
Force in particular has never liked the Special Projects
organization and the associated strong civilian direction of
NRP programs and would prefer to "normalize" the organization
with the Air Force established as the developer and operator
of satellites through their line organizations to meet all
intelligence as well as other Defense needs.
In most important respects, the factors which shaped the
NRP agreement between Defense and CIA and the factors which
shaped the type of structure of the National Reconnaissance
Organization in 1965 have been replaced by another set of
problems and issues in 1975. The atmosphere of conflict and
disagreement between CIA and Defense at the top levels which
was a major issue in 1965 is not the dominate factor in 1975.
The problems of the upcoming years will be focused on insuring
that the collection resources needed by the evolving set of
national requirements will be met, while at the same time
providing the essential support to the various military services,
particularly military field commanders. The most serious con-
flicts are likely to evolve around issues pertaining to defining
the realistic needs of the military field commanders, allocation
of collection resources to military field commander requirements,
and developing effective requirements and product interfaces
with this category of users while at the same time supporting
the range of national intelligence needs within the limitations
of resources.
- 5 -
Approved For.Release 2005/0_1/10 CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/10cSfi-r1P861300269R001200210001-4
R
These several new factors are likely to require a restruc-
turing of the National Reconnaissance Program, as well as end
the National Reconnaissance Organization. The NRP EXCOM will
continue to be an essential high level policy and major program
decision body. The EXCOM will need to be expanded back to the
original three member group. The third member should be a
senior White House official, either the President's Science
Advisor if that position is re-established, or a senior member
of the NSC staff. Depending upon other organizational changes
and their impact on the DCI, a reconsideration of the appropriate
Defense member of the EXCOM may be required. In any case the
EXCOM must be constituted to adequately represent a balance
of the range of equities of relevance to NRP management.
The Under Secretary of the Air Force is likely to find it
increasingly difficult to fill both his Air Force and his
Director, NRO role. As the senior operating official responsive
to the EXCOM, he is charged with preparing program recommendations
and carrying out EXCOM decisions. At the same time he is the
selauTofficial of the Department of the Air Force and therefore
must concern himself with Air Force equities and requirements.
It is likely in the future as satellite reconnaissance becomes
more important to the Air Force mission, that these two roles
will generate serious and real conflicts of interests. He is
likely to find himself embroiled in inter-service rivalry
where satellite reconnaissance issues are at stake and under
*me circumstances where he feels strong pressure to represent the
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
- 6
Approved For Release 2005/01MS EORIEDT86B00269R001200210001-4
Air Force to the detriment of the NRP. A number of times in
the past there has been serious discussion of re-establishing
the NRO outside of the military services in anticipation of
just this problem. Most recently during Mr. Schlesinger'
brief tenure as DCI, he considered several proposals, one of
them generated by the PFIAB, placing the NRO reporting directly
to the Secretary of Defense. However, draft NSCIDS which would
have rechartered the NRO and readjusted its organizational
placement were not carried forward by Mr. Schlesinger due to
his abbreviated tenure as DCI.
There are two options for the restructuring of the NRO.
First the earlier proposals which would have the NRO reporting
to the Secretary of Defense could be reconsidered and adjusted
as pertinent to the current time. Any such arrangement Would
no doubt need to provide for more direct involvement by the Army
and perhaps expanded involvement by the Navy. As a practical
matter, the substantial roles of SAFSP (Program A) and CIA
(Program B) would have to be continued in something like their
current form. Also an appropriate position for the D/NRO
would need to be created. An appropriate model might be the
Office of Telecommunications in Defense.
A second alternative is to reconstitute the NRO as an
integrated, operational organization jointly staffed by the
three services, CIA and NSA. In this arrangement theD/NRO
would become the line manager of the various NRP programs.
- 7 --
Approved For. Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/1SE
CR FE"
86B002.69R001200210001-4
In addition to program management resources, the NRO would
require a full range of contracting, security and administrative
support services. This organizational structure for the NRO
has appeal from the point of view of streamlined management
and tight, coherent program direction. It would certainly
meet the increasing insistence of Congress for efficient use
of resources and elimination of needless duplication. It would
also be well suited for dealing with the increasing complexity
and growing diversity of consumers, which is likely to occur
as direct support to military commanders becomes more substantial.
However, an integrated operating organization of this type
raises the problem of appropriate organizational location.
Such a structure would probably be inappropriate if not totally
infeasible, as an element of the Secretary of Defense's staff.
For different reasons establishing such an organization within
one of the three services would pose a number of serious problems
as eluded to above. If the role of the DCI changed along the
lines of Option Two as discussed elsewhere in this paper, and
the CIA were correspondingly renamed and rechartered, the NRO
could be placed within this structure. However, there is a
question as to the acceptability of this arrangement from
Defense's standpoint even with the reconstituted EXCOM with
senior Defense membership.
Appmvpd Fnr RPIPaRP 7005/01 pip ? CIA-R111DRARI07R9RI0 1 700210001-4
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
Approved For Release 2005/1C MRDP861300269R001200210001-4
/On the other hand,
it seems extremely unlikely with the current mood of Congress,
that these private, informal arrangements between 4 few key
influential senators and congressmen and certain Executive
branch officials will be allowed to continue outside the normally
applicable statutes. Thus, in addition to finding a proper
home for the National Reconnaissance Organization, a mean; for
appropriating funds for the NRP must be established outside
the normal DoD appropriation process if an aggressive and
effective National Reconnaissance Program is to be continued-.
While this issue needs further study, there is noimmediately
obvious solution. The most nearly suitable would be the
appropriation of such funds to the CIA or to the reconstituted
DCI under the reorganization Option Two.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
- 10
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4
25X
1
25X1
REFERENCES TO ANNEXES
A
I (Did not see in pacakge)
Page 78 & 96
Page 29
Page 36
Page 36
Page 59 & 93
Page 77
Page 99
Page 9, Annex A
This page added by
DCl/IRO on 26 Jan 96
for reference purpose only
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86600269R001200210001-4