TELECOMMUNICATIONS--A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY BOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 371
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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ICTED
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-
A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS
THIS DOCUMENT IS A
SOURCE REFERr!Na ii
OC HISTORICAL PAM: ?
NO. OC-I, VOL.
-DO NOT DESTROY-
A Report by the
President's Communications Policy Board
?RES
v.__ 951
MONMSZ
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TELECOMMUNICATIONSA: PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS
A Report by the
President's Communications Policy Board
February 1951
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Dear Mr. President:
February 16, 1951
We have the honor to transmit the report on policies
and practices recommended to be followed by the Federal
Government in the communications field, which was called for
by Executive Order 10110 of February 17, 1950, establishing
the Presidentls Communications Policy Board.
During the year since our appointment, we have
examined many phases of the problems of national telecommuni-
cations policy and practice. We have consulted the best-
qualified Government and private sources. A small professional
staff has studied special phases of the field. The major
results of these consultations and special studies are embodied
in our report.
expressed.
The Board is in unanimous agreement on the conclusions
Respectfully submitted,
Lee A. DuBridge
William L. Everitt
James R. Killian, Jr.
David H. OtBrien
Irvin Stewart, Chairman
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INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM POSED
Pressing problems in the operation of the nation's wire and
radio communications facilities led to the creation of the
Presidentts Communications Policy Board on February 170 1950.
In his letter of that date tb our Chairman, the President
declared that there is uti major public interest in assuring the
adequacy and efficiency" of this "vital resource.," He noted the
close relationships of the telecommunications services--radio? tele-
phone, and telegraph--and the influence of governmental operations
on the system. The President therefore asked for a comprehensive
inquiry that would view the specific problems as parts of the
"broader problem of developing a total national communications
policy." The text of the President's letter follows:
"My
dear Dr. Stewart:
"Communications services represent a vital resource in
our modern society. They make possible the smooth functioning
of our complex economy. They can assist in promoting inter-
national understanding and good will; they constitute an im-
portant requirement for our national security. There is,
accordingly, a major public interest in assuring the adequacy
and efficiency of these services.
"Developments in this field during and since the war have
created a number of problems which require careful consider-
ation at this time. The extent to which the Government should,
in time of peace, continue to operate its own communications
facilities is one such problem of current importance. The
question of merging the overseas operations of our commercial
communications companies also requires objective review. The
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claims for frequencies, and possible administrative arrange-
ments within the Government for assuring, on a continuing
basis, a sound and equitable allocation of the limited fre-
quency supply.
"I believe that the studies to be undertaken by the
Board are of vital importance to the economy of this Nation,
to our international relations, and to our national security.
I am sure that you will receive the full cooperation and
assistance of all parties concerned.
Sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN"_
The Executive Order referred to in the Presidents letter reads
as follows:
"EXECUTIVE ORDER # 10110
"PRESIDENTS COMMUNICATIONS POLICY BOARD
"By virtue of the authority vested in me as President or the
United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
"1. There is hereby created a board to be known as.the
Presidentls Communications Policy Board which shall be: composed
of a chairman and four other members to be designated by the
President.
"2, It shall be' the function of the Board to study the
present and potential use of radio and wire communications
facilities by governmental and non-governmental agencies and to
make and present to the President evaluations and recommendations
in the national interest concerning (a) policies for the most
effective use of radio frequencies by governmental and non-
governmental users and alternative administrative arrangements
in the Federal Government for the sound effectuation of such
policies, (b) policies with respect to international radio and
wire communications, (c) the relationship of government com-
munications to non-government communications, and (d) such
related policy matters as the Board may determine,
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"3. The Board is authorized to hear and consult with
representatives of industry and the Federal Government con-
cerned with the subjects under study by the Board. All
executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government
are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Board in
its work and to furnish the Board such information as it
may require in the performance of its duties. The Board
shall protect the security of any classified information
submitted to it.
14. Each member of the Board shall, while away from his
home or regular place of business and engaged in the official
business of the Board, receive actual traveling expenses and
per diem allowances in lieu of subsistence in accordance
with rates established by the Standardized Government Travel
Regulations, as amended.
"5. During the fiscal year 1950 the expenditures of
the Board and the traveling expenses and per diem allowances
of the members thereof shall be paid out of an allotment
made by the President from the appropriation appearing under
the heading "Emergency Fund for the President" in the Inde-
pendent Offices Appropriation Act, 1950 (Public Law 266,
approved August 24, 1949); and during the fiscal year 1951
the same shall be similarly paid from any corresponding or
like appropriation made available for the fiscal year 1951.
Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions
of (a) section 3681 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 672),
(b) section 9 of the act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027
(31 U.S.C. 673), and (c) such other laws as the President
may hereafter specify.
"The Board shall terminate one year after the date of
this orc:er.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
HARRY S. TRUMAN
February 17, 1950."
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CHAFTER I
AN ANSWER IN SUMMARY
One of the bulwarks of a free society is freedom of
communications. Its commerce, its education, its politics,
its spiritual integrity, and its security depend upon an un-
impeded and unsubservient exchange of information and ideas.
One of the hopes for a peaceful world rests upon the
ultimate possibility of extending this same freedom of com-
munications beyond all barriers. War begins in the minds of
men and in the minds of men must be engendered the will for
peace. We must therefore strive to facilitate a meeting of
the minds of men everywhere, and through the liberating arts
of communication to create the attitudes favorable to peace.
These convictions and concepts have provided the back-
ground for the conclusions and recommendations reached in the
following study of the economic, organizational, and physical
aspects of America's telecommunications system.
1
Our telecommunications system is a great national resource which
makes available to the people of the United States a rapid nationwide
and worldwide communications service.
All the facilities which make this service possible?telephone,
telegraph, radio, and television--utilize electrical energy in some
form to transfer information from one person to another. Electrical
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impulses speeding through these facilities convey intelligence of
all sorts throughout the country and to other nations of the world.
When wires and cables are used as the sole media through which
they are transmitted, it is not difficult to control these impulses.
When the transfer of electrical energy is made by radio through the
medium popularly called the nether,n serious problems arise.
Many of these problems stem from the fact that the ether is public
property available to all the people of the world, and the further fact
that there is a limit to the number of electromagnetic waves which can
travel through it without interfering with one another.
If interference is to be avoided, it is obvious that both national
and international users of the radio spectrum must reach accord on
equitable sharing of this limited medium. Consequently, telecommuni-
cations must be considered both from a national and from an inter-
national point of view.
The telecommunications system of the United States is engaged
basically in the transfer of information from one person to another.
Yet information about the system is inadequate. As part of our
studies, we have gathered facts that fill some of the important gaps.
The recognition that there are other gaps and that they too must be
filled underlies several of the recommendations of policy and action
which we shall make.
In our quest for solutions to the problems of telecommunications,
we surveyed the facilities available'today and the difficulties
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encountered in their operation, reviewed the troubles that have caused
growing pains in the development of the system, and sought symptoms
of future ills.
Both private and public agencies operate in the telecommunications
system. We have found inescapable evidence of serious difficulty,
not confined to the United States alone, but internationa] in scope,
in the management and use of the worldwide but limited resource of
the radio frequency spectrum. There is indication of economic danger
for some private companies, and of a lack of help on the part of
Government agencies in avoiding that danger. There is evidence of
confusion of responsibility among Government agencies which from time
to time have been established for the regulation of parts of the
system. These are principal among the disconcerting facts which our
studies have disclosed.
Not all the facts are disconcerting, however. We have also found
reason for no small amount of encouragement. There are many--and they
are among the largest--areas of the telecommunications system, both
public and private, in which standards of efficiency, economy, and per-
formance are guperb. There is a spirit of cooperation among the com-
ponent organizations?public and private. There is in existence an
administrative structure which, if properly strengthened, can become
an effective central instrument to foster a vigorous telecommunications
system.
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apssi2.1 Problems of Telecommunications
Telecommunications present a special combination of technological,
economic, social, and political problems. The telecommunications
system as a whole public and private, depends to an unusual degree
upon a technology which is changing and growing with marked rapidity.
The task of adjusting organization and practice to take advantage
of these technological advances and opportunities is complicated,
however, by the intimate connection of telecommunications with both
the national security and the international relations of the United
States. Political considerations may require commercial carriers to
maintain unprofitable circuits to certain overseas points. Economic
prospects may counsel against heavy investment in the latest and most
expensive high-speed cable equipment, yet the requirements of national
defense may justify such an outlay.
The radio sector of our telecommunications system is further
complicated by the fact that radio operates in the public domain.
The possibility of interference necessitates domestic and international
efforts to arrive at agreements for the apportionment of radio fre-
quencies. Here again, efforts to take full advantage of new develop-
ments must proceed in the short run within the limits of existing
agreements, and may be hampered or helped in the long run by the results
of efforts to negotiate new ones.
Special ecOnomic pressures have borne heavily on some of the
nation's telecommunications companies. 'Air mail and long-distance
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telephone service have reduced the potential demand for telegraphic
services. American companies engaged in overseas operations have
been competing with each other for markets and in dealing with
foreign monopolies. In this latter case, American companies have
met with a special obstacle: The competition among American firms
offers foreign monopolies the opportunity to play American competitors
off against each other. The Federal Governmentrs own international
telecommunications network, which has grown to vast proportions in
recent years, has handled traffic which might have been sent over
common carriers.
The merging of private companies engaged in international radio
and cable communications has at times been advocated as a way of
easing their position. In the domestic field, merger of the telegraph
companies has already occurred. It has been further advocated that
the merged company acquire the record communications business of the
telephone company--its teletypewriter exchange and leased line
services.
Continued operation of the privately owned companies is essential
to the national security, but nowhere do we find provision within the
Government to insure that Government policies do not inadvertently
affect the economic well-being of these companies.
We have found that the Federal Government has encountered many
difficulties in its efforts to keep up with the growth and increasing
complications of the nation's telecommunications structure. Some of
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these difficulties are suggested in the chapters on domestic and
international telecommunications.
Technological progress in telecommunications is so rapid that it
could quickly alter the character of the entire structure. This
fact requires special vigilance on the part of the regulatory agencies.
Specific Issues
For analysis, we resolve these general problems into five specific
issues. They are:
1. How shall the United States formulate policies and plans for
guidance in reconciling the conflicting interests and needs of Govern-
ment and private users of the spectrum space--that is, for guidance in
making the best use of its share of the total spectrum?
2. How shall the United States meet the recurrent problem of
managing its total telecommunications resources to meet the changing
demands of national security?
3. How shall the United States develop a national policy and
position for dealing with other nations in seeking international tele-
communications agreements?
4. How shall the United States develop policies and plans to
foster the soundness and vigor of its telecommunications industry in
the face of new technical developments, changing needs, and economic
developments?
5. How shall the United States Government strengthen its organi-
zation to cope with the four issues stated above?
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The first four of those questions require brief explanation.
1. Reconciling Uses of the Spectrum. This task--which is known
as frequency management--is one of enorindus technical complexity. Dif-
ferent portions of the spectrum have radically different propagation
characteristics; that is, their range and dependability vary. Some
are usable for long-distance and others only for short-haul purposes.
Their efficiency also changes from night to day, and from day to day,
and is affected by sun spots and by atmospheric conditions.
By better management of the spectrum, much more could be done
with frequencies now available. There is opportunity for more effective
sharing of frequencies, for more intensive use of individual frequencies,
and increased economy in kilocycles assigned to each circuit.
The assignment of space in the spectrum among private users (in-
cluding state and local but not Federal Government agencies) is a
responsibility of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The
total amount of such space available for assignment, however, is not
determined by the FCC. In effect, it is determined by the President,
who is responsible for the assignment and management of those fre-
quencies used by Federal Government agencies. The Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee (IRAQ) is the instrumentality through which
frequencies are assigned to Federal users. Thus far, no national
policy has existed to clarify this dual control of a single resource
and thus to aid in governing the apportionment of space between private
users and Government users as groups. No criteria have been established
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for use in choosing between the conflicting needs of a Government and
a non-Government user.
2. National Security: In the present period of recurrent crisis,
it is likely that we shall be faced with a continuing problem of ad-
justing the use of telecommunications--especially radio 'frequencies--
to what may be violent fluctuations in the requirements for national
security. Indeed, we may face a situation in which the President's
emergency powers to control, take over, or close down communications
facilities will have to be invoked, and arrangements for the delegation
and exercise of those powers will be essential. We may also be faced
with the necessity of creating wholly new telecommunications facilities.
Telecommunications of course play a major role in the economic and
cultural life of the nation. They are the vital nerve system of
our modern military establishment. When spectrum space is insufficient
to meet both the full needs of national security and the full needs of
other affairs, the latter must give way to the former. When the emer-
gency has passed, frequencies and facilities must be restored to
civilian use. To create an ad hoc agency to meet each crisis would
be a clumsy expedient at best, and indeed, the problems of transfer
and retransfer of spectrum space and of facilities for using it are
too complex for ad hoc control to be adequate. A continuing mechanism
to deal with this situation is needed for the foreseeable future.
3. International Agreements. Just as the United States has no
clear policy for apportioning its.own share of spectrum space, so it
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has lacked satisfactory means of determining policy as a basis for nego.
tiations with other nations. The United States, in preparing positions
for international negotiations, has in effect asked Federal and other
claimants to state their needs, and then presented the total as the
United States requirement. In those portions of the spectrum where
the total of these requirements has been small enough to be accommo-
dated along with the needs of the rest of the world, our delegations
to conferences have had a negotiable position. In some cases, however,
the total stated requirements have exceeded not merely those which
could reasonably be put forward as the proper United States Share, but
have actually exceeded the total physical content of the bands. Further-
more, there is no permanent mechanism by which the stated requirements
of United States users can be adjusted with equity and safety. The
imperative need for means of making such adjustments hardly requires
elaboration.
4. Maintainim_a_Lani_Induatu. The private telecommunications
industry of the United States is one of the nation's most valuable
assets in peace or in war. The normal life of the country is supported
and facilitated by it in numberless ways. In abnormal times, the in-
dustry can place at the disposal of the nation its large reserve
capacity, built up because of its competitive structure. This capacity
helps to take up the immediate surge of military requirements. The
industry can release radio frequencies, cable capacity, and other com-
munications facilities, when required for Government purposes, without
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seriously affecting its ability to carry the civilian load.
It is essential that the industry be in sound economic condition.
Some of its components, however, have faced serious difficulties. To
meet these situations, the companies have from time to time taken
individual action, and from time to time Government has been of assis-
tance to them in rate adjustments and other ways.
But there has been no long-range study of the question, no long-
range planning. No agency of Government is in a position to take a
comprehensive view of this problem. No agency is qualified to advise
the President in fields where the interests of private and Government
telecommunications users are in conflict. Meanwhile, in the absence
of guiding policy, the action of Government agencies could seriously
handicap the industry.
Scope of the Study
We have spent nearly a year seeking answers to these four problems
and also to the crucial question Number 5--"How shall the U. S. Govern-
ment strengthen its organization to cope with these four issues?"
In this study we found it necessary to collect a large volume of infor-
mation--some of which was not readily available in public documents.
We were fortunate in securing the services of an extremely competent
staff and we received most cordial cooperation from all Government and
private agencies whom we consulted. Many agencies went to great lengths
to supply detailed data on various phases of the problem.
The most pertinent information which we collected is summarized in
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the succeeding chapters of this report, and we have given particular
attention to those subjects not adequately covered in existing litera-
ture. And yet there are many important phases of the subject which
we have covered only too lightly, in some cases because there already
exists available public information, but in other cases because we
did not have time to carry out the extensive research necessary for
an adequate treatment. In fact, as our study progressed) we became
more and more aware of the great complexity of the problem and of
the fact that no temporary or part-time board could do justice to the
entire problem.
Critical to this study was an investigation of the nature and
extent of the actual pressure for additional space in the radio fre-
quency spectrum. The picture of the situation presented in Chapter II
is one of great complexity. In many bands there is extreme congestion.
The competition for frequencies for radio broadcasting and for tele-
vision is well known to all. Less well known but also critical is the
situation in the band suitable for very long range communication--4 to
27.5 megacycles. In this band not only is there great need for many
circuits, but, because of propagation characteristics, two stations
thousands of miles apart may still interfere with each other if they
operate on the same or adjacent frequencies. The problem immediately
becomes one for complex international negotiations.
The degree of spectrum crowding varies enormously in different
parts of the spectrum and in different parts of the world. And opinions
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vary as to how serious the situation now is. But no one denies that
it is getting worse and will continue to do so. Only vigilant in-
telligent management and vigorous pursuit of new technological possi-
bilities can prevent possible future chaos.
In Chapter III we turn attention to an analySis of the U. S. domest
wire and radio telecommunication facilities, tracing their technological
development and the economic problems they face. These facilities are
very largely privately owned--though the U. S. Government is a most
substantial customer. But the great bulk of the facilities available
for public message service--telephone and telegraph--are owned by two
great regulated butcompeting monopolies--the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company and the Western Union Telegraph Company. These two
companies perform an invaluable public service, and it is important
for the Government to make sure they are intelligently regulated so
that the public and the Government may continue to receive the benefits
of the irreplaceable service they supply.
We believe that this service can best be insured by retaining
the present system of private ownership.
The field of international telecommunication (Chapter IV) offers
far more puzzling problems. Thus, while the United States end of
overseas radio telephone service is in the hands of a single company
(the Bell System), radio and cable telegraph services are offered by
several competing companies. Fluctuating international political and
economic conditions the rapidly growing use by the U. S. Government of
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international communication facilities (many of which are Government
owned), competition for space in the crowded long-range radio communi-
cation spectrum, and many other factors have led to serious problems
whose nature and extent are only too inadequately outlined in this
report. But they demand urgent attention by the U. S. Government,
and we have recommended policies and mechanisms to help solve these
continuing problems.
The nature and functions of the various existing Government
agencies concerned with telecommunications have been given detailed
examination (Chapter V). We find a complex pattern of such agencies
with even more complex interrelations. It is a structure which has
functioned smoothly in many ways. But it involves a duality or even
multiplicity of control, overlapping interests, and is a structure
inadequate to meet the ever more complex problems of this field. We
believe the structure can be rendered coherent by the creation of a
new executive agency and we set forth in some detail our proposals
for the creation of this agency.
Finally in Chapter VI, we set forth existing and proposed telecom-
munications policies in the hope that they may serve as a starting
point for the development of policies to guide present and future
agencies, public or private, which deal with telecommunications.
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Conclusions
On the basis of our studies, we have reached the following
conclusions.
A. As to the pressures on the radio spectrum:
1. Pressure on the radio frequency spectrum is steadily increaH,
as a result of the greater use of radio in telecommunications.
2. The means on which we have relied in the past for management
of the spectrum are no longer adequate to resolve in the best national
interest the problems produced by this increasing pressure. The
current difficulty growing out of the search for suitable space for
television broadcasting in itself emphasizes this inadequacy.
3, Measured in terms of spectrum space rather than in number
of discrete frequency channels, the Federal Government's share of the
spectrum, though not so great as is commonly believed, is nevertheless
large. While we do not know that it is out of proportion to the
Government's responsibilities, it must have the most adequate justifi-
cation and careful management if the greatest benefit is to be obtained
from it.
4, There is need for a continuing determination of the changing
requirements of Federal Government users both among themselves and in
relation to the requirements of other users.
5. The recent rapid worldwide growth of telecommunications, com-
bined with the needs of the current national emergency, makes the
resolution of these problems a matter of great urgency.
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6. The resolution of these problems can be secured only through
adequate, energetic management, which demands that the Government
organize itself to take a comprehensive view of the telecommunications
field.
B. As to United States telecommunications at home:
10 The telephone system of the United States is a financially
sound, multi-billion dollar Industry consisting of the Bell System and
5,000 independent companies. This coordinated system is providing the
nation with what is admittedly the best telephone service in the world.
It is steadily improving that service by aggressive technological
advancement. In view of the healthy condition of the telephone system,
we conclude that no changes in Government procedure for insuring ade-
quate service in the national interest are necessary.
2. The telegraph system of the United States has experienced
economic difficulties owed in part to the expansion of other means of
rapid communication. The recent return of the principal telegraph
company to profitable operation, in part because of improved managemen
and modernization of its plant and in part because of greater general
business activity, is encouraging. This current improvement in the
position of the industry affords an opportunity to develop information
needed for sound, long-range planning to avoid future difficulties.
We believe that sound management and vigorous technological development
can contribute further to the stability of the domestic telegraph'system4
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3. The effects of the administration of the Communications Act.
of 1934 relative to reductions of telegraph service through the
closing of unprofitable offices or through substitution of agencies
need further study. Western Union maintains that the restrictive
application of present legal provisions places an undue financial
burden upon the company which it can ill afford to bear; representa-
tives of labor contend that too great a degradation of service often
has followed the substitution of agencies for offices.
4. Rates for the telegraphic services?telegram, TWX, and private
leased lines--are given regulatory approval without adequate knowledge
of the costs of providing such services. Also, in passing upon long-
distance telephone rates, the Federal Communications Commission should
inform itself of the probable effect of proposed changes upon the
position of the telegraph industry, and upon rates for local telephone
service.
5. We have looked carefully into the proposal that our telecom-
munications industry should be divided clearly into two parts, one
dealing exclusively with "record" communications, the other with cOm-
munications by "voice." Our examination of this question has shown
that such a dividing line is very difficult to draw, and we have con-
cluded that the attempt to reorganize our telecommunications system on
the basis of such a distinction might result in effects on the system
going far beyond the initial intention of any such division. The main
bone of contention today is the fact that the telephone company Offers
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a form of record communications--TWX and private-line leases--which
competes with message-delivery functions of the telegraph company.
We note that Congress in 1943 amended the Communications Act to permit
acquisition of this form of service ?by the telegraph carrier. Thus
the companies involved are free to negotiate an agreement to make
this change, subject to approval by the FCC. We believe that this
matter should be determined by the normal processes of negotiation.
6. The operation of leased domestic telecommunications networks
by the Federal Government for the transmission of Federal Government
messages is not, strictly speaking, competitive with the operations
of commercial telecommunications companies. In its teletype networks,
the Government is taking advantage of volume rates offered by the tele-
communications companies in the same manner as can any other customer
with large volume requirements. The Government should continue to take
full advantage of the most efficient and economical rates and conditions
of service which are available to any large user. While it is important
that the Government seek the most economical means of handling its own
communications, it also is of great importance that it continue its
present policy of using privately owned facilities rather than building
up a Government-owned competing network,
C. As to United States telecommunications abroad:
1. The Government should adopt the policy of maintaining the
strength of the private competitive international communications system.
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2. There should be a Government agency charged with the responsi-
bility for implementing this policy.
3. Urgent recommendations have been made to Congress that legis-
lation be enacted to permit companies in the international cable and
radio field to merge. One of these calls for a single company to
handle all United States domestic and international record communicatio.
thus providing an integrated system. We find no imperative reasons
calling for an immediate merger of these companies; we conclude, on the
contrary, that recent improvements encourage a continuation of their
present independent status. Moreover, in our judgment, a period of
partial mobilization is not a good time to undertake a reorganization
of these important components of our communications system. Our conclu-
sions in regard to merger are based on conditions as we now find them
and can project them. We recognize, however, that the situation can
change and that the welfare of our communications system demands constant
attention to the condition and stability of these companies. We are
mindful of the strong conviction held by informed members of Congress
and others that merger is desirable. We have ascertained that interested
Government departments are divided in their views on the subject. While
we believe that the national interest does not at this time require the
repeal of existing prohibitions against merger, we recognize that changii,
conditions may provide compelling reasons for a merger later on. If so,
their anticipation by adequate study and legislation will be essential.
The kind of merger which might thus be indicated, as well as the timing
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of it, may be dictated not only by normal economic forces, but by
the wisdom of the Governmentts own policies vis-a-vis the companies
and by technological developments. Technological developments may in
fact prove to be the conclusive factor in determining the future of
these companies.
D. As to Government organization:
1. Fundamental changes in telecommunications require the overhaul
of Government machinery for formulating telecommunications policy and
for administering certain telecommunications activities in the national
interest.
2. The Communications Act of 1934 established a system of dual
control of the radio frequency spectrum. This dual control arises
largely from the fact that the regulation of private telecommunications
is a function of Congress exercised through the FCC while the operation
of Government telecommunications is primarily a function of the Executive,
For example, the assignment of frequencies to military services is an
exercise of the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces,
3. The Federal Communications Commission, though needing further
strengthening, should continue as the agency for regulation and control
of private users.
4. The President has exercised his power to assign frequencies
through the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, made up of
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representatives of the, using Government agencies. While this Commit-
tee should continue as a forum to arrange the use of the spectrum in
such a way as to avoid interference, it is not an adequate means for
keeping in order the large portion of the spectrum occupied by Gov-
ernment agencies.
5. The Telecommunications Coordinating Committee has served a
useful function and should continue as a mechanism for interdepart-
mental discussion of telecommunications matters.
6. The whole Government telecommunications structure is an un-
coordinated one and will be even less adequate in the future than it
has been in the past to meet the ever growing complexities of tele-
communications. A new agency is needed to give coherence to the structu;
7. There is need for a better determination of the division in the
national interest of frequency space between Government and non-Govern-
ment users. To achieve that end, close cooperation between the Federal
Communications Commission and the proposed new agency will be necessary.
Recommendations
1. There should be established in the Executive Office of the
President a three-man Telecommunications Advisory Board to advise and
assist the President in the execution of his responsibilities in the
telecommunications field. This Board should carry out the planning and
executive functions required by the President's powers to assign radio
frequencies to Government users, and to exercise control over the nation's
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telecommunications facilities during time of national emergency or
war. It should stimulate and correlate the formulation of plans and
policies to insure maximum contribution of telecommunications to the
national interest, and maximum effectiveness of United States partici-
pation in international negotiations. The Board should recommend
necessary legislation to the President, and advise him on legislation
in the telecommunications field. The Board should stimulate research
on problems in the telecommunications field. It should establish and
monitor a system of adequate initial justification and periodic rejus-
tification and reassignment of frequencies assigned to Federal Govern-
ment users, and, in cooperation with the Federal Communications Commis-
sion,- supervise the division of frequency spectrum space between
Government and non-Government users. While we believe that a three-man
board is preferable, we recognize the possibility of appointing one
man, a Telecommunications Adviser, to exercise the functions of the
proposed board.
2. The Federal Communications Commission should be strengthened
in funds and in organizational structure so it can better carry out its
duties under the Communications Act of 1934, and can participate more
fully in Government-wide formulation of policy.
3. Appropriate units within the Department of State should be
strengthened for the better performance of the functions of the Depart-
ment relating to telecommunications.
4. Other Federal departments and agencies which have large
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telecommunications interests also should strengthen their machinery
for formulating telecommunications policy, and for relating that policy
to the other policies and programs served by telecommunications.
5. The Federal Government should step up its program for conduc-
ting and stimulating research in telecommunications, especially in those
fields bearing on propagation and frequency utilization. Such studies
would make it possible for the Government to take economic or techno-
logical changes promptly into account in revising policies for pre-
serving the vigor of our private communications companies.
6. The proposed Telecommunications Advisory Board should give
special attention immediately to the stimulation of technological
developments which will still further strengthen our overseas communi-
cations. It should also formulate policies which would insure that
these new technological developments will be used in behalf of the
nation as a whole, its industry and commerce, its security, and its
cultural exchange.
7. Policy of the United States 'should be based upon the following
fundamental propositions:
a. The radio frequency spectrum is a world resource in the
public domain. Our Government must adopt policies and measures
to insure that this resource is used in the best interests of
the nation, with due regard to the needs and rights of other nations.
b. The United States, almost alone among the nations of the
world, relies on privately owned telecommunications companies to
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play the principal part in the country's telecommunications
system. It should continue to be the policy of the United
States Government to encourage and promote the health of these
privately owned companies as a vital national asset.
c. The United States telecommunications system is essential
to the national security, to international relations, and to the
business, social, educational, and political life of the country.
Hence, Government must remain alert to the problems of this
system, and be prepared to support measures necessary to insure
the continued strength of the telecommunications system as a
whole.
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CHAPTER II
PRESSURES ON THE RADIO SPECTRUM
The use of radio frequencies for communications has expanded
tremendously since Marconi first bridged the Atlantic with his
historic wireless signal on December 12, 1901? Research and de-
velopment in the past quarter-century have been responsible for most
of the additional utilization of the radio spectrum.
In the years immediately following Marconi's achievement, it
was thought that only a few frequencies in the lower portion of the
radio spectrum were suitable for communications and that they could
be employed only for limited purposes.
The Berlin Radio Conference of 1906, for example, considered
but two frequencies--500 kilocycles (kc) and 1,000 kc--and discussed
them only for ship-shore telegraphy. By 1912, the time of the
London Conference, use of the spectrum had broadened somewhat,
ranging from 150 kc to 1,000 kc. In the early 19201s, even after
broadcasting had begun, frequencies above 1,500 kc were still con-
sidered of little value for communications, but later in the decade
new emphasis on high-frequency operations and a general spurt in
demand for all communications led to a rapid exploitation of
additional portions of the radio spectrum.
The extension of use of the spectrum is summarized chronolo-
gically in the following table:
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PI
FREQUENCY SCALE
WAVELENGTH SCALE
NOMENCLATURE
MODE OF TRANSMISSION.
GROUND WAVE
SKY WAVE *
DIRECT WAVE
A GLANCE AT THE
RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
SHOWING SOME OF THE BROADER FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTICS
10 KC
30
100
300
1000
3000
10,000 KC 30 MC
100 MC 300 MC
1000 MC 3000 MC 10,000 MC 30,000 MC I00,000 MC
10
KM
1
KM
100
M
10
M
I
M
10
CM
--
1
CM
VHF
SHFEHF
VLF -
LF
-ME
HF
UHF
.;
LONG RANGE
.MODERATE JO
SHORT RANGE
OVER LAND
SHORT RANGE
OVER LAND
MODERATELY LONG RANGE OVER WATER
MODERATE RANGE OVER WATER
SHORT
RANGE---y-
k SHORT RANGEI MED
IUDM LONG RANGE
AT I
RANGEDAYDAY
MEDIUM RANGELONNGI
RANT GE
NIGHT
QUASI OPTICAL
* THE USEFUL RANGE VIA SKY WAVE TRANSMISSION VARIES WITH THE TIME OF DAY, SEASON, YEAR, AND PHASE OF THE SUNSPOT CYCLE.
TRANSMITTER
GROUND WAVE
GROUND WAVE
RECEIVER
DISTANCE
VOLUME
ATTENUATION EARTH
F2 LAYER
140- 350 KM
MODES OF TRANSMISSION
SKY WAVE
ESCAPE RAY
E LAYER
90 - 140 KM
0-
7 000 "A F neW47?
sop DISTANCE
2400 KM EARTH
CRITICAL RAY
NOTE;
IF. ONE REFLECTION
2F= TWO REFLECTIONS
NOMENCLATURE OF FREQUENCIES
14
DIRECT WAVE
TRANSMITTER
RECEIVER
FREQUENCY SUBDIVISION
FREQUENCY RANGE
FREQUENCY SUBDIVISION
FREQUENCY RANGE
VLF
(VERY LOW FREQUENCY)
BELOW 30 KC
VHF
(VERY HIGH FREQUENCY)
30 TO 300 MC
LF
(LOW FREQUENCY)
30 TO 300 KC
UHF
(ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY)
300 TO 3,000 MC
AIF
(MEDIUM FREQUENCY)
300 TO 3,000 KC
SHF
(SUPER HIGH FREQUENCY)
3,000 TO 30,000 MC
HF
(HIGH FREQUENCY)
3,000 TO 30,000 KC (30 MC)
EHF
(EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY) 30,000 TO 300,000 MC
(PRESIDENT'S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY BOARD - FEBRUARY 6, 19511
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Year
Incident
29.
Usable Radio Lectrum
1901
1906
Atlantic bridged
Berlin Radio Conference
500 kc and 1000 kc
1912
London Radio Conference
150 kc to 1000 kc
1927
Washington Radio Conference
10 kc to 23,000 kc
1932
Madrid Radio Conference
10 kc to 30,000 kc
1938
Cairo Radio Conference
10 kc to 200,000 kc
1947
Atlantic City Radio Conference
10 kc to above 30,000,000
The development of so valuable a natural resource as the radio
frequency spectrum is a matter of paramount importance. Despite
technical and operational improvements the demand for frequencies
has steadily crowded the supply within the usable spectrum. The
use of this resource should have the most careful planning and ad-
ministration within the United States and in cooperation with other
countries. Unfortunately, guidance and administration often have
been inadequate.
The Radio Snectrum
A determination of the possibilities for greater use of the
radio spectrum is a very complex undertaking. Each use of it,
whether an international broadcast carrying a news report thou-
sands of miles, or the signal of a short-range navigation beacon
making flecks of light on the receiver aboard a ship almost within
shouting distance, requires the establishment of a channel in the
spectrum. Contrary to the layman's opinion, the presently usable
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spectrum (10 kc to 30,000,000 kc) does not offer an unlimited num-
ber of channels. Consider the spectrum as a slice of the North
American continent a hundred miles wide running straight from the
East to the West Coast. Each channel may be thought of as a highway
through that stretch of land. Some of the highways are narrow,
some
wide, but each must be somewhat wider than the vehicles using it.
Here a major danger to understanding of the problem arises. The
radio spectrum embraces nearly 30 billion cycles. Standard practice
refers to radio channels in terms of single frequencies. Hence hasty
judgment easily assumes millions of frequencies as efficiently avail-
able and wonders
the slice of the
clear. A center
why there
continent
line runs
should be any problem. Another glance at
and the highways will make the matter
along each highway, just as a center fre-
quency lies in each channel. The hundred-mile slice of the continent
would accommodate a vast number of white lines--even though that num-
ber would have ultimate limits. To think of the white lines rather
than of highways leads to confusion. The radio channel occupies more
than the center frequency by which it is identified.
Each usable channel thus consists of a relatively small, but a
specific, part of the radio spectrum. Depending upon the traffic it
is to carry, it may be only a few cycles or several million cycles
wide. In the language of engineering, the total channel width (or
bandwidth) required for a transmission of energy is the number of
cycles embracing 99 per cent of the total radiated power extended
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to include any discrete frequency on which the power is at least
0.25 per cent of the total radiated power. In double sideband
emission (the type used in broadcast transmissions of intelligence),
the channel width is twice the departure (tolerance) of the actual
operating frequency from the reference or assigned frequency plus
twice the bandwidth required to convey the particular intelligence
desired. The frequency tolerance is usually specified as a number
of cycles which is a percentage of the reference frequency, and thus
increases with the number of cycles representing the reference fre-
quency. The specified tolerance usually is the best it is practical
for industry to meet in the design of equipment.
If the total U. S. requirements in terms of channels of various
widths were known, reckoning the spectrum possibilities would still
be exceedingly difficult because of the complex and varied manner
in which radio signals travel from the transmitter to the receiver.
In radio propagation, energy fed to the transmitting antenna pro-
duces electromagnetic waves in the space surrounding the antenna.
The energy radiated into space can be used to convey intelligence.
These waves travel away from the antenna with the velocity of
light. There are three principal ways in which they may pass from
transmitter to receiver: 1. the "sky wave," which travels up to
ionized layers in the earth's upper atmosphere (the ionosphere)
whence it is reflected back to the earth; 2. the "ground wave,"
which travels along the earth without influence of the ionosphere;
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and 3. the "direct wave," which travels as its name implies, on
the line of sight. Most long-distance radio transmissions consist
of the sky wave and most short-distance transmissions consist of
the ground wave. Many are a combination of all three.
Frequencies below about 300 kc (VLF and LF) Are used for long-
distance ground-wave transmissions, particularly in regions such
as Alaska where physical conditions make blackouts of sky-wave
common. Frequencies from about 100 kc to 3000 kc (LF and MF)
generally are used for ground-wave transmissions for moderate dis-
tances over water and moderate to short distances over land. During
the night, frequencies from approximately 1000 to 3000 kc generally
are suitable for sky-wave transmission up to about 200 miles; in dotimo,
frequencies from _about 3 to 8 megacycles (Mc) usually are satisfac-
tory for this distance. Long-distance sky-wave transmission gen-
erally is the most effective for frequencies from 3 to 12 Mc (HF)
during the night and 6 to 25 Mc during the day. Frequencies from 3
to 30 Mc are used for ground-wave transmissions for relatively short
distances over land and moderate distances over water. Those from
30 to 300 Mc (VHF) are usually employed for short-distance ground-
wave and direct-wave or optical path transmissions. Frequencies
above 300 Mc (UHF, SHF, and EHF) are limited in use to distances
not greatly exceeding the line of sight. However, there may be
transmission to greater distances by way of the troposphere.
Simple arithmetic, obviously, is not alone enough to determine
the possibilities of use of the spectrum.
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Although the parts of the spectrum are not of equal usefulness
for all purposes, each is in sufficient demand to give rise to
allocation and assignment problems. Use of the high-frequency portion
of the radio spectrum (4 Mc to 27.5 Mc) presents the most serious
difficulty, because of the multiple applicability of this portion
for medium- and long-distance telecommunications, tropical and long-
distance broadcasting, and other services, and because of its inter-
national aspects. Further, frequencies outside these limits are in
general not suitable substitutes. The possibilities of the high-
frequency spectrum have to be measured in terms of possible circuits
rather than frequencies since, in general, more than one frequency
assignment is required for each circuit. The number of possible
circuits which can be carved out of the spectrum depends upon the
type of circuit desired (radiotelephone, radiotelegraph, etc.); the
geographical location of the terminals; the time of day, season, phase
of the sun-spot cycle; the amount of power used; the type of antennas
used; atmospheric noise; questions of possible interference; number
of circuits operated by the agency; efficiency and effectiveness of
equipment and operators; availability and correct use of propagational
data.
To provide continuous 24-hour-per-day service for the average
circuit over a sun-spot cycle, it may be necessary to use five or
more frequency assignments for a single circuit in one direction.
As the number of circuits operated by an agency increases, the average
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number of frequency assignments required per circuit may decrease
slightly because of greater freedom in changing frequency to avoid
interference and multiple use of frequencies at different locations
and for different path lengths. On the average, about three high
frequency assignments are required daily for each one-way circuit.
Since communication usually is a two-way matter, most communica-
tions circuits require two one-way circuits and, consequently,
two complements of frequency assignments. This dual need may not
be encountered on light traffic circuits.
Further, on the average long-distance circuit requiring three
frequency assignments of, for example, 6, 10,and 14 Mc for night-
time, transition, and daytime operation (over the midpoint of the
path involved), the circuit cannot be maintained continuously un-
less a frequency assignment of each order is available. In practice,
because of the greater requirements for frequencies below 8 Mc, the
supply of channels between 6 and 8 Mc (taking into account possible
multiple use of each frequency) determines the maximum possible num-
ber of 24-hour long-distance circuits. Fortunately, the situation
is not so bad as it appears at first glance, because of the propa-
gation characteristics of the high frequencies, which have multiple
use possibilities with geographical separation, generally as follows:
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Emallana_Eang2
Possible Number
of Duplications
4 to 7 Mc
5
7 to 12 Mc
4
12 to 15 Mc
3
15 to 27 Mc
2
? The actual number of separate and distinct channels available
within any particular portion of the spectrum is not static but is
fluid, increasing with improvements in equipment, operating tech-
niques, circuit discipline, availability and proper use of propaga-
tional data, need, and willingness to accept a poorer grade of
circuit. The actual separation between frequencies required to
provide the same grade of service has been continually decreasing
because of improvements in the stability and selectivity of equip-
ment. It is not expected, however, that there will be much greater
improvement in this respect. The possible frequency separation
throughout the high-frequency spectrum is essentially constant on
a percentage basis but not on a kilocycle basis. Consequently,
there are more possible usable channels between, say, 4 and 5 Mc
than there are between 13 and 14 Mc.
In the exploitation of a limited entity such as the radio spectrum,
it is essential that as the pressure for radio channels increases
there must be established alert telecommunications management to
assure equitable allocation of these channels. Further, it is
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essential that this management assure, insofar as is economically
practicable, the use of the technical improvements in equipment
and operating techniques for increasing the intelligence transmitted
per kilocycle of spectrum space.
It is as.diffiCult to ovaluate:froquency utilization as to
determine the possibilities of the radio spectrum. Efficient utiliza-
tion of radio frequencies can be obtained only if the user and regula-
tory agencies constantly keep watch over the use of frequencies. Only
in this way can the regulatory agencies know which users make full use
of their frequency assignments and which have too many frequency.
assignments. It is estimated that a thorough analysis and control
program for the United States and possessions would cost $50 million
a year. Such a program would envision the use of U. S. monitoring
stations plus additional stations elsewhere throughout the world.
As the demand for frequencies increases, the necessity for better
frequency management will become greater.
There is no evidence that the United States has made any
serious attempt previously to measure the utilization of radio
frequency assignments by either industry or the Federal Government.
There is evidence that other countries have done some work along
this line.
The nations of the world have met periodically to conclude
treaties which regulate the use of the radio spectrum,to obtain
standardization of methods and procedures, and to minimize interference.
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Nearly all countries have imposed additional regulatory measures in
their areas of jurisdiction to implement provisions of international
treaties, to prevent domestic interference, and to obtain the most
equitable distribution of frequencies.
The history of the international agreements through 1938 is
summarized in Section 2 of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
"Special Report on Frequency Allocation to the Communications Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
March 29, 1950."
World War II caused cancellation of the international telecommuni-
cations conference planned for Rome in 1942. As a result, the con-
ference in Atlantic City in 1947 followed a 9-year period in which the
nations did not get together to seek up-to-date agreements on world
use of the radio spectrum.
U S. Control of Frequency Allocation
The United States Congress has passed three major acts and estab-
lished two commissions specifically to regulate various phases of
communications. These acts were the Radio Act of 1912, the Radio Act
of 1927, and the Communications Act of 1934, since amended. The
commissions were the Federal Radio Commission and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission. Interested Federal Government departments and
agencies formed the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC),
recognized by several presidents, and the Telecommunications Coordin-
ating Committee (TCC) as voluntary coordinating groups. The effects
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which these actions have exerted in the assignment and use of
radio frequencies are discussed in detail in Chapter V of this
report.
In the armed forces during World War II, frequency allocations
were coordinated in the Frequency Allocation Committee (FAC) of the
Joint (JOB) and Combined Communications Board (CCB) of the Joint and
Combined Chiefs of Staff, respectively, and by organizations within
each department. Since the war the JCB has been replaced by the
Joint Communication-Electronics Committee (JCEC) within the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Relationshi of International and National Organizations
The international and national organizations concerned with
telecommunications problems, plus various ad hoc committees and
delegations to conferences, make up a formidable array of groups
dealing with one or more phases of the problem. Inevitably, there
are overlapping of responsibility and gaps in authority. Few per-
sons understand this hodge podge. The complexity of the subject
is indicated by the chart in Chapter V, which shows the international
and U. S. organizations engaged in some phase of radio spectrum
management or use.
Weaknesses in Present Organizations and Practices
Statutory Authority.--The limitations of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, and of the Commission created largely for its
administration have been the subject of much consideration by Congress
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in recent years. The law was written when radio was not so highly
developed and before the present demand for spectrum space had
become acute. It established a dual system of allocations as between
Federal Government and non-Governmenti/ users but provided no umpire.
The FCC is empowered to assign radio frequencies to non-Government
users and the President is likewise empowered to assign frequencies
to Federal Government users, a power he exercises through IRAC. Each
agency enjoys coequal authority over the entire spectrum.
Because of this dual authority over the same entity, it is
essential that there be full coordination between IRAC and the FCC.
As a member of IRAC, the FCC is afforded, on the one hand, an oppor-
tunity to comment upon all assignments to Federal Government stations.
On the other hand, IRAC has an opportunity to comment upon proposed
FCC assignments when the FCC considers it necessary to refer the
proposal to IRAC. Final action by FCC does not require approval by
IRAC, but the reverse is not true; FCC as an IRAC member can veto
action desired by other Government agencies. In practice, the spirit
of accommodation has generally prevailed. But if there is disagree-
ment between the FCC and IRAC, only the President can resolve the
issue. Upon at least one occasion during World War II, he was called
upon to do so. The fact that this system has worked at all is a credit
to the good will and common sense of the members of both agencies.
1/ Includes State and municipal government and all other than
Federal Government users.
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National Poli.--Both the FCC and IRAC have been and are greatly
handicapped by inadequate national policy for the division and use
of the radio spectrum.
To cite one instance, lack of a clear policy
concerning the use of radio
tions during the war led to
meager policy as exists and
VI of this Report. Much of
writing.
Allocation Practices.--There are several faults in the present
frequency-assignment practice. Contrary to the public impression
created by procedures for assigning frequencies for standard broad-
casting and TV purposes, the FCC in general does not require rigorous
justification for the assignment of frequencies for other services.
IRAC does not require sufficient justification for the assignment
of frequencies, has no authority to question any Government depart-
ment's statement of need for a frequency, and is not constituted to
do so. Assigning blocks of frequencies to be used by a particular
agency on a national basis, without providing for their use by others
in areas where the original assignee does not use them or is not
likely to use them, is wasteful of frequencies and adds to the
crowding of the radio spectrum. For example, there are many areas of
the U. S., Alaska, and Hawaii where there is little prospect of need
or of support for the existing 12 very-high-frequency television
channels, much less the greater number of ultra-high-frequency channels
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long, bitter arguments in IRAC. Such
could be collected is included in Chapter
it has not been previously reduced to
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41.
where use of these frequencies for other purposes would be in the
public interest. Another example is the making of too many assign-
ments for broad band transmission, when the broad band is needed
only a very small percentage of the time. Waste also results from
the practice of assigning many of a userts frequencies to all of that
user's stations, although the frequencies are rarely used at more
than one or two stations.
Emmencv Assignment Records.--It is fundamental that a storage
and issuing agency maintain a catalog and adequate records of stock
on hand and issued. In its management of the priceless radio spec-
trum, however, the U. S. has failed to maintain in one place ade-
quate records of frequency assignments or deletions, or to publish
a list of such assignments. The latest list available for public
use was prepared by the FCC and reproduced by a private firm in
1949; it does not include the frequency assignments of the Federal
Government agencies and is not now complete for the non-Government
users. In the event a commercial user wishes to apply for frequency
assignment for a circuit, he must search through this non-current
public list, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
Frequency List (even more out of date), come to Washington or retain
the services of Washington consulting radio engineers to study the
FCC records, and then file a complete application. This application
incidentally gives notice to competitors that the requested frequencies
are reasonably clear and available for use. The applicant has no
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42.
opportunity to determine beforehand if a Federal Government depart-
ment is using a frequency with which interference will result or if
such department will raise an objection. If Federal Government
objection is forthcoming, he must repeat the whole process.
Existing Situation
The rapid growth of telecommunications in the nine years between
the Cairo (1938) and Atlantic City (1947) conferences led to greater
pressure for radio frequencies. More and more countries went outside
the Cairo service allocation bands, in derogation, to meet the increaseL
requirements. The war, of course, prevented full coordination be-
tween countries to avoid and clear interference. This situation
was further complicated by the decision of some of the warring nations,
including the United States, to withhold international notification
of new uses of radio frequencies and to reject any claims of prior
rights for any country registering a frequency after 1939.
Recognizing early in 1943 that the end of the war would present
many frequency allocation problems because of withheld notifications,
pent-up requirements, continuing large military requirements, and
enormously expanding commercial aviation and other new activities,
the United States began a consideration of postwar frequency allo-
cations. The U. S. Atlantic City proposal in 1947 was the outgrowth
of this preparatory work, of public hearings held in 1944 by the
FCC, and of the discussions in Rio de Janeiro and Bermuda in 1945
and in Moscow in 1946.
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The Atlantic City Table of Frequency Allocations was designed to
provide essential radio services with adequate spectrum space. Fre-
quency usage within these allocations was to be regulated by an
engineered international list of circuit assignments which was de-
signed to make the greatest use practicable of the radio spectrum.
From the point of view of frequency allocation, assignme-it,and
use, the most far-reaching agreements at Atlantic City were: (1)
revision of the frequency allocation table to provide, in the main,
exclusive bands for the five basic functions?fixed, mobile, broad-
casting, amateur, and radiolocation services; (2) changes in the
amount of spectrum space allocated to these services; (3) procedure
for the preparation of a new international frequency list on the
basis of sound engineering principles; and (4) the adoption of the
concept of an International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) to
register frequencies on a technical basis.1/
The Provisional Frequency Board (PFB) was created to prepare in
draft form a new international frequency list on a basis of these
agreements, for submission to the Extraordinary Administrative Radio
Conference scheduled for The Hague on September 1, 1950.
Upon approval of such a list for the Atlantic City Table of
Frequency Allocations below 27.5 Mc, the IFRB was to commence its
functions and a date was to be agreed upon for implementation. Post-
1/ The IFRB and its work are covered in more detail in thenFinal
Actsnof the Atlantic City Conference.
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44.
poned because of the international situation, the Conference is now
scheduled to convene in Geneva on August 16, 19510 if that date is
confirmed in April by the Administrative Council of the ITU.
The United States participated, as did the other nations, in
the Atlantic City Conference and the work of the Provisional Frequency
Board, performed under the agreements reached at that Conference, for
the purpose of improving international telecommunications.
Conditions of unrest, cold war, and continuing international
crises generated an atmosphere that was hardly favorable to the
efforts of the PFB.
The Table of Frequency Allocations between 4 and 27.5 Mc ado*Ded
at Atlantic City in 1947 has not yet been implemented. Tentative
plans have been prepared for the aeronautical and maritime services,
and partially for the fixed services. The frequency list for the
Table of Allocations between 150 and 4000 kc, which are for the most
part regional in character, is ready within Regions 1 and 3 for final
amendment and adoption. Region 2 (which includes the U. S.) has no
regionally-integrated plan as of February 1, 1951, even though it is
about 85% completed below 2000 kc.
Experience gained from the past three years has highlighted the
difficulties of implementation under the procedures envisaged at
Atlantic City. Lack of plans and policy plays a major role in the
difficulty experienced by all countries concerned to agree upon im-
plementation. It was obvious to the President's Communications Policy
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45.
Board, in view of the forthcoming meeting of the Administrative Council
of the ITU in Geneva in April, 1951/ and the impossibility for the Board
to complete, in the time available, all the tasks assigned to it,
that special steps would have to be taken to overcome this lack.
In view of the extreme importance of this matter, the Board
considered it imperative that the United States re-examine the situa-
tion to determine:
(1) The current scope and magnitude of the United States
interest in the Atlantic City Allocation Table below
27.5 Mc.
(2) The most workable methods by which the Table could be
implemented in the light of changed world conditions.
(3) The course which the United States should advocate and
pursue in the light of findings under (2) heretofore.
Accordingly, in October and November of 1950, the Board discussed
the problem with the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission,
The Board proposed that these three officials constitute themselves
into an ad hoc committee, and take responsibility for reviewing the
political and technical difficulties contributing to the impasse, and
for recommending workable policies for the Government to follow. The
Board further recommended that this ad hoc group enlist the help of
a small panel of especially qualified persons, who would make an
objective appraisal of thellactors of national interest involved,
independent of the particular interests of any claimant agency.
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46.
The proposal was accepted; the ad hoc group was formed, and the
independent panel set up in January, 1951.
Demand for Radio Frequencies
The basic difficulty of the nations of the world in arriving
at a satisfactory frequency list and means of implementing the
Atlantic City Table is that of inflated demands for radio fre-
quencies. The apparent shortage of frequencies thus engendered has
been aggravated as each nation attempts to provide for future as
well as present needs. The United States also has been handicapped,
as perhaps have many other nations, by the necessity of remaining
on a defense emergency basis which requires radio frequencies far
in excess of peacetime needs.
The demand for radio frequencies has been growing steadily since
the early 1900's. It was not until the beginning of World War II,
however, that pressures became acute. During World War II the
increased requirements of the Federal Government, in particular the
armed forces, for radio frequencies were offset somewhat by the
closure of a number of facilities and the release of the frequencies
involved to the armed forces. Upon the termination of hostilities,
the borrowed frequencies were returned piecemeal to the FCC, commercial
circuits were reopened, and many new circuits were established. At
the same time, the armed forces found it necessary to continue many
of their overseas circuits, each of which required radio frequency
assignments. The tremendous expansion of the use of radio by many
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48
have been expanded rapidly to keep pace with the growth of the
activities they support and because of intensified use of communica-
tions in those activities. Additional room in the spectrum has had
to be found to accommodate these services. At the same time, new
services such as television broadcasting have been brought out of
the laboratory and have won public acceptance. Many entirely new
users?railroads, taxicabs, and trucking companies, for example--
have requested frequency channels. When the FCC held a public fre-
quency hearing in 1944, approximately 30 different radio services
were represented. Among them were the services concerned with the
safety of life and property--the police and fire radio services,
the aviation service, the ship service, and the forestry service.
The total demands of these groups far exceeded the available spectrum
space.
The parts of the radio spectrum where pressure causes the most
serious concern are those in which international coordination and
agreement are required. Principally, they are the portions having
long-range characteristics, 4 to 27.5 Mc frequencies; the portions
used by services such as the aeronautical service, where standardi-
zation of equipment and procedures is essential; and broadcasting
in the Standard Band, which is of regional concern. Other portions
of the spectrum are of national concern primarily and usually do
not involve other countries, except to provide common systems.
Within the United States, dissatisfaction with efforts to meet
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commanders, and combat or tactical channels between field commanders
and their forces. Since the armed forces may be engaged in areas
where existing communications to Washington are inadequate or
unsuitable, they must provide their own. Usually, existing commercial
international circuits cannot be used for reasons of control and
security. For example, the foreign terminals of commercial companies,
in most instances, are operated and controlled by foreign nationals
or governments and all traffic handled may be subject to scrutiny
and delay. Few if any of the proponents of greater use of commer-
cial facilities for the transmission of Government messages advocate
that military messages be routed through the commercial companies.
Where no interference to the flow of military messages results,
the communications facilities of the armed forces are used to trans-
mit traffic for other Federal Government departments and agencies and
the Red Cross. It has been suggested that this traffic should be
sent via commercial companies and that the cost would be less. The
stated policy of the armed forces in this matter is that no increase
in military facilities, equipment, or personnel shall result from
the handling of other department and agency traffic and that such
traffic will be accepted only on the basis of an official request
by the department or agency concerned. Military systems must be
designed with a reasonable amount of spare capacity able to absorb
greatly increased traffic loads on short notice. The armed forces
therefore feel that the handling of maximum traffic within authorized
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52.
selected as one medium to this end.
Under the Communications Act, Navy Department radio stations
and apparatus are made available for the reception and transmission
of press messages offered by newspapers published in the United
States or its territories and possessions or published by citizens
of the United States in foreign countries, and by United States
press associations. The act provides also for the use of Navy
facilities for reception and transmission of private commercial
messages between ships, between ship and shore, between localitiec
in Alaska, and between Alaska and the continental United States. Both
these services are subject to certain rate conditions, and it is
provided that they shall be discontinued whenever the FCC notifies
the Secretary of the Navy that privately owned and operated stations
are capable of carrying them on. The Navy also furnishes a general
broadcast service of weather, time, and hydrographic information to
all shipping.
In addition to its defense functions, the U. S. Air Force
operates weather flying squadrons for the collection of data for
weather forecast, collects and broadcasts weather information, and
furnishes communications to non-military aircraft in certain areas
where civil facilities are not available. These services all require
the use of radio frequencies.
Radio frequencies are used by the Department of the Treasury
(Coast Guard) in providing marine navigational aids and safety services
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53.
for shipping. The Coast Guard also operates the radiolocation ser-
vice known as Loran. Transfer of these operations to commercial
facilities could not be expected to decrease the total number of
frequency assignments required.
The CAA is charged by Congress with the function of providing
navigational aids and communications facilities as a public service
for both civil and military aircraft. If these functions were turned
over in whole or part to private enterprise, the over-all number of
frequency assignments or the spectrum space required could hardly
be reduced.
The FCC employs radio to connect certain of its remote monitoring
stations. Instantaneous communication to all of these stations is
essential at times to identify an unknown transmission or to obtain
a "fix" on an aircraft or ship in distress. It is considered imprac-
tical to lease the facilities of a commercial company for this work
or to turn over the function to a commercial company.
Thus we see that there is a large Federal Government requirement
for radio frequency assignments, and that much of it is for services
which would use the same amount of the radio spectrum even if they
were transferred to private operation. Another substantial portion
of it is for services which must for security reasons be operated as
they are at present. The question may nevertheless be legitimately
raised whether the demands have been kept to a minimum in relation
to the tasks to be performed. Non-defense radio traffic of some
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54.
Federal Government departments might in some instances? be carried
by commercial facilities.
In 1939 the major international common carriers were operating
138 circuits, whereas in 1950 the international common carriers as
a group were operating 219 circuits (many at high word capacity) to
more than 100 foreign cities. Since the war the FCC in general has
followed a policy of granting competing companies circuits to the
same foreign city.
Since but one U. S. frequency list can be presented to the IFRB,
the Federal Government and non-Government frequency requirements
should be accommodated within such a list. At present there is no
national telecommunications policy under which the relative impor-
tance of particular circuits can be determined and the frequency
requirements screened. This factor assumes even greater importance
when one considers that the pressure on the radio spectrum is con-
tinually increasing.
The relative amounts of the spectrum used by the Federal Govern-
ment and non-Government users are often compared. The question is
asked whether the Federal Government has more high frequencies than
non-Government users, and whether it has more of the spectrum than
it needs. Available comparisons of high-frequency assignments have
been made on the basis of the number of discrete frequencies assigned
without regard to the band of emission and thus are subject to con-
siderable misinterpretation in many instances. This is evident from
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55.
the fact that one telephone channel with a band of emission of 10 kc
occupies 100 times as much spectrum space as one telegraph channel
with a band of emission of but 0.1 kc, yet each assignment counts as
one frequency. A fairer method of evaluating the amount of spectrum
space used by any agency is to take the sum of the bands of emission
assigned to that agency. An analysis of the high-frequency spectrum
between 4 and 20 Mc as of May, 1950, reveals that although the Federal
Government agencies are allocated 1166 frequencies, they have but
4164 kc of the spectrum; whereas the non-Government users, with 833
frequencies, (excluding international broadcasting with 38 frequencies
and 380 kc of spectrum space and the amateurs with 700 kc of space),
occupy 4324 kc of spectrum space.1/ A comparison of the spectrum
space allocated to the Federal Government and the non-Government users
for the fixed service by increments of 1 Mc follows, Table I.
1/ The fact that the sum (9567.73 kc) of these assignments is
considerably less than the 16,000 kc analyzed does not mean there
is unassigned spectrum space. The entire spectrum is not available
for assignment by the United States, but is shared with other
countries. In addition an equally large part of the spectrum is
used by the United States for transmission from foreign locations.
Above 30 Mc the shorter interference range characteristics permit
full use of the spectrum by the United States, except immediately
adjacent to Canada or Mexico.
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TABLE I
FREQUENCIES AND SPECTRUM SPACE ASSIGNED--CONTINENTAL
UNITED STATES, TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS
(as of May, 1950)
a
? Federal Government
Non-Government
: Shared
:No. of : Total :
:Frequen-: Spec-
:cies : trum :
Kc
? No. of
?
Frequen-
cies
: Total
: Spec- .
: trum
Ke
a
? No. of : Total
? Spec-
Frequen-:
cies trum
Kc
4 Mc
167
676.20
74
335.35
4
19.25
5
152
589.42
92
446.15
6
106
352.65
61
258.05
7
46.00
7
70
236.30
63
325.30
8
114
389.69
75
272.17
6
24.10
9
69
200.16
31
192.80
10
52
190.30
76
377.36
11
64
236.82
41
147.45
12
84
253.98
33
121.55
13
54
177.37
57
408.00
14
30
106.87
27
203.00
15
32
119.29
59
339.70
16
69
239.59
40
129.12
17
64
231.89
39
207.40
18
26
96.20
40
361. 00
19
67.50
l99.1O
1166
4164.23
833
4323.50
17
89.35
In the range 4-20 Mc, approximately 380 kc was used for inter-
national broadcasting (from the continental U. S. and Hawaii) and
700 kc was allocated to the Amateur Service. These assignments are
not included in the preceding table.
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This table shows that, contrary to general belief, the Federal
Government has exclusive use of 42.1% of the space between 30 and 300
Mc and but 13.2% of the space between 300 and 3000 Mc, The Federal
Government has its largest percentage (44%) of any decade between
3000 and 30,000 Mc. If the analysis is based on a logarithmic
frequency scale, a method more nearly reflecting the actual possi-
bilities for derivation of channels in the spectrum, the relative
division of the spectrum is as shown by Table
Table III
Relative Division of Radio S ectrum in Percentage
Federal Government vs. Non-Government
30 Mc to 30,000 Mc
(Based upon logarithmic scale)
Portion of
Spectrum
17edera1
Government
Non-
Government
Shared
Amateur
Mc
%
%
%
30-300
29.7
57.0
8.5
4.8
300-3000
18.8
43.6
28,3
9.3
3000-30 M
36 o
2.6.:2
18,7
8 6
Total
28.2
45.7
18.5
7.6
While Table II shows the Federal Government has about 50% of
the total spectrum space between 30 and 30,000 Mc/ Table III shows
that, based on the probable number of useful channels which can be
derived, the Federal Government has allocated for its exclusive use
less than a third of the probable number of channels which can be
derived from the 29,970 Mc between 30 and 30,000 MC..
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59.
The preceding discussion and comparison of the relative division
of the spectrum is not considered complete nor final. It does, how-
ever, show that while the contention that the Federal Government
has 50% of the useful radio spectrum is not strictly true, the
Government does have a large proportion. This large use of so valuable
a national resource demands adequate justification and the most care-
ful management to assure its operation in full accord with national
policy and to meet proved need in the best interest of the nation.
A current major problem involving the relative division of the
radio spectrum and relative needs of the Federal Government and non-
Government users is that of finding adequate space in the spectrum
for television. There are now allocated for television broadcasting
12 very high frequency (vim') 6 Mc channels as shown by Table IV.
Table IV
VHF Channels
Channel No.
11202211a2
Channel No.
ga222212g
2
54- 60
8
180-186
3
60- 66
9
186-192
66- 72
10
192-198
5
76- 82
11
198-204
6
82- 88
12
204-210
7
174-180
13
210-216
The spectrum space between
470 and 890 Mc or 410 Mc was reserved by.
the FCC for ultra high frequency (UHF) television broadcasting channels.
To date, experimental licenses only have been issued in the UHF band.
As the number of television stations in operation increased, it
became evident from resultant interference between stations and from
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61.
a number of VHF channels for educational purposes serve to increase
the pressure for more VHF channels for the rapidly growing tele-
vision industry. Television interests are continually pressing for
more spectrum space in the VHF band or immediately adjacent thereto.
Assuming the validity of the need of television for the 42 additional
channels adjacent to the present 12 channels, the problem becomes
one of finding 252 Mc of continuous spectrum space between channels
Nos. 6 and 7 and above Channel No. 13. Thus the question arises--
Can the services now allocated these frequencies move, and if so,
to where?
An examination of the present allocations in the 86 Mc between
88 and 174 Mc reveals that the Federal Government is allocated 28
Mc; non-Government is allocated 30 Mc; and 24 Mc is shared by
Federal Government and non-Government. Of the Federal Government
allotment, 16 Mc is within the VHF band which the U. S. was forced
to use to work with its allies in World War II and which is used for
essential military purposes. Only the remaining 12 Mc offers any
possibility at all for TV channels (2). Twenty of non-Governmentts
30 Mc are allocated to the culturally and technically important FM
broadcasting. Even if all of this space were reallocated to tele-
vision, it would yield only three channels. The 24 Mc shared by
Federal Government and non-Government is used for aeronautical navi-
gation and aircraft control, part of the SC-31 system of instrument
landing of aircraft. A great investment of time, money, and develop-
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62.
ment resources has been made in this system and it cannot be changed
overnight. At best, then, not more than 5 TV channels could con-
ceivably be allocated between 88 and 174 Mc. This would leave 37
channels or 222 Mc to go above 216 Mc, the present upper limit of
VHF-TV,
Until January 1, 1952, when the agreement with the British to
use the band 220 to 231 Mc for the British Radar Indicator System
at U. S. gateways terminates, the nearest frequency above 216 Mc
where a TV channel could start would be 240 Mc. Provision for 39
additional channels or 222 Mc would extend the TV band up to 462 Mc,
well above the upper limit of the VHF band or 300 Mc, and into the
present UHF-TV band. Such an allocation would necessitate moving
and finding new space for the aeronautical radio navigation "Glide
Path," also part of the SC-31 Instrument Landing System, Meteorol-
ogical Aids, Amateur, essential military services, and non-Government
land mobile services. A number of these allocations and uses, for
example, the Glide Path and Meteorological Aids, involve agreements
and treaties with other nations and could be changed only with great
difficulty and delay. Many of these allocations and uses involve
great investments in time, money, and development resources which
cannot be wasted.
The investment in time, money, and development resources is
proportionately important to the television industry. At the end
of 1948 the estimated investment in tangible property of television
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stations and in receivers was
63.
403 million. By the end of 1950,
even though no new station construction permits were granted after
September, 1948, there were 107 stations serving about 10.6 million
receivers. Manufacturers have reached large scale production of
receivers and during December produced 704 thousand receivers. At
the end of 1950 the estimated investment in tangible property of
television stations and in receivers had grown to about $3.09 billion.
Television net time sales for 1950 were estimated at about $84 million,
compared with $28 million in 1949. This rapid increase in the number
of receivers and investment makes much greater the impact of changes
in frequency assignment. Even should additional channels become
available between the present Nos. 6 and 7 channels, most of the
older receivers would require adapters or converters to receive them.
Delay in solving this problem multiplies the difficulties and ex-
pense of making the necessary changes.
The problem of finding sufficient spectrum space for television
has defied solution since the beginning of postwar planning in 1943.
It can be solved only after the most careful study and weighing of
competing needs of all concerned to arrive at a solution in the best
national interest. By no stretch of the imagination could it be
resolved by a temporary board. This major problem in itself empha-
sizes the need for a high-level permanent agency concerned with
telecommunications, and with the resolution of conflicting Federal
Government and non-Government requirements.
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?1.42:12n.a.U'
In the 50 years since its inception, use of the radio spectrum
has grown into an enormous, vital, and complex activity connecting
all countries with means of rapid communications. The radio com-
munications systems which have developed are of major importance to
the United States and to the world in the dissemination of infor-
mation and maintenance of security and welfare, and in the conduct
of business.
With the development and expansion of radio, the need for
regulation, both national and international, has grown until the
resulting organizations, treaties, and agreements have become as com-
plex as telecommunications itself. Most of these organizations and
agreements were devised to meet an existing need and not in anticipa-
tion of future needs. Frequently they were not established formally
until long after they started to function. Once formalized, legis-
lation and organizations to deal with telecommunications have not
been kept current with this dynamic activity. The condition of "too
little and too late" has held more often than not.
Existing organization to control use of the spectrum, one of
the most valuable natural resources of the United States, is res-
ponsible for the establishment or continuance of dual control of this
resource. This dual control has led to friction, misunderstanding,
waste, and avoidance of responsibility. The organization is lacking
in over-all policy guidance, and so complex that few persons understand
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all its ramifications.
Weaknesses in the present United States telecommunications
organizations and lack of high national policy and direction have
hindered the United States in the national control of telecommunica-
tions and in its international relations on telecommunications. The
present telecommunications legislation and organization have failed
to produce adequate direction, leadership, administration, and
control and have fostered dissension between the Federal Government
and industry. Many of these shortcomings could have been mitigated
if not avoided.
The United States ratified the Atlantic City 1947 International
Convention, including adherence to the Atlantic City Table of Fre-
quency Allocations and associated radio regulations. Over three
years later, there has been no acceptable position and plan for the
implementation of this Table for more efficient and orderly use of
this limited resource.
Experience of the past three years has highlighted the diffi-
culties of implementation under the procedures envisaged at Atlantic
City. Lack of plans and policy plays a large part in the inability
of all countries concerned to agree upon implementation. It was
obvious to the Board, in view of the forthcoming meeting of the
Administrative Council of the ITU in Geneva in April, 1951, that
special steps would have to be taken to overcome the lack.
Accordingly, in October and November of 1950, the Board dis-
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cussed the problem with the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the ChairMan of the Federal Communications
Commission. The Board proposed that these three officials constitute
themselves into an ad hoc committee, and take responsibility for
reviewing the political and technical difficulties contributing to
the impasse, and for recommending workable policies for the Govern-
ment to follow. The Board further recommended that this ad hoc
group enlist the help of a small panel of especially qualified persons,
who would make an objective appraisal of the factors of national in-
terest involved, independent of the particular interests of any
claimant agency.
The proposal was accepted; the ad hoc group was formed, and
the independent panel set up in January, 1951.
Since the beginning of World War II, the allocation of radio
frequencies has been increasingly an engineering and executive mutter
and not merely a record-keeping problem. However, the U. S. has
failed even to maintain adequate records of frequency assignments.
Sound frequency management could find ways of greatly reducing the
pressure of the demand for radio frequencies, bringing it more into
keeping with the supply. Under present management and policy, that
pressure has grown to dangerous proportions. In the ten years between
1939 and 1949, the number of discrete frequency assignments between
4 and 20 Mc used by the U. S. was doubled. The growth of U. S.
international long-distance broadcasting has greatly increased. the
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demand for frequency assignments. In the critical world situation,
there is little chance that the pressure will be reduced. The only
solution is improved policy for the use of radio and better manage-
ment of the radio spectrum.
Most of the differences of opinion between the Federal Government
and industry users of the radio spectrum spring from lack of informa-
tion concerning the relative needs of Government and industry for
radio and the relative division of the spectrum. Previous estimates
of the relative division of the spectrum have been based on non-
representative methods of evaluation. Measured in terms of spectrum
space rather than number of discrete frequency assignments, the
Federal Government's share, though not so great as is commonly
believed, is nevertheless large. While we do not know whether this
use is out of proportion to the Government's responsibilities, it is
apparent that it must have the most adequate justification and careful
management if the greatest benefit is to be obtained from this resource.
Pressures for additional, suitable channels in the VHF region
for television broadcasting pose a major immediate problem. By the
end of 1950 the estimated investment in tangible property alonb of
107 television stations and 10.6 million receivers amounted to about
$3 billion. Television net time sales for 1950 were estimated at
about 84 million. Most of the existing receivers will have to be
modified or provided with adapters to receive additional channels
regardless of their location in the radio spectrum. The great growth
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of television broadcasting, agitation for the reservation of VHF
channels for educational purposes, and the discovery of tropospheric
interference have demonstrated that 12 VHF channels are insufficient
to meet the stated needs. The space desired for television is now
used for essential services of the Federal Government and non-Govern-
ment users with great investments in time, money, and development
resources which should not bo jeopardized by woving the peremptory of
these services, In addition, the entire VHF band of 270 Mc is insuffi-
cient to accommodate the apparent desire for a total of at least 324 Mc.
This Board is of the opinion that a $ 3 billion, rapidly growing
industry and a multi-billion dollar Federal Government investment for
defense, civil aviation,and other essential non-Government services
cannot long be left in this uncertain situation. Because of the rapid
increase in the number of new, individually-owned receivers--over
700,000 in December 1950--frequency allocations cannot be changed
easily and mistakes reach far into the future. This major problem
alone emphasizes the need for a high-level permanent agency concerned
with telecommunications and with the resolution of problems involving
the interest of both the Federal Government and non-Government users.
No temporary Board could hope to resolve them.
The high frequency portion of the spectrum between 4 and 27.5
MC prosonto the gravest problem because of its multiple use for
medium and long-distance telecommunications, tropical and long-distance
broadcasting and other services and because of its international
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aspects. Better and more far-sighted management and regulation
might have averted some of these difficulties. The full possibili.,
ties of the radio spectrum have not yet been realized, but are being
approached. Exploitation of the spectrum is not static but is fluid,
increasing with the cooperation and good will of users, improvements
in equipment, operating techniques, circuit discipline, need, and
willingness to accept a poorer grade of service where necessary.
It is not likely that the improvements derived from these measures
will keep pace with the demands uhless energetic steps are taken
to establish an agency competent to assure the best circuit dis-
cipline, equitable allocation_of frequency channels, and full use
of technical developments.
Conclusions
1. Pressure on the radio frequency spectrum is steadily in-
creasing as a result of the greater tise of radio in telecommunications.
2. The means on which we have relied in the past for manage-
ment of the spectrum are no longer adequate to resolve in the best
national interest the problems produced by this increasing pressure.
The current difficulty growing out of the search for suitable space
for television broadcasting in itself emphasizes this inadequacy.
3. Measured in terms. of spectrum space rather than in number
of discrete frequency channels, the Federal Government's share of
the spectrum, though not so great as is commonly believed, is never-
theless large. While we do not know that it is out of proportion
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to the Government's responsibilities, it must have the most adequate
justification and careful management if the greatest benefit is to
be obtained from it.
4. There is need for a continuing determination of the changin
requirements of Federal Government users both among themselves and
in relation to the requirements of other users.
5. The recent rapid worldwide growth of telecommunications,
combined with the needs of the current national emergency, makes the
resolution of these problems a matter of great urgency.
6, The resolution of these problems can be secured only through
adequate, energetic management, which demands that the Government
organize itself to take a comprehensive view of the telecommunications
field.
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provide the backbone of military telecommunications in time of
emergency. The dependence of the armed forces upon the domestic
telecommunications facilities of the United States is indicated
by the following statement made to the Board by the Department
of Defense:
"The nerve system of National Defense is the sum
total of all communication systems that are available,
operationally and potentially, for the prosecution of
any emergency or war effort. The operational existence
of nation-wide systems of rapid voice and record communi-
cations in peacetime is indispensable from the standpoint
of meeting the wartime requirements of both the military
services and the civil economy. As the intensity and com-
plexity of warfare continue 4 to increase, correspondingly
greater demands will be placed on the communication systems
of the nation from the standpoint of both circuit capacity
and flexibility of operation. It is, therefore, considered
in the vital interest of National Defense that there be
maintained within the United States to meet that need as
many nation-wide commercial communication systems as are
economically feasible."
Civil Defense,-- Since the outbreak of the Korean action in June,
1950, the attention of the people and Government-Federal, State,
and city--has been drawn to the need to plan and organize for civil
defense.
For the over-all national interest there must be sound, modern,
efficient nationwide systems for the rapid handling of telecommunica-
tions. From the standpoint of national security and civil defense,
and in view of the possibility of sabotage, strikes, and catastrophe,
duplicate systems should be maintained. Circuits between key points
should not be concentrated in one cable, on one pole line, nor on
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one radio been route. Nor should all terminal equipment serving key
points be housed in one building. The dispersion and duplication of
facilities should be considered in all telecommunications planning
for the future. In planning the defense of our cities against
bombing, we need to be sure that communication can be maintained
both within and between cities, and that emergency means are available
for communication with the populace by radio.
The TWO Basic Stems.--Although the telephone and telegraph
systems do not offer precisely the same kind of service, each can
and does serve at least as a partial substitute or replacement for
the other for emergency telecommunication. Much of their outside
plant facilities can be used interchangeably.
To provide the nation with an adequate system for both peace
and war, these two basic networks for telecommunications should be
developed and maintained. Practical considerations will limit the
extent to which alternate routings will be feasible; but within these
limits, each network should maintain separate inside and outside
plant facilities with alternate circuit routes and terminals.
In the discussion which follows, the soundness of the nation's
telephone system is apparent. On the contrary, the telegraph industry
has passed through a succession of crises which probably are not over.
Current improvements in the position of the industry afford an oppor-
tunity to develop information needed for sound, long-range planning
to avoid future difficulties. Ile believe that sound management
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and vigorous technological development can contribute further to
the stability of the domestic telegraph system.
The Telephone System
The nation's telephone system consists of the Bell System with
approximately 34 million telephones, together with some 5,000
independent telephone companies operating an additional 8 million
telephones.
Units of the Bell System are the American Telephone and TelegrapL
Company, its general departments and its long lines department, 20
associated Bell operating companies, Western Electric Company, and
the Bell Telephone Laboratories. The independent companies are
served by a healthy manufacturing industry which has pioneered many
important technical advances such as the use of dial telephones.
Description of the Bell System
The Bell System's primary undertaking is the furnishing of
telephone service. Through interconnecting arrangements with the
independent companies, it provides domestic local and long-distance
telephone service to the 42 million U. S. telephones, and international
telephone service with nearly all of the balance of the estimated 72
million world telephones.
The Bell System also leases to its clients telephone and tele-
graph circuits for various domestic services, maintains a teletypewriter
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exchange service (TWX), a telephone service to land mobile units aad
to aircraft, and telephone service to overseas points and to ships
at sea, the latter divided into two categories, coastal harbor and
high seas.
The Bell System in 1949 had total assets of nearly $11 billion
and a gross annual revenue of nearly
3 billion. It owns or controls
about 80% of the telephones and receives about 90% of the revenues
1/
of the domestic telephone systems. -
General reliance upon telephone service is so widespread in the
nation that to itemize uses of it would be to labor the obvious.
Its public acceptance is evidenced by the fact that there is now a
telephone for every 4 persons in the country. For the present pur-
pose, this over-all contribution of the telephone industry to the
national interest is taken for granted, and other individual contri-
butions are discussed specifically.
The Bell S stem and the National SeparlLy
The national security requires that there be available, to expand
or supplement the military communications system, a nationwide effi-
cient, integrated, and diversified domestic telephone system operated
by persons loyal to the United States. Defense planning should also
include multiple automatic communications systems on a national grid
???????????=0111....
1/ Attachment III-A gives selected Bell System statistics which
reflect the size, growth, and importance of the Bell System and some
comparative data with the totals for all telephone carriers for 1949.
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to insure continuous operation if key points are destroyed. Further,
we must plan for essential expansion, and stock critical materials.
Efficient, fully functioning civil operations which support the
military operations are also necessary to a successful war effort.
To function properly, civil activities such as commerce, manufacturing,
transportation, exercise of Government, civil defense, fire protec-
tion, and public information must have adequate rapid communication.
In time of national emergency, the communications networks must
be expanded to include many new manufacturing plants and military
posts. Communications must be provided for fire protection and guard
systems for these plants and posts. Convenient telephone pay stations
must be furnished for workmen and military personnel. Frequently,
trunklines as well as local facilities must be expanded.
In World War II the Bell System provided 400,000 miles of inter-
city leased circuits and 2,600 teletypewriter stations, built new
facilities for over 3,000 military establishments, and provided
600,000 telephones for them. Aircraft warning service was provided
for 58 Information and Filter Centers, handling Army Flash Calls at
a peak rate of 30 million annually.
During World War II public telephones were installed at 201
camps (housing over 5,000 men each), at 376 attended locations in-
volving about 3,000 attendants and. nearly 19,000 telephones. Tele-
phone facilities were also provided for 88 hospitals with 1,000 or
more beds, with 102 attended locations, 584 attendants, and over
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4,600 telephones. The demands of World War II increased the tele-
phone calls per month from 2.8 million in 1940 to 3.3 million in
19451 an increase of 18%. To meet these requirements, the Dell System
expanded from 17 million telephones, 89 million miles of wire, and
$4.7 billion invested in plant in 1940 to 22 million telephones, 99
million miles of wire, and $5.7 billion invested in plant in 1945.
The Bell System provides trained telecommunications personnel.
In World War I, 14 telegraph battalions were formed with men from
the Bell System. In World War II, communications specialists cadres
were designated to provide a nucleus of experienced telephone men
within each of 380 Signal Corps units. For these units 4,250
officers and enlisted men came from the Bell System. Over 400 addi-
tional Bell System specialists volunteered under this plan for desig-
nated commissioned staff positions in the Signal Corps. In all,
nearly 70,000 men and women from the Bell System entered the military
services during the war. Four affiliated units were ordered to active
duty in 1950 after the start of the fighting in Korea. In addition,
many trained civilian telephone operators replaced military operators.
During World War II the Bell System operated 26 plant schools,
training 7,235 men for the armed forces.
The system's laboratories helped materially in the development
of new tools of war. Telephone research conducted in peacetime proved
to be valuable in many military problems, enabling the Bell labora-
tories to make major contributions to such projects as gun directors,
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rockets, torpedoes, guided aerial missiles, detection of submarines
and magnetic mines, airplane crew trainers, propagation of micro-
waves, and microwave relay equipment. In an, over 1,200 military
research projects were carried through to completion.
The extensive resources of the Bell System also mean that large
quantities of critical items of materials and equipment can be stored
for war emergency use.
The extensive manufacturing facilities of the Western Electric
Company, a Bell System subsidiary, made it possible to produce large
quantities of urgently-needed equipment for communications and
military purposes.
The Bell qyfitem and the National Economy
The Bell System in 1949 received for its domestic communications
services nearly 13 billion. It paid out about $2 billion in wages
and salaries to some 600,000 employees, and about $346 million in
taxes, and collected for the Federal Government about $444 million
in excise taxes. Operating disbursements of about
addition to wages and taxes, were made to
viduals. Dividends of about $216 million
500 million, in
other companies and indi-
were paid to nearly a million
stockholders. Capital expenditures of over $I billion were made for
expansion. The. system's major contribution to the national economy,
difficult to measure in dollars but nonetheless real, is the increase
in business attributable to the convenience of rapid communication.
The Bell System and the connecting companies network provides
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widespread facilities for distribution of international wire and
radio telephone messages. These facilities connect the nearly 42
million telephones in the U. S. with nearly 30 million telephones
in 86 other countries of the world. In 1949 about 620,000 overseas
and high-seas telephone calls were completed, producing about $7
million in revenue.
Trends in the Bell S stem
Technological Trends.--The domestic telephone communications
systems have made many mechanical and technical advances which have
improved the quality and speed of service. The "hearability" of
the telephone has been improved about four-fold in the past 20 years
through the use of newly-developed equipment and techniques. Greater
use of automatic equipment has reduced the average time of completing
toll and long distance calls from 1.8 minutes in 1948 to 1.5 minutes
in 1949, with 95 out of every 100 being completed while the calling
party was holding the line.
Dial telephones have been increased to 73% of the total. New
type toll switching systems enable customers in large areas to dial
their own calls directly to other cities beyond their local calling
areas.
The provision of the teletypewriter exchange has made it possible
for any one teletypewriter to be connected to any other of the 25,000
teletypewriters in the system.
Coaxial cable and microwave relay have appreciably increased the
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available channel capacity and improved in great measure the quality
of electrical transmissions.
Manual switching or relaying has been greatly reduced through
the use of improved automatic switching systems. Toll dialing equip-
ment is now in operation to permit operators to dial toll calls
straight through on 25,000 toll circuits to over 600 cities or towns.
Economic Trends.--Since 1939 average hourly earnings in the
telephone industry have increased 70% and costs of materials have
increased more than proportionally. For instance, in 1949, electro-
lytic copper was 2.2 times its 1939 cost, zinc 3.3 times the 1939
cost, and lead 3.38 times the 1939 cost. These rising costs have
been offset in part by operating economies and by local rate increases.
From the early days of the telephone, revenues from local service
have generally followed business conditions, lagging behind somewhat
and fluctuating to a lesser extent. Through the years there has
been an increase in the number of local calls that can be made without
increasing the subscriber's monthly bill.
World lothr II started another cycle of rising costs which the
company has sought to offset by requesting increased local rates.
With earnings below the average of the previous 25 years, the Bell
Telephone Companies, faced with rising costs and wages and the need
to expand plant facilities, in 1946 secured local rate increases in
8 states and requested rate increases in 16 others-. By 1949 increases
in local rates had become effective in, or had been requested in,
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practically every state.
Though increases in local telephone rates
have varied for different classes of service in different places,
the increases requested (including those already granted) averaged
about 20% of the Bell System revenues.
The U. S. Treasury Department 1947 study entitled "Excise Taxes
on Communications" summarized the subject of rates as follows:
"Rates charged on local telephone service vary among
localities and are subject to differences in State regula-
tory practices. Following increases made after World War
there were no important changes in basic rates until
1946. There was a slight decline between 1935 and 1941,
but no change in prices to consumers during the war except
for the increase in excise tax. Although basic rates re-
mained substantially unchanged for a long period, the rate
of return permitted to be earned has shown a long-term
decline. Rates probably were not reduced during the period
between the wars because the increase in the demand for
local telephone service apparently leads to higher unit
costs which the companies have only been able to offset by
technological developments and increased employee work loads.
Because of higher costs, rates are now being increased."
Since 1919 interstate long distance rates have been periodically
reduced, under the jurisdiction of both the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the FCC. Over the period, 14 reductions have been
made. Most recent action was taken on January 19, 1951, when the
FCC directed that A. T. & T. and its 20 affiliates in the United
States file a statement before March 23 on the basis of which decision
would be taken on a possible interim reduction of long-distance rates.
Hearings to determine whether existing rates are unjust, unreasonable
and burdensome were scheduled to begin April 16.
The Commission's order was taken as occasion by the National
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Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners (NARUC)--
representative of the state commissions whose responsibility is for
intrastate rates as distinguished from the interstate toll rates
with which FCC is concerned--to petition to intervene and seek
enlargement of the issues. The NARUC move was strongly endorsed by
Senator Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona, Chairman of the Communications
Subcommittee of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.
In a letter to the Commissioners, January 30, 1951, Senator McFarland
said in part:
"The problem of disparity in telephone rates has disturbed me
for a long time although I appreciate that it is commendable on
the part of the Federal regulatory agency to be vigilant in
attempting to avoid an inordinately high return to the American
company on its plant investment. The trouble is that the
general public does not realize that every move that is made
to reduce long distance toll rates results directly or indi-
rectly in an eventual increase in local exchange rates and in
intrastate toll telephone rates.
"Some of the examples...of differences between an interstate
toll rate and an intrastate rate for an identical or nearly
identical mileage are almost fantastic. For instance, the
three minute station-to-station rate between Florence and Yuma,
Arizona, is $1.05 while the rate for the some service between
Yuma and Winterhaven,Californial is 800 although the telephone
route mileage is identical, namely 197 miles
"We all know that the nationwide telephone plant is a complex
and closely integrated structure and that over the years no
separation formula has been wholly fair or wholly satisfactory
either to the American company and the associated companies or
to the 48 state commissions. But one thing is clear to all
of us--there would be no long distance toll business without
the local plant and the local telephone instrument in each home
and business....
',The fact remains that while the Commission (FCC) has ordered
long distance rates lowered, local exchange and intrastate rates
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have steadily increased. Moreover, while wages and other general
expenses of doing business have increased tremendously, those
who use the long distance actually get cheaper service. In my
judgment, this anomaly cannot be explained away by merely in-
sisting that greater volume of long distance business has
brought this about since it is clear without any question that
the basic volume increase is due largely to the tremendous
expansion of local facilities."
The Western Union Telegraph Company also filed a petition to
intervene, on the ground that a substantial reduction of long-distance
rates might adversely affect its financial stability. The General
Services Administration of the Federal Government also petitioned
to intervene, citing that the Government is among the largest single
customers of the Bell System.
Total taxes on the Bell System's telephone service in 1949 aggre-
gated nearly $800 million--an increase of about $100 million over 1948.
Since the early days of the telephone, the gross revenues of the
telephone systems and in particular the Bell System have increased
rapidly except for a temporary regression following 1930. By about
1940 the Bell System had again reached the revenue level of 1930,
and the impetus of World War II increased its earnings even more
rapidly until in 1949 its gross revenues were nearly $3 billion.
The capital investment, operating expenses, and taxes showed
the same general rise from 1925 to 19500 increasing more rapidly
since World War II. As a result the per cent return on capital of
the Bell System (including Western Electric) showed a steady decline
from a high of 8.7% in 1927 and 1928 to 4.3% in 1933, then fluctuated
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between a high of 7% in 1940 and a low of 4.5% in 1947, reaching
4.9% in 1949. The average return for the 25-year period was 6.26%.
Through 1931 the A. T. & T. never failed to earn its dividend.
In the next 17 years, there were 9 years when the dividend was not
earned but was paid partly out of the surplus accumulated over the
years. The Bell System at the end of 1949 had a surplus applicable
to A. T. & T. stock of over $340 million.
With minor exceptions there has been for some years a monopoly
of telephone service in each area. Rates and services, instead of
being controlled by competition, are now regulated by State commissions
and the Federal Communications Commission. Although there are more
than 5,000 telephone companies in the U. Soy the Bell System is the
dominant unit in the domestic telephone communications field. Actual
ownership of the Bell. System is now in the hands of nearly 1 million
stockholders.
General Trends.--The growth of the Bell System reflects the im-
portance of the telephone to U. S. industry and social life.
The requirements of the public for rapid, flexible record com-
munications led to the expansion of the Bell Systems private line
service, begun before 1890, and its teletypewriter exchange service
(Mc), started in 1931. Together these total nearly 48,000 stations,
with revenues of ;ri)46 million in 1949.
Mobile radio telephone service for ships and small craft has
existed for a number of years. State and city police have used private
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mobile radio telephones since the early 1930ts. The second world
war increased the demand for communications in all circumstances.
In response to this requirement, the Bell System in 1946 inaugurated
the new domestic public lard mobile radio telephone service, pro-
viding for connection via radio and wire with any other telephone
in the nation. By the end of 1949 it was available in 144 areas, and
on certain railroad trains.
Influences Affectin the Bell S,stem
Public demand is a powerful instrument in shaping the policy and
operations of the Bell System. Demands for better quality and faster
and cheaper service, and the company's pride of performance, have led
to many technical and operational improvements. Subscriber objec-
tion to delays in completion of toll calls and the ever-increasing
volume of calls stimulated the establishment of the toll dialing
system. Demands for long distance telephone service beyond the
capacity of existing plant facilities led to the development of the
carrier system, the coaxial cable, and the microwave radio relay.
Through arrangements between Western Union and the telephone
company, a telephone subscriber may dictate a telegram to the Western
Union operator and have the cost charged to the monthly telephone bill.
The telephone company collects the charge, deducts its commission
for the work performed, and pays Western Union. Conversely, Western
Union frequently makes delivery of telegrams by telephone. In addition
to the normal telephone service furnished to Western Union, the
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telephone company also leases considerable circuit mileage to Western
Union for its use. At the same time, the Bell System competes with
Western Union for record communication business through its tele-
typewriter exchange service, private line teletypewriter, and some
telegraph service.
The Bell System is closely related to other domestic telecommu-
nications systems such as are used by broadcasting, airlines, and
other companies, because it leases to them the circuits which make
these systems possible.
The Telegraph System.
Rapid record delivered telegram service in the United States is
provided principally by the Western Union Telegraph Company. The
service involves the carrier's taking possession of a message, charging
for it on a word-count basis, and conveying it by rapid means to the
addressee. The business came into being something over a century
ago, displacing the Pony Express familiar in American legend. During
the past twenty years, the telegraph business has undergone a number
of economic vicissitudes. In an effort to overcome these, the Congress
in 1943 permitted merger of the Postal Telegraph Company with the
Western Union Telegraph Company. As the company neared the start of
its second century, increased business and industrial activity in the
United States and increased alertness and aggressiveness on the part
of Western Union's management combined in April 1950 to change the
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earning status of the company for the better. Western Union in
1950 showed an encouraging net income after several years of deficit
operation.
The troubles of the telegraph industry Fave concern to Congress
as many as fifteen or sixteen years ago. The 1943 merger action
stemmed from those troubles. Recommendation has been made from time
to time that a thoroughgoing long-range study of the problems oftele-
graph communication should be made by appropriate Government authority.
The most recent such recommendation was that of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission in 1946, but the necessary funds were not made
available by Congress. Present performance and immediate prospects,
however encouraging, do not eliminate the need for such a study.
Descripti2p.ofWestern.Union Telegraph Comnam
Since its incorporation in 1851, Western Union has gradually
developed into an integrated nationwide telegraph system through
purchase, lease, or stock ownership of more than 500 telegraph proper-
ties. The merger of the Postal Telegraph company with Western Union
in 1943 virtually completed this process. The system operates as a
regulated monopoly under the provisions of the Communications Act,
which places regulation of interstate and foreign communications by
telephone and telegraph, both wire and radio, in the hands of the
Federal Communications Commission. Purely intrastate wire communica-
tion does not fall within Commission juricdiction.
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The provisions of the Act require that common carriers subject
thereto furnish service at reasonable charges upon reasonable reeuest.
Without Commission approval, carriers may not construct or acquire
interstate lines or curtail or discontinue service. All charges,
practices, classifications, and regulations must be just, reasonable
and non-discriminatory. Common carriers file with the Commission
tariff schedules for regulatory purposes.
Western Union as it operates today under this public sanction
webs the nation with more than a million miles of open wire and almost
380,000 miles of wire in undergound and overhead cables. This outside
plant, directly or through tributary lines of telephone companies,
serves almost 30,000 public telegraph agencies and offices and 22,000
private customer offices scattered over the nation. In PAdition, 42
million telephones in the United States are available to the ?subscri-
bers for the filing or receipt of telegrams.
Over 41,000 employees received more than $125 million in 1949
for operating and maintaining this system. More than 174 million
domestic telegram messages were handled An 1949, producing revenues
of '141 million at the average toll of about 82 cents per message.
Net investment in this communication plant runs over $172 million.
The largest customer of Western Union is the United States
Government, which as a single user, provides more than 3% of the
total domestic operating revenues of the company.
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Western Union offers a number of telegraph services, including
straight telegram, serial, day letter, night letter, telegraphic
money order, telemeter service, leased wire, custom-built tele-
graph systems, commercial news service, and illustrated telegram
service. In addition, it handles correct time service, messenger
errand service, messenger distribution service, collection and re-
mittance service, and American Express money orders and travelers'
checks.
While, historically, Western Union has been and still is a
wire system, it has recently begun to utilize radio in several
applications. One of these is the use of microwaves (radio beam)
to replace wire for trunkline channels. Another is the "telecar
service" which involves pickup and delivery of telegrams by
cruising automobiles connected by radio with the central office.
Still another is the marine reporting service, involving the re-
porting of vessels to the central office by radio.from pilot vessels.
By far the bulk of the traffic today is recorded on automatic
typewriters called "teleprinters" or on typing reperforators. The
old-fashioned manual Morse system is disappearing, while the fac-
simile method may emerge as a fully automatic device requiring little
operating labor. As the name implies, this method aims to reproduce
at the receiving end the material as offered for transmission--
written, printed, typed, or drawn matter.
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With the United States today a leader in world affairs, the need
for efficient international communictions is obvious. International
telegraph communications originate at or are destined to places all
over the United States. Bence a pickup and delivery facility is
necessary. This facility is provided for the general public by the
Western Union's nationwide system of wires and offices. The system
serves not only Western Union's overseas cable service but those of
other overseas cable and radiotelegraph companies. However, in gate-
way cities most of the commercial overseas companies handle a large
percentage of their own pickups and deliveries.
Western Union and National Security
With a few exceptions, the armed forces of the United States do
not construct or own domestic wire telegraph networks. Their domestic
telegraph requirements are met by normal telegram service provided by
Western Union and by lease of facilities from the telegraph and tele-
phone companies.
Potential demand for telegraph services in any ? future war may
be gauged by the demands made upon the telegraph industry in World
War II, Federal Government domestic messages rose from 2.5 million
in 1937 to more than 14.5 million at the war period peak ir 1943, or
almost six times. In addition, the armed forces began to lease tele-
graph lines from Western Union in significant volume in 1938 and these
facilities reached a war peak of 1,800 miles in 1944. The growth of
such service has been accelerated in the postwar period and had
reached 78,000 miles in September 1950.
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The telegraph industry also provides an immediate source of
'know-how " and facilities to meet special communications require-
ments of the military. In World War II, Western Union was called
upon to handle more than 7,000 spedial telegraph projects for war
purposes. These included development of special equipment to meet
military requirements, adaptation of existing equipment, and many
research assignments.
In peacetime the telegraph industry provides a ready reservoir
of trained communications personnel. More than 10,000 employees
of Wc3tern Union and Postal entered military service during World
War II. Assuming that the bulk of these performed military duty
for which they were already trained, the military was thus relieved
of much training effort. The industry not only had to train addi-
tional personnel handle increasing war business, but also had to
train replacements for those who entered the armed forces.
Well over $5 million was expended by the telegraph companies
to set up and operate training organizations. Taking advantage of
the school facilities, the military fitted hundreds of members of
the armed forces into these groups-, in order to reduce its own mam-
moth training job.
Apart from huge increases in the carriage of message?, special
circuit facilities and equipment were supplied to the Department of
State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Maritime Commission,
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the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of War Information,
Army, Navy, Army Anti-submarine Control, British Admiralty,
British Air Commission, other governmental agencies, and many
large basic war industries. Special telegram services were created,
including the casualty message procedure, the Expeditionary Force
Message, the Homeward Bound Message, and the reduced rate telegraph
money order.
Telegraphic communication "know-how," research, and development
contributed to the solution of many military communications problems.
Special automatic equipment and circuits were involved, such as
radio multiplex, telekrypton, telefax, varioplex on ocean cables,
multiple film scene selector, reperforator switching, means for
generation of additional channels from existing wire line plant,
etc. While some of these activities produced results applicable
in peacetime, others tended to defer the normal long-range program
of modernization.
Western Union and the National Econ2my
Significant measures of Western Unions participation in the
domestic economy are the following rounded figures for 1949:
Total net investment in communication
plant $172,000,000
Operating revenues $171,000,000
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Total telegraph offices 29,400
Telegraph revenue messages handled 174,000,000
Number of employees
(October 31, 1949) 41,600
Total employee compensation $125,900,000
Total interest charges
(domestic and overseas) $ 3,150,000
Federal and State taxes
paid by company $ 5,775,000
Federal excise taxes -
paid by customers $ 36,500,000
Trends in Western Union
Technological Trends
Transmission of domestic telegraph messages for many years was
accomplished almost wholly by the manual method, employing the
Morse "dot-dash' code.
In 1915 Western Union began a series of technological improve-
ments with the introduction of the "automatic multiplex telegraph
system" on its trunkline network. In this system the circuit is
multiplexed" into two or more channels, each of which can carry a
message in two directions simultaneously. The system is "automatic"
in that the sending operator, by operating a keyboard, punches a tape
which is automatically fed into the system and the transmission is
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automatically received on an electric typewriter at the receiving
end of the channel. The new system improved accuracy and speed of
service, raised the productivity of operators, and obviated large
capital expenditures which would otherwise have been necessary to
carry increasing volumes of traffic with equal or improved quality
of service.
In 1926 a modified version of the automatic system, known as
the "simplex printing telegraph system," was applied to circuits con-
necting main offices to branch offices and to smaller independent
offices in other communities. By 1928 most of the telegraph companies'
branch offices had been so equipped. At this point, to round out the
automatic system, the telegraph companies began making installations
of this type in the offices of larger customers.
Because, with little instruction, an ordinary typist could send
and receive telegrams on them, these electric telegraph "typewriters"
were well received by the larger users of the telegraph service. The
installation of simplex printers made it unnecessary for a customer
who wanted a rapid service to employ a Morse operator. The telegraph
companies were also interested in avoiding the delay and expense of
messnger pickup and delivery. Today more than 20,000 such printers
are in customers' service and many thousands more are in use in tele-
graph offices operated directly or indirectly by Western Union itself.
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Even with the automatic system, a telegram moving across the
country had to be typed manually from two to six or even seven times
en route. To eliminate such labor-consuming, delaying, and error-
producing manual re-transmissions, the company initiated a limited
program of reperforator switching at its larger relay offices. By
1943 several of its larger offices had been converted to this type
of operation, but, because of war conditions, the program was more
or less suspended. Following the merger of Postal with Western
Union in the fall of 1943, an extensive program to modernize and
mechanize the combined operation and plant and to improve telegraph
service was planned.
Insofar as reperforator relay switching is concerned, the pro-
gram, originally scheduled to be completed in seven years, was
speeded up in January 1946. The dire necessity for reducing costs
and improving handling methods accelerated the reperforator switching
plan to the extent that the objectives sought at the time of merger
are today practically realized. In this system each area relay
center has direct circuit connections with every other area relay
center, thus avoiding relays through intermediate centers.
In the early 1930's Western Union undertook to investigate the
possibilities of facsimile to transmit and record reproductions of
printed, typed, and hand-written copy. The system was tried on both
intercity trunk circuits and on short lines between the customers1
and branch offices and main offices. By 1934 it was determined that,
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in its then state of development, facsimile had a speed in words
per minute far below that of other systems in use at the time.
Nevertheless, developmental work continued and some installations
were made until the project had to be suspended during the war.
Emerging after the war was the desk-fax, a small and relatively
inexpensive machine capable of sending and receiving messages. The
operation requires no skill. It is fully automatic once the message
blank is placed in the machine and the starting button depressed.
As part of Western Union's postwar program, more than 2,000 desk-
fax units have been installed in customers' offices. The company's
management believes that the desk-fax promises to solve, in part
at least) the perplexing problem of quick and economical pickup and
delivery of telegrams.
To assist in the solution of the pickup and delivery problem
at branch and "agency" offices, installation of transmitting and
recording facsimile equipment designed to handle a substantial volume
of telegrams is part of Western Union's current program of plant
improvement.
One of the heavy expense burdens borne by the communications
industry is the construction and maintenance of its trunk circuit
plant. Over the years, Western Union has continued the erection of
stronger and better pole lines, replacing the less desirable and less
efficient iron wire with copper, and substituting underground cable
for aerial lines in congested areas.
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In 1934 Western Union commenced the use of carrier current
telegraphy in its network of trunk facilities. Carrier operation
permits the derivation of a multiplicity of circuits from a smaller
number of wires. Even when the cost of the terminal equipment
necessary to derive the additional circuits is deducted, the savings
over the construction of new wire lines are high.
By 1944 carrier current telegraph had developed to the extent
that installations between New York and Washington provided 36 high-
speed two-way telegraph circuits on two physical wires. By this
time: it was clear to Western Union that carrier operation was a vast
improvement over the "ground return" single wire trunk circuit opera-
tion then in general use.
Western Union's wire plant in 1930 comprised 219,000 miles of
pole line and over 1.5 million miles of open wire. The merger of
Postal with Western Union in 1943 added 31,000 miles of Postal line
and 334,000. miles of wire, but, because of its physical condition,
most of this equipment was dismantled after World War II.
By 1950 Western Union's wire plant had contracted to 205,000
miles of pole line (of which 98,000 miles are railroad lines shared
by Western Union) and to a little over 1 million miles of wire.
In addition to this plant, the company installed and operates
more than 800 miles of multi-channel radio beam, and leases from
the telephone companies 1.25 million miles of carrier channels.
The demands of World War 11 accelerated research and development
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in the use of radio, particularly on frequencies above 30 million
cycles. Much was learned about the behavior and use of frequencies
from 30 million to 10 billion cycles. From this research, it has
become possible to adapt radio beams to the transmission of record
communications.
Radio beam (microwave) relay involves the construction of a
series of towered radio stations along the desired route, spaced
about 30 miles apart. The beam system obviates the otherwise neces-
sary continuous rights of way, pole lines, cross arms, and wires.
As a result of the mechanization program, Western Union states
that its modernized telegraph plant is capable of handling more than
double the present telegraph volume. Percentage utilization of plant
available for message business as of October 1950 was as follows:
Daily peak period (one-half hour)
32%
Over 24-hour weekday
11%
Over Saturday-Sunday weekend
4%
The company declares that it recognizes the vital importance
of maintaining separate trunking systems as between oral and record
communications. Asked what its intentions were as between leasing
of trunk-line facilities from the Bell System and the continued
construction of its radio beam system, Western Union told the Presi-
dent's Communications Policy Board on November 6, 1950:
"Contrary to the impression that may have been created
by Western Union's increasing use of facilities leased from
telephone companies in recent years, Western Union has at
the present time and intends to retain in the future a com-
prehensive network of physical facilities entirely independent
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of telephone facilities....
"Western Union has substantially completed large-scale
rebuilding of its circuit facilities on an FM carrier
basis. This has involved the transposition and loading
of physical wires on which FM carrier was imposed, the
addition of FM carrier on radio beam voice bands and as
required, on leased voice bands. Its radio beam system
linking New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and Pittsburgh,
is in operation, and in connection with the expansion of
this system the Company has planned routes across the nation
and has acquired tower sites as far west and south as
Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and Atlanta.
"These plans reflect Western Union's recognition of
the advisability, in the in'...erest of national security,
that a nationwide network of telegraph trunking circuits
be for reasons of physical security separate from the cir-
cuits carrying voice communications. Given favorable econo-
mic conditions and the high level of demand for circuits
that makes radio beam systems economically justifiable, we
envisage over a period of time a radio beam system pro-
viding trunk facilities between major cities, replacing
leased facilities and some parts of Western Union's
existing wire plant.
"The speed and extent of the expansion of the radio
beam system are necessarily dependent, however, upon the
establishment of National Policy. Western Union's ability
to obtain necessary capital funds for the expansion will
be influenced in major degree by the establishment of
National Policy strengthening its financial position; and
the expansion can be justified as a matter of economics
only if National Policy is formulated to the end that
telegraph traffic which has been diverted from Western
Union be returned to it."
As of December 31, 1949, Western Union's outside plant facilities
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Miles of Line
Jointly
100.
Percent
Facility
Owned
Leased
Lu?sed.
Pole Line
88,169
_Owned
13,272
6,359
5.90
Tire
1,030,000
11,040
25,750
24.10
Aerial Cable
72,758
19)308
257
.27
Underground Cable
260,012
15,057
1,992
7.20
Carrier SylIpm Miles
Channel
On Owned
Wires
On Owned
Radio Ream
Leased Voice
FreallenLy 1/
Percent
Leased 1/
300 cycles
72,908
6,908
36,531
31.4
150 cycles
212,641
75,216
1,206,240
80.7
Other
7,898
1/ Almost wholly from A. T. & T. and
The relative costs per telegraph
associated companies
channel mile, assuming the
actual assignments made to the various types
by Western Union in October 1950 as:
of service, were stated
1. For Western Union lines $19.70
2. For lines leased from telephone company 5.30
3, For microwave 6.30
In summary, basic technological developments in Western Union
have been directed not only toward economy in investment, reduction
in operating expense, and improvements in existing services, but also
toward new services. Some of these are telemeter service and private
automatic telegram systems, and currently, a private telegraph network
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involving automatic switching centers located in Western Union offices
and operated by Western Union personnel.
Service Trends
Western Unions basic service is the transmission of telegraph
messages; this is supplemented, as has been explained, by a number
of allied services including the leasing of circuits. Discussion
of service trends hence involves message business, which can be
measured by the number of telegrams transmitted and by the revenues
they produce, and non-transmission business, the most convenient
measure of which is revenues.
MessaPe Business.--About 80% of Western Union's income is pro-
duced by telegrams, the most important of which is the full-rate
so-called "day message," which brings in almost 75% of the company's.
total public message service revenues. Business messages--those
concerned with commercial transactions as distinguished from personal
and social matters--account for about 75% of the total message volume.
The general trend of Western Union's message volume between 1927
and 1949 was downward. The reduced rate serial service, after a fast
build-up in 1934, had steadied down to about 7.5 million messages in
1949. Money order messages, on the other hand, show a rather healthy
long-range growth.
The reduced rate "timed wire service" classification, which had
reached a peak of 8.5 million messages in 1949, was ordered discon-
tinued by the Federal Communications Commission because it was found
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to be unjustly discriminatory.
The reduced rate greeting message--a "social" rather than "business"
service--had reached a record volume of 22 million in 1941. This
service and all other non-essential activities of Western Union were
ordered discontinued by the Board of War Communications in 1942 in
order to clear the lines for essential war traffic. They were not
restored after the war.
The number of Government transmission messages averaged around
7.5 million per annum between 1926 and 1941, rose to a peak of over
14.5 million per annum during the war years, then fell off to an
average of about 3 million, standing at less than 2.5 million in 1949.
Tho trend is similar for non-Government messages but not so pronounced.
These messages totaled 189 million in 1926 and dropped erratically
thereafter. They numbered 151 million in 1949.
With these changes in the character and quantity of transmission
messages, the total of all messages dropped by 30 million or 14%
between 1927 and 1949; because of rate increases, however, revenues
rose by $11 million or 8% over the same period. 1/
Western Union's message volume is sensitive in two ways to the
marked increase in the number of telephones in the United States.
The total of telephones of the Bell System, which serves over 80% of
the country's telephone subscribers, stood at about 12 million. in
1/ Attachments III-B and III-C
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1925, 17.5 million in 1940, 22.5 million in 1945, and over 33 million
in 1949. The telephone has probably taken over social and personal
business from the telegraph, The increase in the number of telephones
has increased the number of direct avenues to telegraph service, since
Western Union receives messages by telephone for transmission,
through cooperative billing arrangements with telephone companies.
Growth of air-mail service is another factor taken into account
in analyses of reasons for the decline in telegraph message business.
The question of dependability of delivery--a major consideration in
business transactions such as supply 75% of Western Union's message
volume--here has to be balanced against savings in cost.
Non-Transmission Business.--Non-transmission service revenues
increased from about $8 million in 1927 to almost 020 million in 1949,
a rise of 150%. Leased services and money order charges show almost
a steady climb during the same period. Measured service (telemeter),
for which the customer who is on a fixed connection with another
customer pays a rate based on the monthly accumulative number of
words transmitted, has grown from $36,000 in 1936, when the service
was established, to almost 02.5 million in 1949. I/ Altogether,
non-transmission revenues, which represented about 5.5% of all operating
revenues in 1927, had risen to 11% of the total in 1949.
A substantial portion of the increase in non-transmission business
1/ Attachment III-D
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104.
came from the increase in leased circuits. These in 1927 had pro-
duced revenues of slightly more than 2 million; by 1949 the figure
had risen to $7.5 million. An illustration of the growth of leased
facilities in the latter part of the period is given by data from
Western Union on facilities leased to Government agencies:
Year
Milos of
Revenues Circuits
Number of Western
Union-owned Printers
1937
4,800
100
4
1944
790,500
57)300
250
1949
1,421,200
106,000
470
1950
1,726,300*
135,000
600
*Estimated on basis of first eight months actual.
Some organizations operating leased facilities estimate that they
are saving from 20% to 40% of what their telegraph expenses would
otherwise be; it is likely that the increaseduse of leased circuits
has contributed to the decline in message business. An isolated
case cited by Western Union is a drop of 50% in monthly public message
revenue at its main office in Schenectady, New York, which is explained
as "caused mainly by the conversion of the file of our largest customer
there (General Electric) to a leased wire system set up by Western
Union for that company."
Need for thorough study of the situation is indicated by the fact
that though the leasing of circuits is growing, is regarded as saving
money for lessees, and is probably reducing Western 'Union's message
business, the question whether leasing gives Western Union any profit
cannot be firmly answered. In response to an inquiry from the Board
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105.
as to the profitability of leased wire service, Western Union reported:
1. The factors involved in a study of the over-all economics of
private wire systems are exceedingly complex, so that several months
would be required for completion of a study in process, and a direct
answer to the question could not be given.
2. The profit margin, if any, as indicated by the study thus far,
is small. The rental of out-station equipment and switching center
equipment is almost certainly done at a loss.
In its response, Western Union took occasion to comment that:
"In the operation of private wire service Western
Union has been faced with the Hobsonts choice of meeting
the rates of the Bell System, in which private telegraph.
and TWX systems are an insignificant part of the total
revenues and upon which a profit is relatively unimportant
to the well-being Of the telephone system, or go out of the
business and see an ever increasing proportion of the volume
record business diverted to the Bell System. Until there
is an over-all integration of rates for communications
service in accord with a national policy of fostering sound
economic conditions in the industry it seems that the kind
of chaotic situation that now exists in this field will
continue."
Influence of TWX,--Revenues of the teletypewriter exchange service
(TWX) to which Western Union referred have shown a significant in-
crease. In this service, the carrier provides the necessary terminal
teletypewriter equipment at the subscriberfs location and the desired
circuit for operation by the subscriber in the same manner as in
public telephone service. Time rather than words serves as the base
for the tolls.
In 1931, the first year TWX service was offered to the public,
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106.
revenues amounted to only $7,000. They climbed steadily to a peak
$23 million in 1943, fell to $13 million in 1946 and again climbed
to almost $18 million in 1949. Private line teletypewriter service,
without the exchange feature, brought the telephone companies $25.5
million in revenues in 1949, as against $9.5 million in 1935.
But here again there is need of knowledge. In October 1949 the
Chairman of the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce requested the Federal Communications
Commission to furnish information on the TWX service of the Bell
System. This subcommittee wanted data particularly on the TWX rate
structure, on whether the present rates would be compensatory if that
service were an independently operated organization, and also on the
extent to which TWX is servicing all business or only the lucrative
part thereof.
? The Federal Communications Commission, in responding to this
request, regretted "that it is not in a position at this time 25arch
19507 to furnish your committee with reliable data which would provide
the basis for some determination as to the extent to which current
rates for TWX service rendered by the Boll System Companies are com-
pensatory to those companies," pointing out that Bell System repre-
sentatives estimated that 4 current study would cost between $400,000
and $500,000 and require on their part from four to six months, and
that no study had been made since one in 1935, which is not considered
reliable for application to the situation today.
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107,
The Commission also made the following points:
1. On March 1, 1944, overtime rates for TWX service were
reduced from about one-third of the initial period rates to about
one-quarter, resulting in estimated annual savings of $2.4 million
to users.
2. On February 1, 1946, the initial period rates for con-
nections in excess of 350 miles were reduced by amounts ranging
from 5 cents to 65 cents, depending on the distance, with the over-
time rate and report charges being reduced proportionately. These
reductions resulted in estimated annual savings to users of $1 million.
Production.--The value and trend of operator productivity at
Western Union central offices in terms of equated messages per hour
worked are shown in Attachment III-E. From an average figure of
about 61 messages per hour in 1941, production fell off during the
war years to a low of about 55 in 1944. With the postwar introduction
of reperforator switching, production has climbed steadily to a high
of 113.2 equated messages per hour worked in June 1950.
The average number of revenue messages per man-hour in 1929 was
1.54. The current series shows an almost steady climb from 1.71
to 2.13 for this measure and indicates in effect improved efficiency
in the amount of labor time applied to the handling of each message
unit.
The figures are:
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Average Number
Revenue Message
Transmission Units 1/
Year (thousands)
Aggregate Hours
Paid For 2/
_J thousands)
108.
Average Number
Revenue Message
Transmission Units
Per Hour Paid For
1944
233,192
136,297
1.71
1945
245,162
132.476
1.85
1946
221,248
120,518
1.84
1947
224,629
107,917
2.08
1948
202,317
100,911
2.00
1949
186,031
87,205
2.13
1950 (7 months) 2/
45,064
2/
2/
Western Union Annual Report to FCC, 1949
Western Union Commercial Department Wage and Hour Reports
Not available December 1950
Speed of service performance and the trends for periods for which
data were readily available are given in Attachment III-F. These data
represent the quality of service at the 25 largest traffic offices
in the United States.
The relay drag figure represents the interval between the time
a message is received at a relay office and the time it is sent to
another office. The figure for reperforator-switching offices
averages about 8 minutes less than for manual offices, standing at
8.8 minutes in June 1948, and at 7 minutes in August 1950.
The trend of the manual figure is likewise downward since September
1948. The combined figure dropped from a high in 1943 of 14.8 minutes
to 9.6 minutes in Auqust 1950.
The average origin-to-destination speed of service is shown by
the lower graph indicating an improvement from the rates in September
1948 to January 1950. From then, the trend is upward again, standing
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109.
in August 1950 at 40 minutes for tie-line deliveries, 44 minutes
for telephone deliveries, and 48 minutes for messenger delivery.
As the foregoing figures suggest, perhaps the oldest and most
perplexing operational problem in the telegram service is the
terminal handling problem. Today a telegram may be economically
speeded across the country in a few minutes, but to get it to the
tranSmitting office and to deliver it from the receiving office
economically and speedily is another question.
While the terminal handling problem is not yet solved--and
indeed may not ever be fully solved--data on Western Union terminal
and originating handlings show the following trends in percentage
distribution of its load for the methods indicated:
Year
Messenger
Counter
--221122112M?
Termi- Oriel-
nating
Tie-Line
Termi-
nating
Origi-
nating
Termi-
nating
Origi-
nating
Termi-
Origi-
1928
80
50
1
26
13
18
6
______
6
1934
74
50
3
17
9
19
14
14
1940
66
40
2
16
15
26
17
18
1946
56
26
3
25
20
26
21
23
1950*
53
25
3
13
17
31
27
31
*February study.
Discounting any changes in the ratio of business to social telegrams,
it is clear that the trend is toward terminal handling by wire--princi-
pally by teleprinter, telephone, Morse, or facsimile as against the
costly messenger handling. Because telephone calls cost money to
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110.
Western Union and often result in handling confirmation of telephoned
telegrams, and, because teleprinters cost more than newly developed
facsimile equipment, Western Union has embarked on a postwar program
to install in large numbers of patrons offices facsimile equipments
such as the .desk-fax earlier mentioned.
Economic Trends
During the past 20 years, powerful economic forces, realignments,
and developments have had impact upon the rapid record communications
industry in the United States. Among the more important are rising
price levels, rising labor costs, increased taxation, new direct and
indirect competition, technological advances, and Government regula-
tion.
All these factors, with the possible exception of Government
regulation, have had telling effects, in one way or another, upon
practically all business enterprises'. But the high ratio of fixed
plant investment to revenues peculiar to public utility operation,
together with the active interest of State and Federal Government in
that operation, has restricted to some extent the ability of the tele-
graph industry to adjust to changing conditions in the same way, to
the same extent, and with the same rapidity, as an unregulated private
enterprise.
These factors were a challenge to management and a hazard to
corporate survival. They ultimately led to the inability of the Postal
Telegraph Company to operate at .a profit so that in -1943 it was
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demand for telegraph service and that Western Union should be able
to earn a profit in the near-term future.
In spite of that outlook, there is much to be gained by Government
authoritios--those responsible for regulation and those interested in
the industry for its national security value--in studying the financial
history and prospects of Western Union. One fact that stands out
immediately is the absence of adequate data on which to base fair
conclusions. Review of the company's difficulties should help to
indicate where these gaps need to be filled, as well as to provide
valuable lessons for the future when new economic problems are en-
countered.
An analysis of rapid record communications in relation to all rapid
domestic communications was made for the Board by Dr. Bonner Brown of
the Stanford Research Institute. He found that total intercity com-
munication revenues (including telephone, telegraph, and air mail)
fluctuated very closely with the country's gross national product,
but that record intercity revenues (of both telegraph and telephone
companies) have lagged behind. He prepared the table on page 113
to illustrate these trends.
Commenting on the trends disclosed by his analysis, Dr. Brown
declared:
"Both of the series--column 4 and column 5--show a rise in per-
centage in the late 201s, but the rise for record communications is
less, and, consequently, its proportion of the total communications
revenues had already started to fall. Whether the early 30's saw
the culmination of a growth period, or whether the data simply reflect
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113,
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND DOMESTIC COMMUNICATION REVENUES
1
Gross
Nat'l
Product
2
Total
Communi.
Revenues
3
Record
Communi.
Revenues
4
Percent
Col. 2 of
Coll. 1
5
Percent
Col. 3 of
Col. 1
6
Percent
Col. 3 of
Col. 2
(Billions)
(Millions)
(Millions)
1926
99.5
413
166
.41
.17
40.2
1927
97.6
437
165
.45
.17
37.9
1928
99.8
482
174
.48
.17
35.0
1929
103.8
538
187
.52
.18
34.8
1930
90.9
518
173
.57
.19
33.5
1931
75.9
474
150
.62
.20
31.8
1932
58.3
378
118
.65
.20
31.3
1933
55.8
350
114
.63
.20
32.7
1934
64.9
361
121
.56
.19
33.4
1935
72.2
392
125
.54
.17
32.8
1936
82.5
440
137
.53
.17
31.2
1937
90.2
460
140
.51
.16
30.5
1938
84.7
441
128
.52
.15
29.0
1939
91.3
467
131
.51
.14
27.0
1940
101.4
497
135
.49
.13
27.2
1941
126.4
586
153
.46
.12
26.1
1942
161.6
740
178
.46
.11
24.0
1943
194.3
915
204
.47
.10
21.3
1944
213.7
1010
210
.47
.10
20.8
1945
215.2
1127
217
.52
.10
19.3
1946
211.1
1118
204
.53
.10
18.3
1947
233.3
1161
230
.50
.10
19.8
1948
259.1
1286
219
.50
.08
17.1
1949
255.6
1347
211
.53
.08
15.6
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seems to be a general public feeling questioning the efficiency of
telegraph operations. Some improvement in volume could possibly
result from better service and from exploration of untapped sources
of business.
"The present international situation is one which appears to
assure a high and growing physical volume of business for the nation
as a whole for some years to come. This means communications acti-
vity at a high level, and there is even some indication from the
history of World War II that the relative decline in record communi-
cations revenues is checked in a period of international tension.
Nevertheless, our economy in recent years has been operating close
to capacity, so that physical volume either in business as a whole
or in record communication cannot be expected to increase very rapidly.
Prices are rising, and it is doubtful that they will be kept fully
in check, so that revenues can also rise from rate increases, but it
is to be remembered that rate changes are sluggish and follow price-
level changes only with considerable lag."
Influences on Revenues.--Trends in the use of rapid communications
services at five-year intervals over a quarter century are shown in
the following carrier revenue figures:
Air Mail 1,/
Telegraph Op-
erations of
Toll Telephone
Year Tele110.22_2L_C.9.11Mnias
(In thousands)
Landline Op-
erations of
Western Union
(and_EQatal) ., Total
1926
$ 996
$ 245,704
$ 15,881
$ 150,112
$ 412,693
1929
4,762
345,935
23,918
163,358
537,973
1934
5,316
235,093
17,987
102,557
360,953
1939
17,656
318,573
20,867
109,899
466,995
1944
79,734
720,014
36,641
173,207
1,009,596
1949
71,627
5/
1,064,521
6/
39,135
171,393
1,3461676
1/ Air mail - Includes domestic air-mail letter, card, and parcel
post postage revenue. Until 1949 the portion of domestic air-mail
revenue attributable to parcel post was not available. Estimates for
1949 indicate it to have been about .1.1 million or 15.4% of total 1949
air-mail revenues used in this series.
a/ Toll telephone - Includes public message tolls, private toll line
revenue and miscellaneous toll telephone revenue. Data are partially
estimated.
.]/ Telegraph operations of telephone companies - Includes TWX, private
line telegraph, and message telegram services. Data are partially
estimated.
A/ Western Union and Postal Telegraph - Includes domestic transmission
and non-transmission revenues.
.5/ Preliminary.
Preliminary, and based on incomplete coverage.
Anorave
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trends affecting the telegraph industry are again emphasized.
Figures for representative years between 1927 and 1949 were:
Year
Interstate Toll
Messages
Volume
Western Union Transmission
Messages
Revenues 17
Revenues
Volume
.?./
(in thousands).-
1927
$ 62,029
35,646
$140,345
215,816
1929
94,421
49,313
154,435
234,050
1934
75,232
37,459
94,653
155,215
1939
102,896
59,218
98,091
189,055
1944
346,884
175,793
158,032
232,712
1949
439,371
225,806
151,740
185,673
1/ Gross revenues (before uncollectibles) from telephone message
tolls in which the Long Lines Department of the A.T.& T. Co. has
participated. Does not include toll message revenue from calls
handled without Long Lines participation or from private line tele-
phone.
aJ Number of telephone messages in which the Long Lines Department
of A.T.& T. has participated. Does not include toll messages handled
without Long Lines participation or from private line telephone.
Attachment III-G, derived from Attachments III-H and III-I, shows
the average revenue per interstate toll telephone message and per
telegraph message.
Rates.--The full-rate telegram, which is the major source of
Western Union's transmission revenues and which is the principal
medium for the business or commercial messages constituting about
75% of the company's message volume, is carried at rates which, in a
typical example, compare thus with other means of rapid communications:
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Charges between Washington and Chicago
(Federal excise tax excluded)
Ten-word full-rate telegram $ .75
Three-minute TWX telegraph call .95
Three-minute nighttime and Sunday
station-to-station telephone call. . . 1.00
Three-minute daytime station-to-
station telephone call 1.40
Three-minute nighttime person-to-
person telephone call 1.55
Three-minute daytime person-to-
person telephone call 1.95
Western Unionts present rates incorporate increases which were
granted by the Federal Communications Commission in 1946 and 1947
because the company was then operating at a deficit estimated at
$12 million for 1946. The Commissions action included:
a) An initial flat over-all increase of 10% in domestic
interstate message rates; Western Union estimated that
this increase, coupled to other adjustments, would pro-
duce $18.5 million additional annual revenues..
b) Elimination of certain low "exceptional" or "special"
rates, which would produce an estimated additional
$3.7 million annual revenue.
c) A flat over-all increase of 20% in 1947, replacing the
1946 increase of 10% in the domestic interstate message
rate. It was estimated that this increase would produce
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119.
an additional $8.5 million annually.
d) Elimination of a 20% preferential rate on certain
Government messages, which would produce an estimated
additional $692,000 per annum.
What influence these rate adjustments may have had on the volume
of transmission business cannot be precisely measured; some effects
are suggested in Attachments and III-K. It appeared
likely that expansion of leased circuits was accelerated. Thus the
total number of Government messages, for example, dropped progressively
from almost 5.5 million in 1946 to less than 2.5 million in 1949,
and the mileage of lines leased from Western Union by the armed
forces rose from the mar peak of 1,800 miles in 1944 to 78,000 miles
in the fall of 1950. The leased circuit revenues of the company afford
another indication; these rose from 3.6 million in 1946 to more than
$7.5 million in 1949. Private line teletypewriter revenues of the
Bell System, which rose from $18.5 million in 1946 to $25.5 million
in 1949, and its TWX revenues, which went from $12.9 million in
1946 to almost $18 million in 1949, may also have benefited by diver-
sion of telegram messages.
Excise Taxes.--Early in the second World War, excise taxes were
increased to 25% on interstate telegrams and on telephone toll con-
.versations costing over 24 cents. Long-distance telephone communica-
tion has continued to increase, the tax apparently being taken as
a matter of course. Western Union, averaging estimates, found that
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"it is indicated that an increase in revenues of about $10 million
might be expected from the elimination of the tax," although "there
is no formula by which a precise determination can be made as to
the effect of the elimination of this tax upon the volume of
domestic telegraph traffic."
Air Mail.--Air mail has experienced a long steady increase in
revenues. This growth may have affected Western Union night letter
revenues. Attachment III-B shows that night letter (over night
message) revenues stood at almost !t;39 million in 1926, dropped to a
little over $19 million in 1933, climbed to over $35..5 million during
the war peak in 1945, and since have fallen to $26.5 million in 1949.
Total air-mail subsidy or deficit payments to airlines for 1950 have
been estimated at *125 million.
ILLIII2a2.22_2nZ.a22/229.Z.--BY far the largest share of the tele-
graph industry's gross income dollar has gone to payments to and for
employees. The trend has been upward. The wage portion of the
income dollar fluctuated between the narrow limits of 54 cents and
60 cents from 1926 through 1944. From 1944 to 1946 it rose from 60
cents to over 72 cents of the income dollar. For 1947, however, it
fell back to 64 cents and for 1948 and 1949 leveled off to about
68 cents.
During the same period 1926 to 1949, total Western Union and
Postal landline employees declined from 76,000 in 1926 to 57,000
in 1938, rose again to 65,000 in 1941, and receded to 41,500 in 1949.
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121.
Western Union reports that the average weekly earnings of
landline local field employees, excluding messengers, rose from
$37.99 in 1945 to $62.78 in 1949. Related data from the Department
of Commerce show the following:
Telephone
May
1949
April
1950
May April
122.4a_1250
Average weekly hours
per worker
38.6
38.7
45.2 44.6
Average weekly earnings
$51.84
$53.44
$63.69
$64.13
Average hourly earnings
$ 1.343
$ 1.381
$ 1.409
1.438
Note: The normal weekday average hourly earnings for both services
are essentially the same, if the overtime rate is eliminated
from these data.
The National War Labor Board on December 29, 1945, granted
Nestern Union employees wage increases amounting to $31 million in
retroactive pay and $25 million in recurring annual wages. In its
decision, tho Labor Board pointed out that the telegraph industry was
a low-paying industry with an inequitable wage structure, that no
general wage increases had been made by Nestern Union since those
ordered by the NWLB in 1943, and that over one-third of the adult
employees were receiving less than 55 cents per hour. One reason for
the fact that no increases were made between 1943 and this NWLB award
was that the National Labor Relations Board for about a year had been
holding hearings on representation of Nestern Union employees.
The sharp increase in wage rates no doubt was the main stimulus
for the introduction of labor-saving devices in the telegraph service.
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122.
One example is automatic reperforator switching, which contributed
largely to making possible the reduction in the number of employees
in the postwar period from 57,500 in 1946 to 41,500 in 1949,
Reduction of Service.--Closing and reduction of telegraph offices
and agencies of Western Union have been a knotty problem to both
Western Union and the Federal Communications Commission since the
merger legislation of 1943.
When the Communications Act was amended to permit merger, Section
214 was also amended to read as follows:
"No carrier shall discontinue, reduce, or impair service
to a community, or part of a community, unless and until there
shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certi-
ficate that neither the present nor future public convenience
and necessity will be adversely affected thereby; except that
the Commission may, upon appropriate request being made,
authorize temporary or emergency discontinuance, reduction,
or impairment of service, or partial discontinuance, reduc-
tion, or impairment of service, without regard to the
provisions of this section."
Additionally, Section 214(a), which authorizes the Commission,
after hearing, to require a carrier to extend its lines and to provide
itself with adequate facilities for performing its serviced as a
common carrier, was amended to give the Commission specific authority
to require a carrier "to establish a public office" and to provide
itself with adequate facilities "for the expeditious and efficient
performance of its service as a common carrier,?
Studies made by Western Union indicate that company-operated
offices and tributary agency offices at which the message revdnues
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average less than $1,500 a month are operated at a deficit. As of
January 1950, there were 1,300 such offices. From the test study,
Western Union estimated that these offices incur an annual operating
deficit estimated at over $3.25 million.
The minuteness of the revenues obtained by a large proportion
of the telegraph offices Western Union operates can be seen from
Attachment III-L. In addition to the 13,000 offices represented
therein, Western Union operates an additional 12,000 agency or com-
mission offices not included in these data.
Attachment III-L reveals that for the classes shown, .85% of
fiestern Unionts offices (118 communities in number with revenues
over
10,000 per month) produce over 71% of its public message revenues.
It also shows that 5.25% of the companyts offices (727 communities in
number with revenues between $1,000 and $9,999 per month) produce
20.79% of its public message revenues. The remaining 93.9% of the
offices (12,997 in number) produce only 7.57% of the public message
revenue, and 2,045 joint railroad offices (Class 4) reported no
public message revenue for January 1950.
The President of Western Union in his Report of Annual Meeting of
Stockholders, April 12, 1950, stated: "...While recognizing the neces-1
sity for reasonable governmental regulation of public service companies,
the fact remains that, under present governmental and public service
policies, the company is required to maintain hundreds of unprofitable
offices."
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On its own motion the Federal Communications Commission adopted
an order on December T30, 1946, providing for an investigation of
and public hearing on the ever-a1l. plans of Western Union, with
respect to the discontinuance, reduction, and impairment of service.
As a result of this investigation, the Federal Communications
Commission established a figure of 46 sent and received messages a
day as a general guide in determining whether the Commission will
authorize conversion of a company-operated office to a teleprinter
agency office.
At the hearings in this investigation, Western Union represen-
tatives gave testimony and submitted numerous exhibits with respect
to company policy, standards, and plans relating to discontinuance,
reduction, and impairment of service.
The companyls basic policy, expressed at a previous hearing,
was reiterated as follows:
"...It was our (Nestern Union) policy to serve, as far
as we could, within our means, as many people in the
United States as possible; that we must operate as effi-
ciently as we can, first, in the public interest, so
that the telegraph users are not asked to bear unneces-
sary cost; secondly, in the interests of the employees;
and thirdly, in the interests of the stockholders."
Western Union representatives testified that three principal
factors made it necessary to reappraise the existing (1947) telegraph
coverages:
"(1) The need for normal postwar contraction of facilities
following expansion made necessary by increased use
of telegraph during the war;
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"(3)
125.
The desirability of changes in the facilities for
accepting and delivering telegraph traffic growing
out of technological improvements;
The need of economy and greater efficiency of opera-
tion arising from deficit operations."
The company also told the FCC that "it is not possible to follow
a mathematical formula in selecting offices for consolidation. The
requirements of the public for telegraph service, volume of traffic,
revenue, operating expense, distance from the nearest office, all vary
so widely that each consolidation must be considered on its own
merits."
Conversion from company-operated offices to agency operation is
not "usually considered by the Company unless the load and revenue
fit both of two standards." These are: (1) that the average revenue
(collections made from all incoming and outgoing messages) at the par-
ticular office does not exceed approximately 050 per month; and (2)
that the ratio of local operating expense to revenue is 50% or more.
The standards used for determining at which offices hours should
be reduced are contained in FCC Rules and Regulations for informal
requests for reduction authority. For other situations, formal appli-
cation is submitted to the Commission with a detailed showing of need
so that each case may be judged on its own merits.
With respect to closures and reduction of service, the Federal
Communications Commission concluded that no general policy could be
formulated to govern its consideration of such action.
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In addition to the closing of a large number of duplicate
offices resulting from the merger of Postal with 7estern Union, cur-
tailments since 1947 have been appreciable. During 1947, 1948. 1949,
and the first six months of 1950, Western Union reports, the FCC
authorized a total of 2,324 branch office consolidations, conversions,
and reductions in office hours, from which annual savings are estimated
to be over vf?.3.1 million.
Interest Charfes.--Western Union in recent years has been reducing
and adjusting its debt structure in order to save on interest payments.
In 1942 the company paid out more than $3.9 million in interest
(chiefly on funded debt). by 1949 these charges had been reduced to
a little over $3.2 million, and in 1949 they were $3.1 million.
Further actions along this line were taken in 1950 by liquidation
of the company's outstanding $7.8 million of 4.5% funding and real
estate bonds, prepayment of installments on remaining obligations
to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and calling for redemption
of $15.3 million of 5% bonds due December 1, 1951. The latter call
was made possible by a $12 million loan from a group of New York banks
at 3.5% interest.
The Current Status of Western Union
The encouragement of competition in the telegraph field was em-
bodied in the Communications Act of 1934 as a matter of policy. In the
next year, however, the Federal Communications Commission evidenced
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its doubt of the wisdom of that policy by recommending enactment
of legislation empowering it to authorize and approve consolidations
of telegraph companies. This recommendation was not acted upon.
But as the condition of the telegraph companies worsened, the idea
of consolidation was revived in 1939. The Senate in June of that
year authorized an investigation of the telegraph industry by a
subcommittee of the Interstate Commerce Committee. No legislation
resulted. In 1943 however, Congress amended the Communications Act
to permit merger of domestic telegraph companies and to permit
Western Union to buy the telephone system's TNX and private line tele-
graph services. Merger of the Postal Telegraph Company with Western
Union followed. The idea of regulated monopoly rather than competition
as a means of strength came to the fore.
Concern for the most effective use of the opportunities offered
by merger then became the keynote. Reporting its decision of Septem-
ber 27, 1943, authorizing the Postal-Western Union consolidation,
the Federal Communications Commission gave expression to it thus:
"We have found that merger may be expected to place the
domestic telegraph industry on a sounder financial basis
than heretofore, and to furnish opportunities for the elimi-
nation of obstacles to improved telegraph service at reasonable
cost to the public; but we cannot pass over the obvious failure
of the management of the proposed merged company to address
itself to any specific plans for meeting the demands of users
for a record communications service having speed and price
standards to which the public is entitled and which will effec-
tively meet the competition of the telephone and the airmail.
Attainment of these service objectives, and a-generally sound
condition, will require radical modifications in Western Unionts
managerial and fiscal policies and practices, and in its
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facilities and operating practices.
"The Commission is seriously concerned with the failure
of the management to direct its plans and aims to such ser-
vice objectives. In the interests of providing a completely
adequate telegraph service in keeping with the technical
accomplishments and public requirements of the present and
of the future, vigilant regulatory action will be necessary.
The Commission will expect that within 1 year from the effec-
tive date of the merger, the merged company will have developed
completely and submitted to the Commission, a comprehensive
plan for converting, within the shortest possible time, its
existing facilities into a modern, efficient, and Nationwide
communications system capable of effectively competing with
other communications services. A continued disposition to
ignore such service objectives will call for such action on
the part of the Commission as may be needful and appropriate
to assure to the public the rapid, efficient, and Nationwide
record communication service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges which it is the stated duty of the Commis-
sion, under the Communications Ict,to make available.
"The future changes in facilities and services available
to the public require special attention. In order to avoid
any future misunderstanding upon this matter, which is vitally
connected with the maintenance of proper service in the domestic
telegraph industry, we deem it important to state before con-
cluding, that we will not sanction any ill-considered elimi-
nation of facilities or services whether or not they are a
result of merger. We will expect that abandonment of facili-
ties, closure of offices, reductions, impairments, or discon-
tinuances of service will be carried out only pursuant to
considered rational plans in which factors of public need
and convenience will be controlling."
In response to the Commission's request the merged company sub-
mitted on October 7, 1944, a "Flan for the Improvement of Telegraph
Service." In general terms the plan mentioned the terminal handling
problem, transmission of messages between telegraph offices, leased
telegraph systems, training program, carrier and reperforator switching
program, telefax (facsimile), telemeter, public information, rates,
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research, and railroad contracts. After the war, implementation of
the plan was begun and was pressed to virtual completion by the end
of 1950, some three years in advance of the original target dato.
During the postwar years, however, financial problems continued to
plague the company and the Commission.
On petition of western Union in March 1946, the Commission granted
a flat over-all increase of 10% in domestic interstate rates but denied
the requested elimination of the 20% differential on Government messages.
?I
Summing up the case in its annual report, the Commission stated:
"It found that Mestern Union was currently operating
at a deficit and anticipated a loss of about $12,000,000
in 1946 if its rates were not raised. The Commission con-
cluded that Western Union would need substantially more
revenue than it requested 'if it is to continuo in opera-
tion as a solvent enterprise and provide satisfactory ser-
vice on a comprehensive Nation-wide basis.' It pointed out,
in particular, that Western Union was faced with increasing
competition from telephone and teletypewriter exchange ser-
vices and airmail services, besides being affected by increased
wage costs and reductions in international telegraph rates.
The Commission is not satisfied that the modernization program
is the answer to Western Union's problems. However, in view
of prevailing economic conditions and Western Union's dire
need for additional revenue, the Commission granted the
rate increase for 1 year pending developments."
In granting the increase, the Commission pointed out that such a
temporary expedient did not meet the basic difficulty, emphasized the
need of a comprehensive investigation into all phases of the company's
operations, and sharply criticized the lack of comprehensive and de-
pendable data in the company's petition for the increase. In June the
Commission issued an order calling for the investigation, but noted that
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such an inquiry was beyond the limitations of Commission funds and
personnel and would necessitate a request to Congress for additional
funds.
Before that request could be made, two further actions were taken
from which betterment of Western Union's financial situation was
expected. Elimination of "exceptional" or "special" city-to-city
and city-to-state rates as discriminatory was ordered in October.
Since these rates were lower than Western Unionts standard rates, it
was estimated that their elimination would produce additional revenue
from interstate service of $3.7 million. In December the Commission's
earlier view that the March rate increase of 10% was an expedient only
was substantiated as Western Union petitioned for a further advance
in interstate message rates. After public hearings, the Commission on
December 27 replaced the March increase with a flat 20% increase with
no time limitation. The effect of this substitution was to increase
current rates by 9.1%, as against the 15% desired by Western Union.
This rate revision action was estimated to produce $8.5 million addi-
tional annual interstate revenues. In its report on this case, the
Commission concluded, in part, as follows:
"Western Union faces a real emergency and the sound
course for it to follow in the immediate future is not clear.
There is no question, however, about the urgency of Western
Union's need for additional revenues. 7e are firmly in
agreement with the testimony of Western Union's president
that rate increases are not the ultimate answer to the
company's situation. At the present time, however, it
appears that some rate increase may offer immediate revenue
relief to the company. The availability of a Reconstruction
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Finance Corporation loan was characterized by Western Union's
treasurer as ran anchor to windward, which may be of some
help in the immediate situation.! Further general rate
increases by Western Union will, of course, worsen its
position in relation to the competitive means of communica-
tion provided by the telephone companies and the airmail,
and may fall short of meeting the company's revenue
needs."
Seeking an appropriation of 3751000 to conduct the investigation
proposed in its June 1946 order, the Commission in testimony before
the House Interstate Commerce Committee on February 251 1947, expressed
doubt "whether the modernization program proposed by Western Union,
or any program which can be devised can save Western Union and, if
so, whether it can be put in operation in time;" stressed the need
for determination of national policy; and explained that, broadly
speaking,
"...five alternative policy solutions are apparent. If a
comprehensive record communications system is not a necessary
part of our national economy, then nature may be permitted
to take its course with respect to the disposition of Western
Union's facilities. If such a system is necessary, but need
not be independent, then consideration may be given to the
possibilities that the telegraph system may be consolidated
with either the telephone industry or the post office. If
it is determined that an insltmnignt, record communications
system is necessary, then the whole issue resolves itself
into the means by which this is to be accomplished and the
issue of subsidy is involved.
"A fifth possibility would permit Western Union to con-
centrate its business only between cities with large volumes
of traffic--to skim the cream of traffic--abandoning all
other communities, but this would be far from the 'nationwide..,
communication service with adequate facilities enjoined by
the Communications Act."
The requested appropriation was not granted. During the period
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since the hearings, the 80th (1947-1948) and the 81st (1949-1950)
Congresses made studies of the communications problems of the country,
including the domestic telegraph situation, but neither enacted
legislation pertinent here. The modernization program of Western
Union was expedited, and the company's management took a more aggres-
sive leadership. Rounding out the modernization effort a program
was announced by the company in 1949 including:
(1) Installation and operation of new high-speed message centers
in Detroit, Los Angeles, and New Orleans.
(2) Installation of hundreds of desk-fax (facsimile) machines
in customers' offices in eight major cities.
(3) Installation and expansion of private telegraph networks
for large industrial users.
(4) Continued operation (made possible through legislation
exempting them from the wage and hour provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act) of 12,500 telegraph agencies.
(5)
Consolidation of major operating departments of the company
for greater operating efficiency and economy, and the establishment
of a separate sales and advertising division.
(6) Further reduction of the company's debt.
The company went into broader matters in a special report issued
in October 1949, proposing the adoption of a coordinated national
communications policy and advocating substantial changes in the tele-
communications industry. The report recommended:
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(1) Repeal of the 25% Federal excise tax.
(2) Purchase by Western Union of the teletypewriter exchange
service (TWX) and telegraph services of the telephone company.
(3) Lepjslative permission for purchase by Western Union of
the cable and radio facilities of American companies operating
in the international field.
(4) Provision by Western Union of an integrated system of
domestic communications geared to military requirements and
available in normal times to the public and the Government.
(5) Long-term Government financing, as may be necessary, to
achieve the above objectives.
Negotiations were carried on in 1943-1945 between Western Union
and the A.T.& T. looking toward the acquisition of TWX and allied
services by Western Union under the permissive legislation of 1943,
but without result. Resumed late in 1949, they had not been con-
cluded at the time of this report. On July 1, 1948, western Union,
the A.T.& T., and certain companies of the Bell System had entered a
contractual agreement in which Western Union would sell and transfer
to the Bell System its public telephone business and property for
$2,4 million cash and the public message telegram business of the
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company and a subsidiary. This agree-
ment was subject to approval of the FCC, and of state or other regula-
tory agencies.
Accordingly, a joint application was filed with the FCC on
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February 1, 1949, for certificates under Sections 214 and 221(a) of
the Communications Act of 1934 as amended. In late 1949 and early
1950, an FCC examiner held hearings, during which two state commis-
sioners sat as representatives of the National Association of Railroad
and Utilities Commissioners. These hearings resulted in an order
for the issuance of a certificate, which in effect approved the appli-
cation.
However, on September 8, 1950, the Chief of the Common Carrier
Bureau of the FCC excepted to the initial decision on the grounds that
the acquisition of the telephone facilities of Western Union by the
Bell System companies under the proposed conditions would deprive
Western Union subscribers of "personalized service and of the advan-
tages of an auxiliary or standby service," and would require them "to
pay higher charges for their message toll telephone service." As for
the discontinuance of public message telegram service by the Pacific
companies, the Bureau excepted to the decision on the grounds that
the service proposed to be provided by Western Union would generally
be less stable in character than the service rendered by Pacific, that
speed of service on a large percentage of traffic would be adversely
affected, and that "the proposed transaction will result in the eli-
mination of all competition between western Union and the Pacific
Companies in the offering of message telegram service." The Bureau
submitted that an order should be entered denying the joint application.
Also on September 8, 1950, on behalf of the Attorney General of
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the United States, exceptions were submitted to the Examiner's
findings, conclusions, and initial decision.
The applicants have filed a reply brief to the exceptions, but
the FCC decision had not been rendered at the time of this report.
April 1950 saw a reversal of the decline in Western Union's
operating revenues. The modernization program, rigid economies, im-
proved operating methods, and greater sales efforts are regarded by
the management as the company actions which contributed to the change,
and rate adjustments, the Korean situation, and increased general
business activity as the salient non-company factors. Commenting
on the upturn, the Federal Communications Commission in a report dated
August 31, 1950, to Senator McFarland of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce said in part:
"The Western Union Telegraph Company has reported a net
income of $2,687,000 before Federal income taxes for the first
six months of 1950. Assuming that revenues and expenses will
continue at the March through June level (Western Union re-
ported net losses in January and February), Western Union may
realize a net income of S71000,000 for 1950 as compared with
an assumed loss of $5,000,000 in the above-mentioned report.
The principal reason for the difference in assumptions is the
substantial savings that the company has been able to effect,
principally through force reductions as a result of the com-
pany's mechanization and economy programs. Landline expenses
in the first six months of 1950 were $7,578,000 less than the
same period of 1949 of which $6,312,000 represented savings
in labor expenses.
"Assuming that Western Union will be able to maintain its
earnings in 1951 at the level assumed for 1950, and after
adjusting for the sale of buildings subsequent to the date
of our earlier letter and further assuming that the once
suggested cut in Federal excise taxes on telegrams will not
materialize, Western Union may be expected to have cash
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balances an December 31, 1950 and 1951 of $34.4 million and
$22.6 million respectively. If the application now pending
before the Commission for authority to sell the former Postal
Telegraph Company's toll telephone system to the Bell System
companies should be approved by the Commission, the cash
balance for 1951 would be increased by $2.4 million.
oWestern Union's improved financial situation bolsters
the Commission's conclusions...that the Commission 'would
prefer to give Western Union a further opportunity to ex-
tricate itself from its financial difficulties, rather than
to propose the enactment of drastic legislation at this time
which might result in, or lead to, Government ownership or
operation of Western Union, or which might result in one
huge monopoly of practically the entire communications in-
dustry of the United States.'"
Summary
The over-all national demand for telegraph facilities and services,
as well as for telephone and air mail services, has been growing
almost steadily since 1926. During that period, however, the relative
demand for tclegram service has lessened. This shift in the character
of the demand for telegraph service has seriously threatened the
continued existence of the Western Union system as a private enterprise.
Remedial measures applied by the company and by regulatory authority
in recent years, following a longer period of Government concern over
the prospects of the industry, resulted in a return to profitable
operation in April 1950. The long-range prospect is indeterminate.
Domestic Telecommunication Systems
of the Federal Government
Federal Government agencies during the year 1949 operated nation-
wide leased wire teletype networks, the size of which is indicated by
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the following estimated figures:
Miles of leased teletype wire,
137.
including weather services
325,931
Miles of leased teletype wire,
excluding weather services
167,824
Cost of leased wire,
including weather services
$ 8,053,877
Cost of leased wire,
excluding weather services
$ 3,501,796
Originated words transmitted,
including weather services. .
.
16,347,342,986
Originated words transmitted,
excluding weather services. .
?
5,835,0710689
A more detailed presentation of these estimated figures appears
in Attachment III-M.
No attempt has been made in this study to include any statistics
concerning extensive telephonic communications of the Federal Govern-
ment agencies, the bulk of attention being devoted to statistics
relating to wire record communications, largely teletype. Such
commercial message statistics as were available, however, are included.
Domestic radio communications such as aeronautical mobile, mili-
tary land-mobile, radar, etc., are considered to have no particular
significance in this study and therefore have been excluded. No
figures embracing costs of operation (other than the costs of leasing
facilities and equipment)are shown. The development of such figures
was considered to be too great a study to make in the time available.
This was because many agencies do not keep adequate cost records.
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from the grand total of leased line words because they embrace
special forms of transmission involving special teletype symbols
and telephonic wordage.
General Services Administration.--The General Services Administra-
tion (GSA) operates a leased wire teletype network totaling 14,392
miles, supplemented by TWX service for Government agencies, for the
year 1949.
This service, available to all Government agencies, operates
from 8:00 A.M. to 11:00 P.M., E.S.T., Mondays through Fridays, and
offers direct message service between 54 major U. S. cities, in addi-
tion to the possibility of refile via other media to other U. S. cities,
or to foreign countries.
Pickup and delivery are done by telephone (with mail confirmation),
messenger, or by local teletype line when and if the message volume
warrants. The Administration estimates that, by acting as a clearing
house for Government domestic rapid communications, it reduces domestic
telegraph costs to the Government 35% to 40%. The cost of this ser-
vice, exclusive of overhead, is prorated to the users on the basis of
the cost of the facilities.
Veterans' Administration.--The Veterans' Administration maintains
a leased wire network of 8,658 miles, supplementing the leased facili-
ties of other Government agencies, to connect its offices in every
State for the conduct of its business. West of the Mississippi River,
it uses a great amount of TWX service.
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Other Federal Government Affencies.--Certain other agencies
(listed by footnote in Attachment while free to use facili-
ties maintained by GSA, also lease teletype wire lines or otherwise
contribute to the total figures, as indicated in the Attachment.
The degree of radio transmission involved in the figures pre-
sented for "Other Federal Government Agencies" is negligible, being
for the most part the result of secondary operation, as in the case
of the FCC and Department of Justice, which use radio frequencies for
emergency purposes when wire lines fail, or to the few points that
normally are not served by wire.
Trends in Federal Government Use of Communications
The policy of using military systems for the transmission of
record communications of the Federal Government agencies is one of
long standing. The volume of Government messages, both military and
non-military, gradually increased, and the military systems were ex-
panded. Domestic radio circuits within the continental limits were
introduced around the year 1921. These, however, were not compre-
hensive enough to furnish service to all points in the United States,
and the Federal agencies, including the military, relied in great
measure upon the domestic commercial companies for service.
There was a gradual transition, starting in 1930, in which wire
circuits leased from commercial companies replaced radio circuits for
the transmission of Government domestic messages. This transition was
the natural outcome of the knowledge that radio frequencies could be
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employed to better advantage in overseas communications. At present
the use of radio frequencies for domestic communication has been
reduced to almost nothing.
Commercial landline rates for Government messages were fixed
In 1886, under the authority of the Post Roads Act, at 40% of the
existing commercial rates. From that time on, the commercial opera-
ting companies made continued efforts to have Government rates
equalized. Finally, by a gradual process which started in 1935,
Government message rates and public rates were equalized in 1947,
As Government rates rose and volume increased, Federal agencies
turned more and more to the use of leased wire lines. The saving
from leased line operation roughly approximates the increased cost
that would have resulted from the equalized rates, given the same
volume.
The use of leased wire lines by Federal Government agencies be-
came so extensive that the Public Buildings Administration (later
transferred to the General Services Administration) was authorized in
1946 to coordinate leased line operations and to provide means of
raising the efficiency of such operations.
At the present time the GSA has made some progress toward the
more efficient use of lines leased by the Federal Government.
A strong influence which has accelerated the leasing of teletype
wires by Federal Government agencies is their cost advantage over
message service, given sufficient volume of messages between specific
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points. The two main sources of leased teletype wires are the
A.T.& T. and. the Vlestern Union Telegraph Company.
LEIgislation.--Public Law #413, 79th Congress, approved June 14,
1946,. gave the Public Buildings Administration authority (with certain
restrictions) to operate public utility services, including tele-
communications, serving one or more Government agencies.
Public Law #152, 81st Congress, approved June 30, 1949, trans-
ferred this authority to the General Services Administration.
In addition, this later law gives broad powers to the GSA in the
operation and management of public utility services for the conveni-
ence and economy of the Government. GSA claims power under this law
to eliminate or consolidate leases of communication circuits operated
by various Federal Government agencies.
interre1ationsIliE2.--Interrelationships between. Federal Government
systems are not particularly complicated and continue to incline toward
a "community" system of operation wherein messages Originated by one
agency may, by arrangement, be transmitted over the facilities con-
trolled by one of the others.
Relationships between Government systems and domestic commercial
systems are more complicated. All of the Federal Government networks
depend upon the commercial companies for wires and maintenance, and,
in some cases, for equipment.
Generally, all of the Federal agencies that have communications
operations rely upon the commercial domestic organizations to round
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145.
lestern Union reports the average cost, including all rate categories,
to be about 5 cents per word. At this average cost per word, the
percentage of saving, adjusted from the GSA estimate, would be 32.1
per cent.
Summarized estimates for the year 1949, using the Western Union
average cost figure of 5 cents per word and the savings
adjusted from the GSA estimate, follow:
Federal Government Leased Wirq_gmEations,
Excluding Weather Data
Rental of facilities
Total words transmitted
Cost at 5 cents per word
Saving by use of leased lines indicated
by 32.1% saving adjusted from GSA estimate.
Resultant estimated cost of Federal Govern-
ment operation of leased facilities ? ? ? ?
percentage
$ 3,501,796
5,835,071,689
$ 291,753,584
$ 93,652,900
$ 198,100,684
We have not attempted to determine whether it is necessary for
the Federal Government to transmit almost 6 billion words yearly for
its domestic business.
Other Domestic Telecommunications Systems
There are a great number of rapid telecommunications systems
within the United States other than those which have been described
above. These systems include networks interconnecting broadcast and
television stations; airline and railroad telecommunications systems;
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148.
miles of telephone wire, and 215,000 miles of pole line. This tele-
communication network, which extends throughout the nation following
the railroad lines, is used for train dispatching, matters relating
to passengers and freight, and various other forms of company. business.
Employees chargeable to the railroad communication service totaled
39,121 and their yearly compensation was $145,248,935.
Domestic Wire Networks of the Press Associations
The Associated Press, United Press, International News Service,
and Transradio News Service operate large national teletype networks
for the distribution of news. The collective cost of these leased
circuits for the year 3.949 was $450,000.
Domestic Systems of Large Corporations
A number of the large corporations in the United States, especially
those which have nationwide interests and branch offices, maintain
their own domestic leased wire teletype systems. Corporations such
as United States Steel, General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and General
Electric, and many smaller ones, have volumes of domestic telecommuni-
cations that enable them to lease and operate wire systems on a
national basis and to effect appreciable savings in costs by comparison
with telephone toll rates and domestic telegraph message rates. It
is estimated that from 20% to 40% can be saved by private line teletype
operation, depending upon volume, under current Western Union message
rates.
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149.
On the Great Lakes and Rivers
On the Great Lakes, the Mississippi River, and connecting inland
waterways, communication is carried on between ships and between ship
and shore by radiotelephone. Certain shore stations have a "public
coastal service" which will permit calls from ships to be completed
through landline connections. Operational messages are also relayed
or forwarded as requested by the company or captain. Charges for
this service are regulated by law, and established long distance rates
apply on shore connections. Revenues as reported by the Class A and B
telephone carriers in 1948 for such services were $575,000 on a basis
of 400,000 calls.
Land Mobile Telecommunication Services
These services provide communication between mobile stations and
base stations which tie in with public landline telephone facilities.
The telephone companies in many locations operate the base stations.
In general, trucking firms and automotive emergency road services make
extensive use of such systems. A.T.& T. revenues from this service
totaled $1.6 million in 1948 on 1.4 million calls handled.
Taxicabs are making extensive use on a nationwide basis of very
high frequency radiotelephone for dispatching. In 1949 radio was used
in nearly 3,000 separate taxicab communication systems covering about
54,000 mobile units.
In Hawaii
The 6 islands of the Territory of Hawaii are provided with telephone
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151.
Several petitions for increases in rates have been filed, and the
company has filed a motion for temporary relief to help it continue
to give satisfactory service, and to permit small additions to plant
equipment pending the approval of a new rate schedule.
Present plant investment approximates $9 million, with other
current assets of about $1 million. Total operating revenues in 1949
were $2.5 million with net earnings of $254,000 after tax deductions
but before interest charges of $196,000, Thirty-five thousand tele-
phones were in service and the company had 80,000 miles of wire, 90%
of which was in cable. Compensation to 675 employees was $965,000 in
1948.
In Alaska
Alaska, with an estimated population in 1947 of 92,000, is pro-
vided with telecommunication facilities by the Alaska Communications
System (OS), a branch of the U. S. Army Signal Corps. Since its
authorization by act of Congress in 1900, the system has operated the
only longline communication channels within the. Territory and between
the Territory and the United States. The ACS now has 32 telecommunica-
tion stations serving the Federal and Territorial Government agencies,
and the general public, by wire and radio. The latter includes service
to and from ships at sea, press services to newspapers, broadcast pro-
grams to radio stations, and general commercial messages. Regular
telephone service is provided in the larger cities by 14 exchanges
with a total of approximately 12,000 telephones in service. In 1948
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the telegraph service provided by ACS to 58 Government agencies had
an estimated commercial value of $480,000 and military telegraph
messages of $3 million. Telephone service to the agencies approximated
54,000 and that to the military $173,000.
Supplementing the ACS, mainly to serve isolated communities, is
a 60-station radiotelephone system maintained by the Alaska Communica-
tions Commission, an agency of the Territorial Government. The Alaska
Native Service also operates a total of 102 radiotelephone stations,
the majority of which are located in APctic and sub-Arctic regions.
The stations are used to conduct the routine business of the service,
as well as for emergency purposes.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration maintains an extensive net-
work of 42 .radio stations, operated by 625 employees, used primarily
for aircraft navigation and for weather information. Routine weather
reports from outlying stations are also relayed to a common point for
forwarding. The CAA is also the largest Government agency user of
Alaska Communications System facilities, receiving services valued
at $80,000 in 1948 and $76,000 in 1949.
Recent Trends
The outstanding trend apparent in the development of the domestic
systems described in this section is that of relatively rapid and sub-
stantial growth. For example, the broadcasting industry served 12
million homes with 618 radio stations in 1930. In 1949 it served
42 million homes with 3,067 radio stations. The aviation industry in
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153.
1930 maintained 170 ground radio stations and 293 aircraft stations.
In 1949, 1,572 radio transmitters were licensed to commercial air-
craft operating with 1,409 ground radio stations.
The growth of television has increased the estimated tangible
investment in stations and sets from a 1948 total of $403 million to
more than p3 billion at the end of 1950. In 1947 there were only
12 stations serving 210,000 receivers. In. January of 1951 (even
though no new television station construction permits were issued
after September 1948), a total of 107 stations were serving an esti-
mated 10.6 million receivers. From Omaha east there are 47 inter-
connected cities having 80 television stations serving 9 million
receivers. Of the total stations, Nov, York has 7, with Chicago and
Washington 4 each. Sixteen other non-interconnected cities. have
27 stations serving 1.6 million receivers. These figures indicate
that about 40% of the homes in TV areas now have receivers. During
the month of December 1950 alone 704,000 were placed in use. Los
Angeles' 7 stations placed that city first in estimated television
investment.
The accelerated growth of television has hastened the construction
of coaxial cables, bringing the nation's total to 7,600 miles in 1949.
This over-all program has been modified somewhat because of planned
installation of microwave radio relay systems between various cities.
Conclusions
1. The telephone system of the United States is a financially
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154.
sound, multi-billion dollar industry consisting of the Bell System and
5,000 independent companies. This coordinated system is providing
the nation with what is admittedly the best telephone service in the
world. It is steadily improving that service by aggressive technolo-
gical advancement. In view of the healthy condition of the telephone
system, we conclude that no changes in Government procedure for in-
suring adequate service in the national interest are necessary.
2. The telegraph system of the United States has experienced
economic difficulties owed in part to the expansion of other means of
rapid communication. The recent return of the principal telegraph
company to profitable operation, in part because of improved management
and modernization of its plant and in part because of greater general
business activity, is encouraging. This current improvement in the
position of the industry affords an opportunity to develop information
needed for sound, long-range planning to avoid future difficulties.
We believe that sound management and vigorous technological development
can contribute further to the stability of the domestic telegraph system.
3. The .effects of the administration of the Communications Act
of 1934 relative to reductions of telegraph service through the closing
of unprofitable offices or through substitution of agencies need further
study. Western Union maintains that the restrictive application of
present legal provisions places an undue financial burden upon the com-
pany which it can ill afford to bear; representatives of labor contend
that too great a degradation of service often has followed the
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155,
substitution of agencies for offices.
4. Rates for the telegraphic services--telegram, TWX, and private
leased lines--are given regulatory approval without adequate know-
ledge of the costs of providing such services. Also, in passing upon
long-distance telephone rates, the Federal Communications Commission
should inform itself of the probable effect of proposed changes upon
the position of the telegraph industry, and upon rates for local tele-
phone service.
5. We have looked carefully into the proposal that our telecom-
munications industry should be divided clearly into two parts, one
dealing exclusively with "record." communications, the other with
communications by "voice." Our examination of this question has shown
that such a dividing line is very difficult to draw, and we have con-
cluded that the attempt to reorganizo.our telecommunications system
on the basis of such a distinction might result in effects on the
system going far beyond the initial intention of any such division.
The main bone of contention today is the fact that the telephone company
offers a form of record communications--TWX and private-line leases--
which competes with message-delivery functions of the telegraph
company. We note that Congress in 1943 amended the Communications Act
to permit acquisition of this form of service by the telegraph carrier.
Thus the companies involved are free to negotiate an agreement to make
this change, subject to approval by the FCC. We believe that this
matter should be determined by the normal processes of negotiation.
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156,
6. The operation of leased domestic telecommunications net-
works by the Federal Government for the transmission of Federal
Government messages is not, strictly speaking, competitive with
the operations of commercial telecommunications companies. In
its teletype networks, the Government is taking advantage of volume
rates offered by the telecommunications companies in the same manner
as can any other customer with large volume requirements. The
Government should continue to take full advantage of the most
efficient and economical rates and conditions of service which
are available to any large user. Mile it is important that the
Government seek the most economical means of handling its own
communications, it also is of great importance that it continue
its present policy of using privately owned facilities rather than
building up a Government-owned competing network.
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BELL SYSTEM SELECTED
STATISTICS
AND SOME COMPARATIVE DATA FOR ALL TELEPHONE
CARRIERS
Attachment I/I?A
S
?
?
PO
Dec. 31:
192 :
Dec. 31 :
1930 :
Dec. 31 :
1935 :
Dec. 31 :
1940 :
Dec. 31 : Dec. 31 :A.11 Carriers Bell
1945 : 1949 :Dec.31,194; System System
s5g
a_
-n
(2,
FIT
cp
0
:
11,909,578:
15,18T.96:
13,57},022:
17,483.981:
22,1145,51: 33,3gg,28:40t709,3 g*:
82
6,147:
6,619:
7,052:
7.374: 8,224: 190 *:
:
394,929:
428,212:
399,838:
420.009: 4839777: ?
:
:
.
?
27.769.000:
12,835.000:
4,339.000:
45,116,000:
23.777.000:
5,231,000:
?
47,639000:
26,425,000:
4,56,0oo:
54,339,000:
30,307,000:
4,66o.000:
?
60,759.000: 81,865,000: :
33.966,000: 44.813,000: :
5.034,000: 6,411,000: .
:
44.943,000:
74,124.000:
78,626_,000:
89.106,000:
99.7994000: 133.089,000:147.30(4000:
90.3
?
?
?
?
58.768:
? 750:
?
?
?
?
?
?
23,023:
25,017:
?
118,900:
3190598: 11.7 754:
362,179: 967,694: 657.465:
$ 98,113: $ 84.712: $ 94,907:
$ 184,770:
000:1 2 02 000:160 000 000: 02
020
1_7 #LTJS
gg
ll.J]4,927: 593869:
a31897:
$ 399,917: 34b,144:
2
2 *F.
0593,2 3 '
10 10000? 8.
3,18Q,000? 30.8
open wire and cable pairs. When carrier is used the maximum capacity of an open wire pair
and the maximum capacity of two cable pairs is 12 telephone channels.
rovide 600 telephone channels,
oad band channel miles.
stern Electric Company and Bell Telephone Laboratories.
tem (41.790.000 telephones as of June 30. 1950)
P.C.P. a. *t.5
Westorn Union and Postal Telegraph (Landline)
Number of Transmission Messages by Class of Reseed*
1926 - 1949
(Thousands)
A ttacii e)-2e k
I.
so
?
?
PO
?
?
PP
RIP
?6
ON
?
?
PO
?
?
?
?6
Year
71111 Bate
Day
Letter
Night Letter
and Night
Massage
Serials
Total
Public
Messages
Govern-
ment
Press
Money
Orders
Timed
Wire
Greet-
ings
Cable
and
Radio2/
Other
Trans-
mission
Messages 3/
Grand
Total
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
(1)
132.472
131.153
135,318
1315,641
13.535
lob,797
80,342
78.007
81,269
157,578
93,605
92,279
85,190
87,811
93,812
105,650
113,2142
118,286
116,926
12,537
124,945
134,733
117,748
108,014
(2)
17,724
18,344
19,900
22,260
21.897
20,414
16,612
18,463
19,563
20,811
22,249
19,590
18,574
18,641
15,631
13,917
11,657
16,883
15,791
15,949
13,362
12,309
10,087
9,281
(3)
38,784
37,388
37.748
38,851
33.659
27,518
19,921
19,208
19,875
20,124
20,019
23,043
19,641
19,661
20,220
22,736
25,126
30,544
33,086
35,578
32,401
31,405
29,181
26,511
(4)
-
550
;24: u)36
7.908
7.774
9,369
9,267
8.550
9,0156
8,580
8,608
6,723
5,909
6,531
7,156
5,924
8,050
7,967
7,670
(5)
188,980
186,885
192,966
199,752
179,091
155;279
119,431
120,581
128,615
136,287
1)45,2142
1414,179
131,955
135,199
138,243
150,951
156,748
171,622
172,334
182,220
176,632
186,497
164,983
151,476
(6)
6,922
6,681
7,655
8,159
8,806
8,993
8,728
15,916
9,763
7,656
8,078
8,495
8,622
7,648
5,882
5,751
13,0140
15,453
12,743
10,593
5,474
3,107
2,799
2,422
(7)
17,992
18,148
19,678
21,287
19,417
15,054
11,678
10,999
12,065
14,749
14,842
14,279
11,788
11,400
11,143
11,288
8,361
7,401
8,484
9,903
10,104
11,596
12,254
11,638
(g)
4,077
4,102
4,272
4,852
4,657
4,044
3,14s
2,864
3,079
3,414
3,757
4,207
4,003
3,892
0,072
5,269
8,609
13,359
15,898
15,748
11,192
8,512
8,577
8,308
(9)
3
1$3
1,693
2,607
3,474
3,389
2,900
3,109
4,093
6,003
8,603
9281/
-
-
(lo)
2,117
8,714
15,013
16,360
17,534
18,766
22,329
18,300
9,65)4
9,623
11,627
3,832
-
-
(11)
4,i;56
h. 3
6,4013
5,678
6,178
5,804
6,174
5,783
9,033
9,614
10,698
9.656
9,852
8,897
7,998
(12)
5,064
4,766
4,746
4.333
4.095
3,642
3,16;
3,7014
14,2142
4,016
3,840
3,814
4,523
4,368
3,831
(13)
21,531
21'3,81;
224,570
23L1,0r;
211,97:
114,
17
--
TO
16 ,
19,,-
21i,,-,
22,10,
23-4,E,-).
232,702
oL,":,2.
270,70j.
224,00
201,31-
185.6'1:
?
?
2/
?
?
2/
1/
Timed wire service discontinued in February 1943 by order of the Commission and a new service, Longrams and Serial Longrams, was introduo:?e..
The number of Longram messages was included with day lettere, serial loagrams with serials. Longrams and serial longrams were discontint
in 1946.
cable and radio messages represents the domestic haul of internatioTly1 traffic handled by Western Union and Postal Telegraph. Doty not
available 1926-1934
other transmission messages irclude Comrerciel News department, cortract (principally railroad) messages and facsimile. Dnta not avyilp,b1 10,26 _ 02314
Sources: For the period 1926 to 1934, irclusive, the data are based on responses from The Western Union Telegraeh Co-.uany (landline ,,L-L.tem)
Telegraph Company to Telegraph Division Order No. 12. Dnta for w_0_sequent years are based or annual re-orts to the Cornission. For te yeprc,
1930 - 1936 Postal Telegraph data were reported for the month of Ja--Alary only; annual data were eetimPted an the basis of the relationship 0-2 January
transmission revenues to the tranemission revenues for the year.
Souror Rt 59 6
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#5
Western Dhion and Postal Telegraph (Landline):
Omposition of Zinsaission Revenues
1927 - 1949
(Thousands of dollars)
/ittachment ZLL
Message Other Total
Money
Dgy Night Order Govern- Timed
Year hai pate Letters Letters Massages sent Press Serials Wire Greeting Total
(I) (2) 13) r (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (112)
1927 $ 83,471 $113,262 $25,000 $ 3.333 $ 006 $3.410 $ - * _ * - *134,362 $ 5,903 *140,345
1928 85,470 19.648 24,924 3,308 074 3,700 T .. 138,292 7,241 145,533
1929 89,437 22,400 26,019 3,765 901 4,005 - 146,607 7,828 154,435
1930 79,027 21,980 22,476 3,708 1,061 3,7* - - 132,041 7,305 139,346
1931 65,880 20,262 17,570 3.183 1,085 3,164 315 4 - 111,463 6,895 118,358
1932 48,526 16,548 12,750 2,443 1,021 2,484 1,295 24 - 85,223 5:09g 90,257
1933 45,701 17,922 120 6g 62 2,169 1,2 2,248 2,370 - 0%062 4 89,025
1934 46,908 18,805. 12,237 2,354 1,607 2,551 3,678 1.693 - 89,913 4,740 94,653
1935 48.291 ig.866 12.029 2.485 1,441 2,548 3,912 2,608 596 92,776 4,792 97,568
1936 51,720 20,033 11,907 2.627 1,470 2.694 14,611 3,324 2,563 100,949 4,849 105,798
1937 50,747 19,069 11,010 2,755 1,536 2,630 4,539 3,261 4,5o1 100,048 6,220 106,268
1938 46,673 16,559 9,139 2,552 1,607 2,245 4,158 2,856 4,708 90,497 5,146 95,643
1939 48,230 16,561 9,066 2,551 1,601 2,208 4,421 3,009 5,004 92,651 5,440 98,091
1940 53,043 14,060 9,205 2,681 2,097 2,251 4,115 3,871 5,4i 96,670 5,328 101,998
1941 62,156 12,708 10,459 3,532 3,314 2,256 4,053 5,648 6, 110,577 4,992 115,
1942 69,650 11.379 12.221 6,025 8,087 1,771 3,331 /4131 5,630 126,225 4,179 130,
1943 82,742 16,617 15.138 9,150 10,819 1,423 3,118 813 3,332 143,152 9,876 153,028
1944 85,073 15,746 16,493 11,322 10,298 1,619 3,669 - 3,356 147,576 10,456 150,032
1945 91,422 15,863 17,641 11,059 8,912 1,089 3,938 - 3,061 1524,555 11,960 316445
1946 95,694 14,420 18,188 8,631 4,627 2,421 3,424 - 1,273 148,678 11,564 160,242
1947 115,824 15,100 20,052 7,049 3,20e 2,907 5,469 - - 171,203 12,631 103,034
1940 102,165 12,833 18,839 7,818 3,362 3.171 5.504 - - 153,692 11,964 165,596
1949 93,713 11,562 16,957 7,651 2,914 3,007 5,296 - - 141,100 10,640 151,740
Source: Responses of carriers to FCC Order NO. 12 and annual reports to 700.
earce: I/ 5.P
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F../0/1L.LIUU v
?
?
PC.P8.#5
Western Union and Postal Telegraph (Landline):
Composition of Nontransmission Revenues
1927 1949
(Thousands of dollars)
kt c Pne n
Other
Leased Measured Leased
rv
1 2 3) 4
Code
Money
Errand Order
I Ch .e
5 6 7
$1,466 $1,892 $1,359
1,723 1,956 1,349
2,058 2,196 1,319
2,031 2,079 1,285
1,961 1,779 1,116
1,934 1,356 854
2,140 1,235 646
2,598 1,325 528
1927 $2,143 $ $ 864
1928 2,072 892
1929 2,338 814
1930 2,324 _ 954
1931 2,228 - 973
1932 2,269 - 963
1933 2,301 976
1934 2,194 - 1,018
1935 2,227 - 1,035
1936 2,342 36 1,053
1937 2,426 188 1,082
1938 2,500 456 1,142
1939 2,631 794 1,140
1940 2,615 1,125 1,144
1941 3,524 1,465 1,199
1942 4,292 1,843 1,241
1943 3,689 2,088 1,415
1944 3,655 2,275 1,502
1945 3,572 2,395 1,493
1946 3,681 2,251 1,599
1947 4,319 2,154 1,617
1948 5,696 2,316 1,621
1949 7,528 2,405 1,593
Time
- 3,219 1,408
- 4,112 1,520
- 4,550 1,643
_ 4,336 1,517
_ 4,418 1,510
4,653 1,558
- 5,016 1,953
- 3,081 3,103
6 61 5,100
5 51 6,306
28 55 6,537
45 298 5,920
59 699 5,394
60 1,033 5,406
64 1,234 5,122
$ 206
225
198
$ 7,930
8,217
8,923
204 8,877
282 8,339
269 7,645
290 7,588
241 7,934
539 266 8,694
556 355 9,974
595 476 10,96C
609 610 11,170
603 712 11,80E
604 890 12,589
614 1,179 14,950
621 1,204 15,385
612 954 13,925
626 755 15,175
653 770 15,503
741 759 15,294
928 650 15,820
941 760 17,833
938 769 19,653
Source: Responses of carriers to FCC Order No. 12 and annual reports to FCC. cl 3
Soufr-c : Rt5.,y
0
-?0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
110
100
70
60
P.C.P.B. IL 5
'bar "
Attachment
The Western
Central Office
Equated Messages
corn?
used
have
re?
This
the
that
methods
?I
Union Telegraph
Operator
Per
1941 ? 1950
Company
Production
Hour Worked
In order
son, the
compute these
all oases
under
certain
oount
for
had been
before
to provide
equated message
production
been stated
100% manual
oaloulations
office labia
the office
the load handled,
processed
installation
a basis:far
handling*
averages
as the number
operation.
at each
produce
movid have
if
by manual
of the
Note:
part
to
in
quired
involves
------- reperforstor
number
reported
load
(1.e.,
reperforator.)
I
f
Os
Sources Rt51
Approved For Release 2QQZ,i0J44C6f.s.IAAIN,14,90269R000800100001-1
SPEED OF TELEGRAPH SERVICE
Sourest CU. Rooponso to KZ
PROMMEMIESENIEM sim
11' '4ii - i ' ;h?-? 1..- . "a i?
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=lam ^. :.: .:*? 'V t .. . . - ' ".1/4 11111MMINIIIIIIII
EtiffilMIRM:Z1PMENERNNEIMillriliki.1111 011111111111111ffli
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iii
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r0t-LiVERE-0- BY TIEL-IN-E . EA ahlbeguitt.gftriketal,ANN
.... ...
i 4 i: ' DEL iVERED BY TELEPHONE :
ORIGIN TO DESTINATION' SPEED OF SERVICE
(T/me Filed To rime Delivered )
? fF: fT
in= 4i1 1;1+
?:!...fataommim-sia, Eal EIMMEMENANNEWIEMEINIMEMEMIUM
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Attachment 2/7
P.C.P.B. 05
Approved For Release 2007/01/20 ? ClAtNYPER513156269R000800100001-1
8401161 OrlII044811 OP SU GAV
0
r-1
Aierage Revenue per Massage
of Western Union (molding PostaI) and
Interstate Toll Telephone of the A. T. & T. CO.
,
i
,
.....,,
,
\
la
i
3
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AnnrovPri For RPIP2SP 2007/01/20 ? CIA-RnP86B00269R000800100001-1
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IS
?
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
P.C.P.B. 05
Attachment 2/D 72- //
Revenue From Interstate Toll Telephone Messages of the A. T. & T.
and Western Union (including Postal) Transmission Telegraph kessages
1927 - 1949
,
,
_
Note:
Gross Revenues (before
telephone message tolls
Department of the A.T.&T.
Does not include toll
calls handled without Long
or fror, private line
uncollectibles)
in which
Co.
message
Lines
telephone.
the
have
partici-
Long
parti-
revenue
.
/1
1
from
? Lines
Daltriltatalle-
fnO
note
Roveaue
___ cipated.
from

pation
/
/
1
I
1
i
:
I
I
,
r
i
.
t
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, ,
? ---1
,
,
,
'
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:
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e
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,
'
CD :18 0
CV CV (V C.1
oI 08 0$
r4 8.4
r4
01 A
Ch Ui 12% Ui
8-4 r4
Ui UI
rI r4
X
Qi
oi
? 8-1
08 Qi 01 0^ $ 08
r4 04 r4 r4 e4 8-4 8-4
73
73
-c3
CD
500 71
CD
450 (17
n.)
CD
400 0
350 1(-;"-3
T>
300 ,
2501
200
150
100
50
'zSonr.n. el.--11CC- Reports (Rt595) & FCC
0
1,-1-00001-002000
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S
260
S
?
240
220
200
180
0
0
d
160
m
m
m
0
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140
?
0
0
11
A '1
120
10
100
BO
S
S
?
60
S
S
S
40
20
0
Atts.cheat 2/2 i'L--
Interstate Toll Telephone Messages of the A. T. & T.
and Western Union (inoluding Postal) Tranmission Telegraph Messages c
4
1927 - 1949 ...
k
4A
cn
MIN
IIIIM
1111119111110.
-4111
1
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.

.

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Telegraph
e
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Messages
issio
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Intestate
Telephone
Toll
Meese
es
?
----
-- -
-...,.
,, -
--
........
..-
-----
...----
'o -:
from
Lines
?
telephone
Department
calls
on or
s .es
Does not
handled
from
nue
message
of
include
without
.ri
:e
tolls
the A.T.&T,Co.
te lie
re
in
toll
Long
te
oo e
which
have
message
Lines
e.ho.-
the
parti-
revenue
partici-
a
Long
oipated.
from
.at
? CD
^4
o C*1
A
?-I 0-1 0-1 r4 ?-1
A Ifi t0
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OW OW OW? Os Qs Os CP, OW Os0. ch CA Qs01
4-4 004 0-4 ?-1 0-1 .-4 r4 0-1 r4 1-1
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260
240
220
200
160
160
140
120
?
UU
100 0
co
80
0
0
0
60 0
0
40
20
0
0
0
0
0
PC.P8.5
Bevenneag from Tolvrob Operations of Largo Telephone Companies
1926 - 1949
Attachrnent
zfrf
S
?
?
?
PO
Of
?
V
BO
?
sr
?
/11
MP
Er
?
I.
Year
Total/
Private
line
Morse
Private Private
line line
tole- tele-
typewriter photograph
TWE
Otherg
Year
TottlY
--"Piliate
Private line
line tele-
Morse typewriter
Privets
line
tele-
photograph
Ta
Other/
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1539
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
(Thousands of dollars)
,
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
11:
19
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
l9
1
1947
1948
1949
(Percent of total)
$16,580
18,016
21,057
25,197
27,034
25,252
21,798
21,018
21,407
20,6E14
24,166
26,178
23,963
23,804
23,344
25,320
15,942
41,693
40,818
34,065
35,876
41,830
46,219
$ -
6,836
7,201
6.961
5,493
4,641
3,630
2,072
2,206
1,
1,539
1,508
1,285
1,081
879
-
9,575
10.733
11,592112
10,755
10,455
10.326
11,282
16,4E6
15,724
18,826
21,573
18,537
19,601
22,766
25,562
-
-
-
46o
467
480
471
473
474
412
366
366
550
776
1,182
1,369
$ o
o
o
o
7
594
995
2,276
3,813
5,645
b,792
6.8.24
7,789
8,440
10,183
16,255
23,485
20,642
16,827
12,963
13,757
16,323
17,965
$ ,.
-
120
358
397
439
477
510
5141
458
513
oj
478
444
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
loo.o..)8;
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
33.0
29.8
26.6
22.9
19.5
15.6
11.3
6.1
3.2
3.4
3.6
2.6
1.9
46.3
44.4
44.2
44.9
43.9
44.2
44.6
45.8
38.o.
45.1
52.9
54.4
54.6
54.4
55.3
-4
2.3
1.9
1.8
2.1
2.0
2.0
1.9
1.4
1.o
.9
.9
1.6
2.2
2.8
3.0
.o
.o
.o
.o
.0
2i
2.41
4.7
10.6
18.4
23.4
25.9
28.5
32.7
e0.2
45.2
6
9:7
5
41.2
38.1
33.3
39.0
38.9
.5
1.5
1.6
1.9.
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.1
1.1
1.2
1.5
1.3
1.2
0.9
1/ Revenues differ from those shown for toll telegraph operations of telephone conwmiec in-Isie primnril:- due to inclusion of r..:venne
for local telegraph service and revenue of other companies in addition to those of the Bell. System, Cincinnti Subarban Dell 2e1ehoue
Company and Southern New England Telephone Company.
3/ Coverage of total revenue figures:
1926-1930 - Private line revenues of Bill System, Cincinnati Suburban Bell Telephone Comynny and Southern :ew :-.:npaand 2e1e1lone Co;n-,y.
1931-1934 - Private line and Ta revenue of Bell system, Cincinnati Suburban Ball iclophane Company, -.ad Soiern 17ow ''n 1
Company.
,
1935-1949 - Bell and other Class A and B carriers reportinc to FCC.
if/ Includes messeGe teleGram service and miscellaneous private and non-private line revenue.
Loss than 0.1 per cent.
Source:. Responses of Bell System Telephone Companies to Telegraph Division order :To. 12 and annual reports of Class A and B 2clenone Carriers
to the Todsral Communications Commission.
57,:orce:--51-
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
P.C.P.B. A 5
TN( WESTERN UNION MEGA APN COMPANY
LAND LINE SYSTEM
Attschasat .20 i27- 1?
DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICES AND PUBLIC MESSAGE REVENUE
ACCORDING TO CLASS OF OFFICE
AND AMOUNT OF PUBLIC MESSAGE REVENUE REPORTED IN JANUARY 1950
DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF OFFICES
PERCINT
NuMBER TO TOTAL
1.190 8.60
727 525
118
.85
59
.43
11,748
84.87
13,842
100.00
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC MESSAGE REVENUE
WESTERN UNION MAIN OFFICES [CLASS!:
Reportmg Publ.c Message Pie,gm-.e os .nd,caied
Less than 51.000 per mon4h
!!
31,000 10 59,999 pc, month
gR
10,000 a more per month
WOW NT PelCropT
AGENCY OFFICES REPORTING REVENUES
DIRECT TO ACCOUNTING CENTERS [CLASS 9A]
JOINT RAILROAD OFFICES [CLASS 4]
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 PERCENT I 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Note: Revenue as shown for main offices comprehends revenues for the main offices themselves, their branch offices and agency offices
?port from those Class 9A agency Offices reporting revenues dined to Accounting Centers which are shown separately above,
-:-.1034troact=iran?t
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
?
PI
STATISTICS -1949
DOMESTIC CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY OPERATION
OF LEASED WIRE TELETYPE LINES - ESTIMATED AVERAGE FIGURES
ATTACHMENT 24 __ELL-P1
(REVISED:ICY/31;qt=
(REVISED I/ 3/51)
-0
-0
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY
MILES OF
LEASED LINES
I
COST OF
LEASED LINES
AND
EQUIPMENT
II
ESTIMATED
ORIGINATED (I)
WORDS
TRANSMITTED
III
NUMBER
WORDS HANDLED
FOR OTHER GOV-
ERNMENT AGENCES
IV
ANNUAL
COST
T W X
SERVICE
V
NUMBER WORDS
TRANSMITTED
VIA
WESTERN UNION
VI
ANNUAL COST el
OF WORDS
TRANSMITTED VI,
WESTERN UNIO
VII I
II
I
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
17,630
$ 244,036
45,705,272
NONE $ 2,400
5,4 I 2,367
$ 1 7 I 03
DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE (WEATHER)
80,497
2,905,958
121
(2) NONE
NONE
NONE .
DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE (OTHER THAN WEATHER)
33,000
588,000
460,000,000
6,000,000 70,028
(3)
t27 94 all
DEPT. OF THE ARMY
23,423
429,958
(4)
330 ,8.16,624
43,500,000 162,326
(3)
524,Q8"
NONE
)
DEPT OF COMMERCE (CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMIN-WEATHER
77,6 1 0
1,646, I 23
(5)
I 0,587,960,000
(2) NONE
NONE
DEPT. OF COMMERCE (CIVIL AERON. ADMIN) - OTHER THAI. WEATHER
31,770
6, 279
695,772
I 16,280
4,31 7,800,000
100,000,000
25,000 k 600
NONE 55,280
47;4.00
4,4 50,866
2,400
190,7 5 9
1
i
DEPT OF COMMERCE (WEATHER BUREAU)
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
14,392
246,088
4,88 2,034
(6)
23,762,639 29,228
7,063,564
16 3,31 1
1 1 6,69*?
DEPT. OF THE NAVY
12,609
446,157
373,697,0 I 6
(8)
254,760 66,840
(3)
VETERAN'S ADMINISTRATION
8,658
225,000
38,729,040
270,000 125,536
9,215,080
160,91 11.
(9)
OTHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
20,063
51 0, 505
87,753,000
1,876,3041 311,795
7,8 6 I, 382
?
25 6 ,6 33 us
)
TOTALS
325,931
$ 8,053,877
16,347,342,9 8 6
75,688,703 $ 824,033
34,050,659
$ 1,7 I 3,760 ??
?
TOTALS LESS WEATHER FIGURES
I 67 824
$ 3,50 I ,796
5,759,3 82,9 86
75,688,703 $ 824,033
34,050,659
$ 1 ,7 I 3,760
(7)
GRAND TOTAL LEASED LINE WORDS
5,835,071 ,689
,
4.
NOTES (I) FIGURES SHOWN DO NOT INCLUDE RELAYED WORDS.
(2) NO ESTIMATE MADE BECAUSE OF THE SPECIALIZED NATURE OF
AND FORMS OF TRANSMISSION.
(3) FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE.
THE SERVICES
(4) THESE FIGURES REFLECT SOME TRANSMISSION BY RADIO, EXACT PERCENTAGE NOT
AVAILABLE.
(5) THIS FIGURE NOT REFLECTED IN TOTALS BECAUSE OF SPECIALIZED NATURE
OF SERVICES AND FORMS OF TRANSMISSION.
(6) INDICATES NUMBER OF WORDS TRANSMITTED ON A PRORATE BASIS, UNDER
AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC LAW 413 (SEC. 7) 79TH CONGRESS, APPROVED JUNE 14, 1946.
(7) DOES NOT INCLUDE WEATHER TRANSMISSIONS, BUT OTHERWISE INCLUDES WORDS
TOTALED IN COLUMNS AND Ir.
(B) SHOWN FOR WASHINGTON AREA ONLY - OTHER FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE.
(9) OTHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN THESE FIGURESt
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICES
EXPORT - IMPORT BANK
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD
HOUSING EXPEDITER
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
1,-1-00001-00200
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
157.
CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS ABROAD
Electrical communications that rival the domestic systems in
speed connect the United States with points all over the world.
Commercial networks span the globe with messages, conversations, and
pictures that give direction to the nation's foreign trade. Interna-
tional radio facilities built up by the Federal Government handle a
heavy volume of communications for the conduct of defense and diplomacy.
Long-range broadcasting under the supervision of the Department of State
is one of the country's essential international activities under current
world conditions. Commercial and government interests participate in
operation of international telecommunications for protection of life
at sea and in the air.
All but the cable systems are directly concerned with the demand
for radio frequencies discussed in Chapter II of this report. Another
problem affecting international telecommunications of the United States
arises from economic and other difficulties of the companies engaged
in cable and radiotelegraph service.
The cable companies have been burdened with a heavy investment in
plant. IntenSe competition with each other and from radio has held
down profits. Development of radio in the international field has
added circuits faster than traffic has grown. The American companies
often have found themselves at a disadvantage in negotiations with
the monopolies of government-controlled companies of other countries.
The result has been an intermittent demand for legislation that
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1584,
would permit the merger of some or all of the American companies
selling cable and radiotelegraph services.
Many agencies of the Government from time to time have supported
the merger idea, but for the most part Congressional policy has been
opposed to such action. The Communications Act of 1934
calls for a
competitive structure among the international record communication
companies. Officials with a primary responsibility for national
security are eager that as many international circuits as possible
are kept in operation.
To supplement other information available on the economics of
the merger question, the President's Communications Policy Board re-
tained the engineering firm of Ford, Bacon & Davis to make a special
survey of the record communications industry. These consultants
found that, while savings from merger in the international field might
make possible reductions in rates, of a group of big customers of
the cable and radiotelegraph companies most were opposed to consoli-
dations on the ground that poorer service might result. The engineers
concluded, moreover, that the companies now have good chances of
operating at a profit.
The staff of the Board, in its over-all study of United States.
overseas telecommunications, has amassed a great deal of statistical
information about the international telecommunications networks, both
government and non-government. Although this information has been
tabulated and a substantial amount of it analyzed, the analysis of
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159.
the government networks has not been completed.
Much of the information relating to overseas telecommunications
of the Federal Government has to do with operations of the armed
forces. When the President on December 16, 1950, proclaimed a
state of national emergency, the Board decided that security re-
quirements would prevent inclusion of material of this nature in a
public report. The material therefore was classified and remains
in the files of the Board.
Development of Commercial Systems
Cables
American companies entered the international communications
field in 1881 when a cable was laid between Canso Nova Scotia
and Penzance, England, and leased to the Western Union Telegraph
Company for operation.
British companies already had been operating across the
Atlantic for some time and later pioneered also in service to
Latin American countries and across the Pacific. In the Atlantic
service, a British monopoly prevented companies of other countries
from landing their lines at Newfoundland and it became necessary
for companies wishing relays there to lease lines from the British
interests.
Operation of the transoceanic cables originally involved re-
laying messages manually at stations located at several points
along the cable route. In 1898 cable relays were developed to
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160.
permit automatic operation. Because of the characteristics of
cable transmission, however, direct service was not possible
over long routes that involved several relays. In 1921 regenerators
were developed to allow operation of cable circuits direct from the United
States to Europe, thus speeding up the service and decreasing the cost
of operation.
Another improvement came in 1923 when, in order to increase
its traffic-carrying capacity, the Commercial Cable Company, an
American organization, laid a line with a copper conductor double
the size of previous conductors. The following year the Bell
System announced development of a high permeability alloy and
Western Union laid a cable in which the conductor was wrapped with
tape made of the new "permalloy." This cable has a capacity in
excess of 300 words a minute, while the Commercial company's 1923
line has a capacity of 200 words a minute and the capacity of the
earlier cables is much lower.
Descriptions of the American cable systems in operation
today are included in the discussion of the "Economic Outlook
for U. S. Cable and Radiotelegraph Companies."
Radiotelegruh
Transoceanic communication by radio was established on a
firm basis prior to World War II after most earlier attempts had
met with only sporadic success because of lack of efficient
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transmitting and receiving equipment. One reason for this
situation was that each equipment manufacturer did not have
available patented devices controlled by others. As a result,
United States radio-communication companies had confined their
operations primarily to ship-shore service.
Upon the American declaration of war in 1917, the U. S.
Navy assumed operation of all of the country's high-powered
stations built for transoceanic communication. Under its war-
time control, the Government combined the patents and scientific
resourees of all electrical manufacturers. These included use of
the Alexanderson alternator and the DeForest tube, which offered
a solution to the problem of efficiently generating and receiving
continuous electrical waves. By.the combining of various other
inventions, new devices were developed out of which came practical
radio transmitters and receivers satisfactory for wartime purposes.
Thus the Navy carried on transoceanic communications during the
war, with powerful stations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts
operating on low frequencies (long waves).
After the war, the Government fostered the organization of the
Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in 1919 to solve the patent tangle and
keep American radio communications free of foreign control. Prior to its
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incorporation, an attempt to obtain exclusive rights to the
Alexanderson generator had been made by the British Marconi Company
and negotiations with General Electric had been practically completed
when the Navy Department indicated its objection to the ownership of
this and other American radio patents by a foreign interest. As Soon
as RCA was organized, it purchased the assets and patent rights held
by the American Marconi Company controlled by British interests. In
1920, RCA entered into exclusive cross-licensing agreements whereby
it obtained rights to the use of other important patents, including
the DeForest tube.
With these rights, the company quickly established direct radio-
telegraph circuits to England, Hawaii, Japan, Norway, France, and
Germany. Service was inaugurated to Italy in 1921 and two years later
to Poland. After the advent of long-distance high-frequency trans-
missions in 1927, circuits were established to Java, French Indo-China,
the Philippines, and Hong Kong.
As these services grew, RCA established two subsidiaries--
Radiomarine Corporation of
--to conduct tha buginass
company departments.
point service between
RCAC
land
America and RCA Communications, Inc. (RCAC)
which previously had been operated by
confines its operations largely to point-to-
stations, and Radiomarina handles service
to and from ships almost exclusively. By 1939 RCAC had establiched
52 international radiotelegraph circuits, and by 1950 it was operating
69 such circuits.
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After World War I, other radiotelegraph carriers also became
active in the international field. By 1926 the Tropical Radio
Telegraph Company had established 12 direct radiotelegraph
circuits to the West Indies, Central America, and South America,
and by 1950 the number had grown to 24.
The International Telephone and Telegraph Company in 1929
acquired the Postal Telegraph and Cable Corporation and, from its
international division, organized the Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company
to challenge RCACts monopoly in the worldwide radiotelegraph service.
By 1933 Mackay had established 10 circuits and in 1950 had 35 in
operation.
Government policy was to grant transoceanic frequencies only
on a public utility basis, and not for private use. As a result,
the Robert Dollar Steamship Company organized Globe Wireless, Ltd.,
and the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company created the United States-
Liberia Radio Corporation to meet their special requirements, al-
though the facilities were made available to any customers. Those
systems and that of the South Porto Rico Sugar Company offer
public service only to a limited number of points.
When the Federal Communications Commission was organized in
1934/ its initial practice was to deny applications for circuits
to countries already served by other 'American radiotelegraph carriers.
With the outbreak of World aar II in 1939, however, the Commission generally
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granted applications for new circuits, regardless of whether other
carriers already were operating to the points concerned.
In January 1942, the Defense Communications Board (later
succeeded by the Board of War Communications) adopted as a wartime
measure a policy encouraging establishment of parallel circuits from
the United States to overseas points, to be operated by two Imerican
companies. Where possible, different locations were to be used in the
country with which parallel circuits were set up. In April of that
year, the policy was amended so that, if parallel circuits could not
be established because of lack of suitable equipment every effort
would be made to establish duplicate circuits to allow two or more
American companies to communicate with the same point abroad.
Under these policies, the Mackay company established circuits
to Russia, Italy, Eire, and Greenland between 1939 and 1942, and after
that time set up communications with 12 more countries.
Press Radio.--The value of international radio communication
for the expeditious handling of news was recognized early by American
press associations and newspapers.
Soon after Marconi's original experiments, the New York Herald
set up a radio station in New York Harbor to gather news from ships
at sea and to send out daily news summaries to them. This station
continued in operation until World War I. After the war, the New 'York
Times edtablished its own station to communicate with European stations,
and soon thereafter similar facilities were installed by the
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Associated Press, the International News Service, and the Chicago
TrIbune.
As the demand for frequencies grew, the Federal Radio Commission
in 1929 entered an order calling for the formation of a single public
utility to serve all the American press. This action led to the
organization of Press Wireless, Inc.- Although it was established to
serve the press exclusively, the companyls charter does not limit
holding of stock to press interests, and its corporate powers extend
to and include the operation of fixed public service as a commun-
ications common carrier. By 1936 Press Wireless had established six
international radiotelegraph circuits, and in 1950 was operating 17
such circuits. In addition to its special services for individual
newspapers and press associations, the company handles multiple-
addressed press material and program and radiophoto services.
Radiotelaphone
Experiments in the field of radiotelephony were begun in 1915
by the United States Government, in conjunction with the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company. Mensages were sent from the naval
station at Arlington, Va., and from Washington to such distant points
as San Francisco, Honolulu, and Paris. Interrupted by World War I,
tests were continued after the war.
Speech was transmitted to England In 1923, and by the end of
1926 successful test operations were being conducted between New York
and London. The first international radiotelephone circuit for
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general use was established between those cities by A.T.& T. in
January 1927. Soon afterward service was extended beyond the
terminals of the radio circuit, by means of wire lines, to ail of
Great Britain and the United States. Cuba and a part of Canada
were added for service by the end of 1927 and the following year
service was extended to many countries of Western Europe, utilizing
the extensive wire telephone network ccnnecting London with the
Continent.
By the end of 1933 transatlantic service was in operation for
most of North America and the principal countries of Western Europe.
Ten direct radiotelephone circuits had been established. In certain
cases, a direct circuit was provided to a distant terminal; in many
others, the establishment of direct service with several countries
was provided on a so-called "forked" circuit basis; in still others,
either of these two types of radio channels was used in connection
with line wire extensions to countries beyond the distant radio
circuit terminals.
Overseas circuits radiating from the United States were centered
at three main focal points: New York, Miami, and San Francisco. By
1936 the LT.& T. had established 27 direct radiotelephone circuits.
Fifty-seven such circuits were in operation in 1950.
The Radio Corporation of Porto Rico also engages in limited
international radiotelephone service, operating the San Juan terminal
of the A.T.& T. circuit between the United States and Puerto Rico.
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The Honolulu end of the U.S.-Hawaii radiotelephone circuit is
operated by the Mutual Telephone Company of Hawaii. Its radiotele-
phone transmitters and receivers in turn are operated by RCAC under
a lease agreement with the Mutual company.
Regalpilion of Commercial ystems
Under the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, the Federal
Communications Commission is charged with regulating, among other
things, international communications by telephone and telegraph,
whether wire, ocean cable, or radiobroadcast and other forms of radio
services. These functions do not however, include control of facil-
ities operated by the Federal Government.
Among the provisions of the Act are those affecting common carriers
and reflecting Congressional policy that the public interest in
adequate public communications service and reasonable rates is to be
protected and promoted by Federal regulation.
The Commission's responsibilities in the international common
carrier field require it to be active in the area of foreign relations
as they pertain to that field.
The United States is a member of the International Telecommunications
Union. As such it participates in the negotiations stemming from the
Union that relate to international telephone and telegraph questions.
Additionally, there are other bilateral and multilateral agreements
on the subject in which the United States is concerned. Because the
Commission has large responsibilities in the field as indicated above,
it must be alert to the effects of such international negotiations
upon the public interest, convenience, and necessity as related to
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non-Federal Government international communications.
Among the regulatory interests of the. Federal Communications
Commission in this field are merger, circuit arrangements, frequency
management, equipment and operating techniques, processing of appli-
cations, conference preparation and negotiation, rate schedules,
acceptance and delivery practices, distribution of traffic, records,
and finance.
One significant matter (Docket No. 8777). has been pending for some ?
time. This case grew out of applications involving the question of
whether and to what extent the Commission will authorize a second direct
radiotelegraph circuit to countries already served directly by one
carrier. This question contains many facets relating to merger, frequency
utilization, national defense, and competition between American carriers.
Adequate regulation, however, has been somewhat hampered in recent
years because of budgetary limitations.
Development of U. S. Government Systems
Apart from the facilities established during World War I and some
minor systems operated between the wars to maintain communication with
overseas military bases, ships at sea, and aircraft over the sea, the
United States Government had not developed any extensive international
communication facilities of its own until the beginning of World War II.
Responding to the requirements of global operations, the Army
(including the Air Force) and the Navy then created new worldwide
networks for Communications. Certain non-military agencies of the
Government also established more limited systems. In the early years
of the war, these agencies leased some commercial radio and cable
facilities until they could install their own equipment and operate
it. Certain of these leased facilities, hoWever, were continued
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throughout the war period and some of them are still in leased use
today.
Many of the overseas facilities installed by the Government for
war use also have been continued in operation. Some of course were
abandoned, but the postwar international situation has required re-
tention of many facilities which otherwise might have been curtailed
or eliminated, as well as the installation of additional ones.
Department of Defense
Following unification of the armed forces in 1947, a Joint
Communications-Electronics Committee was established as an agency of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense to coordinate
telecommunications activities of the several services and to provide
liaison with Government departments and with other public and private
agencies having interests in the field. As a result of the committee's
work, the Department of Defense has established principles for the
integration of telecommunications functions among commands and
services.
As the General Services Administration has managerial respon-
sibilities for Government telecommunications services specified under
Public Law 152, the GSA and the Department of Defense have agreed on
areas of understanding on the procurement of telecommunications
facilities in order "to obtain the maximum economy consistent with
the requirements of service."
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S
Ar.--Before the turn of the century, the Army was
devoting attention to wireless telegraphy with a view to adapting
it for military purposes. These tests led to the installation of
four radio stations in 1900 and within the next eight years the
Army was operating 17 stations in the United States, Alaska, Cuba,
and the Philippines, plus radio stations on five Army transports.
By the time of the United States entry into World War I, the
Army radio network had expanded to 51 stations in the United States
and 10 overseas, and 53 Army vessels also had been equipped with
radio.
The Army radio net was officially organized in January 1922,
In June of that year, 218,000 words were handled over this system.
Because of budgetary difficulties, the Army's use of telecommunication
facilities grew little until the limited national emergency was
declared by the President in 1939. At that time, the Army radio net
connected Washington with the Corps Area Headquarters in the United
States and its overseas Department Headquarters such as the Philip-
pines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Panama. This net then handled about
5,000 messages a day.
During the early months of World War II, the Army leaned heavily
upon the commercial facilities of Western Union, Mackay, ?A.T.& T., and
RCAC. But commercial facilities did not completely fill the bill.
Direct circuits and greater security were required. In the circum-
stances, the Army and the Air Corps drew plans to build worldwide
communications to serve the armed forces.,
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171.
The plan comprehended a "pipe-line" around the world. The
first leg put in on the "pipe-line" was from Washington to Asmara,
Eritrea, on a multi-channel teleprinter basis.
around-the-world belt line had been completed,
to New Delhi, from New Delhi to Brisbane, from
Francisco, and thence on to Washington. The
reached 50,000 a day in March 1943,
Before V-E day, the Army Communications
By early 1943 an
extending from Asmara
Brisbane to San
network's message volume
Service had been extended
into an unprecedented global system, employing the most modern equip-
ment and operating techniques known to U. S. telecommunications
experts, and providing instant communications to all overseas forces
and missions and allied countries. By January 1, 1949, this network
had been contracted and rearranged, but 14 overseas trunk circuits
were still in operation. The Army, in addition, utilizes the services
of the international carriers to locations where it has not been
necessary to establish Army facilities. The Army also
traffic for some of the other Government agencies when
capacity is available.
-- Radio communications
established by the U. S. Navy, as early
communicating rapidly between ship and
handles radio
spare circuit
on an operating basis were
as 1903 for the purpose of
shore and between ships.
Later, radio communication facilities also were provided between
shore establishments both at home and abroad. As the Navy grew and
the communications art developed, the Navy's communication system
became larger and more complex.
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172.
Before 1940 the Navy operated several point-to-point multi-
station radio telegraph circuits and one Morse wire circuit within
the continental United States,
In 1941,
however, the Morse circuit
was converted to private teletypewriter operation. This conversion
marked the commencement of the transition from radio to landline
for intracontinental circuits.
Today, with the far-flung interests and missions of the Navy,
its communication system meets the requirements for essential con-
tinuous, and immediate communication between Navy air, surface, and
sub-surface operating forces wherever they may be and between those
forces and Navy shore establishments.
The stated mission of the Naval Communication Service "is to
provide and maintain an adequate and secure communication system
for the Navy, based on war requirements; and to ensure operation
thereof to best meet the requirements of the operating forces and
the shore establishment, wherever located, primarily to serve command
and to facilitate administration."
To implement this mission the Navy provides facilities at
strategic locations. These are classified as primary, major,
and minor communication centers, and tributary offices. The six
primary communication centers are strategically located to furnish,
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as far as practicable, complete radio communication coverage
for the major portions of the ocean areas of the world. Major
centers provide more limited area coverage. Minor centers pro-
vide fleet communication support as may be required. Tributary
offices are served from the primary, major, and minor communication
centers.
Certain channels of the radio trunk circuits, particularly
overseas circuits, combine with nearly all of the landline
circuits Of the Navy to form the Naval Teletypewriter System (NTX),
which employs the tape-relay method of distributing traffic.
Navy point-to-point radio trunk circuits are integrated with
continental point-to-point wire circuits. Many of these circuits
were designed and established about 1910 for manual telegraph
operation. As the demand for greater speed and capacity increased,
these and newer circuits were converted to automatic operation in
a progressive transition from Wheatstone and single channel radio-
teletypewriter to duplex, multiplex, and finally single-sideband
teletypewriter multi-channel operation.
Force.--The need for an airways communication
system capable of supporting military operations under all weather
conditions was brought home to the Air Corps in 1934 when a
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flight of new bombing planes was sent on maneuvers across the
United States. All that was available at the time was a series
of radio ranges and rotating light beacons operated by the
Department of Commerce. Communication between the ground and
aircraft was restricted for the most part to short-range voice
contacts with the range stations. Messages from point of de-
parture to point of intended arrival were sent by Western Union.
It took four years to get funds and assemble equipment to
make the beginnings of what is now the Airways and Air Communi-
cations Service (AACS). At its inception, AACS established 33
stations consisting of a combination of control towers, ground-
air, point-to-point, and radio range facilities. A personnel
total of 3 officers and 300 enlisted men was authorized.
From 1938 to 1941, the East and South were fairly well covered,
while most of the Middle West and North West had little coverage.
Existing installations serviced practically all the permanent
Air Corps stations of that day.
Operations outside the U. S. were begun in April 1941, when
an AACS party was sent to Newfoundland to start work at Gander
Lake. From this beginning grew the extensive wartime ferry routes
to England, over the North Atlantic and later to Africa through
the Azores.
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During all of 1942 the AACS was fully occupied in building up
ferry routes to all overseas theaters and in developing its plans
for further expansion. The leased bases in the Antilles were manned
for anti-submarine operations and also as way stations on a South
Atlantic route to India through Central Africa. In the Pacific, the
pre-war air route to Manila through Midway and Wake was closed off
by the enemy and was replaced in early 1942 by a South Pacific route
through Fiji and New
Canada a ferry route
were developed.
The years 1943
Caledonia to Australia. In Alaska
to Siberia and an airway along the
and Western
Aleutians
and 1944 were spent improving the routes started
in 1942 and in building new stations as offensive plans proceeded.
Operations in support of the Air Transport Command's flights over
the "Hump" in Southeast Asia were perhaps the most spectacular, but
concurrently a number of stations were established in China for the
14th Air Force and later for the early raids of the B-29's from
China bases.
In the spring of 1945, communications had to be provided for
the air power assembled at Okinawa for the projected assault on Japan.
In France, the Lowlands, and Germany, the Allied offensives secured
new airdromes which had to be tied into the airways system.
Meanwhile, the great increase in the air establishment at home
called for more installations, but naturally the overseas areas had
first priority. Therefore, not until after the war could AACS
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inaugurate its planned Military Flight Service Communications System.
This is a network of strategically located stations which primarily
furnish point-to-point and ground-air facilities, but also provide
aids to navigation such as control touers, radio ranges, direction
finders, ground controlled approach units and instrument landing
systems. This plan was drawn up to complement the communications of
CAA.
Since the end of hostilities AACS has devoted itself to improving
its service. Facsimile is rapidly taking the load ?off the point-to-
point radioteletype circuits which transmit weather data. Multi-
channel equipment is being installed as rapidly as possible. A
global system of communications is in process of development.
AACS has participated in all the major Air Force operations
since World War II. It supplied all the airways communications and
navigational aids for the Berlin Airlift. It took part in large-
scale joint service maneuvers. It supplied communications to the
Lucky Lady II on its round the world non-stop flight. It also was
responsible for airways communications in Korea.
Department of the Treasury
The only international communications facilities of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury are those of the United States Coast Guard,
which is a part of the department in peacetime. The Coast Guard
operates as a service in the Navy Department in time of war, or when
the President directs.
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The peacetime functions of the Coast Guard include law enforce-
ment or assistance in enforcing all applicable Federal laws upon the
high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and promotion of safety of life and property in those areas. These
functions require the use of radio for point-to-point, radiolocation,
and mobile services.
The Coast Guard operates and maintains ocean stations in both
the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans to provide search and
rescue services at sea and over the sea, communications, and air
navigation facilities, and meteorological services in such ocean
areas as are regularly traversed by aircraft of the United States.
It operates land telephone lines along the coastline, connecting
lifeboat stations, lighthouses and other units. The facilities in-
clude eighteen radio broadcast stations. Medium frequency direction
finder stations, previously operated along the coasts, have been dis-
continued as a navigational aid to the public, owing to the use,
generEilly, of shipboard direction finders in conjunction with marine
radio-beacons and the utilization of radar and "loran" systems. The
direction finder stations have been continued, however, at strategic
points for search and rescue purposes.
During 1949 the Coast Guard maintained 37,309 aids to naviga-
tion, many of which require radio transmissions. It also operated
34 fixed "loran" stations along with 14 "racon" stations along the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska.
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Department of Commerce 178.
The principal users of radio frequencies in the Department of
Commerce are the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the Weather Bureau,
and the Bureau of Standards. The remainder of the bureaus and offices
of the Department, in their international operations use both commer-
cial communications and the facilities of other Government agencies.
Most of their messages are exchanged with the Foreign Service of the
United States. Departmental procedures have been established for
handling such international communications. Under these procedures,
messages to and from the embassies, legations, and consulates of the
United States are routed through a liaison office in the Department of
Commerce and are handled by the Department of State.
Civil Aeronautics Administration.--The communications and air traf-
fic control systems of the Civil Aeronautics Administration were estab-
lished to provide for the safety of life and property in aircraft
operated on the civil airways and air routes in the United States, its
territories and possessions, and between the United States and foreign
countries..
Increased use of aircraft following World War I stirred up concern
about hazardous flying over unfamiliar territory and during periods of
poor visibility. It also gave rise to two other problems: (1) preven-
tion of collision, and (2) expediting the movement of aircraft.
Traffic adjacent to large airports and along major routes had become
heavy within a short time.
The Post Office Department, whose air-mail service then was the
only operator of aircraft during all types of weather, established
aeronautical radio stations in 1920. This was the beginning of the
present complex aeronautical communications and radio navigation_ sis.
tem which is the end-product of a number of organizational changes
through the years.
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The Aeronautical Communications Stations operated by CAA per-
form the following 14 functions:
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
Service
110
111311
ItC11
11D11
11E11
11F11
11G11
nip
1110
111,11
- Collection and distribution of hourly and special
reports on surface weather, airfield conditions,
and inoperative air navigation aids, etc.;
- Requests for and approval to conduct an aircraft
flight; flight plans, in-flight progress reports,
and aircraft arrival reports;
- Collection and distribution of 3 and 6 hourly
weather data; pilot balloon reports, radiosonde,
weather forecasts, etc.;
- Radio broadcast of meteorological information,
advisory messages, and advice to airmen;
- Two-way radio communications with aircraft in
flight;
- Dissemination of messages to assist flow and pre-
vent collisions of aircraft flying under instrur
ment flight rule;
- Monitoring radio aids to air navigation and
communications systems;
- Operation of non-directional type radiobeacons by
ground stations;
Flight assistance services;
- Operation of lighting facilities (various lighting
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equipment of airports, etc.);
Service "0" - Collection and distribution of overseas and for-
eign meteorological data;
Service "R" - Operation of radio ranges by ground stations;
Service "W" - Airway weather observational service;
Service "X" - Determining of information relative to the fixed
location, bearing, or heading of aircraft.
Four radiotelegraph stations were in operation in 1920 along
the transcontinental airway, and the first radio range station vas
installed at Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, in 1927. Two years later a
teletype circuit was placed in operation, connecting 13 stations
by means of 700 miles of leased wire. The general use of teletype
machines meant that weather information could be transmitted by
employees able to type. This change helped to eliminate interference
in the crowded radio frequency spectrum. By the end of 1936 there
were 203 weather-reporting teletype stations.
Service "B" was inaugurated in 1938. During the same year the
need for communications services in the Territory of Alaska, and for
the proposed transoceanic aircraft services was recognized, and action
was started on both projects.
The first overseas-foreign aeronautical communications station
was completed in 1940 at New York. The station was needed to provide
two-way radio communication with aircraft operating on the Atlantic
air routes. Communications were also inaugurated between New York
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and various points in Europe, the Azores, Bermuda, and Newfoundland
to collect meteorological data and to transmit information concerning
aircraft movements. In Alaska, 6 communications stations were com-
pleted and placed in operation. Most communications with Alaska
were by means of radiotelegraph because of the lack of landline faci-
lities.
With the advent of World War II, the civil aviation systems
were closely coordinated with the military services. Four communica-
tions stations to handle overseas traffic were completed in 1942--at
San Francisco; Everett, Washington;.Anchorage; and Honolulu. Over-
seas airway communications facilities were further expanded in 1942
to include stations at New Orleans, Miami, and Balboa, Canal Zone.
The additional stations provided services to flights operating to
South and Central America and the Caribbean. An estimated total
of 64-million words of weather and flight traffic was handled during
the year.
Today the subordinate services of CAA use radio to maintain
communications with commercial and military aircraft, and also for
administrative purposes, weather information and safety requirements.
For international aircraft operations, the Administrator of
Civil Aeronautics provides directly, or through an agency sponsored
by the Government for the purpose, the basic fixed and mobile tele-
communications system for the exchange of the following categories
of messages:
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1) Distress messages,
2) Messages for the safety of life and property,
3) Flight safety messages,
4) Meteorological messages,
5) Notices to airmen,
6) Flight regularity messages,
7) Aeronautical administrative messages,
8) Reservation messages, and
9) General airline operating agency messages.
It is the practice to handle without charge the messages in
categories 1 through 7. 'Reservation and general airline operating
agency message categories are not accepted when private or commercial
facilities are capable of meeting aeronautical communications require-
ments.
Weather Bureau.--In addition to its many offices and part-time
stations within the United States, the Weather Bureau, under agree-
ments with foreign governments, is active along many of the overseas
air routes. It maintains, in cooperation with the, Coast Guard)
ocean weather stations in both the Atlantic and the Pacific) as well
as in the Arctic regions. Over 2.2 million weather report words were
received collect from foreign points and from commercial ships at
sea during 1949.
The Weather Bureau cooperates extensively with the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration and the Coast Guard in disseminating weather
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information for aircraft and ships.
Although the Weather Bureau does not own and operate any inter-
national communications facilities, it does lease international
landline facilities to Cuba and Canada for the exchange of weather
information.
National Bureau of Standards.--The National Bureau of Standards
uses radio for its international frequency-measurement service, for
research, and for special tests. It has no facilities for the handling
of rapid communications.
The Bureau's station WV has a worldwide reputation in its field.
The station transmits continuously a highly accurate complex signal
on specified frequencies. It transmits accurate time signals,
Central Radio Propagation Laboratory forecasts of propagation con-
ditions, accurate audio tones, and accurate carrier frequencies. In
addition, the listener can obtain propagational data over the path
traversed by the signal to the listener's receiver.
Demrtment of State
The Department of State has a two-fold interest in telecommuni-
cations. It is responsible for international negotiations on telecom-
munications matters. It is also a large user of telecommunications
for the conduct of its general operations, for the dissemination of
informational and educational matter abroad, and for the Voice of
America.
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022rational Communications.--The Department of State useo
practically all forms of communication to meet its requirement for
rapid interchange of instructions and information between Washington
and missions abroad. Speed, security, and distance dictate heavy use
of telegraph service.
The Department maintains its own internal 'message centers."
In Washington and at' several of the large posts abroad, telegraph
centers are established for the centralization of the exchange of
traffic with commercial carriers and with communications centers of
the armed forces.
With the exception of certain isolated emergency operations, the
Department of State neither controls nor operates long distance
communications channels, nor does it maintain or operate radio trans-
mitting or receiving stations for the handling of telegraph communi-
cations.
The Department of State has a direct leased Western Union cable
"varioplex" telegraph channel connection between Washington and the
U. S. Etpbassy in London and another between Washington and the U.S.
Embassy in Paris. These two direct channels accommodate regular
message traffic charged for at the prevailing message rates.
In addition, the Department of State shares the use of another
Washington to Paris telegraph facility over a New York-Horta-Cherbourg
cable, which is alit Western Union-Army circuit (Western Union from
New York to Horta and Army from Horta to Cherbourg over the former
German Emden cable). While this facility terminates at the Army
message center in Washington, the Department of State message center
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in Washington can be combined with it when the circuit is not in
use by the Army.
Voice of America,--The need of the United States for international
high-frequency broadcasting has been greatly increased by the up-
surge of interest in programs of international information and edu-
cational exchange. Between the two world wars, there was a tremendous
growth, especially in Europe, of international broadcasting. Only
toward the latter years of that period did American commercial broad-
casting interests engage in relatively modest programs of international
broadcasting, chiefly directed to the Western Hemisphere. During
World War II, however, the U. S. Government created worldwide radio .
and pressEervices, operated by the Office of War Information and
the Office of Inter-American Affairs. These activities were trans-
ferred to the Department of State by Executive Order on August 311 1945,
for reduction and incorporation in the small program of information
and cultural exchange already started in that Department.
During the period immediately following the termination of hos-
tilities, the program was carried on under authority of annual
appropriations acts. Then it came under severe Congressional attack,
and was almost eliminated by the summer of 1947.
With the developing world crisis, however, Congress responded to
the need for special machinery to tell abroad the story of the United
States and of the free world. The presumption of an early return
to a peaceful world, which lay beneath the earlier decision to cut
the Government program to the bone and let private information agencies
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carry on, was proved false. In January of 1948 Congress passed
the U. S. Information and Educational Exchange Act to promote the
better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the
world and to strengthen cooperative relations."
High-frequency radio bulked large among the media available to
carry out this worldwide commitment. With more and tighter restric-
tions and barriers to the dissemination of information, high-frequency
radio appeared to be the best way to get the truth about the free
world into iron-curtain areas. The geographical position of the
United States has heightened the value of high-frequency operations
in its international radio broadcasting.
The Voice of America not only provides service for its own
broadcasts, but also for the United Nations at New York and the armed
forces of the United States abroad.
For transmissions from the United. States, the Voice of America
generally leases transmitter time from various commercial broadcast
or communications companies. For transmissions from overseas points
the Voice of America, in general, owns its own facilities. It also
transmits to certain stations in other countries for rebroadcast by
them.
This rapid expansion in the Voice of America poses a serious
problem for world telecommunications, especially in the high-frequency
band. In November 1950 the Voice was using 69 frequencies on the
average of seven hours per day each. These are a substantial per-
centage of the total spectrum space available to the world for
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international broadcasting under the Atlantic City Table.
Government policy calls for a large increase in radio instal-
lations used for the Voice. These increases, however necessary and
desirable,may put more pressure on the spectrum during the years
immediately ahead. The future after that will depend on the level
of international crisis.
Information for the Foreign Press.--In addition to the broad-
casts of the Voice of America, the Department of State sends around
the world a daily news service of information about the United States
for use in newspapers and other media abroad,
For this service, the Department's Division of International Press
and Publications operates a teletype communications center in
Washington. Into this center pour thousands of words daily for
transmission to New York, where they are sent overseas by commercial
radiotelegraph facilities.
These Morse transmissions are received by radio operators at
United States missions abroad and are reproduced and distributed to
press and other information outlets in those countries. Ships and
other stations of any nation also may intercept these radio news
reports.
Other Government Ago2ies.--Many independent agencies and com-
missions of the Federal Government which do not own or lease inter-
national circuits transmit and receive international communications
through existing Government or commercial company facilities. Be-
tween 85 and 90 per cent of this wordage is transmitted over Government
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188.
facilities at practically no cost to the originating office. The
Economic Cooperation Administration and the Veterans' Administration,
the largest of these users of international communications, route
the majority of their traffic through the Department of State and
the military services, respectively.
The American Red Cross, although not a Government agency, is
privileged to use Government-owned international communications facil-
ities to handle its traffic. During 1949 over 7 million words were
transmitted by the armed forces for this organization.
Control of Government_qystems
Federal Government agencies now decide, at something less than
top level, the amount and type of record telecommunications matter
that is to be transmitted to overseas or foreign points by means of
facilities controlled by the Federal Government and established
primarily for purposes of national defense. Too great a diversion
is not conducive to the best health of the nation's telecommunications
networks.
If our national policy recognizes the desirability of strong
private Anerican companies operating in the international telecom-
munications field, there must be some form of control to insure that
a substantial amount of Government message business is handled by
commercial agencies, so that the Federal Government does not, perhaps
unwittingly and by unilateral action of independent agencies, bring
about a total or partial collapse of commercial facilities by
eliminating their largest customer--the Government.
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not yet been granted.
Relationships to Commercial Systems
Though Government-owned facilities handle A large portion of
Government communications, the Federal Government is dependent upon
commercial overseas facilities to round out its over-all needs for
international service. This is true in two major respects. The
Government finds in some cases that it is more economical and effic-
ient to lease or subscribe to a circuit or channel from a common
carrier than it is to install and operate a facility of its own. For
the transmission of small amounts of traffic to remote points, the
Government often finds it more economical or convenient to route
such traffic via common carriers than to send it part way over
Government facilities.
Government also depends heavily upon the existence of common
carrier facilities during the early stages of war. Because it is
not possible to anticipate the precise nature and locale of hostil-
ities, the armed forces try to maintain a minimum basic system in
peacetime and depend upon appropriate expansion in wartime, utilizing
common carrier facilities to tide them over.
The Merger Question in International Record Communications
Historical Summary
Proposals for merger of American companies providing cable and
radiotelegraph services have provoked vigorous debate ever since
radio emerged as a-practicable means of international communications.
The traditional American policy against monopoly has affected this
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while other Government departments have opposed consolidation.
Some of these agencies have shifted their positions from time to
time on the desirability of one or another form of merger. At no
time have all the interested executive agencies been in agreement
on this issue. As of May 1950, this was still the case.
The move for merger in the field of international record com-
munications has never been able to win complete Congressional
support because of traditional resistance to monopoly. Numerous
hearings have been held by committees of the Congress, but no legis-
lation has resulted. Either the case has not been strong enough, or
prevailing international situations have delayed consideration of
the various proposals. In the meantime, however, Congress has
approved mergers of telephone companies and of domestic telegraph
companies, and permits the domestic telephone companies to operate
in the international field.
During World War I, when the Government operated the telegraph
industry, the U. S. Navy was given control of the transoceanic
radio stations in the interest of national security. Immediately
after the war, a bill was introduced in Congress providing for the
control and operation by the Navy Department of the then existing
private U. S. radio stations used for overseas communications. The
measure had Navy support. Under its provisions, the Navy was to
operate the private stations as well as its own stations for the
handling of both commercial and Government international communi-
cations. The bill did not become law. The country would not accept
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Government ownership or operation of these facilities.
The first expression of Congressional policy on merger of the
privately owned cable and radio companies came in the Federal Radio
Act of 1927. This law specifically prohibited mergers of radio
with cable companies, and vice versa, if such mergers would lessen
competition or restrain trade in interstate or foreign commerce. The
Radio Act also declared that anti-trust laws are specifically
applicable to the manufacture, sale, and trade in radio apparatus,
and to interstate or foreign radio communications.
The Communications Act of 1934 included the same provisions.
In 1939 the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce requested
the FCC to study the merger question afresh. The Commission reported
in the following year, recommending permissive merger of the cable
and radiotelegraph carriers.
After lengthy hearings, Senator White and Senator McFarland
introduced a bill in 1941 to permit mergers in both domestic and
international telegraph systems. When the measure was before the
full committee during the following year, however, the Navy Department,
previously a supporter of merger, objected to changing the law to
permit changes in the international industry at that time. The
Navy thought that the structure of United States overseas telecom-
munications should not be altered during the war. Provision for
this type of merger was deleted from the bill; although the House
restored it, the bill was not voted on before the end of the 77th
Congress.
The problem of domestic merger was felt to be so urgent, however,
that it could not wait for the conclusion of the war. The Postal
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Telegraph Company was deeply in debt, and there appeared no prospect
that its financial affairs could possibly be put in order. The 78th
Congress took up the question of domestic merger in 1943, and amended
the Communications Act so as to permit Western Union to purchase
Postal Telegraph. This permissive legislation required Western Union
to divest itself of its international business, Western Union Cables,
within a reasonable period of time according to conditions and pro-
cedure specified in the Act, and with the approval of the FCC. Up
to the present time, Western Union and potential buyers of its cables
have been unable to agree on terms of sale. Western Union Cables
continues from year to year as the FCC renews permission for it to
continue in its present ownership. This situation has given rise to
suggestions that the provision for splitting domestic from international
carriers be stricken from the law.
In 1945 resolutions calling for study of the international merger
problem again were introduced in Congress and further hearings were
held. No new action resulted from the Congressional hearings, how-
ever. Senator McFarland, on discovering that the Department of State
no longer supported merger while other executive agencies and the FCC
favored it, took the position that Congress could do nothing until the
executive agencies arrived at a common policy.
In 1946 the newly organized Telecommunications Coordinating
Committee, at the suggestion of the Navy Department, tried to work
out a Government policy on merger.
The Committee was unable to reach
a unanimous recommendation after thorough exploration of the issues
by an ad hoc subcommittee. This ad hoc group submitted a report in
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December 1946, which set forth the arguments of proponents and
opponents of merger. These arguments are summarized below..
Arguments for Merger
The arguments by proponents of merger of the international
record communication companies included the following points:
apmency Conservation.--By eliminating duplications in circuits
and inefficiencies in routing, unification would release a large
number of frequencies, which could be used to handle increasing traffic
volumes, establish new circuits, improve speed and reliability of
existing services, and promote the development of new services. Such
an elimination of the wasteful use of frequencies would relieve pres-
sures on the radio spectrum and would strengthen the United States
position at international conferences in urging adopting ,of new tech-
niques designed to make the most efficient use of frequencies.
Economic Sav.ingE.--Unification might permit the retirement of
a large amount of the telegraph plant maintained by competing carriers.
Not all of this plant is necessary to meet the nation's communications
requirements. Retirement of some of it would result in savings in
communications costs, as well as the ultimate reduction in the invest-
ment on which a return is earned, and could be reflected by substantial
rate reductions and improved service.
Traffic Routing,--Traffic between the United States and foreign
points may be handled over a variety of competing cable or radio routes,
some of which are more advantageous than others to United States
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interests. Merger would permit each facility to be used to its best
advantage, technically and economically.
Standardization.--Unification would promote the use of uniform
operating practices and equipment throughout the unified system, a
procedure which would strengthen the United States position in favor
of worldwide standardization. Standardization among American companies
could be at the highest technical level, since merger would permit a
complete interchange of patents and pooling of research activities
and talents.
Relations with Foreign Carriers.--Merger would place the American
international communications system more closely on a par, so far as
influence and bargaining power are concerned, with the foreign mono-
polies with which it must deal. This would permit the unified carrier
to insist on equitable operating arrangements and would enable the
United States Government to give more direct guidance and support to
the policies of the unified company in its dealings with foreign
syztems.
Improved Regulation.--Merger would help the Federal Communications
Commission to achieve its objectives of providing a worldwide communi-
cations system, with adequate facilities at reasonable charges. A
unified carrier could be required to extend service to foreign points
on a worldwide basis, whereas it might be difficult to impose such a
requirement on one out of several competing carriers. Because of the
great divergence in earning power among the various carriers, reasonable
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rates for the most prosperous company would tend to drive competing
carriers out of business, a circumstance which may deter completely
effective regulation. Unification would also facilitate the severance
of the telecommunications system from intercorporate manufacturing
affiliates and from foreign activities.
Security.--Merger would foster security in the sense that it
would provide a more efficient, integrated, and standardized communi-
cation system, which would be available for military use and planning,
but it would have little or no effect upon cryptographic security,
loyalty of communications employees, or anti-sabotage measures.
kgments_mainst Merger
Of the Government departments represented on the Telecommunica-
tions Coordinating Committee, those opposed to merger based their case
on these major points:
Hommly.--United States economic policy, both in the domestic
and in the foreign field, traditionally has been opposed to the creation
of monopolies, especially those which would receive special Government-
sponsored privileges. Generally, a favorable political, economic, and
technical climate results from competition tempered to the extent
necessary by regulation. In view of this traditional policy, the
proponents of merger must sustain a very heavy burden of proof that
merger is in the national interest.
Frequency Conservation.-- It is recognized that a merger would
have the potentiality for the immediate conservation of a substantial
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number of frequencies. However, the strength of a monopoly in its
dealings with the regulatory agency might make it difficult to realize
this saving.
Economic Considerations.--Substantial economies could be accom-
plished under a merger. But, even if potential savings might be
immediately realized, it is questionable from a long-run point of
view whether the continued existence of competition would not result
in greater economic advantages.
kallation.--Experience indicates that regulation of a monopoly
is difficult. Standards of performance are not readily available to
the regulatory agency. The self-policing of an industry inherent in
a competitive situation is net present in a monopoly. These factors
outweigh the apparent superficial advantages which a regulatory agency
might have in dealing with a merged company.
Other Considerations.--Other considerations such as improvement
in traffic routing, increased ?standardization, and the promotion of
advantageous relations with foreign carriers also can be achieved
through competition supplemented by vigorous regulation. It was not
contended that perfect results would be achieved in those fields, but
it was argued that, on the whole, results at least comparablo with
those under a regulated monopoly would be possible.
Economic Outlook for U. S. Cable and Radiotelegraph Companies
Although many factors have been involved in previous arguments
over merger of the international record communication companies, the
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question now appears to rest primarily on whether the companies can
survive economically without merging. All of the Board's discussions
of the subject with industry and labor leaders and Government officials
stressed the economic problem, while other elements of the controversy
were given secondary consideration.
For that reason, the Board arranged for an economic analysis of
the industry and a forecast as to its future profitability to be made
by the engineering firm of Ford, Bacon & Davis. The balance of this
Chapter, except for the Conclusions, is adapted from the survey made
by that firm.
kuaiktion of Facilities
Eli2E_Carriers.--The Western Union Company operates 14 submarine
cables, of which eight connect the United States with England, two
with the Azores, and four with the West Indies. Five of the eight
lines to England are leased until the year 2010 from a British company.
The 14 cables measure 30,000 nautical miles and permit the company to
furnish all classes of telegraphic message service directly, or indi-
rectly through connecting carriers, to all parts of the world.
Three affiliates of the International Telephone and Telegraph
Company, all of them wholly-owned subsidiaries of the American Cable &
Radio Corporation, are engaged in the American international record
communications business. Six cables between New York and Europe, via
the Azores, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, are operated by the Commercial
Cable Company. Total length of its lines is 22,000 nautical miles.
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They make possible cablegram service to all parts of Europe, Asia,
and Africa. Through affiliated organizations, the company also pro-
vides message service to Latin America. All America Cables & Radio,
Inc., has five lines, measuring 24,000 nautical miles, between the
United States and South America, Central America and the West Indies.
In addition, it operates several cables and a number of international
radiotelephone and radiotelegraph stations in South America. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Company, Inc., maintains direct radiotelegraph
circuits to some 40 overseas points, furnishing all classes of record
communications service on a worldwide basis. It operates radio stations
in New York, California, Hawaii, the Philippines, and Tangier. The
Tangier station is used to relay messages to points in eastern Europe,
North Africa, the Near East, and India.
RCA Communications, Inc., provides worldwide message service
through operation of direct radiotelegraph circuits to some 60 overseas
points and arrangements with connecting carriers to reach other points.
The company has four radio stations near New York City and one near
San Francisco, as well as stations in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, the Philip-
pines, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Okinawa, and Tangier. Direct circuits
reach Mexico, Central America, South America, the West Indies, Europe,
the Near East, the Far East, Australia, Oceania, and North and South
Africa. The company also operates a radiotelegraph circuit between
New York City and San Francisco for domestic haul of international
messages and a leased wire circuit between New York and Washington, D.C.
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Smaller C,y-riers.--Radiomarine Corporation of America furnishes
all classes of radiotelegraph message service from shore-to-ship and
ship-to-shore. Transmitting and receiving stations are located on
both coasts of the United States and at St. Louis, Mo.. Buffalo, N.Y.,
and Port Arthur, Tex. The company alto manufactures, sells and services
mobile radio station equipment.
Press Wireless, Inc., provides a specialized radiotelegraph service
to newspapers and press associations. It operates radio circuits to
some 19 overseas points, and has stations at New York) Eiaa Franeisco,
Manila and in Europe. The company also owns subsidiaries that manu-
facture and sell communications equipment in Latin America.
Globe Wireless, Ltd., controlled by the Robert Dollar company,
furnishes telegraphic message service from the United States to
Honolulu, Manila, Shanghai, and Havana. Its radio stations are located
in New York City, San Francisco, and Honolulu. Globe also operates
a ship-shore radiotelegraph message service.
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company is affiliated with the United
Fruit Company. Tropicalls message service is carried over direct
circuits to Central America and the West Indies and by connecting
carriers to the rest of Latin America. In the United States, it operates
radiotelegraph stations at Boston, Miami, and New Orleans. In Central
American countries, 20 stations provide both radiotelegraph and radio-
telephone services.
The United States-Liberia Radio Corporation was established by the
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Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. Its operations are restricted
to a radiotelegraph circuit between Akron, Ohio, and Harbel,
Liberia.
The South Porto Rico Sugar Company furnishes radiotelegraph
service to five Caribbean points and to ships at sea.
Financial Performance
The financial data used in the study were obtained directly
from the companie6 involved. In the course of obtaining the
financial information, conferences were held with accounting
executives of the principal companies.
The information contained in Tables I, II, and III was
secured from the larger companies and included balance sheets,
income statements, and various related data for each of the years
1944 to 1949 and for the nine-months period ended September 30,
1950. The principal purpose of this information was to provide a
knowledge of financial status and operating results through the
recent years and up to the latest date for which actual data were
available at the time of undertaking the study.
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TABLE I
INTERNATIONAL RECORD COMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES OF THE UNITED STATES
GROSS OPERATING REVENUES - YEAR
1942
Revenue
illousancLI
$ 8,208
3,951
9,713
6,528
Per Cent
of Total
gaigy Carriers
Western Union Telegraph Company
(Cable Division) (WUC)
American Cable & Radio Corp. Subsidiaries:
. Commercial Cable Company (CCC)
All America Cables & Radio, Inc.(AACR)
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. (MRT)
17.85
8.59
21.12
14.19
Total A.C. & R. System
20,192
434,90
RCA Communications, Inc. (RCAC)
12,226
26.58
Total Major Carriers
40,626
88.33
Smaller Carriers
Radiomarine Corp. of America (PIT)
1,277
2.78
Press Wireless, Inc. (PW)
1,294
2.81
Globe Wireless, Ltd. (GW)
1,306
2.84
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company (TRT)
1,406
3.06
United States-Liberia Radio Corporation
78
0.17
South Porto Rico Sugar Company
7
0.01
Total Smaller Carriers
5,368
11.67
Total All Companies
45,994
100.00
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204.
TABLE II
AGGREGATE ADJUSTED NET INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAX
MAJOR CARRIERS - INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRY
Year
of Dollar21
Income in
Per Cent
of Measure
.(Thousands
Basis for *
Adjusted Net
Income before
Income Taxes
1946
_Meaagrat
61,478
1,622
2.6 %
1947
60,830
-2,395
-3.9
1948
61,206
-738
-1.2
1949
60,710
1,177
1.9
1950 (9 mos.)
63,605
2,618
4.1
* The basis for measure of income is in each instance the sum of
net property and actual net working capital.
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Table III
Comparison of Gross and Net Operating Revenues
Maior Carriers - International Industry
(Thousands of Dollars)
Company
Gross Revenues
1947
_1242_
1949
9 Months
_1246 ,
__1.9J0
WUC
7,790
7,402
8,224
8,208
5,993
CCC
4,445
4,642
4,144
3,951
2,854
AACR
8,639
9,934
9,835
9,713
7,991
MRT
4,767
6,041
5,599
6,528
4,919
RCAC
12411(2
124.116.
Total
_114226
124267
_114700
224219
0,188
42,626
_24.674
21,A21
Net
.Revenues
WUC
1,296
613
1,411
1,505
1,438
-1,039
-1,896
-1,075
-1,111
-597
,CCC
AACR
673
554
324
536
1,019
MRT
-1,042
-837
-818
71
224
RCAC
2401
=a2
r7..?.
Total
-_--15.4
1.855
_252
1.1..(2A2
Net Revenues in Per Cent
of Gross Revenues
_524
WUC
16.6%
8.3%
17.2%
18.3%
24.0%
CCC
-23.4
-40.8
-25.9
-28.1
-20.9
AACR
7.8
5.6
3.3
5.5
12.8
MRT
-21.9
-13.9
-14.6
1.1
4.6
ROAC
18,8
-0.2
6.1
2,2_
Average
6z11
_ -4421
13_21
_4Lgl
_2,11
As shown in the preceding table, the average ratio of aggregate
net revenue to gross revenue has improved since the low Point or
deficit in 1947. The Commercial Cable Company continues to show a
net revenue loss in 1950 although its position has improved. While
to some extent the continuing net revenue losses of Commercial Cable
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may be attributed to the decline in gross revenue, it is evident
that total operating costs are higher in relation to gross revenues
than those of the other major carriers.
CompamIlz2 Utility of Services
In making their survey, the engiueers prepared a questionnaire
to determine the basic objectives sought in using each type of rapid
international communications (air mail, telephone, cable, and radio-
telegraph) and the experiences of the users with respect to how well
these objectives had been achieved. Selected customers were asked
whether they were making a conscious effort to change from one type
of communication to another. They were also questioned as to amounts
presently spent on cables and their estimates as to the amounts likely
to be spent in the near future.
Information was sought to determine whether each type of communi-
cation did have its definite place in customers' operations. It was
believed that if this were true and that each type was serving its
purpose, it would be unlikely that the present pattern of services
used would change much in the future. If customs and habits have been
the main influence in determining the uses of each type, however,
material changes in the pattern might occur.
The consensus was that the use of a particular type of communica-
tion is dictated by its utility and that each fills its particular
need. It does not appear, therefore, that there are any conditions
that may materially change the pattern in the near future. Each type
has been available for a considerable period of time and the pattern
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has become fairly stabilized.
The survey disclosed that there is a definite field for cable
and radio messages in which they are unlikely to be supplanted by
either the telephone or air mail. In addition, there are fringe
areas in which the use pattern of telephone, telegraph (cable and
radio), and air mail is variable. These fringe areas, however, appear
to be relatively small compared to the area in which the use of cables
and radiograms is fixed.
Answers to the inquiries indicated that the various typot, of
rapid communications are used under the following conditions:
Cables and Radiograms -
1. When speed and certainty of delivery at a definite
time are necessary, and
2. When a written record is important, or
3. Where cost is a consideration as compared with long
distance telephone, or
40 When immediate responses or a conference are not
no
Overseas telephone -
1. When immediate decisions or responses ax G nacausarv. or
2. When a conference (back and forth conversation) is
desirable.
Air Mail -
1. When high speed is not essential, and
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2. When certainty of delivery as of a definite time
is not essential, or
3. Where the length of the message renders a letter pre-
ferable, and
4. Where communication costs are of importance in com-
parison with the amount of the transaction affected.
It was generally agreed that the international telegraph service
is, on the whole, very good and reliable. Besides the features noted
above, cables and radiograms have the additional advantage of getting
prompt attention whereas letters may be set aside temporarily. A
large insurance company stated that this is one of the chief reasons
it uses cable and radio messages to the extent it does. Some companies
attempt to overcome this by writing important air mail letters on
special forms that resemble cables but they have found that this
practice is not altogether successful.
The delivery time for "ordinary" telegraph messages is said to
range, at present, from about ten minutes (in the case of major direct
points like London and Paris) to about an hour. A cable or radio
message can be sent from New York to London and a reply received in 20
to 30 minutes. Prior to World War II dealers in arbitrage used to send
cables and receive replies in from two to four minutQs, but ouoh ser-
vice is not rendered now.
Many companies reported extensive use of the night letter classi-
fication of cable and radio service. This is borne out by the records
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of the major international companies which show that about 64 per cent
of the public messages sent during the third quarter of 1950 were
night letters. This service assures delivery at the start of the
following business day, a period of 12 hours elapsed time from New
York to London, whereas an air mail letter from New York to London,
under minimum pickup and delivery conditions, requires 18 hours. There
therefore, no question as to the necessity for a cable or radio-
grain when delivery at the start of the next business day must be assured.
Telegraph service also is preferred to long-distance telephone
in many cases except when immediate decisions or discussions are re-
quired because (1) delivery at a certain time is more sure, (2) it is
usually less expensive, and (3) it gives a written record.
The principal advantages of long-distance telephone messages lie
in the ability to engage in discussion, which may be important in
clarifying certain situations. They also get immediate attention
whereas a telegram or a letter may be put aside. Great strides have
been made in international long-distance telephone service and the
average elapsed time to put through a call has been materially
reduced. The major time-consuming factor, however, is that of locating
the person called. This may take considerable time. In fact, it was
said to be common practice to send a cable to make an appointment for
a telephone call.
While the cost per word on the telephone may be quite low as
compared to a telegram, it was the consensus that the actual cost per
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message generally was far less by telegram than by telephone. In the
latter case, much time is often wasted in amenities and irrelevant
conversation whereas in a telegram the heart of the message can
usually be compressed into relatively few words.
While the transmission over the telephone was said to be usually
satisfactory, it is not entirely reliable and instances were cited
where poor transmission seriously impaired the value of telephone
service. This is not apt to occur with telegrams, for if the message
can not be sent one way it can be rerouted and will get through by
another way.
Although air mail is widely used and has taken business from the
cable and radio industry in the past, it appears that this competition
has reached a stable condition. Two factors have been cited as
limiting the use of international air mail--first, the possibility of
planes being grounded or diverted on account of weather conditions,
and, second, regardless of the flight speed, pickup and delivery ser-
vices are time-consuming. Delivery service is said to be particularly
poor in all foreign countries except in the major cities. The engineers
were advised that for most inland points at least 24 hours should be
added to the scheduled 16-hour service to London, Paris, etc. One
company having extensive operations in the Near East stated that the
normal air mail delivery service from its office in New York to its
branches in the field was from five days to one week. This compares
with a normal telegram service of a few hours at most for ordinary
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messages and overnight for night letters.
The main drawback, however, appears to be the undertainty as
to delivery time of air mail. While practically all air mail messages
might go through on schedule the fact that a few might be delayed is
a serious deterrent to sending any message by air mail when certainty
of delivery time is of material importance. Air mail is widely used
to send longer messages than would be economical by cable or radio, to
send documents and confirmations, and to send many messages for which
certainty of delivery is not important. For other purposes, however,
the uncertainty of delivery of air mail is often too great a risk for
the savings involved.
It appears, therefore, that except to correct abuses by corres-
pondents in the use of cables and telephone by Ix:x.10,411a Qy1enso-5avin8
campaigns, there is little likelihood that air mail will seriously
encroach further on the cable and radio business.
Distribution of Business Among International Carriers
Except as specific cable and radio companies have direct service
to certain areas, or when they serve certain areas exclusively, cus-
tomers reported dividing their cable and radio business among the
various companies in the industry. One bank said that it follows a
poliby of reciprocity and distributes its business approximately in
proportion to the balances maintained in the bank by the various
carrier companies. One large insurance company conducting business
mainly with London through night letters reported confining its business
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almost exclusively to one carrier because of the satisfactory service
received. However, this is an exception, as most companies said. they
believed that by dividing their cable and radio business they main-
tained competition and thus got better service from all carriers.
Potentialities of Meror
Rates. Service and Development.--The fundamental purpose of any
merger is to save money. This is generally accomplished by greater
flexibility and efficiency in the use of facilities, reduction in
duplicated facilities, and savings in administrative and labor costs.
A portion of the monetary savings is assignable to the stockholders .
up to a reasonable return on the investment; that is, a return suffi-
.cient to assure adequate financing of current plant investment and
reasonable development costs.
It is to be expected that at least some of the savings derived
from a merger would be reflected in direct public benefits; principally
through reduced rates. Also, it may be reasonably assumed that any
development expenses ultimately would be reflected in similar direct
public benefits.
The fact that the Western Union-Postal Telegraph merger in the
domestic field was followed by reportedly poorer service and higher
rates is not a criterion unless it may be shown that the service would
have been better and the rates lower if the competitive situation had
continued. The evidence at the time of that 'merger indicated that the
Postal Telegraph Company was on the verge of going out of business, in
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which case the service, at least in so far as coverage is concerned,
might have been less than now exists under the merged companies. The
engineersi survey of communications users, including the State Depart-
ment, clearly indicated that there was a greater interest in service
than in rates. Rate reductions are a measurable public benefit and may,
therefore, be overemphasized and given too much weight, to the detri-
ment of service. To this end, it is important that a large share of
any merger saving be directed to maintenance of adequate service and
to development expenditures having the same ultimate objective.
The allocation of income, after operating expenses and taxes, is
generally subject to supervision by the regulatory authority. At the
same time, the regulatory authority is expected to police the matter of
adequate and proper service and this directly affects operating expenses.
Excessive service to the detriment of adequate development or rate
decreases may be just as improper as insufficient or relatively poor
service. Competition may cause excessive service in competitive areas
to the detriment of service in other areas.
The matter of the maintenance of less profitable or unprofitable
services is of considerable importance in considering the question of
merger versus competition. While competition may serve as an incentive
for the preservation of borderline services in competitive areas,
obviously the maintenance of dual service, in areas where even one
service may not be justified, is uneconomical and has the effect of
increasing costs over the whole system which will be reflected
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ultimately in the overall rates of both competing operations. The
effect of merger is to:
1. Eliminate unnecessary duplication of services, and
2. Remove the incentive to maintain any service in areas where
revenues are insufficient to support costs.
While the first is a beneficial result of merger, the second may.
be a disadvantage overcome either through an enlightened management or
rigid supervision by the regulatory authorities. Actually, a monopoly,
through the elimination of duplicated out-of-pocket expenses and general
reduction in assignable overhead charges, should be better able to
sustain certain borderline operations. Finally, certain other points
not now served may become economically feasible to serve under a unified
operation.
Customers Attitude.--The customers consulted :or lost J:adnimous in
their reaction to the possibility of a merger of all cable and radio
companies. All but one of the customers opposed the suggestion in
principle as being detrimental to the type of service they might expect
to receive. Although the engineers' questionnaire did not seek their
opinions on this subject, practically all of them volunteered their views
when the reasons for the survey were explained to them. In substantiation
of their views, many cited their experiences with foreign carriers, most
of which are monopolies. These experiences indicated to them that, with-
out competition, carriers were very indifferent to customers' reactions.
Inquiries regarding confirmation of messages originating abroad often
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were unaswered for several days or disregarded entirely. This
condition appeared to be so common as to convince them that it
was a definite result of a monopolistic position. Also, while a
number of the largest users of domestic telegraph services said
that they had not noted any reduction in the quality of domestic
service after the Western Union Telegraph and Postal Telegraph
merger, another and even larger group stated that they had ob-
served a definite deterioration in the quality of service since that
merger. A few users expressed the view that there might be no
objection to merging all the cable companies into one group and
all the radio companies into another as this would still retain a
degree of competition which they believe to be essential to main-
taining telegraphic service of high quality.
Labor's Position.--Consideration should be given to the con-
tention that wage scales in the record communications field have
been held down to some extent because of the long-standing record
of unprofitability of the industry. It is to be anticipated,
therefore?-that labor would expect a share of any financial benefits
resulting from general improvement in the business, whether it be
the result of merger or any other cause. Consideration mist also
be given to the probability of delay in savings on labor costs
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under a merger. It is unlikely that permissive legislation
would allow an immediate general reduction in force. Rather,
it would probably require retention of employees for periods
of time in proportion to their length of employment in the
industry.
There does not appear to be any unanimity on the part of
labor for or against merger, expressed opinions ranging from
unqualified approval through conditional acquiescence to outright
opposition. It appears that labor is not satisfied with the
results of the Western Union-Postal Telegraph. merger. Opportunity
for expansion of labor's views would normally be provided through
public hearings held in connection with any proposed legisla-
tion.
Carriers' Position.--The major international carriers told the
engineers that they are in favor of permissive legislation for merger
of international record communications. There is no positive evidence
that these organizations actually would Merge under such legislation.
There may be an effort on their part to agree upon a merger but
there is considerable difference of opinion among them as to
the terms and conditions.
Western Union has suggested nOtonly that the international
operations should be merged but that they should be consolidated with
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its domestic telegraph business under its management. This company
claims, among other reasons, that the terms of its lease of five cables
from Anglo-American Telegraph Company, Ltd., might prove an absolute
block to the transfer by Western Union of these five cables into a
merged company which did not include Western Union's domestic operations.
American Cable & Radio Corporation and RCA Communications, Inc.",
adhere to a consolidation of international facilities only.
Because of these differences of opinion, it has been stated that
any permissive legislation should at least clearly indicate an intent,
if not contain a specific directive, as to the desirability of such
mergers. This should be sufficiently emphatic so that it could be used
to resolve inter-company differences.
Radiomarine Corporation of America would participate in a consoli-
dation of international facilities only to the extent of its ship-shore
communications, but not its equipment manufacturing, selling and
servicing operations.
Press Wireless, Ltd., and the South Porto Rico Sugar Company told
the engineers that they do not oppose permissive merger legislation of
international companies, provided they are adequately protected from
unfair competition by the merged organization and from any undue pressure
upon them to join any such merged operation. These companies would
remain outside of any merged operation resulting from permissive legis-
lation.
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company is the only carrier opposed to
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merger. Should such legislation be written, however, their position
is similar to that of Press Wireless, Globe Vireless, Ltd., said that
it does not, at this time, desire to express any views on an inter-
national merger. United States-Liberia Radio Corporation has not
expressed any opinion.
Accordingly, it may be said that the consensus of the industry
is for permissive merger of international record communications speci-
fically divorced from domestic operations with provision for adequate
protection of the carriers which do not wish to join the consolidation.
.Legislation.--There appears to be some difference of legal
opinion as to limitations in respect of consolidation or mergers under
present laws. It is agreed that a clarification of Congressional
intent would be desirable and that any merger of international companies
now in competition probably would require specific legislative exemp-
tion from anti-trust lay provisions.
Company officials said they believed that mandatory legislation
is unnecessary, is not in the public interest, and probably would be
a step in the direction of ultimate Government ownership.
In general, it appears that any legislative action permitting
merger of international record communications companies should contain
protections for the independence of companies desiring to remain in an
independent status, specifications as to protective measures for labor,
and protection from alien control. It should also provide for all
possible economies. Resulting savings should be reflected in reduced
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rates after provisions have been made for sufficient earnings to
allow for adequate capitalization, reasonable research and improvement
in facilities, and good and sufficient service to the public.
SavingE under Merger.--The major carriers, in 1949, made studies
of their facilities and operations to determine those facilities which
would be in excess of the industry's requirements in the event of a
merger. A review of these studies indicates that where duplicate tele-
graph cables or radio transmission and receiving equipment were opera-
-bed., the oldest facilities were to be abandoned.
Where the companies
operated competing branch offices at particular points, these would
be combined into one office.
The facilities which were determined as excess in the event of
merger had a gross book cost of ;13,279,000 for cable plant and
$6,471,000 for radio plant. The gross costs less depreciation were
$3,752,000 and 52,753,000, respectively. Combining the facilities
of various companies would involve some expense in consolidating
offices and combining cable and radio circuits into one location in
order to make possible further savings in operating cost.
The engineers discussed the combining of facilities with repre-
sentatives of the principal companies which would be involved in a
merger and were assured that the capacity of the merged facilities
would be sufficient to handle any annual volume of business which the
industry might reasonably expect in the future up to 800 millions of word
It was further explained that recent developments in the industry would
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permit an increase in capacity of about 50 per cent in the cable
facilities and two or three times the present capacity in the radio
facilities. The additional investment required for these increases
in capacity would be relatively minor.
The companies also made studies of the personnel and the amount
of operating expense necessary to staff and operate the combined
facilities properly. Estimates were prepared of expenses for con-
ducting operations and maintenance of the cable and radio facilities
and for general and administrative expenses. These estimates involved
the projection of the expenses of the individual companies as now
constituted and a pro forma estimate of the merged expenses. The
difference between them indicated the savings to be realized frem a
merger of the industry. The annual savings that might be anticipated,
as estimated by the companies, if the industry were merged, are as
follows:
Company Estimates of
Annual Savings from Merger
Conducting Operations Expenses:
Cable
Radio
Maintenance and Repairs Expenses:
Cable
Radio
General and Administrative Expenses:
Total
Amount (in
thousands)
1,464
2,633
678
540
19 565
6,880
The estimated savings resulting from the proposed merger were based
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on a volume of business ranging from 300 millions to 500 millions of
words annually. However, since the facilities provided for a merged
operation are stated to be adequate to handle a volume of up to 800
millions of words, there should be no necessity for any additional
facilities to handle the increased volume of business indicated by
the engineers' study of future prospects.
It follows, therefore, that the savings expected from a merger
as estimated by the companies in 1949 took into consideration all
expenses of a fixed or basic nature that might be eliminated by a
merger. Thereafter, if the volume of business increased, any addi-
tional expenses would be of a variable nature and would be substantially
the same in either a merged operation or an individual company operation.
The engineers did not make any independent estimate of the savings
that might be realized from a merger of the several companies, nor was
a detailed study made of savings estimated by the companies. However,
a review of their working papers indicated that consideration was
given to all of the principal factors involved in the merger. The
methods and bases used in making estimates were sound and thc)
seem reasonable. There are, however, certain observations applicable
to the companies' estimates which are discussed below.
Since the companies' estimates were prepared in 1949, there has
been an increase in wage rates. This would mean an increase in savings
from merger over the original estimates. The extent of the wage
increase in relationship to wages paid at the time the merged savings
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were computed could not be determined without an exhaustive analysis.
A review of the operating expenses of the five major companies in the
years .1949 and 1950, however, indicated that there had already been
a substantial reduction, particularly in salaries and wages. Such
savings may be attributed to modernization of facilities, devaluation
in foreign currencies, and some economies of the same nature as those
attributed to savings resulting from a merger. To the extent that
savings in this latter category have already been made, they could not
again be realized in the event of merger but would tend to offset any
increase in the savings as a result of wage adjustments. It is also
recognized that among the parties to the merger, there are certain
differentials in wage scales. In order to place all employes on a
uniform basis, the tendency would be to increase some wage rates, which
would reduce the indicated savings resulting from a merger.
The companies' estimates made no allowance for savings in depre-
ciation expense. It is to be expected that if facilities were to be
reduced, there would be a corresponding reduction in depreciation
expense. However, it is recognized that in the event of merger, some
arrangement would have to be made with the Federal Communications Com-
mission to amortize the amount of abandoned facilities. Since any
estimate of such an arrangement would be largely conjecture, no adjust-
ment of depreciation expense has been made.
The companies, in their estimates of savings, did not give any
consideration to changes in pension expenses. Discussion with the
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company representatives led the engineers to conclude that the current
pension plans of the individual companies are not comparable. In
the event of a consolidation, a uniform pension plan would have to be
adopted for the new organization. It is possible that the existing
plan which is most ,favorable to the employes would have to be adopted,
and this would tend to increase pension expenses. However, the reduc-
tion in the number of employes as a result of merger would tend to
decrease the overall pension expense. It is also recognized that the
reduction in the number of employes would reduce the amount of payroll
taxes, which also was not considered in the companies' estimate.
From the foregoing discussion, it will be recognized that an
independent estimate of the profitability of a merger would require a
detailed and lengthy study which was not indicated for the purpose of
this survey. It was the opinion of the engineers that the savings
resulting from a merger as estimated by the companies were reasonable
as applied to conditions existing in 1949. The engineers felt that the
net effect of the offsetting factors discussed above and changes in
conditions since 1949 would not materially alter the companies' esti-
mates and that such savings therefore could reasonably be applied to
projected levels of operation.
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Estiziates of Future Business
The method used by the engineers in preparing their estimates
of future business for international record communications systems
included statistical studies and limited customer survey. Statistical
studies were made to determine whether any economic indicators could
be found that parallel the curve of international telegraph revenues
in the past and hence might be used to estimate the revenues in the
future. The customer .survey was made to find out whether customer
policies might materially alter the present pattern of distribution
of rapid communications and thus affect the estimates established by
the statistical method.
The engineers felt that as the actual users of telegraphic ser-
vices determine the volume.of business, their reactions would establish
the pattern for the future. Accordingly, the customer survey sought
to find out the conditions under which the various types of rapid
communications are used, as well as any indications of intentions to
use cables and radio to any greater or lesser extent than in the past.
This survey was conducted by interviews with responsible persons
in 35 companies in 12 different industries. The aggregate cable and
radio business done by these companies amounts to about $2,4001000 per
year, or 7 per cent of the total public outgoing cable and radio revenues
in the year 1949.
The extent of the survey was limited by the time available but
the unusual uniformity of the responses indicated that a pattern of
answers had been established and that it was unlikely that more
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StateS
-ey Trade
(7)
0 President's Communications Policy Board
Washington. D C.
/0
INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH VOLUMES
L6- AND
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE
OW
fort, Macon 8. 'Davie
Engineers
=
REPORT
30
20
C./)
0?j A9
L... 8 -
Z 6
cTo
?4
cc.
ra:j Total United States
Foreign Trade ? Less Aids
(,)
cr
?
Estimated Total United States Foreign Trade
?
/936
? Public Words
?
1 1 1
38 '40 '42 41 46' 'Id '50 52
W. 50.1,54,2
40
30
20
2
cr)
Estimated Total Words 0
--- __ _r _
_4
Estimated Words 0
Public_
\
'58
60
ct)
a
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226.
interviews would materially have changed the picture.
Statistical Indicators.--The engineers tested several statistical
indicators to determine their correlation with the volume of telegraph
business. Among these, they investigated the possibility of using
the volume of foreign trade (total of United States imports and exports)
as the indicator of volume in international record communications. To
test the accuracy of this economic indicator, the engineers examined
the relationship of the volume of words (total of incoming and outbound.)
and the volume of foreign trade, not only for the world as a whole but
for various areas of the world separately and for certain individual
countries. In some instances, foreign trade with particular areas
varied considerably from foreign trade with the world as a whole. It
was found that, in general, there has been a similarity of trends between
the volume of foreign trade and the volume of cable words not only for
the world as a whole but for the various areas studied. While other
factors than trade do, at times, affect the volume of words, foreign
trade evidently has had the predominating influence on it.
The relationship of United States foreign trade with international
telegraphic business is shown in the accompanying chart by the lines
A and B. It will be noted that although there is a general similarity
of trends, the correlation is not very close during the period 1941 to
1947. During the war period 1941 to 1945 the normal relationship between
the volumes of words of public messages and other messages, including
Government and press communications, was distorted. Normally, public
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words account for about 85 per cent of the total words, but in 1944
the public words dropped to a low of 37 per cent. Government words
increased from the normal of about 4 per cent prewar to better than
30 per cent in 1944, and press words increased from a normal of about
10 per cent prewar to about 20 per cent in 1944. The remaining 13 per
cent of the word volume in 1944 included "miscellaneous" messages, a
low-rate classification used during the war for personal messages by
members of the armed forces. In the first half of 1950 the percentages
resumed the prewar pattern, i.e., public messages were 84 per cent,
Government messages 6 per cent, and press dispatches 10 per cent of the
total words.
Assumptions.--The projection of volume and revenue into the future
involves making assumptions as to conditions that may prevail. The
future trend of the indicators of volume and revenue can then be esti-
mated. For this purpose, the Department of Commerce supplied estimates
of U. S. imports and exports over the next ten years on the basis of
assumptions made by the engineers. Among these were the probability of
continued tension in the international situation through 1951 with no
outbreak of large-scale hostilities, of a gradual decline in military
expenditures beginning in 1953, of normal growth in gross national
product after 1952, of no general economic recession during the decade,
and of an immediate spurt in stockpiling of imported critical and
strategic materials, with the purchases falling off rapidly after 1952.
Assumptions which, in view of current conditions, the engineers felt
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were equally conservative were made with respect to exports from the
United States.
Future Volume and Revenues.--In the field of international record
communications, the preponderance of revenues is directly related to
the number of words. The engineers therefore used words as representing
the measure of volume of business.
Starting with 1950 conditions, the line for public words (Line D
in the chart) was extended parallel with Line C to arrive at estimates
of the volume of words for the short-range period 1951 to 1955 and
the long-range period 1956 to 1960. The level of public words was then
raised from 84 to 100 per cent to determine the volume of total words.
On this basis, it was estimated that the average volume of words during
the short-range future would be of the order of 540 millions of words
per year and for the long-range would be of the order of 565 millions
of words per year.
Multiplying the estimated volume of words by the average rate
of 8 cents per word, the engineers concluded that the transmission
revenues of the international cable and radio companies for the short-
range period will be of the order of $43 millions per year and for the
long-range period will be $45 millions per year, as compared with 1949
revenues of about $36 millions.
Estimates of Future Profitability.--The estimates of future pro-
fitability of the international industry, based on the operation of
the carriers as separate corporate entities, were made by the engineers
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2.29.
for the groups of major and smaller carriers.
The estimated international message revenue was allocated to the
two groups on the basis of the average of the actual distribution of
this revenue in the year 1949 and the first nine months of 1950. This
resulted in an allocation of 90 per cent to the major carriers and 10
per cent to the smaller carriers. To the message revenues thus allocated
were added the estimates of other revenues as they applied to the two
groups.
The estimates of gross revenues for the major and smaller carriers
for the short-range and long-range periods were as follows:
Estimated Gross Revenues
International Indust_
(Thousands of Dollars)
Major Carriers
Short-range
Average Year.
Long-range
Average_Year
International Message Revenue
38,880
40,680
Other Revenues
....7 210
Total
.(1.1.022
.2.4210
L7222
Smaller Carriers
International Message Revenue
4,320
4,520
Other Revenues
1,797
14222
Total
_?..L117
61,312
The estimates of future profitability are based on the above esti-
mated gross revenues to which have been applied estimated revenue de-
ductions and other income account items. Actual totals for the year
1949 are included in the following estimates of future profitability of
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Measure of Actual and Estimated Income
International Industry
(Thousands of Dollars)
Major Carriers Year_1949
Estimated
Short-range Long-range
Average Year Average Year
Basis for Measure 56,596
58,369 58.618
Net Income before Income Taxes:
Amount
828
5,966
7.308
Per cent of Basis for Measure
1.5%
10.2%
12.5%
Smaller Carriers
Basis for Measure
8,240
8,988
9,164
Net Income before Income Taxes:
Amount
309
1,164
1,307
Per cent of Basis for Measure
3.8%
13.0%
14.3%
General Observations
It is clear from what has been set forth above that the privately
owned U. S. international telecommunications network is an invaluable
asset to this country in peace and an indispensable military facility
in time of war. During the early part of World War II, this network
was almost the sole means of linking the U. S. headquarters with its
forces overseas. During the war, of course, vast additional networks
had to be created by the military services.
At the end of the war, those private facilities which had been
taken over by the Government were returned to their owners and a portion
of the Government network was dismantled. What was left of the Govern-
ment-built net, however, is still a substantial communications facility,
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and this facility is now to a considerable extent competitive
with the private systems. That is, Government-owned facilities
built for military purposes are now used by both military and
non-military Government departments for administrative and other
non-security traffic which might be handled by the common carrier
companies. Faced already with serious economic problems, these
carriers are now faced also with a Government-owned competition
which handles much of the business of the carriers' biggest customer--
the Government itself. At the same time, it is to the Government's
own best interest to see that the private carriers remain strong,
for their facilities may be needed again in time of crisis. Indeed,
they are needed now.
The President's Communications Policy Board can hardly enunciate
a formula which will at once solve for all time this critical problem*
For the problem changes from year to year, almost from day to day.
It must be under continual surveillance and Government policies
and practices must be flexibly adapted to meet changing conditions.
What has concerned us is that there is no adequate mechanism for
dealihg with the problem, for examining its nature, or for evolving
solutions. For example, Federal agencies now decide for themselves
at something less than top level whichportion, if any, of their
overseas traffic shall be handled by private or by Government facil-
ities. And these decisions are based entirely on considerations of
convenience, availability of circuits, or apparent cost and certainly
not on consideration of how their actions may affect the health
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or even existence of the private carriers.
We believe the Government must have a mechanism for keeping
under continual review the way in which privately owned international
telecommunication companies are affected by Government policies and
procedures. The Government should adopt the general policy that it
will seek in every feasible way to follow such procedures as will
maintain the health and strength of the common carriers. The Govern-
ment should avoid, within limits set by national security, such pro-
cedures as weaken these carriers.
Urgent recommendations have been made to Congress that legisla-
tion be enacted to permit companies in the international cable and
radio field to merge. One of these recommendations calls for one
company to handle all American domestic and international record com-
munications, thus providing an integrated system.
The Board finds no urgent or imperative reasons calling for an
immediate merger of these companies; we conclude, on the contrary,
that recent improvements in the profitability of these companies
encourage a continuation of their present independent status. More-
over, in our judgment, a period of partial mobilization is not a
good time to undertake a reorganization of these important components
of our communications system.
Our conclusions in regard to merger are based on conditions as
we now find them and can project them. We believe, however, that the
situation can change and that the welfare of our national communica-
tions system demands constant attention to the condition and stability
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of these companies. We recommend that the Telecommunications
Advisory Board, proposed in Chapter V, take this as one of its
assignments, working jointly with the Federal Communications
Commission. We are mindful of the strong conviction held by in-
formed members of Congress and others that merger is desirable.
While we believe it in the national interest that such a merger be
deferred, we, too, recognize that changing conditions may provide
compelling reasons for a merger later on. If so, these should be
adequately anticipated by the Telecommunications Advisory Board and
by the Congress. The kind of merger which might thus be indicated,
as well as the timing of it, may be dictated not only by economic
forces but by the wisdom of the Government's own policies vis-a-vis
these companies and by technological developments. Such technolo-
gical developments, in fact, may prove to be the conclusive factor
in determining the future of these companies.
Conclusions
1. The Government should adopt the policy of maintaining the
strength of the private competitive international communications
system.
2. There should be a Government agency charged with the respon-
sibility for implementing this policy.
3. Urgent recommendations have been made to Congress that
legislation be enacted to permit companies in the international
cable and radio field to merge. One of these calls for a single
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company to handle all United States domestic and international
record communications, thus providing an integrated system. We
find no imperative reasons calling for an immediate merger of
these companies; we conclude, on the contrary, that recent improve-
ments encourage a continuation of their present independent status.
Moreover, in our judgment, a period of partial mobilization is not
a good time to undertake a reorganization of these important com-
ponents of our communications system. Our conclusions in regard to
Merger are based on conditions as we now find them and can project
them. We recognize, however, that the situation can change and that
the welfare of our communications system demands constant attention
to the condition and stability of these companies. We are mindful
of the strong conviction held by informed members of Congress and
others that merger is desirable. We have axcertained that interested
Government departments are divided in their views on the subject.
While we believe that the national interest does not at this time
require the repeal of existing prohibitions against merger, we
recognize that changing conditions may provide compelling reasons
for a merger later on. If so, their anticipation by adequate study
and legislation will be essential. The kind of merger which might
thus be indicated, as well as the timing of it, may be dictated not
only by normal economic forces, but by the wisdom of the Government's
own policies vis-a-vis the companies and by technological develop-
ments. Technological develOpments may in fact prove to be the
conclusive factor in determining the future of these companies.
* * * * *
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CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
Our study of each of the main telecommunications problems to
which we have addressed ourselves has led us to a single common
conclusion: The United States Government must strengthen its organ-
ization to deal on a continuing basis with telecommunications policies
and problems.
In our Study of the problem of scarcity of space in the radio
spectrum relative to increasing demand, we found an enormously
complex problem of frequency management. The Government is trying
to cope with this problem by dividing responsibility for frequency
assignment between the Federal Communications Commission and the
President, and thus establishing a dual system of control over a
single physical entity.
In our study of the problem of the relationships of Government
communications activities to non-Government activities, we again found
divided responsibility and a lack of conprehensive assignment of
authority to deal with the problem as a whole. Nowhere did we find
any agency or system of collaboration among existing Government agencies
dealing comprehensively and continuously with policies or integrated
execution of Government programs affecting non-Government telecommun-
ications activities.
In our review of the question of merging the overseas operations
of our commercial telecommunications companies, and in our examination
of factors affecting the economic health of these and other commercial
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telecommunications carriers, we were struck first by the lack of
economic and technical information on which we could base a sound
conclusion. Although we decided, on the basis of the facts and
testimony we were able to collect, that no Government action need
be taken now to assure the financial soundness of these activities
for the immediate future, we arrived at the strong conviction that the
Government needs to strengthen its existing organization to keep a-
breast of economic, technical, and other data affecting the health
of commercial telecommunications carriers, so that helpful measures can
be taken promptly whenever conditions require them.
In our efforts to discover the current state of Government
telecommunications policy as preliminary to recommending needed steps
toward a total national communications policy, we once more encoun-
tered dispersion, confusion, gaps, and deficiencies in the product
and performance of those agencies charged with telecommunications
policy responsibilities.
Since our appointment, the nation has?passed into a state of
national emergency, and our country faces deepened crisis and
heightened threat of war. Thus we examined the problem of the need
for appointment now of a Board or Administrator of Defense Communi-
cations, to exercise the President's powers over the nation's tele-
communications system, public and private, in the interest of the
national security. Again we concluded that neither existing organi-
zations, nor the creation of an ad hoc organization like the Board
of War Communications, would suffice. We suggest that the permanent
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agency we describe below, headed by a board, or by a single indi-
vidual,can discharge these responsibilities.
During the past year we have become aware of the possibility of
radical technical developments which may affect fundamentally the
economics and the engineering of our present telecommunications
system, particularly in the international field. It is impossible
for us to foresee the specific impact which these developments may
have. But we are more than ever convinced that the Government re-
quires a strengthened telecommunications organization to keep such
ddvelopments under constant review.
Both the present and the potential threat of unfriendly inter-
ference to international communications underline the urgency of the
need for this strengthened organization.
Dimensions of the Problem
The telecommunications field is one affected with the public
interest.
Telecommunications by wire have long been regarded as such a
business, and therefore appropriately subject to regulation by pub-
lic authority.
Telecommunications by radio fall even more clearly into this
class, since the basic medium they use for the transmission of in-
formation lies in the public domain.
Nature has presented the inhabitants of this world with what
used to be called the "ether," the medium through which radio waves
of all frequencies are propagated. Like the air we breathe, the
radio spectrum is there for all to use, Unlike the air, there is
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not enough of it to accommodate all claimants. Everyone who uses a
portion of the radio frequency spectrum automatically excludes others
from using this same portion at the same time, unless the other po-
tential user is far enough away geographically to cause or suffer
only tolerable interference. Since impulses of certain frequencies can
be sent by low power half wararound the earth, the conflicting in-
terests of peoples in all nations of the earth, as well as of all
those within a single nation, must somehow be brought into harmony.
Otherwise there will be chaos,
Clearly it is a responsibility of every government to manage
this world resource, this element of the public domain, in such a
way as to maintain an ordered use of the radio spectrum by its own
citizens. Each government must also reach agreements with other
governments for equitable sharing and mutually compatible use of
this world resource.
The Government of the United States has recognized these
responsibilities for many years, and has from time to time estab-
lished a succession of agencies to deal with various aspects of this
problem. But as the use of the radio spectrum has grown, as the
Government has itself become a major user, and as other nations
of the world have sought a larger share of the spectrum, the problem
has outgrown the authority and capacity of existing Government agen-
cies to deal with it.
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What are the major issues arising out of the problems and
responsibilities the nation now faces in utilizaing its telecommuni-
cations resources--including both wire and radio--which existing
agencies are admittedly not equipped to handle? We have found five.
1. How shall the United States formulate policies and plans for
guidance in reconciling the conflicting interests and needs of Govern-
ment and private users of the spectrum space--that is, for guidance
in making the best use of its share of the total spectrum?
2. How shall the United States meet the recurrent problem of
managing its total telecommunications resources to meet the changing
demands of national security?
3. How shall the United States develop a national policy and
position for dealing with other nations in seeking international
telecommunications agreements?
4. How shall the United States develop policies and plans to
foster the soundness and vigor of its telecommunications industry in
the face of new technical developments, changing needs, and economic
developments?
5. Hoy shall the United States Government strengthen its
organization to cope with the four issues stated above?
The first four of the questions require brief explanation.
1. ReConciling_Ips of. the Spectrum. This task--which is
known as?frequency management--is one of enormous technical complexity.
Different portions of the spectrum have radically different propaga-
tion characteristics; that is, their range and dependability vary.
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Some are usable for long-distance and others only for short-haul
purposes. Their efficiency also changes from night to day, and from
day to day, and is affected by atmospheric conditions and by sun spots.
Technical advances in the art alter the degree of possible use of a
particular band. The difficulties inherent in these facts are aggra-
vated by the increasing congestion of certain spectrum bands.
By better management of the spectrum, much more could be done
with frequencies now available. There is opportunity for more effec-
tive sharing of frequencies, for more intensive use of individual
frequencies, and increased economy in kilocycles assigned to each
circuit. Sharing includes division both of time and of geographical
area. Frequency-conserving practices call for use of the most effi-
cient and stable receiving equipment available, compatible with
economic soundness. These in turn permit smaller allocations of
spectrum space to accomplish given tasks.
The assignment of space in the spectrum among private users
(including state and local but not Federal Government agencies) is
a responsibility of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
The total amount of such space available for assignment, however,
is not determined by the FCC. In effect, it is determined by the
President, who is responsible for the assignment and management of
those frequencies used by Federal Government agencies. The Inter-
department Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) is the instrumentality
through which frequencies are assigned to Federal users. Thus far,
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no national policy has existed to clarify this dual control of a
single resource and thus to aid in governing the apportionment of
space between private users and Government users as groups. No cri-
teria have been established for use in choosing between the conflict-
ing needs of a Government and a private agency.
2. National Security, In the present period of recurrent
crisis, it is likely that we shall be faced with a continuing problem
of adjusting the use of telecommunications?especially radio frequen-
cies--to what may be violent fluctuations in the requirements for
national security. Indeed, we may face a situation in which the
President's emergency powers to control, take over, or close down
communications facilities will have to be invoked, and arrangements
for the delegation and exercise of those powers will be essential.
We may also be faced with the necessity of creating wholly new
telecommunication facilities.
Telecommunications of course play a major role in the economic
and cultural life of the nation. They are the vital nerve system
of our modern military establishment. Since spectrum space is de-
monstrably insufficient to meet both the full needs of national se-
curity and the full needs of other affairs, the latter must give way
to the former in time of emergency. When the emergency has pasSed,
frequencies and facilities,must be restored to civilian use. To
create an ad hoc agency to meet each crisis as it comes would be a
clumsy expedient at best, and indeed, the problems of transfer and
retransfer of spectrum pace and of facilities for using it are too
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complex for ad hoc control to be adequate. A continuing mechanism
is needed for the foreseeable future.
3. InternationalAggeelents. Just as the United States has
no clear policy for dividing its share of spectrum space, so it has
lacked satisfactory means of determining policy as a basis for nego-
tiations with other nations for the world division of the spectrum,
The United States, in preparing, positions for international negotia-
tions, has in effect asked Federal and other claimants to state their
needs, and then presented the total as the United States requirement.
In those portions of the spectrum where these totals have been small
enough to fit within the world complement, our delegations to con-
ferences have had a negotiable position.- In some cases, however, the
total stated requirements have exceeded not merely those which could
reasonably be put forward as the proper United States share, but have
actually exceeded the total physical content of the bands. Further-
more, there is no permanent mechanism by which the stated requirements
of the United States users could be adjusted with equity and safety.
The imperative need for means of making such adjustments hardly
requires elaboration..
4.luniainalle a Sound Industgy. The private telecommunipa-
tions industry of the United States is one of the nation's most
valuable assets in peace or in war.
The normal life of the country
is supported and facilitated by it in numberless ways. In abnormal
times, the industry can place at the disposal of the nation its large
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reserve capacity, built up becauseAof its competitive structure.
This capacity helps to take up the immediate surge of military
requirements. The industry can release radio frequencies, cable
capacity, and other communications facilities, when required for
Government purposes, without seriously affecting its ability to
carry the civilian load.
It is essential that the industry be in sound economic condi-
tion. Some of its components, however, have faced serious diffi-
culties. These have arisen in part from changing economic conditions
and from new technical developments, and in part from the varying in-
ternational situation. The industry also has objected to practices
and policies of the Government, such as taxation policies, subsidies
to competing facilities, and the Government's increasing extension and
use of its own communications system. To meet these difficulties,
the companies have from time to time taken individual action, and
from time to time Government has been of assistance to them in rate
adjustments and other ways.
But there has been no long-range study of the question, no
long-range planning. There should be. No agency of Government is
in a position to take a comprehensive view of the problem. .Regula-
tory authority over all communications common carriers in inter-
state commerce, wire or radiol.is centered in the FOC. However, the
FCC does not have power, for example, to require Government agencies
to make greater use of private facilities, or even to investigate
whether such transfer of traffic would be feasible or desirable from
the Government's point of.view. There is no agency qualified to' advise
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the President in fields where the interests of private and Govern-
ment telecommunications users are in conflict. Meanwhile, in the
absence of guiding policy, the action of Government agencies could
seriously handicap the industry.
In addition to these special problems which are directly con-
cerned with telecommunications policies and programs, it is neces-
sary,to keep in mind the fact that these policies and programs do not
exist in a vacuum; they are part and parcel of the policies and oper-
ations both Of the Federal Government and of the political, economic,
military, and social life of the country as a while. Therefore we
must take into account, in estimating the dimensions of the problem
before us, the point that telecommunications policies and programs
must not be considered as entities in themselves. They should be
constantly related to the larger whole of which they are part.
One further fact is important in understanding this problem.
All Federal Government agencies have interests as users of tele-
communications. The degree of user interest varies; the most promi-
nent users are the Department of Defense, the Department of State,
and the Civil Aeronautics Administration, The Civil Defense Adminis-
tration is vitally concerned with the adequacy and dependability of
domestic communications. The General Services Administration has a
threefold interest: as a user, as a provider of long-distance
communications systems to other Federal agencies, and as the con-
troller and manager of telecommunications (subject to certain restric-
tions) for all Federal agencies. The Federal Communications Com-
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mission, although not itself a prominent user, speaks in Federal
Government councils for the interest of the non-Government user.
While all Federal agencies have greater or lesser interests
as users of telecommunications, the use of telecommunications as
such is not a major interest or function of any of them, but is a
tool to accomplish their missions.
The problem now facing tly. Federal Government is how to
organize itself to meet its responsibilities for policy formation
and program execution in the telecommunications field, which will
meet the four special problems just outlined.
Lumunl_gtanizatio
We turn now to a study of the existing Government telecommuni-
cations agencies to determine the extent to which they can cope with
the problem just stated. In order, they are the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, and
the Telecommunications Coordinating Committee. Their position in
the intricate pattern of national and international telecommunica-
tions is indicated in the accompanying chart. In our study of
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Ju pcmuJuu
FLOW CHART OF
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION AUTHORITY AND COORDINATION
FLOW OF AUTHORITY
? ? FLOW OF COORDINATION
r--=-- --
-COORDINATING
COMMITTEE
THE
CONGRESS
THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE
UNITED STATES
.11?M
AIR
COM
PO
CAB
BUDGET
STATE
? A_ _
L-MEMBERSHIP OF AIR COORDINATING COMMITTEE (INCLUDES DEPT. OF DEFENSE) OF
DEPARTMENT
DEFENSE
IMM MOM MOM M?11111
IRE AS
_
GSA'.
..a
FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
THE
PRESIDENT -**--
NON >--
FEDERAL
USERS
?
FEDERAL
AGENCIES I4
L____?__J 1 I
I 1
AGR
COM
FEDERAL NON-MILITARY USERS
FCC
CIA
INT
JUS
STATE
TREAS
JCEC
JCS
MILITARY
USERS
AIR
FORCE
NSRB
I RAC
A
MEMBERSHIP OF
INTERDEPARTMENT RADIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE (IRAC)
AGR -DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BUDGET - BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
. CAB - CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
CIA - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COM- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
ECOSOC- ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (UN ORGAN)
FCC- FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
GSA - GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
IA- INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AND AGREEMENT
ICAO - INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION.
NATIONAL
nos ma am m? am, so
A I
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
INTERNATIONAL
TCC
a
PREP
? LEGEND ?
imco - INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION
I NT- DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
IRAC - INTERDEPARTMENT RADIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ITU - INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
JCEC - JOINT COMMUNICATIONS ? ELECTRONICS COMMITTEE
JCS - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JUS - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NARBA - NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL BROADCASTING AGREEMENT
PO - POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
PREP- CONFERENCE AND POSITION PREPARATORY COMMITTEES
'AUTHORITY UNDER PUBLIC LAW 152 OVER PUBLIC UTILITY COMMUNICATION SERVICES
OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN OF THEIR ACTIVITIES.
TB F
CONVENTION
(SUBJECT TO /
RATIFICATION)
CONVENTION
1
REGULATIONS
-4-, -4-
SPL
NARBA
IA
3
SVC
FINAL ACTS
SLS- INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA
SPL- SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ITU MEMBER COUNTRIES
STATE-DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SVC- RADIO SERVICE CONFERENCES
T a c - TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (UN ORGAN)
F- TERRITORIAL AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
TCC- TELECOMMUNICATIONS COORDINATING COMMITTEE
TREAS - DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (INCLUDES COAST GUARD)
I - REGION I OF ITU, EMBRACING EUROPE AND AFRICA
2-REGION 2 OF ITU, EMBRACING NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA AND HAWAII
3-REGION 3 OF ITU, EMBRACING AUSTRALASIA
PREPARED BY P. C. P B., DECEMBER 21, 1950.
(PRESIDENT'S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY BOARD) " ""'
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247.
each of these agencies, we have examined the record and discussed
with qualified observers the basic nature of these organizations,
their past record and their probable adaptability to meet more ade-
quately the exigencies of the present and future. We have been
mindful of the advantages of building on existing men and organiza-
tions; we have no wish to add to the number of existing Government
organizations unless the need is inescapable; we have looked for
ways and means of adapting these agencies so they can more effectively
carry out the tasks we think need to be done, or done better.
From this special point of view we have appraised each of these
agencies, as a means of arriving at our conclusion as to what should
be done to strengthen Government telecommunications policy machinery.
The Federal Communications Commission
The Federal Communications Commission was created by the Commun-
ications Act of 1934 as an independent agency to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce in communications by wire and radio. The Com-
mission/s jurisdiction extends not only to private radio broadcasters
and to coMmon telecommunications carriers engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce, but to the communications activities of state
and local governments aswell.
The ultimate public policy embodied in the Act is
to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-
wide, and world-wide, wire and radio communications service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the
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purpose of promoting safety of life and property through
the use of Tire and radio communication...."
An immediate objective was to secure "a more effective execu-
tion of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted
by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority
with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio
communication...." 21
The Commission has broad powers to regulate common carriers
engaged in interstate or foreign communications activities, and
radio broadcasters. The Commission enforces those provisions of
the Act which require ships to carry specified radio equipment and
comply with procedures for safety at 508.4 The Commission carries out
the necessary inspections and investigations, and can compel actions
by those it regulates to conform to the broad purposes of the Act.
The Act provides sanctions and empowers the courts to enforce Com-
mission decisions. The Act also specifies elaborate procedural
provisions, designed to afford appeals to the courts to any party
who is aggrieved by a Commission decision, or whose interests are
affected thereby. These provisions for due process of law, these
protections against arbitrary or capricious Government action are
necessary elements of the Commission's concept and conduct.
I/
- Communications Act of 1934 as amended, Sec. 1.
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The Communications Act was passed with the intention of
oentrali2ing in one -agency the task of viewing non-Federal Government
communications as a whole, of developing communications policies
for wire and radio on an integrated basis, and of providing for
regulation of specific forms of communication' with due regard to
the effects of particular actions on other forms of communications.
It Was recognized this was a technical field in which Congress could
not hope itself to carry out the quasi-legislative process of rule-
making, or the administrative process of applying the standard of
"public convenience, interest, and necessity" to numerous specific
cases. Those provisions of the Communications Act which require the
.Commission to study special problems and recommend legislation to
cure them explicitly reflect the intent of Congress to give the Com-
mission special policy-forming responsibilities for telecommunications
matters.
As such, we considered carefully whether the Communications Com-
mission is not an appropriate place to put the functions we have in
mind.
The Communications Act itself, however, suggests otherwise.
Division of Powers between the President and the FCC. The Com-
munications. Act vests defense powers in the President alone, and
divides Government power to assign spectrum space. While the pre-
amble to that Act recognizes the value of -communications to national
defense, and itplies that the Commission has a direct interest in the
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management of telecommunications for defense purposes, Section 606
of the Act clearly vests in the President the power to take over
civilian telecommunications facilities, both wire and radio, for
emergency and war purposes. The President need not turn to the
Commission for any sort of prior consultation or advice before ex-
ercising his powers under the Act. Furthermore, Section 305 of the
Act specifically gives the President the power to assign radio fre-
quencies to Government stations, and specifically exempts Government
stations from the licensing and other regulatory powers of the Com-
mission when they are operating as such. The Act on the one hand
provides no standards to guide the President in assigning frequencies
to Government stations; his determination is final. On the other hand,
the Act places the Commission under no duty to respect the ,President's
assignments; either the Commission or the President could start a
radio war by assigning a frequency already in use to an interfering
user.
'Similarly in the field of foreign relations, the preamble to
the Act suggests the Commission should concern itself with foreign
relations by including, as part of the Commission's broad public
policy objective, regulation of foreign commerce in part with an eye
to fostering a rapid and efficient worldwide wire and radio communi-
cation service. Yet it is patent that Congress could not and did not
wish to give the FCC powers in the field of foreign relations which
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211.
are constitutionally within the prerogative of the President.
This division of responsibility offered ample room for the
Government to get its telecommunications policies and administra-
tion into serious snarls. Two factors have worked against this.
One is the relatively small need for close coordination between the
Commission and the Chief ExeCutive during the early years of the
Commission's life; the other is the spirit of sensible cooperation
which has marked the relations between the Commission, in particular
its chairmen, and the President.
The Communications Act was passed at a time when there was far
less conflict than there is now between the requirements of the
Government and the requirements of other claimants for radio fre-
quencies: Technological and economic developments kept pace with
valid demands for frequency assignments, in the main. Expectations
for defense needs were geared to the thinking of the times. The
nation's concept of the size and importance of its responsibilities
and commitments in the field of foreign relations was also far more
modest than now.
Accommodation between the President and the Commission was, how-
ever, a,de facto political result, not a necessary legal result from
the powers and structure of the Commission and legislative specifi-
cation of its relationship to Congress and to the Executive. The
Commission, as an independent regulatory agency', does not report to
the President, nor need it consult the President in arriving at its
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decisions in actions before it. Members of the Commission are
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The Commission must come to the Bureau of the Budget in
presenting its appropriations requests to Congress. The Commission
is subject to presidential power in reorganization and management
matters. The President on the one hand has issued Executive Orders
affecting the Commission and its participation in Government activ-
ities, and the Commission has complied with them. On the other hand,
the President has been chary indeed about using his budget and
reorganization powers with respect to the Commission. Chairmen of
the Commission have voluntarily taken up many policy matters with
the White House, and the record shows a high degree of cooperation
on matters of joint concern.
Congressional Interest. Relationships between the Commission and
the President are always conditioned by the views of Congress--and in
particular of those Senators and Representatives who take a special
interest in broadcasting or other communications matters--as to the
proper role of the Commission and the degree of independence from
the President it should enjoy.
Many Congressmen take special interest in matters before the
Commission which may affect availability of nationwide outlets for
political debate, or which may affect communications activities in
their home areas. These interests are largely concentrated in the
fields of broadcasting and television. We take account of this fact
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here because of its effect on the Commission's freedom to emphasize
the various parts of its total responsibility under the Communica-
tions Act according to its own sense of their importance or
priority.
Some Congressmen regard the FCC as an "arm of Congress," and are
anxious that the Commission maintain a healthy independence from
presidential influence and control.
Hoover Commission Views, The Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission) pointed
in 1949 to the dilemma under which the FCC has long suffered: the
FCC has been unable to deal effectively with the work-load before
it because it has not formulated the broad policies to guide its
decisions and thereby expedite its handling of cases; it has been
unable to formulate those policies because of the pressure of current
business. The Hoover experts also reported that the FCC has charac-
teristically faced its tasks by dealing with problems as, they arise,
rather than by conscious policy-making, planning, and programing
for the broad future of communications regulation and development.
Other Views, qany have pointed to the tremendous burdens placed
on the Commission by requirements for hearings and other time-consuming
processes needed to furnish protection to the rights of claimants.
The FCC has been hampered in the discharge of its full regulatory.
-responsibilities by difficulties in getting funds to make requisite
inspections, special studies, and analyses of pressing regulatory
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problems. All these counsels have been urged as reasons why we
should not recommend for the Commission new responsibilities for
critical policy-making tasks, dealing with frequency utilization
both by Government and by non-Government agencies, and treating of
other comprehensive telecommunications issues.
We are also impressed by the fact that no Government agency or
official with whom we have discussed this matter, including the
Chairman and members of the FCC, has recommended that we expand the
powers and staff of the FCC to deal with the policy-forming problems
we think must be met.
Appraisal. The arguments involving excessive work-load, method
of organization, and time-consuming administrative practices are per-
suasive but not conclusive. The Commission has already taken steps
to reorganize itself in line with the Hoover group's recommendations,
'and expects to complete this process by the end of 1951.
The argument of excessive concentration on the problems of
domestic broadcasting and television is even more persuasive. We do
not think that the Commission will ever be free from the ix,,rsistent
pressures which force it to devote the majority of Commissioners'
time and attention to these portions of the field. The solution of
dividing the Commission into panels, already authorized by the Com-
munications Act, is not a complete answer, as suggested by the
Hoover Commission report. Similar conclusions were stated in 1949
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by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce.1/ Panel consideration and decision is not Commission con-
sideration and decision. To organize a regulatory commission into
panels according to specialized types of work is to divide what
should be comprehensive attention to the interrelations of communica-
tions problems.
The two most important considerations against placing new func-
tions in FCC, and in our opinion the conclusive ones, are these.
First, the FCC in its capacity as representative of the interests of
non-Federal communications agencies, is in effect a user. As such,
it would never be accepted as an impartial arbiter by other Federal
users. Second it would be unwise and improper to give to the FCC the
power to make decisions which nffoct the ndministration of executive
agencies, or which relate closely both to foreign relations and to
Rept 49, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 10, 1949, pp. 2-3.
Despite the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Communications Act, the
subcommittee thought "that adoption of the panel system without
enactment of legislation specifically dealing with the subject is
not contemplated by the existing law which contemplates that all
decisions must be made by the whole Commission." With respect to
the merits of panels, the subcommittee concluded that litigants had
a right to expect that decisions on matters affecting them vitally
should be made by the entire Commission authorized to decide such
issues. However, "the Commission must, find a method of speeding up
its work and reducing the current backlog of cases, which we are
informed represents as much as 15 monthst work." The subcommittee
made concrete proposals to that end, and recommended reorganization
of the FCC into the three functional divisions (broadcast, common
carrier, safety and special services) recommended by the Hoover ex-
perts and in process of adoption by FCC.
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national defense. These must be made by the President.
The Interdeplartment Radio Advisory Committee
The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee was created in
1922 by letter to interested Federal agencies from the Secretary. of
Commerce, for the purpose of coordinating the uses of the frequency
spectrum by the several Government agencies. Thus it antedates both
the Federal Communications Commission and its predecessor, the Federal
,Radio Commission.. These agencies were brought in on their creation,
however, and IRAC has always been the nearest approach to an in-
clusive body in which the needs of both Government and non-Government
agencies for frequency spectrum space could be considered.
IRAC membership has always included those Federal agencies most
interested in the Use of radio communications. Eleven are now
represented: the Department of Agriculture, the Department of the
Air Force, the Department of the Army, the Department of Commerce, the
Federal Communications Commission, the Department of the Interior,
the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the De-
partment of the Navy, the Department of State, and the Treasury Depart-
ment. The Federal Communications Commission acts as spokesman for
non-Government users (that is, all users not within the Federal Govern-
ment; state and local governments must come to the FCC for frequency
assignments). Other Federal agencies are present or represented
when matters affecting them are before the Committee.
Thual IRAC is a_group of users.
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As such, it has been severely limited in its capacities as a
policy-forming body. The practices and priorities it has generated
have always been restricted to those by which a group of users with
equal rights could get along.
IRACIs most important task through the years has been to serve
as a technical forum in which users could agree on assignment of
spectrum space to Federal claimants, and in which Government users
could inform the Federal CommUnications Commission of their comments
on proposed C6mmission allocations and assignments of frequencies to
non-Government users. The Commission, as spokesman for the non-
Government Users, could also comment on the effect of requested
assignments to Government users on present or future interests of
other users.
IRACIs decisions are incorporated in a Station List which is not
available to the public. This list gives all particulars required
for coordination necessary to minimize radio interference. These
particulars are binding delimitations on the use of the assignment.
IRAC recommends to the President lists of broad assignments of
frequencies to Federal users, which are then promulgated in, Executive
Orders. These orders have recognized IRAC by reference, in giving
it power to make interim assignments pending preparation of a new
Executive Order. These orders were expected to be issued once
every two or three years; nothing is fixed about this period*
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However, the latest order eppeared in 1944, and there is little
prospect for a new one in the near future. IRAC, or in effect
its sponsoring agencies, has given higher priority to other tasks.
Problems of IRAC. Theoretically, since the IRAC "advises" the
President on the use of his power to assign frequencies to Government
users under the Communications Act of 1934, an appeal can always be
made to the President. Practically, such a case would come up only
if an agency felt that it was denied something so important that the
agency thought it appropriate to bring its request to the President's
attention. As a group of users representing Coequal agencies, IRAC
has a de facto rule of unanimity in frequeney assignment matters. In
practice, there have been only three or four cases in which an ag-
grieved department did appeal to the President. The first of these,
in 1928, demonstrated the difficulty of trying to use an inter-depart-
mental committee of coequal users for generating policy, and re-
sulted in a working rule of first-come first-served, with assignments
to be made on a non-interference basis. Under formal IRAC procedures,
those to whom assignments have been made may enjoy them until they
wish to give them up. Practice again, however, is something different:
Back of the rule of unanimity. and absence of compulsion has lain a
complex process of bargaining and accommodation. New users or old
agencies looking for new assignments during the more recent years
of frequency scarcity have had to engage in a highly skilled, technical
process of searching for combinations of frequency, power, time of use,
A nnrnvAci For
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direction and area of propagation, and stability of receiving and
sending equipment in order to fit new uses into the existing
pattern of operations.
Although there has been no compulsion by directive, all the users
have been under $trong suasion to find mutually agreeable solutions
A
in order to avoid having-to seek decisions ata higher but technically
unqualified level. Furthermore, to the telecommunications specialist
it is fundamental that the alternative to agreement is chaos.
Hence arises the technical reconnaissance and negotiating process
which takes place between seeking agencies and possesser agencies
whenever new assignments are sought. Requests usually come in to
IRAC only after the agencies affected have come to some sort of private
understanding.
We have been told that IRAC never concerns itself with "policy"
and that Government users are not required to justify their requests
for frequency assignments or their retention. IRAC has made some
real contributions to policy--as for example its recommended prior-
ities for allocating the spectrum to services which should underlie
the United States Government position at the Atlantic City Telecommuni-
tions Conference-of 1947. These priorities and policies were not
generated however, for IRAC to follew in dealing with its own business.
They were valuable contributions of technical specialists intimately
associated with governmental operations,. to the formulation of an
Annr
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international agreement.
The extent to which Government claimants must justify their
requests is important to an evaluation of IRACIs role. The key to
the matter is the nature of the group--a group of users, rathef
than an independent judging body. IRAC points to various criteria
which have been decided as relevant to the justification of fre-
1/
quencies in its deliberations.- Whatever
the
relevance of the cri-
teria, no body of users acting as judge of its own requirements can
taken an impartial view of the requests of its members. Security
problems have complicated these issues, especially in time of war,
when the fact of value to national defense would often be alleged,
but no supporting data brought forth on which the claim could be
evaluated.
In sum, we find that IRAC has done a good technical job of
frequency assignment through the years, within the inherent limita-
tions imposed on it by its constitution. It has taken advantage of
the incentives to technical achievement and agreement inherent in
its peculiar situation. It should remain as a technical body in which
1/ Eligible reasons include: specific legislative directives;
international commitments, such as treaty obligations; national
defense requirements; internal security; protection of national
resources; essential mobile communications; communications affect-
ing safety of life or property; research and experimental services;
and absence, inadequacy, or impracticability of establishment or
use of other means of communication. See IRAC By-Laws, 1 January
1950, Article X, "Principles Governing the Assignment and Use of
Radio Frequencies .n
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the day-to-day tasks of Government frequency assignment can be
carried out. It is obvious, however, that a different kind of
agency is needed for the future to solve the problems that will
arise from congestion of the radio spectrum.
The Telecommunications CoordinaIing Committee
The Telecommunications Coordinating Committee is an informal,
voluntary group created in 1946 by exchange of letters between the
Secretary of State and the heads of four other departments and, the
Federal Communications Commission. The purpose of this move was to
create a body to consider telecommunications policy questions, and
thus to fill for the postwar period the gap left by the demise of
the Board of War Communications. The Committee is composed of one
representative each of the Departments of State, Treasurys Commerce,
and of the Federal Communications Commission, and three from the
Department of Defense (one each from the Departments of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force), The Bureau of the Budget is represented by an
observer. Representatives are designated by the heads of each
agency; they are supposed to be of the Under Secretary or Assistant
Secretary level for the non-military agencies' and the chief commun-
ications officers of, the armed services. Several efforts have been
made by member departments to set up the organization more firmly
by Executive Order. This has never been done. Subsequent to its
formation, other departments have from time to time sought membership
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but have been excluded by the Committee on the ground that membership
is restricted to those agencies having a "high policy" interest in
telecommunications: The Committee, as a matter of practice, in-
cludes in its meetings, and in the composition of any ad hoc working
committees, representatives of any agencies having a special interest
in the work in hand;
At the outset it was thought this committee could formulate
policies and develop plans and programs which would promote the most
effective use of wire and radio facilities; The FCC, however,
pointed to its statutory responsibilities for policy formulation and
advice to Congress on such matters, and.stated that its participation
in any group such as TCC could not relieve it of these obligations
or bind it in any way. The State Department reiterated its initial
view that the TCC could work only by. unanimity, and that there must
be no intrusion on the statutory or other authorized responsibilities
of any of the component agencies. TCC accordingly adopted a more
modest charter in which it was agreed by the members that its mission
was
"The coordination of policies of the various departments
and agencies of the United States Government relating to
domestic and international communications matters;;;; and
advise on problems of an international nature including pre-
paration for international telecommunications conferences.
The Committee shall act in an advisory capacity only, but
may take final action when specifically authorized by
unanimous concurrence of all Government agencies represented
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by the membership....In accordance with the foregoing,
the primary objective of this Committee is the formulation
of a national communications policy." 1/
The TCC is served by a small part-time secretariat furnished by the
Department of State. Although it has no formally elaborated organ-
ization, it does set up ad hoc working groups.
glablog_a_mg. From the evidence before us, and from dis-
cussions with participants, it appears to us that the TCC, in its
present form, is inadequate by itself to play the major role in the
formulation of a national telecommunications policy.
TCC is bound by the rule of unanimity. TCC can act when the
Government departments are in agreement, or can be brought into
agreement by intragovernmental persuasion and diplomacy. TCC can lay
out the areas of agreement or disagreement on any issue before it,
but, since its members represent agencies with user interests, the
Committee cannot easily weigh and evaluate points of disagreement,
resolve them, and advise the heads of their agencies, and through
them the President, of a national telecommunications policy.
TCC is hampered by the difficulties, found in other technical
fields as well, of translating technical differences of opinion
into policy alternatives, so they can be dealt with by the President
or by Cabinet officers. TOG membership has suffered the decline
1/TCC Document No. 11, Organization/6, April 8, 1946.
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inevitably to be expected when staff officers are unable to master
this thorny task of translation. Under Secretaries and Assistant
Secretaries have been replaced at meetings by Directors of Offices;
Directors of Offices have been replaced by technical specialists so
TCC meetings are often conventions of IRAC representatives acting
under different instructions. This situation might have valuable
advantages from the standpoint of continuity of problem consideration
and economy of personnel, if it were not true that technical user-
-oriented personnel do not occupy positions which permit them to act
as plenipotentiaries to make, policy commitments on behalf of their
agencies.
When the Government, after the passage of the National Security
Act of 1947, could have replaced the War and Navy Department rep-
resentatives either by a single Department of Defense representative
or by representatives of the three service departments, the choice
was for the latter. This meant in practice that 'ICC is weighted
with representatives of military interests and functions, who
besides are chiefs of the communications services of the three
departments--that is, users and operators of specialized services
rather than officials Charged with agency-wide responsibilities.
In most instances, this would have been salutary, since close
relationships between major operational responsibility and policy
responsibility are wanted. .The difficulty here arose from-the fact
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that much of telecommunications policy formation has to do :fith
dividing scarce resources among military claimants, other Federal
Government claimants, and non-Government claimants. Officials
heading extensive service agencies, with larger potential demands
on their services than they can expect to meet, can hardly,be
expected to take an impartial view of such questions as the, national
requirement for a share of the worldts frequencies, or
the national share among all claimants.
TCC has done good work of a preparatory character toward policy
formation. But TCC as presently constituted has found it difficult
if not impossible to complete policy formation tasks. In those cases
where unanimity does not prevail, TCC could never do so. However,
TCC, better organized and staffed, could do afar better job of
preparatory work so sub-Cabinet level members might go farther than
now toward resolution of policy differences, and in any event make
possible intelligent resolution of remaining differences at the level
of the Cabinet or the Presidency. We believe that reorganization and
strengthening of TCC will make possible such a contribution.
The Current Problem Re-Examine4
The existing organization for frequency assignment to Govern-
ment and to private users was set up at a time when--outside of the
standard broadcast band--there was enough for all, and the proportion
of spectrum space needed for Government purposes was small in rela-
tion to the whole. In such circumstances, it was feasible to leave
division of
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Government frequency administration to the Executive Branch, as a
proper extension of executive control over the substantive functions
of Government which its communications serve; to leave assignment
to non-Government users to the Federal Communications Commission as
a proper extension of its regulatory functions; and to leave inter-
relations between the two to good sense and a will to get along.
Government now occupies something under half of the presently
usable radio spectrum and was doing so before the Korean crisis.
Although the Federal agencies have acquired this large portion of the
spectrum under established procedures and with consideration to private
interests as represented by the FCC as spokesman, these allocations
were made by officials who could not weigh all demands for spectrum
space, Government and private, and judge them impartially on the
basis of full explanation according to a single set of standards and
a well-considered national policy.
We have found conflicting evidence as to the seriousness of the
scarcity of frequencies in relation to demands. Some think there is
no problem, and that the expected rate of technical advance, continued
good will among those competing for space, and the elimination of
wasteful uses will meet the nationfs requirements for the indefinite
future. Others think the problem is critical. Without passing
judgment here as to the precise degree of scarcity, we are convinced
that pressure of present and future demands is so heavy as to force
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the Government ultimately to consider telecommunications resources
as a whole, and to apportion them as a whole to meet the most pres-
sing requirements of the whole nation.
As for telecommunications policy formation, recent experience
has demonstrated that the available machinery works only-in the case
of unanimity, and that the event of unanimity has become increasingly
rare. Although there was unanimous acceptance of the Atlantic City
Convention, unanimity disappeared when attempts were made to translate
accepted policy into practice. The United States thus was unable to
devise a reasonable position for implementing an agreement it had
initiated and urged on other nations. Neither the TCC nor any
specially-devised machinery has so far been able to provide that
detailed position.
Conclusions
1. Fundamental changes in telecommunications require the over-
haul of Government machinery for formulating telecommunications policy
and for administering certain telecommunications activities in the
national interest.
2. The Communications Act of 1934 established a system of dual
control of the radio frequency spectrum. This dual control arises
largely from the fact that the regulation of private telecommunica-
tions is a function of Congress exercised through the FCC, while the
operation of Government telecommunications is primarily a function
of the Executive. For example, the assignment of frequencies to mili-
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tary services is an exercise of the President's powers as Comman-
der-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
3. The Federal Communications Commission, though needing
further strengthening, should continue as the agency for regulation
and control of private users.
4. The President has exercised his power to assign frequencies
through the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, made up of
representatives of the using Government agencies. While this Com-
mittee should continue as a forum to arrange the use of the spectrum
in such a way as to avoid interference, it is not an adequate means
for keeping in order the large portion of the spectrum occupied by
Government agencies.
5. The Telecommunications Coordinating Committee has served a
useful function and should continue as a mechanism for interdepart-
mental discussion of telecommunications matters.
6. The whole Government telecommunications structure is an
uncoordinated one and will be even less adequate in the future than
it has been in the past to meet the ever growing complexities of
telecommunications. A new agency is needed to give coherence to the
structure.
7. There is need for a better determination of the division
in the national interest of frequency space between Government and
non-Government users. To achieve that end, close cooperation between
the Federal Communications Commission and the proposed new agency
will be necessary.
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The Solution Recommended
The urgency of the need for remedial steps in telecommunica-
tions organization calls for prompt action.
We recommend the immediate establishment in the Executive Of-
fice of the President of a three-man Telecommunications Advisory
Board served by a small, highly qualified staff, to advise and assist
the President in the discharge of his responsibilities in the tele-
communications field. Its task would include formulating and recom-
mending broad national policies in this field, and giving advice and
assistance in the formulation of policies and positions for inter-
national telecommunications negotiations.
The Telecommunications Advisory Board should exercise on be-
half of the President his powers in the telecommunications field--
in the main, those powers arising from Sections 305 and 606 of the
Communications Act Of 1934. Thus the Board would be responsible
for assignment of frequencies to Federal Government users, and for
the exercise of the President's emergency and war powers over the
radio and wire communications of the country. This agency would also
be available to discharge any other tasks the President might lay
upon it.
While we believe that a three-man board, as suggested above, is
preferable, we recognize the possibility of appointing one man, a
Telecommunications Adviser, to exercise the functions of the proposed
board.
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We believe that an immediate task of the new agency would be
to assure that the Federal Governments use of radio frequencies is
in as good and economical order as possible and to further the most
rational use of the entire spectrum.
Another closely related and important function of the new
Board will be to establish and maintain effective working relation-
ships with the Federal Communications Commission for the informal
solution of those joint questions of frequency allocation which
will inevitably come up under our system of dual control over the
spectrum. The vast growth in public demand for television has made
acute the problems of deciding how to allocate space in the higher
frequency bands as between Government and non-Government users. The
claims of a multi-billion-dollar industry with a tremendous potential
impact on the daily life of every citizen must be put over against
vital needs of Government agencies for services necessary to the se-
curity and welfare of the entire nation. If this cannot be done
promptly and wisely by joint action of the FCC and the new Board,
it may be necessary to seek a change in the Communications Act so as
to set up a single authority where such decisions can be made.
We recommend that the Telecommunications Coordinating Committee
should be left much as it now is, so far as its legal basis and scope
of activities are concerned. -e see no particular merit in formaliz-
ing it by Executive Order; to do so might unduly institutionalize
what should be a flexible informal interdepartmental committee cm,-
posed of representatives of those Federal departments and agencies
possessing statutory or other formalized responsibilities relating
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to telecommunications. The chairmanship of the TCC should be held
by someone primarily interested in telecommunications. We suggest
he snould be a member of the proposed Board.
We recommend that the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
should also continue much as it now does as a specialized agency to
perform the detailed work of assigning frequencies to Federal Govern-
ment users, but under policies promulgated by the Telecommunications
Advisory Hoard. IRAC recommendations for frequency assignments,
should be made to the Telecommunications Advisory Board for authenti-
cation.
We recommend that no changes be made at this time in the powers
and duties of the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC should
continue to regulate telecommunications common carriers and to control
the use of the radio spectrum by non-Government agencies according
to the standards of public convenience, interest, and necessity
specified in the Communications Act.
?
to afford to interested or aggrieved
public hearings and other safeguards
The Commission should continue
persons full opportunity for
of due process of law. The
Commission's present efforts to reorganize itself as recommended
by the Hoover Commission should be pressed, in order that it may
quickly Increase its capacity to help in Government-wide formula-
tion of telecommunications policy.
We do, however, think that the FCC should have more funds and
a stronger staff to keep up with engineering and economic develop-
ments affecting the commercial telecommunications carriers of the
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country. We foresee the possibility of quicker and more radical
change in these fields; we think the Commission should be in a
position to take necessary action without delays caused by the need
to get special appropriations, recruit special staff, and conduct
special studies before sound decisions can be made.
We recommend the creation of this Telecommunications Advisory
Board after an exhaustive review of alternative solutions. We be-
lieve that a board acting to advise the President has the best
opportunity within the philosophy of our Government operation to
set our communications house in order.
We call attention to the one alternative most frequencly sug-
gested-that is, the creation by Congress of a board having complete
power to assign frequencies both to Government and to civilian users.
The creation of such a board would mean a fundamental change in the
present Communications Act. It would involve, we believe, serious
conflicts with the proper exercise of the executive function of the
Government. We mention it only as a possible last resort in the
management of our communications resources. We hope that the solu-
tion proposed here can obviate the necessityof such fundamental
change in our communications policy.
The Telecommunications Advisory Board--Gualificalima_apa
Emoluments---High Caliber of membership is the most important single
factor which will determine the success or failure of the proposed
Board. The Board should combine sound engineering knowledge with
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experience and skill in governmental affairs. The business of the
Board will not be confined to technical questions of electronics and
engineering; its problems of Government policy and operation branch
out into many fields of public policy. It is therefore important
that the members of the Board should be men of broad vision, able
to resolve complex telecommunications issues with due attention to
probable impact on related fields.
Salaries of Board members should be sufficient to attract men
of high qualifications.
Ila_al=mumigations Advisor Board--Detailea_ad
Powea--The Telecommunications Advisory Board should be established
preferably by Executive Order. This agency should:
A. Act for the President in carrying out his responsibilities
arising from:
(1) Section 305 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended. (Assignment of frequencies by the President to
Government stations or classes of stations.)
(2) Section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended. (Emergency and war powers over telecommunications
common carriers, and protection for telecommunications activ-
ities)
The Telecommunications Advisory Board should carry on
such planning functions as are necessary to the discharge of
its duties under this Order.
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B. Stimulate and correlate the formulation and publication of
plans and policies by appropriate existing agencies to insure:
(1) Maximum contribution of telecommunications to the
national interest.
(2) Maximum effectiveneSs of U. S. participation in
international negotiations.
C. Recommend to the President and advise him on proposed
legislation in the telecommunications field.
D. As preliminary and preparatory steps in the discharge of
the duties specified above:
? (1) Approve and promulgate engineering standards for
? allocations and assignments to Government users.
(2) Provide for adequate initial justification and
periodic rejustification and reassignment of frequencies
assigned to Government users.
(3)
Maintain such records of U. S. frequency assign-
ments as it deems necessary.
(4) Make 'arrangements with the FCC or with other agencies
for monitoring and check to determine compliance with con-
ditions attached-to frequency assignments, and for other
purposes.
(5) Keep abreast of research programs in those aspects
of the telecommunications field which bear on radio propa-
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gation and frequency utilization, and stimulate and support
research where most needed in these areas by governmental
and private agencies.
(6) Stimulate and sponsor such studies pertinent to the
broad objectives of the board as are necessary to keep the
President informed of the health of the telecommunications
industry and the effects upon it of Federal telecommunica-
tions policies and procedures.
F. Cooperate with the Federal Communications Commission for
the purpose of arriving at an equitable distribution of frequency
space between Government and non-Government users.
G. Establish and maintain liaison as required with departments
and agencies of the Federal Government.
H. Create advisory bodies, or utilize the assistance of
existing advisory groups, as required in the discharge of its duties
and responsibilities.
I. Carry on such other duties and responsibilities as may be
directed by ?the President from time to time.
Access to I formation--All departments and agencies of the
Government, including the military services and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, should be authorized and directed to furnish to the
agency whatever information it requires to make a full determination
of the questions before it.
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The Board must always be in a position to receive and consider
thd most highly classified matter submitted by military or other
Government agencies in justification of their proposals. Only thus
can it hope to make reasonable judgments based on complete facts.
Obviously, the Board must be in a position to protect such confidences.
Discussion of Functions and Relations to OthuAgaul2z--If the
new Board acts for the President in carrying out his responsibilities
arising from Sections 305 and 606 of the Communications Act, it will
have real power. In our view, both of these functions are continuing
functions involving the exercise of substantial governmental power.
They are the heart of the mission of the new agency.
Section 305 gives the President power to assign radio frequencies
to Federal Government users. This is a power vital to national d -
fense and security. Under the growing use of international tele-
communications for international information, the power to assign
space in a most important medium for disseminating such information
is increasingly vital to peace, security, welfare, and prosperity.
Radio frequencies are vital to the development of,aviation. Radio
frequencies are playing -a larger part than ever before in domestic
security and law-enforcement measures. Because of these develop-
ments, problems of priorities of claims on the spectrum are keener
than ever before within the Federal Government itself. A continuing
agency, with real power to assign and review assignments of fre-
quencies to Government users, is needed to set Government policies
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and to supervise the work of IRAC in carrying them out.
In World War II, Government powers for taking private communi-
cations resources for public purposes in time of emergency and war
were exercised by an ad hoc agency. This solution is a wise one
for periods in which world wars and international crises are far
apart.
crises with the ever
We are
It is hardly prudent in a period of constantly recurring
present possibility of world conflagration.
now in a period of national emergency, which may become even
more serious. Plans should be made promptly to see that the nation's
communications resources are put to their best use to meet any emer-
gency in an orderly way. These plans must consider the net benefit
to the nation of leaving communications wholly or partly in private
hands. airing emergency or war., there should be cOnstant attention
to the best combination of governmental and non-governmental opera-
tion of the nation's telecommunications.
Needless to say, the exercise of the President's power under
Section 606 calls for advance planning. Obviously no board or sin-
gle person, assisted by a small staff, can do this job alone.
Several existing agencies are charged with related responsibilities
and it will be necessary for the new
tion. The Department of Defense and
of State, and the FCC must be called
agency to enlist their coopera-
its components, the Department
on; there must also be close
working with such agencies as the National Security Resources Board
and the Defense Mobilization Administration. The new agency may
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have to avail itself promptly of its recommended power to set up
advisory or other working groups to cope with its responsibilities
under Section 606.
The role of the new Board in Stimulating and correlating the
formulation and publication of plans and policies by existing agen-
cies is of great importance. Our own work has been hampered by the
lack of comprehensive, correlated, and readily available statements
of telecommunications policy. We have encountered examples of the
failure of existing policy machinery to meet the requirements of inter-
national negotiations or of other Government action.
Yet the answer to this lack is not to create an agency spec-
ialized to deal with telecommunications policy formulation. Tele-
communications policy must be integrated with policies and programs
for the full range of Government and national activities. If it is
elaborated in isolation, it is almost sure to be incomprehensive or
faulty, and will require reconsideration by other agencies in order
to be correlated with other policies and programs.
Our solution leaves the main responsibility for the elaboration
of telecommunications policy with existing Government agencies which
already must relate telecommunications to other functions for which
they are responsible. The new agency will provide a point for stim-
ulus and correlation which we do not think has been satisfactorily
.provided in the past by the Telecommunications Coordinating Committee,
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Since the new Board is also given responsibility for weighty func-
tions in the telecommunications field, we prevent a divorce of policy
formulation from operating responsibility.
Our solution implies the following corollary: Existing Govern-
ment departments and agencies which participate in this policy-formu-
lating process must markedly strengthen their units for carrying out
policy formulation in the telecommunications field, and in adjusting
telecommunications policy to related policy.
The Telecommunications Advisory Board has been designed to
facilitate formulation of policy helpful in international negotiation.
If it is to function effectively for this purpose, it is imperative
that the Department of State shall ?havb a strong telecommunica-
tions staff, and our plan is predicated on the assumption that such
a staff will be maintained and available.
In approving and promulgating engineering standards for allo-
cations and assignments to Government users, the agency should
direct major attention to setting up standards which will make it
possible for the Government to meet its telecommunications needs
with a minimum use of spectrum space. The new agency should have
several highly qualified engineers on its staff who will work with
engineers already employed by other Government agencies, toward the
end that operating equipment and practices be as efficient and
economical as possible.
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It is highly important to concentrate upon adequate standards
relating to efficiency and stability of equipment, minimum separation
of frequency assignments, and sound circuit engineering which relates
the load to the band width and number of frequencies necessary to
do the work, if maximum use of the spectrum is to be achieved under .
Standards of minimum harmful interference.
Our suggestion that the agency should provide for adequate
initial justification and review of frequency assignments to Govern-
ment agencies is designed to correct a basic fault in the present
situation: protection to first-comers irrespective of the relative
needs of conflicting claimants later on, which results in premature
requests for frequencies. While many factors in the present situa-
tion temper the potential evils of our present system of assignment
to Government users, we are not convinced that the present system
can yield as good results as the country should have. All Federal
requests for frequencies should go to IRAC in the first instance,
where they should be screened for conformity to current policies
and for potential interference. Where IRAC cannot act, conflicts
should be carried to the new agency. One of the most difficult
problems under this system will be to prevent IRAC from failing to
settle anything and referring every problem to higher authority.
Every encouragement should be given to IRAC to settle problems itself.
This calls for firm leadership.
We have suggested the new Board maintain such records of U. S.
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frequency assignments as it deems necessary. IRAC now keeps
reasonably complete records of Federal assignments; the FCC, of
non-Federal ones. However, there is no one central place where
a complete list now exists. While the new agency should not main-
tain more in the way of records than it needs for its own purposes,
it should take strong steps to see to it that somewhere in the
Government a comprehensive and current record of U. S. assignments
is maintained. The FCC is the most logical place for this. If leek
of funds or staff block achievement of this purpose, Congress should
remedy it.
We wish strongly to stress the need for more intensive and com-
prehensive research on problems of radio propagation and frequency
utilization. In the recent past, critical decisions about use of
the Spectrum, including geographical and frequency separation of
stations, have had to be made in the absence of sufficient scientific
data.
The Board should not itself engage in research; indeed there is
no necessity for it to contemplate such a role. The newly established
National Science Foundation, whose principal concern will be the
fostering of basic research, provides one avenue for the board's
support of projects in this field. The Research and Development Board
in the Department of Defense, moreover, is in a position to deal with
problems closely related to telecommunications.
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At the beginning, the agency should try to improve the
coverage of research on pressing problems by suggesting research
projects to agencies already equipped to conduct them. Such
projects should include research on propagation in particular sets
of conditions, and for particular bands of the radio spectrum. The
board should be represented in the Executive Council of the Central
Radio Propagation Laboratory. If stimulation in the form of funds
is needed, the agency should encourage an existing Government de-
partment to seek such funds and to allocate them or expand them
as executive agent for the particular research envisaged.
If the Board is properly to advise the President, it should
also conduct and stimulate other studies pertinent to the various
phases of its mission.
There is also a continuing task of considering basic Government
policies for the handling of the Government's business with privately
owned communications companies. This is not a regulatory matter
appropriate for the FCC, although it has important implications
for regulatory decisions. Government traffic is proportionately
so large a part.-and promises to become an even larger part--of
private communications business that its terms and conditions can
affect the health, the.scope, and the serviceability of private
communications companies. This task involves questions of Govern-
ment economy,_ of efficiency and promptness of telecommunications
service, of the impact of future telecommunications capabilities for
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defense and for economic progress; it is thus a continuing question
appropriate for the new Board.
The General Services Administration deals on a day-to-day
basis with these questions of telecommunications management. It is
our opinion that GSA should turn to the Telecommunications Advisory
Board in the first instance for the determination of those issues
of high policy relevant to the discharge of GSA's telecommunications
management responsibilities.
Inherent in our concept of the Board and its duties is the
conviction that the Government has a responsibility to preserve the
present free enterprise status of the telecommunications industry.
The hoard should be authorized to create if necessary, and to
utilize such existing panels, advisory groups, working committees,
and ad hoc working parties as are required to carry out its respon-
sibilities. It should use, where feasible, the personnel and
services of existing departments and agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment, and of state and local governments on a reimbursable or other
mutually agreeable basis.
Only thus can the Board take full advantage of existing resources
in knowledge, skillsond people, and itself remain a small organiza-
tion.
While the agency should be small, we recognize that it may
have to take on certain operating functions necessary to the full
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284.
We recommend it be flexibly
constructed so it can do so if necessary.
It should be clear from the ioregoing that it is our intention
that the new Board should not supplant or encroach upon the res-
ponsibilities of existing Government agencies. We do not wish to
lessen the normal responsibilities of the Department of State in
the field of foreign affairs; we wish to facilitate the formulation
of national telecommunications policies on which policies and
positions for telecommunications negotiations can be based, and
thus to fill a gap which the Department has had increasing difficulty
in closing.
Federal
00 ?????
Communications Commission. --Our desire is to make the
tasks of the Federal Communications Commission more manageable and
to take full advantage of its resources. As an independent regula-
tory agency, the Commission bears major responsibility for assuring
to private persons full consideration of their rights, interests,
and claims in telecommunications matters. The courts see to it that
this is done. Nothing we propose will infringe on the Commission's
powers to assure such procedural protection. The Commission should
?remain in this role. Because of the burden thus placed on the Com-
mission, especially the Commissioners themselves, we have thought it
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prudent to supplement the Government's machinery for arriving at
comprehensive telecommunications policy.
It is neither appropriate nor desirable to try to put the FCC
in a position to tell executive agencies what are the most important
uses of the radio spectrum. Nor would it be proper for executive
agencies to decide for the Commission how to carry out its regulatory
and policy responsibilities under the law. We know of no neat
solution to this governmental dilemma. We see no reason to reor-
ganize the regulation of privately owned communications carriers,
placing it under the President. The good sense and accommodation
which have marked legislative-executive relations in this field in
the past can be expected to continuo.
If the newBoard is to work harmoniously with the Telecommunica-
tions Coordinating Committee and the Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee, these latter organizations need to be strengthened. The
particular changes required are discussed in the paragraphs that
follow.
The Telecommunications Coordinating Committee.-.-The Telecommuni-
cations Coordinating Committee should work out for itself clarified
terms of reference; it should also be authorized to establish
necessary subcommittees and special working groups, and be equipped
with an adequate secretariat.
Ara-wt.-mind P
r_ - so I
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This Committee should remain an advisory and coordinating
body, It should be a forum in which Government agencies possessing
substantial responsibilities or interests in the telecommunications
field can meet in an attempt to work out a coordinated policy in
telecommunications matters arising out of those responsibilities.
In case of agreement, each agency affected can take administrative
action within its own established powers to put agreed decisions
into effect. In case of disagreement, the matter involved can be
promptly referred to the new board for consideration of the reasons
?for disagreement and for evaluation of.the probable consequences
for the nation of following alternative courses of action. Thus
in effect the Committee would be a means for taking the first
important steps toward the formulation of a compi-ehensive telecom-
munications policy; it would uncover areas of agreement and disagree-
ment, permit action in case of the former, and point up policy
choices in case of the latter. The rule of unanimity would no
longer block action, since participating agencies could always act
by reporting their differences.
It is recommended that the level of membership be determined
through the appointments by the heads of those agencies-to be
represented on TCC. The present membership is supposed to be of
the Under or Assistant Secretary level, but it is well known that
these' officials rarely attend. One reason for this is the fact
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that rarely if ever have problems been well enough prepared so
persons of this level can deal with them expeditiously. Technical
issues have not been well enough translated into policy choices.
TOC has failed as a top policy organization because of its lack of
substructure.
Level of membership should be left flexible, and agency repres-
entatives should be as high as necessary to deal with the particular
policy issues under consideration. The Committee needs a competent
and energetic full-time Executive Secretary as well as the power to
create whatever working committees it requires to deal with special
fields or non-recurring problems. With such resources, the Committee
should be able to solve many interagency problems at the working.
level, and to reserve for higher officials the consideration of
policy choices which could not or should not be resolved by specialists.
The TCC should consider carefully the merits of associating
industry representatives with its subcommittees as observers. The
Air Coordinating Committee has done so with marked benefits. The
Telecommunications Policy Staff in the Department of State should
continue to call on industry advisers to help in preparation of
positions for international conferences. The F..cloral Communications
Commission should continue to carry the main load of industry re-
latiOnships. Other Government departments should continue or in-
crease their efforts, where appropriate, to base their particular
planning and operating responsibilities on sound industry
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relationships.
As suggested above, the top responsibility for systematizing
and recommending Federal Government frequency assignment policies
should rest with the new board; the Telecommunications Coordinating
Committee should serve as the forum in which spokesmen for Govern-
ment agencies meet to lay out the existing pattern of views. If
TCC is to do this job completely, it must include within its member-
ship or afford rights of representation to all Federal agencies with
substantial interests in telecommunications.
The InterdemxImpt Radio Advisory Committee.--The Interdepart-
ment Radio Advisory Committee should be continued as a specialized
working body to assign frequencies to Government users under
policies promulgated by the new agency. Frequency assignment
priorities have been generated in IRAC by the stream of day-to-day
decisions. We think that this process should be replaced by con-
scious policy consideration at the appropriate policy level.
IRAC recommendations for assignments of frequencies by Executive
Order should be transmitted to the new telecommunications Board,
and IRAC should keep the Board informed as to interim assignments.
IRAC should take on the new task of periodic review of assignments
to Government agencies, and should hear in the first instance
justifications of agency requests to retain assignments already made.
These tasks are considerably larger than those IRAC now carries;
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representatives of agencies composing IRAC may have to devote most
or all of their time to IRAC business. The new agency should spot-
check IRAC assignments to determine compliance with presidential
policy. IRAC should be kept flexible to participate as technical
adviser to the various Government agencies in the formulation of
Government telecommunications policies and positions.
IRAC's membership should include as a matter of course every
Federal agency which is a substantial user and operator of radio
communications.
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CHAPTER VI
TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY
In our study of existing telecommunications policy, we find
little to go on. :;]-xtant policy is meager, and varies from self-
evident generalities about very broad insues to filigreed treatment
of highly specialized detail. The policy statements in this Chapter
have been assembled by the Board in the course of its work. They
include:
(1)
statements of published policy drawn from treaties, laws,
and expressions by committees or other groups dealing with tele-
communications, which are enclosed in quotation marks;
(2) statement's of commonly accepted policy, not hitherto
formally expressed, which are indicated by underscoring; and
(3) statements of newly formulated suggested policy, which
are presented in roman type without special indication.
We have arranged this material in a logical order to produce
an integrated statement of general policy and specific policy actions.
As far as possible, the Chapter has been circulated informally to
interested organizations in the United States for comments and sug-
gestions, many of which have led to improvements.
The time available to the Board aid not allow us to obtain
judgments and observations on all phases of the subject; nor could
we pursue the ramifications of telecommunications policy into re-
lated policy for other fields. Hence this compilation is not con-
sidered as conclusive or binding, nor in itself sufficient for guidance
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in telecommunication activities. Rather, it is regarded as a
starting point from which national telecommunications policy can
be further developed.
The concept is not new; it has proved its value to the estab-
lishment of efficient national procedures in comparable fields.
For example, "A Statement of Certain Policies of the Executive
Branch of the Government in the General Field of Aviation," pre-
pared for the President by the Air Coordinating Committee in 1947,
is a valuable document setting forth policies essential to the
advancement of United States aviation.
In the preparation of this effort at a kindred statement regard-
ing United States telecommunications, their relationship to the
national defense and security and to the national welfare and pros-
perity has been taken into account. Telecommunications are here
considered to relate to national defense a6 part of the resources
which the nation uses in combating hostile armed forces; to national
security as part of the organized effort to maintain the national
strength and to safeguard the nation against harmful influences,
internal or external; to national welfare as they are used for the
growth of national enlightenment and health; and to national pros-
perity as they aid in the growth of trade, in the production effort
of the nation, and in the resultant enhancement of the nation's in-
fluence in world affairs. These relationships, taken aS a whole,
comprise the national interest,
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I. General Telecommunications Policy
A. Public Con_mlmications--Par ose
There shall be "available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide and
worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facili-
ties at reasonable charges. . . ."
B. Public Communic tions--Polkly
1. The radio frequency spectrum is a world resource in the
public domain. Our Government must adopt policies and measures to
insure that this resource is used in the best interests of the
with due regard to the needs and rights of other nations.
2. The United States, almost alone among the nations of the
world, relies on privately owned telecommunications companies to
play the principal part in the country's telecommunications system.
It should continue to be the policy of the United States Government
to encourage and promote the health of the privately owned companies
as a vital national asset.
3. The United States telecommunications system is essential
to the national security, to international relations, and to the
business, social, educational, and political life of the country.
Hence Government must remain alert to the problems of this system,
and be prepared to support measures necessary to insure the con-
tinued strength of the telecommunications system as a whole.
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C. National Defense
in time of war or national emergemya. as roclaimed by the
President the Government of the United States s all have avail-
able to it the total telecommunications resources of the nation
for utilization with due re ard to the extent of the war or emer-
Lemland to the q2EILling_e_pgmlign_21_Luyices considered to be
essential or esirable for the welfare and interest of the United
States during such a time.
D. atfILY-21_19.2
"The national security, the nation's sea commerce, and the
assurance of adequate safety of life and property at sea require an
efficient, integrated, standardized system of radio and electronic
aids for marine navigation. . ? ?
"In consequence, it is vital to the national interest that the
United States play a leading role in the development, investigation,
selection and standardization of a world-wide system for marine
navigation. . . .at the earliest practicable moment consistent with
open-mindedness and sound technical judgment directed toward the
attainment of optimum results, with due consideration for the cost
to ship operators being kept as low as possible. . . .
"To simplify standardization, to effect the greatest economy in
4eration and to further the most economical use of the radio spec-
trum, the joint use of radio aids by both air and sea craft is. . . .
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advocated where mutually advantageous." See Appendix II)
E. Safet in the Air
The nation's air travel and the a surance of safet of life and
property in flight reauire an efficient inte'rated stand rdized,
svstme of ra io and electronic aids to ion -distance air navirtatim;
therefore "The United States will support and promote a single system
of electronic long-distance aids to (air) navigation for United States
and world-wide standardization. . . .
"The United States will take the necessary stops to obtain and
maintain at all times the qualitative and quantitative data by which
the choice of electronic long-distance aids to navigation can be
determined and furthered internationally." (See Appendix III)
F. International Communications
1. The United States considers the International Telecommuni-
cations Union to be the competent and appropriate international forum
for the purpose of negotiating world-wide agreements on telecommuni-
cation matters..
2. The United States should be appropriately represented at any
international telecommunications conference when such a conference is
.considered to be related directly or indirectly, to the national
defense, security, welfare, or prosperity.
3. The United States should foster and encourage the partici-
pation, for the purpobe of providing advice an information, of experts
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from its commercial communications enterprises in the work prepara-
tory to and at telecommunications conferences which involve the
commercial communications interests of the United States.
4. The fact that both cable and radio facilities are required
by the United States for its overseas telecommunications system shall
guide consideration of any material matters which affect the avail-
ability, in the form of continued operation, of either medium.
II. Specific Policy Actions
A. Radio Frequencies
1. The United States considers that a basiq_guide to follow
in the normal assi nment of radio fre uencies for transmission ur..ses
is the avoidance of harmful interference.
2. Lug=rangg_gacjio frequencies for other than overseas
circuits normally shall be used only_alfn_q.tter forms of communica-
tionj_npIlkly_Eire communication are not ade uate.
3. Priorities in the normal eacetim assi nment of radio fre-
quencies shall be as follows in the order named:
(a) Exaqu2n2lps used redominantl ?rimaril and directl
for national security and defense which means that such fre uen-
cies for which are vital to the safety of the
nation.
(b) FrequeeLynciesusedrildominantlanddirectl
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? (c) Frequencies used in services that have no other adeauate
con-
sidered to be necessar or desirable the national interest.
(d) Freuenciesus all sg_therrses_theassinedfo/
of which must be judged upon the merits of individual need.
B. Radio S ectrum Utilization
1. In view of the limitations of the usable radio spectrumt_md,
to insure the best ossi le return from th use thereof it is i the
best interests of the United States in time of eace to re uire all
pf its users to:
(a) Justif in a satisfactor and e um bl manner an
except an radio
Eassinmentofakcja_fLggacl
(b)Ifirnag_lodioLlintersofreeCornined
sta dards that the use of_g_Stsgatagy since its latest assign-
ment. justifiedtlamnIt_g_An
(c) Submit evidence to indicate wh ther the continued
EassimpiLL2f_a_freaLy.
It will further be in the.best interests of the United States. in
(c) heretojore considerations
to decide by high-level impartial determination, the disposition of
freqjncies not assigped or
user.
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2. Common standards of performance and efficiency of radio
spectrum utilization shall be developed and applied to each type of
radio operation. All users of the radio spectrum shall be required
to adhere to these standards.
C. Miscellaneous
Fixed Service .
1. ELei_gjsac_y_=cor_alezyL_ng_t2_qhrjjavss, shall be applied ov-
ever 'practicable in radio o erations and particularly in the operation
of point to point radio circuits. These techniaues include St10.
develo ments as sin le sideband operation and freellema=slia4calnz.
Aeronautical
1. 1121212Quilapaucto_u_giall ot be tr nsmitted. on fre-
quencies exclusivel allocated to the aeronautical mobile service.
2. The United States s ..ort a s stem of radio communica-
tion between aircraft and the stations o
Maritime Mobile Service,
vihi_,..c_b_sa'ovidesameanforthee)_bliccorresondencebe-
tween ircraft in fli ht and the eneral ? blic on world-wide basis,
And_alLano.2_22.11IY.
Maritime
1. Use of the distress frecuenc of five hundred kiloc ales,
as prescribed b the current International Radio Re lations shall
continue to be the means primarily employed to summon assistance or
to safeguard life and proPertY cn the high seas.
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Amateur
1. The Amateur Service shall be fostered and encouraged
because the immediate availability to all world areas of the Amateur
Services's frequencies and the, amateurs who utilize them, is y
during times of emergency1 whether such emergencY be of a localized
nature or national in scope.
2. The United States considere its own Amateur Service to
be vitally_nluagara_12_1110 national de ense and securit because it
provides a pool of personnel trained in the techni ues of telecommuni-
cationincluding
skilled o erators.
Telegraph
1. The Government of th United States should o erate domes-
tic communication circuits as it considers nec ssar for the conduct
of Federal Government business. further
such domestic communication
circuit- shall be available for an Federal Government use if such
use is considered to be practicable and to afford economy: provided,
that such domestic operated by Federal Government be
leased or rented whenever ossible or racticable from the commer-
cial communications corn anies, The Government should not in fenerall
install its own domestic circuits wherever ade ate and efficient
facilities ma be economicall leased or rented from commercial
sources.
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2. The United States subscribes. to the stan ardization of
Iha_apnit code of International Telegraph:Alphabet Number Two.
3. mi States advocates the eliminatign oja1
rates for Government televrams in the International Service,
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APPENDIX I
STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OF MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON THE
DOMESTIC (COMMERCIAL) COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
OF THE UNITED STATES .
1. General. The nerve system of National Defense is the sum total
of all communications systems that are available, operationally and
potentially, for the prosecution of any emergency or war effort. The
operational existence of nation-wide systems of rapid voice and record
communications in peacetime is indispensable from the standpoint of
meeting the wartime requirements of both the Military Services and
the civil economy. As the intensity and complexity of warfare con-
tinues to increase, correspondingly greater demands will be placed
?on the communications systems of the nation from the standpoint of
both circuit capacity and flexibility of operation. It is, therefore,
considered in the vital interest of National Defense that there be
maintained within the United States to meet that need, as many nation-
wide commercial communications systems as are economically feasible.
2. Military_Policv Regarding_Mg2_2L12mmercial Facilities.
It is impracticable to employ similar concepts and standards in
assessing military and commercial communications requirements. In the
development of. commercial facilities, expected revenue must of natural
consequence be a prime consideration. Military communications, on the
other hand, as an essential element of command must first satisfy
military needs with economy of force or funds an important but secondar5
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consideration. As a result of this fundamental difference, it is
impossible for the Military to enunciate a policy which will under
all conditions prescribe the specific degree to which it will utilize
or depend on commercial communications facilities. It is incumbent
on all military commanders, in compliance with the basic principle
of economy of force, to make maximum possible use of all existing
facilities available to them including commercial service. Before
reaching a decision to employ other than strictly military facilities,
each commander based on the conditions prevailing in his area must
weigh any advantages from the standpoint of economy against the result
ing effect on military security and control, dependability of service
and the rapid flow of military messages. As general policy, therefore,
it may be stated that the Military Services will, whenever practicable,
utilize commercial facilities and service in the interest of economy
of force or funds provided that acceptable military standards of
security, control, and service can be maintained.
3, Mili?aa_gat_of Commercial Facilities in the Zone of the Interior'.
During the early period in the development of national communications
systems, it was necessary for the Military Services to construct and
operate their own communications facilities in the Zone of the Interior.
Today, however, extensive, dependable commercial communications net-
works cover the length and breadth of the United States. From the
standpoint of security, the risk normally involved in partial military
control of its communications has been considered as being relatively
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low within the continental United States. This condition is a
result of the close working relationship thnt exists between the
Military Services and the commercial communication organizations
and the existence of adequate legislation to permit prompt government
operation and control if deemed advisable in the national interest.
Under these conditions, the construction and maintenance of com-
pletely separate communications systems within the United States for
exclusive military use would entail an unjustifiable outlay of funds,
manpower, and equipment. Military policy concerning use of commercial
communications facilities in the Zone of the Interior may, therefore,
be summarized as follows:
"Within the continental limits ?of the United States, the
Military Services, in establishing communications networks for
the purpose of interconnecting their various headquarters, in-
stallations and activities, will by lease or other contractual
arrangement, utilize commercial facilities and services when
available and feasible except where unusual security or operational
conditions are required. The terminal facilities including com-
munications centers and relay stations of these networks will be
operated and controlled by the Military Services."
4, The Commercial Communications Networks as a Source of Trained
Personnel forMilitary Service.
The Military Services can maintain in peacetime only the nucleus
of a wartime communications system. It is also well established that
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the impact of a state of war or national emergency on military com-
munications systems is instantaneous and can only be met through
immediate expansion of both trunk and terminal facilities.
Modern communications facilities while extremely efficient require
a comparatively long lead time in the training of operator and main-
tenance personnel. Hence in the critical period between the outbreak
of hostilities and the time when military training programs can meet
over-all demands, the commercial systems of the United States represen:
an important source of additional trained communications personn1
for military service.
In this connection, it is the policy of the Military Services to
maintain a close, working relationship with the commercial communica-
tions companies of the nation in order that anticipated wartime military
requirements may be reflected in peacetime expansion and training pro-
grams and to the end that emergency military needs for trained communi-
cations personnel may be met and with minimum effect on the continued
operation of vital domestic communications facilities. Further, to
facilitate the transition of commercial communications personnel from
civilian to military operation, it is the policy of the Military Ser-
vices to utilize fixed communications equipment of standard commercial
design to the maximum possible extent and to prescribe similar opera-
tional and maintenance techniques.
5. Trends in Military Use of U. S. Domestic Communications Facilities.
The Military Services do not foresee the necessity for any
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material change in current policy concerning their use of commercial
facilities within the Zone of the Interior. In both peace and war,
these facilities have proven to be operationally reliable and fully
responsive to military requirements. This, in effect, means that
for continuous, effective coordination of military operations within
the United States, the Military Services will remain largely de-
pendent on the commercial communications systems of the nation.
Hence, while not being in a position to.pass judgment on measures
designed to improve the economic well-being of the commercial com-
panies, the Military Services will have a vital interest in any
changes which might adversely affect the capacity and operational
efficiency of the commercial systems.
The advent of long-range, highly destructive warfare, including
intensive infiltration by subversive elements, will require greatly
increased defensive measures on the part of both military and
civilian agencies. The impact of this increase on the domestic
communications facilities of the nation has not been fully deter.
mined, but may reasonably be expected to be of considerable pro-
portion.
Instrumentalities now exist which provide that in time of war
or national emergency, the total telecommunications resources of the
nation can be placed at the disposal of the government. The Military
Services are mindful, however, that any successful prosecution of a
war effort will require that all agencies contributing to this effort
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be afforded use of these facilities on a just and equitable basis, and
in addition, must insure reasonable safety, comfort, and security for
the civilian populace. To this end, the Military Services believe
that the domestic communications systems of the United States should
be as efficient and dependable as sound engineering, reasonable economy
and good operating practices will allow, and that their capacity should
reflect not only the ability to handle
but maximum flexibility in terms of as
of facilities as can be had consistent
cial companies to realize a reasonable
greatly increased wartime volumer,
many alternate routings
with the ability of the
and types
commer-
profit from their investments.
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306.
APPENDIX II
UNITED STATES POLICY FOR RADIO
AND ELECTRONIC AIDS FOR MARINE NAVIGATION
The national security, the nation's sea commerce, and the assurance of ade-
quate safety of life and property at sea require an efficient, integrated,
standardized system of radio and electronic aids for marine navigation.
A multiplicity of new radio and electronic devices and systems possessing
potential applicability for marine navigation have been developed during
recent years, both at home and abroad. In fact, the devices and systems
which have been developed and made potentially available as aids to navi-
gation are so numerous that standardization is mandatory if the encourage-
ment and develOpment- of United States sea commerce is to take place
economically and realistically.
In consequence, it is vital to the national interest that the United States
play a leading role in the development, investigation, selection and stan-
dardization of a world-wide system for marine navigation. This role should
be played at the earliest practicable moment consistent with open-minded-
ness and sound technical judgment directed toward the attainment of opti-
mum results, with due consideration for the cost to ship operators being
kept as low as practicable.
An open-minded attitude shall be maintained toward novel systems and de-
vices which eventually may develop to be superior to existing systems.
This attitude, however, shall not be permitted to retard the adoption of
a world system based on systems already proved and in wide use over a
large part of the world's waterways.
To simplify standardization, to effect the greatest economy in operation
and to further the most economical use of the radio spectrum, the joint
use of radio aids by both air and sea craft is hereby advocated where
mutually advantageous.
The policy contained herein is applicable for domestic gui4ance as well
as for use as a basis for international discussions on standardization
of devices, systems and performance.
For the present and at least the immediate future the following devices
and Systems are advocated as being 'practicable..
I. Navigation
A. Anti-Collision.
The use of radar shall be encouraged in order to enhance safe
and economical operation primarily to reduce the risk of collisior
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307.
B. Position Fixing.
1. Distances over fifty miles.
(Aid to ocean navigation requiring accuracy of 1% and
allowing 15 minutes to obtain position fix.)
(a) Loran - This system shall be continued, improved
and expanded.
(b) Shipboard MF/DF with radiobea cons (useful up to
200 miles). This system shall be continued,
improved and expanded.
2. Distances between 50 and 3 miles.
(Aid to approaching land, coastal navigation and port
approach requiring one-half mile to 200 yards accuracy
and allowing 5 minutes to one-half minute respectively
to obtain position fix.)
(a) Shipboard MF/DF with radiobeacons. This system
shall be continued, improved and expanded.
(b) Shipboard radars. Their use shall be encouraged
and the devices shall be improved.
(c) Radar aids, both active and passive. They are
necessary for the special marking of navigational
aids, dangers and shore features, to facilitate
identification by radar. Their further develop-
ment for purposes of operational evaluation should
be continued.
3. Distances less than 3 miles.
(Aid to harbor entrance requiring 50 yards accuracy and
instantaneous position and track fixing.)
(a) Shipboard radars (high resolution). Their use
should be encouraged and the devices shall be
improved.
(b) Radar aids, both active and passive. They are
necessary for the special marking of navigational
aids, dangers and shore features, to facilitate
identification by radar. Their further develop-
ment for purposes of operational evaluation should
be continued.
RESTRICTED
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308.
(c) Shipboard IVT/DF with radiobeacons. This system
shall be continued, improved and expanded.
II. Harbor Control and Harbor Communicatia.
A. Harbor Control Radar.
This service shall be provided as required.
B. Harbor Control Communications.
VHF Radiotelephone channels for harbor control purposes
shall be provided. The channels and modulation should be
standardized internationally.
III. Frequencies.
The United States shall advocate the international standardization of
frequency allocations for use or operational evaluation with respect
to the above devices and systems.
It is believed that the frequency allocations recommended to the De-
partment of State by the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee
and the Federal Communications Commission will meet the operational
and technical requirements of the radio navigational devices and
systems herein designated. These are as follows:
A. Shipboard Radar: 3000 to 3246 Mc
5460 to 5650 Mc
9320 to 9500 Mc
B. Radar Beacons: 3256 Mcs j 10 Mc
5450 Mcs ,Z 10 Mc
9310 Mcs 10 Mc
C. Loran: 1800 to 2000 kc
D. LF/MF Radiobeacons 280 to 320 kc
E. Harbor Control Communi-
cations in the Band: 152 to 162 Mc
RESTRICTED
-. - as re':41:19 als:881:81 sets
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309.
APPENDIX III
UNITED STATES NATIONAL POLICY ON ETECTRONIC
LONG-DISTANCE AIDS TO NAVIGATION*
POLICY
1. The policy of the United States in respect to electronic long-dis-
tance aids to navigation is as follows:
a, The United States will support and promote a single system of
electronic long-distance aids to navigation for United States and
world-wide standardization.
b. At the present time the aids which the United States has
adopted and now supports and promotes are Loran and high-power
LF/MF Non-Directional Beacons in that order of preference.
(1) "Loran" is considered as one type of aid regardless of
the- frequency employed.
(2) Loran will be continued, improved, and expanded to provide
needed coverage. The choice of a frequency for Loran installa-
tions in any particular area will be governed by the require-
ments to be met and the frequencies available in that area.
(3) Wherever it is technically, economically or operationally
desirable, the United States supports LF/MF Non-Directional
Beacons of sufficient power to meet requirements in a specific
area.
(4) Recognizing the special recommendations set forth in At-
tachment A of the draft document, "Annex 10 to the Convention
of International Civil Aviation," during the interim period
the continued use or extension of other systems will not be
acceptable if such system or.systemi require airborne or ship-
-borne equipment in excess of, or different from, that required
for the use of Loran or LF/MF NonDirectional Beacons.
C. The United States will take the necessary steps to obtain and
maintain at all times the qualitative and quantitative data by which
the choice of electronic long distance aids to navigation can be
determined and furthered internationally.
*Approved by TCC (Document No. 557), January 31, 1950
Approved by ACC (Document No. 58/5D), April 19, 1950
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310.
APPENDIX IV
REPERENCE SHEET
I. General Telecommunications Policy
A. Public Communications--Purpose Communications Act of 1934
B. Public Communications--Policy New
C. National Defense Executive Order #8546, dated
September 24, 1940, defining
functions and duties of Defense
Communications Board
D. Safety at Sea United States Policy for Radio
and Electronic Aids for Marine
Navigation, 1947
E. Safety in the Air Air Coordinating Committee
Document 58/5D, April 19, 1950
F. International Communications Present practice
II. Specific Policy Actions
A. Radio Frequencies 1. Atlantic City Convention
2. IRAC Report to Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce,
81st Congress, 2nd Session
B. Radio Spectrum Utilization Proposed
C. Miscellaneous
Fixed
Aeronautical
Maritime
Amateur
Telegraph
Atlantic City Convention, Art. 42
Atlantic City Radio Regulations,
Sections 396 and 398
Atlantic City Radio Regulations,
Article 27
Atlantic City Radio Regulations,
Articles 5 and 33
RESTRICTED.
Present Practice
U. S. proposals to International
Telegraph and Telephone Con-
ference, Paris, May-August, 1949,
(Report of Chairman of U. S. Dele-
gation, dated Oct. 31, 1949).
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311.
Appendix I. Military Statement re Domestic U. S. Communications,
(Department of Defense)
Appendix II. "United States Policy for Radio and Electronic Aids
for Marine Navigation." Prepared by an ad hoc
committee headed by Admiral Merlin O'Neill, U.S.C.G.,
and representing all major U. S. maritime interests.
Approved by the Telecommunications Coordinating
Committee on September 4, 1946, TCC Document 112.
Appendix III. ACC-TCC Document on Electronic Long-Distance Aids
to Navigation.
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312.
HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION
President's Communications Policy Board
Shortly after the appointment of the President's Communi-
cations Policy Board on February 17, 1950, the Chairman came to
Washington to discuss plans and programs with officials in the
Executive Office of the President.
On March 100 the Board held its first meeting in the offices
of the Federal Communications Commission. Federal agencies con-
cerned with telecommunications problems were represented. The
meeting was devoted to a review of specific issues related to the
Board's mission. At this meeting, the Signal Corps invited the
Board to set up its offices in the Pentagon, and undertook to pro-
vide necessary administrative services. During the next month, the
Board commenced organization of its staff.
The Board held 59 sessions. Procedure was informal and off
the record. Much of the time in these sessions was spent in dis-
cussion and analysis of major telecommunications problems and
policies with specially qualified people in Government, in industry,
and in private life. This procedure enabled the Board to secure a
maximum of pertinent data in minimum time.
The-Board also requested and received formal statements on
the issues before it from a large number of Government and private
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313.
officials and exerts. Members of the Board and its staff drew
heavily on these and other sources on an informal basis as well.
A small and highly competent professional staff was set up
to make detailed studies and analyses of telecommunications poli-
cies and problems.
The Board wishes to express its indebtedness to Charles A. H.
Thomson, Staff Director and chief executive officer, for his effec-
tive management of the staff work of the Board. It also wishes to
thank Fred C. Alexander, who ably organized and directed the technical
studies, particularly on frequency utilization, which have contri-
buted so Much to the report.
Other senior members were William E. Plummer, William F.
Minners, Ralph O. Smith, Ernest C. Shaffer, and John J. Keel.
These senior members were assisted by Julia M. Gilbert and
Charlotte Hazard, Margaret J. Myers and Doris Gates served as
Secretary to the Board. Carol Ashworth, Robert J. Eames, and
Betty T. Walters gave secretarial and clerical assistance.
F. G. Fassett, Jr., and Charles Schwarz gave special help in
writing and editing the report.
All members of the Staff contributed time and energy beyond
any normal call to duty, and in a very real sense shared in the
work of the Board.
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314,
The Board contracted with Ford, Bacon and Davis, engineers,
for a study of the economics of the record communications industry,
and with Dr. Bonnar B. Brown of the Stanford Research Institute
for special economic consulting service.
Many Government departments and agencies--in particular,
the Federal Communications Commissionl.the Department of Defense,
the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce--made
available a large mass of detailed information about telecommunica-
tions operations and policies. These agencies prepared special
reports for the use of the Board which permitted a more comprehen-
sive'view of the telecommunications system of the country than had
previously-been available in any one place.
Without this opportunity to tap special resources, the Board
could not have, in the time available, covered the ground necessary
to completion of its report.
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TO r AD/SO
Attention: Cmdr. Johnson
FROM : Exec Asst to DCI
1 March 51
Our comments have been requested by Mirth 10 on the following
pointer'
?
1. The need for a top-level telecommunications agency;
2. The function
of the Telecommunications Advisory poAr41
3. The location or the preposed.Boarduin the Erotoutive
, Office of the President;
4. The structure. of the proposedasAmmq.,
,
S. The relationship to other agencies, particularly IRAC
and the TelecommunictionsCoordinating :Committee.
Wotad you let me have your comments by fi March.'
, .
76
" %- ? ?
LBL
'? ?
'
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PRESIDENT'S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 16, 1951
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr, President:
The President's Communications Policy Board, pursuant to
your request to its Chairman for a study of the growing scarcity
of frequencies in relation to demand, has studied the utilization
of the high-frequency part of the radio spectrum used for trans-
oceanic communications. To the best of our knowledge, no such
study has previously been made.
For reasons of security and because of Possible embarrassment
to the United States in its international negotiations, we have
not included this study and its findings in our public report.
They are set forth in detail in the attached confidential report.
A brief summary for your information is included.
The results of our study suggest that the radio frequencies
in the supposedly crowded long-distance transmission band are not
being fully utilized by either Government or private stations.
These results emphasize the need, if the United States is to fore-
stall an actual shortage in the days ahead, for more effective
national management of the radio spectrum, as pointed out in
Chapter V of our public report.
There is also an immediate urgent international problem of
implementing the Atlantic City Treaty. No effective machinery was
available to cope with this problem. Therefore, as a temporary
expedient, we recommended to the Under Secretary of State, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Federal Com-
munications Commission the prompt appointment of an ad hoc group
to work on implementation of the Treaty. This group has been
appointed and we have made our study available to it. The lack
of a permanent mechanism within the Government equipped to perform
this task is another example of the need for an agency such as we
have recommended in our public report.
CONFIDENTIAL
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-2
We recommend that the attached study be transmitted for the
confidential information of the heads of those Government agencies
named in the accompanying list and that the Federal Communications
Commission be authorized to send copies to the Companies on the
list. If you accept our recommendation to establish a new Tele-
communications Advisory Board in the Executive Office of the
President,' this study and its supporting data should be turned
over to it as well.
0
Respectfully submitted,
/Signed/
Lee A. DuBridge
William L. Everitt
James R. Killian, Jr,
David H. O'Brien
Irvin Stewart, Chairman
:
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The Secretary of State
Mr. Dean Acheson
The Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. John W. Snyder
The Secretary of Defense
General George C. Marshall
The Attorney General
Mr, J. Howard McGrath
The Secretary of Agriculture
Mr. Charles F. Brannan
The.Secretary of the Interior
Mr. Charles Sawyer'
The Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission
Mr., Wayne Coy
The Director of Central
Intelligence
General Walter B. Smith
The Administrator
General Services Administration
Mr. Jess Larson
The Director
? Bureau of the Budget
Mr. Frederick J. Lawton
Mr. R. V. Howley, President
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company
80 Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts
General David Sarnoff, Chairman
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N. Y.
Mr. William J. McCambridge, President
Press Wireless, Inc,
1475 Broadway
New York, N. Y.
Mr. Leroy A. Wilson, President
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
195 Broadway
New York, N. Y.
Sosthenes Behn, Chairman
International Telephone & Telegraph Co.
67 Broad Street
New York 4, N: Y.
Mr. R. Stanley Dollar, President
Globe Wireless, Ltd.
311 California Street
San Francisco, California
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777, 7,
0 ONF IDENT
FIDENTI A
Copy No.
UTILIZATION STUDY
of the
HIGH FREQU'EN'OY PART
of the
RADIO SPECTRUM
A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT BY THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY BOARD
February, 1951
CONFIDENTIAL
HAL
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C ONFIDENTIAL
Copy No.
UTILIZATION STUDY OF THE HIGH
FREQUENCY PART OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM
(Performed under the direction of the Presidents Communications
Policy Board, August through December, 1950.)
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTIO
A. Scope of the Study.
B. Methods used.
(a) Selection of Spectrum Space.
(b) Station Observations.
C. Results of Monitoring before Analysis.
D. Factors Governing Analysis.
E. Tabular Results. Tables II to VI.
F. Discussion of Scope, Method and Results.
(a)
Purpose and Value.
v
(b) Assumptions and Interpretations made for Purposes of
Analysis.
(c) Reasons for Non-use or Limited Use of High, Long-Distance
Radio Frequencies.
(d) Relationship of Results to Other Services.
G. Conclusions.
H. Recommendations.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
FREQUENCY WITJZATION STUDY
putpaRy,
On approaching the problem of the generally alleged scarcity
of radio frequencies in relation to increasing demands, the Presi-
dent's Communications Policy Board found no reliable data on which
to form a sound opinion. The Board, therefore, decided to undertake
a monitoring study of representative slices of the high frequency
part of the radio spectrum--whers there is a maximum of international
competition. Basic monitoring for the study was done by the Federal
Communications Commission's monitors, following instructions issued
by the Board. Monitoring results were analyzed by the Board's staff.
The method and detailed findings of our study are described in the
body of this confidential report.
The fundamental objective of this study was to indicate the de-
gree of use the United States is making of its high-frequency radio
assignments in the fixed point to point service. This service was
selected for study because it was one for which usable data could be
secured in the time available.
Analysis of monitoring reports reveals that efficient usage
has not been made of all of the frequencies observed.
Of 140 fixed service, U. S. assigned frequencies which were
observed, 23 were not used at all during the periods of observation'.
Sixteen additional frequencies were used to a very minor degree.
If we had used less generous assumptions, the latter number
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CONFIDEETIAL
- 2 -
would have been larger. In addition, these figures are representa-
tive of a period when the volume of communications to be handled
was abnormally high because of the defense effort.
These, results strongly suggest that similar conditions also
exist in other parts of the high frequeney bands which are allocated
to the fixed services, as well as to those-used by other services,'
such as maritime mobile, aeronautical, etc.
Such conditions as these, where they exist, would be harmful
to our interests were they to becalm?known internationally, because
they would weaken our position at ihternational conferences.
Our findings also point to these further Conclusions:
(1) The "increasing scarcity of radio frequencies" is
not yet acute. However, users of the spectrum have tried to
secure sufficient frequencies to protect themselves from
anticipated scarcity. Thus while new registrations and
assignments are hard to get bothlederal Government and
other users in the aggregate appear to have considerably
more than enough to meet their normal and immediate needs.
(2) These conditions probably exist in other countries
as well, varying directly with the number of frequencies
used by each country.
(3) The alleged Scarcity of frequencies available for
registration is a timely warning of the actual scarcity
which will gradually be brought about by growth in the
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- 3 -
demand for telecommunications services and for other
usages of the radio spectrum, intensified by the current.
international race for frequencies to be used for high-
frequency broadcasting and defense. This trend toward
scarcity may be offset in part by application of existing
technological advances hitherto retarded by economic or
other factors, and by improvements yet to be developed.
(4) Careful monitoring is'a vital key to factual
knowledge of spectrum utilization. The study confirms the
need for further analysis of the data accumulated and for a
permanent program of organized monitoring. One important
objective of such an effort is to evaluate the frequency
usage factors arising out of the growing amount of inter-
ference to communications.
These conclusions--in particular the prospect of real scarcity
to come--lead us to recommend that the Federal Government initiate
and maintain comprehensive studies of the use being made of the
radio spectrum both by the United States and by foreign users. Such
studies are the indispensable basis for the sound and effective regu-
lation and management of use of the radio spectrum, and for the
strengthening of our position at forthcoming international telecom-
munications conferences.
11
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CONFIDENTIAL
UTILI4ATIOn_STUDY OF THE HIGH F.R.Qi(jp.my PART OF THE
RADIO .spgaTimi
Introduction
Executive Order #10110, February 17, 1950, and the accompanying
letter of the President stressed the need of a study of radio fre-
quency utilization and the "scarcity of radio frequencies in rela,.
_
tion to the steadily growing demand." To establish proper background
.? ?
for consideration of,the subject, the President's Communications-Polie
Board created by the Executive Order felt that factual data on present
actual use of radio frequencies were necessary.
The Board knew of no current monitoring studies broad enough to
. . .
indicate the extent to which the United States was using the, frequencies--.
?
registered by it or assigned to it in the high frequency portion of the
;
radio spectrum. Accordingly, the Board decided to make its own study.
-
of the current utilization of frequencies by United States users in the ,
4 to 27.5 Mc part of the radio spectrum. This portion of the spectrum
was selected for study because of the technical usefulness of such
frequencies for long-distance overseas communications and because of
the increasing world demands for them.
To monitor the entire spectrum from 4 to 27.5 Mc would have been too
great a task to complete within the time available; it was 'therefore
decided to conduct the study by means of a comparative sampling process.
This process in itself involved 7,000 log sheets and the analysis of
175,000 observations. The services ,of the monitoring stations of the
-
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- 2 -
Federal Communications Commission were made available to the Board
for the purpose, and the FCC was extremely cooperative in permitting'
?
the Board to write its own directives to the 19 FCC monitoring sta-
tions in the United States, Alaska andllawaii.
The Board wishes to express its sincere appreciation not only for
the high degree of cooperation given but also far) the completeness of
the work performed by the stations, in a monitoring program larger and
more comprehensive than any ever before' Wertaken by them.
A. Scam of the_glidy
To secure data sufficient for comparative analyses on which conol
sions could be based, the Board sought:coMPleti*of,eight phases of
monitoring observation by December, 1954 Or An about 16 weeks. ,T
,
eight phases decided upon were between 6710 kc and 1.6980 kd embracing
frequencies considered generally representative Of international-corn-
munications. They totaled 995 kc or,an :average of 124.41c per Phase:.
Within them were 140 frequencies with:knownAlhited States fixed assign.,
merits, an average of 17.5 per phase, Which --0$ considered in the analY,
sis. Of the 140, 64 were Government, 67 non-Government, and 9 sharedi,
These assignments encompass 598.88 kc, of spectrum space.
The following table indicates the scope of the study in terms
assignments and kilocycles of space 141 .the;v4xl,ous tmq140,
Q1U
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3
CONF I DEN T\I A L
Number of U. S. Frequencies assigned included in parts of Spectrum monitored and Amount
Phase
Band ? Kc.
Space Kc.
of Spectrum Assigned in each Band
No. of Frequencies Assigned.
Space in Ke.
No.
Gov.
non?Gov.*
Shared: Gov, Non?Gov.*
Shared.
1
6710 - 6515
105
21
7
11
3
24.61 6s.00
is.00
2
7625 - 7735
110
24
13
11
o
39.55 .56.50
0.0
3
9290.- 91410
120
17
9
5
3
31.514, 19.00
19.00
14
1014140 - 10550
uo
21
6
12
3
9.50 63.00
19.145
5
13170 - 13290
120
5
1.1.
4
o
3.54 19.00
0.0
6
14570 - 14700
130
20
11
9
0
47.50 53.00
0.0
7
15760 - 15570
uo
23
9
14
o
27.95 50.50
0.0
5
16790 ? 16950
190
6
1
o
4.9(a 6.00
o.o
Total
995
2.40
....5
64
' 67
9 .
159.15 365.00
?44.70
*includes all others except Federal Government
7
(7)
00?3
Totals
no.6a. 'if)
co
cv
96.05'in:21]
(0
69.54 02
a
70.20 ,It
22.5149.
0
(.1
110.50g
izz
105.458
c.,
10.99 ai
as
w
595.55 (-1
(t5
u_
-0
0
?
CONFIDENTIAL 2
0_
a
<
Approved For Release 2007/01e8 :N9A-IRED)PR648496RRE00800100001-1
- 4 -
B. EL L11211
(a) Selection of Spectrum Spage
The confidential IRAC-FCC list of May 24, 1950, showing U. S.
assignments in numerical and ascending order of frequency, was used
as a guide to ascertain where a preponderance of United States fixed
assignments might be found in any band.
It was 'desired, as far as possible to observe unbroken portions
of the spectrum. Hence the monitoring of selected individual frequencies.
was ruled out. Frequencies below 6710 kc. and above 16980 kc. were also:
ruled out, in order to be as fair as possible to all users, because of
the greater possibility that active use of these frequencies might be
interfered with by the effects of the eleven-year sunspot cycle.
At the time the selection of space for observation was made, t
Board had no advance information on how much use was being made of fre-
quencies within a particular part of the spectrum. The only considera-
tions guiding selection of particular portions of the spectrum to
monitored were these:
1. As many bands representative of fixed overseas operation
were to be observed as time would allow.
2. Within the limits of the spectrum space embrdced by each
phase (within the practical limits of about 125 kc.), as
many observations as possible of United States fixed assign?
ments were to be made and observation of a preponderant
number of frequencies assigned to any one organization,
1100.J 0 0.1.
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
. 5 .
gONFIDENTIAL
whether Government or commercial, was to be avoided.
Observation was to be concentrated, as far as possible,
on assignments in the fixed service, .The frequencies
selected, therefore, included those with a high per-
centage of assignments to the fixed service as listed
in the IRAC-FOC list,
Some aircraft and maritime frequencies were included among those
observed, particularly in phases 5 arid 8 (13 and 16 Mc bands), but these
were eliminated for the purposes of analysis, which was confined to the
Fixed Seririce,
(b) OLIIRD-g12.1=Ii9D2
For these observations a total of 19 monitoring stations, located
from Maine to California and from Alaska and Hawaii to Florida, were
available. Of the 19 stations, 10 were primary and 9 secondary.
As far as possible, all freqUencies were to be observed on a 24-ho
basis, regardless of the characteristics of the frequency itself,
whether it was more useful predominantly by day, night, or transition
(twilight). The 24-hour observation was possible at the 10 primary
stations; at the secondary stations, because of limited hours of ?per-.
ation, only 12 hours of daily observation was recorded. The station
locations and classes are show,il in Attachment Not p
Instructions were sent to the 19 stations cutlining,their assign.4,
merits and procedures relative to each phase, Delays in the receipt or
"these instructions by mail create'
?.
. .
th Staggered'the'start
1?1 ti-;
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -
resulted in about 15 days of observation on a particular assignment, all
stations considered. The stations were instructed merely to monitor
the spectrum space sot forth and to record on special log sheets the ob-
servation of any transmissions occurring within that space. None of the
stations know why the work was being done and they, therefore, approached
it as intended, objeCtively, as is borne out by the logs, upon which aro
recorded both foreign and U. S. transmissions as they occurred. Details
covering assignments and tho instructione relating to observation, in-
cluding sample log shoots, are shown in Attachment (1).
C. Results of Monitoring Before Analysis .
At the conclusion of the monitoring study, the Board received by
airmail approximately 7,000 log sheet Those are in the files of the
Board and have been classified as "Confidential." There are no duplicate
copies.
They were prepared by the Board especially for this study and show
in 5 basic columns (1) the time, (2) frequency upon which a transmission
was observed, (3) transmitting station if identified, (4) type of emission
and the type of activity (traffic, calling, idling, carrier, etc.), and
(5) remarks, which were used to amplify where necessary columns 2, 3, or 4.
(See Attachment 3.)
Because of the widespread geographical locations of the listening
stations and the propagational characteristics of the frequencies observed,.
the observations include, in addition to the transmission of the U. S.
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7 -
stations, an appreciable amount of transmission from foreign stations.
Some unidentified transmission was observed, but the, amount was surpris-
ingly low. This may have been due to the experience of the radio oper-
ators engaged in this activity, who have become highly familiar,with
constant transmissions on particular frequenciea. The accuracy of the
frequencies shown is considered sufficient for the purposes of this study.
It would have been too ponderous a procedure in the time available to
measure each transmission with a precision frequency meter. In lieu of
such a procedure, the stations were given the latitude of calibrating
their receivers within the particular part of the spectrum under observe-
tien by means of a precision meter, and, in the course of observation,
determining by reasonable estimate the frequency heard. It was deter-
mined. that this method produced a result that was accurate by approx-
imately / or 500 cycles.
The observations recorded on the log sheets, when considered en masse,
are generally representative of the actual transmission on specific
frequencies. This results from the Pact that 19 stations were under
instruction (See Attachment 1) to cover and record all activity heard
within an average space of 124.4 kc. (per phase), once each hour. At
least three primary stations covered the same part of the 124.4 kc. during
the hour for 24 hours, and all nine secondary stations covered the entire
124.4 kc. once each hour for 12 hours daily. The possibility of recordin
any signal, however intermittent its transmission, was enhanced by the
I :
-,-fact that, in accordance with the instructions, no two stations started
t the sate time to make the hourly abservationexcePt'by coincidence':
OONFID E.
..",(
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
- 8 -
D. Factors for Analysis of the Stusly.
For the 'purposes of analyzing the study, it was determined to select,
.from within each phase, the ten days that showed the highest degree of
monitoring coverage. This selection necessitated scanning log sheets for
approximately 15 days of observation within each phase, occasioned by the
varying lag in mail delivery of instructions to stations. This selection
earmarked the ten days which had the greatest number of listening stations
in simultaneous observation, even though any difference in the number of
transmissions observed appeared to be negligible.
As the study was primarily made to observe the degree of activity on
the U. S. assignments in the fixed point-to-point service, it was necessary
to eliminate U. S. assignments to other services, such as maritime mobile
and aeronautical mobile, in addition to the recorded transmissions of
foreign stations.
The U. S. fixed service assignments (including aero-fixed) were then
carefully reviewed and a number of these assignments eliminated wherever
there was reasonable doubt that the monitoring stations could have heard
the transmission. As an illustration, a station having an assignment in
the 7 Mc band, transmitting from Manila to Tokyo, unshared with any other
U. S. station, was eliminated from consideration because there existed
a reasonable doubt that U. S. monitoring stations would hear the Manila
station during the hours that it Was transmitting to Tokyo.
After this weeding out, there remained in the eight phases concerned
140 frequencies upon which there were fixed point-to-point U.S. assignments.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
- 9 -
The approximately 175,000 observations were recapitulated by frequency,
call sign, time heard, emission, and nature of transmission activity, i.e.,
traffic, idling signal, dotting, transmission of call signs or testing,
sending steady carrier, or other. These data for the 10 week days
monitored by the most stations were then recapitulated by agency and
station. Each station intercepted was given credit for one hour if an
emission was intercepted once or more within a particular hour. Uniden-
tified emissions which probably emanated from a particular station were
credited to that station. The various types of transmission activities
were then totaled for the 10 days and the average hours of use per day were
determined. Where one agency used a frequency at more than one locptiqn
the agency was credited with the total time as though used at but one
location. In instances of frequency sharing, ?the total time of use was
credited to the frequency.
In order to determine the hours of uie possible with the circuit path
and propagational characteristics of the frequencies monitored, each
assignment was analyzed separately. This was done by reviewing records
of ?transmissions made during the actual monitoring period over essentially
the same distance and path. The records were made available to the Board
through the courtesy of the Signal Corps.
C ONFIDENT.IAL
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
-10-
E. Results of the SIudv.
The results of the study are presented in tabular form.
Table ha shows the number of frequencies assigned vs. average
hours of use for all probable U. S. transmissions totaled for
all types of transmission activity. Tables IIb? Tic, and lid
show the same information separately by type of transmission
activity; respectively, traffic, idling--call signs--testing,
and steady carrier. Table ha shows that, over a period of
10 week days, of the 140 frequencies monitored 23 frequencies
or 16.4% had no U. S. transmissions of any kind. Table ITh
shows that of the 140 frequencies monitored, 28 or 20% had no
U. S. transmissions of traffic.
.g ONFIDENT IA L
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
-11-
CONFIDENTIAL
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
Freq. Bands : 6710
Monitored -- KC to
Spectrum Space--K0 : 105
; 6815
Lamajiag. Asstd: 21
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with no U.S. 5
transmissions
# Frogs. U.S. Assid:
with no iden-
tifiable U.S. : 6
transmissions :
;1 Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with identified : 15
UpSt transmissions :
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with transmissions :
identified as U.S. : 16
2"...rob.EcIlAy_LJat.._ :
Table ha
7625
to
771.g
9290
to
9 /.210)
10440
to
lon
13170
to
13m
14570
to
14/00
15760 16790
to to
16980
15R___
99-5'
140
____120 ..--
23 6
24
17
21
8
20
3
2
0
2
0
8 3
23
5
2
0
2
1
9 3
28
19
15
21
6
19
14 3
112
21
15
21
6
20
15 3
117
Number of Frequencies Vs. Hours of Use
(Includes all probable U.S. Transmissions)
Hours Frequency Bands
of Use 1 2 5 6 7 8 Totalas
Accumulative
8 3 23
1 1 7
1 0 9
1 1 8
6
8
10
13
6
6
0* 23
1 1 1 30
2 1 0 39
3 1 1 0 47
4 1 2 0
5 1 0 2 0 61
6 1 4 1 71
7 1 4 1 84
8 2 1 1 90
9 1 3 0 96
10 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 5 101
11 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 4 105
12 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 108
13 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 6 114
4 . 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 6 __
15 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 123
16 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 5 128
17 0 0 0 1 O. 0 0 0 1 129
18 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 131
Ii 0 1 2 0 0 QQ2_3____ 134
20 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 137
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 137
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 137
23 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 140
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 21 24 17 21 8 20 23 6 140
1. In the "hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted
as the next higher hour.
2. All forms of emission such as traffic, calls, dotting, idling were included
* - No U.S. transmissions
5
2
2
3 2 0 2 0
1 0
2 0 3
2 0 2
0 0 2 0 1
0 4 1 0
2 0 2 0 0
1 2 2 2 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 11 0 0
CONFIDENTIAL
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Approved FOr Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
-12-
CONFIDENTIaL
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(All Probable U.S. Traffic)
1
Freq. Bands : 6710
Monitored -- KC : to
t 6815
Seotrm Smcg--EC 105
Frecs,,.U.S. AssId: 21
Freqs. U.S. Ass:d:
with no U.S. : 4
transmissions,..____1__
TITTsTu.s. Ass:d:
with no iden-
tifiable U.S. : 7
transmissions :
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with identified : 14
U.$.transmissions :
Freqs. U.S. Assid:
with transmissions :
identified as U.S. 17
2E-RE.211.11Y-g?S.
Table lib
? 10.
2
3
4
5
6
7 _
8 .
7625
to
7715
110
24
9290
to
9410
.10
17
.
10440
to
10550
110
21
13270
to
13290
120
8
2
14570
to
14700
133
20
0
15760 16790
to to
15870 1.62g0
110_1.9
21____6
8 3
IL
23
3
3
0
5
3
1
2
2
10
3
33
19
14
20
6
18
13
3
107
21
14
21
6
20
15
3
117
Number of Frequencies Vs. Hours of Use
(Includes all probable U.S. Transmissions of Traffic)
Hours
of Use
2.._2345
Frequency Bands
6
Accumulative
8
0*
4
3 3 0 2
0
8
__Ts212.1Totals
3 23 23
1 ,
6
2
0
2
0
4
, 2
1
17
40
2
2
4
1
2
1
5.
1
1
17
57
3
0
4
2
2
0
1
1
1
11
68
1
1
2
1
2
0
12
80
5
3 '
1
0
1
1
2
0
0
8
88
6
3
2
3
4
1
0
0
0
13
101
7
0
, 2
0
4
0
1
4
0
11
112
8
0
0
2
1
1
0
1
0
5
117
2_
0
0
0
2
0
I
12
-2
10
11
0
0
2
1
2
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
3
0
0
5?
130
135
12
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
136
13
0
0
0
1
01
0
0
2
138
14139
0
0
0
1
0
0
15
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
140
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0000_
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
21
24
17
21
8
20
23
6
140
1. In the "hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted
as the next higher hour.
2. "Calling" was counted as sending traffic.
* - No U. S. traffic
CONFIDENZIfi
Aoproved For Release 2007/01/20 : CIA-RDP861300269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(All Probable U.S. Idling, Dots, Call Signs, or Test)
Freq. Bands t
Monitored -- KC :
-I--
S ctrum_fta22--KO :
rF___
Fre211.-EsaL.A22111-----
reqs. U.S. Assid:
with no U.S. :
transmissions
6_1 2 3
710 7625 9290
to to to
6111_22/1_9A10
10_11.9 1,20
21 24 17
7 3 2
# Freqs. U.S. Assid:
with no iden-
tifiable U.S. 1 11 5 2
transmissions
Freqs. U.S. Assid:
with identified : 10 19 15
U.S. transmissions :
# Frogs. U.S. Assid:
with transmissions :
. identified as U.S. : 14 21 15
or probably U.SL :
Table Tic
4
7
8
10440 13170
to to
105f1_1220
14570 15760 16790
to to to
1470Q 1222_1_
62%2_
111, 120
130 112_ 1211._2E
21
5
8
2
....2C2_2
0 9 4 32
1
2
al?.?????14110.11.m?M?101.81?????????????.0.1.111.....?????????.,.........11.......
4 11 4 40
20
6
16 12
2 100
16
6
20 14
????=1???.???????????mo/M?IIIM?
3 108
Hours
Number of Frequencies Vs. Hours of Use
(Includes all probable U.S. Transmissions of Idling,
Call Signs and Testing)
Frequency Bands
Dotting,
.
Accumulative
of Use
1 2
7 8
Tot,11
Totals
o*
7
3
2
5
2
0
9
4
32
32
1
8
8
3
3
1
15
8
2
48
80
2
0
7
4
3
5
5
3
0
27
107
3
2
4
5
4
o
0
2
0
17
124
0
1
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
129
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
129
7
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
3
132
8
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
? 134
9
0_O
0
2
Q
0
lo
000l0000l
137
o
o
o
1
0.
o
o
o
1
138
1.2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
138
13
1
0
0
0
0
0
0 .
0
1
139
15
o
00
o
o
0
o
o
16
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LB
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
to
o
o
o
0
0
o
0
o
0
ti0
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
t2
o
o
o
o
0
o
0
o
130
o
o
o
o
o
0
o
o
'A.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
otal
21
24
17
21
8
20
23
6
140
. In the
as the
- No. U.
"hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour
next higher hour.
S. idling, etc.
CONFILENTI I
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was counted
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
1
- 14
gONEIDENTIAL
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OP RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(All Probable U.S. Steady Carrier)
1
Freq. Bands 6710
Monitored -- KC : to
luatma_Emaa=0 : 1
LEE9412,..g,s Asstd.: 21_
# Freqs. U.S. Assid:
with no U.S. : 8
a sm32ssions
Frogs. U.S. AssId:
with no iden-
tifiable U.S. 12
transmissions
# Frogs. U.S. Asstd:
Table lid
????????????10.????=...?01?Mers...?????L.M...????????.Leo....o.
7625 9290 10440 13170 14570 15760 16790
to to to to to to to
13291.1.4719_1217Q 16980
112____129_3225
__ 21 8 20 23 6 149.
5 4 6 2
0 9 3 37
16 8 11 4 10 19 5 85
with identified : 9 8 9 10 4
U S transTissions
Freqs. U.S. AssId:
with transmissions :
identified as U.S. : 13 19 13 15 6 20 14 3 103
Number of Frequencies Vb. Hours of Use
(Includes all probable U.S. Transmissions of Steady Carrier)
??????????*.???????........?????.e.
10 4 1 55
wesemn.a.m.ompoes,??????????....ms.....????????*????????...oryor.e.ro ??????......r....n.??????????? *Wm..*
Hours
of Use
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
lo
11
12
13
15
16
'T 17
?18
).9
20
21
22
23
24
Total
Frequency Bands
Accumulative
1
2
4 5
6
7
8
Total
Totals
8
5
5
6
2
0
9
3
38
38
8
10
3
7
2
15
5
3
53
91
0
4
3
3
0
4
4
0
18
109
1
2
3
2
0
1
4
0
13
122
3
1
0
1
0
7
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
3
132
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
134
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
135
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
3
138
0
0
1
0
0,,_oo
0
0
119
0
139
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
139
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
139
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
139
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
140
0
0
0
0'
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
o
0
0
0
0
o
o
o
o
o
o
q0.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
24
17
21
8
20
23
6
140
1. In the "hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted
as the next higher hour.
. No U. S. steady carrier
aONFIDENT
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Approved For Release 2007/01/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
C011FIDENTIAL
- 15 -
Table III presents the amount of spectrum space in kilo-
cycles (assigned to all U. S. frequencies given in Table ha)
vs. hours of use. This table shows that the sum of the bands o
emission for the 2,3 frequencies shown by Table Ha to have no
U. S. transmissions over a period of ten week days is 68.29,kc.
This is 10.4% of the sumlof the bands of emission assigned to
U. S. stations for the 140 frequencies considered. When more
than one U. S. assignment was listed for a frequency, the widest
bandwidth of emission was used. Table III also shows that over
one-half of the -entire spectrum space involved (655.88 kc ? )
was used an average of six hours or less for each 24 hour
period.
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
-3.6-
Approved For Release 2007/01/1t0NR
0269R000800100001-1
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(All Types of Probable U.S. Transmission Activity)
1
q. Rands :: 6710
nitored--IC I: to
6815
trum Space--KC .: 105
tri m Space
Assi ned 120.61
rum Space U.S. 1:
signed with no U.S. :: 25.1
issions
rum Space U.S. ::
signed with no iden. 31.1
fiable transmissions
ANOMMIMINaM....?????????????IMPle
rma Space U.S.
signed with idea-
ed U.S.
emissions
.1 89.51
2_1
ti-un Space U.S. ::
igned with trans-
sions identified as ::
or probably U.S. ::
95.51
Table III
2
3
4
5 6 7
8
7625
to
7735
9290
to
9410
10440
to
10550
113.33---14-T-70 15760
to to to
13290 14700 15870
16790
to
16980
...???????.?.??????
110
120
110
120
130
110
190 m
995
110.55
72.54
80.2
25.54
116.50
118.95
10.99
655.88
5,05
3.95
0
9.0
0
22.75
2.44
68.29
7.25
3.95
0
9.0
6.0
28.75
2.44 88.49
103.3
68.59
80.2
16.54
110.20
90.20
yill????????????
8.55 567.39
105.5
68.59
80.2
16,54
116.5
96.20
8.55
587.59
?
so
Amount of Spectrum Space in KC VS. Hours of Use
(Includes all Probable U.S. Transmissions)
Frequency Bands
1 2 3 4 5
25.1 5,05 3.95 0,0
7.31 381 2.85 10.0
20,0 1.1 0,0 4,1
10.0 10.0 0,0 1380
6,0 13.0 ONO 0.0
lo.o 0.0 6.0 080
6,0 23.1 3,0 20,0
10,0 224 3,0 3,0
380 6.0 1080 0.0
1,2. 4,2 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 1.1 4.1
10.0 0.0 0,0 2,1
080 0.0 0,4 0,0
0.0 10.0 16,0 0.0
0,0 3.0 0.0 4.25
0.0 0.6--- 0.0 147
3.0 0.0 6.0 7.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 3,0
0.0 '6.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 6.0 7.24 0.0
0.0 0.0 13,0 2.65
080 0.0 04 0.0
0.0 0.0 040 0.0
3.0 0.0 0,0 5,0
0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.o
0.0
4.24
0.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1 120.61 110.55 72.54 80.20 25.54
6
7
8
Tots.1
Accumulative
Total
0.0
22.75
2.44
68.29
68.29
0.0
10.0
1.31
32.57
100.86
19.0
6.0
0.0
50.20
151.06
9.0
10.0
6,0
58.00
209,06
16.0
0.0
1.24
36.24
245.30
21.2
1.1
0.0
38,30
283.60
6.1
0.0
0.0
58.20
341.80
1141
13.0
0.0
66.34
408.14
10.0
10.0
0.0
39.00
447.14
10.0
0.0
0.0
25.40
472.54
0.0
6,0
0,0
17.20
489.74
1.1
10.0
040
23.20
512,94
10.0
10.0
0.0
20.40
533.34
0.0
9.0
0.0
35400
568.34
3,0
11.1
0.0
22.35
589,69
0,0
OA-
0.0
1592.5.
0.0
0.0
0.0
16.10
608.69
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.00
611,69
0.0
0.0
0,0
7,10
618.79
0.0
0.0
0.0
13.24
632.03
0.0
0.0
0.0
15.85
647.88
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
647.88
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
647.88
0.0
0.0
0.0
8.00
655488
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
655.88
116.50
118.95
10.99
655.88
In the "hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted as the next higher hour.
All forms of emission such as traffic, calls, dotting, idling were included.
U. S. Transmissions
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86600269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
- 17 t
Table IVa shows the number of frequencies vs. average hours
of use for identified U. S. transmissions totaled for all types
of transmissidul activity. Tables IVb, IVc, and Did show the same
information separately by type of transmission activity, respec-
tively--traffic, idling--dotting-call signs?testing, and steady
carrier. Tabl IVa shows that, over a period of ten creek days,
of the 140 U. S. frequencies assigned that Were monitored 33 or
23.6% had no identifiable transmissions of traffic, Twenty-
eight or 20% had no identifiable transmissions of any type of
activity. Seven others included in the 22 frequencies shown in
Table IVa as being used an ,average of one hour or less per day, .
were included therein on the basis of being heard only once dur-
ing the ten day period. Thus, 35 or 25% of the U. S. assignments
observed,were used but one hour or less in the entire ten day
period. Table IVa also shows that ovet one-half of the fre-
quencies were used less than three hours a day.
NFIDENTIAL
APProved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Appr
ed For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
-18-
CONFIDENTIAL
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(All Types of Identified U. S. Transmission Activity)
-1-.6g15-77:
105 110
21 24
Freq. Bands 1 6710 7625
Monitored -- KC : to to
Su.ctrum Space--KC :
3-Freqs. U.S. Assid:
with no U.S.
transmissions
W-Freqs. U.S. Assid:
with no iden-
tifiable U.S.
traumiggions
rFreqs. U.S. Assfd:
with identified :
MAt_iummissions :
# Frogs. U.S. AssId:
with transmissions :
identified as U.S. :
or probably U.S. :
U,L_Assid:
5 3
6 5
15
19
16 21
Hours.
of Use
Number
(Includes
Table IVa
9290
to
94:0
10440
to
1=
13170
to
14570
to
1:00
15760
to
1,5870
16790
to
169.80
120
17
_23:Q
8
20
110
23___6
_1922:225
142
3 22
2
0
2
0
7
2
0
2
1
9
3
28
15
21
6
19
14
3
112
15
21
6
20
16
3
118
of Frequencies Vs. Hours of Use
identified U.S. Transmissions Only)
Frequency Bands
1 2 3 5 6 7 8
o* 6 5 2 0 2
1 3 4 1 2 1
2 2 0 1 2 0
3 2 1 0 2 1
5 0 0 1 2 1
6 2 4 1 1 1
7 0 2 2 0 0
8 2 2 0 1 0
o 1 1
10 0 1
11 o 0
12 1
13
15 0
16 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 1
18 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0
21 0 0
22 0 0
23 1 0
24 0 0
0
1
0 3
0 0
0 1
0 0
Accumulative
Total Totals
1 9 3 28 28
7 3 1 22 50
4 1 1 11 61
2 4 1 13 74
2 0 0 1084
0 1 0 g9
0 0 0 9 98
2 0 0 6 104
1 1 0 7 111
0 2 0 6 112._
0 1 0 0 0 2 119
0 0 0 1 0 2 121
2 0 1 1 0 8 129
1 0 0 0 0 1 130
1 0 0 0 2 13q
1 0 0 0 0 1 133
2 0 0 0 0 2 135
0 0 0 0 1 136
0 0 0 0 1 137
0 0 0 0 0 137
0 0 0 0 0 137
0 0 0 0 0 1 138
0 0 0 0 0 0 138
1 0 0 0 0 2 140
0 0 0 0 0 0
1
Total 21 24 17 21
8 20 23 6 140
1. In the "hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted
as the next higher hour.
2. All forms of emission such as trafficscalls,dotting, idling were included.
* - No identifiable U.S. transmissions
CONIIDENZIAL
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
1
19 ?
CONFIDENTIAL Table IVb
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(Identified Traffic Only)
1
: 6710
: to
6815
?optrum Space?KC 105
# Precis. U.S. Asstd: 21
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with no U.S. traffitoL
Freq. Bands
Monitored --KC
? Frogs. U.S. Asstd:
with no identi- 7
fiable U.S. traffic:
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with traffic iden, : 14
tified as U.S:
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with traffic iden-
tified as U.S. or : 17
Probably U.S.
2
3
9290
to
4 5 6
10440 13170 14570
to to to
1055.2_112_2014700
7
15760
to
15870
8
16790
to
169.11.____
7625
to
7721_2A10
110 120
110
120__130
8 20
110
23
190
6 140
24._
17
21
0
2
0
7
22
5
3
1
2
2
10
3
33
19
14
20
6
18
13
3
107
21
14
21
6
20
16
3
118
Number of Frequencies Vs. Hours of Use
(Includes only identified U.S. Transmission of Traffic)
Hours Frequency Bands Accumulative
of
Use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total Totals
0* 7 5 3 1 2 2 10 3 33 33
1 5 7 1 3 1 9 2 1 29 62
2 1 2 4 3 2 5 4 1 22 84
3 2 3 1 2 o 2 1 1 12 96
..4. _l____ 0 1 1 2 0 2 DI_ _ T _I'M__
5 4 3 2 1 o 1 1 o 12 115
6 1 2 1 ?2 0 0 0 o 6 121
7 0 2 2 3 0 o o 0 7 128
8 o 0 o 1 1 0 1 o 3 131
___ o p 1 .0 p 2 Q ______
10 o 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 138
la o o o o 0 1 o o 1 139
12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 140
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 .,1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q
14
15 o o o o o o o o o
16 o o o o o o o o o
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 o o o 0 o o o o
19 0 o o o o o o 0
20 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 o o o 0 o o o o o
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 21 24 17 21 8 20 23 6 140
1. In the "hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted
as the next higher hour.
2. "Calling" was counted as sending traffic.
* - No identifiable U.S. traffic
CONFIDENTIAL
0
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
- 20 -
CONFIDENTIAL
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING
(Identified Idling, Dots, Call Signs
PROGRAM
or Test)
7
Freq. Bands : 6710 7625 9290 10440 13170 14570 15760
Monitored -- KO : to to to to to to to
: 683,5 7735 9410 10550 _13290 14720 ;5870
11 120 110 120 1:L0_1.1.1_
: 2 2 17 21 8 20 2
2 5 2 0
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd
with no U.S.
Freqs. U.S. Asstd
with no identifiable: 11 5 2
U.S.1dlin etc
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with idling, etc., : 10 19 15
identified as U.S.
Table IV?
8 _______
16790
to
16980
12Q._5.
1 2
8 lk
4 11
4 40
20 6 16
12
2 100
Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with idling, etc., :
identified as U.S. :
or probably U.S. :
14 21 15 16 6 20
Number of Frequencies Vs. Hours of Use
(Includes only identified U.S. Transmissions of Idling,
Call Signs and Testing)
15 2 109
Dotting,
Hours
Frequency Bands
Accumulative
of Use
1
4
1
6
7
8
Tot al
Totals
0*
11
5
2
1
2
4
11
4
40
40
1
4
9
4
5
2
15
6
2
47
87
2
2
5
4
3
4
1
3
0
22
109
3
1
3
3
4
0
0
2
0
13
122
_A.__
'2
2
29
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
129
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
130
7
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
131
8
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
3
134
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
136
13U--
_9
10
0
11
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
138
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
138
13
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
139
0
0
1
0
140?
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
000_J2____0______
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0 0
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
o
o
o
0
o
o
o
o
o
24
.0
0
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Total
21
24
17
21
8
20
23
6
140
1. In the "hours of use" column time in excess of a
as the next higher hour.
* . No identifiable U.S. idling, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL
whole hour was counted
Approved For Release 2007/01/20 CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approwl Fdr Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
-21-
CONFIDENTIAL
FREQUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(Identified Steady Carrier)
:
:
Freq. Bands
Monitored -- KG
Table IVd
1
2
3?
4
5
6
7
8
6710
7625
9290
10440
13170
14570
15760
16790
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
: 6815 _22,21242.1.222_14701_12870
amtram_ana22--KC :
Lamo. U.S,, Asstd:
# Frogs. U.S. Asstd:
with no U.S. steady:
22ZEitE__
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with no identifiable:
teady- carrier:
Frogs. U.S. Asstd:
with steady carrier:
identified as U S
# Freqs. U.S. Asstd:
with steady carrier:
identified as U.S. :
or probably U.S. :
16980
105
110
120 110 12Q_ 130 110
190 LT,122
21
2412_
21
8
20
2
6 14g
8
5
4
6
2
0
8
3
36
12
16
8
11
4
10
19
5
85
9
8
9
10
4
10
4
1
55
13
19
13
15
6
20
15
3
104
??????????????=41401.0?1?11.0.1?40
Number of Frequencies Vs. Hours of Use
(Includes only identified U.S. transmissions of Steady Carrier)
Hours
Frequency Bands
Accumulative
of Use
1
2
3.
4
?
6
7
8
Total
Totals__
0*
12
16
8
11
4
10
19
5
85
85
1
5
5
6
7
2
8
2
1
36
121
2
1
2
2
0
1
2
2
0
10
131
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
,
133
4
1
1
o
1
0
0
0
0
0A.
0
1
137----
138
5
o
0
o
6
ooloo
Oool
139
7
o0
0000000
139
8
000
1
0
Oool
140
9
0
0
0
0
0
Q
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
19
0
? 0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
21
24
17
21
8
20
23
6
140
1. In the "hours of WO" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted
as the next higher hour.
* - No identifiable U.S. steady carrier
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CON.:IDENTIAL
-22-
Table V presents the amount qf spectrum space in 'Cc.
(assigned to frequencies given.by Table IVa) vs. hours of
use. This table shows that-the sum of the bands of emission
for the 28 frequencies sham by Table IVa to have no identifia-
ble U. S. transmissions over a period of ten week days is
88.49 kc, This is 13.6% of the sum of the bands Of'eMion
assigned to U. S. stations-for,the 140 frequencies eiiiiiiaddted..
When more than one. U, S. assignment was listed for a frequericy,
the widest bandwidth of emission was used. Table V also shows':
that over one-half of the entire spectrum space involved
(655.88 kc.) was usednnaverage .of three hours or less for
each 24 hour period.
CONFIDENTIAI
?
Approved For Release 2007/01/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
bUrir lUtri I lilt
Approved For Release 2007/01/AkfilkerP11414.):, .9R000800100001-1
Table v
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
(All Types of Identified U.S. Transmission Activity)
2
3
4
5
6
7
eq. Banda
nitored--KC
:
6710
to
6;5
105
7625
to
73.
110
9290
to
120
10440
to
0
110
13170
to
!AI
120
14570
to
St
130
15760
to
..; 0
16790
to
16980
ctrum Space-KC
:
11.0
190
995
eotrum Space
S. Assi ned
otrum Space U.S.
signed with no U.S.
namissions
:
:
:
:
120.61
25.1
110.55
5.05
72.54
3.95
80.2
0
25.54
9.0
116.50
118.95
10.99
655.88
0
22.75
2.44
68.29
trum Spaoe U.S.
signed with no iden-
able transmissions
:
:
31.1
7.25
3.95
0
9.0
6.0
28.75
2.44
88.49
trum Space U.S.
igned with iden-
ied U.S.
missions
!
89.51
103.3
68.59
80.2
16.54
110.20
90.20
8.55
567.39
rum Space U.S.
igned with trans-
sions identified as
or probably U.S.
:
95.51
105.5
68.59
80.2
16.54
116.5
96.20
8.55
587.59
es
Amount of Spectrum Space in KC Vs. Hours of Use
(Includes Identified U.S. Transmissions Only)
1
2
Frequency Bands
3 4 5
6
7
8
Total
Acoutsulat iv*
Total
31.1
7.25
3.95
0.0
9.0
6.0
28.75
2.44
88.49
88.49
21.31
32.00
2.85
13.00
1.24
35.10
26.00
1.31
132.81
221.30
20.0
0.0
3.0
4,1
0,0
11?3
3.0
6.0
47.40
268.70
6.1
3.0
0.0
12.1
0.1
20.0
22.2
1.24
64.74
333.44
6.0
1
9 0
0 0
020
11.1
0.0
0,0
53k20
386.64
0.0
0.0
10.0
13.0
3.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
29.00
41-3764
16.0
17.1
1.1
10.0
1.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
45.30
460.94
0.0
6.1
10.4
0.0
0.0
20.0
0,0
0.0
36.50
497.44
11,1
9.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
10.0
10.0
0.0
43.10
540.54
31.9____3.0
0.0
1.1
10,0
0,0
20.0
0.0
37 10
577.64
0.0
6,0
0.0
v0.0
1.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.10
584.74
0.0
0.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
13.00
597.74
3.0
0.0
18.0
2.95
0.0
3.0
3.0
0.0
29.95
627.69
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.00
629.69
Qsa__-.12.0
24
3 0
0.0
0 0
0 0
0.0
4.24
633.93
0.0 0.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.00
636.93
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.10
641.03
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.00
644.03
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.85
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.85
646.88
0 0
jm24.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
646.88
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
646.88
0.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.00
649.88
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
649.88
3.0
0.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.00
655.88
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
655.88
120.61
110.55
72.54
80.20
25,54
116.50
118.95
10.99
655.88
the "hours of use" column time in excess of a whole hour was counted as the next higher hour.
forms of emission such as traffic, Galls, dotting, idling were included,
antifiable U.S. transmissions
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Table VI summarizes the results of the Monitoring Program.
It shows the bandwidth encompassed by the program; the number of
discrete frequencies assigned to U, S. agencies; the spectrum space
included (sum of the individual bands of emission); possible hours
of use for the assigned frequencies, (based on the actual circuit
for which the frequencies are assigned); the hours used as determined :
from thdmonitoring program; a utility factor (in %) obtained by
dividing hours of use by possible hours of use and an average
utility factor arrived at by dividing the total hours used by the
total frequency hours per day, This table show that out of a
total of 3360 frequencies hours per day, 1858 frequency hours per
day were consideredjase t further shows that 620 frequency
hours per day or 34% wore used by U. S. stations identified during
the course of the monitoring program; and 995 frequency hours.per.
day, or 54%) were uRO.by:stationsHideritified:as:U., S. or considered
as-probably U. S. stations.
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Table VI
FREOUENCY UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF MONITORING PROGRAM
All lyses of Identified U. S. Transmission Activity)
Phase 1 .22_,_1______2L___, 6 7 8 Total_
Band KC : 6710 '7625 9290 ,10440 13170 114570 !15760 '16/90
: to 1 to to to 1 to to to .1 to
: 6815._aD5 9410 jp55o1.122 700 0 6280
Band Width KC 1 lOr 110 120 ' 412_jd 1 0 1 0 190 __22L.
No. -Q.S. aspiFn.: gl f---24 17 I, 21 1 8 20 6 140
Spectrum Space : 1
included :120.61 110.55172.5/ 80.2 2'
AVERAGE UTILITY FACTOR
(Avers e Hours of Us_91.12.2.9Lible_. Hours of,Use)
Identified U. S Transmissions
Possible Hours :
1 '
I
Use day : 299
345
253
22 267
76
1658
_ppr
Hours used .
_122222,.9
2,91..Atay : 83.1
87.6
112.8 19
6 .2
4 8
620.
Utility Factor :
..12J,ILL.0,2_2
(5) : 28
25 44 64
14__:___22_2_24_i_6..,3
-
Average Utility factor (Identified U. S. Transmissions)
Identified as U. S. or probably U. S. Transmissions
Hours used
1292_,..cip_21V.56.62.1.2.6.6..4 233.81 68.6 i110.3 128,
. Utility Factor :
: _11! 45 ! 66 77 76 50 48
Average Utility.factor (Identified U.S. or probably *U.S. transmissions) 54
Total Frequency Hours per day = 24 x 140 3360 hours.
Ratio of possible hours to total elapsed hours = 56%.
33
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F. Discussion
(a) Value of_tha_aillay
This extent of our sampling of various selected parts of the spec-
trum within the high frequency rahge cannot be considered as positive
proof that utilization throughout the entire scale of long-range fre-
quencies is relatively poor; nevertheless, on the basis of what the
observed frequencies indicate, the Board is of the opinion that this
possibility certainly exists. In fact, it is possible that some areas
of this part of the spectrum may show even less national use.
The study is regarded as of value because:
i. It is an indication that in the parts of the spectrum
studied, at least, the situation is not critical; on
the contrary, the percentage of use is comparatively low.
ii. It is an indication that more extensive and continuing
studies of the spectrum are necessary if- national radio
frequency management is to be accomplished in a manner
designed to serve the best interests of the United States.
iii. It is an indication that a review of the transmissions
of other countries will probably show varying degrees
of non-use and the study should be further analyzed in
this connection, as this information will be of extreme
value at forthcoming radio conferences.
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(b) Assumptigo_guLatummiatipns made for Purposes
of Analyaizt
In the process of collecting the observations by the listening
radio stations, no assumptions were made and none appeared necessary.
The coverage was considered to be ample both from a standpoint of
number and location of the listening points. In fact, review of the
log sheets indicated that the number of transmissions recorded was
not appreciably increased when a number of stations in the same
general location were given identical segments of the spectrum to
cover. The stations were instructed to record whatever was heard
and they did so.
In the course of the analysis, however, certain assumptions and
interpretations became necessary for evaluation of the 175,000 entries
contained in the log sheets. These are:
i. Frequency assignments were removed from consideration
whenever there existed a reasonable doubt that the
monitoring stations could hear them. Foreign assign-
ments and U. S. assignments other than Fixed were not
considered in the final total of 140 United States Fixed
assignments.
ii. When a transmitter was heard on the assigned frequency
but not positively identified by call-sign, station-fix,
or other available methods, it was assumed to be the
U. S. transmitter. to which the frequency was assigned,
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and was given credit accordingly.
iii. When an assigned frequency was shared and used by two
or more different stations or organizations, credit
was given for the total time of transmission to all
the stations concerned.
iv. Credit for transmission time on an observed frequency
when heard by one or more monitoring stations was given
as follows:
1. Once in any hour counted as a full hour.
2. Once in ten days counted as ten hours for the
10-day phase.
3. Final averages exceeding a whole hour, were
rounded off to the next higher number of hours.
v. Analysis excluded any transmission occurring on Satur-
days and Sundays. It was considered that such records
would not be representative ef normal transmission
and frequency usage.
The cumulative effect of these assumptions and interpretations
led to the conservative analysis presented in Tables II to VI. The
restrictions imposed upon the analysis probably more than offset,
in favor of the user, a possible human error of 10% in monitoring
,or analysis. The human error, of course, could have been plus or
minus. From this point of view, it is quite possible that a new
analysis, bolstered by the usage records of the stations to which
the frequencies are
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assigned, would show even less frequency utilization than is in-
dicated by those tabular results.
The Board believes that the period during which the study was
made was fair to all concerned. During this period the commercial
agencies showed a profitable rate of return on their investments,
which indicated that traffic loads were not subnormal and the
Government facilities were particularly active because of the Korean
War and related defense preparations.
(c) Reasons for Non-use or Limited Use of High or_Ialg:Egno
R221.9.212.02.191es
The reasons that may apply to non-use or limited use of radio
frequencies by radio stations are numerouslinterrelated, and com-
plicated. Discussion of this subject often results in confusion
and impasse, unless those concerned have a sincere desire to reach
a conclusion. Some of the more common general explanations of why
a frequency is not used to the full by the assignee are:
1. Because of interference, transmissions may be shifted to
another frequency. There has always been a need for oper-
ating organizations to be prepared to meet an interruption
to communication occasioned by the sudden development of
interference on an active frequency assignment. Such
events have always occurred from time to time because of
error, apparatus, technical defect, laxity in operating
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practice, dispute involving priority in registration
date or date of use, desire to develop shared use by
time difference and geographical separation, and wilful
intent. The clearing up of such interferences varies
from a few hours to very long periods, particularly if
negotiations must be carried on through diplomatic
channels. This condition has led to the need for opera-
ting agencies maintaining frequency assignments in re-
serve. The tendency has been to keep such assignments
partially active to prevent them from being activated
by some other stations. It should be mentioned that the
need for such protection has greatly increased during
and since World Vier II, which factor now aggravates the
frequency utilization problem.
2. The frequency may be one reserved for emergency, for
special intermittent uses, for national/defense efforts
requiring secrecy of preparation, for troiningpurposes,
for use at traffic peaks only, for research and experi-
mentation, or for readiness to serve.
3. Low or high sunspot activity over the 11-year cycle may
limit usability of the frequency on a particular path.
If
4. Temporary reduction of traffic may cause a lapse in
operation.
5. Failure of equipment may close down operation.
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6. On shared frequencies, harmful interference may occur
during some overlapping periods of time. The effects of
interference during such overlapping times may vary from
day to day and from season to season due to variable wave
propagation conditions.
7. Rearrangements of frequencies to assigned circuits to
maintain flexibility of operations may occasion lapses
of transmission On a particular frequency.
E. The national interest may require the maintenance of
a circuit even with low traffic volume.
These reasons are all valid within themselves, and the application
of some of them has undoubtedly contributed to the growth of the
national telecommunications networks to their present high state of
efficiency and service. They present real difficulty, however, if
they are invoked too hastily or too often.
The Board, however, had no desire to investigate frequency usage
by individual organizations, nor did it feel that it should attempt
such action during the limited period of its life. Accordingly, it
decided to view the matter from the standpoint of total frequency
utilization and to make the most representative evaluation, as directed
by the President, in terms of the National Interest.
(d) Relationship of Results to other Services.
The competition for spectrum space between the various primary
services, Fixed, Broadcast, Maritime, Aeronautical and Amateur, has
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greatly increased during the past ten years. This is a healthy con-
dition, viewed from afar, as it tends toward self-regulation and makes
it more difficult for any one service to amass vast areas of spectrum
space to the detriment of the remaining four.
This study is a partial evaluation of frequency usage in only
one service, the Fixed point to point. To apply only the technique
of monitoring in order to determine frequency usages in the other
services could have been highly misleading. For example, the Broad-
cast service, given a frequency, normally transmits n program during
the hours considered to be useful in the listening audience area.
Maritime, Aeronautical, and Amateur services share identical fre-
quencies with hundreds of other users, national as well as internationa
within each service. Hence the Broadcast service would probably show,
from monitoring records only, practically 100% usage of frequencies
and the remaining three services would show highly intermittent usagu.
Obviously, considerations in addition to monitoring, such as degrees
of safety, necessity, and result are necessary to evaluate frequency
usages within these other services.
Although the Board was not able in the time available to make
conclusive evaluations for these other services, in the course of
its monitoring study it did observe evidence of non-use of frequencies
allocated to services other than fixed, both U. S. and foreign,
The Board desires to make abundantly clear the fact that while
study indicates that the frequencies observed within the Fixed
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service were not totally used to advantage, the absence of a study
for the other services does not imply that they are collectively.
making adequate use of their frequencies. The Board feels that much
useful information would be obtained if detailed studies in the case
of these other services were prosecuted.
G. -Loclusions
Of 140 fixed service, U. S. assigned frequencies which were
observed, 23 were not used at all during the periods of observation.
Sixteen additional frequencies were used to a very minor degree.
If we had used less generous assumptions, the latter number would
have been larger. In addition, these figures are representative of
a period when the volume of communications to be handled was abnor-
mally high because of the defense effort.
These results strongly suggest that similar conditions also
exist in other parts of the high frequency bands which are allocated
to the fixed services, as well as to those used by other services,
such as maritime mobile, aeronautical, etc.
Such conditions as these, where they exist, would be harmful
to Our interests were they to become known internationally, because
they would weaken our position at international conferences.
Our findings also point to these further conclusions:
(1) The "increasing scarcity of radio frequencies" is
not yet acute. However, users of the spectrum have tried to
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secure sufficient frequencies to protect themselves from
anticipated scarcity. Thus, while new registrations and
assignments are hard to get, both Federal Government and
other users in the aggregate appear to have considerably
more than enough to meet their normal and immediate needs.
(2) These conditions probably Axist in other countries
as well, varying directly with the number of frequencies
used by each country.
(3) The alleged scarcity of frequencies available for
registration is a timely warning of the actual scarcity
which will gradually be brought about by growth in the
demand for telecommunications services and for other
usages of the radio spectrum intensified by the current
international race for frequencies to be used for high-
frequency broadcasting and defense. This trend toward
scarcity may be offset in part by application of existing
technological advances hitherto retarded by econoMic or
other factors, and by improvements yet to be developed.
(4) Careful monitoring is a vital key to factual
knowledge of spectrum utilization. The study confirms the
need for further analysis of the data accumulated and for a
permanent program of organized monitoring. One important
objective of such an effort is to evaluate the frequency
usage factors arising out of the growing amount of inter-
ference to communications.
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H. Recommendatiau
These conclusions--in particular the prospect of real scarcity
to come--lead us to recommend that the Federal Government initiate
and maintain comprehensive studies of the use being made of the
radio spectrum both by the United States and by foreign users. Such
studies are the indispensable basis for the sound and effective regu-
lation and management of use of the radio spectrum, and for the
strengthening of our position at forthcoming international telecom-
munications conferences.
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Instructions for Snecial Monitoring
General Explanatory Note
CONFIDENTIAL
This project is designed to outline, as projected by the log
sheets provided, the nature, frequency, degree of activity, and the
identity of the stations operating within the spectrum space indicated.
For ease of handling and to enable monitoring stations to produce
reliable information, the project has been broken down into 2 phases
of about 100 kc each.
Samle Tcg
Form No, 54 Daily Page No.
SPECIAL MONITORING CASE NO. RE54
(See special instructions for using this form)
Monitoring Station
Date (GMT)
Band kc to kc, (incl.)
1. : 2. 3.
TINE : FREQ. : TRANS. STATION
IGNT) :
?
: 4. : 5.
: EMISSION : REMARKS
: ACTIVITY :
Instructions for Using Form 1E14
Col. 1: Self-explanatory.
Col. 2: The frequency upon which the transmission occurs need only be
accurately measured once during each Phase and then only by
Primary Stations. Each accurate measurement is to be noted
in "Remarks." Other frequency observations may be done by
reasonable estimate. If more than one station is heard on
the same frequency, use a separate line on the log sheet with a
note in "Remarks" column if necessary.
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Col. 3: It is desirable that identity of transmitting stations be estab-
lished and set forth either by call sign or name and location,
in this column. However, if it is not possible to establish
identity within a brief period, it may be possible to establish,
from the traffic or otherwise, the location of the receiving
station or stations, which should be noted in "Remarks." It is
not expected that identity will be definitely established each
time a station is monitored, but it is hoped that the identity
of each signal monitored will be established one or more times
in the course of Phase 1 and likewise for Phase 2. Reference
to previous records in establishing station identity is de-
sirable, as long as care is taken in matching types of emission,
frequency, etc.
Col 4: The type of emission should be indicated in this column, using
the standard international symbols such as Al, F4, etc.,
followed by a coded estimate of activity as follows:
- Idling signal, dots, call sign, or test.
X - Steady carrier.
Y - Sending traffic.
Z'- Other; see remarks.
The two codes employed may be amplified and combined cznsistent
with the circumstances. Some examples follow:
1. A SSB telephone carrier - idling - would be indicated as
"A3-SSB-X."
2. A telegraph circuit - high speed - carrying traffic - would
be indicated as - "Al-Hi speed-Y."
3. k DSB telephone - carrying traffic scrambled - would be
indicated as - "A3-Y-Scrambled."
Col. 5: Remarks - Should be used whenever it is considered advisable
to amplify previous information to be found in the foregoing
columns.
The judgment of the monitoring officer must be called into play
in filling out columns 3, 4, and 5, in order that, within the limited
time available, as complete a job as possible may be turned out.
It is desired that the band(s) indicated for each monitoring station
concerned be covered once each hour. This may be done at any time
during the hour.
_ This coverage must necessarily be accomplished with due regard
for emergency operations, etc., and, if unavoidable gaps occur in the
log, the notation "Coverage not possible" should be used.
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Schedule for Special Monitoring Case No. 4124
Phase 1 (6710 to 6815 kc (inc1t)_z_105 ks)
CONFIDENTIAL
It is desired to initiate Phase 1 of this Case at the earliest
date and time possible for all monitoring stations. This Phase 1
comprehends monitoring the bands indicated in the Phase 1 schedule
.during two consecutive weeks (Monday through Friday of each week). It
is not essential, however, that all stations start this Phase at the
same time of the day nor on the same day of the week.
Single copies of log sheets, which have been provided, are to be
Airmailed* to "Chief, Field Engineering Monitoring Division, Federal
Communications Commission, Washington 25, D.C." as soon as practicable
after each 24-hour period of monitoring by Primary Stations, after each
12-hour period by Secondary Stations.
*laurel, Millis, and Scituate - Regular Mail.
Phase 1 Schedule
Monitoring Stations : Frequency Band(kc) : Daily Periods (IST)
: to be monitored : to monitor indicated band(s1
Primary : : Night Dav
Millis : 6710 to 6745, inc. : 7 pm to 7 am :)
Laurel : 6745 to 6780, inc. : n :) 7 am to 7 pm
Powder Springs : 6780 to 6815, inc. : n :)
Allegan : 6710 to 6745, inc. : vi :)
Grand Island : 6745 to 6780, inc. : n :) 7 am to 7 pm
Kingsville : 6780 to 6815, inc. : n :)
Portland, Ore. : 6710 to 6735, inc. : n :)
Livermore : 6735 to 6760, inc. ::) 7 am to 7 pm
n
Santa Ana : 6760 to 6785, inc. :
Lanikai : 6785 to 6815, inc. : ft 0
Secondary
Searsport :)
North Scituate :)
Spokane :)
Twin Falls :) 6710 to 6815, inc. : None : 7 am to 7 pm
Fort Lauderdale : )
Lexington 0
Muskogee 0
Bay St. Louis )
Anchorage :)
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Else 2(7625 12_2735 kc (inc141...- 110 kc)
It is desired to initiate Phase 2 of this Case immediately upon
completion of Phase 1 by each monitoring station concerned.
Like Phase 1, Phase 2 comprehends monitoring the bands indicated
in the Phase 2 Schedule during two consecutive weeks (Eonday through
Friday of each week). It is not essential that all stations start
this Phase at the same time of the day nor on the same day of the week.
Basically, the same general instructions apply, unless modified
by dispatch.
CONFIDENTIAL
Phape 2 Schedule
Monitoring Stations : Frequency Band(kc) : Daily Periods (LST)
: to be moDlIored : tg monitor indicated bncsi(s1
- Primary : .
Night :
:
Pa
:)
:) 7 am to 7 pm
:)
Millie
Laurel
Powder Springs
Allegan
Grand Island
Kingsville
Portland, Ore.
Livermore
Santa Ana
Lanikai
: 7625 to 7664, inc.
: 7664 to 7700, inc.
: 7700 to 7735, inc.
: 7625 to 7664, inc.
: 7664 to 7700, inc.
: 7700 to 7735, inc.
r 7625 to 7651, inc.
: 7651 to 7678, inc.
: 7678 to 7707, inc.
: 7707 to 7735, inc.
?
.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
7 pm to 7 am
it
u
11
11
11
111
0
: )
:) 7 am to 7 pm
:)
)
:) 7 am to 7 pm
:)
:)
fa22EILIZY
Searsport
:)
North Scituate
:)
Spokane
:)
Twin Falls
:)
Fort Lauderdale
:) 7625 to 7735, inc.
:
None
: 7 am to 7 pm
Lexington
:)
Muskogee
:)
Bay St. Louis
:)
Anchorage
:)
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Phase_11220 to 0 kc (4121,1 - 120 kc)
It is desired to initiate Phase 3 of this Case immediately upon com-
pletion of Phase 2 by each monitoring station concerned, using the same
basic instructions previously received.
Like Phases 1 and 2, Phase 3 comprehends monitoring the bands indi-
cated in the Phase 3 Schedule during two consecutive weeks (Monday through
Friday of each week). It is not essential that all stations start this,
Phase at the same time of the day nor on the same day of the week.
Basically, the same general instruCtions apply, unless modified by
dispatch. For convenience in analyzing the data, it is desired that a
new log sheet be started at 0000-hours, GMT, and that the same sheet not
be used for more than one day. The log sheets should be unclassified.
Phase 3 Schedule
%
Monitoring Stations : Frequency Band (kc) :
Daily Periods (LST) '
? to be monitore : To monitor indic tee bandisl
Primary ' :
Millis :'
Laurel :
Powder Springs, :
:Allegan :
.?-Grand? Island :
:Kingsville :
Portland, Ore. :
Livermore :
Santa Ana :
Lanikai :
9290 to 9325, inc.
9325 to 9365, ,inc.
9365 to 9410, inc.
9290 to 9325, inc.
9325 to 9365, inc.
9365 to 9410, inc.
9290 to 9320, inc.
9320 to 9340, inc.
9340 to 9380, inc.
9380 to 9410, inc.
:
:
:
?
:
:
:
:
:
:
Night Day
7 pm to 7 am : 7 am to 7 Fan
If II
II II
II Ti
It
. II
IT tr
It TI
I/ II
If
Secondary
Searsport :)
Nprth:Scituate :)
:Spokane ' :)
Twin Falls :)
:Fort Lauderdale :) 9290 to 9410, inc. . None : 7am to 7 pm
Lexington :)
,4uskogoe
Bay St.-, Louis :)
VAnchorage :)
CONFIDENTIAL
A nnrnwarl FrIr RAlp.ase 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP861300269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
Phaa2_4_1.g_0440 to 10550 kc
- 6 -
It is desired to initiate Phase 4 of this Case immediately upon com-
pletion of Phase 3 by each monitoring station concerned, using the same
basic instructions previously received.
Like Phases 1, 2, and 3, Phase 4 comprehends monitoring the bands
indicated in the Phase 4 Schedule during two consecutive weeks (Monday
through Friday of each week). It is not essential that all stations start
this Phase at the same time of the day nor on the same day of the week.
Basically, the same general instructions apply, unless modified by
dispatch. For convenience in analyzing the data, it is desired that a
new log sheet be started at 0000 hours, GMT, and that the same sheet lat.
be used for more than one day. The log sheets should be unclassified.
Phase 4 Schedule
Monitoring Stations : Frequency Band (KC) . Daily Periods (LST)
: to be monitored : to monitor indicated band(s)
Primary : Night : Ea
Millis :10440 to 10470, inc. : 7 pm to 7 am : 7 am to 7 pm
Laurel :10470 to 10505, inc. : it : II
Powder Springs :10505 to 10550, inc. : tr : il
Allegan :10440 to 10470, inc. :
Grand Island :10470 to 10505, inc. :
Kingsville :10505 to 10550, inc. :
.Portland, Ore. :10440 to 10460, inc.:
Livermore :10460 to 10490, inc.? :
-Santa Ana :10490 to 10520, inc, -:
Lanikai :10520 to 10550, inc. .
If
if
if
it
it
It
it
It
Ii
tt
tt
Secondary
Searsport
North Scituate
Spokane :)
Twin Falls
Fort Lauderdale :)10440 to 10550, inc.: None : 7 are to 7 pm
Lexington . :)
'Muskogee :)
Bay.St.-Louis
.Anchorage
C ONFI.DENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
. 7 - CONFIDENTIAL
Phase 5 (13170 to 13290 kc (incl.) - 120 kc)
It is desired to initiate Phase 5 of this Case immediately upon com-
pletion of Phase 4 by each monitoring station concerned, using the same
basic instructions previously received,
Like the previous Phases 1 to 4, ?has? 5 comprehends monitoring the
bands indicated in the Phase 5 Schedule during two consecutive weeks (Monday
through Friday of each week). It is not essential that all stations start
this Phase at the same time of day nor on the same day of the week.
For convenience in analyzing the data, it is desired that a new log
sheet be started at 0000 hours, GMT, and that the same sheet not be used
for more than one day. The log sheets should be unclassified.
It is desired that each station report the number of log *leets remai4-
ing at the end of Phase 4 so an additional supply may be furnished if needed.
Phaa_l_pchedule
Monitoring Stations t Frequency Band (kc): Daily Periods 6LST)
to be monitored t to monitor indica ed band s
Primary
t : Night
: 1
:
Millis
:13170 to 13210, mc,: 7 pm tio 7 am
: 7 am to 7
Pm
Laurel
:13210 to 13250, inc.: it
: n
Powder Springs
:13250 to 13290, inc.: n
: n
Allegan
:13170 to 13210, inc.: ft
11
Grand Island
:13210 to 13250, inc.:
Kingsville
:13250 to 13290, inc.: ft
II
Portland, Ore.
:13170 to 13200, inc.: ft
ft
Livermore
:13200 to 13230, inc.: ft
Santa Ana
:13230 to 13260, inc.: ft
Lanikai
:13260 to 13290, inc.:
amallay
Searsport
North Scituate
Spokane
Twin Falls
Fort Lauderdale
Lexington
Muskogee
Bay St. Louis
Anchorage
13170 to 13290, inc.: None : 7 am to 7 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
- 8 -
Phase 6 (14570 to 14700 kc Ll.nc1.)j0 kc)
It is desired to initiate Phase 6 of this Case immediately upon com-
pletion of Phase 5 by each monitoring station concerned, using the same
basic instructions previously received.
Like the previous Phases 1 to 5, Phase 6 comprehends monitoring the
bands indicated in the Phase 6 Schedule during two consecutive weeks (Monday
through Friday of each week). It is not essential that all stations start
this Phase at the same time of day nor on the same day of the week.
For convenience in analyzing the data, it is desired that a new log
sheet be started at 0000 hours, GMT, and that the same sheet not be used
for more than one day. The log sheets should be unclassified.
It is desired that each station report the number of log sheets remain-
ing at the end of Phase 4 so an additional supply may be furnished if needed.
Phase 6 Schedule
Monitoring Stations
: Frequency Band (kc):
: to be monitored :
I
:14570 to 14620, inc.:
:14620 to 14660, inc.:
:14660 to 14700, inc.:
:14570 to 14620, inc.:
:14620 to 14.660, inc.:
:14660 to 14700, inc.:
:14570 to 14610, inc.:
:14610 to 14640, inc.:
:14640 to 14670, inc.;
:14670 to 14700, inc.:
Daily Periods (LST)
to monitor indicated band(sl_
Night PLY
7 pm to 7 am 7 am to 7 pm
ii
tt
it
It
tt
Ti Ii
It
it TI
Primary
Millis
Laurel
Powder Springs
Allngan
Grand Island
Kingsville
Portland, Ore.
Livermore
Santa Ana
Lanikai
Second=
Searsport
North Scituate
Spokane
Twin Falls,
Fort Lauderdale
Lexington
Muskogee
Bay St. Louis
Anchorage
1.4570
:)
to 14700, inc.:
CONFIDENTIAL
None : 7 am to 7 pm
Approved ForRelease2007/01/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100m1_1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
C ONFIDENTIAL
- 9 -
Phase 7 (12769.2_-.12_15I22_19._IJILild....7_112.19.)
It is desired to initiate Phase 7 of this Case immediately upon com-
pletion of Phase 6 by each monitoring station concerned, using the same
basic instructions previously received.
Like the previous Phases 1 to 6, Phase 7 comprehends monitoring the
bands indicated in the Phase 7 Schedule during two consecutive weeks (Monday
through Friday of each week). It is not essential that all stations start
this Phase at the same time of day nor on the same day of the week.
For convenience in analyzing the data, it is desired that a new log
sheet be started at 0000 hours, GMT, and that the same sheet not be used
for more than one day. The log sheets should be unclassified.
Phase 7 Schedule
Monitoring Stations : Frequency Band (kc) ? Daily Periods (LST)
: to be monitored
?
to monitor indicated
Primuy
:15760 to 15800, inc.
:15800 to 15840, inc.
:
:
Night
_ban)
: Iga
: 7 am to 7 pm
: 11
Millis
Laurel
7 pm to 7 am
II
Powder Springs
:15840 to 15870, inc.
:
11
ir
Allegan
:15760 to 15800, inc.
:
It
:
11
Grand Island
:15800 to 15840, ine.
:
11
H
Kingsville
:15840 to 15870, inc.
:
II
If
Portland, Ore.
:15760 to 15790, inc.
Livermore
:15790 to 15820, inc.
:
Santa Ana
:15820 to 15845, inc.
:
il
:
11
Lanikai
:15845 to 15870, inc.
:
it
:
11
Secondala
Searsport
:)
North Scituate
:)
Spokane ,
0
Twin Falls
:)
Fort Lauderdale
:)15760 to
15870, inc.:
None
: 7 am to 7 pm
Lexington
0
Muskogee
0
Bay St. Louis
:)
Anchorage
:)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
-10-
Phase 8 (16790 to 16980 kcapc1.1.z. 190 kc
It is desired to initiate Phase 8 of this Case immediately upon com-
pletion of Phase 7 by each monitoring station concerned, using the same
basic instructions previously received.
Like the previous Phases 1 to 7, Phase 8 comprehends monitoring the
bands indicated in the Phase 8 Schedule during two consecutive weeks (Monday
through Friday of each week). It is not essential that all stations start
this Phase at the same time of day nor on the same day of the week.
For convenience in analyzing the data, it is desired that a new log
sheet be started at 0000 hours, GMT, and that the same sheet not be used
for more than one day. The log shoots should be unclassified.
Phase 8 Schedule
Monitoring Stations : Frequency Band (kc): Daily Periods (LST)
: to be monitored : to monitor indicated band)
ilk= t : Night : Day
Millis :16790 to 16850, inc.: 7 pm to 7 am : 7 am to 7 pm
Laurel :16850 to 16910, inc.: n : ti
Powder Springs :16910 to 16980, inc.: ti : n
Allegan - :16790 to 16850, inc.:
Grand Island :16850 to 16910, inc.:
Kingsville :16910 to 16980, inc.:
Portland, Ore. :16790 to 16840, inc.:
Livermore :16840 to 16880, inc.:
Santa Ana :16880 to 16930, inc.:
Lanikai :16930 to 16980, inc.:
Secondary
Searsport
North Scituate
Spokane
Twin Falls
Fort Lauderdale
Lexington
Mdskogee
Bay St. Louis
Anchorage
IT
II
It
It
ft
11
16790 to 16980, inc.: None : 7 am to 7 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
(ro
-
-n
7J
(ro
(T)
CD

0
0
UNITED STATES
73
0
co
a)
co
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
BUREAU OF ENGINEERING
FIELD ENGINEERING 6 MONITORING DIVISION
TOLD OfF,CES AND STATIONS
ASSIONAL AAAAA
MAMA, IIIONITNNINS STATION
StOONSAINT NONITOIS810 STATION
.0) (ASTMS, OFSIOS ? GD .?
0 ne?e4ST?ICT OFFICE ?
WT. TMIS ?A? ofaINsTED TO
? 7.:::::,,%=""'"'" MAY 29 1950
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001D1any
Form No. 7I
SPECIAL MONITORING CASE NO. RE54
(See Special Instructions)
Monitoring Stn.
Band
Page No
Date (GMT)
KC To KC (Incl)
(2)
(3) (4)
EMISSION
FREQ. TRANS. STATION ACTIVITY
(5)
REMARKS
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800100001-1