THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001100090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET CiA.131C0
COMMENTS
by
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A,GENCY
on
"CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
of
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mr. William H. Jackson
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Entitled
"THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE"
February 28, 1949.
TOP SECRET
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COMM7NTS
by
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGFNCE AGENCY
on
"CONCLUSIONS AND PECOMAENDATIONS"
of
A RErORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mr, William H. Jackson
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Entitled
"THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE"
February 28, 1949
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The Cremelttee'e reront is an admirable effort to dire :ttha
Central In eliieence Agency to Amiamentals and is a genu5nely
consruetiee effort to improve the rroduction of intelligoice on
which the Tolioy of the United States should be based. 7,"le observa-
tions of the Comm:Atee are, in seneral, accurate, and it: objectives
ere 3ound; Its conclusions, however, are, in many respeo;s, faulty,
and the recommendations for their attainment are, in ma r.T cases,
impracticable,.
The larger part of the Report is concerned with .03 amount of
coordination exercised by the Central Intelligence Agensy in regard
to tee, other intelligence activities of the Government. It is
real4zed that an optimum coordination has not yet beer reached;
howe-el, nei, only a start, but considerable progress eLong the path
)f eexTeLete coordination has been attained. No gaps -emain oven
sheu h all derlicalion has not yet been abolished. Cm this suhject
if crcedins-uion, I am sure the members of the Nationl Security Council
eeal=ve the difficulties encountered; particularly. 'chose members
lavin, to do with the unification of the Armed ServJces, A comparable
erob em has confronted the Central Intelligence As2ncy with the added
eb34-eale thet one additional department is invoi/ed,
The Committee states (page 5): "---coordisation can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various as-encies."
here is no euestion as to the validity of thet statement. However, to
echieve coordination in xsch a manner, com,/omises of wording,
emphesie, etc., have to be accepted. For example, three months were
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required to secure agreement on most of the present NSCID's, while it
required one year to resolve the differences between the Air Force
and the Navy on one NSCID.
The Committee begins its discussions on coordination with the
above-mentioned declaration, but, in numerous cases thereafteri,
throughout the Report, the element of "direction" in coordination is
intimated and even stressed. This element of "direction" has usually
been entirely unacceptable to the interested agencies. Further, the
Director of Central Intelligence, per se, has no avthority to enforce
coordination, and, indeed, the Committee (page 41) recognises this
when it says, "The Act does not give the Central Intelligence Agency
independent authority to coordinate intelligenee activities." Yet
many of the Committee's recommendations hinge upon having such
authority, and many of the alleged shortcomings are due to this lack
of authority. The phrase, "such procedure would violate the chain
of command," was repeated over and over again in the discussions during
the drawing-up of the present NSCID's.
In view of this lack of explicit authority, in view of the
progress made in the relatively short time this activity has been in
operatIon, and In view of the progress already made in coordination
by mutual agreement, it is oonsidered that in not too long a period
the continued augmentation of such a program will more than justify
any delays incurred.
A second alleged shortcoming is that the Central Intelligence
Agency is "overadministered in the sense that administrative
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conditions have been allowed to guide and, on occasion, even control
intellieenoe rolicy, to the detriment of the latter." The adminis-
tration of the Central Intelligence Agency ha e been developed on
the following natterns
(1) Budget, porsonneloend other support services are
essential to any operation, and are centralleed to serve all
components of the Agency,
(2) Control procedures are restricted to keeping within
the budget requirements, insuring that illegal transactions
are not permitted, avoiding waste and duplication in expendi-
tures, and maintaining certain standards required by security,
the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and the
General Accounting Office. No agency, regardless of its nature,
and most emphatically One that handles confidential government
fleede, can nossibly avoid such eontrols
Administration haa advised on policy matters and should continue
eo rio o, particuiarly,in the determination of the ability to support
operational proposals and in the achievement of greater efficiency with
the means available for operations. Administration has no voice in
determining the substance of operational direction, guidance, and
eroduction, nor should it over have,
There is a never-ending argument on the merits of administration
eereue eperattons. The operating people would like to be given a
eump sum for their operations and complete latitude with regard to
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numbers and grades of personnel, travel authorities, new projects,
etc, The results of such action, without controls, is obvious--
chaos?and, again, it simply cannot be done where government funds
are involved,
The Committee further declares: "Administrative arrangements
which do not at first appear to be efficient or elsonosioal may be
necessary in the Central Intelligence Agency. Personnel revirements
for oartain types of work cannot conform to normal civil service
standards, and the demands of security often impose special and
unusual procedures, This situation must be understood net only by
those responsible for the internal organization of the Central
Intellieence Agency but also by Congress and the Bureau of the
Budget," --.. "The centralization of all administration in one office
is undesirable since secret operations require their own separate
administration"
The Committee's report seems to Indicate undue emphasis and
alarm In connection with complete autonomy for covert components of
the Central Intelligence Agency. There has to be an umpire some place,
and no one, directly responsible for operations, should be his own
final authority and judge in the utilization of funds and personnel.
Security is adequately served through the physical segregation
of covert administrative branches and the establishment of direct
ehannels, both to the covert operational officials and to the
responsible administrator who is the third senior official in the
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Agency. Covert and overt support activitlee are not intermingled,
but a single administrative chief over each phase insures adequate
mutual support and minimizes duplication. The Central Intelligence
Agony'', saved Over sixty positions by the new organizational approach
and so far has had few complaints. From a strictly security point
of view, there will be better security than before because of not
pointing up autonomous separate support functions in a single agency.
It is all very well for a group with no responsibilities or
authority to state that both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget
must understand that the Central Intelligente Agency must be given,
in effect, a blank eheek and a free hand. In practice, the Central
Ietelligence Agency muat justify its demands with some reason and logic
and must reassure both of those bodies that the Central Intelligence
Agency is, at least, somewhat careful with government funds and does
its best to guard against waste and fraud.
Another Committee comment is: *Many able persons have left the
organization and few qualified ones have been attracted to it. On
the higher levels, quality ie uneven, and there are few persons who
are outstanding in intelligence work."
The above statement seems to be totally unwarranted, as well
as to have no actual basis in fact. Out ofnsmployees in the
three top Frades (P-6 to P.8 and CAF.13 to CAF-15, both inclusive),
20 omployees have left, not all of them voluntarily. The following
table shows this turnover.
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or the ftalendar year 1948; the turnover in the Central
Ints/ligerce igeney for all personnel, for ell 11.1.1rlea--donth;
sickness, maternity /eaves and al/ other voluntary or involuntary
25X1 serarations?has averaged
per month. This to a considerably
lower rate than for most other government agencies.
Thn charge that there are few persons outstanding in intelli?
genee work Is anOther general one and is difficult to sustain, It
ia admittedly difficult to establish an absolute criterion as to
ability, but, if scho/arship and experience do have some bearing,
the following tables will demonstrate that the Central Intelligence
kqency is not totally devoid of capable people,
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As of Septembnr 1948)
_gal ego 95%
No Deffree
I "
II Degrees
III "
Lozgiga_1 am.an e
II
III or more
15%
80%
30%
11%
93%
68%
30%
Military Sfrrlree 60%
Lry_tqlliggittim_akmag
year 91%
IT years 76%
III " or more 61%
ted
year 95%
Ii years 88%
Iii " or more 79%
Ettlitactasmign
year
II years
III " or more
Emelim..:L/ _2...ay I
Sex
Male
Female
44%
37%
27%
55%
70%
30%
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LatL.7_2ollf I catiPna_g_timfaulamligagnml
(A3 of September 1948)
Collfto
99%
No Degree
11%
"
88%
II Degrees
27%
TTI
14%
TOrei.Frall. e
95%
71%
23%
58%
TT
ITT or more
Military_arvice
IotelliPenot_awziama
year
98%
II years
84%
III " or more
la,1-9121Z2tr.trigngs2
year
70%
98%
IT years
93%
III " or more
86%
Fesidence Foreign
I year
46%
11 years
39%
ITT " or more
29%
Poreirm Travel
55%
ex
Male
67%
Female
33%
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Another error, states the Report, Is 'The placing in key
peeetione of lerge rercentage of military personnel, many of them
on relativeie short 'tour cr duty' assignment, tends to discourage
ceneetent cividian personnel from looking to employment in the
Central IntelAgenee Aecncy as a career,"
aeittine the post of Director, which is considered in another
part of the Report, there is only one-out of sire-Assistant Director
tiiIA a military man. Four?out of six?Deputy Assistant Directors
are rrom the eilitary services, but, considering the fact that the
eiiteley srv4ce, are both the greatest suppliers and the greatest
ou9tem re, this does not appear unreasonable The overall figure
25)(1 isr--1111tary personnel, or of the total number of
enreloy-es n the Central Intellieence Agency,
The above Committee etatement seems somewhat inconsistent with
eeccemendalions in other parts of the Report which urge the assign-
lent of' ilitary personnel to various branches of the organization-
Budget
Cr page 33 of the Rerort is the statement: "Both Congress and
:;h ueaz ef the Budget have refrained from examining in detail the
ees'i workings of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to
le line the justification for the budget," This statement is only
art'ii correct as, while Congress, so far, has not inquired into
eeeee,the details have been gone over in the Bureau of the Budget
ho has full security clearance, It was at the
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?neistenee of' the Bureau of the Budget that a centralized
adminestratve staff was set up,
-"ecur4eta
The Committee recogni zes the need for security, " the
Centrel Intel 11 eonce Agency which has unfortunately become
lerolieized as a secret intelligence organizetion,." The Central
Th) ieence P. Fancy concurs completely in this, and the publicity
received leis neither been sought nor encouraged, but has been
ctvelydisco ura7eci . By speelal plea of the Director, various
pee eedicals erid newspapers (Life, Time, Newsweek, U,? 5,- News, New York
Hereld Tribune, wnong other) have refrained from publishing articlese
Under the existine conditions of press and radio, it would be practi-
onJey ru.possible to conceal completely, desirable as it undoubtedly
would be, activities of the Central fntellie:ence Agency. Th a more,
p..e.eticable iannr, which has been adopted, is to conceal the covert
seeeioee &:'.lowtng th.!! -:)?.rert sections to serve as a "lightning rod"
d irw o'f' ettention From the clandestine activities,-
Concise eomments ea the individual conclusions and recommendations
o' tee Commitee follow:
CjelLskr 'eit_Lage 27e
'(I.: Section 102 of the National Security Act of' 1947
tabl. isha a framework for a sound intelligence system and
TIC :1171endment s to this Section of the Act, are deemed necessary
thl a time,"
Concur.
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"(2) The Central Intelligence Agency la properly placed
in our rovernmental structure under the National Security
Council,"
Concur,
"(I) The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered
and encouraged to establish through its Director closer
7iiaieon with the two members of the National Security Council
on whom it chiefly depends, namely, the Secretaries of State
eed Defense,"
Concur, Although an effective liaison already exists,
closee ialatione will be established,
Che.Pter_I 7 -IMM2S"
"(1) The centralization of all administration in one
office is undesirable since secret operations require their
own seperate administration,"
The Central Intelligence Agency is on the horns of a
6ilemma in this problem. Until a few months ago, separate
edministrations were rrovided for secret operations. Then,
the 7berstadt Report recammended a decrease in the administra-
tive overhead, and the Bureau of the Budget required that
administrative duplication be eliminated. So, a centralieed
edministration was instituted Either type of organization,
It has been demonstrated, will work,
"(2) The present arrangements for handling the difficult
budgetary questions of the Central Intelligence Agency are
soundly conceived, and the Agency has not been hampered in
carrying out its present :responsibilities by lack of funds."
Concur.
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"(3) To assist the Director in carrying out his statutory
duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods he Should
in cases where the disclosure of secret information is sought
from him and he has doubt as to whether he should comply, refer
the question to the National Security Council in order that
It may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public
interest."
Concur.
9(4) In the interest of security, the Central Intelligence
Agency should increasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator
of intelligence rather than its secret intelligence activities
in order to reverse the present unfortunate trend where it finds
Itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organi-
zation. In this way it can help to cover up rather than to
uncover the secret op,rations entrusted to it."
Concur,
"(5) The placing in key positions of a large percentage of
military personnel, many of them on relatively short 'tour of
duty' assignment, tends to discourage competent civilian
personnel from looking to employment in the Central Intelligence
A-ency as a career."
Do not concur. Omitting the post of Director, which is
considered In another part of the Report, there is only one--
out of six--Assistant Director who 13 a military man. Four--
out of six--Deputy Assistant Directors are from the military
services, but, considering the fact that the military services
Rre both the greatest suppliers and the greatest .customers,
this does not appear unreasonable. The overall figure i I 25X1
military personnel, or
f the total number of 25X1
employees in the Central Intelligence Agency-
13
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The above Committee statement seems somewhat inconsistent
with recommendations in other parts of the Report which urge
the assignment of military personnel to various branches of
the organization
clumlAmal_mamAl.
"(1) The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency
under the National Security Act with respect to the coorOination
of intelligence activities, which is one of the most important
ones assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, has not been
fully discharged-"
Concur in the importance of coordination,. Such coordination,
as the Committee points out, must be achieved by mutual agreements
and, although a complete answer has not yet been made, progress
has been continuing along the desired course Lacking explicit
authority, coordination cannot be imposed, and, even where sueh
authority might exist, its exercise might be undesirable because
of the tensionsand resentments that would be set up, Coordination
by agreement should be continued and should be accelerated by
placing into effect the practicable recommendations in the Report
"(2) One of the important areas where more active efforts
at coordination are needed is the field of scientific intelligence"
Concur, This has been provided for with the establishment
of the Office of Scientific Intelligence,
"(3) Another important area is that of domestic intelligence
and counterintelligence insofar as they relate to the national
security. To improve coordination in this area and between it
and the entire intelligence field, we recommend that the
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Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee."
Relationships in this field between the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have
grown steadily in scope and in closeness during the past year?
There is no objection whatsoever to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation becoming a part of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee, but it should be pointed out that the present
charter of the Intelligence Advisory Committee permits invi-
tation to Intelligence Advisory Committee meetings of agencies
in addition to the permanent members, when the subject matter
to be discussed is of interest to additional agencies. This
seems to be adequate, The Federal Bureau of Investigation
was invited to meetings of the Intelligence Advisory Board,
but in 1946 discontinued attending these meetings. It is
thought that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would not now
care to join the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a permanent
member, but I shall be glad to invite the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to participate on a permanent basis if the
National Security Council approves this recommendation in the
Report,
"(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shoule, be made
permanent chairman of the United States Communicatiras Intelligence
Board,"
Do not concur. Having membership on the United States
Communications Intelligence Board, where procedures must be
15
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adopted unanimously, seems to be eufficient.
"(5) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly
conceived, but it should participate more actively with the
Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination
of intelligence activities,"
Concur, The Intelligence Advisory Committee is now meeting
regularly, at more frequent intervals, both for the purposes of
coordination and for the joint preparation of estimates, for
briefings and presentations to the Secretary of Defense, Committees
of Congress (including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy), and
the National Security Council, Increased use of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee for the continuing coordination of intelligence
activities will be carried out,
1(6) The Intelltgonce Advisory Committee should consist of
the Director of Central Intelligence and representatives of
the Departments of State Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other departments and agencies
would sit as ad hop members when appropriate."
Do not concur. There is no objection to the participation
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a member of the
Inteltieence Advisory Committee, but it is believed that much
benef=t ts obtained by the presence of representatives of the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Intelligence Group as
permaneni., members. There seams to be no valid reason for
dropping these latter two members. The Atomic Energy Commission
is particularly desirous of maintaining this relationship.
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"N The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning . naff
should be renonstituted as a staff responsible only to the
Director of Central Intelligence, with the task of developing
plane for the coordination of intellinTence activities,"
Corcur. This is its present organization and its present
tank.
"(P) The responsibilities of the Office of Collection and
Disseminetion with respect to the coordination of collection
requirements and requests and the dissemination of intelligence
should be tarried out nnder the new Coordination Division, This
is subject to future determination of the extent to which
individual arfices may conduct their own dissemination,"
Do not concur-, See recommended organization at the end
thsse comments,
Chatter_
"(1) In the Central Intelligence Agency there has been
confusion between the responsibility of producing coordinated
national intelligence estimates and responsibility for
miscellaneous research and reporting activities,"
This is n broad statement that needs qualification. Both
types of activities may have been performed, but there has been
no no Zneion between them, and both were found to be necessary,
It 13 bevci that whet the Committee describes as "cenfusion"
has resu_ted from the Central :ntelligence Agency's recognition
of its threefold responsibilities as the producer of national
intelligence estimates, as the intelli ence facility of the
National Security Council, Ind as the agency responsible for
pororning services of common concern. The Committee has failed
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to Yf'CC;r71.2Z t113 nur that ncists between the Central Int12ig,ence
ext,icAt rspcnsibilities, ae sot forth in NSCIL #3,
Inte'ligenze A7en.ty's Impligit responsibilities
as 1,1-* ultel:17enee &o1liy of the ?atonal Security Council,
'4oreover, NMI) #3 5. n r'gid with respect to the Central
Inteili?.sncs Agency' ;.-J production rcaronsibilities and so flexible
with fescet to those of the departitental intelligence agencies
that Ito usetu _nese as a worktne,- defaiment is seriously iopPired,
The C:11 :ittes's conclusion is made 3n the basis of a dangerously
r
view of the ',3entra 1ntel1t7ence Agency's responsibilities
for Ilig:nee TIroduction Such 7esponsibilities should be
Consied not solely in terns of the production of "coordinatO
nationa intolligenoo_sqt-Tap3 and 4intellir:ence in fields of
T)/amo oter,--st'' but also in tel-as of the Central Intelligence
Ao'enc;role s the intoAi;7encla f'r,cility of the President,
the N-tonal :lecurLty Council, and such agencies as may be
739EAT:tlual 1)7 ti,er,
he Cent-e1 intbili7orce Agency's intelligence production
3hoilld Include the following, and NSCID
qL,C:D --lhou_e, s aodified 2cocrdtnlly to include a revised
appr)prite definition :4' rational intelligence
Po prude intelligetce required to reduce
-rum hn e;_ellleni of surprise in foreign situations
'nc Iniormente whch cffect tnthd States national
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(2) To produce coordinated intelligenie estimatea
required for national planning, policy, and operational
decisions?
(3) To produce intelligence required to sUpport
thosejigencion detignated by the National Seeurity.
. Council to receive it.
(4). To produce intellivnce in fields of gammon
interest to the Central Intelligente ATc$ney and. the
departmental intelligence agencies, inoludine economio
and scientific intelligence..
(5) To rroduee intelligence .oeeul.red for Central
Intelligente Agency estimates not normal to tat
departmental reeponsibilities.
(It should be noted that paragraph (2) above is the only categorY
of intelligence which conforms to
intelligence in NSCI) f3.)
no definAlon Of national
"(2)-The provisions of the National Semcity Act for
the production e national intelligence esCcates, as inter?
preted by the National Security Council Intulligence Directives,
are sound but have not been effectively carried out."
Concur in the assertion that the proviaions or the National
Security Act for the production or national intelligence estimates
are sound, but, after almost a year s experience, Ilelieve that
NSCID #1 and NSCID #3 should be reVised for ti!e ,.sons cited
immediately above and for the follm7ing 7eas
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(1) The directives do not provide for adequate
treatment of the matter of priority within the departmental
intelligence agencies with respect to their support of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Consequently, the Central
intellisence Agency is unable to make optimum use of
departmental intelligence and cannot depend upon timely
departmental action In meeting rentral Intelligence Agency
eommitments and deadline-.
(2) The directives do not adequately allocate
sroductien responsibilities and do not defino intelligence
t'ields or common concerre
1(3) There should be created in the Central Intelligence
Agency a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and
review the specialized intelligence product of the departmental
agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence
estimatcs,''
The'1eport is vague concerning the details of the proposed
reorganisation, and, therefore, opinion is divided on the
necessity or desirability of a drastic internal reorganization
now. However, if the Committee's recommendation means that the
Estimates Dission is to be large enough to provide its on
rolatvely h1f7h level research suprort, the recommendation is
.sorka'sle and night result in staplifieation of the procesal. of
predneing est:mates.
The problem of a greater duplication of
effor, than now exists, immediately arises. It is beliesed,
thererore, thA this recommendation is premature snd shouM bs
consiCered only after revison -SCID #1 and NSCID #30
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t/(4) Under the leadership of the Director of Central
Intelligence, these estimates should be submitted for discussion
and approval by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee
whoee members should assume collective responsibility for them."
"(5) Provision should he made In these arrangements for the
handling of crisis situations when coordinated estimates are
required without delay,"
"(6) Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this
way must, in order to be effective, be recognized as the most
authoritative estimates available to the policy makers.*
These three recommendations have been considered together
as parts of the same problem The Central Intelligence Agency
cannot agree with the view that members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee should assume collective responsibility for
Central Intelligence Agency estimates. It is considered that the
main question is what sort of estimates should emerge from the
national intelligence structure. Those who developed the original
concept of a central intellieeece group had clearly in mind the
evereeresent factor of departeertel bias as well as the short-
comings of joint ,ntellieenee, uhich often produces estimates
so watered down in the process of reaching agreement as to be
valueless, The Central Intelligence Agency estimates can be free
from such faults only if they are eroduced with full cognizance
of departmental views but without subservience to departmental
prejudices. Intelligence Advisory Committee review of the
Central Intelligence egency drafts should undertake to eliminate
einoe or apparent differences but not to gloss over divergences
of inoemed opinion. The resultant estimate must be essentially
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that of the Central Intelligence Agency and not that of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee collectively. Any statements
of dissent should be limited to substantial and welledefined
issues, as the directives now provide. Moreover, these
directives Should be further modified to restrict dissent to
the field of responsibility of the dissenting agency. (For
example, the Office of Naval Intelligence has an InIagg1 in
political matters but is not margunikle for estimates in that
field, and the Central Intelligence Agency should not be required
to publish a dissent by the Office of Naval Intelligence on purely
political matters if the State Department concurs in the Central
Intelligence Agency position.) The logic of this contention is
simply that, just as a dissenting member of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee cannot be expected to Share in the responsibility
for a Central Intelligence Agency estimate in which he dissents,
so, by extension, the Central Intelligence Agency has sole
responsibility for its estimates, even when Intelligence
Advisory Committee concurrence is complete, and does not share
this responsibility collectively with the members of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee. Concurrence should fortify the
estimate; it should not create an artificial responsibility.
The Report does not reflect a clear understanding of this vital
aspect of the coordination theory,? To the Committee, "national"
intelligence is merely Ttcoordinated/ intelligence, and coordinated
intelligence is joint intelligence, at the mercy of departmental
bias.
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Although the Report favors the method of preparing drafts
in an ad hoc eommittee, experience shows that this procedure
is time-consuming and inefficient. The Central Intelligence Agency
believes that coordination procedure will be effective only if
its own estimates personnel produce the initial draft as a basis
for discussion with a permanent, fall-time, substantively
competent Intelligence Advisory Committee sub-committee, prior
to the submittal of the estimates to the Director for Intelligence
Advisory Committee action.
There must be effective means for handling crisis situations.
In the pasts an informs/ procedure, which worked, was in effect.
This procedure is now in process of being formsli2ed by agreeds
written understanding.
The Central Intelligence Agency's estimatesmust sata their
distinction as the most authoritative intelligence available
to the rolicy makers. It is, however, recommended that the
National Security Council enjoin the policy makers to give
the Centre/ Intelligence Agency such guidance in matters
pertaining to national policy that Central Intelligence Agency
support will be more directly responsive to their needs.
AmIdt2ELL_Pana1
"(1) In addition to the Estimates Division recommended in
the previous Chapter, there should be created out of the preacnt
Office of Reports and Estimates a Research and Reports Division
to accomplish central research in, and coordinated production of,
23
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intelligence in field of common interest. The staff of this
Division should include sufficient representation from the
State Department and the Services to insure that their needs
are adequately met."
The Report is vague concerning the details of the proposed
reorganieation, and, therefore, opinion is divided on the
necessity pr desirability of a drastic internal reorganization
now. However, if the Committee's recommendation means that the
Estimates Division is to be large enough to provide its own
relatively high level research support, the recommendation is
workable and might result in simplification of the process of
producing estimates. The problem of a greater duplication of
efforts than now exists, immmediately arises. It is believed,
therefore, that this recommendation is premature and Mould be
considered only after a revision of NSCID #1 and NSCID 13.
Similarly, the proposed Research and Reports Division,
including a basic economic research unit as well as the present
Map Branch and such other facilities as might be determined to
belong there, could profitably operate apart from the
Estimates Division. It must be pointed out, however, that
these recommendations are made within the framework of the
entire Report. It would be highly inadvisable to separate the
present Office of Reports and Estimates functions without
making sure that corresponding changes will be brought about
in the functions and faeilities of the departmental intelligence
agencies, particularly in their relationships to the Central
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Intellirence Agency., It thould be recognized that decentra-
lization of intelligeime production responsibilities, as
recommended in the Report, necessarily involves substantial
problems of coordination, flow, routing, and priorities of
access to source materials, and raises the potential danger
of an even greater duplication of effort than now exists.
This proposal will be further discussed in the recommended
organization at the end of these comments,,
"(2) The Coordination Division (reconatuted Interdepart-
mental Coordinating and Planning Staff) should be given the
responsibility for studying the actual scope of the Research
and reports Division and for recommending those services of
common eoneern which should be performed centrally."
Concur. It is believed that the reconstituted Interdepart-
mental Coordinating and Planning Staff should determine what
revision of NSCID #3 its needed, in collaboration with the
Intelligence Advisory Committee Standing Committee and repre.e
sentatives of the Office of Reports and Estimates
4(3) The propriety of the preparation by the Central
Intelligence Agency of essentially political summaries should
be reviewed, taking Into consideration the need for such
summaries, the existence of a number of duplicating summaries
and the particular capabilities of the individual departments
to prepare them,)"
The Central Intelligence Agency does not concur in this
recommendation or its implications. In referring to the Central
Intelligence Agency current intelligence publications as
"essentially political summaries," the Report properly indicates
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that those publications are based to a considerable degree on
State Department materials. However, a major cause for this
preponderance of State Department materials is that Army, Navy,
and Air Pores did not until recently, as State does, make all
their highest level intelligence and operational materials
available to the Centre/ Intelligence Agency. A strong National
Seourity Council directive is required to remedy this situation,
Concerning the problem of duplication, the Central Intelligence
Agency believes that such duplication is more apparent that.
real,.. Each of the departmental agencies produces periodic
summaries which are designed for a specific audience, and no
one of those publications could meet the needs of the other
audiences. (Even the State Department summaries are specialised;
they are diplomati, summaries for readers with an intimate knowl-
edge of diplomatic operations.) The Central Intelligence Agency
current intelligence publications are the only ones designed
primarily for the President and the National Security Council.
It is believed that only the Central Intelligence "gency has the
perspective and the freedom from bias necessary for proper
performance of this delicate and significant function.
The President and the members of the National Security
Council have repeatedly expressed their approval of the Central
Intelligence Agency Daily and Weekly Summaries, Although the
Report makes no specific recommendation concerning the Central
Intelligence Agency monthly "Review of the World Situation,"
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the publication has been well received insofar as the Central
Intelligence Agency has been able to ascertain.,
"(4) The various reports, studies and summaries which are
not national intelligence or recognized services of common
concern should be discontinued."
Concur.
gpulajaIL,Rfilmag4.
"(1) The Office of Operations consists of three distinctive
activities, which represent useful and recognized functions in
their own field but pave no particular relation to each other,"
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STAT
STAT
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28
STAT
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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Concur. This is being done. It is not unprofitable to
think of the Office of Special Operations career in terms of
other professions, such as the law. In law, three years of
formal study constitutes merely a mental conditioning and the
acquiring of a rationale preparatory to its practice. The
career itself has developed into innumerable fields of speciali-
zation, However, it is within the power of legal experts to
judge the competence of members of the profession since it has
established standards. An examination of the plaintiff's and
defendant's briefs against the judge's opinion and legal
precedence permits an evaluation of professional ability which
will at least find a substantial body of concurrence within
the profession. The Office Of Special Operations is only
beginning to establish standards or a relative sense of valuers
In its own profession which enables competence to be recognized
universally within the intelligence profession. The Office of
Special Operations training is developing in a sound manner since
it is formalizing a program of instruction based on case histories
and field experience. This course of study is being continually
refined by the criticisms of incoming field personnel who have
eained new techniques and encountered spetial.conditions Which
require revisions in the training program.
"(5) The cover policies or the Office of Special Operations
in the field should be generally reviewed and tightened. Con-
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25X1
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and closer liaison In this field should be established with
the Pederal Bureau of Investigation."
Concur. This is being done. This continued implementation
will naturally result in a higher quality of counterespionage
activity which will in turn directly influence the Central
Intelligence Agency relationship with the ?ederal Bureau of
"(7) Relations with departmental agencies should be brought
closer, and the guidance which the Office of Special Operations
receives from intelligence consumers should be strengthened,
This miebt be achieved by including representatives of the
Service agencies and the State Department in the Information
Control Section of the Office of Special Operations."
Concur. It must be noted that this will increase the
number of military personnel employed in the Central Intelligence
Agency.
"(8) The Director should assure himself that the Office
of Special Operations is receiving adequate information on the
current and strategic intelligence needs of the Government.
This might be achieved by establishing closer relations with
the Secretaries of State and Defense."
Concur.
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"(9) The Office of Special Operations should exercise
a greater measure of control over the dissemination of its own
material."
Do not concur. This would again produce duplication which
has already been so sharply criticized. Save for operational
matters, normal dissemination, subject to security safe-guards,
should he employed.
"(10) The Nuclear Energy Group should be moved from the
Office of Special Operations to the proposed Research and
Reports Division where it should be a part of the general
scientific work."
Concur, The Nuclear Energy Group has already been moved
to the Office of Scientific Intelligence.
"(11) The Office of Special Operations should have access
to communications intelligence to the full extent required for
guidance in directing its operations and for more effeotive
conduct of counter-espionage."
Concur, This is being done. In this connection, the
Committee's comment on page 126 appears a trifle gratuitous:
"Although, as pointed out elsewhere in this report (See Chapter
II), we have not gone into this field, there appears to be some
question whether the Office of Special Operations now has
adequate and prompt access to this material," The Office of
Special Operations is receiving all information that is available
In this field,
r
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C ez_bap..L:_at1.314.
"(1) The close relationship between covert intelligence
and covert operations and the fact that the latter is related
to intelligence affecting the national security justifies the
plaeing of the Office of Policy Coordination within the
Central Intelligence Agency."
"(2) The Office of Policy Coordination should be integrated
with the other covert Office of the Central Intelligence Alenen
namely, the Office or Special Operations, and with the Contact
Branch of the Office of Operations, and these three operations
should be under single over-all direction (Operations Division)
within the Central Intelligence Agency."
25X1
In this connection, the Office of Policy Coordination and
the Office of Special Operations were formerly integrated and
combined into one office during the period when NSC 44 was in
effect. NSC 10/2 states explicitly that the Office of Policy
Coordination shall be autonomous in the Central Intelligence
Agency. To carry out the second recommendation above, NSC 10/2
will have to be revised,
gheadria_plat_118.
?
"(1) The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency
has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate
of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate
effectively,"
39
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Do not concur. Had the Central Intellinence Agency been
constituted in a vaeuum, where relations with other established
agencies need not have been taken into account, progress in
coordination, organi7.ation, and rroduction might have been much
more rapid. However, the relationships and impacts between not
only the other inte .igence agencies, but also the administrative
agencies of the Government?the Bureau of the Budget, the General
Accounting Office, the Civil Service Commission, etc --bad to be
adjusted and had to he lived with, Dismissing the theoretical
eonditions which one might have liked to enjoy, and considering
the realistic conditions which have confronted the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, it is believed that much progress along sound
Tine has been made And, what is more gratifying, this tendency
is increasing in both scope and in the right direction,
'(2) Administrative organi7ation and policies tend to
impede the carrying out of the essential intelligence functions
of the Central intelligence Agency under the Act,'
DO not concur, The development of our organivation and
l'unetions ha a been hnsed on a policy of centrali7ation of specific
responsibilitiee in single offices and the coordinated work of
the offices as a team, each concentrating .in its own field and
looking to the others for support from other fields. Only in this
manner can we avoid the confusion, duplication of effort,
inefficiency, and major frictions which always attend a situation
herein every component tries to be self-sufficient and attempts
to do the sane things, at the same time, in the same sphere,
40
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and in constant competition. Our organizational policy has
resulted in the centralized groupings shown below:
(1) Research, ovaluation,and production, and
coordination in these fields:
Office of Reports and Estimates (except science)
Office of Scientific Intelligence
(2) Collection and liaison control, disseminat3.on,
liaison service, and information service, and coordination
in these fields:
Office of Collection and Dissemination
(3) Overt field collection:
Office of Operations
(4) Covert field collection and counterespionage:
Office of Special Operations
' Covert field operations:
Office of Policy Coordination
(The last two functions which had been integrated into one
covert office were separated as a result of a directive issued
by the National Security Council,)
"(3) Continuity of service is essential for the successful
carrying out of the duties of Director of Central Intelligence"
Concur. This principle is obvious, and a lack of the
assurarce of continuity works a hardship on both the personnai
cf the Central intelligence Agency and the quality of work
performed, Changes of Directors with the following changes of
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organieation tend to make the Central Intelligence Agency
employee feel uncertain and insecure in his job with con-
sequent harm to the quality and quantity of his output This
was part5curlar.y noticeable last Fail just before election when
literally doeens of rumors were extant in Washington that one of
the Committee members was to become Director of Central Intelli-
gence as soon as the election was over,
"(4) As the best hope for continuity of service and the
greatest assurance of independence of action a civilian should
be Director of Central Intelligence. If a Service man is
selected for the post he should resign from active military
duty "
This is a question that has arisen time and time again.
Perhaps the best discussion of this problem is that stated in
the report of the nerstadt Committee which is quoted, as
follows:
"A moot question is whether the Director should be a
civilian or a professional military man. The argument
In favor of a service man is that he will command more
confidence from the armed services who talk his language
and will respect his position and security. With a mili-
tary man, the Present pay scale will not prove a deterrent.
The job could be developed into one of the top staff
assignments available to members of the three services
"Against this, it is said that the position requires
a broader backeround and greater versatility and diplomatic
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exrerience than is usually found in service personnel;
that the best qualified and most competent officers
would not accept the position if to do so meant permanent
retirement and an end of the road to important command or
operational resronsibility. If a military man is assigned
to the position as a tour of duty, he will, it is said,
inevitably be influenced to some degree, in the execution
of his duties, by his rank and status as compared with that
of other offieers with whom he deals, He may also be
influenced by concern eor his next billet
"The principal argument against a civilian is the
diffieulty of getting a good one, It will be difficult
to attraet a man of force, reputation, integrity, and
proven administrative ability who has an adequate knowledge
of foreign history and politics and is familiar with intelli?
gence technique and the working machinery of the Government
and the military establishment. Not only is the pay low in
comperision to industry and the professions, but the reward
of success is anonymity. The wisdom of putting an individual
who lacks intelligence experience in charge simply because
he is a competent administrator is dubious. A civilian
would have the advantage of being free from taint of service
ambitions or rivalries. On the other hand a civilian may
be more subject to political pressure than a military man,
in certain foreign countries this hes occurred, In any
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even e a civilian would have to be a man of commanding
reputation and personality in order to secure the
respect and cooeeration of the services CIA's
relations with the State Department would undoubtedly
benefit from the presence of a Civilian director, known
and respected by the Secretary of State and his
assistants,
mThe intrinsic interest of the work, its potential
influence on policy, and recognition of public service
to be performed might combine to persuade a competent
civilian to accept the position. If so, his appointment
would seem desirable, A change in the statute that would
disqualify a military man is not, however, recommended,
"Moreover it would not be wise, at this time at least,
to amend the statute to include a mandatory requirement that
a military man, appointed as Director, must retire from
the service. A competent officer could be persuaded to
retire from his service and abandon his career to become
Director of CIA only if he felt some assurance of a
reAsonable tenure of office. That no such assurance exists
oday appears from the fact that three different Directors
have been appointed since January of 1946, A provision
requiring the retirement from service, of any commissioned
officer appointed Director might appropriately be included
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In the statute-elf coupled with the provision for
adequate retirement pay in ease he is removed as
Director,"
Chala..e! Xle_etnegtel.42
"(l) The Service intelligence agencies have manifested
an increased interest in intelligence and an attitude conducive
to aecomplishing its effective coordination,"
Concur,
"(2) In order to meet adequately their vital responsibilities
and maintain their proper position in the departmental structure,
the Service intellieence agencies should be staffed with qualified
personnel who concentrate In intelligence over the major portion
of their careers,"
Concur,
"(3) In accordance with a program of coordination initiated
and guided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service
intelligence agencies should confine themselves principally to
those fields of intelligence in which they have the primary
interest."
Concur,
"(4) A more active program of coordination by the Central
Intelligence Agency would result in a higher decree of centre-
lieation and coordination of intelligence production in fields
where the Services have a common interest,"
Concur.
"(5) There should be effective coordination between the
work of the Joint Intellieence Committee in the field of mili-
tary estimates and that of the Central Intelligence Agency and
Intelligence Advisory Committee in the field of national
estimates"
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Concur
"(1) The State Department, to which the National Security
Council has assigned dominant interest in the collection and
product.en of political, cultural and sociological intelligence,
should equip itself more adequately to meet the legitimate
requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency and of other
levernment intelligence agencies or such intelligence,"
Concur
1(2) The specialized intelligence staff in the State
Department, the Research and intelligence Staff, does not now
have sufficient current knowledge of departmental operations
and policies to furnish, on behalf or the Department, the
basic estimates which may be required by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Serviee intelligence agencies"
No eomment,
"(3) The liaison between the State Department and the
Central Intelligence Agency should be closer and put on a
continuing, effective basis,"
Concur Authorization should be granted the Office of
P,eports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency to
maintain effective liaison with political and operational levels
in the 7,tate Department in addition to the liaison presently
authorised with the Office of Intelligence Research. It is
particularly important that the Office of Reports 8nd Estimates
have effective working relations with the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff in order to coordinate intelligence
production requirements, The Office of Reports and Estimates'
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intelliPence production plans should be in phase with the
policy planning of the State Department
"(4) To meet the foregoing requirements, consideration
should be given by the Department to designating a high officer
of the Department, who has full access to operational and
policy matters, to act as intelligence officer. This officer,
with a small staff, should process requests for departmental
intelligence received "rom the Central Intelligence Agency and
other agencies and see that legitimate requests are met through
the preparation of the requisite intelligence reports or
estimates by the appropriate departmental officers, He should
also act as continuing intelligence liaison officer with the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Service intelligence agencies"
Concur, depending upon the position of the person selected.
Unless the individual is situated at a high policy level within
the State Department, his designation would be meaningless, if
not detrimental,
47
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Centr Intel' 1,7ellee P;:ency Orpani zati on
Attached hereto 9,re charts showing: (Enclosure A) the present
organintion and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(Fnclosure B) an organization recommended by the Committee; and
(Enclosure C) an organization recommended by the Central Intelligence
Agency. This latter recommended organization incorporates those
recommendations of the Committee which are believed to be pract.',.cable,
The changes in the functions of the various bodies are discussed
below in connection with the oreanization (Enclosure C) recommended
by the Central Intelligence Agency:
Intellieence Advisory Committee - The Intelligence Advisory Committee
is increased by the addition of a
representative of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation as a member,
interdepartmental Coordinating , The Interdepartmental Coordinating
and Planning Staff
and Planning Staff is not placed in
a Coordination Division because that
seems merely to place unrelated
elements into one body
Office of Collection and The Office of Collection and
Dissemination
Dissemination is retained as a
collecting, disseminating, liaison,
and reference branch as at present
constituted,
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The Committee proposes, in essence, that the reference fuletions
of the Office of Collection and Dissemination be divorced from the
liaison functions, that the reference functions be transferred to
the Office of Reports and Fstimates, and that the liaison functions
be administered by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff. The stated reason for this proposal is that the reference
and liaison functions have little interrelation, that the former
are closely related to the research function of the Office of Reports
and Estimates, and that the latter are closely related to the ccordin-
ating function of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff. The best reply to this seemingly logical proposal is that
the AtTency has already tried it out in practice and found it =satis-
factory? It had taken the Agency many months of hard work, trial, and
error to learn that the seemingly different functions of reference
and liaiscn are, in fact, so closely related that they are better
eerformed by a single administrative unit than by separate ones
It would be exact to state that the techniques of the Office of
Collection and Dissemination are many and various, involving the use
of mueh unique machine equipment, but it is only on paper that the
functions arrear unrelated In truth, they all serve a single and
common end: to get and store intelligence information and make it
available to those who need it,
In 3947 the Agency was organized with the Reference Center,
embracing library and repisters, in the Office of Reports and
.7.stimates; and with liaison assigned to the separate Office of
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Collection and rissemination. This was similar, In principl-!
with what the Committee now proposes. The only difference is that
the Reference Center (under the Committee's proposal) would now be
inetalled in one of the two Divisions into which the Office of
Rei arts and Estimates would be split, and the liaison function would
be assigned to a renamed Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff.
The separation of liaison and reference functions did not work
out well in practice. The administrative void between the two worked
to the detriment of both. If an analyst in the Office of Reports and
Estimates called for a document knownto be in the State Department's
library, it was clearly the job of the inter-library loan people in
the Central Intelligence Agency's library to get it for him; but, if
it turned out that the document was subject to stringent security
restrictions, then it became the job of a liaison officer to make
arrangements, with appropriate officials of the State Department,
for thl document to be released. The two jobs were one and the same,
but they required different approaches and different techniques.
As the library and liaison people were under different adMinistra-
tions, they failed to develop intimate knowledge of each other's
daily problems and of the techniques and channels being developed to
deal with them. Delays were many, and tempers were exacerbated.
The Reference Center, under the Office of Reports and Estimates,
found itself without adequate administrative understanding and support,
The main business of the Office of Reports and Estimates was to deal
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with critical problems of a substantive nature, and the speei:lists
preparine an imrortant estimate against a tight deadline naturally
took precedence over library and register reople whose rroblems could
be rut off unFal the morrow. The needs of the analysts had rriority,
and there was a tendency to postpone action on the more humdrum needs
of the Reference Center. It seems inescapable that the same situation
would revelop aeain if the library and registers were to be reassigned
to ,he Office of Rererts and Estimates, or to a Research and Reports
Division created out of the Office of Reports and ;',stimates In
addition, there ie now an Office of Scientific Intelligence whieh
equlres library and register services no less than the Office of
Reports ar,d 7stimates, and it would be unwise to make it dependent
on ito sist r Office for these services. I believe that the Central
Intelligence Agency Library and the registers should serve all of
the Central in'elli7ence Agency, and that they can best do so if
administered centrally, separately and apart from any one of the
consumer offices or divisions
Office or Reports and Estimates An "Estimates" Group, as recommended
by the Committee is formed at the
highest level in the Office of
Reports and Estimates By placing
this Froup so, instead of making it
a separate office, duplication is
avoided by not requiring a special
staff and research Froup to support
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Office of Operations
Office of Special Projects
a new office, It is believed the
result desired by the Committee,
i.e., an ultimate control and
coordination of estimates can be
obtained in this way without
requiring additional, separate
supporting personnel
Thisoffice is left intact as in
the present organization because
its task is the overt. c9liecIdnx,
of information, as distinguished
from the covert methods used by
the ')ffice of Special Operations and
the Office of Policy Coordination.
This is a new office comprising the
present Office of Special Operations
and the Office of Policy Coordination
and combines all covert operations
into one office as recommended by the
Committee It differs from the
Committee organization in that the
administrative services are performed
centrally, which conforms to the
Bureau cf the Budget's ideas regarding
the avoidance of duplication. This
52
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organiration is similar to that
4htch functioned before the
adoption of NSC 10/2, and for it
to be rlaced in effect now will
require the amendment of NSC 10/2.
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