A REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100100003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 9, 1984
• Content Type: MF

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NIC 02114-84
9 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
member, senior Review Panel
A Review of Intelligence Performance in
Afghanistan
Memo for SRP from the DCI, dated 19 December
1983, Subject: "Report on a Study of
Intelligence Judgments Preceding Significant
Historical Failures: The Hazards of Single-
Outcome Forecasting" (ER 83-6093)
This is in response to your memorandum of 19 Dec: ember 1983
directing further research on the performance of the Intelligence
Community with respect to the massive Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in December 1979.
In answer to your specific question, "Lid (the intelligence
Community) speculate the Soviets were going to control
Afghanistan?".
In March 1978 an Intelligence Memorandum, "The Afghan
Successors," discussed the potential replacements for Daoud
Khan. The thrust of the paper anticipated a palace-type coup
with one or another of the ruling elite taking over the
government. There was no mention of a role for the Communist
Party, nor either of its two competing factions. No individual
mentioned in the memo actually acquired a position of leadership
in the April revolution a month later.
Once the communist seizure of power had become a reality,
the Community produced a series of excellent reports. The first,
a biographic research paper published in June 1978, "Leaders of
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," analyzed the results of
the April revolt, traced the development of the communist threat,
detailed the events which occurred during the seizure of power,
ALL PARAGRAPHS
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described the backgrounds of the members of the cabinet and
provided pictures and biographies of four of the leading
officials.
In July 1978, an IIM, "Afghanistan: Orientation and
Policies of the Taraki Government," stated:
The Soviets near term aim was to solidify the
new government's control of the country and
the expanded Soviet presence in Afghanistan--
both steps to insure against any backsliding
in the bilateral relationship. Over the long
term the Soviets will seek to guide the new
regime in the implementation of domestic and
foreign policies compatible with those of the
USSR.
At about this time there emerged a running dialectic within
the Agency which was to continue with gradually dimirishing
intensity until December 1979. The discussion ;.entered on the
estimate, "Would the Soviets intervene massively with Soviet
ground forces?".
-- One group, the Soviet political analysts, generally held
to the view that although the Soviets had the capability,
it was counterproductive for them to intervene with
ground troops and they would recoil from making such an
irrational decision.
-- A second group, the analysts specializing in Afghan
affairs, detected the growing deterioration of the social
and political fabric of Afghanistan and conc'uded the
Soviets could not tolerate this kind of diso-der for a
variety of compelling reasons.
-- A third group, the analysts who studied the Soviet
military, held the view that the military could see
advantages as well as disadvantages to military
intervention and would certainly not oppose a political
decision to go in.
The turning point in the debate probably occurred in early
September 1979. The Office of Imagery Analysis had identified
what it considered was a Soviet airborne battalion at Bagram
Airfield in Afghanistan. The Office of Soviet Analysis did not
accept this identification and considered the evidence
inconclusive. It is my understanding that the DCI, Admiral
Turner, was briefed and approved a finding of "tentative" until
such time as the unit identification could )e corroborated
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by some other means, such as HUMINT or SIGINT. However,
Admiral Turner on 14 September 1979 sent a memorandum to the NSC
stating in part, "Small Soviet combat units may already have
arrived in country." On 20 September 1979, a memo for the record
written by Admiral Turner of a conversation with Dr. Brzezinski
indicates he urged that a Presidential Review Committee discuss
US reaction in the event of a Soviet move into Afghanistan.
The various intelligence publications chronicled the events
as they unfolded in a professional manner. The collection
problems the community faced were severe. Both the Russian and
Afghan societies are by nature and tradition secretive and
conspiratorial. In addition, Afghanistan is contiguous to the
Soviet Union and far from our normal commercial or political
centers of activity.
There was a logical basis to the estimate that the
disadvantages to the Soviets of massive intervention would be
large and enduring, and- so they have proved to be. The
misjudgment was that the Soviets would place the same value on
the factors that we did. Afghanistan was by no means an
intelligence failure. The community gave an excellent perfor-
mance with the single exception of its reluctance to accept the
likelihood of massive intervention. No policymaker in the US
Government should have been surprised when the actual cross-
border operation began in late December.
In the attachment I have traced the series of events which
led up to the massive Soviet cross border operation in consider-
able detail and cross referenced the intelligence judgments that
were adopted at the time.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a tae of complicated
intrigue and treachery in which two societies, the Russian and
the Afghan, have added more chapters to an old, but unfinished,
murder mystery.
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SUBJECT: A Review of Intelligence Performance in Afghanistan
ODCI/SRP
Distribution:
Orig. - Addsee.
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI Registry (blind copy:)
1 - SRP File
1 - SRP Chrono
1 - SRPMembers
SECRET
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ATTACHMENT
9 %pri i 1984
A Review of Intelligence Performance in A"yhanistan
It. General William J. McCaffrey, USA (Retd)
Member, Senior Review Panel
The series of events which culminated in the late December
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the corresponding
intelligence judgments adopted by the Intelligence Community at
the time make a very intricate and convoluted story. To
understand these events and how they were interpreted by the
Community, it is necessary to start. with Russiar history.
Russia has been an expansionist state s nce the Dukes of
Muscovy started the empire in the 15th century. Russia has con-
quered and subjugated neighboring states throughout the
intervening years. Fueled by the messianic zeal of true
believers, and based on the dogmas of international communism,
the Russians have vastly expanded their empire over the past 50
years. Recently their methods have grown more subtle and more
sophisticated, but world domination remains the ultimate Soviet
objective. Therefore, on the basis of history, there should have
been a reasonable presumption that, faced with c' power vacuum in
a contiguous territory, the Russians would fill it. I suggest
many of the intelligence judgments reflected a -eluctance to face
this stark reality.
After the October Revolution, the Soviets nad attempted to
set up communes in Afghan-claimed territory. These were short
lived. Because the Soviets were preoccupied with internal
problems until after their recovery from World War II, they
pursued a policy of "benign neglect" with respect to Afghanistan.
However, in 1956 they began to provide firanciat aid to the
Afghans. In 1965 the Afghan Communist Party (PDPA) was
established which splintered in 1967 into two factions, Parcham
and Khalq.
In 1973 Mohammed Daoud for the second time took over power
in Afghanistan. Daoud visited Moscow in February 1977 and signed
a third treaty of neutrality and friendship with the Soviets. At
the same time the Soviets were attempting to heal the breach
between the two indigenous communist groups wihin Afghanistan.
This was accomplished by June 1977.
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As a revealing sidelight on US misjudgments of Afghanistan,
on 16 March 1978, US Ambassador Dubs, appearing oefore the House
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated: "internally,
the political situation is stable." A month later in April 1978,
President Daoud was assassinated and Nur Mohammend Taraki assumed
the Presidency. In October 1980, Ambassador Dubs was killed by
guards of the New Republic ostensibly seeking to free him from a
hostage situation.
In contrast to Ambassador Dubs' impression of Afghan
stability, an Intelligence Memorandum dated March 1978
discussed a developing struggle for succession to Daoud that was
beginning to surface. None of the individuals who were
identified in the paper as possible successors emerged in a
position of power a month later. Neither the PDPA nor its two
factions were mentioned. The paper stated: "The USSR has a
heavy political and economic investment in the country, but
Moscow will probably allow the Afghans to settle their own
affairs."
Early Assessments
The DCI's notes of 20 and 30 March 1979 from a briefing he
delivered to the President and a few key aides reflect that he
painted a balanced picture of our 'intelligence capabilities to
monitor events in Afghanistan, laid out the elements of the
situation as it existed, and discussed the probable reactions of
Iran and Pakistan.
His discussion of Soviet options seemed to rule out an
increase in advisory personnel to operate the new, more sophisti-
cated equipment, but he speculated the Soviets could introduce an
airborne division or commit Turkestan Military District forces to
combat along the border and in Afghanistan.
He then covered the pros and cons of each course of action
from the Soviet view and concluded he could not predict how such
a debate by the members of the Politburo on the matter would be
decided.
In June 1978, a month after the bloody coup in which Daoud
was assassinated, the National Foreign Assessment Center
published a Biographic Research Paper entitled "Leaders of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." This paper identified the
principal players in the recent events, traced the origins of the
revolution, and identified 13 of the members. of the cabinet as
founding or very early members either of the PDPA, or of its
Khalq or Parcham factions.
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The paper stated, "The exact nature of its (Afghanistan's)
relationship with the USSR, however, may not be discernible for
some time-." The study speculated the Afghans might opt for a
status as a Soviet Republic incorporated into the Soviet Union,
or they might convert Afghanistan into an Asian Yugoslovia, or
the PDPA might wish to create a uniquely Afghan version of a
communist state.
I am unable to recall a precedent wherein the Soviets have
peacefully and voluntarily accepted the elimination of a
communist orientation from a nation in which they have seized
power.
In July 1978, an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum,
"Afghanistan Orientation and Policies of the Taraki Government,"
was published. This paper acknowledged that the Taraki
government was much more closely oriented toward the USSR than
were previous regimes. It qualified this conclusion by
stating: "The new government will attempt to preserve
Afghanistan's basic independence from Moscow, but it is not clear
that it will be able to control the growth of soviet influence in
the country."
At the time of publication the Agency disclaimed that it had
developed any evidence that the USSR was directly involved in the
coup against the Daoud regime. Cui bono. !:;ircumstantially,
considering the growth of the Soviet presence, the size of the
embassy, the presence of advisers throughout the Afghan
government and in all military units, the statement might well
have pointed out the unlikelihood that such an operation could be
mounted without Soviet connivance and support.
The July 1978 paper provided a short biographical sketch of
Hafizullah Amin, the Vice Prime Minister, but did not mention his
May visit to Moscow, nor did it reflect the growing number of
indications of a power shift within the ruling regime. By this
time it should have been evident that the Khalq faction appeared
to have won the first round. In early July Kabul newspapers and
public records indicated that the leaders cf the Parcham faction
were being sent abroad to diplomatic posts. However, it can be
reasonably surmised that the Soviets were finding Taraki unsatis-
factory and that they agreed to back Amin curing his Moscow visit
in May. The Soviets were also warming up Fabrak and his Parcham
followers as an additional entry into the leadership sweepstakes
should Taraki and/or Amin stumble.
An Intelligence Assessment published n December 1978 stands
out as a common sense and realistic analysis of the then existing
situation. The paper accurately highlighted the growing power of
Foreign Minister Amin and succintly laid out the weakness of the
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regime and relationships between the various factions contending
for power. The paper also accurately identified the trends which
culminated in Taroki's subsequent overthrow. It called the turn
on the change in the role of the Soviet military advisers and on
the reorganization of the Police Service.
The Road to Intervention
The uprising in Herat in mid-March 1979 was a significant
milestone on the road to intervention. In this incident a
popular eruption of resentment against
eblocal Afghan officials
either was started, or was soon supported
army garrison and quickly turned into a blood bath. Possibly as
many as 100 Soviet men, women, and children were brutally
butchered as the mobs vented their ancient hostility on their
Russian neighbors; 3,000 to 5,000 Afghans were estimated to have
died before the loyal troops, brought in from (andahar, were able
to restore order.
The reactions to this uprising, both by the Afghan regime
and the Soviets, intensified the forces which rexorably led the
Soviets to conclude later that a massive invasion with ground
combat troops was their only satisfactory course of action.
--On the Afghan side, the government failed to recognize
the uprising as a signal that their tactics were non-
productive and were alienating their own people. Instead
of pursuing a more moderate course, Amin took over direct
responsibility for the government from Taraki on 27 March
1979 and proceeded to tighten the screws.
--The Soviets moved in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
additional personnel. Tanks, armored personnel carriers,
and helicopter gunships were flown in to Kabul on 26 and
27 March 1979. In April 1979 the Soviets sent the women
and children home, in effect clearing the decks for
action.
A paper prepared in the Office of Political Analysis in
April 1979 appraised the cooperation among rebel groups,
estimated that the prospects for success of these groups were
dim, and acknowledged that the possibility of massive Soviet
intervention, as in Hungary, could not be completely
discounted. Here, I think the integrity of the intelligence
process was validated. The warning flag was raised. In the
penultimate paragraph the paper speculated on the return of the
Parchamists headed by Babrak Karmal. In the final paragraph the
conclusion was presented that the change of government would
probably occur as a result of a military coup and that if
installed quickly the USSR would probably have no choice but to
accept the new regime.
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Inasmuch as the Soviets manifestly had the capability to
intervene, this conclusion implies that the Soviets would not
take whatever measures were necessary to instal; a government
compatible with their interests. This judgment was short of the
mark.
To further indicate the essential integrity of the Agency's
performance, on 2 May 1979 a Special Report was sent to the
President covering various potential world trouble spots.
Afghanistan led the list (which included South Africa, Cuba,
NATO, Italy and Spain.) The memo stated: "The-e is no Community
consensus as to whether the Soviets would in fact introduce
ground combat forces in Afghanistan to maintain the laraki
government in power, should this ultimately prove necessary."
The issue was surfaced for the President's information, despite
the continuing disagreement within the Community.
A follow-on Special Report to the President on b June 1979
advised that the Soviet dilemma was worsening, the situation was
deteriorating, and Soviet assistance had not reversed the
trend. Again the Report reflected the differing views in the
Community:
Partly because our evidence contirues to be
inadequate, views differ as to how close is
the critical point when the Soviets will have
to decide whether or not to intervene with
combat forces. Some analysts, however,
consider it quite possible that a sharp
collapse could occur unexpectedly during the
coming month which would make it -mpossible
for the Soviets to defer such a decision.
This statement was probably accurate in that a series of
visits, inspections, reinforcements, plots, pressures, assassina-
tions and so forth followed during the ensuing months as the
Soviets sought by every means at their disposal to cap the
volcano that was emerging in Afghanistan. In addition to being
difficult as friends and subordinates, the Afghans were proving
to be incompatible as communists.
An 11 June 1979 Intelligence Assessment which focused on
Afghanistan's relations with its neighbors reflected a good grasp
of the factors driving the turmoil but failed to highlight the
shift in power from Taraki to Amin..
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A Regime Besieged
On 1'5 July 1979 the National Foreign Assessment Center
published "Afghanistan: A Regime Besieged." This paper
identified Amin as the heir apparent of Taraki, who was
considered to be in poor health. It discussed the progress of
the insurgents and the deterioration of Afghan control over the
country.
The paper interestingly outlined Soviet disinformation
efforts to conceal their patron-client relationship and estimated
that it was difficult to assess how deeply the Soviets were
involved in shaping Afghan domestic and foreign policy
decisions. The writer considered that Taraki still appeared to
be making key decisions, some of which had met with Soviet
disapproval. The paper speculated that the Soviets were
attempting to put some distance between themselves and the
Taraki-Amin regime.
The first of the exploratory visits by senior Soviet
officials occurred when General Andrei Yepishev, who was in
charge of ideology, morale, and discipline in the Soviet armed
forces, arrived during the spring of 1979. His visit followed
the delivery of new and more sophisticated weapons to the Afghan
army.
There are some indications that during the spring of 1979
Soviet enthusiasm for Amin had begun to wane. His seizure of
power, when it occurred, did not, in the Soviet view, further
their objectives.
The Soviets sent in a new man, V.S. Sarorchuk, to help get
the situation under control. He attempted to persuade the Afghan
leadership to adopt more palatable and conciliatory public
positions on matters that had heretofore alienated the people.
He pressed the Afghans to broaden the goveromert by including
non-Communists and Parchamists. This advice presumably fell on
deaf ears. By July it was evident that the Soviets were seeking
an alternative to Amin.
The US embassy reported, "We frequently hear rumors that the
Soviets are still trying to build a new regime."
Two more army mutinies occurred, one in Jalalabad in June
1979 and a second in Kabul on 5 August 1979.
General Ivan C. Pavlovsky, Commander, Soviet Ground Forces,
arrived in Kabul in August 1979 with a large group of Soviet
specialists. The team members spread out through the country to
gather firsthand information on the situation. Based on the
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conclusions of this team, the Soviets finalized their plans for
future action.
Certainly, by the end of Pavlovsky's visit, we must conclude
that the Soviets had firmly decided to get rid of Amin and to
install Babrak Karmal to head the new puppet regime.
To indicate how intricate were the plots, counterplots and
sheer treachery pursued by all participants, President Taraki was
in Havana on 5 September 1979 making a lengthy speech to the
nonaligned conference praising his own government and the Soviet
Union. He flew back to Kabul via Moscow. There he had conversa-
tions with Brezhnev and Gromyko in which we must assume both
agreed that Amin had to go. Taraki returned to Kabul on 11
September to an effusive welcome. The foreign minister, Shah
Wali, who had accompanied Taraki to Havana and presumably learned
of the dump Amin agreement, is generally considered to have been
the source of warnings to Amin that his services were to be
terminated.
On 14 September 1979, Radio Kabul announced that cabinet
changes had been made with Taraki's approval. There are no
trustworthy accounts of what transpired that day but the day
ended with Taraki as Amin's prisoner. One account of the events
suggests that Taraki summoned Amin to a meeting on the morning of
the 14th. Amin feared a trap but was reassured by Soviet
Ambassador Puzanov that it was safe to go. Amin, however, took
an armed escort. On entering the building where Taraki lived, he
was fired upon. One of his escorts was killed, but Amin withdrew
uninjured, rounded up a small military force, and counter-
attacked, taking Taraki into custody.
On 16 September 1979 Kabul Radio announced that Taraki had
requested that he be relieved of his duties due to ill health.
In his place Amin was appointed Secretary General of the PDPA.
On 10 October 1979 the Kabul Times published a report that Taraki
had died of serious illness. In actuality he was strangled on
the orders of Amin.
Meanwhile, the US Intelligence Community was striving to
make sense out of these bizarre events or, more accurately, to
make sense out of the information that escaped the secrecy
barriers maintained so diligently by the Soviets and the Afghans.
A National Foreign Assessment Center Memorandum of 17 August
1979 reaffirmed the outlook for the Afghan government was bleak,
estimated the Soviets would increase their adv-sory presence, did
not rule out that the Soviets would attempt to install a new
government or qualitatively change the nature of their military
involvement. The memo hedged by stating:
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The pitfalls of even a limited military
operation to bolster a pro-Soviet regime in
Afghanistan
are
tremendous, and it is quite
conceivable
that
in
the end Moscow wiiI let
Taraki and
Amin
fall
and try to form a new
government
with
old
friends from the arevious
regime.
On 14 September 1979, Admiral Turner sent a memo to the
National Security Council stating:
The Soviet leaders may be on the threshhold
of a decision to commit their own forces to
prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and
protect their sizable stake in Afghanistan.
Small Soviet combat units may have already
arrived in the country.
This last sentence is interesting because a dispute was
going on between the Office of Imagery Analysis and the Soviet
political analysts over the interpretation of photo coverage at
Bagram Airfield. The imagery people identified an airborne
infantry battalion on the airfield in early September 1979. The
Soviet political analysts would not accept this interpretation
and, according to my information, Admiral Turner was briefed and
decided the evidence was insufficient for a firm identification
until Humint or some other corroboration was received. An
Imagery Analysis memo was published on 21 September 1979,
stating, "A Soviet probable airborne infantry batallion is
located at Bagram airfield." It was later determined that the
Soviet airborne battalion had been at Bagrani since June.
On 20 September 1979, Admiral Turner wrote a memo for the
record of his conversation with Dr. Brzezinski in which he
suggested the need for a Presidential Review Committee meeting to
discuss US reacton in the event of a Soviet move into
Afghanistan.
On 28 September 1979, an IIM, "Soviet options in
Afghanistan," noted the increased readiness posture of the
airborne forces in the Turkestan Military District and speculated
that in the event of a breakdown of control in Kabul, the Soviets
would be likely to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions
to the Kabul vicinity to protect Soviet citizens as well as to
ensure continuance of some pro-Soviet regime in the capital. The
memo included a caveat:
We do not believe Moscow would intend such a
deployment for use in fighting against the
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Muslim insurgency although once in
Afghanistan, such Soviet, airborne forces
.could eventually be drawn into such
fighting. We have not seen indications that
the Soviets are at the moment preparing
ground forces for large-scale military
intervention in Afghanistan.
The first overt indications of a Soviet contingency plan for
massive intervention began to surface in October 1979, when
members of the Soviet Army Reserve in Central Asia began to be
called to active duty.
A memo prepared by the Office of Strategic Research on
22 October 1979 estimated there were 3,500 to 4,000 Soviet
military personnel in Afghanistan and speculated that Soviet
pilots were flying the helicopter gunships.
A 25 October 1979 memorandum for the Director W' the
National Foreign Assessment Center outlined a contingency plan
for the formation of a Special Task Force or Afghanistan to be
manned by personnel from the Office of Strategic Research and the
Office of Political Analysis. Obviously, the Intelligence
Community had accepted the possibility of major changes in the
Afghan situation and was organizationally preparing to monitor
events as they developed.
The Soviet press, as the autumn turned to winter, developed
an ever cooler approach to Amin. On 4 December 1979, the eve of
the anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty, the
congratulatory message from Brezhnev and Kosygin conveyed
congratulations and friendly wishes to the PDPA and the friendly
Afghan people. The usual Soviet buzz words of personal esteem to
leaders of friendly nations who remained in good standing in the
Kremlin were entirely absent. Amin on the contrary sent an
effusive message to his dear comrades--esteemed comrades--
personally wishing them health and new successes.
A few weeks later Soviet troops were successful in overrun-
ning his country and killing him.
The Soviets Build Up
A 12 December 1979 internal memo drafted in OSR provided an
unclassified statement detailing the known extent of Soviet
presence in Afghanistan. It was estimated that there were 5,000
men in the country, with 1,000 in combat units, and that heavy
Soviet air transports were continuing to land at Bagram,
indicating the build-up was continuing.
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Also on 12 December 1979, an NFAC memo prepared by OPA
provided an historical view of the relations between the Soviet
Union and- Afghanistan, beginning with the years before the
October Revolution in 1917 and continuing to the present. The
memo did not speculate on future developments but gave a well-
balanced summary of the events which led up to the continuing
crisis.
On 14 December 1979, NFAC published a Spot Commentary
identifying a new Soviet command post on the Afghan border.
An NFAC Spot Commentary on 15 December 1979 detailed the
accelerating build-up of Soviet forces opposite Afghanistan and
bluntly stated that Moscow might be in the early stages of
mounting major operations.
Further indications of Soviet preparations for intervention
appeared 16 December 1979. A Spot Commentary, "USSR-
Afghanistan: Soviet Buildup," detailed the departure of units of
the 105th Guards Airborne Division from garrison and identified a
second airborne battalion at Bagram airfield in Afghanistan. In
addition to the airborne units, the Commentary identified a
motorized rifle division at Samarkand as in the process of being
mobilized and noted the absence of the military rifle divisions
at Termez and Kushka from their normal garrison locations. The
Commentary also described the deployment of 45 SU-17 Fitter
fighter-bombers to the Turkestan Military District and identified
a high level field headquarters near Termez as the probable
supervising Headquarters.
The report described the Afghan army ai deteriorating and
the insurgents' pressure as increasing.
On 19 December 1979, Admiral Turner signed a memorandum to
the NSC, "USSR-Afghanistan," in which he accepted the location of
the airborne battalions at Bagram and specified they were capable
of conducting multibattalion combat operations. He concluded the
USSR may be positioning themselves in a deliberate manner to
escalate further should circumstances require." He, however,
hedged:
While the Soviets may now be less concerned
about the adverse consequences for tneir
relations with the US of a major intervention
in Afghanistan, they probably also wish to
avoid deflecting unto themselves any of the
militant Islamic hostility now directed at
the United States.
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The Intelligence Community had picked uo and identified the
indications for the final preparations of a multidivisional
massive ground combat invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union, but it was unable to divest itself of the conventional
wisdom that they would, at the final moment, shrink from such a
major escalation of Soviet involvement in Afqhar affairs.
An Alert Memorandum published on 19 December 1979 spelled
out in greater detail the nature of the forces recently
introduced into Afghanistan and described the growing Soviet
buildup near the Afghan border.
The skeptics of Soviet intervention were still able to
insert a qualifier:
At a minimum the Soviets have now established
a capability to defend Bagram as an
airhead. They could hold other key points,
engage insurgents in selected provinces, or
free Afghan army units for operations
elsewhere if they introduced forces of the
size now being built up near the border. To
conduct extensive anti-insurgent operations
on a countrywide scale would require
mobilization and commitment of much larger
numbers of regular ground forces drawn from
other military districts in a potentially
open-ended operation.
On 25 December 1979 a Spot Commentary stated: "The Soviets
have apparently completed their preparations for a major inter-
vention in Afghanistan, and they may have started to move into
that country in force today."
The report briefly described the air movement of troops and
equipment, including artillary, from the Western USSR to
Turkestan and Central Asian military districts on 24 December
1979. The report continued to specify the early morning flights
of a large number of AN-22 heavy transports--probably carrying
troops and equipment from Fergana toward the Afqhan border.
On 26 December 1979, an NFAC memo, "Capabilities and
Requirements of the Afghan Insurgents," estimated that the
insurgents "would be unlikely to survive concentrates
counterinsurgency operations conducted by Soviet trocps."
Another interesting NFAC memo, dated 26 December 1979, was a
"tour d' horizon" of Southwest Asia. In summary the memo stated,
"The Soviets seem committed to maintain the Afgnan regime--even
at the cost of direct intervention."
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On 27 December 1979, a Spot Commentary gave a status report
of the recent events and detailed a coup led by Babrak Karmal,
and reported Soviet troops and their Afghan supporters were in
control of Radio Afghanistan.
On 29 December 1979, NFAC stated, "We have strong circum-
stantial evidence this morning that the Soviets have sent the
motorized rifle division from Termez into Afghanistan." The
report estimated the total number of Soviet combat troops in
country at 20,000. In addition, it was estimated the Soviets had
about 3,500 military advisers and technicians in country.
The report speculated that an additional motorized rifle
division from Kushka had been fully mobilized and was probably
moving toward Hurat, while a third division had departed its
garrison areas on 28 December 1979 and was moving toward the
border.
A Spot Commentary on 29 December 1979 described the disinte-
gration of the Afghan army units in the Kabul area. The
Commentary stated that the Soviets have occupied most important
military bases in and around Kabul and, with Parchamist
irregulars, were guarding most important government buildings.
A memo dated 30 December 1979, "Afghanistan: The Babrak
Government," outlined the composition and background of the
recently installed regime.
In Retrospect
The story of how the Soviets planned and carried out both
the destruction of the Amin government and the invasion is a case
study in thorough planning, the use of surprise, mass and
boldness in execution topped off by treachery and a cynical
campaign of official disinformation that has seldom been equalled
in history.
Babrak, who had been fired by Amin as Afghan ambassador to
Czechoslovakia, was maintained by the Soviets in exile in Czecho-
slovakia until he was needed to head a new more subservient
regime. His movements are obscure.
The most likely explanation was that Babrak was flown into
Afghanistan and secreted in the Soviet Embassy prior to the
assassination of Amin.
The Soviets probably made the final decis-ons to execute
their invasion plans prior to the meeting on 21 November 1979 of
the Central Committee in Moscow. The Politburo group likely to
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have decided the issue was headed by Brezhnev and included
Andropov, Gromyko, Kosygin, Suslov, and Ustinov.
The actual plan provided for pre-invasion introduction of
Soviet combat forces into Kabul and to secure critical points
along the main invasion routes, a thorough cover and deception
plan which involved disarming Afghan units, a banquet for all
armored officers which isolated them from any contact with their
troops, an explosion which knocked out the Kabul telephone
system, the seizure of the Kabul broadcast facilities, the
Interior Ministry, Amin's headquarters in the Darulaman Palace,
overriding the Kabul broadcasting facilities program with Soviet-
prepared false Afghan government announcements, and so forth.
It would appear that Amin and his guards fought desper-
ately. It was not a surgical operation. It was on the contrary
a sledge hammer blow.
The following morning, after the Soviet airborne units had
tidied up in Kabul, two motorized rifle divisions began crossing
the Amudarya on pontoon bridges.
The Soviets began the difficult task of convincing the world
that the government of Afghanistan whose head they had just
assassinated had in fact requested their intervention.
On 17 November 1980, an IIM, "The Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan: Implications for Warning," was published. This IIM
was a lengthy and detailed analysis of the performance of the US
Warning System and the identification of the lessons learned as a
result of the invasion.
The report concluded that the system worked, that the US
collection system was equal to the task of providing analysts
with sufficiently detailed, accurate, and timely data to allow
them to reach essentially correct conclusions.
The Key Judgments concluded:
The Intelligence Community's analysts met
their basic responsibility in a situation of
this sort by providing sufficient prior
reporting to assure that no key policymaker
should have been surprised by the invasion.
The analysts were unable to forecast
precisely the time or the size of the
Soviets' move, but gave warning at least 10
days beforehand that the USSR was prepared to
invade.
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The problems of intelligence collection in Afghanistan are
great, perhaps as severe as any we have faced in recent years.
Language; distance, lack of domestic infrastructure, a territory
contiguous to the Soviet Union, a tradition of native hostility
to all foreigners, and mutual suspicion among the Afghan tribes
all combine to make the collection ofintelliqence an extremely
difficult task. Under the circumstances a fair Judgment would
give the community a "well done."
On evaluation I would conclude that the Community was reluc-
tant to accept the indications that the Soviet Union would
undertake whatever steps were necessary to maintain a
cooperative, friendly, communist regime in Afghanistan.
I would pick the week of 15 September 1979 as the turning
point in the Intelligence Community's evaluation of Soviet inten-
tions. It was during this week that the dispute between the
imagery people and the SOVA experts landed in the DCI's office.
Whatever his decision at the moment on the official recognition
of a combat unit in country, the DCI's subsequent personal
initiatives with Dr. Brzezinski, the President, etc., highlighted
the developing possibility that the Soviets would intervene with
combat forces. The careful wording of the various advisories
which up until early September 1979 stated "could not rule out
the possibility," etc., gradually gave way on 25 December 1979 to
the forthright "may already have started to move into that
company in force today." The major mass cross oorder operation
actually began on the 29th of December.
The key, of course, was the identification of a combat unit,
an airborne battalion, at Bagram. in September. When confirmed it
was a firm indicator that the Soviets would utilize Soviet ground
combat troops in direct combat operations inside Afghanistan to
accomplish their objectives.
No policymaker in the US Government should have been
surprised when the actual cross-border operation began in late
December.
The DCI's personal initiatives with the Director of the NSC
staff and the President and the establishment of a contingency
crisis management group all reflect an excellent performance in
maintaining a free flow of intelligence to those with a need to
know.
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