NIE TRACK RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1979
• Content Type: NOTES

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11 July 1919
DCI BACKUP BRIEFING NOTE
NIE TRACK RECORD
I. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the NIEs significantly overestimated
the existing and prospective size of the Soviet ICBM force. Thee
overestimates were based in part on the pace and success of the Soviet
ICBM development program and in part on projections of Soviet denloyr~rel--.
capabilities made in the absence of hard evidence of actual deployment
activity.
II. In the mid- and late 1960s, the NIEs significantly underestimates the
prospective size of the Soviet ICBM and SLB"1 forces. Even though by this
time we had good knowledge of Soviet launcher construction and deoloyrnents
as they occurred, we underestimated the prospective magnitude of the
Soviet programs. The NIEs predicted that the Soviets would deploy either
fewer, or later, only about the same number of ICBl launchers as the US.
The estimators believed mistakenly that the Soviets would want to avoid
triggering major new US programs, failed to appreciate the vigor of the
Soviet reaction to the humiliation they suffered in the Cuban missile
crisis, and overcompensated for the earlier errors of the "missile gap" era.
III. The estimative record during the 1970s has been mixed. Insofar a! can now
be determined, many forecasts made in that period have been about right.
These include the IOC dates predicted for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBis. In
addition, the NIEs seem to have correctly identified the main lines of
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development in Soviet strategic air defenses and correctly judgd that
Soviet ASW capabilities against SSBNs would remain low. There nave 11;)
been some apparent overestimates. For example, we overestinate,i the
rapidity with which the Soviets would convert older ICBi1 silos `or tha
newer MIRVed systems, now being deployed and the rapidity with which a
new SSBN and a new heavy bomber would be developed and deployed. Howeter,
in two important aspects of Soviet intercontinental striking capability--
the accuracy of Soviet IC31k1s and the number of on-line Soviet missile RVS--
we now believe that in the past few years we were underestimatinq the
progress the Soviets would make by the early 1980s. We believe that we
have now corrected this error in our most recent estimate. 25X1
IV. As to the degree of confidence consumers should have in NIE forecasts it
light of the estimative record, a number of considerations are rolevant:
A. Our present forecasts are based on the expectation that the USSR wi
continue to demonstrate broad scope, vigor, and persistence in its
strategic programs. Concern about US reactions is no longer assumed to
inhibit the Soviets' determination to improve their deterrent and
war-fighting capabilities.
B. In general, our historical base and current information about on-going
Soviet deployment programs is better than before, but we still have
very little information about specific Soviet plans. Forecasts for
the near term are likely to be more reliable than forecasts t)r tin
period 5-10 years hence.
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C. When deployment programs are in mid-stream and their pace is well
established, confident forecasts can extend some years into the
future. Periods of change in Soveit deployment programs, however.
can introduce substantial uncertainties about even the near term_
25X1
D. With respect to new weapons, long development leadtimes permit us
to be reasonably confident that future Soviet strategic forces will
consist very largely of types of weapons identified several years in
advance.
25X1
Recognizing these limitations, our present estimative philosophy is
to change our forecasts, even drastically, as soon as possible when
the evidence leads us to believe we have detected a new development or
trend, or that the Soviets have altered a program. This means we
accept considerable fluctuations in forecasts from year to year in the
interests of giving our consumers as much advance warning as possible.
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