UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 132
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For?filelease 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B002 20Q1100130001-4
Pds ~'O- a
COPY NG 26
A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI J
by
THE EXECUTI1,7E SEC ETARY
on
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES A:TD PRO GRAMS FOR :+ATIO~~ dL SECURITY
DEC -A.SSIFIED
Au4h:. /l
By: :! iT o G~ ty
i':'s~ICi;?LL SECUTtI TX COUNCIL
April Th., 1950
WASHINGTON
NSC review(s) completed.
STAT
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved Fceleas1 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00ZR001100130001-4
25X1
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
C 0 P Y April 12, 1950
Dear Mr. Lay:
After consideration of the Report by the Secretaries
of State and Defense, dated April 7, 1950, re-examining our obo-
jectives in peace and war and the effect of these objectives
on our strategic plans, I have decided to refer that Report to
the National Security Council for consideration, with the re-
quest that the National Security Council provide me with fur-
ther information on the implications of the Conclusions con-
tained therein. I am particularly anxious that the Council
give me a clearer indication of the programs which are envis-
aged in the Report, including estimates of the probable cost
of such programs.
Because of the effect of these Conclusions upon the
budgetary and economic situation, it is my desire that the Eco--
nomic Cooperation Administrator, the Di.-ector of the BureE_u of
the Budge,.t, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers,
participate in the consideration of this Report by the Co=uncil,
in addition to the regular participatign of the Secretary of
the Treasury.
Pending the urgent completion of this study, I am
concerned that action on existing programs should not be post--
poned or delayed. In addition, it. is my desire that no pub-
licity be given to this Report. or its contents without my
approval.
Sincerely yours,
(SIGNED)
HARRY S. TRUMAN
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
e
 Approved Fq, elease 20 3/09/29: CIA-RDP86B002#8R 1100130001-4
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE
OF JANUARY 31, 1950
April 7, 1950
I. Background of the Present World Crisis 4
II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States 5
III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin 6-
IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of
Ideas and Values Between the U. S. Pur-
pose and the Kremlin design 7
Terms of Reference
Analysis
A. Nature of the Conflict 7
B. Objectives 9
C. Means 10
V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities--
Actual and Potential 13
CONTENTS
NSC 68
VI. U. S. Intentions and Capabilities--
Actual and Potential
VII. Present Risks
VIII. Atomic Armaments
21
34
37
A. Military Evaluation of U. S. and
U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities 37
B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic
Weapons 38
C. International Control of Atomic
Energy kO
IX. Possible Courses of Action 44
Introduction 44
The Role of Negotiation 44
A. The First Course--Continuation of Cur-
rent Policies, with Current and Cur-
rently Projected Programs for Carry-
ing Out These Projects 48
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R0p1100130001-4
 Approved ForAWease 003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B0026PO01100130001-4
CONTENTS
(Cont'd)
Pt-&e
B. The Second Course--Isolation Ill
C. The Third Course--War 112
D. The Remaining Course of Action--
a Rapid Build-up of Political,
Economic, and Military Strength
in the Free World
trsC 68
i
r l
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RD01100130001-4
 Approved F_ Releasl 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00 9R001100130001-4
TERMS OF REFERENCE
The following report is submitted in response to the
president's directive of January 31 which reads:
"That the President direct the Secretary of State
and the* Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination'
of our objectives in peace and war andsof ith~heffelight ct of
th`
these objectives an our strategic plan possible thermonucfeare
probable fission bomb capabilit- and p
bomb capability of the Soviet Union."
The document which recommended that such a directive be
issued reads in part:
"It must be considered whether a decision J to proceede
with a program directed toward determining whe judges the more fundamort~ltrdecisions ermonucle(r)t?reapon provesr' in
the event that a test
successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if'
stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be usessz'L,__,
in war. If a test of thn~'-'~stockpi1e41such weapons tocbe
the pressures to produce held for the same purposes for which f isThe sioq estbs are
user
being held will be greatly only as a part of a ~.?rieT'~~ ~
policy can be adequately assessed on .T fans and it
reexamination of this country s strategic p
neec~
objectives in peace and war.. Such reexamination would
siI.
to consider national policy not only with respect to Ft}s
with respect to fission.
but also
thermonuclear weapons, weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb
capability and the pqssible thermonuclear .boml,capability
of the Soviet Union. The moral, swould need to be ta:::jen
questions involved in this problem
into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this
reexamination would have a. crucial bearing on the further
should be a revision in the
question as to whether them,
nature of the agreements, including the international contra-L
of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with
the U.S.S.R."
NNSC 68 - 3
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved Forre1ease 003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B0026001100130001-4
ANALYSIS
I. BACKGROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS
Y3c i
Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced t?.,ro
global.wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revoluti.Dns
the Russian and- the Chinese--of extreme s-cope and intensity. t
has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-
Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese--and the drastic decline of
two major imperial systems, the British and the French. Dur-ing+he
span of one generation, the international distribution of power Sias
been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved in.-
possible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength ti-.at
a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with grea~_er
strength. The international-scene was marked by recurring prio=s
of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states
was maintained, over which no state was able to. achieve hegemony.
Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this t-_s-
tor ical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and
Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have into --
acted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union
in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two
centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to
hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our
own and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of tie
world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, or '; le
part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in at.-1
cordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development o:
increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual
faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the con-
flict enter the phase of total war.
On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relLef
the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand,
any substantial further extension of the area under the dorn nat^=o-
of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate
to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It
is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascend-
ancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.
The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfihirtent
or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itse3f.
They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With ccn-
science and resolution this Government and the people it represcrts
must now take new and fateful decisions.
Nsc 68 - 4 -
(Corrected)
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For Q91ease 2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B002601100130001-4
II . FU~,DAfIENTAL PURPO E OF THE UNITED STATES
The f undar:ental purpose of the
in the Pre , United States is laid do,;n
Unicn, evtu*ble to the Constitution.; ... to form a more
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranauilit ovide ct.
for the co,,or defence, Y, Prvic-.
Promote the general Welfare,
the Blessings of Liberty *to Ourselves re, and sect:re
essence, the furdhmentaT and our Posterity," IT.
ssen' e Of or dame tli purpose is to
assure the integrity E?d
and uortn of the individualy~ which is founded upon the di~'Tn-t ~-
y
Three realities e e
Our dTh ,.`rtlin e s e rge as a consequence of this ``~ ~' purpose:
Our d e t main-Lain the essential elements of indiv idua l,
_ de' as set forth in the Constitution
ou itution and Bill of Rights;
~orr_nation to create conditions under which our free and
democratic system can live
to fight if necessary and prosper; and our determination
in
t fie t if nece oto defend our Way of life, for which as
otetDec a Independence, with a firm reliance on the
lives our F Divine Providence, we Honor."
pledge to each other
Fortunes and our sacred Honor.,"
;
:~sc 68
- 5 -
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved For Lease- 3/09/2-9-:-CIA= 30001--4-
~: R'3 .i ?~
-
4
`
07b.Y"'a ~~A.'t
III . FUN AMENTAL DESIGN OF THE KR iNILIN
The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet
and tho international communist movement is to retain and so7_id ;y
their.absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in
the areas now under their control. 'in - the' minds of the Soviet
leaders, however achievement of this design requires the dy lam:-
extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of
any effective opposition to their authority.
The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversio-1 or
forcible destruction of the machinery of government and stru~-turt:~
of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their
replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and con-
trolled from the Krremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now
directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The
United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Sovie
world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is .he
principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted
or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve
its fundnmontal design.
Approved For Release 2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B00269R0fi11100130001-4'
IS,
 Approved For4aelease 003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00268R0j1100130001-4
J
ni1
CLJa Rr'
IV. THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT IN THE REALM OF IDEAS
N VALUES BET TM EM 'iil _U_. S S. i'U OSE 7N D _71-i -E
KREPiLIN DESIGN
A. Nature of conflict:
The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major
threat to the' achievement of its fundamental design. There is
a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government
of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the
Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of
power described in Section I, and the-exclusive possession of
atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom,
moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea
of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose
of the slave state 'o eliminate the challenge of freedom has place
the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which
gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis,
The free society values the individual as an end in hims lf,
requiring of him only that measure of self discipline and sell'
restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible wits
the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individt__'_
has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility
of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsi tept
with the. freedom of other individuals and the positive responsi-
bility to make constructive use of his freedom in the buildin
of a just society.
From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the
marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the
free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free
men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a, free
and democratic system. The free society attempts to create aid
maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportu-
nity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why th_
free society tolerates those within it who would use their frr
to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations,
the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and a.pp,--,
of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bri.ng
all societies 14o conformity with it.
For the f ee society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity.
It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic:
ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its
faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a f :llor
and better realization of their powers in exercising their cheeicce
1JSC 68
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved Fceleas~ 2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B00869F01100130001-4
L 1 ~
ti a+s s1' Z.r'' c7 3 +
qld"~'
The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history,
more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For
the breath of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has
core under the domination of an individual or group of indivicfuaJ,;
with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute
power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will--al: ._
other wills must be subjegated in an act of willing submission,
degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the ctm-
pulsion of a perverted faith.. It is the first article of thi
faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his e:is .enc:
in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, a-.--,d
submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of
the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the syste:ri--
even Ghandian non-violence is not acceptable--for the spirit of
resistance and the devotion to a higher authority night then ..emaLr_
and the individual would not be wholly submissive.
The same compulsion which demands total power over all m_.r_
within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands tDta.l
power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet
domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of
Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for th_
proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is
defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the
Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love
of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of
the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advan-
tageous form of fighting capitalism", is a device to divide and
immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union:
seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.
The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain.
the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute
power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a
permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave
society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long cortinu?;d
existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the
continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now incs-
capably confronts the slave society with the free.
The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in
the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free
institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sus-
tained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure
of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material ser30
her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the
integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in
the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more
damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.
fij
~ISG 68 - 8 -
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RQ01100130001-4
 Approved F Releaseq 2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B00249R001100130001-4
Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally
challenged by the Soviet system.. No other value system is so who:_, I
irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to des -~ro-r
ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous)
and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully
and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature
everywhere, and no other has the support of a -rent and grows ig
center of. military power. -
B. Objectives:
The objectives of a free society are determined by its
fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the m-.ter i c '
environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, t"-zero. -
fore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not
only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect th,ir
environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace . nd
war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of It.
1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way
in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national J.ife.
and in the development of our military and economic strength.
2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning
political and economic system in the free world. It is only by
practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our esse ti._1
values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies th,:
real frustration of the'Cremlin~design.
3. But beyond thus affirming our* -values our policy and
actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the
nature of theSoviet system, a change toward which the frustratio:
of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step.
Clearly it will not only be, less costly but more effective if
this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal
forces in Soviet society.
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic
warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check
the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is
becoming; less and less tolerable. This fact imposcs on us, in
our ovn intorosts, the responsibility of world leadership. It
demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent
in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with
the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our re_
quirerient of the Soviet Union to its participation with other
nations on the basis of eque.lit and respect for the rights o,,
others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and
the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based
on the principle. of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible
It will consist of many national communities of great and varyin-
TC'
1J 68
r 4J x.\l ~. ~i3
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved Fo elease 8003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B002 RQ01100130001-4
abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds
of conflicts will Inevitably exist or will come into being. ;_'o
Uckrtotrledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of 4~
final solution. Not to acknowled ge it can be fatally dangerous
in a world in which there are no final solutions.
All these objectives of a free society are equally valid
and necessary. in peace and war. But every consideration of d?.-
votlon to our fundanenta1 values and to --our national secur'i'ty
demands that we seek to achieve them by the strateg- of the cold
war. It is only
3 by developing the moral and materis
al strengt~_
of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convince-p
of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for
workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating
the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widen.
the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to
bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sur:
will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design.
Short of this, however, it Might be possible to create a situation
which will induce the Soviet Ur_ion to accommodate itself, with
or without the conscious abar_don gent of its deli gn, to coexist ne
negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our obj?.
ives. The present world situation,-however, is one which militate:;
.against successful negotiations with the h:?emlin -- for the terms of
agreements on important pending issues would reflect present reali-
ties and would, therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to t~.Ee
United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision arc'
a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made.,
it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initia--
?tive in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the
process of accommodation b.- the Kremlin to the ;yew situation. Failing
that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms cr
NSC 68/2 ? 5
L [gy p TOP -C `I" il s~r- by ~+ty% It toJ S~
'IL
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269FZ001100130001-4
 Approved For Tease 2 03/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B002691100130001-4
0
its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidat:"_ng P=oeu-
lar opinion in the free world in support of the measures necess,iT'y
to sustain the build-up.
11. In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustz:inec
build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of
free world and by means of an affirmative
~ program intendec1 to
wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with cc-r,--
wincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free cw{)r Ld
to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by it wil}..
Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually c.t
force the Kremlin to abandon its present dourse?of action and tta
negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.
12. The whole success of the proposed program hangs u timatcay
on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free
peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the sur?--
vival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to
success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed tc
make the program the.object of non-partisan legislative support,
and a presentation to the public of. a full explanation of the facts
and implications of the present international situation. The p-cs-
ecution of the program will. require of us all the ingenuity, sa -r 1-
fice and' unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue a"I
the tenacity to persevere until our. national objectives hav} be,n
attained.
NSC 68/2
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RP01100130001-4
 Approved For Ueas~ 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B0026 W01100130001-4
NSC Registry (P. F.)
NSC 6313 COPY NO. 8C!
A REPORT
TO THE
N.A'FIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECPMTARY
on
UNITED SLATES OBJECTIVES UTD PROGFJ-iS FOR RATIONAL SECUP1TT
December 8, 1950
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
Auth: .O_ /~G./
- /y/G
Date:
By;scT~?4~2.~_!s~
NATIONAL SECURITX CQU!ICII:
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved For I 6ease\2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269QP01100130001-4
Pi Sc 68/3
December 8, 1950
o
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
eferences:
A.
B.
C.
NSC
NSC
Memo
same
Series
Actions Nos. 361 and 386
for NSC from Executive Secretary,
subject, dated November 14, 1950
The enclosed revision of NSC 68/1 on the subject, pre-
pared pursuant to Reference C. by the NSC Staff with the assist-
ance of representatives from the other departments and agencies
participating in the NSC 68 project, is submitted herewith for
consideration by the National Security Council, the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Economic Cooperation
Administrator, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chair-
man, Council of Economic Advisers at the regularly scheduled
Council meeting on Thursday, December 1k, 1950.
Also attached for information are the following
appendices:
Appendix A - Tabulation of Approximate Costs
of the Programs;
Appendix B The Economic Implications of the
Proposed Programs, prepared by
the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers.
There is also being circulated separately, for information
in connection with this report, a set of seven related annexes,
prepared by the respective departments and agencies as indicated
in each annex.
It is recommended that, if the enclosed report is
adopted, that it be submitted to the President for consideration
with the recommendation that he approve it as a working guide and
-direct its implementation by all appropriate departments and agen-
cies of the U. S. Government.
DECLASSIFIED
Auth: X/&
p
NSC 68/3 Date: cr'CL /BOG
NNAT NAL SECURITX COUt-CIL'
By:_ .~..lL1
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved or R Tease 2 03/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269W1100130001-4
o
It is requested that this report be handled with specie
security precautions, j.n accordance with the President's deiire
that no publicity be Riven the NSC bb series without his approya
and that the information contained therein be disclosed only to
the minimum number of officials of the Executive Branch who need
to know.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary
cc:
The Secretary of the Treasury
The
Secretary
of Commerce
The
Economic
Cooperation Administrator
The
Director,
Bureau of the Budget
The
Chairman,
Council of Economic Advisers
NSC 68/3
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RQ01100130001-4
 Approved Forgplease 003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B0026W01100130001-4
DRAFT
REPORT BY TIM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND
PROGRPI,IS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
1. The invasion of the Republic of Korea by the North-Korean
Communists imparted a new urgency to the appraisal of the nature,
timing, and scope of programs required to attain the objectives cu;-
lined in NSC 68. The aggression by the Chinese Communists in Nor~,,:1
Korea has created'a new crisis and a situation of great danger. =sir
military build-up must be rapid because the period of greate::t dan-
ger is directly before us. A greatly increased scale and tempo c"
effort is required to enable us to overcome our present military
inadequacy,
2. It must be emphasized that the programs and estimated costs
in the tabulation in Appendix A are not final. In the critical, com-
plex, and rapidly changing international situation, it is impossi.Dle
to bluep.int the specific steps and the costs involved. It :~s our
J
intention to keep this problem, now so greatly accentuated, under
continuous scrutiny. The principal value of these first est:.mates
is that they furnish a starting point for the major effort e3sential
to our national security and to our national objectives.
3. The several programs hereinafter briefly described* are all
conceived to be mutually dependent. In accordance with the underly-
ing concept of NSC 68, they represent an effort to achieve, under the
* These programs are described in greater detail in the Anneces tc
NSC 68/3 reproduced separately.
NSC 68/3 . - 1
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For$1lease A003/09/29: CIA-RDP86BOO26 1100130001-4
shield of a military build-up, an integrated political, economic,
and psychological offensive designed to counter the current threat
to the national security posed by the Soviet Union.
The 'Military Program
}+. Present conditions make unacceptable the delay involved in
the phasing of our military build-up over a four-year period. It is
evident that the forces envisaged earlier for 1954 must be provided
as an interim program as rapidly as possible subject to continuous
review to build toward military strength capable of fulfilling; our
two fundamental obligations: (a) Protection against disaster, and
(b) support of our foreign policy. The military programs are de-
signed to provide U. S. forces in being and readily available to
meet, in collaboration with our allies, these two fundamental obli-
gations.-
5? The estimates of forces are based on the assumption that
hostilities in Korea will terminate in Fiscal Year 1951.
6. In arriving at these estimates of forces, with full consid-
eration of the objectives of NSC 68, the following basic task, were
envisaged:
a. To provide a reasonable initial defense of the Western
Hemisphere and essential allied areas, particularly in Europe,
b. To provide a minimum mobilization base while offensive
~~ Qi t..4 r bf
forces are being developed.
c. To conduct initial air and sea offensive operations to
destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity and to
NSC 68/3
- 2
J7 FN
i
Y EID
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved For Ieas~ 2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B0026001100130001-4
check enemy offensive operations until allied offensive
strength can be developed.
d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication an
base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks.
e. To provide aid to our allies to assist them in the exe-
cution of their responsibilities.
7. It should be realized that the forces recommended he,-rein:
a. Will not insure that the United States will be abso-
lutely secure against attack by air or unconventional means.
b. Will not be adequate to defeat the probable enemy ur-Aess
augmented by full mobilization of the United States and he.r
lies..
C May not be adequate to defeat aggressive Soviet. or
Soviet-directed actions in Soviet-selected areas around the
periphery of the USSR, although they will act as a deterrent
to further Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggression.
Foreign Nilitarv and Econ mie ssistance
8. The magnitude and phasing of the MDAP reflected in th!!, )'e-
port are generally designed to accomplish the following: U) to pro-
vide nations which are participants in the North Atlantic Treaty with
those quantities and forms of military and economic aid which thf"y
will require in order to raise, organize, train and equip by 195+
.the forces set forth as necessary for the defense of the North At-
lantic Treaty area in defense plans currently approved by the North
NSC 68/3
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For.] lease12003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B002 01100130001-4
0
Atlantic Treaty Organization (D. C. 28, dated 28 October 1950);* and
(2) to furnish military assistance which will, in varying degrees,
assist certain other nations in Eastern Europe and the Middle East
(Greece, Turkey and Iran) and in the Far East and Sout7heast Asia
(Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Formosa, etc.`
which are now receiving military assistance to restore or maintai
internal security and, in the case of several countries, to per'~~.
limited defensive missions in the event of major external aggress i,)n.
A very substantial portion of the total aid proposed, perhaps 5
thereof, would take the form of armaments produced in the United
States, the remainder being primarily devoted to furnishing Weste:ri
European nations with those additional resources which they will. --a-
quire, in addition to their own, in order (a) to support a c.ompl.e,-
mentary European production program of the magnitude now envisaged
as necessary, and (b) to raise and maintain the forces which they
must provide.
9. It should be specifically noted that the phasing of` the
N?NDAP is on an entirely different basis than that of the U. E. mi !!
tary programs -- the former being timed, in accordance with the a:>
sumptions of the North Atlantic Treaty Defense Plan, to provide
forces adequate for the defense of the North Atlantic area by l954,
whereas the target of the latter is to obtain the required t. S.
forces as rapidly as possible. Since the factors which governed tie
selection of the earlier date in the case of U. S. programs have
* The NSRB I?Iember of the Senior NSC Staff declines to record a judg-
ment on this statement, which refers to a document to which he nas
not had access.
NSC 68/3
-4-
19
ion.
.4 -2 E -~
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R00i100130001-4
 Approved For P4d9ase 20009/29: CIA-RDP861300269124 100130001-4
equal applicability to North Atlantic defense measures, it is of the
greatest importance that the phasing of the latter should, to the
maximum degree possible, be brought into consonance with the phn!:1_ng
of U. S. programs. Therefore, every method should immediately bE? ex-
plored, and thereafter continue periodically to be explored, for ac-
celerating, if possible to 1952, the completion date of the pro2iam
envisaged in current North Atlantic Treaty defense plans, including,
but not limited to, consideration of (a) additional measures directed
toward encouraging, persuading and enabling other North Atlantic
Treaty nations to increase and speedup their contributions; (b) new
methods for accelerating the work of the North Atlantic Treaty Crgan-
ization; (c) the possibility of setting earlier production targets
more sharply in the earlier years and will also be increasec in tie
for MDAP armaments to be produced in the United States; and (d) ti-,e
possibility of the United States assuming a substantially greater
proportion than presently proposed of the actual task of physically
producing the capital and replacement requirements of the forces to
be raised. To the extent that such acceleration can be achieved,
the amounts of U. S, aid required will tend to be telescoped eveji
aggregate. Even in the absence of any such acceler. Lion, the f u-- Cher
refinement of NATO defense plans and their firm pricing on an izttr-
national basis may indicate a U. S. aid requirement appreciably
larger than that now proposed.
10. In the event that the number of natioA;s receiving assist--
-arice"is increased or in the event of a major change in current
tary assistance objectives with respect to present aid recipient.; In
. NSC 68/3
is
Lf T. . `3.' 'COY -' .
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For. lease\2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B002601100130001-4
0
the Middle or Far East, as, for example, in the case of Formosa or
Indochina, MDAP figures would have to be reviewed.
11. Our objective in providing economic aid outside the NATO
areas is to create situations of political and economic strength t:-
the free world especially in critical areas whose present weakness
may invite Soviet thrusts. However, as a consequence of increased
demands on U. S. resources resulting from the military defense pro-
gram, claims on U. S. resources for foreign aid have been limited to
programs that will meet-most urgent and immediate needs. Th'se pre-
grams have therefore been restricted to those fulfilling three broad
purposes: (1) investment to increase the production-and facilitate
the distribution of critical materials directly needed for defense;
(2) aid to strengthen the defense effort of our allies; and (3) aid
to enable governments which are or can be expected to become friendly
members of the free world to. win the confidence and support of their
own peoples as a solid foundation for political stability ard nt--
tional independence. To reduce the drain on U. S. resource, aid
programs have been held to the minimum believed necessary to effect
these purposes.
The Civilian Defense Program
12. The civilian defense program should contribute to a reasar--
able assurance that, in the event of war, the United States wout
.survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its
objectives. Civilian defense programs are designed to serve to min-
imize casualties in the event of attack, to provide emergency re?.-lief
; rr
A N
?YSC 68/3 - 6
U
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved FQ Release\2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86BO0 001100130001-4
0
~+. 1~~1 ~~4^/~jZ L3 iiia- -
immediately after attack, and to help preserve the productive core
of the nation. Civil defense programs are tailored to domestic mi:w--
itary defense programs and require close and continuing coore.inatio-z
with them. In this regard civil defense programs are currently be-
ing reviewed with the objective of revising them, as to timing and
magnitude, in. accordance with the more urgent and increased military
program now being developed.
The Stockpiling Program
13. The stockpiling program is designed to afford the United
States those strategic and critical materials, essential for the
prosecution of a five-yr ar war, which would not be forthcomi.1g'rcm
United States wartime production and imports from.accessible sources.
11+. Plans developed up to the end of November, 1950, bad beer.
designed to have these stockpiles complete and physically on hand.
in the United States by 1951+.
15. The stockpile program is currently being reviewed with the
objective of revising in accordance with and subject to the increEtseo
military requirements now being developed. In addition, stcckpi`-(.,
objectives themselves are undergoing constant review, particularl;r
in the light of such questions as substitution of other less cri .i-
cal materials, tests of necessity, and changes in military specifi-
cations.
The Information Program
16. '"he information and educational exchange programs are de-
signed to develop the maximum psychological effect from the poiitiB],
Nsc 68/3
U
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
U
 Approved F elease12003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B002 R001100130001-4
diplomatic, economic and military measures undertaken by the Unit.eci
States and its allies and to convey the implications of these meaa-
ures effectively to the minds and emotions of groups and individual.;
who may importantly influence governmental action and popular atti-
tudes in other'nations and among other peoples. The primary effort,
will be directed at creating, in the areas and the nations of most
critical importance to the achievement of the national objectives of
the United States, (a) popular and governmental confidence and reso-
lution in support of the shared interests of the peoples of the free
world, and (b) psychological resistance to the further expan'ior.,
whether by overt or covert means,-of the influence of Soviet Com-
munism.
17. The peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellites, as L4ell
as the 'eoples of the most vulnerable areas of the free world, arE
primary targets of this psychological offensive.
Intelligence and Related_Activities"
18. An intensification of intelligence and related act vit E;;
is vitally necessary as a'safeguard against political or mil..itar;
surprise and is essential. to the conduct of the affirmative program
envisaged in NSC 68. The intelligence and related programs projected
in response to NSC 68 provide for such an intensification of e1'ort.
They are being put into execution as rapidly as possible without ref-
erence to the phasing of the other programs presented in this re;cart.
NSC 68/3 - 8
f to y ;
Vfl
uJ ~b+ t s~ F a. i:.
ci4/ it CL "M
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved Fo etease 203/09/29 : CIA-RDP86BO02 R 01100130001-4
0
The Internal Security Program
19. The elements of the accelerated program recommended by the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and the InerdeTrart-
mental Intelligence Conference constitute a.balanced-internal secur-
ity program within the framework of the original NSC' 68 project.
There is every reason to believe that if these basic elements are
realized they will contribute substantially to the accomplishment of
the objectives outlined in NSC 68 by insuring the adequacy of the na-
tion's internal security, which is an indispensable part of a nation-
ally secure United States. The early realization of the objecti?v3s
outlined by the ICIS and the IIC is essential in order to strengthen
our defenses against the dangers of espionage, sabotage, and oths^
types of subversion by impeding the individual and collective w._11
of subversive elements to act to the detriment of internal security
by increasing the physical hazards as well as the legal obstacles
and penalties incident to the commission of subversive acts.. Add1-
tionally, it will afford greater protection to the nation's crit.ial
governmental and industrial facilities;.it will make more-secure the
orderly functioning of government; it will minimize the pos!;ibili -;
of the clandestine introduction of unconventional attack mei?ia and
of the exportation of strategic materials and information; and i
will thus aid in thwarting the strategy ..nd tactics of the _.rem3 Lu
.which are designed to weaken, dominate and destroy us as a free
people.
20. In the light of developments since the preparation of
NSC 68 and in view of the resulting revisions in The Military
NSC 68/3 - 9 -
!Sgt. V: 4 1 i } E -ll
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved Fg2eleas~ 2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B008GgR001100130001-4
Program, ever-increased emphasis should be afforded the projected
internal security program to the end that the level of internal
security preparedness contemplated by 1954 may be attained by
1952, or as soon thereafter as circumstances permit.
NSC 68/3
- 10
I .J - 15. Z-O." Ii A
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For lease 200309/29: CIA-RDP86B0026,W0f100130001-4
J ,4 n OLM 1
APPENDIX A
on !~ q 41
?! acv
`3#a1
a..,~Y.'ll~
The following tabulation of the approximate costs of the
programs required to implement the policies outlined in N$C 68/
over a five year period, is wholly tentative both with re3pect to
the magnitude of the sums involved, and the rate of their exp;n-ii-
ture. It is inserted solely to convey an idea of the general
magnitudes likely to be required for the NSC 68 program accord.i-io-
to current estimates of requirements. The four year projectic.on3
for certain of the programs are subject to review in the r.ight. or
the decision to accelerate the military program as rapidly as
possible, and are currently being reappraised.
NSC 68/3
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
APPROXIMATE COSTS OF PROPOSED PROGRAMS
(In billions of dollars on an obligations basis)
PROGRAMS
ARMED FORCES*
T FY 1951
FY 1952
FY 1953
I FY 1954
FY 1955
FOREIGN MILITARY AND
2;7
10
650
7
5.010
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
8.697
10.409
.
.
INFORMATION AND
198
.200
.200
EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE
.233
.193
.
**
150
486
.632
.452
**
;IVILIAN DEFENSE - Federal
.
61
.418
- State
.429
.
5
0
8
3TOCKPILING
1.800
1.000
1.000
0
.
[NNERNAL SECURITY
-=,Excluding the Department
)f Defense programs which
ai1l be included in U.S.
1
163
.170
.179
lr Forces")
.112
.154
.
To be supplied by the Department of Defense.
The assumption is made that only recurring and maintenance costs will be incurred after FY 195 .
Approved For Release 2003?109129.: CIA-RDP861300269R001100130001-4
 Approved FqrReleasee2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B00IWR001100130001-4
APPENDIX B
NOTE: This is based on assumptions concerning the U. S. mili-
tary programs which appeared most reasonable on t .e
basis of the NSC Senior Staff meeting of Wednesday,
December 6, 1950, namely:
a) That the strength target for June 1952 would
be 3.2 million men; and
b) That the force targets for June 1954 set for';h
in NSC 68/1, dated September 21, 1950, would
be accepted as targets for June 1952.
The broad calculations flowing from these assumptions
were in large measure based on Annex A to the NSRB
document. of December 4, 1950, entitled "Instruction f'or
Preparation and Presentation of Programs and Program
.Requirements". This Annex represented a preliminary
effort to translate these assumptions into terms of
productive effort.
Should these assumptions be revised substantially up-
wards the attached document would, of course, require
major revision.
rNSC 68/3 13 - T F
} gar Ji - ~
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For Release 203/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B0026 1100130001-4
' 71 r'~ r.. tY
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOS F3 'Pi~OGTIt1f?1S:
REQUIRED F v f ~t3 D i ` A1 AND `! iz . .~.COI,10M C IES
repo re by he C~ a rman, C ounc of Economic Advisers)
1. The top advisers to the President in the field of economic
policy have been asked to register their appraisal of the econo:tl.c.
impact and economic policy implications of the objectives of .:
NSC 63/2, as approved by the President on September 30, 195C, arxc
of the programs submitted in support of those objectives. It is
not, of course, the function of such an economic appraisal to pal-;z
judgment on the adequacy of the recommended programs to meet the
requirements of military and foreign policy in the light of the
risks and needs outlined in NSC 68/2. If such an appraisal sho.a--
ed, however, that the recommended programs substantially exceeded:
our economic capabilities, or wrought damage to the economy to an
extent endangering our general strength, they would clearly have
to be brought into balance. Likewise, if such an economic apprai..---
al showed that the recommended programs fell substantially short
of our economic capabilities, or imposed a burden upon the economy
light in relation to the seriousness of the clearly revealed and
commonly agreed upon national danger, that conclusion should be re--
vealed forthrightly as one guide in evaluating these recommended
programs.
2. Because it has not been feasible, within the time availa ".e,
for the Department of Defense to prepare procurement and expenditLre
estimates in support of the force and strength targets recommendee
for June 1952 and thereafter, only a few broad indications of
? NSC 68/3
- 14 -
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For Rase 200/09/29 : CIA-RDP86BOO2694100130001-4
-;`r' ~'.
economic impacts can be given at this time. From such pre.imir,i
calculations as can be made, however, certain broad conclusions
emerge clearly.
3. The programs submitted in the report represent _a relati.
brief maximum effort toward a limited objective. The strength
target of 3.2 million men for June 1952 represents about 41 per_
cent of the total labor force, as compared with over 17 percent
(12.3 million men) during the peak of World War II, and about
62 percent (3.9 million men) as of July 1, 1942. Military iaroduun-
tion at its peak would absorb not more than 15 to 20 percent: of tr
total steel supply, as compared with well over 50 percent during
World War II. Yet production of ingot steel is now at an annual
rate of 100 million tons, as compared with 89 million tons in
1944. The absorption of copper would be less than one-third of
supply, as compared with two-thirds during World War 11. The all-
sorption of aluminum would also be less than one-third, as comparIT,c;
with over 80 percent during World War II.
4. The production rates required to achieve the targets indl.
cated in the report would reach a peak in 1952 which would be sub-
stantially below our capabilities. Total budget expenditures on
national security programs would probably reach a peak annual- rat
of about 70 billion dollars during the second half of the fi.;cal
year 1952, or about 25 percent of total national output. If such
expenditures were to reach the World War II peak burden of about
42 percent of national output, they would amount to about 13(1 bil
r1SC 68/3
15
5 WH G ~ VfY ' ~' ~ ~1
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved ForQqlease 2403/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B0026 01100130001-4
0
lion dollars. If they were to reach the 32 percent level achieved
during 1942; i.e. during the 12-months period following Pearl Ha-
bor (when the number of men in the armed forces averaged 3.8 mil-
lion men),. thby would amount to about 100 billion dollars. Such
calculations are, of course, only illustrative. They indicate
quite clearly, however, the limited character of the effort im-
plied in the programs recommended in the report.
5. This relatively limited character of the programs does
not, of course, mean that their impact on civilian consumption
would be negligible. In order to free the materials necessary to
support the productive effort implied in these programs (with no
allowance for stockpiling), the production of automobiles art of
other metal-using consumer goods would probably have to be cut
below their 1950 levels by sixty percent or more. Housing would
have to be cut by more than one-third. The production of civilian
radios and television sets would have to be cut by much more than
this, if not eliminated enjirely, in order, to meet military demancis
for electronics.
6. Although these represent very sharp cuts in individual
items below the record-breaking levels of 1950, the general civi.Lan
consumption standards which would be possible under the proposed
programs could hardly be described as austere, even if the rela-
tively comfortable standards of World War II in this country were
taken to represent bedrock austerity. By the standards of any
other country in the world, they could only be described as
NSC 68/3
- 16 -
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For aplease 003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B0026 01100130001-4
li 'al 1.ss s a. :~
luxurious. Aggregate personal consumption in 1952, although sub-
stantially different in composition and somewhat less satisfac-
tory to consumers, would be within 10 percent of the 1950 le;rel
It would be nearly one fourth greater than the 1914 level, and over-
half again as great as' in- 1939. Even the-production of dura3le
consumer goods would be about half again as great as in 1939.
7. These broad estimates are based on the assumption that
working hours and the proportion of the population drawn int=D th-
active labor force would increase considerably above recent levels,
although not approaching the peaks of World War II. With greater
increases in labor effort than assumed in these estimates, a sub-
stantially greater increase in total output could be achieved. This
could provide the basis for a greater military production even wifle
still maintaining the consumption standards outlined above (with
the exception that sharper cuts in durable consumer goods would,
course, be necessary in order to free materials for military pro-
duction).
8. Given a m.:Jor labor effort over the next two years, and
given a substantial investment in basic productive facilities, ter
can be no doubt that the force targets presented in the report
could, from the standpoint of our manpower and other resources, ue
maintained indefinitely; and that, even with the maintenance of
these forces, the civilian consumption standards of 1950 could 1)
restored and improved within a few years. This is hardly the ti;i
to give high priority to improving the consumption standards of l CiO.
r PTA 1
Nsc 68/3 ].? U) -A
~Yi rt71 '.
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved Forlease\ 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00264{it001100130001-4
0
t_-Y Y.17 :i, W ~ I.i `uj 4 }
But the fact that such an achievement is within reasonably conserka--
tive bounds of feasibility casts light on the degree of long-term;
sacrifice and effort implied in the programs recommended in the re-
port. Without passing any judgment upon the adequacy of the pro-
grams recommended in the report, which would be outside the scope
of economic analysis, it follows palpably that these programs in
terms of their economic implications fall about half way between
"business as usual" and a really large-scale dedication of our
enormous economic resources to the defense of our freedoms, even
when defining this large-scale dedication as something far short or
an all-out war or ~.'.i-out economic mobilization for war purposes.
9. Aside from the basic economic conclusion just stated, it
is necessary to outline the economic policies which would flow frog
programs of the size and degree of acceleration recommended in the
report. It is self-evident that defense, civilian (both industri.
and consumer) and international needs are of such a size that none
can be given an absolute priority over another. Perhaps the most
striking example of this is' the fact that fulfillment of the
manganese stockpiling goal would require a very severe cutback in
current steel production. A decision to attempt to achieve the
full stockpile objective for copper by June 1952, for example, would
be tantamount to a decision to forego any industrial expansion in
this country, and to disrupt the economies of. allies nations, It
for such reasons that so great importance is attached by Mr. Atlee
in the current conversations to the establishment of machir.'--ry for
the international allocation of basic materials.
NSC 68/3
... l8. _.
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved Forlease\ 003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269P001100130001-4
10. The central and urgent requiremerr of economic policy,
indispensable to the sound formation of policy in all other areas,
is the continuing maintenance of an over-all inventory of supply
and requirements, accompanied by a continued basic programming to
determine the priority considerations which must determine the dis-
tribution of available supply among competing requirements. lithe
basic requirements are military, stockpiling, international, in-
, o
dustrial and consumer. These must all be serviced, in varying de-
grees, by the totality of supply. Every specific economic program
is directed, in the final analysis, toward the matching of supply
and requirements, whether it be by increasing supply, redirecting
supply, or restricting certain requirements. And since this over-
all programming operation is central to the whole task of economic
mobilization, it should be located in one place. Further, this
place of-location should also be the place of location for ulti-
mate decisions, short of the President, with respect to coordina-
tion of programs, settlement of disputes arising from conflict-
ing policies or requirements, etc. This is true because no ulti-
rate coordinator or umpire can act effectively unless armed with
programming operation to provide the basis for intelligent action.
The Administrative question of where this function is located is
not specificially within the economic sphere, but economic ar.alyv >
must point out that until this operation is functioning on a centra-
lized and comprehensive basis there can be no effective economic
mobilization either partial or complete.
" 94
IvsC 68f3 - 'lg -
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved For Ruse 20p3/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269k%l100130001-4
EC:
11. The completion of the first effort at such a compreher:4ive
balancing of program requirements and supply would reveal the need,
and provide first quantitative guide lines, for the expansion of
capacity in critical areas. It would also reveal areas where suc?11
expansion could be given only a low priority. Such an analysis
essential in order to give meaningful and detailed content to th.
term "shortages", and in order to translate the need for expansior
into concrete terms.
12. Such a comprehensive programming operation is also es:;n--
tial to reveal the way in. which direct controls should be used.
The need for such controls is no longer in question. There can no:i
be no doubt of the early necessity for complete allocation of basis
materials throughout the economy, on a scale comparable to the Con-
trolled Materials Plan of World War II. There can be no dout t tha
widespread price ad wage controls will be required within tY.e near
future. Maximum feasible action in the field, of taxation and crerl Lt
will be essential, not in the hope of minimizing the need for di-
rect controls, but in order' to make those controls workable. The
probable existence, under present and pending tax legislation, of z
deficit of over 30 billion dollars (annual rate) by the second ha f
of fiscal 1952 is ample evidence of this.
13. It would be the height of folly, however, to initiate a
fully comprehensive system of direct controls before having a rea-
sonably clear idea of the purposes which those controls were
tented to accomplish, i.e. before major policy decisions had been
NSC 68/3 - 20 -
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
 Approved For Re ase 200
a spa t? n- i?
reached in the light of a comprehensive analysis of the facts, 3-id
of a reappraisal of existing policies in the light of thosE.. fact:;.
Controls without purpose could only weaken the economies of the
free world and confuse the populace. Nonetheless, it shou)d be
emphasized that certain tasks to be accomplished by controls ar?! -;o
immediately urgent, and the size of the ultimate task so great,
that the development of the necessary organization and staff should
proceed with utmost speed.
NSC 68/3 - '21 -
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RQ01100130001-4
 Approved Foreleas~ 2003/09/29: CIA-RDP86B002001100130001-4
NSC
A REPORT
TO THE
COPY NO. '9-
PRESIDENT.
BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIGNNAL SECURITY
DECLASSIFIED
Auth:. //G
Date D zoFC, 7~ -
B;~r/Tct~ JL:~'oEL
NATIONAL SECURITY, COUNCIL
December 14, 1950
WASHINGTON
tq r.
.$ 1`Lisl' 3-:s7 b ?i ~scsi'
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100130001-4
S
 i SC 68/1+
Approved Fora ease 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP8613002 11.00 30001-4
December 14, 1950
NOTE BY TIM EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
subject, dated December 13, and three demos
dated December 14, 1950
At their 75th Meeting, with the President presiding, tho Na-
tional Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secre-
tary of Commerce, the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Di-
rector, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers, considered NSC 68/3 on the subject and adopted the draft
report cntained therein subject to the following amendments (NBC
Ac ti on No. 393) :
a. The amendments in paragraphs 4, 7-c, 9, 11 and 15, proposed
by the Senior NSC Staff by reference memorandum dated De-
cember 14, 1950.
b. The amendment in paragraph 5 proposed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff by reference memorandum dated December 13, 1950.
DECLASS1 i
;Auth:_
ITS' 68/4 By: Z. ~ X. _ i -
IL
II.ATJO1tA J SECURITY COUNC
rz~) tj
is
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGP,AFF'IS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
The President then issued at the meeting the following direct-
ive (NEC Action No. 393-b):
NSC 68/3 as amended is approved as a working guide for tl-E-
urgent purpose of making an immediate start. However, since
this paper points out that the programs contained in it are rot
final, I hereby direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense to undertake immediately a joint review of the
politico-military strategy of this Government with a view
increasing and speeding up the programs outlined in NSC 68/3
as amended in the. light of the present critical situation anu`
to submit to me appropriate recormmendationS, through the NSC ,
as soon as possible.
This review is not to delay action upon the basis of
NSC 68/3 as amended, the implementation of which by all appr o-
priate departments and agencies of the United States Governm_~nt
is hereby directed.
References:
A.
B.
C.
NSC
NSC
Memo
66 Series
Action No. 393
for NSC from Executive Secretary, same
IT 0
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
 Approved For Relea a 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B069R001100130001-4
a
Accordingly, the report contained in ITSC 68/3, as amended by
the Council and approved by the President, is circulated herewith
for implementation by all appropriate departments and agencies of
the U. S. Government as directed by the President in the above
paragraph.
It is reauested -that this report-be handled with special secur-
itv precautions in accordance with the President's desire that nor
pt+bli city be given the I`NSC 66 Series without his approval, and that-
the information contained herein be disclosed only to the minimum
nunber of officials of the Executive Branch who need to kno;a.
JAM-,E- S S. LAY I JR.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Economic Cooperation Administrator
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO01100130001-4
SEp. TU 'ti