POST-MORTEM OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001200060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 11, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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A SECRET `6""
POST'-MORTEM OF THE CUBAN CRISIS
DD/I COMMENTS
I I MAR 1963
1. We have identified a number of points that need further study and action
.to improve the performance of the intelligence community in future crisis situations,
and a brief description of them follows.
2. A large number of key people throughout the intelligence community, and
in CIA specifically, were fully committed during the Cuban problem. They worked
long hours seven days a week and had no time to devote to other problem.. It would
be highly desirable for the Agency to develop what amounts to a strategic reserve
for use in times of crisis. For example, it might be possible to use JOT's to con-
siderable advantage in such a situation. In any case each component should identify
people of proven ability and experience who could be pulled off their normal work
for the duration of major crises.
In a fast moving crisis situation, rapid distribution of highly sensitive
information becomes terribly important and normal procedures to obtain the release
of this information for dissemination or special attempts to restrict circulation of
sensitive information cause disproportionate difficulties in the production of current
intelligence. It probably would be advisable for us to develop pre-arranged procedures
for crisis situations which could be put into effect by the Director on the advice of his
principal deputies which would make possible a streamlining of our reporting and
analytical activities. Such pre-arranged procedures might also take into account the
need to shift personnel described in the preceding paragraph. Within the DD/I we
will study this matter. The Deputy Director and Executive Director should do so in
a broader context.
4. In addition to the need for streamlined procedures pointed out above, in
a fast moving crisis situation there is a heightened need for senior officials to push
information down through the organization. In other words, guidance has to move
faster and more comprehensively. through all levels of the organization in a crisis
situation if intelligence production is to be faster and more comprehensive:. A
specific staff officer assignment should be made at each command level to insure
appropriate debriefing and dissemination of information from key officert; involved
in the crisis.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
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5. In some cases during a crisis it would be helpful to get periodic negative
reports from the field. During the recent crisis, for example, it would have been
helpful to get such periodic negative reports from US Embassy, Moscow. The lack
of significant new developments there would have been of considerable interest. The
Office of Current Intelligence should specifically request DD/P and perhaps State and
Defense to lay this procedure on when .it would be helpful.
6. During times of crisis a large volume of extremely important intelligence
moves through the command channels of US military organizations. There is no simple
established way by which such valuable information gets fed into the intelligence ma-
chinery, We managed to overcome this problem in large part by ad. hoc measures
during the Cuban crisis but believe that systematic measures should be developed to
insure the availability of such information in a future crisis. We are working on this
problem.
7. Many of the people involved in studying the problems of the Cuban crisis
have been concerned with the problems that appear to be inherent in. our existing
system for the reporting and analysis of information from human sources. Wit-
nesses are an. extremely important source of evidence in our work. But just as the
testimony of witnesses in a trial often conflicts, we find that the intelligence infor-
mation obtained from human sources is also conflicting. In. thinking about this
problem, we believe that our existing system for reporting and analyzing information
from human sources has changed relatively little from the early days of World War II.
In the meantime, the intelligence community has acquired great sophistication in.the
collection and analysis of information from non-human sources. We believe that it
might be advisable to take a new look at the basic philosophy and implementing pro-
cedures involved in the collecting and use of this human source material. Perhaps
more systematic evaluation of raw intelligence from all sources by DD/1 analysts
would be helpful.
8. With respect to the estimates business, one of the main concerns in my
mind post-Cuba, I should like to suggest the following steps which I believe would
be constructive:
a. On major strategic problems involving crisis situations, esti-
mative writing should, to an extent greater than commonly now true,
be made to be:
(1) data-oriented and evidence-oriented rather than
abstract and speculative (what the DCI calls "philosophical");
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(2) focused on describing situations and identifying
key factors influencing developments rather than purely
predictive;
(3) attentive to the nature and consequences of various
alternative lines of future developments, including "worst
cases, " rather than seemingly firm in identifying "most
probable" developments when these are by their nature im-
possible to predict with much certainty.
b. To insure that the DCI is being supplied in timely fashion. this
kind of estimative writing, a.s well as current and basic research data
he needs, the DD/I should produce balanced, broad-based CIA reports;
the Office of National Estimates staff should contribute to this process,
and this task should have as high a priority as drafting inter-agency
reports for consideration. of the Board of National Estimates and USIB.
c. It should be the responsibility of the DD/I within the Agency to
establish the CIA substantive position on strategic intelligence matters
of primary importance at the National Security Council. level drawing
on expert opinion in all of the DD/I offices, and coordinating with DD/P
and DD/R as appropriate when CIA substantive assessments are
required.
d. To insure close intellectual harmony between the researchers,
evaluators and estimates officers, the DD/I should insist on close
coordination among all DD/I office staffs, including ONE, and with
DD/P and DD/R.
e. The Board of National Estimates might voluntarily or upon
invitation contribute to or comment on CIA assessments, but their
main task would be the review and approval of USIB papers based
on CIA papers and other USIB agency contributions. The Board of
National Estimates should as now report directly to the DCI on
USIB papers, but the DD/I should advise the Board (and the DDCI or
DCI when they consider these papers) of the relationship of USIB texts
under consideration to related CIA assessments based on the work of
all the offices of the DD/I complex, plus information available from
DD/P, DD/R and policy levels of the Government.
9. Much of what I suggest herein. is already standard procedure and in fact
is what Agency Regulations call for. An improvement in what I have called the
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"data-oriented and evidence-oriented" quality of estimates and CIA asses. sments
will be sought by administrative and educational efforts by the DD/I.
10. The following comments were subscribed by Chester Cooper:
a. In. assessing-the lessons that we can draw from the Cuban
developments, I think we should pay some attention to what may have
been an important failure of the Soviet "Board of National Estimates. "
Regardless of how the Soviet decision to put missiles in Cuba was
reached, and regardless of the Soviet machinery for providing "irLtelli-
gence support" to policy makers, some evaluation must have been
made of probable US reactions upon learning of the missile emplace-
ment (if not, the intelligence failure was monstrous, indeed).
Apparently, the line of thought which assessed that the US would
probably not learn of this emplacement until after.it was a fast accom-
pli, and/or which gave relatively high odds to a type of US reaction
which would not entail great risks for the Soviet Union won the day.
It would be interesting to know whether a presentation was made as
to the likelihood and consequences of the "worst case. " Soviet action
immediately following the President's broadcast would indicate that
such a presentation was either not made or was totally ignored.
b. What would have been the "worst case ?" It would have been
one in which the US discovered the emplacement of the missiles be-
fore they were operational and would have been prepared to take
military action to invade and/or destroy Cuba -- an act which the
Soviet Union was powerless to prevent unless it wished to enlarge
the conflict to an extent which would, for all practical purposes,
amount to general war. We cannot assess what odds the Soviets
should have placed on this "worst case" eventuating. Suffice to say,
however remote it may have appeared (if indeed it had actually bean
conceived of), it happened.
c. The Lesson: In our own assessment of Soviet Bloc reactions
to certain proposed US courses of action, we should, as SOP, exam-
ine the consequences of the "worst case. " The policymaker should
be apprised of our judgments of what may happen if everything that,
could go wrong does in fact go wrong no matter how unlikely we think
that may be. There is a natural tendency to resist this type of analysis
on the part of advocates of particular courses of action on the grounds
that this might so frighten the decision makers that they are likely to
turn down the proposal. However, the Soviet experience ( and our own
earlier experience) in Cuba would dictate the necessity of presenting
the policymaker with a "worst case analysis. "
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DD/P COMMENTS
11. I have canvassed all components of the DD/P, including members of the
senior staff, for comments on such deficiencies they may ha'e observed during the
Cuban crisis. For your convenience, I have summarized these comments in sub-
sequent paragraphs.
12. Headquarters Emergency' Relocation Plan. Considerable confusion exists
regarding plans for the relocation of CIA headquarters in enemy-inspired emergency
situations. Plans on this subject are dispersed in a variety of instructions of
different classifications to different addressees: e. g. -
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b. "Guide for Civil Defense Action in the Washington Warning
Area" (unclassified).
d. DD/S (secret) memorandum of 18 October 1960 to the Deputy
Directors, subject: "Plan for the Relocation of the Headquarters of
the CIA in Time of Emergency. "
e. DD/S (secret) memorandum of 18 October 1960 to the Deputy
Directors, subject: "Instructions for Deploying the Initial Emergency
Relocation Force. It
Recommendation: That the Executive Director's newly constituted Emergency
Relocation Group, after re-esamination of the problem, republish the Agency reloca-
tion plans in a single document with the lowest classification possible and make it
available to all employees. Such re-examination should include the following points:
a. Practicality in the light of overall US Government plans in this
era of ballistic missiles and megaton warheads. The primary consider-
ation should be continuity of CIA's ability to function with the inherent
need to safeguard personnel, communications and other facilities to
achieve this objective. These considerations are particularly significant
because of the, perhaps unavoidable, ambiguity in present plans a3 to
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the timing of redeployment. If possible, employees should be told
when and where to move themselves and dependents in clear,
unequivocal language.
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13. Need for a CIA (CONUS) War Plan. Related to the foregoing problems
concerning Emergency Headquarters Relocation Plans, the Cuban crisis has high-
lighted additional unresolved problems which affect CIA's ability to serve effec-
tively in time of war. Some of the more important of these concern our working
relationships with other elements of the US Government, notably Defense, in
wartime; the specific wartime functions of CIA headquarters, and the practical
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aspects of support to our overseas elements during war, especially during the first
90 days. The need for guidance on these matters has been expressed by the DD/I;
Senior War Planners, Europe and Pacific; elements of the DD/S, as well as of the
DD/P.
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a. Provide a basis for peacetime preparation for the Agency's
wartime mission.
b. Prescribe the wartime functions of Headquarters.
c. Outline CIA headquarters' role in wartime and its relation-
ships with other parts of the Government, such as the Presidential
Staff and Departments of Defense and State.
d. Assign missions to the subordinate elements of CIA.
This gap should be filled by a CIA (CONUS) War Plan which would become the
basis for the planning of all subordinate elements of CIA headquarters. The overall
Plan would:
Recommendation: Responsibility for the development of a CIA (CONUS) War
Plan be assigned to an appropriate element of the Agency. Because of the background
of experience in planning which exists within the War Plans Staff, DD/P, it is sug-
gested that consideration be given to assigning this responsibility to DD/P with support
from DD/I, DD/S, and DD/R.
14. Liaison with DOD/JCS. Inherent in the foregoing but perhaps deserving
of special mention is the inadequacy of CIA liaison with DOD/JCS both with regard
to. contingency planning and to effective operational and, perhaps, intelligence. coordi-
nation in. emergency or wartime situations.
The Cuban crisis and the declaration of world-wide DEFCON-3 did result in
increased liaison between the CIA and the Joint Staff, but it is questionable whether
this liaison was sufficiently timely or at the appropriate levels to provide the needed
guidance for CIA contingency planning and preparatory action. The liaison which was
effected at different levels within DOD by various elements of CIA was inadequately
coordinated and, therefore, inadequately exploited within the Agency. Agency con-
tingency plans in. support of US military plans must be written and preparatory actions
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must be undertaken before the crisis is upon us /
. t out this preliminary planning and preparation, C s record of support would
have been a sorry one. Had the planning and preparatory actions been fully com-
pleted, the Agency response would have been even more satisfactory and rapid.
Current discussions of the adequacy in level and scope of CIA participation
in Cuba planning indicate that a thorough review of CIA-Military relation., during
contingency planning and actual operations is in order. The DD/P is currently look-
ing into this problem with respect to its responsibilities in this field.
In dealing with Defense, we have to think along at least four lines:
a. Policy (CIA participation in pertinent DOD policy meetings
in which Secretary of Defense and Chairman of JCS participate).
b. Intelligence (USIB activities and DD/I liaison with JCS).
c. Operational/action.. liaison with Secretary of Defense (Special
Group(s) matters).
d. War and contingency planning with JCS and military commands.
Recommendation: These factors be fully considered in the development of a
CIA War Plan as recommended in paragraph 3 supra.
15. Significance of Intelli ence Reports. It is clear in retrospect that the
25X1 significance of the numerous reports on the arms buildup in Cuba was not generally
recognized in the Intelligence Community until after the photographic confirmation.
Whatever reasons maybe cited for this, it is at least probable that these reports
would have presented a sharper issue for consideration by the Community if their
total volume and common drift had been succinctly emphasized to the USIB members
in summary form, rather than entrusted entirely, on an individual basis, to the nor-
mal processes of intelligence methodology.
Obviously the chief. contribution the Clandestine Service can make in the
field of intelligence continues, as in the past, to be the collection and prompt dis-
semination, with suitable sourcing and appraisal, of spot information reports in
response to requirements. Any effort to dictate Community procedures for sifting
and weighing these reports would be both presumptuous and impracticable. Never-
theless, we believe the Clandestine Service can and should take steps to ensure that
25X1 any persistent train of ^ reporting, the acceptance of which would challenge
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prevailing estimates on a matter vitally affecting US interests, is pointedly brought
to the attention of those charged with producing the estimates.
Recommendation: On its own initiative, the L-koduce timely summaries
of possible significant, previously disseminated reports bearing on situations of
vital national concern. These will not be analytica or estimative documents, nor
will they present new information. Their aim will be to bring to the personal
attention of USIB members and other appropriate officials, the essential content of
various reports, previously disseminated over a period of time, to ensure that the
cumulative significance of these reports is explicitly considered and evaluated.
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During the crisis, a number of Book Messages were sent to the
field at times and with a precedence which prevented complete co-
ordination. This resulted in a number of these cables being sent to
Our Agency representatives posted to the various military com-
mands reported that the intelligence traffic to the commands of
situation summary material was largely duplicative in nature. The
JCS Sitsum and the OCI summary particularly complemented each
other. In view of the fact that the communications facilities were
overloaded during this time, coordination of releases of this type
from the military and other agencies should be fully studied to ensure
minimal duplication of effort.
with limited communu-
we have made arrangements with
whereby an automatic stop
can be lifted on each specific occasion by the area division directly
involved.
d. Secure Interdepartmental Telephone Communications: During
the crisis the DD/P Operations Center was equipped with a gray phone.
Offices in the Executive Office Building, the Departments of Statti and
Defense and the USIA, with which the Operations Center had to deal,
however, had no similar telephone installation. If possible, a secure
interdepartmental telephone system capable of rapid expansion in
emergency situations should be developed.
e. Operational Support: During the critical period, CIA elements
directly concerned went on a 24-hour duty schedule; however, other
elements that could render direct and/or indirect support were not
readily available as they were not on a physical 24-hour duty status.
Although -there may not be any need for all elements of the Agency to
go on 24-hour duty, a general alert message from the highest levels
would serve to transmit a sense of urgency to the lower levels to
provide reasonable support to the action elements directly involved.
As a guide, DD/P found that prior briefings at the appropriate office
head level, even if placed in an "if or maybe" category were invaluable
in putting the office on notice as to possible actions expected during a
crash period.
f. Transportation: There is difficulty in arranging for trans-
portation after normal duty hours for DD/P personnel, particularly
clerical, who work long, irregular hours. It must be remembered
that the CIA building is an extremely difficult and expensive place to
reach if one has to depend on public transportation after normal work-
ing hours. A suitable after-hours transportation system of some kind
is required.
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g. Vending Machines: The automatic vending machines which
provided a major share of nourishment after hours and on weekends
were poorly serviced during the crisis period. The vending rooms
were not cleaned over the weekends and .the accumulation of trash
and discarded foods made for a very unhealthy and unsightly situation.
h. Reproduction Facilities: In planning for emergency facilities
the acquisition of a mobile reproduction unit that could be
moved into the area when needed, has been recommended, Recent
experience in the Cuban and Far East situations suggest that such a
mobile unit would have been most useful at Langley. `Too frequently
the reproduction facility cannot meet the concurrent requirements
for high priority work in spite of the best efforts of OL/PSD which,
during the recent crisis, have been outstanding.
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j. Security: It was noted that the Office of Security was well.
prepared for the crisis. Extensive experience with the "Bay of Pigs"
build-up plus the number of Security personnel previously associated
with the whole Cuban project proved extremely helpful.
k. DD/I Support: Cooperation and coordination by the operating
elements of the DD/I with DD/P were considered outstanding during
the crisis period.
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DD/S COMMENTS
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17. The Office of Communications has been greatly affected by thf_- events
of the crisis weeks.
19. The following discussion points out the major areas where deficiencies
have been discovered. Further details and specific recommendations on each sub-
ject will be prepared if you desire:
a. Personnel. Two main categories of personnel were required
beyond our on-board strength, namely radio operators and technicians.
Attempts were made during this period to obtain military personnel as
operators and commercial Tech Rep personnel as technicians. In both
instances we were only partially successful in that personnel thus
obtained were not fully qualified and when obtained could not be pit to
immediate use as they were not cleared for CIA use. It is recommended
that personnel ceilings be adjusted so that a reserve of qualified personnel
that can be called on short notice be developed.
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20. In retrospect, the past few weeks illustrated that our basic system and
organization can react to crisis situations if they are not too big and if they occur
only one at a time. We do not have reserve capacity sufficient for simultaneous
large crises or a hot war. The creation of the National Communication: sub-com-
mittees absorbed practically the full time of seven of our senior people in com-
mittee meetings for three weeks. During this time we still had sufficient depth
of staff officer personnel to carry on implementation actions on a world- wide basis.
Our. recommendations stemming from this period are made in terms of being
prepared in the future to meet rapidly increasing requirements with available assets
of equipment and personnel whether they occur simultaneously in several parts of the
world and whether they occur at the beginning or the end of a given Fiscal Year.
Office of Security
21. This memorandum is divided into two Sections. Section I sets forth
comments deemed to be of overall Agency importance, and Section II comments
referring to Office of Security problems.
SECTION I: Agency Problems
A. During the week of crisis, substantial effort was exerted in
planning against requirements and needs of the Agency. Difficulty
was encountered in this important area by the lack of sufficient
25X1 available information concerning the purpose, nature, and extent of
the activities planned The
25X1 same type of problem was encountered in planning for the protection
and support of Agency
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substantial requirements for security protection and support would be
levied by overseas stations and bases. Efforts to plan in this area
were also rendered difficult by the lack of precise information, We
are vitally concerned with Agency plans for regrouping of personnel
and, at this time, we are not aware of where or how this will be
accomplished.
B. Concern was developed about activities at the Headquarters
Building during crisis. Present Agency policy requires a total evacua-
tion of the building, and protection of it is the responsibility of the
Office of Security. It is believed,. depending on the degree of damage
to the building, that the plan for total evacuation may meet with less
than conformity, and that a substantial number of people from all com-
ponents housed at Headquarters will see fit to remain as an informal
stay-behind group, Even. if this should not occur, the protection of
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the building by the Office of Security will require a substantial nurn-
ber of Security personnel who will be assigned indefinitely to the
building to guard against sabotage, penetration, and to protect
against an onslaught of citizens seeking a haven. As of the present,
there are no plans to house either the informal stay-behind group,
which might develop, or the Security force. Most importantly,
nothing has been done to provide accommodations affording protection
against blast and fall-out for any extended period.
C. Great difficulty was encountered in an attempt to provide
guidance to Office of Security personnel regarding their dependents.
General reaction to the instructions currently available was that
they are limited and not sufficiently complete. Questions concerning
whether dependents can follow employees on an emergency assign-
ment, and whether they can be housed near relocation sites were
common. Further questions about communications with dependents.,
transport, medical care, and housing were also presented. It may
well be that the present policy definition regarding this problem i:,
all that can be done, but the general reaction of personnel has becn
such as to warrant further clarification.
D. The problems referred to in paragraphs A, B, and C, in the
opinion of this Office, require revision of A ency policy and further
study and planning. Regulatory issuances and
related documents will require review. It is recommended that con-
sideration be given to adding to the administrative approach to
emergency planning the establishment of an appropriate advisory
board or council composed of senior officials representing major
Agency components. This board should review current planning and
policy in the areas cited and make appropriate recommendations based
on the needs, operations, and. requirements of all major Agency com-
ponents. This board should also correlate Headquarters emergency
plans with overseas wartime planning.
E. A vagueness was encountered as to the responsible office in
the Agency to provide professional advice and guidance in the impor-
tant area of nuclear effects, such as radiation, fall-out hazard, and
blast hazard. It is recommended that the Medical Office be authorized
to assume this responsibility and to achieve whatever degree of
specialized information is necessary for it to adequately advise tl-:e
Agency in connection with this problem.
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F. Survey of indicates a lack of protec-
tive facilities for personnel and vital records against atomic blas and
25X1 fall-out. It is our understanding that a feasibility study has been made
concerning the solution of this problem. It is recommended that this
25X1 matter receive further exploration to the point of
provide adequate protection.
SECTION II: Office of Security Problems
A. The Office of Security employees, during emergency, will be
assigned to various rosters and duties, including the Security Patrol,
Relocation Force, and Emergency Stand-by Team for overseas support.
Duplication of assignments has been noted. A certain degree of indefi-
niteness exists as to functions and responsibilities. Accordingly, all
emergency assignments of Office of Security personnel are being re-
viewed to avoid duplication and to provide clarification of functions and
responsibilities within the limits of available information. In addition,
as far as possible, all employees will be provided with instructions as
to where to report and what they are expected to do.
B. The role of area and project Security Officers requires clari-
fication and definition. These officers have been requested to furnish
the Office information on their emergency assignments and plans.. This
will be analyzed for the purpose of obtaining complete knowledge as to
the availability and function of these officers.
C. Recent experience has demonstrated the need for further
orientation and training regarding emergency problems. Requirements
for added equipment also became evident. Accordingly, a program has
been instituted to hold periodic meetings of Office Relocation Forces,
the Security Patrol, and the Emergency Stand-by Team. Plans are
being formulated to provide for instruction in the use of the gas mask,
complete familiarity with the physical features of Headquarters
Building and relocation sites, fire fighting, radiation detection, and
first aid. Surveys are current to determine the types and quantities
of equipment necessary for training and for emergency operations.
D. Analysis of the Office of Security staff in terms of emergency
requirements leads clearly to the conclusion that we are not staffed to
meet all responsibilities. Accordingly, plans have been undertaken to
assess our requirements and to request, through appropriate Agi ncy
channels, military assistance, particularly in the area of guarding
and general protection responsibilities.
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E. The lack of adequate communications facilities for the Security
Patrol and the overall emergency operations of the Office appeared
critical. Accordingly, a study has been undertaken to analyze ou
requirements to determine the necessary equipment and systems and
to implement the study to the point of solution.
F. We have become aware of the need for mibility and transport
which might arise during a catastrophe of serious proportions. This
problem is. being pursued with consideration being given to obtaining
a better potential for the emergency use of various types of transport
equipment and obtaining necessary passes and credentials from t1te
Office of Civil Defense.
G. Further Security planning is necessary for each Agency relo-
cation site and for all areas housing Agency personnel during an
emergency. Present plans have been reviewed, and action. has bt en
taken to conduct real surveys designed to bring up to date the plans
for these areas.
H. The adequacy of our vital storage materials program has
been reviewed, and it has been concluded that this program must be
intensified. This will be done.
Office of Logistics
22. In response to the request contained in paragraph 2 of the reference,
the following paragraphs contain problems and deficiencies noted in recent weeks
along with suggested course of corrective action.
23. Emergency Plans:
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a. Problem: A review of the Headquarters Emergency Relocation
Plans revealed that the plan pertaining to the Agency emergency relo-
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lacks required materiel support in place. was a so round
port organization was needed.
b. Proposed Solution to Organization: A proposed concept of
25X1 operation of the facility has been developed
and submitted to the Agency Emergency Planning Officer in include
an organization structure to cover the essential services required.
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25X1
25X1
25X1
c. Proposed Solution to Materiel Assets: Tables of Equipment
representing estimated austere survival requirements needed to sup-
port have been prepared and forwarded to
the Agency Emergency Planning Officer. It was recommended that
action be taken to secure necessary funds to enable procurement and
prepositioning of these assets in rea. Estimated
cost of these assets was 1 -1 There will be additional require-
ments for operational equipment and supplies for the proposed sup-
port organization.
24. Supply Items:
a. Problem: During any emergency or prolonged period of
tension requiring 24-hour a day coverage by offices, not ordinarily
staffed for such action, a certain amount of cots, blankets, etc. , is
needed in the interests of minimal operational efficiency of the per-
sonnel concerned. This type of bedding is not available at the Head-
quarters building. In many cases the personnel who were required
to remain on duty for 24-hour periods and longer had to find what
rest they could on the tops of desks, tables, and in chairs.
b. Proposed Solution:
(1). Each major component of the Headquarters should
determine the minimum number of cots, etc., that would be
required for its personnel during periods when there must
be 24-hour a day coverage of their operations.
(2) Once the bedding requirements have been determined
and submitted to the Building Supply Office, then the necessary
procurement and placement of these items in the Headquarters
building and in other Agency buildings can be undertaken.
a. Problem: As policy is made at high levels (NSC, USIB, etc.),
considerations must be given to those decisions which require urgent
procurement of large amounts of scarce items in terms of setting up
the necessary priorities to accomplish the desired objecti.es. With-
out the necessary accompanying priorities, the requested project is
stalled and valuable time is lost while Logistics goes back through
the channels to obtain the necessary data. This must be done when
it is learned that the requested material is in competition with other
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established projects. A recent example of this is the request laid on
.system as requested by the Subcommittee on Communications of ti'l-e
National Security Council. Projects such as the one cited above will
be competing with other established projects. Therefore, without an
established priority, the project falls behind schedule and causes a
great deal of unnecessary correspondence.
b. Proposed Solutions That as a part of the planning process,
any decision that results in an urgent request for large amounts of
25X1 scarce supplies, personnel or services should have
assigned because of possible conflict with established projects.
25X1 is used by Department of Defense only for a prograrz
that has been cleared. by the Director of the Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization (OCDM) to be eligible for such priority. Pre-
sent policy is that final approval is granted by OCDM for reference
to the Secretary of Commerce only after National Security Council
review and/or by direction of the President. Once the priority has
been assigned, it should be sent along with the decision to insure
the meeting of established suspense date(s) for this project.
Z6. With.the exception of the items noted above, there were no major diffi-
culties within the Office of Logistics. Judicious scheduling of personnel during
the recent emergency allowed coverage on an extended basis. Requests placed
upon the Office of Logistics for support were met within the time frame specified.
V. Control Procedures for Employee Military Reservists.
The trend toward rapid call up of reservists by the Military Departments as
a strategic deterrent to subversive threats points up a definite need for refinement
of the control procedures for Agency employee military reservists. This is parti-
cularly true in the case of those Army Reservists on duty outside the Unit,-~d States
whose records are under the jurisdiction of the Army Field Commander.
25X1
25X1
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28. Requirements for Military Security Forces for Headquarters and
Relocation Sites.
The close examination given to emergency relocation plans during the early
days of the emergency and particularly the decision reached to move a percentage
of the emergency force to the relocation site revealed requirement 25X1
for military security forces prior to mobilization to augment existing guard forces
at Headquarters s a precaution against possible
sabotage. Military personnel requirements for these tasks have been accepted by
the Military Departments and are included in the Mobilization Troop Basis, but they
would not be available prior to approximately M plus 30 days.
ACTION - Department of the Army officials with whom preliminary discus-
sions have been held recommend that our requirements. be submitted to the Depart-
ment of Defense (who will relay them to the Department of the Army). Information
is now bein assembled in coordination wi the Offices of Security and Communi-
cations reparatory to preparing a memorandum
to the Department of Defense for the signature of the DDCI.
29. Key Employee Military Reservists in CIA Category 2 (release to Military).
Employee reservists have been permitted to belong to military reserve units
I Ion the basis of a release signed by an appropriate official in
individual offices, staffs and divisions. When the lists of approximately= Category, 1 1
2 reservists w
lid
t
d b
ere conso
a
e
y major component, it became apparent that a
number. of "key" employees were in position to be lost in event of mobilization.
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31. Need for Dissemination of Information Regarding Control and Use of
Employee Military Reservists.
25X
In the course of analyzing the situation regarding employee military reservists
it became apparent that information on this subject should be disseminated to the field,
particularly that regarding action which was being taken to improve control procedures
with the Military Departments.
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