REPORT ON THE COVERT ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000900010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT
ON THE
COVERT ACTIVITIES
OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
thru
TS# 158938
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Washington, D.C.
30 September 1951
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
In compliance with your verbal directive, confirmed by
your letter of 26 July 195 (Appendix A), the undersigned
have made a comprehensive study of the covert activities of
the Central intelligence Agency. We have carefully
examined its operations in this area. We have also given
due consideration in our study to the Agency's overt
activities and to its relationship with the intelligence
community as a whole.
Our findings are embodied in the attached report. For
your convenience, conclusions and recommendations are
summarized on pates l0 to 18. With these we are in unanimous
agreement.
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we cannot speak too highly of the assistance and
cooperation that has been given to us by the Central
Intelligence Agency at all levels, and by the other
agencies of Government and individuals contacted.
We are particularly indebted to our Executive
Director, Mr. S. Paul Johnston, and to Mr. J. Patrick
Coyne of the National Security Council, both of whom
have worked with us throughout and whose assistance
has been invaluable.
Respectfully yours,
J. H. Doolittle, Chairman
William B. Franke
1orris Hadley
/,-I
William D. Pa.wiey `
3`
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CONTENTS
II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIO113
Page
5
10
A.
With Respect to Personnel
11
B.
With Respect to Security
12
C.
With Respect to Coordination
and Operations
15
D.
With Respect to Organization
and Administration
17
E.
With Respect to Cost Factors
18
III.
DISCUSSION
19
A.
The Personnel Factors
21
B.
The Security Factors
28
C.
Coordination and Operations
38
D.
Organization and Administration
44
E.
Cost Factors
48
A.
Presidential Directive
54
B.
Programs and Procedures
57
C.
Chart - Present Organization
of DD/P
68
D.
Chart - Possible Organization
of DD/P
69
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REPORT
ON THE
COVERT ACTIVITIES
OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The acquisition and proper evaluation of adequate
and reliable intelligence on the capabilities and
intentions of Soviet Russia is today's most important
military and political requirement. Several agencies
of Government and many thousands of capable and
dedicated people are engaged in the accomplishment of
this task. Because the United States is relatives
new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police
state enemy whose social discipline and whose security
measures have been built up and maintained at a high
level for many years, the usable information we are
obtaining is still far short of our needs.
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Introduction 2
As long as it remains national policy, another
important requirement is an aggressive covert psycho-
logical, political and paramilitary organization more
effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless
than that employed by the enemy. No one should be
permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient
and secure accomplishment of this mission.
In the carrying out of this policy and in order to
reach minimal standards for national safety under present
world conditions, two things must be done. First, the
agencies charged by law with the collection, evaluation
and distribution of intelligence must be strengthened
and coordinated to the greatest practicable degree.
This is a primary concern of the National Security
Council and must be accomplished at the national policy
level. Those elements of the problem that fall within
the scope of our directive are dealt with in the report
which follows. The second consideration is less tangible
but equally important. It is now clear that we are
facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is
world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost.
There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable
norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States
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is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair
play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective
espionage and counterespionage services and must learn
to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever,
more sophisticated and more effective methods than those
used against us. It may become necessary that the American
people be made acquainted with, understand and support this
fundamentally repugnant philosophy.
Because of the tight security controls that have
been established by the U.S.S.R.. and its satellites,
the problem of infiltration by human agents is extremely
difficult. Most borders are made physically secure by
elaborate systems of fencing, lights, mines, etc.,
backed up by constant surveillance. Once across
borders -- by parachute, or by any other means -- escape
from detection is extremely difficult because of constant
checks on personnel activities and personal documentation.
The information we have Qbtained by this method of
acquisition has been negligible and the cost in effort,
dollars and human lives prohibitive.
The defection of Soviet and satellite personnel
offers a more profitable field for exploitation. The
Agency is properly focusing a great deal of its effort
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in this direction, alone and in collaboration with the
Armed Services abroad. The information obtained from
this source has been of value but is sporadic and
incomplete.
A still greater potential lies in communications
intelligence. This leads to the conviction that much
more effort should be expended in exploring every
possible scientific and technical avenue of approach
to the intelligence problem. The study group has
been extensively briefed by C.I.A. personnel and by
the Armed Services in the methods and equipment that
are presently in use and under development in this
area. We have also had the benefit of advice from
certain civilian consultants who are working on such
special projects. We are impressed by what has been
done, but feel that there is an immense potential yet
to be explored. We believe that every known technique
should be intensively' applied and new ones should be
developed to increase our intelligence acquisition by
communications and electronic surveillance, high alti-
tude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissance with
manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceano-
graphic studies, physical and chemical research, etc.
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From such sources may come early warning of impending attack.
No price is too high to pay for this knowledge.
In the short time that has been available to us we have
been intensively briefed by the Director and staff of the
Central Intelligence Agency, by the rest of the intelligence
community, and by the principal users of the intelligence
product. We have conferred with representatives of other
.interested Government agencies and with certain knowledgable
individuals whose past experience and present thinking have
made their views of value. The procedures which have been
followed, and the list of witnesses who have been heard are
detailed in Appendix B, attached. Our findings and recom-
mendations follow.
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II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECON, ENDATIONS
With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency in
general we conclude: (a) that its placement in the over-
all organization of the Government is proper; (b) that the
laws under which it operates are adequate; (c) that the
established provisions for its financial support are suf-
ficiently flexible to meet its current operationall, needs;
(d) that in spite of the limitations imposed by its relatively
short life and rapid expansion it is doing a creditable job;
(e) that it is gradually improving its capabilities, and
(f) that it is exercising care to insure the loyalty of its
personnel.
There are, however, important areas in which the C.I.A.
covert organization, administration and operations can and
should be improved. The Agency is aware of these deficiencies
and in many cases steps are being taken toward their solution.
While we believe our study to have been as comprehensive
as possible in the time available to us, we realize that it
is not complete. We are well aware of the tremendous problems
facing the Director and staff of an organization such as C.I.A.
and appreciate the sincere efforts being made to solve them.
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tns -- 2
In an attempt to be constructive and in the hope that we may
be helpful, we make the following recommendations:
A. With Respect to Personnel
That the Agency personnel competence level be raised.
The Agency should continually strive to achieve this and if
necessary reduce its present work load to expedite its
realization. Necessary steps are:
1. Elimination of personnel who can never achieve
a sufficiently high degree of competence to meet the
C.I.A. standard. This will entail a substantial reduc-
tion in present personnel. There is no place in C.I.A.
for mediocrity.
2. Review and improvement of recruitment plans
and procedures in order to obtain higher quality appli-
cants for Agency jobs. The time required to process
them should be reduced.
3. Continual improvement of the present excellent
training facilities and capabilities in all covert
activities to keep step with future requirements.
4. An intensified training program to include
those key personnel in the covert services who require
additional training, by rotation through C.I.A. train-
ing facilities. At present at least 10 percent of
total covert personnel should be in training.
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Assignment to field stations and to country
areas of only those people who are fully qualified to
handle the highly specialized problems involved.
6. Maintaining the position of Director above
political considerations in order to assure tenure
and continuity as in the F.B.I.
B. With Respect to Security
That greater security be developed at all levels of the
Agency to the end that the good name of the United States
and the fulfilment of C.I.A.'s important mission may not be
jeopardized. The following steps should be taken to
accomplish these objectives:
1. Eli ination, to the maximum extent practicable,
of provisional and preliminary clearances in the security
processing of prospective Agency personnel.
2. Improved and more standardized security process-
ing of alien operational personnel prior to their use by
the covert services overseas.
3.. Immediate completion of full field investiga-
tions and polygraph examinations of the several hundred
Agency personnel who have not yet been fully processed.
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1. Establishing of uniform and tighter security
4. Establishing of uniform and tighter security
procedures at headquarters and suitable safeguards in
the field the better to insure the security of the Agency's
facilities, operations, sources and methods.
5. Insurance of the -closest possible coordination
of the counterespionage activities of the covert
services with the over-all counterintelligence activities
of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect and
eliminate, any penetrations of C.I.A.
6. Augmentation of the present sound policy of
polygraphing all new employees and all personnel :return-
ing from overseas assignments to include periodic rechecks
of all personnel, on a more comprehensive basis, whenever
effective counterintelligence practices indicate.
7. Creation of greater security consciousness on
the part of all personnel by improving initial indoctrina-
tion courses and by conducting regular "security
awareness" programs.
8. Imposition of severe penalties upon employees
at any and all levels who advertently or inadvertently
violate security.
9. Establishment of a uniform system for the
submission by all overseas missions of regular reports
on the status of personnel, physical, documentary and
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nc us ons an commen a ions -- S
related elements of security. Such reports should be
submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the
Inspector General and to the appropriate division of
the Deputy Director of Plans.
10. Periodic security inspections by the Security
Office of overseas missions and of DD/P's divisions,
staffs and facilities in the United States.
11. Rigid adherence to the "need-to-know" require-
ment as the basis for dissemination of classified intel-
ligence developed by the covert services and for intra-
Agency dissemination of classified data.
12. Continuous indoctrination and guidance to
correct the natural tendency to overclassify documents
originating in the Agency.
13. Promulgation of definitive standards and
procedures governing cover for the guidance of all
personnel. There should be a continuing program of
monitoring cover in foreign installations. Personnel
departing for overseas assignments should be more adequately
briefed concerning the importance of cover generally: and
in particular their mission and personal cover.
1L. Insurance that officials of proprietary
organizations adhere to C.I.A.'s security regulations
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}09~01Adations --- 6
in order to avoid disclosure, breach, or compromise of
the Agency's covert association with such organizations.
15. Assignment of qualified security officers
to the larger proprietary organizations to aid in avoid-
ing security compromis es .
16. Formulation for immediate implementation of
emergency plans and preparations, geared to the specific
needs of each overseas mission and station, to insure,
as far as possible, adequate safeguarding of personnel
and safeguarding or destruction of material, in the event
of emergency.
17. Concentration of C.I.A.'s headquarters operations
in fewer buildings with increased emphasis in the interim
on improvement of the physical security of C.I.A.'s many
buildings and the classified data and materials contained
therein.
C. With Respect to Coordination and Operations
That one agency be charged with the coordination of all
covert operations in peacetime, subject to the provision that
necessary flexibility be achievable in time of war. The
covert operating capabilities of C.I.A. must be continually
improved. Steps toward these ends are:
1. Implementation of NSC 5412 which now makes
C.I.A. the coordinating agency pending a national emergency.
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I ' L ? nm I Conclusions and Recommendations -- 7
2. Preparation and test of a readily implementable
plan for the immediate and effective availability of local
covert assets to theater commanders at the outbreak of
war in their areas.
3. Immediate resolution,, by the National Security
Council, of the misunderstandings that still exist
between C.I.A. and some of the Armed Services with
respect to "agreed activities."
Li. Development of better understanding between
other agencies and C.I.A. relative to exploitation of
Soviet and satellite defectors.
5. A greater interchange of information, at all
working levels, between C.I.A. and the military services
regarding their intelligence programs and policies.
.6. Improvement at all levels of coordination of
C.I.A. covert activities with the State Department.
7. Establishment of definite world-wide objectives
for the future, and formulation of a comprehensive long-
range plan for their achievement.
8. Use, in all areas, of governmental. cover by
C.I.A. personnel only when other cover is not suitable
or cannot be made available.
9. Active development of non-governmental cover.
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some foreign language training or experience, and nearly
half have had some prior foreign area knowledge. Slightly
over 50 percent are Armed Service veterans.
From the above we feel that the present personnel
potential of the Agency is reasonably good. There is con-
vincing evidence, however, that "dead wood" exists at
virtually all levels. We have heard critics remark to
the effect that there are too many ex-military people.
We have been advised that some people coming back to head-
quarters from overseas assignments are sometimes not assigned
to new jobs for long periods. Uncertainties in policy,
frequent internal reorganizations, together with competition
from industry frequently cause good people to seek employment
outside. As in other governmental agencies, there is a
tendency through inertia or because of a desire for financial
security, for the mediocre to stay. As a result, despite
the continual and necessary acquisit ion of additional good
people, the competence level of the Agency is not rising as
rapidly as is desirable. Prompt and drastic action to
increase the rate of improvement is indicated. We are of
the opinion that a planned reduction of at least 10 percent
in present personnel can and should be achieved without
reducing the amount and quality of Agency output.
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We have been briefed on the Career Service Plan by
means of which the Agency hopes to increase personnel
stability. Whether the plan will achieve, this result is
as yet unknown, but it will not in itself solve the Agency's
personnel problems. Nevertheless we believe that a sound
Career Service Plan is desirable and should be implemented
as promptly as possible.
The C.I.A. has a recruitment program operating in
colleges and universities throughout the United States.
This program has not been entirely successful in producing
either the quantity or the quality of applicants needed
for Agency requirements.
In part, this is due to'the general shortage of
technically trained people vis-a-vis heavy current demands
by industry in practically all fields. On the other hand
we have heard criticism from scholastic sources that the
C.I.A. approach, both to the school and to the individual,
is not what it should be, and furthermore, that many
potentially good people are lost because of the very
great length of time that now elapses between initial
contact and entry into the job.
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Clearance of new personnel at present averages 90 days.
The F.B.I. takes only 30 days maximum for clearing its own
personnel. Although we appreciate fully the special problems
involved in C.I.A., we believe it is both practical and
essential to reduce the'present 90 day period as much as
possible.
Many applicants find the necessary clearance procedures
unpalatable and annoying. Some are repelled by misunder-
standing of the purpose of polygraphic examination and the
techniques employed. Some (particularly in scientific fields
where future professional reputation may depend upon publica-
tion of papers, etc.) are unwilling to accept the implications
of a lifetime of anonymity, or of life under a pseudonym.
We do not suggest that these requirements be abandoned or
relaxed in any degree. We are certain that they are neces-
sary for maximum security and success of covert operations.
But some better means of approach should be developed to
assure the prospective employee that he is necessary, and
to persuade him that in this Agency he can find a desirable
career and at the same time perform a vital service to his
country.
We have been impressed by the excellence of the Agency's
training facilities and the competence of its instructor
personnel. Our comment is that insufficient use is made of
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these facilities. It is obvious that the language, communi-
cation and clandestine agent training centers which we
inspected are being operated far under capacity levels.
This, of course, is a reflection of the slacking off in
recruiting programs, but it suggests also that adequate
use of the facilities is not now being made to improve the
over-all quality of Agency covert activities by new train-
ing or refresher training of personnel already in the Agency.
We are aware that the present tendency of the Agency to
take on more work than it can handle satisfactorily has
limited optimum use of the training facilities, but it cannot
be repeated too frequently that in C.I.A.'covert operations
quality is more important than quantity. A small number of
competent people in a sensitive agency can be more useful than
a large number of incompetents. In the long run it will pay
to stop some of the less essential operations now to permit
10-15 percent of Agency covert personnel to go into training.
As the backlog of inadequately trained personnel is reduced
and the competence level of Agency personnel increased, this
percentage may be lowered.
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scusa o -
B. The Security Factors
Nothing is more important in the planning and execution
of C.I.A.'s covert activities than continuing recognition at
all levels throughout the Agency of the importance of security
in all of its aspects. Although many sound and important
security steps have already been put into effect by the Agency,
in view of the outstanding importance of C.I.A.'s mission to
the national security, constant effort must be made to improve
security wherever possible.
We have been thoroughly briefed by the Security Office
of-the Deputy Director of Administration (DD/A), and by appro-
priate offices of the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) on
personnel, physical, documentary, operational and cover security.
We have examined the Agency's methods of screening out undesir
able applicants or present employees by interrogation, field
investigation and polygraph techniques. We have also examined
DD/P's methods of processing alien operational personnel prior
to their use by the covert services overseas.
We believe that C.I.A.'s security clearance criteria for
prospective Agency personnel are sound. Without exception,
they should be fully adhered to in practice. The granting
of provisional or other interim clearances should be minimized.
Full background investigations and polygraph examinations
9 ..
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Discussion -- 11
should continue to be prerequisite to hiring for all positions.
Individuals now on the rolls who have not had the benefit
of these full security clearance procedures should be so
processed at the earliest possible date. (At the time
of our study there were 132 headquarters and 531 field
personnel who had not been polygraphed because they had
entered on duty prior to the institution of the polygraph
program in 1948.)
We are impressed with the competent manner in which
the polygraph program is handled in the Agency and with the
results obtained therefrom. Polygraph examination has
proved extremely useful in identifying sexual perverts and
other security risks. To September 1,, 1954,Ioly-
graph examinations had been conducted., resulting in the
elim.ination o Individuals as security risks. We
endorse the Agency's continuation of the polygraph program
as an aid to investigation and interrogation as long as the
present high standards govern the use of this device.
There is considerable room for improvement in existing
security processing procedures for alien operational personnel.
Because some personnel must be used for immediate short term
operations, it may sometimes be difficult to apply full
security clearance procedures to them. In such rare cases
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a calculated risk may have to be taken. It is conceivable
also that the application of full security clearance pro-
cedures might actually militate against the accomplishment
of some particular operational objective. Nevertheless,
minimum standards and procedures for security should be
promulgated to control all types of operational clearances.
At the present time clearances of alien operational personnel
are issued by DD/P. Al]. other clearances are issued by the
Office of Security, DD/A. Closer coordination and a freer
exchange of information between these respective offices is
a requirement.
As the Agency is presently organized, the Office of
Security has no direct authority or responsibility with
respect to personnel, physical and related types of security
overseas. Responsibility for the security of a mission and
its personnel rests with the Chief of !Mission. The Security
Office, DD/A, furnishes trained and experienced security
officers to the larger missions, but these officers are
responsible to, and normally report only to, the Chief of
Mission. Such a decentralized system can well result in
insecurity unless carefully supervised, inspected and
monitored. A uniform requirement should be established
for the submission by all overseas missions of regular
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reports on the status of personnel, physical, documentary
and related elements of security. Such reports should be
submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the
Inspector General and the appropriate division of DD/P.
We recommend that periodic security inspections should
be made by the Office of Security of all overseas missions
and of DD/P's headquarters and other facilities in the
United States. Tighter security procedures at headquarters
and particularly in the field will better insure the security
of the Agency's facilities, operations, sources and methods.
Implementation of these recommendations should aid in rais-
ing the level of security throughout the entire Agency,
particularly throughout the covert services.
If such a system of reporting and inspecting is adopted,
the Director can, for the first time, look to one office
for the security of the entire Agency. He will then have
a more precise and timely picture of security-related
developments throughout the Agency.
We cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of
the continuation and intensification of C.I.A.'s counter-
intelligence efforts to prevent, or detect and eliminate
penetrations of C.I.A. We endorse fully the present counter-
intelligence practices of the Agency which include
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Discussion -- 14
polygraphing all personnel returning from overseas assign-
ments, automatic security checks and file reviews of personnel
being considered for transfer in the field or reassignment at
headquarters, security checks of personnel nominated for
special types of clearance, etc. We do not think that
periodic re-investigation of all personnel is now necessary,
but we believe that comprehensive rechecks of personnel
should be made on a selective basis whenever sound counter-
intelligence practices dictate. Questionable cases should
be intensively investigated and expeditiously resolved.
The counterespionage activities of the clandestine
services can be one of the most fertile sources of informa-
tion concerning attempted penetrations of G.I.A. Appropriate
steps should be taken to insure the closest possible coordina-
tion of DD/P's counterespionage activities in this field with
the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Office of
Security. Any penetration attempt made against C.I.A.,
whether it involves Agency personnel and/or clandestine
intelligence operations, can never be fully controlled and
exploited until all information concerning such attempts --
whether made in the United States or overseas -- is channeled
through one focal point, preferably the Security Office.
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"Security consciousness" is an obvious "must" for all
C.I.A. personnel. Constant efforts should be made to
improve the Agency's security indoctrination courses.
Regular "security awareness" programs should be inaugurated
in order that all personnel may be reminded of the continu-
ing need for "security consciousness" in the conduct of
their day-to-day affairs.
Most breaches of security committed by C.I.A. personnel
appear to be inadvertent rather than intentional. The net
effect of such breaches on the national security is the same
regardless of intent. Without exception, an inflexible
attitude must be adopted with respect to security breaches
and severe penalties meted out to employees at all levels
who advertently or inadvertently violate security.
Too easy access to much of C.I.A.'s classified data is
a potential source of trouble. Except for the tight restric-
tions drawn around super-sensitive material, large segments
of C.I.A.'s files are open to inspection and use by Agency
personnel without qualification as to "need-to-know."
Improvement is needed in carrying out the "need-to-know"
rule as a basis for intra-Agency, as well as interdepartmental,
distribution of C.I.A.'s classified data. This situation
m ?f f'S
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is aggravated considerably by the fact that there are too
many duplicate records. The security of C.I.A. is data is
further jeopardized by a tendency to over-classify documen-
tary data originating in the Agency, a condition which
operates in derogation of the security classification system
as a whole.
Considering C.I.A.'s unduly dispersed headquarters (43
buildings in the Washington area), its physical security
program is reasonably good. The potential security risks
inherent in such wide-spread dispersal make it essential that
the Agency continue its efforts to consolidate the headquarters
facilities into fewer, more adequate buildings.
The physical security measures in effect at C.I.A. installa-
tions which were visited in the general vicinity of Washington
are excellent. The physical security of overseas installations
visited by representatives of our study group appeared to vary
with local circumstances and conditions. The limited number
of inspections made was not sufficient to allow of definitive
conclusions as to the general security of all overseas missions.
There appear to be, however, no basic,, minimum physical
security requirements governing these missions or stations,
except for the safeguarding of classified documents. We
believe that acceptable minirdura standards should be promulgated
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10. The planting of agents under very deep cover
in all areas including those that may not be of immediate
interest, and the careful preservation of such assets.
11. More effective use', of "proprietary project"
cover through better planning and by using personnel
having adequate business and, area experience.
D. With Respect to 0r anization',and Administration
That an intensive organizational study be made to the end
of streamlining functions, clarifying lines of responsibility
and authority, reducing overhead'', and increasing efficiency
and effectiveness. From our relatively brief examination
of organization it is obvious that:
1. The present elaborate staff structure of the
Deputy Director for Plans should be simplified.
2. The covert organization should be so located,
organized and administered as to maintain maximum
security with reference to personnel and activities.
3. The Inspector General should operate on an
Agency-wide basis with authority and responsibility
to investigate and report on all activities of the
Agency.
4. The activities of the Operations Coordination
Board under the N.S.C. should be broadened to provide
the D.C.I. with adequate support on the more important
covert projects. 17
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5. Despite the recommended reduction in present
personnel and budgetary economies that the C.I.A. must
continue to grow in capacity until it is able to meet,
entirely, its national commitments.
6. Centralized accommodations, hand-tailored to
its needs, should be provided to house the Agency.
E. With Respect to Cost Factors
That although the activities of C.T.A. should be expanded,
costs of present operations should be reduced. This can be
in part, accomplished through:
1. The exercise of better control over expendi-
tures for all covert projects, and specifically that
(except for those of an extremely sensitive nature)
they be made subject to review and approval by the
Agency's Project Review Committee.
2. Furnishing the Comptroller (under proper
security provisions) with sufficient information on
all covert projects to enable him to exercise proper
accounting control on a fiscal year basis.
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III. DISCUSSION
Introduction - History and Growth''Iof C.I.A.
The Central Intelligence Agency is an organization
of mixed origins and recent growth.
The overt side of C.I.A., well described by the Agency's
title, took over in 1947 from the former Central Intelligence
Group. It receives the intelligence collected by all
government agencies, processes its disseminates and files it.
This phase of the work is well administered under the Deputy
Director of Intelligence and serves the whole intelligence
community. Since 1947 it has grown to its present size of
The covert side of C.I.A. started with O.S.O. (Office
of Special Operations) which was a remnant of the former O.S.S.
Next came O.P.G. (Office of Policy Coordination) which was the
"Cold War Shop," an offshoot of the State-Department. The
two operated under C.I.A. in virtual independence of each
other until they underwent a shot-gun marriage in 1952, and
were put under a Deputy Director for Plans. This covert side
on the regular table of
organization, and approximately as many more engaged in
special projects, or about
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II
Supporting and serving Intelligence and Plans are about
more persons, of whom about twos-thirds are grouped
under a Deputy Director for Administration, and about one-
third are under Directors or Assistant Directors reporting
directly to the Director of Central Intelligence himself,
as in the case of Personnel, Training, and Communications.
The work is largely in support of covert
operations, as the requirements of the overt intelligence
side are relatively simpler, whether for training or for
support.
Additional personnel on special projects bring the
current total In 1947 the
increase in seven years.
This represents a seven-fold
(Note: Throughout this report we have considered as'bovert"
all activities that are not "overt." Specifically, we have
included under "covert" the operations assigned to the
Agency by NSC 5412 as well as its clandestine espionage and
counterespionage operations.)
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A. The Personnel Factors
The most important elements in the successful conduct
of covert intelligence operationslare the people who run
them, -- from top management down 1 to the agent under deepest
cover. First consideration, therefore, must be given to
the recruitment, selection, training and evaluation of the
most highly competent people available. They must then be
assigned to jobs where they can be used most effectively and
be given whatever support they require to enable them to
carry out their missions.
In the past this Agency has not been entirely successful
in achieving this result. In its short history it has
suffered from lack of continuity in policy direction and
management. At its inception itllsuffered from an inheritance
of mixed and sometimes mutually antagonistic elements from
O.S.S. and other predecessor agencies. Then, at a stage
when still groping toward a stabilized peacetime program, it
was suddenly called upon to meet the requirements of the
Korean War.
Under this pressure it "ballooned" out into a vast and
sprawling organization manned by a large number of people
some of whom were of doubtful competence. Of necessity,
sensitive positions were sometimes filled with people having
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cussion --
having little or no training for their jobs.
Fortunately, the Agency did possess an invaluable asset
in the form of a hard core of capablell!and devoted men as a
part of its World War II inheritance, 1 and did succeed in
attracting to this cadre an appreciable number of capable
people. In some areas they have done, and are doing, an
excellent job, but it appears from a personnel standpoint, that
C.I.A. tends to accept more commitments than are warranted
by its human assets. This leads us to the belief that an
immediate re-evaluation of all programs should be undertaken
by the Project Review Committee to eliminate those of lesser
importance and to out back the activity rates of all but the
most essential to bring the over-all program into a more
realistic coincidence with current Agency capabilities.
When improved recruitment, adequate training and over-all
experience level justify, Agency activity may again be
accelerated.
We have made a study of the educational and experience
background of the 34 key people in the Agency's chain of
command. From this the following composite figures emerge:
all are natural born U.S. citizens; they range in age from
38 to 66 yrs., averaging 47.9 yrs; 32 are married; 17 have
1 or more dependent children; 21 are wholly dependent on
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government salary; all but 2 are college graduates; 13 have
advanced degrees. Twelve have had 1 or more years business
experience; all but 6 have'served'in the U.S. Armed Forces;
15 have had intelligence experience (O.S.S., Armed Forces,
etc.) prior to 19473 and 10 have had specialized C.I.A.
training. Of this group 32 have had 3 years or more service
with C.I.A., 20 have had 5 years or more, and 15 have been
with the Agency for the full 7 years since it was established
in its present form in 1947.
The Office of Personnel supplied an excellent statistical
study covering
staff employees and agents on the roster
as of 30 June 1954 from which the following data were taken:
males make up 58 percent of totalo females, 142 percent; average
age is 31.2 years and two-thirds are in the 25-39 year age
bracket. As for education, approximately 68 percent of the
total are high school graduates, some 47 percent have B.A.
(or equivalent) degrees, and about 24 percent have done post-
graduate work or possess advanced degrees. Forty-five percent
have served 3 years or more with the C.I.A. Looking at prior
intelligence experience, which includes service with the Armed
Forces or with the Agency's predecessor organizations and
realizing that all Agency personnel do not require such training,
71 percent had none, but 29 percent have had 1 year or more and 11
percent 2 or more years. Of the Agency total, 73 percent have had
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scuss on --
year ending June 30, 1955 will be allocated as follows:
Covert operations:
Foreign Intelligence
Political & Psychological
Paramilitary
Overt operations
Indirect or support elements
This total does not include individuals under contract, who
are not regular employees of the Agency, individuals under
deep cover and those engaged in proprietary enterprises, and
indigenous personnel. The aggregate of persons in these
categories is estimated 0 most of whom are engaged
in covert operations.
The actual number of individuals to be engaged on Agency
activities for the fiscal year 1955 will, therefore, be
approximately]
The covert operations of the Agency are budgeted and
accounted for on a project basis except for headquarters and
overseas support costs. Political and psychological and
paramilitary projects exceeding a specified minimum dollar
total are in general reviewed and approved by a Project
Review Committee. Foreign Intelligence projects are not
subject to review by this committee but are authorized by
49
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the Director of the Agency, the Deputy Director of the Agency,
the Deputy Director of Plans, or certain other individuals
depending upon the estimated dollar costs of individual
projects. We believe that for purposes of control and
as an aid in auditing, Foreign Intelligence projects (except
those of an extremely sensitive nature) should be made sub-
ject to review and approval by the Project Review Committee.
Due'to DD/P's'present secrecy policies with respect to
Foreign Intelligence projects, the Comptroller of the Agency
is unable to maintain meaningful records showing the expendi-
tures made for individual projects in this category. The
Foreign Intelligence Staff keeps certain records of such
expenditures but on the basis of a calendar rather than a
fiscal year. We believe that the Comptroller should be
furnished with information which will enable hire to record,
control and account for the costs of the individual projects
of this element of the Agency. Adequate protection for
security purposes can and should be provided within the
Office of the Comptroller.
Certain other projects in the political and psychologi-
cal and paramilitary areas, of a sensitive nature are
occasionally developed and processed without full information
with respect thereto being given. to the Deputy Director for
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Administration and the Comptroller. Since? of necessity,
the funds must be made available by the Comptroller, it is
inevitable that he will have knowledge that operations of
this nature are being conducted and it is unlikely that more
specific information relating to the projects can long be
kept secret from him. In one particular instance where
substantial sums were expended, the Comptroller was called
upon to make the expenditures with no supporting data being
furnished to him at the time or at, any future date. When
we requested breakdowns of costs of the operation we found
that they were available only in the area division involved
and that they were incomplete and unsatisfactory. We are
.of the opinion that this deviation from the normal procedure
of placing upon the Comptroller the responsibility of account-
ing for expenditures is unsound, and is not justified by the
claim that the security of the operation is improved by this
deviation.
We are of the opinion that the administrative plans for
individual covert projects are not in all instances as
complete in detail as is desirable and that if they were
amplified the Comptroller and the Auditor-in-Chief would be
in a "much better position to carry out their respective
duties and responsibilities.
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IV. APPENDICES
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C 0 P Y
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
26 July 195)4
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, USAFR
Washington, D. C.
Re: Panel of Consultants on Covert Activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency
Dear General Doolittle:
I have requested you, and you have agreed, to act as
Chairman of a panel of consultants to conduct a study of the
covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. With
your concurrence I have invited Messrs. William B. Franke,
Morris Hadley, and William Pawley to act with you as members
of the panel, Mr. S. Paul Johnston has kindly agreed to serve
as Executive Director of the panel.
It is my desire that the Panel of Consultants should under-
take a comprehensive study of the covert activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, in particular those carried out
under the terms of NSCID #5 of August 28, 1951, and NSC 54.12
of March 15, 1954. You will consider the personnel factors,
the security, the adc-qu.acy, the efficacy and the relative costs
of these operations and, as far as possible, equate the cost of
the over-all efforts to the results achieved. You will make
any recommendations calculated to improve the conduct of these
operations. To the extent that agencies of the Government,
other than the Central Intelligence Agency, are engaged in
covert operations which may parallel, duplicate, or supplement
the operations of CIA, you may investigate such other operations
conducted by any other department or agency of the Government
in order to insure, insofar as practicable, that the field of
foreign clandestine operations is adequately covered and that
there is no unnecessary duplication of effort or expense.
SECRET
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In view of the particularly sensitive nature of these covert
operations, their relation to the conduct of our foreign policy,
and the fact that these sensitive operations are carried on pursuant
to National Security Council action approved by me, I desire that
your report be made to me personally and classified TOP SECRET. I
will determine whether or not the report or any part thereof should
have further dissemination. I should appreciate it if your report
could be available to me prior to October 1, 1954?
As you know, the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, generally known as the Hoover Commission,
is constituting a Task Force to study and make recommendations with
respect to the organization and methods of operations of the CIA.
General Mark W. Clark has been designated by Mr. Hoover to head this
Task Force which, I understand, will probably be organized and start
its work sometime in September next. Under the law constituting
the Hoover Commission, the Task Force shall study and investigate
the present organization and methods of operation of the Agency to
determine what changes therein are necessary to accomplish the policy
of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service by:
A. recommending methods and procedures for reducing
expenditures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient
performance of essential services, activities and functions;
b. eliminating duplication and overlapping of services,
activities, and functions
c. consolidating services, activities, and functions
of a similar nature;
d. abolishing services, activities, and functions not
necessary to the efficient conduct of Government;
et eliminating nonessential services,, functions, and
activities which are competitive with private enterprise;
f. defining responsibilities of officials; and
g. relocating agencies now responsible directly to
the President in departments or other agencies.
As the work of the Hoover Task Force will get under way shortly,
I suggest that you and General Clark confer in order to avoid any
unnecessary duplication of work as between you. The distinction
between the work of your Study Group and of the Hoover Task Force
is this:
.JL.i I L~
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.`. LL LI
You will deal with the covert activities of the CIA
.as indicated in paragraph (2) above, and your report
will be submitted to me. General Clark's Task
Force will deal largely with the organization and
methods of operation of.the CIA and other related
agencies within the limits prescribed in the law
as outlined in paragraph (4 ) above. Reports of
the Hoover Commission are made to 'the Congress.
The purpose of these studies, both that of the Hoover Task
Force and that of your Group, is to insure that the United States
Government develops an appropriate mechanism for carrying out its
over-all intelligence responsibilities and the related covert
operations. I consider these operations are essential to our
national security in these days when international Communism is
aggressively pressing its world-wide subversive program.
Sincerely?
/S/ Dwight D. Eisenhower
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APPI DIx B
P 1GRkMS AND PBOCE.DURF!
In early July, 1951i,, President Eisenhower verbally
directed James H. Doolittle to form a Special Study Group
.to conduct an investigation and to report to him on the
covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The other members of the Group included William B. Franke,
William D. Fawley., and Morris Hadley. Mr. J. Patrick
Coyne, of the National Security Council. Staff, was
designated as consultant to the Group. Mr. S. Paul
Johnston, Director of the Institute of the Aeronautical
Sciences; was appointed Executive Director. The terms
of reference for the project were spelled out in the
Presidential directive of 26 July 195L. (Appendix A).
The first meeting of the Study Group (excepting
Mr. Hadley and the Executive Director, neither of whom
had been appointed by that date) took place in C.I.A.
headquarters on 14 July. On that occasion the Director
of Central Intelligence and key members of his staff
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presented the over-all problem from the viewpoint of
the Agency.
The Group as a whole met for the first time in its
assigned space in C.I.A. headquarters on 29 July. The
Chairman outlined his views as to the job to be done and
the procedures to be followed. A program of briefings
which had been prepared by Agency personnel in the interim
was discussed and accepted. The non-C.I.A. agencies to
be heard were agreed upon and the program outlined below
was initiated. The schedule of the hearings and a list
of all witnesses heard by the Group is attached.
At the request of the Group extensive briefings were
arranged by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,, the
three Armed Services,, the Department of States, ' the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of the Budget.
In most cases the documentation from which briefings were
conducted was made available for Group study.
A number of individuals whose knowledge and background
seemed pertinent to the study were invited to present their
views. Others were consulted informally by various members
of the Group. The Chairman discussed intelligence matters
of interest to the Atomic Energy Commission with its Chairman,
Mr. Lewis L. Strauss. He also discussed matters of
58
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cooperation between the two committees with Ex-President
Herbert C. Hoover and General Mark W. Clark, U.S.A. (Feet.)
Several field trips were taken during the course of
the study. The entire Group vis .te and later
the Office of Communications Staff Training installation.
During the week of 13 September the Chairman, accompanied
by Mr. Coyne, made an inspection of representative C.I.A.
stations in Western Europe, including
they were also briefed by senior repre-
Because of the extremely sensitive nature of most of
the paper work made available to the Group, special pre-
cautions were taken with respect to its handling and security.
No such papers were taken out of the immediate office area
except under suitable precautionary measures, and all working
papers, files, or other records have either been destroyed
or returned to their source. This. Group has developed no
archives.
The fact that the Group was able to cover so much
ground in such a limited time stems from the assistance
and cooperation that was received from the Agency at all
levels. The Director took personal and continuing interest
in seeing that the Group had all needed facilities and
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information. Particular credit must be given to
Brig. Gen. J. D. Balmer, U.S.A. (Ret.), who was assigned
as Liaison Officer for the Group, and his two aids,
Lt. Cmdr. E. I. Carson, (USNR), and Mr. John Leader.
They laid on briefing schedules, set up conferences,
came up with needed information promptly and arranged
for local transportation. Without their help the job
accomplished would have been vastly more difficult.
Mention must be made also of the assistance rendered in
connection with the "general housekeeping" needs of the
Group. Everything needed, including numerous require-
ments for complicated air and rail travel arrangements,
was promptly and efficiently handled bar the Agency adminis-
tration people.
Particular thanks are due to Miss Virginia Thomas,
the sole secretarial assistant of the Group, for her
efficient and effective handling of all paper work and
other day-to-day office requirements.
j
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SPECIAL STUDY GROUP -
Date Subject
114 July C.I.A. Covert Activities
29 July Planning "Cold" War
Planning "Hot" War
30 July Foreign Intelligence
Communications Intelligence
Psychological & Paramilitary
3 August Collection & Dissemination
4 August Technical Services
F1mctions, Dep. Dir./Intell ige noe
State Department
5 August Security Services
Southeast Europe Division
6 August Training
Near East & Africa Division
7 August Field Trip
10 August Coordination OCB and Defense
Clandestine Records
Western Hemisphere Division
State Department
11 August ' Soviet Russia Division
Technical Services
Eastern Europe Division
61
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Daily Log -- 2
Date
Sub ect Presented by
12 August For.Intel:Servicps
Western 1Europe Division
13 August Director's Staff Meeting
Admin. - Proprietary Projects
17 August Operation Guatemala
Inspection & Review
Inspector General
18 August Special Operations
Clandestine Planning Committee
Research & Development
19 August Field Trip - COMB)
24 August U.S. Air Force Intelligence
25 August Federal Bureau of Investigation
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
Germany
26 August Intelligence Acquisition
27 August Office of Naval Intelligence
31.August Operations of Soviet Russia Division
PP Activities of SR Division
Defections
Coordination of GW Activities with
Defense Department
Operation Iran
1 September U. S. Army, G-2
National Security Agency
2 September State Department
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Daily log
Date
3 September
4 September
13-18 Sept.
14 September
15 September
16 September
17 September
22 September
28 September
Subject 25X1
Special Operations
General Comments
Personnel Management
Operational Security
Special Briefings
Bureau of the Budget
Functions, Inspector General
Operation Iran
Defense Dept., Intel. Operations
Security
National Security Council
Agreed Activities
Special Briefing -
63
Presented
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Abbott, W. Be
Acker, F. C., Capt.
Armstrong, 'PI. Park, Jr.
Ayer, Frederick
Baker, James
Belmont. A. H.
u er, c er
Drain, D. T., Cdr.
Drake, Thomas R., LCdr.
Espe. Carl F.. Rear Adm.
USN
USN
State
USAF
Harvard
FBI
wz5u
USN
USN
USN
Ulbbs, Jack A., Col.
Godel, William H. OSD
Gregg, G. W., Col. USAF
Hamilton, Lyman C. Budget
Harrold, F. J., Jr., Lt. Col. USAF
Harvey, Mose State
Hedden, Stuart Consultant
Holland Henry F. State
Howe, Fisher State
Hulick, Charles State
Jernegan, John D. State
Jones, S. E., Capt. USN
Jones, J. .iesley State
Junghans, Earl A., Capt. USN
Koons, Tilghrnan Be NSC
Lay, James S., Jr. NSC
Lerette, Earl L., Col. USA
Lindbeck, J. A., Cdr. USN
Lydman, Jack State
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ARH
McClure, Robert A., Brig. Gen., USA MAAG
McConaughy, Walter State
McFarlane, R. N., Capt. USN
Macy, Robert M. Budget
Matlack, 1Irs. Dorothy USA
Montgomery, J. H., Jr., Col. USA
Mooney, J. T., Cdr. USN
Moore, H. G., Capt. USN
Murphy, Robert State
Nash, D., Capt. USN
Papich, Sam FBI
Perez, Ramon N., Cdr. USN
Reeder, H. G., Col. USAF
Samford, John A., Maj. Gen. USAF
Scammon, Richard State
Setchell, J. F., Col. USAF
Siegmund, T. C., Cdr. USN
Spore, B. W., Cdr. USN
Stevens, Leslie C., Vice Adm.,
USN (Ret) Consultant
Stuart, C. J., Capt. USN
Sullivan, J. B., LCdr. USN
Thurston, Raymond State
Trudeau, Arthur G., Maj. Gen. USA
Weinbrenner, G. R., Col. USAF
Welden,-Frank, Cdr. USN
.Wiggin, Bruce E., Capt. USN
Young, Kenneth T. State
Oee31
r
l
66
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immediately and that regular inspections by qualified Security
Office personnel should be made to enforce them.
Detailed plans and preparations should be made for
immediate implementation of war-emergency measures by all
overseas missions and stations, tailored to the local con-
ditions. They should provide for maximum safeguarding of
Agency personnel and operations, and for adequate safeguarding
or'destruction of classified data and material in the custody
of the installations in question.
Secure cover is an inherent part of all clandestine
operations. The security of some of the Agency's cover
devices is excellent, security of others is inadequate.
Cover security is a problem that requires continuous and
exhaustive study. Detailed standards and procedures,
policies and regulations, should be issued for the guidance
of the personnel concerned. There is need for more adequate
briefing of personnel departing for overseas assignments
concerning the cover of their missions and their personal
.
cover problems. The Office of Security should continually
monitor the cover devices used in all foreign stations.
Maintaining proper cover in proprietary organizations
requires that all personnel concerned actually live within
the cover framework at all times. Vulnerable points are
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the channels of communications between C.I.A. and the
proprietary organizations as well as contacts between
personnel of such organizations and other personnel of the
Agency. Another vulnerable feature is in the assignment
of personnel from the Agency to the proprietary organizations
and the hiring of outside personnel. Any person who has
previously served in a known capacity with the Agency is a
potential security hazard if associated with any proprietary
organization. A like hazard exists if a person is hired
on the outside by the organization without first obtaining
a complete clearance from the Agency.
Professionally qualified security officers should be
placed on the staff of the larger proprietary organizations.
Experience shows that organizations so staffed usually
have fewer security compromises. Close coordination should
be maintained with the Agency on the matter of requesting
surveys of proposed "business" sites before they are acquired.,
so that any potential security hazard on or near the premises
may be disclosed. . All officials of proprietary organiza-
tions must be indoctrinated in the necessity of conforming
with the security requirements of the Agency. Neglect of
certain basic security requirements by such officials
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can lead to disclosure, breach, or compromise of the covert
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Ofrl Q?)3-8
C. Coordination and Operations
The success of the covert operations of C.I.A. depends
upon how efficiently they are conducted and how well they
are coordinated with other agencies of the Government.
These criteria prevail both in peace and in war, but both
coordination and operations are necessarily somewhat differ-
ent during each of these periods. Peace in any ordinarily
accepted sense of the word, appears to be impossible of
achievement in the foreseeable future. The covert operations
of the Agency must therefore be planned and coordinated in
order to meet the requirements of a continuing cold war
situation as well as the requirements of possible hot war.
C.I.A. has this obligation under NSCD 51112 (March 15, 1954).
Looking toward the possible outbreak of actual hostilities
in any theater of operations,, a detailed plan should be
developed now delineating the wartime headquarters responsi-
bilities of C.I.A. to insure that appropriate policy guidance,
integrated with N.S.C. and J.C.S. plans., be furnished to C.I.A.
representatives in the field. In an emergency situation time
obviously will not permit referral of all critical covert
operational questions to Washington. Furthermore, the needs
of commanders in the field may require the immediate transfer
of many local C.I.A. covert operational assets to their
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r,.
E.,,' it !. -. ~- ,~
commands. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that
well-considered, well-implemented and pre-tested plans be
prepared in advance to insure smooth transfer of such
assets and to deal with any other local covert operational
problems.
In the case of espionage and counterespionage operations
there is disagreement between C.I.A. and some of the military
services which has yet to be resolved. This relates to the
area of "agreed activities" (NSCID 5, August 28, 1951) as to
which a dispute has dragged on for years. Some of the
services feel that certain foreign espionage and counter-
espionage operations must be run directly by them. The
Director of Central Intelligence has been desirous of securing
the voluntary agreement of the Armed Services, and has sub-
mitted various proposals to them as to the delimitation of
these areas of "agreed activities." To date the attempts
to resolve the differences have been unavailing. We believe
that the prime responsibility for the failure does not lie
with C.I.A., but with these services. In fact, we believe
that the Director of Central Intelligence, in his desire to
reach an amicable solution, has gone further than was intended
by the N.S.C. directives. Since agreement has not been
reached on a voluntary basis, the dispute should be resolved
`i
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by the N.S.C. In the settlement of this dispute, in
addition to recognizing the right of the Armed Services to
perform counterintelligence activities for the security
of their own installations and personnel, the Armed Services
should be allowed to engage in espionage and counterespionage
operations.(provided they are coordinated by the Director of
Central Intelligence) until such time as C.I.A. has the capability
to perform all espionage and counterespionage operations out-
side the United States.
In order to avoid undue delay in the resolution of such
problems in the future, the Director of Central Intelligence
(as coordinator of all foreign intelligence) should report
regularly to the N.S.C. on the status of efforts to implement
N.S.C. directives, with particular emphasis on major
unresolved questions.
Inasmuch as the exploitation of Soviet and satellite
defectors outside the United States has been a source of
annoyance (and even hostility) on the part of some of the
military services and other agencies toward C.I.A. and vice
versa, we believe that steps should be taken immediately to
insure full implementation of the defector program in accord-
ance with the spirit and letter of NSCID 13 (Jan. 19, 1950).
The misunderstandings which exist between C.I.A. and
the Armed Services stem largely from insufficient exchange
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of information and coordination with respect to espionage,
counterespionage, and covert operations. We have been
advised, for example, that in certain instances C.I.A.
operators appear to have been too secretive with respect
to information which is of direct interest to the military
services and vice versa. We have been told of incidents
where important covert operations have been "blown" because
C.I.A. and military intelligence units were operating against
each other, without knowledge of each other's interest or
activity. The relationship that exists in various countries
between covert C.I.A. personnel and the military attaches
is not always satisfactory. Attaches and MAAG's are
playing important roles in the collection of foreign intel-
ligence and in the defector program, and it is, therefore,
essential that closer coordination and greater exchange of
information be established between C.I.A.'s representatives
and the military at every foreign station.
Misunderstandings between some of the services and the
Agency are not confined to overseas operations. A lack
of knowledge of plans, facilities, and operations seems to
exist in some areas between the Pentagon and C.I.A.
Compartmentation can be carried too far. Improvement in
collaboration at the working levels is particularly essential.
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Discussion -- 24
Relations with C.I.A..'s other principal customer, the
Department of State, also are not entirely satisfactory.
In Washington, coordination seems to be reasonably good
with well-established liaison channels, but misunderstandings
seem to exist at many overseas stations. There is a feeling
that C.I.A. is making too much
in many places.
is thin, at best, and
any compromise creates embarrassing situations. In some
areas C.I.A. personnel have not coordinated their activities
sufficiently with those who should know of them
0
As a result, people have worked. at cross purposes,
with unfortunate results. It is realized that there are
situations in which disclosure of plan and purpose should
be held to a minimum number of people, but in all cases the
Senior U. S. Representative should be sufficiently advised
to insure proper coordination in accordance with approved
N.S.C. intelligence directives.
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1 1.1 Y cuss on -- 5
D. Organization and Administration
In the course of investigating the covert operations of
the Agency, we were briefed on the organization of the
individual components of the DD/P complex. We also had
the benefit of the thinking of a number of key Agency people
with respect to the DD/P organization as a whole. As a
result certain general observations with respect to DD/P
organization have emerged which are germane to the problem
of the efficiency and economy of its operations.
From the remarks that have been made on the subject of
Agency history and personnel problems, it is clear that the
organization is still in an evolutionary stage. It has
suffered from a mixed inheritance, a lack of policy continuity,.,
tremendous pressures to accept commitments beyond its capacity
to perform, and a mushroom expansion. As a result there has
been an absence of long-range planning with consequent
organizational difficulties. We are strongly of the opinion
that further streamlining of organization, clarification of
functions, and straightening of lines of authority will result
in more and better work with fewer people at lower costs.
The covert activities of C.I.A. fall under the direction
of the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P). They are presently
conducted by a complicated organization of a mixed straight-line
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and functional type in which staff has been superimposed on
staff to such an extent that duplication of effort, conflict-
ing command authority, and division of responsibility have
inevitably resulted in dilution of the total effort.
There are six principal staffs in the DD/P complex
ranging in size
These are superimposed over seven area divisions ranging in
have subordinate divisions, and two of the staffs have
subordinate staffs. In addition, each of the divisions has
its own set of staffs. Altogether, the DD/P complex totals
over 40 major units.
We are strongly of the opinion, based upon our limited
review of the DD/P element, that consideration of a complete
reorganization of the element is needed. As an indication
of the type organization that might be more effective and
less costly, we have included in this report for considera-
tion purposes only, a revised organization chart as Appendix
D. A chart of the present DD/P organization is also included,
for purposes of comparison, as Appendix C. The personnel
contemplated under the revised DD/P organization would number
4:
25X1.
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Dis cuss ion -- 27
approximately less than are presently employed by this
element.
In considering any reorganization, we cannot emphasize
too strongly our feelings with respect to the need for greater
security in all DD/P operations. As the covert side of C.I.A.,
it should operate with a maximum of anonymity. Knowledge of
its physical location, operation and the identity of its
personnel should be kept on an absolutely need-to-know basis.
We feel that continuous inspection and closer control
(both fiscal and operational) over covert activities are
necessary. We realize that certain security risks are
involved but we believe they can be handled properly.
The subject of fiscal control, and the relationship of
the Comptroller to the organization are discussed under
Section E following.
The concept of an Inspector General for the Agency is
sound. He should report only to the Director. He should
be given the greatest possible latitude and authority to
inspect all aspects of the Agency at any time, including the
Director's own office and the DD/P complex. We believe that
any limitations that have been placed on this function in the
past should be completely removed.
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Because of the rapid expansion of the Agency, its
operations are conducted in some 43 buildings in the Washington
area. Some of these buildings are of temporary wartime
construction and constitute a fire hazard. This forced de-
centralization of operations results in great loss of time
of personnel whose duties require them frequently to visit
various buildings of the Agency; it increases security problems; and
it results in a great reduction in over-all efficiency. We
recommend that sympathetic consideration be given to the Agency's
effort to obtain funds with which to provide centralized accommo-
dations for its activities, and we suggest that these accommo-
dations would best serve the peculiar requirements of the
Agency if they were hand-tailored to its needs. We are of
the opinion that in a relatively short time the expenditure
required would be self-liquidating.
Although in the present organizational plan of the
Government C.I.A. seems to be well integrated into the Intel-
ligence Community at the National Security Council level,
events have occurred recently (for example -- Guatemala)
which indicate that gaps exist in high level planning and
coordination of important covert operations which may expose
the U. S. Goverment to unnecessary risks of compromise.
Over-all policy guidance comes from N.S.C., and is satisfactory,
1`~ 4d !ri j wa
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but better coordination is needed for the more important covert
activities of C.I.A. at the national level. This is the
function of the Operations Coordination Board, but at the
present time it does not appear to be giving the Agency
adequate guidance and advice on, the more important covert
projects. The activities of the Board should be broadened
in order to provide the D.C.I. with the support he needs on
such projects.
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E. The Cost Factors
The budgetary procedures of the Agency were reviewed
with the Agency Comptroller and representatives of the Bureau
of the Budget and appear to be satisfactory. Between the
fiscal years ended June 30, 1947 and 1955 the total budget
has increased from approximately
the latter figure including a reserve fun
The 1955 fiscal year budget exclusive of the reserve fund is
divided approximately as follows:
Covert operations
Overt operations
Indirect or support costs:
Since indirect or support costs are relatively pro-
portionate to direct costs, the total budget may be considered
to be approximately
lOperations.
The number of civilian employees of the Agency under
personnel ceilings has increased from
at June 30, 1947,
to an estimatediI for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955,
and military personnel has increased during the same period
The aggregate
CeOi t,,, L_v,. F~ 9
48
I for the fiscal
2 5X1
25X1
25X1
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DOOLITTLE ORIGINAL
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