COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 569
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R?-P86B00269R0O 800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE
WORLD
IR-6165
January 1953
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
Department of State
Approved For Release 2'007/ 9_,,_ -
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.1
IR-6165.2
IR-6165.3
IR-6165.4
IR-6165.5
IR-6165.6
IR-6165.7
IR-6165.8
IR-6165.9
IR-6165.10
IR-6165.11
IR-6165.12
IR-6165.13
IR-6165.14
IR-6165.15
IR-6165.16
IR-6165.17
IR-6165.18
IR-6165.19
IR-6165.20
IR-6165.21
IR-6165.22
IR-6165.23
IR-6165.24
IR-6165.25
IR-6165.26
IR-6165.27
IR-6165.28
IR-6165.29
IR-6165.30
BURMA
INDOCHINA
INDONESIA
MALAYA
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
THAILAND
JAPAN
ALGERIA
EGYPT
GREECE
INDIA
IRAN
IRAQ
ISRAEL
MOROCCO
PAKISTAN
SYRIA - LEBANON
TUNISIA
FRANCE
THE NETHERLANDS
ICELAND
ITALY
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
WEST GERMANY
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
GUATEMALA
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.1
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BURMA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . .
I ? Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 3
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . 1.
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . ? 5
II. Electoral Strength ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? - ? . . ? ? ? ? ? 5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 9
V. Communist Influence in Labor . ... .. 9
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . 10
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . .,. . . . . 13
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 13
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . . . ? 14
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 19
XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . .. . . 20
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . 21
SECRET -? SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific.
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
COMMUNISM IN BURMA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
1. OBJECTIVES
The Communists in Burma are at present pursuing a two-pronged,
\and not completely consistent, policy. The illegal Communist under-
ground) is continuing the insurrection which began in 1948, and seems
at present to be concentrating on maintaining and consolidating its
control over "base areas,' while training and strengthening guerrilla
units for future action. Efforts are also being made to develop
effective alliances with other insurgent groups such as the White Band
element of the People's Volunteer Organization and tha Karen National
Defense Organization.
At the same time, the above-ground, Communist-dominated Burma
Workers and Peasants Party (B`JYPP), which is recognized by the govern-
ment as a legal opposition group, seems most concerned with its own
internal organization and with programs designed to develop popular
support for the Party. The BWPP is agitating for an end to insurgency
through formation of a coalition government including opposition
elements. Communist efforts to recruit support within the Overseas
Chinese Community are spearheaded by the China Democratic League (CDL).
Vithin the framework of these general objectives, the Communist
parties seek a number of immediate goals. Domestically, current efforts
are concentrated on:
1, combating the growth of anti-Communist sentiment among the over-
seas Chinese;
2. penetrating Buddhist organizations;
3. increasing the membership of "mass organizations," which have
thus far been relatively small in Burma; and
4. undermining the political position of the government and the
Socialist Party which is its dominant element.
Internationally, the chief immediate goal is to prevent a shift in
official Burmese foreign policy toward the West and the US in
particular.
. References in this section to insurgent activity refer principally
to action by the Burma Communist Party (BCP). Other Communist
underground groups include: (1) the Communist Party (Burma) --
CP(B) -- which is a relatively small splinter group, and (2) a band
of China-trained guerrillas under leadership of the Kachin renegade
Naw Seng, which does not appear to be in contact with the BCP.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
There is, to some extent, a conflict between the policy of
preparation for eventual overthrow'of the government and "legal"
efforts to establish a broad popular base and to create pressures
leading to a coalition government. The GUB is unlikely to be respon-
sive to demands for a coalition as long as armed insurrection continues
to threaten the political and economic stability of the nation, despite
its apparent acquiescence in a rather artificial distinction between
BCP insurgency and BWPP legal action. At the present time, overall
Communist strategy seems to favor the "legal" efforts of the UWPP.
II. TACTICS
Current tactics include attempts to establish collaborative
arrangements with other political groups and attempts to win direct
following, for the party or its fronts, from diverse elements within
the Burman and minority populations. The strength of the Communist
appeal rests in the coincidence of certain aspects of current Communist
policy with general Burmese fears and aspirations -- neutralist, anti-
colonialist, and "peace" sentiments. The basically Marxist orientation
of most present-day Burmese leaders, and the lingering sense of attach-
ment to the homeland among the Chinese community also favor Communist
efforts.
Special appeals are.directed to identifiable groups within the
population -- particularly youth and students and, most recently, the
Buddhist leaders. There are some reports that Communist propagandists,
perhaps aided by Chinese specialists, are attempting to subvert the
minority peoples along the Sino-Burma border.
The BWPP's small delegation in the Chamber of Deputies is
important primarily as a focal point for expression of what are
basically extra-parliamentary political pressures. Popular organiza-
tions controlled by the BVPP or its labor wing, the Burma Trade Union
Congress, are utilized to create the impression of popular demand for
policies favored by the Party. In addition to opposing the specific
actions or presumed intentions of the Government, political pressures.
have been used in an attempt to destroy public confidence in the
competence of the present Government. In planning its program, the
E PP seems to be responsive to direction from the Chinese Embassy,
through which it apparently receives some financial support.
At the same time, guerrilla activity is continuing among under-
ground groups. Although the BCP forces have increasingly been broken
up into small. groups by Government military pressure, marauding bands
still render large areas of the country insecure. Present insurgent
military operations seem designed primarily to secure supplies and
manpower, and to keep government forces off balance.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET .. SECURITY INFORMATION
The BCP is capable of continuing its present level of guerrilla-
type insurgency, thereby preventing the consolidation of government
control over all Burma and retarding economic recovery and development.
The BiVPP appears to have sufficient leadership, and an adequately dis-
ciplined organization, to continue its agitational and penetration
tactics, designed to maintain political pressure on the government and
retard its slowly emerging trend toward a closer relationship with the
West.
The prospects for future Communist action will be determined
largely by developments outside Burma, particularly decisions concerning
broader Asian strategy. In the event of direct invasion or a greatly
magnified program of direct aid to insurgent groups, the stability of
the GUB would be seriously threatened. The Government might, in the
absence of immediate and effective help from the West, seek accommoda-
tion with Asian Communism, and it is relatively certain that the
prestige and power of local Communist elements would be rapidly
magnified.
In the absence of external intervention, however, the Government
will probably continue to make progress in its efforts to suppress the
insurgents and may, as larger areas of the' country are secured, be
emboldened to take more restrictive measures against "legal" Communist
elements. In that event, the BNPP, which now appears to be the chief
instrument of international Communist policy in Burma, might find its
access to propaganda outlets circumscribed and its ability to manipulate
front groups curtailed before its present organizational efforts have
born fruit. In the absence of actual or imminently threatened invasion,
or of unforeseen internal economic disorders, it seems unlikely that
the parliamentary position of the BWPP will improve significantly or
that its mass base will grow materially.
The capacity of Burmese Communist groups to support Soviet
policy will, therefore, depend directly on Soviet (or Chinese) action.
The 1948 insurrection by the BCP has thus far failed in its primary
aim of overthrowing the government and, balanced against an improving
government position, its future is even less promising. Were it not
for the ever-present threat that the Burmese future will be over-
whelmed by events beyond its borders, it might be predicted that the
Communist conspiracy would continue to wither, although at an
agonizingly slow rate.
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
4 -
COMMUNISM-IN BURMA: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
An assessment of Communist strength in Burma must include both
the illegal insurgent movement and above-ground Communist elements.
Available data are insufficient to permit a definitive statement of
total numerical strength.
The Burma Communist Party (BCP) is the most important element
of the underground movement. Its membership is estimated to be
about 5,000. A small splinter group, the Communist Party (Burma) --
CP(B) -- was estimated in 1951 to have about 300 members and candi-
dates. The CP(B) split from the BCP in 1946 as a result of personal
differences within the Communist leadership. The two groups, however,
reportedly concluded an agreement for at least limited military
cooperation in August 1952.
The principal above-ground group now appears to be the Burma
Workers and Peasants Party (BVPP), which was formed in December 1950
by a group of dissident Socialists.. The party membership is unknown,
but it has become increasingly well disciplined and energetic, taking
effective leadership of Communist-dominated "front groups." The most
significant of the latter are: (1) the Burma Trade Union Congress
(BTUC) with a present estimated membership of about 2,000; (2) the All-
Burma Peasants Organization (ABPO), which claims a membership of
100,000, probably with considerable exaggeration; (3) the World Peace
Congress (Burma) with a small but vocal membership; and (4) the People's
Youth Organization (PYO), which was founded only in December 1952 but
which has considerable potential importance. Communist organizations
within the Overseas Chinese community are dominated by the China
Democratio League (CDL), the nearest equivalent of a Chinese Communist
Party. The League's membership is unknown.
Although the membership of Communist organizations therefore
seems relatively small, the number of individuals who are subject to
Communist influence and pressure is probably significantly higher,
partly because of widespread receptivity in Burma to a number of aspects
of current Communist propaganda efforts. The number who are "strongly
influenced" by Communist elements should probably include most of the
membership of the non-Communist Trade Union Congress (Burma), and the
membership of the People's Peace Front (PPF) and Mahabama parties, which
collaborate with the BXPP. The Chinese population as a whole remains
vulnerable to Communist pressure, but since 1950 vigorous efforts
by non-Communist Chinese elements have probably reduced the number who
are strongly influenced. Rural populations are exposed to Communist
propaganda and organizational effort for short periods in the course
of guerrilla operations. Although no adequate figures are
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 5 -
available, it seems likely that 5 percent of the total Burmese
population may be controlled or strongly influenced by Communist
elements.
Geographically, Communist strength is heavily concentrated in
Rangoon and the southern towns of Burma (the BWPP and CDL groups)
and in insurgent pockets in central and northern Burma (BCP). The
main sources of Burmese Communist recruits appear to have been
students and youth, intellectuals, and peasants; urban labor has thus
far been less significant. Among the resident Chinese, the leadership
is predominantly middle class in origin; laboring classes provide the
bulk of membership; and a number of businessmen appear to be passive
sympathizers.
Comparatively little is known concerning the quality and
reliability of the Communist membership or of its leaders. Although
the guerrilla groups undoubtedly include some elements whose principal
motivation is organized banditry, the leadership appears to possess
firm political resolve and to be in effective control of its following.
The surrender rate among insurgent groups has remained relatively low
despite mounting government military pressure. Most of the leadership
has belonged to Marxist, if not Communist, organizations for a period
of five to ten years.
The above-ground BWPP has recently been reorganized and "puri-
fied" in a move which has apparently strengthened its internal
homogeneity and removed elements of doubtful reliability. Although
it is probable that the total membership has declined somewhat since
mid-1951, it seems likely that the strength and dependability of the
party has increased, and that it will continue to exercise effective
leadership of above-ground pro-Communist groups.
The leadership of the China Democratic League is relatively
more experienced and many of its important leaders have been trained
in China. The membership of the League inoreased"markedly between
1946 and 1950; in the last two years, however, its total strength has
remained relatively stable and may have declined somewhat.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Since the underground Communist parties are outlawed, Communist
voting power is reflected only in the votes received by candidates of
the B41PP and the parties which support it -- chiefly the People's
Peace Front and the Mahabama. The parliamentary strength of these
groups in the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1951, related to the
representation of other parties, is as follows,
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
6 -
Party Number of seats
BiIPP 9
PPF 3
Mahabama 1
Other opposition groups 27
The Government Coalition#
including the Socialist Party 196
The moat recent test of Communist electoral strength occurred
in the Rangoon municipal. elections of February 20, 1952. The three
opposition parties listed above ran joint candidates, under the
banner of the Triple Alliance. The coalition won only one seat out
of 35, in contrast with a representation of 15 seats for comparable
parties in the Council elected in 1949. However, these figures do
not reflect BXPP strength adequately, for Triple Alliance candidates
are reported to have received almost half the total vote given to
candidates of the governing coalition (the Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League). Nevertheless, the drastic decline in Council seats
is significant because of the predominant role of Rangoon in national
life.
Although the B1RPP and its affiliated groups are currently
agitating for a coalition government including the Communists, there
is no evidence of specific planning for future. elections.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The Communist insurrection in Burma, coupled with Karen
insurgency and the depredations of non-political bandit gangs, has
effectively and seriously retarded Burmese recovery from wartime
devastation. It is a continuing, though somewhat diminishing? threat
to the integrity of the state. The insurgency is exploited by above-
ground Communist elements in their attacks on the government.
Of the various insurgent elements, the Burma Communist Party
(BCP) has been and remains the most significant. The party controls
as many as 8,000 guerrillas, which are now organized in small bands.
There have been no recent report of concentrations of more than 300
in a single group. The BCP is reported to have succeeded recently
in establishing a coalition with two other underground elements:
(1) the Communist Party (Burma), with an estimated strength of 1,000;
and (2) some elements of the White Band People's Volunteer Organization
-- total PVO strength is estimated at 3,000, but the effective
strength of collaborating groups is unknown. A potentially important
group, which is now apparently independent of the BCP, is a force of
Kachin-Burman-Chinese guerrillas, estimated at 1,500, under the
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 7 -
leadership of the renegade Naw geng. Naw Seng's two battalions have
been trained in China, and may represent the beat disciplined and most
thoroughly indoctrinated insurgent group.
All insurgent groups appear to be currently concentrating on
strengthening their control of limited, relatively inaccessible "base
areas." BCP groups have been pushed back within the past year by
government military operations; their current strength is located
chiefly in central Burma south of Mandalay, in northern Burma, and
in the western region stretching toward the Chin Hills. CP(B) groups
are located primarily in the Irrawaddy delta and westward toward the
Arakan. Naw Seng's force is reported to be in the Bhamo area in
northern Burma.
No significant military operations have been undertaken recently
by-the insurgent groups except the BCP, and these have been confined to
hit-and-run raids against government outposts, attacks on trans-
portation and communications lines, and harassment of villages which
are inadequately protected. Troops not so engaged are concerned
primarily with protecting Communist-held areas from government forces,
but in case of attack, the Communists prefer to withdraw rather than
fight as long as it is possible to remove supplies and equipment.
Little has been learned concerning the administrative apparatus
established by BCP groups in areas which they control. Although the
party claims to govern local areas -- appointing officials, directing
education, and controlling marketing -- it is doubtful whether any
permanent administrative apparatus has been established.. Above-
ground Communist groups are primarily responsible for propaganda
activity, but the BCP has undoubtedly carried on some propaganda work
in connection with local recruiting efforts.
The degree of popular support which Communist guerrillas have
received seems to be a function of the military force which they can
apply in any area. For the most part, the rural population appears
to be passive, reacting to preponderant military pressure and aiding
guerrillas only when coercion is present or threatened. The guerrilla
groups live off the country, and no central supply organization is
known to exist. Even though the several groups are relatively
independent, there is some intercommunication (including radio), and
Communist intelligence concerning government operations appears to
have been generally good.
The BCP leadership has made persistent efforts to secure
effective working arrangements with other insurgent groups. In
August 1952, an agreement was reportedly reached with representatives
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- s -
of the Communist Party (Burma) and some White Band elements of the
People's Volunteer Organization, providing for collaboration and
demarcation of respective areas of activity. Because of past personal
antagonisms among leaders of the various groups, the realization of a
working arrangement would appear to reflect desperation born of
declining strength, or perhaps a BCP effort to qualify for more
extensive Chinese assistance by providing evidence of effective leader-
ship of all guerrilla elements.
External assistance (from China) to the Communist guerrillas
has. thus far been sporadic and at a relatively low level. Some BCP
cadres are reported to have received training in Yunnan. Naw Seng's
guerrilla units have been trained in China, and may pose a more
significant long-term threat to the government by establishing a
protected base area in a remote region of northern Burma. There are
no reliable reports of significant amounts of arms being furnished to
Burmese guerrillas from China.
In its efforts to suppress the Communist insurgency, the Burma
Government has been handicapped by the necessity of simultaneously
containing Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, attempting to
subdue Karen rebels, and suppressing'Moslem dissidents in the Arakan.
Total government strength of about 60,000, including the Union
Military Police, is heavily taxed by its varied responsibilities,
and the forces available for anti-Communist efforts fluctuates from
time to time, in accordance with demands created by the actions of
other dissident groups. Key posts are manned; mobile reserves are
maintained at central locations; and from time to time offensive
actions are taken against isolated pockets of resistance.
In the absence of stepped-up external assistance, the future
capabilities of the Communist insurgents are not likely to improve.
Although the guerrilla forces have been able to maintain their
strength for some time, no significant expansion has taken place. It
is not clear whether manpower or arms shortages represent the chief
limitation. On balance, the government position has improved within
the past year; perhaps the most significant development has been the
increasing fragmentation of guerrilla forces and the restoration of
agricultural production in some areas of the Irrawaddy delta which
have been cleared on insurgents. In addition to weakening the
resource base of the Communists, this development will, in the long
run, contribute to the strength and stability of the government.
So far as is known, the above-ground BWPP has organized no
paramilitary units, and has no plans for participation in violent
action. In order to keep its present legal status, the party must at
least preserve the appearance of being no more than an opposition
political party.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 9 -
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
Present government policy draws a somewhat artificial distinction
between political pressure and insurgency which, in turn, has led to
the development of the two arms of the Communist movement in Burma.
The insurrectionary Communist parties -- BCP and CP(B) -- have been
outlawed by the Government, and exist only as underground movements.
The BWPP, however, is a legal, political party, has a small parlia-
mentary representation (9 seats out of 232) and is relatively unob-
structed in its manipulation of front groups. (Exception: the
government has occasionally denied passports to proposed delegates to
international Communist meetings.)
Because of official reluctance to prevent distribution of
literature which is not openly seditious, Communist propagandists
havesecured important outlets for dissemination of printed propa-
ganda, taking advantage of an existing market for any literature which
is interpreted as shedding light on "experiments in socialism."
Recently, however the Home Minister issued a strong warning to
publicists who spread false information, advocate armed uprising, or
undermine the security of the state.
Within the Chinese community, the CDL and other Communist fronts
have been permitted considerable political freedom of action in Burma,
owing to the Burma Government's neutralist foreignpolicy, its desire
not to antagonize Communist China, and to the fact that Peiping has not
encouraged the Burma Chinese to indulge in overt agitation against
the Burma Government. Nevertheless, Chinese Communist political
activity is limited by the Burmese constitutional provisions that only
Burmese nationals may vote and by the exclusion of a large proportion
of the Chinese from Burmese citizenship.
During 1951-52, the increasingly vitriolic anti-Western tone of
local Chinese Communist propaganda, which the Burma government deemed
injurious to Burma's neutral position, and the affiliation of pro-
Communist Chinese with Burmese extreme leftist opposition elements, led
to the government's tacit encouragement of anti-Communist elements
in the Chinese community. It is expected that the government will
continue its present policy of sharply scrutinizing, though not
severely restricting, local Chinese Communist political activities,
and of tacitly encouraging the anti-Communist Chinese.
There is. relatively little organized labor in Burma; total
union membership is probably less than 70,000. The Socialist-
controlled Trade Union Congress (Burma) -- TUC(B) -- split in
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
December 1950 when the BWPP,wah organized; the dissident union leaders
formed the Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC), which is now Communist-
controlled.
The most important affiliates of the BTUC are the All-Burma
Ministerial Services Union (ABMSU), which is small but vital because
its members staff government offices, and the Chauk Oilfields Workers
Front. Total BTUC membership was estimated in mid-1952 at less than
2,000. The percentage of Communists to non-Communists within the
BTUC unions is unknown; the leadership is Communist, however, and
.appears to be in effective control.
In addition to the BTUC, there are at least a dozen Chinese
labor unions, most of them small and concentrated in Rangoon; all
except the Carpenters Union are Communist-controlled. The Most
important are those which deal with food marketing and handling,. the
Teachers Union, and the Stevedores Union.
Apart from Communist-controlled unions, there is probably some
surviving Communist influence in most of the unions affiliated with
the Socialist-led TUC(B). Since the 1950 split, the struggle for
control between BTUC and TUC(B) leaders has been particularly strong
in the Inland Water Transport Workers Union and its five subsidiary
groups. Although the leadership now supports the'TUC'(B), Communist
influence may still be prevalent in some locals.
The Communist-controlled BTUC has been affiliated with the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) since July 1951. The status
of the TUC(B) in relation to WFTU is at present unclear. Prior to the
1950 split which led to formation of the BTUC, the parent organization
had been affiliated.: A 1951 May Day resolution expressed interest in
continued membership, but TUC(B) leaders have since stated that the
group is not presently affiliated. It is certain that the TUC(B) has
not been active in WFTU affairs.
VI. CONQUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL,
CULTURAL, A T ONS
The most active Communist front organizations are in the fields
of youth and student activities, international "friendship" societies
and the Communist "peace movement," and among the Overseas Chinese.
The following groups merit special mention:
1. Youth: There are two underground youth organizations, the
Communist Youth League and the Democratic Peopls's Youth League, which
are probably small but under effective BCP. control. The B4i'PP sponsored
no distinct youth organization until December 1952, when the People's
SECRET - SECURITY.INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Youth Organization (PYO) was founded. Although at present, in the
formative stage, the PYO may become the focal point for Communist
activity among youth and students. The only non-Communist youth
organization, the Burma Youth League, is non-political and relatively
insignificant.
2. Students: The All-Burma Students Federation (ABSF) and the
All-Rangoon Students Union are believed to be Communist-controlled.
The ABSF is probably affiliated with the International Union of
Students. The only competing organization is the Rangoon University
Students Union (RUSU) which has experienced a continual struggle for
control between Communist and non-Communist elements. The most recent
elections for union officers reflect some persisting. Communist
influence.
3. The World Peace Council: The Burma Branch of the World Peace
Council -- WFC(B) -- Is probably one of the most significant "front"
groups although its active membership is believed to be relatively
small. Branches of the parent organization have been established in a
number of towns, and the group may be the most effective instrument
for dissemination of Communist propaganda outside of Rangoon. The
Council is controlled by the BWPP; its Secretary General, Ba Nyein,
is a member of the BoIPP.Executive Committee and is considered the
party's "leading thinker."
4. Chinese Organizations: A number of organizations within the
Overseas Chinese commun are ommunist-controlled or at least pro-
Peiping. Next to the China Democratic League, the most important
Chinese group is the Chamber of Commerce. Its leadership is pre-
dominantly pro-Peiping, although control is being vigorously contested
by anti-Communist elements within the Chamber. The Hui-an Young Men's
Association, the Chinese Youth Society, and the Chinese Students Union
attempt to spread Communist influence among youth and students; the
first two are outstanding among all Chinese youth organizations. Of
the several regional Chinese societies, the Fukienese Association is
the only one which is considered to be Communist-dominated. Other
Communist-controlled Chinese organizations include: the Chinese
Women's Association, the Women's Welfare Workers Society, the Burma
Chinese Relief Association, and the Burma Chinese Cultural Union.
5. Women: The All-Burma Women's Freedom League, formed by
the BWPP in January 1951, is the most active of three legal women's
organizations in Burma. A smaller group, the All-Burma Women's Union,
is controlled by the BCP and has been underground since 1947.
6. Friendship Societies: The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society..
and the Burma-Soviet Cultural Association are small but significant
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
groups, because membership is drawn largely from educated and therefore
relatively influential classes. The former is now composed exclusively
of Burmese, and is devoted to promoting interest in China and preserving
"traditional ties of friendship." The latter was formed with tacit
approval of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, but appears to be operated
by Burmese, including some non-Communists, who are. interested in
Soviet culture.
7. Minorities= Apart from the numerous Chinese organizations,
the principal m nority groups controlled by Communists or Communist-
sympathizers are the All-Burma Indian Youth League and the All-Burma
Indian Congress. Communist penetration of the Indian minority has
been largely limited to laborers, some of whom are also represented
in Communist-dominated unions.
Organizational efforts appear to be directed at present toward
enlarging Communist-controlled units within important organizations
and securing mass support for the propaganda appeals of above-ground
Communist groups. Most politically conscious Burmese support some
policies which are currently advocated by local communists: eg.,
resolution of the problem posed by the Chinese Nationalist troops in
Burma, some aspects of the "peace" campaign, and anti-colonialism.
It has not been possible to determine the extent to which advocacy
of such programs by non-Communist Burmese represents oonsoious support
of particular Communist policies. Quite clearly, however, Communist
influence extends beyond those organizations which are controlled. or
strongly influenced by Communists.
SECRET -.SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 13 -
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Direct Communist infiltration of the Burma Government appears to
have been slight. So far as is known, no Communists are represented in
policy-making bodies or in top levels of the military and police organ-
izations. Although there are probably some Communists or Communist-
sympathizers on the staffs of the several government departments, there
is no evidence that they have had a direct impact on policies and pro-
grams of the government.
Nevertheless, it may be well to point out that, indirectly at
least, Communist "influence" is present within the government'at almost
all levels. The most important Communist asset is the strength of Com-
munist China; fear of antagonizing the powerful neighbor to the north
has been directly responsible for the government's rigid verbal adherence
to a neutral foreign policy.
Secondly, most government officials subscribe to Marxist views
in fields such as economic organization, and their background has
stimulated an interest in "socialist experiments" in other parts of the
world. Many are known to read Soviet and Chinese. literature. This
indirect influence is stronger with some individuals than others. The
present Minister of Land Nationalization, Thakin Tin, for example, holds
extreme leftist views on nationalization and collectivization, although
he is not known to be a Communist. In general, there is far more
interest in the Chinese "experiment" than in the Soviet Union, and it
is doubtful whether such interest is attributable, at the top levels of
government, to direct Communist infiltration..
VIII. COMMU IST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Just as there is some indirect Communist influence at official
levels, so interest in China and to a limited degree a curiosity about
the USSR have opened the way to. some Communist influence on the public
opinion-forming process. This is attributable as such to the predispo-
sitions-of non-Communist Burmese as to direct efforts by Communist
elements.
There is some Communist influence in educational circles, partic-
ularlythe Chinese schools and in higher Burmese educational: institutions.
Of the more than 200 Chinese schools in Burma, a majority appear to be
using Peiping-approved textbooks, although there has been some recession
.in Communist penetration since 1950. There is also continuing Communist
penetration of student groups at Rangoon University .
Penetration of Buddhist, circles has thus far been slight, although
efforts to secure Buddhist support for international Communist "causes"
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
are currently being intensified, apparently with some success. The
government has shown genuine concern over these developments, and is
endeavoring to counteract Communist influence by stimulating Buddhist
revival programs, denying passports to Buddhist priests recruited for
international Communist conferences, etc.
The Communist press is relatively small, but non-Communist
publications, on their own initiative, support some current Communist
propaganda themes (most notably, the "menace" of Chinese Nationalist
troops in eastern Burma, and evidences of "colonialism" in all parts
of the world.)
The Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has recently secured an outlet
for Chinese and Russian films, by renting the King Theater on a monthly
basis. During 1951 over 100 Chinese films were exhibited in Rangoon,
and although the contents are not known, it seems safe to assume that
many contained Communist propaganda themes.
No noteworthy infiltration of right-wing political organizations
and parties has come to light. Among left-wing, non-Communist politi-
cal groups, there has been considerable indirect influence; some ele-
ments of Communist dogma (anti-colonialism, collectivism) have wide
appeal in most political circles in.Burma, due to historical experience
and Marxist training of most national leaders. Direct Communist in-
fluence, however, appears to be declining. There is an increasing
tendency, particularly at the top levels, to distinguish between cur
rent Soviet behavior and the theoretical Marxist formulations to which
many Burmese leaders still adhere.
Collaboration with Communist elements by some Karen leaders and
Dr. Ba Maw's Mahabama party appears to be based on expediency, rather
than on ideological-compatibility.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800080001-4
The nearest approach to a
"party organ," except possi-
bly for clandestine newsheets
circulated in guerrilla areas.
Generally pro-Communist.
Sometimes prints Communist
propaganda materials.
Generally follows interna-
tional "line."
Pro-Communist
Pro-Peiping, but does not
follow Soviet "line."
Life:tieekly (Chinese) Unknown A weekly "scandal sheet."
SECRET - SECURITY INFOR4kTI0N
SECRET - SECURITY IJ?~FORYATION
_15_.
X. C0'WIAUNIST PROPAGANDA "AEDIA
For practical purposes, the Rangoon press is synonymous with
the Burmese press. Very little publishing activity is carried on out-
side the capital city, and for that reason, human-carrier techniques
are probably more important in the dissemination of Communist propa-
ganda than formal media of communication. In addition to the
periodicals listed below, there is a considerable amount of pamphlet
literature circulated within Burma, a good deal of it prepared or
controlled by Communist organizations.
A. Communist Newspapers and Periodicals
Name Circulation
Ludu 2,000
Zin Min Pao 2,000 (1950 est.) Organ of CDL
Pyi..:Thu Ne Zin Unknown Said to be financed by
TPeople'sily) Chinese Embassy. Has ap-
peared spasmodically since
1951.
B.
Pro-Communist-Publications
Guide Daily
3,000
Tainglonekyaw
3,000
Red Star
1,500
New Rangoon Evening
2,500
(1950 est.)
Post ("Chinese
New China Pao
4,000
(1950)
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 16 -
C. Printing Establishments
The following information is incomplete, but probably covers
the most important local sources of Communist publications, excluding
newspapers:
1. Kyaw Linn Booksellers and Publishers, /180, 51st Street,
Rangoon -- Kyaw Linn has translated and printed books on China and
the USSR, in addition to distributing literature reportedly sup-
plied through Soviet and Chinese Embassy channels in Delhi. Kyaw
Linn reportedly has been aided by the Rangoon Chinese Embassy with
an initial capital investment. The firm manages at least four
bookstalls on Bogyoke Street. The US Embassy has estimated that
sales at each average more than 1,000 books per week.
2. Myint Swe Publishing House, Rangoon -- This firm is
reported to have translated and published some of the works of
Mao Tse-tung. It is not a prosperous concern.
3. Central Publishing House, Bogyoke Market, Rangoon --
This firm publishes and sells Burmese translations of popular
Communist literature.
Do Imported Publications
The following periodicals have been available, at various times,
at the People's Literature House, 546 Merchant Street, Rangoon:
1. Weekly
New Times
Soviet Weekly
Cross Roads
Cominform Journal
2. Fortnightly
Peoples China
World Trade Union Movement.
World Student Movement
Soviet Land
3. Monthly
Russia Today
Soviet Literature
Soviet Union
SECRET - SEC'?JRITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Masses and Main Street
Political Affairs
Indo Soviet
Czechoslovak Life
China Monthly Review
4. Bi-Monthly
Soviet Woman
In addition, pamphlet literature seems to be distributed in fairly
large quantities.
E. Publications of Soviet-Satellite Diplomatic Establishments
Viet Minh representatives in Rangoon publish a weekly bulletin
entitled "Vietnam Information." Its total circulation is unknown.
Distribution to many parts of the world is handled in Rangoon.
The Chinese Embassy apparently subsidizes one or more papers in
Rangoon, but is not known to publish any periodicals itself.
Local radio broadcasting is a government monopoly, and no direct
Communist influence has been discernible. There is no known Communist
broadcasting activity in Burma, except 'possibly for some radio communi-
cation among guerrilla units. The military network, if it exists, is
probably used primarily for operational liaison and not for public
propaganda activity.
There is a limited audience for both Soviet and Chinese broad-
casts. Soviet broadcasting appears to be confined to daily trans-
missions in English directed to Southeast Asia, plus the Soviet
Chinese-language service which can perhaps be heard in Burma. The
audience for Chinese Communist broadcasts is probably limited to the
Chinese community. Approximately 30 hours per week on international
beams can be picked up in Burma. Although no figures are available,
the number of radio receivers is sufficiently low so that radio is a
much less significant medium for external propaganda than publications
and personal contact.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
XI. FINANCIAL C?NDITION
No quantitative data on Communist finances are available. It
is doubtful whether the dues-paying membership of Communist organiza-
tions, particularly in the labor unions, is very large, and direct
receipts of this kind can be only a minor element in total party
finances. The underground guerrilla groups appear to be heavily de-
pendent on local requisitioning and foraging in the areas of current
military operations.
Above-ground Communist groups are known to receive contributions
from businessmen and other groups which are vulnerable to persuasion or
pressure. The China Democratic League, in particular, probably derives
part of its financial support from merchants engaged in trade with
China. It is not known, however, whether any of these firms exist
primarily for purposes of financing Communist activity.
Leaders of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party apparently re-
ceive some financial assistance through the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon.
The money spent on local rallies (where, frequently, no collections
are taken) suggests outside financial help. In addition, supplies of
Chinese Communist publications are a direct contribution to local
Communist propaganda activity. It is not known whether the Soviet
Embassy has contributed directly to local party finances.
In general, the financial condition of the Burmese Communists
appears to be poor, with the exception of activities connected with
the increasingly virulent propaganda campaign. The guerrilla groups
have been able to sustain their present level of activity, but do not
appear to have financial resources adequate to attract wider support
or to procure additional arms.
Chinese Communist elements, by virtue of their ability to exact
donations from local businessmen, are in much better financial condi-
tion than the Burmese groups.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 19 -
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
A. Communist China
The first Chinese Communist Ambassador to Burma presented his
credentials in September 1950. By August 1952, the Embassy staff was
reported to. include 15 principal officers and 26 other members. Many
of these individuals are described as "active outside," implying that
considerable efforts are made to keep in contact with local Chinese
organizations of various types. Supplies of printed propaganda are
apparently funneled through the Embassy for distribution throughout
the Chinese community, utilizing schools, commercial, labor, and cul-
tural organizations as outlets and as centers for displays. It is
probable that propaganda activity, in the broadest sense, is an impor-
tant responsibility of most members of the Embassy staff.
The Sino-Burmese Friendship Society also functions with support
from the Chinese Embassy. Its membership (total unknown but apparently
relatively small) includes non-Communists interested in cultural re-
lations with China as well as pro-Communist elements.
The Soviet Embassy was established in Rangoon in April 1951, with
an original staff of eight. In late 1951, the total staff was reported
to number 31, including housekeeping and administrative personnel. The
Embassy has a Press Attache, and it seems probable that other staff
members are engaged in essentially propaganda and contact work, since
the size of the Embassy is greater than regular Embassy activities would
justify.
The Burma-Soviet Cultural Association, headed by a respected
member of the Rangoon University faculty, was founded early in 1952.
The Soviet Embassy appears to have left the initiative primarily to
Burmese intellectuals interested in the USSR, with quiet encouragement
for the society's activities. The first open meeting was attended by
about 200 persons, but active membership is not known.
Co European Satellites
A Czechoslovak Consulate General was opened July 10, 1952, but
no information on its staff is available. A Hungarian trade delegation
is reported to be in Rangoon, but its size also is unknown. The
activities of both the Czech Consul General and the Hungarian trade
delegation members, although ostensibly directed toward increasing trade,
probably include activities which should be labeled as propaganda.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 20 -
XI II. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Although no international Communist organizations maintain
permanent bureaus or offices in Burma, the activities of some of these
groups have been an important part of the total Communist propaganda
effort in Burma. Local propaganda organs play up Burmese participation
in international conferences both before and after Burmese delegations
Delegations have been sent to the following recent
.
one abroad
have
g
conferences:
Meeting
World Youth Festival - Berlin
Moscow Economic Conference
Asian and Pacific Peace
Conference - Peiping
International Cultural
Conference - Moscow
WFTU General Council - Berlin
World Peace Council - Vienna
Date
Size of Delegation
Aug. 1951
5
April 1952
7
Sept. 1952
26
Oct.
1952
10
Nov.
1952
3
Dec.
1952
20
Although the delegations have usually included Communists, they have not
been composed exclusively of known party members.
Burmese participation in the work of international "front"
organizations seems to have been largely limited to-attendance at these
conferences. Although no reliable data*are available, it seems un-
likely that financial contributions have been received from Burmese
groups. On the contrary, the international organizations appear to.
subsidize the participation of. Burmese groups, at least to the extent
of underwriting expenses while travelers are in orbit countries.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 21 -
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
A. International Party Channels
All Communist elements in Burma emphasize the country's ties to
China, because of a general Burmese sense of nearness to China and an
interest in Chinese developments. Outwardly, therefore, the closest
international links appear to be with Communist China. Ties with the
Indian Communist Party have not been close, although one finds
occasional references to liaison with representatives of the East
Bengal Communist Party.
There is ample, although circumstantial, evidence that above-
ground Communist elements follow international Communist directives
concerning propaganda drives, although local implementation of specific
campaigns is frequently tardy. Under the'direction of local "front"
groups, the world-wide "signature campaigns" are carried on in Burma,
and particular propaganda themes related to Far Eastern affairs are
generally carried in local organs. It is not known, however, whether
the Chinese or the Soviet Embassy is the original source of directives
to local groups.
Although there are frequent reports of directives from Chinese
or Soviet officials concerning party strategy in Burma, it is impossible
to determine whether specific moves, particularly with reference to
guerrilla activity, are the direct result of Chinese or Soviet direction.
Since early in 1952, there seems to have been a shift in emphasis, from
direct military action to above-ground agitation for a "united front"
government and an end to insurgency. It is not clear whether the mili-
tary weakness of the insurgent groups is responsible for the shift, or
whether it was made in response to a directive concerning general Asian
Communist strategy.
1. International courier system. The Chinese Embassy in Rangoon is
known to have a regular courier service, and it is probable that the
Soviet Embassy provides similar facilities. In addition, commercial
channels are readily available within the Chinese community. There are
reports that crew members of ships calling at Rangoon serve as contacts
with both Chinese and-Soviet Embassies, but details are unavailable.
There is also direct overland communication with China, but it is not
possible to state whether these routes are more important than sea con-
tacts. Available evidence suggests, without definite proof, that the
above-ground BWPP has direct access to the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon,
and that the underground BCP maintains overland contact with China.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
It is probable that arrangements for guerrilla training in China are
made by direct liaison with Chinese officials in Yunnan.
2. Domestic communications. The nature of current Communist
operations reduces the need for close integration among the several
elements. Above-ground activities are concentrated in Rangoon and in
major towns, and personal travel is limited only by deficiencies in
local transportation. Underground activity is apparently linked by
courier and radio facilities between guerrilla areas, but details are
unavailable. Radio equipment is frequently moved to avoid capture,
and the location of present installations is unknown.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.2
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: '
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDOCHINA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
01
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Tactics . .. .. 1
III. Capabilities . 3
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . ~+
I. Numerical Strength . ?
II. Electoral Strength . .. . . . . . . . 5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 10
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . 12
VI. Communist. Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional organizations . .. + 13
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . 14
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 14
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . . . . . . ? . .. . . . . . . . . . . 15
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . + . . . . 15
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 17
XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . . . . . 18
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . 19
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party;.and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMATICN
C OMMUN IBM IN IND CCHINA s OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
All of the immediate objectives of the Communists in Indochina are
related to their effort to win the bitter civil war which they are waging
against the forces of the French Union. Within the area which they have
conquered, the Communist objective is to improve their control over popu-
lation and resources in order to maximize their total military effort.
Within the areas controlled by the legitimate Governments of Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia, the Communist objectives area
1. To subvert the loyalty of the population.
2. To improve the party's covert organization.
II. TACTICS
Communism's objectives in Indochina are furthered by the Soviet and
satellite-recognized "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," its Chinese-supported
and equipped army, its administrative and control organizations (police,
secret and security services, propaganda organizations, administrative.
cadres), and by its popular front movement, the "Lien Viet" or "National
Unity Front."
The entire insurrectionary structure is held together and controlled
by the Laodong (Communist) Party. It is the Laodong.Party which, in the
final resort, operates the complex mechanism of war, propaganda, and compul-
sion which appears to the people of Vietnam and to the outside world as the
"Viet Minh" movement. And the Laodong Party, in turn, is managed by a
group of highly trained and thoroughly experienced revolutionary leaders.
The Communist Party in Indochina uses.both military tactics and
political warfare tactics to further its over-all objectives.
Its military tactics are designed: (1) to inflict maximum disrup-
tion and destruction on enemy forces and enemy war potential in the rear
zones, with the minimum expenditure of Viet Minh forces; (2) to infiltrate,
occupy, and consolidate territory with a view to securing a continuing
reservoir of potential manpower recruitment for the army and to finding
the necessary economic mans (mainly food) to support intensification of
the war. These tactics have been highly successful. For over six years
the Viet Minh has inflicted heavy casualties on the Franoo-Vietnamese
forces, while paralyzing Indochinese. economic life and preventing the
country's recovery. The Viet Minh is now strongly established in North and
Northwest Tonkin, in the lightly industrialized and food-producing regions
SECRET - SECURITY IN+CRMATION
A ---A C- ')fl171 t11lon Id_PnPRAPnn9RARfltl(1Rflt1(18fltlfl'I-4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
of North Central Vietnam, and in the coastal plains of South Central
Vietnam. Most of China's long common boundary with Indochina is now
in Viet Minh hands, permitting continued Chinese Communist assistance
to the Viet Minh armed forces.
Communist political warfare tactics are designed: (1) to ex-
tend Communist influence among all social and economic groups in the
populations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and (2) to consolidate
Communist control over conquered areas and populations..
Communist propaganda attempts to exploit sentiment "for independ-
ence" and "against French colonialism." To some extent, but only within
carefully-drawn limits, the attempt to make the Viet Minh effort appear
one of genuine national resistance to a foreign colonizing power con-
tinues to displace certain other considerations in Communist tactics.
Thus, Catholics in the Viet Minh zones have not.been persecuted,. nor,
until very recently, attacked ideologically, so that the pretense of
continued Catholic support for the "war of resistance" could be main-
tained. Similarly, although agrarian reform has been strongly stressed,.
landlords have been dispossessed only where it was essential to secure
fuller cooperation on the part of the landless peasantry. Orthodox
Communist doctrine has generally taken second place to "anti-imperialist"
themes in Viet Minh propaganda. However, whenever the priority needs of
intensifying the armed struggle have demanded that themes of "national
unity" and nationalistic propaganda be soft-pedalled, this has been done,
particularly since 1951.
Efforts to consolidate Communist control over areas and popula-
tions already under Communist influence center upon the peasantry.
Basic Viet Minh policies and the major part of its propaganda output
are calculated to increase the peasantry's contribution to the military
effort. Both within and outside the zones under direct Viet Minh control,
the Communists rely heavily upon conspiratorial methods and upon a large
and widespread system of terror and compulsion. Such a system has been
essential not only in providing the necessary vehicle for Communist control
of the vast masses of people (some 12 million) and the variegated leader-
ship which the Viet Minh movement has brought under its banners,. but also
in order to gather the necessary intelligence for military operations and
political warfare.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
3 -
III. CAPABILITIES
If Franco-Vietnamese military strength in Indochina does not
increase, the Viet Minh may become strong enough within the next few
years to be able, without identifiable Chinese Communist interven-
tion, to break the current stalemate. While the Viet Minh's military
capabilities are at present limited by its exclusion from the more .
productive regions of Vietnam, this might be overcome by significantly
increased Chinese Communist materiel and technical assistance and by
conquest of further territory. At the same time, although the regime
continues to be based largely on compulsion and terror and to depend
mainly for the achievement of its objectives upon increasingly harsh
exploitation of a war-weary peasantry, the Viet Minh's administrative
and control capabilities seem adequate to counteract any growth of
discontent among the populations and armies under its control. The
Viet Minh's popular hold on substantial portions of the populations
outside its own zones, based partly on military prestige, partly on
continued nationalist appeal, and partly on a widespread mechanism of
compulsion and terror, is likely to be increased or decreased in.
proportion to the military power and ideological dynamism which the
free world, and above all the free states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos may be able to bring to bear against it.
SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMATICIK
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY I'ORMATION
Communist Party membership, following and strength are heavily
concentrated in the areas of Indochina controlled by the "Democratic
Republic of Vietnam." In the "DRY", the official Communist party, the
LAO DONG (Workers) Party,has a membership variously estimated at be-
een 56,000 and 715,000. Although reliable data on the number of
people under Communist Party discipline is lacking, the all-enoompassing
coverage of the constituent organizations of the Communist-controlled
National Unity Front (LIEN VIET), suggests that a majority of the 12.7
million inhabitants of the "DRY" may be oonsidered under effective
Communist control.
In the areas under the control of the Associated States govern-
ments of Vietnam$ Cambodia, and Laos, the Communist party is proscribed.
However, there are obviously Communists in all of these areas, due to
the ease With which the non-Communist regions can be infiltrated. In
Vietnam particularly, but also in Cambodia and Laos, a number of
clandestine Viet Minh or Chinese-Communist-controlled organizations are
believed to be operating.
How many of the 9.9 million population of free Vietnam are under
Communist discipline cannot be estimated. Clandestine Communist opera-
tions are, however, relatively successful. In part, this is due to a
widespread Communist system of compulsion; on the other hand, the Viet
Minh cause continues to exert considerable national appeal in the free
zones of Vietnam. It is possible that a substantial portion of the
Vietnamese population and of the 800,000 Chinese in Vietnam are
sympathetic to the objectives of the Viet Minh and therefore susceptible
to Communist influence.
In Cambodia, it is unlikely that more than 10 percent of the
population of 3 million (including the Chinese) are strongly influenced
by Communism. However, some 5000-10,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, mainly
concentrated in the Southern provinces, are reported fighting in units of
about company size against Franoo-K aer forces. In early 1952, the
Chinese Communist regime claimed the loyalty of 60 percent of the 300,000
Chinese in Cambodia. While this claim is undoubtedly exaggerated, a sub-
stantial percentage of the Chinese in Cambodia are believed to be under
Communist influence.
In Laos, the number of people under Communist influence is believed
to be extremely small - perhaps one percent of the one million population.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The number of Viet Minh guerrillas in Laos is estimated at about 5,000.
Communist strength is believed heaviest in the DRV-oontrolled
provinces of North Tonkin and North Central Annam; less numerous in "DRV"
areas in Central Annam and Cochinohina. Communist influence in free
Vietnam is probably strongest in the urban areas of Saigon-Cholon, Hanoi,
and Haiphong. In Cambodia, Viet Minh influence is strongest in the
southern provinces where guerrilla units are concentrated. Chinese
Communist influence in Cambodia is strongest in Phnom..Penh where the
Chinese population is heavily concentrated. In Laws, Communist influence
is strongest in the Bolovens Plateau region where the Viet Minh guerrillas
are mainly based.
Communist Party membership in Indochina is believed to be composed
principally of professionals and government employees. In the "DRV",
industrial workers probably constitute an additional important membership
group,
Communist leadership in Indochina is believed to be well-educated
(Western Europe, China and the USSR), thoroughly experienced, completely
dedicated, and competent to fulfill not only its present responsibilities
but those it would inherit as a consequence of total victory in Indochina.
The average age of the sixteen current top-level Communist leaders is 47.
Many top leaders have been active since 1930.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
On January 6, 1946, the Viet Minh Government held elections for a
"Vietnam National Assembly" in an effort to legitimize its rule. In
addition to the polling in-areas of North and Central Vietnam under
DRV control, clandestine votes were taken in parts of South Vietnam.
There is considerable doubt as to the extent to which these elections re-
flected the popular will; an implausibly large vote was claimed for a
country where the parliamentary system is all but unknown. Among the
300-odd members of the "elected Assembly," the Viet Minh (then ostensibly
a coalition of left-wing and nationalist parties under Communist domina-
tion) emerged as the largest party with 80 delegates. The 90 independents
probably also included a significant number of Communists and another
group of 15 Communists was elected under the label of the "Marxist Party."
No further elections have been held in the Communist-held areas of
Indochina. Elections have, however, taken place in Laos and Cambodia
and are now about to take place in free Vietnam, although, of course,
without Communist participation.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
A. Total Strength and Character of Communist Forces
The Viet Minh disposes of a total armed strength of about 315,000
men, distributed as follows,
Regular Army,
130,000
Regional Forces,
15,000
People's Militia,
110,0000
The Regular Army is a well-trained, well-equipped, highly mobile,
modern fighting force capable of waging effective positional warfare
against France-Vietnamese forces. The Regional Forces are less well
equipped and generally recruited regionally for static support of the
Regular Army. The People's Militia is locally recruited for village
defense and small-scale guerrilla action.
Be Security of Controlled Areas
The Viet Minh armed forces of 315,000 men, which are employed both
for the defense and security of controlled areas and for offensive opera-
tions based on these areas, are distributed within the "DRV"-controlled
areas as follows, 174,000 men in Tonkin; 80,000 men in Central Vietnam;
46,000 in South Vietnam; 10,000 in Cambodia; and 5,000 in Laos.
The population in Communist-controlled areas has generally been
stable and tightly-controlled. Disturbances and riots have, however,
occasionally been reported, particularly in the strongly Catholic Vinh
and Thanh Hoa regions of North Central Vietnam.
Civil administration in "DRV"-oontrolled zones is in the hands of
administrative cadres directly responsible to the "DRV" Ministry of
Interior. It is logical to suppose, although no information is available
on the subject, that the Viet Minh armed forces have at least temporary
control of civil administration in regions only recently conquered. This
control is presumably exercised by political and administrative cadres of
the Army.
C. Military Support Organizations
"DRV" supply, cgmmunioations, and intelligence organizations are
highly developed units operating at all levels of the military administra-
tion. Their authority is derived from Directorates attached to the
General Staff of the army. Information concerning the strength of the
various support organizations is not available although these organiza-
tions may be assumed to be quite large. Their networks are known to
embrace all of Vietnam, including Franco-Vietnamese areas.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
In view of the fact that North Vietnam is not only the theater of
the most active military operations but also the seat of the "DRV" govern-
ment, supply, communications, and liaison functions are presumably con-
oentrated in that area. Intelligence activities are probably concentrated
in urban centers (chiefly Hanoi and Saigon) as strongly as in strategic
military areas.
Available reports indicate that "DRV" support organizations have
achieved a high degree of efficiency.
D. External Military Support
Reports from a variety of sources, in most cases neither evaluated
nor confirmed, suggest that while certain supplies may originate else-
where in the Soviet bloc, Communist China is the main source of military
support to the Viet Minh. The following types of supplies have been
reported:l
1. Arms and ammunitions Mountain guns; anti-aircraft guns; light
machine guns; heavy mac ine guns; field guns; howitzers; mortars;
rifles, including Browning automatic rifles; pistols; rocket launchers;
spare parts; ammunition; TNT and other explosives; fuzes; detonators;
projectiles; grenades and grenade throwers; and land mines,
2. Commissary:
a. Food: Rice; maize; dried sweet potatoes; cereals; and soy
beans, flour.
be Clothin : Uniforms; cotton material; army blankets; cloth
shoes; rubber shoes; steel helmets.
3. Transportation and communication equipment: Trucks; tires; spare
parts; gasoline; oil; kerosene; radio sets and field transmitters, .
4. Others Medical and clinical supplies; X-ray metal testing equip-
ment; baTanoes; electric meters; electric drills; files; abrasives; saw
Reports often include quantity figures, frequently between. 400
and 800 tons per month. Overlapping of the time periods covered
and non-comparable quantity designations (e.g. rounds, cases, or tons
of. ammunition), however, make it impossible to arrive.at meaningful
totals. Moreover, in a few oases where cross-checking of reported
totals has been possible, resultant discrepancies have cast further
doubt upon the validity of the figures reported.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
blades; iron and steel for making cables; electrical distributing
machinery; agricultural machinery; oxygen containers; oxygen-generating
machines; gas masks; binoculars; industrial machinery.
E. Military Operations
Military operations in Indochina since 1946 have been conducted in
virtually all areas of the peninsula, but have.been principally concentra-
ted in North Vietnam (Tonkin). There, Communist forces have been, fighting a
savage battle for over six years for control of the crucial rice-
producing Red River Delta (in which the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong
are located). At present about 174,000 Communist troops are pitted
against an estimated 185,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces in the Tonkin
region. The principal tactic of the Communist forces has been to harrass
the Franco-Vietnamese Army by guerrilla warfare inside the Delta and by
massive attacks against isolated French posts and cities outside the
Delta..
A turning point in the battle for Tonkin was reached in the fall
of 1950, when Viet Minh forces, in quick succession. seized all French
posts along-the China border (Langson, Caobang, Laokay), excepting only
Monoay in the extreme eastern coastal sector. In the fall of 1952,
Communist forces expelled the French from all of Northwest Tonkin, ex-
cept Laiohau and Nasan. At this moment, therefore, the Communist forces
hold most of Tonkin outside of the key Delta region. The latter, how-
ever, in which the vast bulk of Franco-Vietnamese forces is now concen-
trated, has been heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh forces and is
besieged at its periphery by some five Viet Minh divisions.
In Central Vietnam, an estimated 75,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces
hold the narrow coastal plain from Faifo to Dong Hoi against some 80,000
Communists who are in control of the remainder of the area. In South
Vietnam, an estimated 162,000 Franco-Vietnamese forces control most of
the region. but conduct frequent and difficult operations against some
46,000 Viet Minh guerrillas, concentrated principally in the unhealthy
and almost impenetrable swamps of the Plaine des Jonas. In Laos and
Cambodia, Communist military operations are aprawn limited to small-
scale harrassment by guerrilla forces.
F. Popular Attitudes. Toward the War
The peasantry of Indochina has.borne the main brunt of the long war.
The peasantry serves as a reservoir of manpower for the armies involved,
performs the coolie duties of supply, engages in sabotage and informer
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
operations at the order of one side or the other, constructs public
works, and -- over and above all this -- produces the food for its own
subsistence and that of the non-productive hundreds of thousands in the
armies. By this time, the peasantry clearly abhors the war and
anxiously hopes for its and.
General passivity toward either side in the conflict may in fact
be said to characterize the sentiments of the vast majority of Indochina's
civilian population. However, passivity is less noticeable, and the
effects of political warfare and propaganda by either side are more
marked, among city dwellers. The nationalist pretentious of the Viet
Minh, rather than Communism itself, continue to hold much appeal for
Indochina's urban population, whether inside the Viet Minh zones or in
areas of Franco-Vietnamese control.
G. Current Strategic and Tactical Objectives of the Communist Insurrection
Current strategic and tactical objectives of the Communist
insurrection are military and political consolidation over newly-won
territories in northwest Tonkin, and intensified penetration by Viet
Minh regular forces into the Franco-Vietnamese-held Tonkin Delta area,
The "DRV" probably will intensify guerrilla warfare in the plateaux
region of Central Vietnam as well as in Cambodia and South Vietnam and
may also attempt a limited military penetration into Laos. In Central
Vietnam, the Communist forces will probably continue to maintain strong
pressure against the Franco-Vietnamese forces along the coast.
H. Relations of Communist to Non-Communist Insurrectionary Organizations
1. Vietnam. In June 1952 Colonel Trinh Minh The, former Chief of
Staff o? _t" e warmed forces of the autonomous politico-religious Caodaist
movement, took to the bush with 2,500 men in South Vietnam to set up
"the National Resistance Front," a "third force" opposed to both the
Viet Minh and the French. Since the spring of 1952, when the French
launched military operations against this group, Colonel The has not
been heard from and his current whereabouts are unknown. There is no
evidence that Colonel The has collaborated with the Viet Minh.
2. Cambodia. In March 1952, Son Ngoc Thanh, a leading Cambodian
nationalist, organized a dissident nationalist movement. At first, the
activities of this group seen to have been limited to propaganda attacks
against the French and Cambodian King. In recent months, broadcasts of
Son Ngoo Thanh have been increasingly favorable to the Viet Minh, but
the present relationship between these two movements is not clear.
3. Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks. The Cambodian and Laotian
Issaraks, under the leadership respectively of Son Ngoo Minh and Prince
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Souphanouvong, have been formally allied with the Viet Minh movement
since March 1951 when the "United National Front of Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos" was established. In the past, military efforts of the
Issaraks have been for the most part limited to sporadic guerrilla
warfare, banditry, and arms smuggling across the Thai border.
A closer degree of cooperation seems to have been achieved during
the past year between the Viet Minh and the Cambodian and Laotian Issaraks.
From 5,000 to 10,000 Viet Minh are reportedly with the Cambodian Issaraks
and 5,000 with the Laotian Issaraks. In October and November, 1952, a
Laotian delegate accompanied the Viet Minh delegation to the Asian and
Pacific Peace Conference in Peiping. In December delegates from both "Free
Cambodia" and "Free Laos". participated in the World Peace Conference in
Vienna.
I. Capabilities for Expansion and Action in the Near Future
Despite the relatively low level of military industrial production
within "DRV" areas and a reportedly increasing food shortage, the "DRV"
could probably expand the present scope of its military activities to a
limited extent without significantly increased support from Communist
China or from other Orbit countries.
If, as seems likely, the Issaraks receive greater material assistance
and technical advice from the Viet Minh, they would be able to expand
their numbers and extend their operations.
A. Repressive Capabilities of the Associated States and France
French and Associated States policy toward Communism in Indochina
is the military destruction of the Viet Minh armed forces and complete
eradication of Communist activities and influence throughout the peninsula.
No Communist parties, groupings, or organizations are allowed to
exist or operate in the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
The overt circulation of Communist publications in Franco-Vietnamese
controlled areas is prohibited and the possibility of Communist-oriented
material appearing in the controlled press is negligible due to tight
censorship exercised by both the French and the Associated States. Severe
repressive measures are taken against any individuals, groups, or organiza-
tions believed operating under Communist. instructions or for Communist
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
purposes. Such repressive measures are expected to continue until
-hostilities in Indochina have ceased and internal political stability
is assured. They are carried out by civilian security services of
France and the Associated States, and insofar as the security of
components of the French Union Armed Forces is concerned, by the
military intelligence and counter-intelligence services of these forces.
At present, the scope and effectiveness of repressive action of
which the French and Associated States civilian and military security
agencies are capable in Indochina cannot be rated better than fair. By
contrast, Communist subversive operations are believed to be, on the
whole, vary effective. Possibly the greatest asset of Communist under-
ground and subversive organizations of all types lies in the generally
apathetic attitude of the Vietnamese population as a whole toward the
conflict which is raging in its territory.
B. Extent and Effectiveness of Communist Subversive Operations
Communist subversive operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
fall into two major categories: those carried out by Viet Minh subversive
teams and underground networks, and those carried out by clandestine
Chinese Communist organizations..
Viet Minh organizations operating in the French and Associated
States-controlled zones of Indochina are for the most part responsible
directly to the central "DRV" government, or its regional representatives.
They perform three general types of assigned taskas propaganda; litical,
economic, and counter-intelligence;l and 'terrorism and sabotage.#
The propaganda function is carried out by teams responsible to the
Information Services of the central "DRV" government. The total number
or size of such teams is unknown,S but their effectiveness seems to have
been considerable. Espionage activities are carried out by organizations
and units of unknown size believed to be attached to the regional Cong An
(Public Security Service) of the Viet Minh, which is the latter's rnal
security organization. Espionage agents reportedly are assigned
specialized tasks, the most important of which is the infiltration of
French and Associated States intelligence and security services. Terrorism
and sabotage within the free zones is performed by the Dich Van which in-
cludes Death Volunteer Brigades, apparently assigned to opera.e in specific
regions. The effectiveness of the,Dich Van is reportedly great; it has
seriously disrupted. highway and rail~traff o, damaged industrial and
Military espionage is oarr ell out by intelligence organizations
responsible to the Directorate for Military Intelligence of the "DRV"
Armed Forces General Staff.
2. Certain types of sabotage activities are carried out by organized
guerrilla and commando units of the Armed Forces.
5. In 1951, ten such Information teams were reported to be operating
in South Vietnam.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
military installations, and organized numerous terroristic acts in major
urban centers, the most important of which was the assassination of a
number of highly prominent French and Vietnamese civil and military
personalities. One of the most successful activities of Viet Minh sub-
versive organizations has been the extortion of money from prominent
French and Chinese as well as from Vietnamese business firms. Many of
these firms regularly pay large sums of "protection money" to Viet Minh
agents in order to avoid bombing of their premises.
The "DRV" benefits considerably by the intelligence activities
carried out by Chinese Communist underground organizations in the non.
Communist zones. Since 1949, the Communist-direoted "Association for
the Liberation of Overseas Chinese in Indochina" has organized various
clandestine student, wen's and workers' organizations in Saigon-Cholon
where approximately 80 percent of the total overseas Chinese population
of some 800,000 is concentrated. During 1952, the creation of a
clandestine "United Action Committee of Democratic Sino-Vietnamese" was
reported, also in Saigon-Cholon. In North Vietnam, the "Society of New
Chinese Democrats of Hanoi and Haiphong" reportedly intensified intelligence
activities during 1952. The size of these organizations is unknown although
it is believed they have been fairly successful in gaining the sympathy
of certain of the Chinese population, particularly among students and
workers. Specific underground activities which have been reported include
extortions of money for the protection of relatives in China, the circula-
tion of Communist tracts and publications believed to be for the most part
procured in Hong gong, and the placement or pro-Communist instructors in
Chinese schools. In Cambodia, the Chinese Communist Party, whose head-
quarters reportedly is located in Phnom-Penh, claims the sympathy of 60
percent of the 300,000 overseas Chinese in that country. No information
is available concerning its activities or effectiveness.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
In "DRV" controlled areas, all workers in key industries are con-
trolled by Communist elements, although the number of Party members in
specific enterprises is unknown. In the Associated States of Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos, the number of Communists in key industries, if any,
is unknown.
In "DRV" areas of Vietnam, the General Confederation of Labor,
which is controlled by the communist Party, claimed "300,000 members" in
1952. The Confederation is composed of numerous affiliated trade unions
organized at provincial levels throughout Vietnam. It has been reported
that although not all of its directors are Party members, those exercising
any real authority are. The Confederation has been affiliated with the
World Federation of Trade Unions (wFTU) since the former's organization in
1946'and has been represented at VPFTU Conferences since 1948. In addition
to the General Confederation of Labor, the Viet Minh reportedly organized
a Trade Union Council in 1950 to embrace "intellectuals and civil servants."
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 13 -
No further information is available concerning this Council.
In the free areas of Vietnam, labor organizations were prohibited
until the promulgation of the Labor Code on November 16, 1952. The
principal Vietnamese labor union, which until last November operated as
an association, is the Christian Confederation Vietnamienne du Travail
Chretien, reported to have 5,000 members. num er of civil servants
in both the French and Vietnamese administrations, belong to Force
Ouvriere which has its headquarters in France. Although pro sions of
Me ew Labor Code in Vietnam do not extend to the overseas Chinese
population, Chinese labor groups have for some time been loosely associated
in a Federation of Chinese Mutual Aid Societies. The 19 organizations
comprising this Federation claim an aggregate membership of some 11,000.
No information is available on Communist infiltration of, or in-
fluence in, these labor unions in Franco-Vietnamese areas of Vietnam.
However, the Chinese organizations are the most likely to have been
infiltrated or influenced by Communists,
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND
PROFESSIONAL O G IZ TIONS
In both the free and the Communist zones, the Lien Viet (National
Unity) Front has developed an extensive and intricate netwozk of front
organizations to enlist the support of the peasants and special interest
groups for the "resistance against French aggression.' The leaders of the
front organizations are believed to be mostly well-indoctrinated and
capable party cadres, many of whom work in more than one organization.
What appear to be the most important front organizations are listed belows
1. The Union of Vietnamese Youth claims a membership of
2,500,000 and has been affiliated with the World Federation
of Democratic Youth since 1947.
2. The Union of Vietnamese Students and Pupils has been
affiliated with the International Students Union since 1948.
3. The Union of Vietnamese Women claimed 3,000,000 members as
of 1950. It has been affiliated with the Woman's Inter-
national Democratic Federation since 1945.
4. The Catholic Association for National Salvation.
5. The Association of Vietnamese Journalists has been affiliated
with the World Federation of Journalists since 1950.
6. The Vietnam World Peace Committee is affiliated with the
World Peace Council.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 14 -
7. The Vietnamese Peasants Association for National Salvation.
8. The Sino-Vietnamese friendship Association.
9. The Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Association?
In addition to Viet Minh front organizations, the Chinese Communist
Party has organized various youth, workers', women's and cultural under-
ground front organizations. These organizations are believed to be
strongest in the Saigon-Cholon area of South Vietnam and in the Phnom-
Penh region of Cambodia, where the majority of the overseas Chinese
residents in Vietnam and Cambodia are located.
Many, if not all, of the "Lien Viet front groups have effective
underground organizations within -We areas under Franoo-Vietnamese con-
trol.
Little information is available concerning non-Communist social,
cultural, or professional organizations which may have been infiltrated
by Communists.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Such infiltration is unquestionably a serious problem for the
anti-Communist goverimmentsof the Associated States. Although policy-
making bodies of these states are believed to be to a large extent free
from subversive Communist personnel and influences, the same can
probably not be said with regard to the Armed Services, police and
security services, and administrative cadres of the States. Communist
subversion is believed to have reached particularly serious proportions
within Vietnam's National Army. The Army Officer's Training School at
Dalat has been reported strongly infiltrated by Communist elements, and
certain Vietnamese troop companies in action in North Vietnam have proved
of marked unreliability. The Vietnamese, and even French, security
services in North Vietnam are also believed penetrated to some extent by
Communist elements.
No reports of Communist penetration of government agencies and
services in Cambodia and Laos have been received, although it is likely
that a limited degree of infiltration may be considered to have occurred.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
In the "DRV"-controlled zones of Vietnam, leaders of public pro-
paganda organizations are usually Party cadres. Communist propaganda has
undoubtedly reached nearly the entire population in these zones, chiefly
through the effective organization of mass front organizations and compulsory
study groups at provincial and village levels.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
In free Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, no known Communists are in a
position to influence public opinion. There are probably a considerable
number of concealed Viet Minh sympathizers or agents, however, in schools,
journalistic, and literary groups. The prohibition of Communist publica-
tions, tight press censorship,and the extremely limited number of radio
sets among the population in Franco-Vietnamese controlled areas have
tended to insulate the population from Communist publications and broad-
casts. Nevertheless, it is likely that Communist influence has been
spread fairly successfully through clandestine operations and through
direct contact of many individuals with underground Viet Minh agents.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST
POLITICIE S
The most important non-Communist nationalist organizations and
parties in Indochina are the Dai Viet Party, the Cao Dai politico-
religious group, the Vietnam a ona iat Party (VN9DD). and the Catholics
in Vietnam, and the Democratic Party in Cambodia. Although information
is generally lacking on their membership, these parties and groups are
thought to embrace several hundred thousand members. The extent of
Communist influence in these organizations is unknown, but is not be-
lieved to be large due to the strongly anti-Communist, although clearly
pro-nationalist, sentiments of most of their leadership.
Branches of the above-mentioned organizations are still in some
instances allowed to operate in "DRV"-controlled zones, where the Catholics
and some Caodaiats, for example, maintain social organizations. However,
the Communists have undoubtedly strongly infiltrated these branches and
probably control them completely. The same would be true for nominally
non-Communist parties and organizations existing only in the "DRV$G Zones,
such as the Vietnam Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, which the
Communists continue to tolerate in order to bolster their nationalist
pretensions.
A. Newspapers and Periodicals
Listed below are the newspapers and periodicals known to have
been published by the Viet Minh in 1951 or 1952. Where known, the
frequency of publication and the principal area of circulation are in-
dicated. These publications are also clandestinely distributed in
Franco-Vietnamese-controlled areas by Viet Minh underground organize.
tions.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Rele
SECRET - ase 2007/0 /201TY "ZNF
Rq$g269ROO0800080001-4
Name(Translation)
organ of
Circulated When,pub-
in lished
1. Major Papers
ccasion-
(
ki
o
n
Ton
Cuu Quoc (National Salvation) Lien Viet
ally thioughout
Vietnam !
Daily
Nhan Dan (The People)
Laodong North Vietnam
Weekly
(Worker's Party) (distributed in
27,000 copies)
Nhan Dan (The People)
Laodong South Vietnam
Monthly
(Worker's Party) (distributed in
24,000 copies)
Lao Doug (The Worker)
Vietnam Federa- Unknown
Unknown
tion of Labor
Specialized and Provincial Publications
Gia Dinh
Administrative Unknown
Two or
th
Committee of
ree
People's Army
times
Weekly
QQuuan Viet Bac
People's Army and North
Unknown
Militia Vietnam
China-Vietnam
Sino-Vietnamese
Friendship
Association
Doc Lap (Independence)
Democratic Party
Tonkin
Unknown
Tien Lien (Forward)
Socialist Party
Unknown
Unknown
To Quoo Tran Het (The
People's National
Saigon-Cholon
3 or 4
=&o n TWv_6Ml7
Union
times
Weekly
Dung Tien (To Go Forward
"Organ of young men
South Vietnam
Unknown
Bravely
and children"
Sang Danh Chua
Catholic Patriots
Hanoi Sector
Unknown
Dan Cay
Association Nambo of
Unknown
Unknown
Peasants for National
Salvation
uan Doi (New Strength)
Unknown Phuyen Province Unknown
South Trungbo
Economic Front
Unknown
Unknown
Educational Review
Ministry of Education Unknown
Unknown
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 17 -
E. Radio
The "DRV" controls the following broadcasting stations which have
regularly scheduled programs beamed to Indochina and to Southeast Asiat
1. Voice of Vietnam is regarded as the official government
station. It is reportedly located in the Vinh area. News
is broadcast daily to Indochina and Southeast Asia in French,
English, Tonkinese, Thai, Mandarin, and Cantonese.
2. Voice of South Vietnam has tentatively been located north
o gon, roe caste three programs daily of news and
commentary in Cochinohinese and one in Mandarin.
3. Voice of Nambo is reputedly located in the Mekong Delta area.
carries four programs of news and commentary daily, one
each in Cochinchinese, French, Cantonese, and Cambodian.
In Cambodia, the Voice of Issarak Cambodia is operated by the Issarak
leader Son Ngoc Minh. One-half hour of news and comment is broadcast daily
in Cambodian.
Radio Moscow broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese and occasionally
in Coo no nese. Radio Peking broadcasts one hour daily in Tonkinese,
and twice daily for 5 to 35 minutes in Thai. Reception of the Thai
language program is reported to be poor.
Considering the small number of radio receiving sets in the
Associated States, it is likely that Communist radio broadcasts reach
only a very limited audience and achieve only limited propaganda effects
outside the Communist zones. Within these zones, however, they are used
as an extremely important,and probably effective, means of disseminating
propaganda and official orders to the population.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
The "DRV" authorities collect both direct and indirect taxes, many
of them in kind, impose "duties" on goods entering Conmumist zones from
the Franco-Vietnamese zones, and exact "voluntary"donations through various
"emulation campaigns." The amount of revenue thus collected is unknown,
as is the size of any subsidies from international Communist organizations,
donations or credits by Soviet or Satellite governments, or dues from
party-controlled labor unions and fronts. Nor is any information available
on the amount of revenue collected through extortion of Vietnamese, French,
and Chinese business firms in the non-Communist zones.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
There are no Soviet bloc diplomatic establishments, trade, or cultural
missions in free Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
- 18 -
Although the USSR, Communist China, and other satellite countries
have recognized the "DRV", they have not established diplomatic missions
there. However, Communist China has sent various temporary military and
economic missions to the Viet Minh. During 1952 a 50-man Chinese
cultural mission was reportedly sent to Thai Nguyen in North Vietnam
for the purpose of establishing political liaison with the "DRV" govern-
ment, and an economic mission is said to have been-not up also in North
Vietnam to study economic resources. Current estimates place the number
of more or less permanent Chinese Communist personnel-- technicians,
instructors, military and political advisors -- with the Viet Minh at
approximately 5,000. All Chinese Communist Missions are surrounded by
seoreoy. It is believed that contact between Chinese personnel and
natives is held to a minimum.
A Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association and a Soviet-Vietnam
Friendship Association were organised inside the "DRV" in early 1950.
Both organizations are associated with the "Lien Viet Front" and have
established branches throughout "DRV"-oontrolled areas of Vietnam.
These organizations are reported to have clandestine branches in the
free areas, particularly in the Saigon-Cholon district. Propaganda
committees areireported to have been established at the branch levels of
both Associations. In addition to carrying out regular propaganda
activities, these associations are responsible for sponsoring celebrations
of major Chinese Communist and Soviet holidays. The Sino-Vietnamese
Friendship Association has published a journal, China-Vietnam, since
May 1950.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
While it is not known to what extent, if any, the Viet Minh move-
ment may have been aided materially by international Communist organiza-
tions, it has been granted a significant extent of moral support by
such organizations through invitations to participate, often in a glorified
role, in Communist international conferences. In the past two years,
delegates from the "DRV" and in two instances from "Free Cambodia" and
"Free Laos" have attended the following international Communist meetingss
Meeting Date
Size of representation
from Indochina
Vienna Peace Congress December 1952 11 (including 2
from Cambodia and
1 from Laos)
Asian and Pacific Peace October- 14 (including 2
Conference, Peiping November 1952 from Laos)
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Meeting
Preparatory Meeting for,Peace
Conference of Asia and
Pacific Regions, Peiping
International Conference for
Defense of the Rights of
Young People
Chinese May Day Celebration,
Peiping
International Conference for
the Defense of Children, Vienna
International Economic
Conference, Moscow
World Peace Council, Vienna
June 1952
June 1952
April-May
1952
April 1952 3
March-April 4
1952
August 1951 16
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The Communists in Indochina maintain closest international ties
with Communist China, which recognized the "DRV" on January 18, 1950 and
received the credentials of the first "DRV" Minister in April, 1951 (his
status has now been raised to that of Ambassador), and with the USSR,
which recognized the "DRV" on January 30, 1950, and received the
credentials of a "DRV" ambassador in April 1952. Close ties are_
.also maintained, although much less prominently and for the most part
covertly, with leaders of the French Communist Party. Relations have
also developed between the Viet Minh leadership and leaders of the
Eastern European and Korean Communist regimes.
The clear harmony between Viet Minh and international Communist
policies leaves no doubt that close coordination with the international
Communist movement prevails. Proof that Communist China supplies high-
level guidance to the Viet Minh leadership was recently received in the
form of a Chinese Communist broadcast supplying the "DRV" government
with the draft of a proposed address by Ho Chi Minh, written in China by
the "DRV" Ambassador to that country. It is likely that frequent
consultations between China and the "DRV" take place, and that a certain
amount of day-to-day guidance is provided by the temporary technical and
military missions now present in the "DRV" areas. It is also probable
that the Viet Minh representative in Moscow sends home frequent guidances
and reports.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Size of representation
rom In oo na
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 20 -
Efficiency of "DRV" contacts with the main Communist centers in
Pei-p'ing and Moscow is presumably very good, since the French now
control only one of the customary routes across the Chinese-Vietnamese
border. Radio contact between Communist China and the "DRV" is main-
tained through stations BAL 6 and GMH in China, which relay broadcasts
between the "DRV", China, and other Communist countries. It is be-
lieved that contacts maintained by the Indochinese Communists with
France and with other Southeast Asian or Pacific countries are probably
less efficient.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.3
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDONESIA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword ? ? ? ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
Objectives . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
He Tactics .. . 1
III. Capabilities . 4
ASSETS . . . ? . . . ? . . . 6
I. Numerical Strength . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Electoral Strength ....... ..... 6
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action. 7
IV. Goverment Policy Toward Communism . . ... ? 7
V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . .. . ? 8
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . .. . . . 9
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . .
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . .
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . . . S . . _ . . . . . . . . . .. . . ? 12
X. Communist Propaganda Media . 12
XI. Financial Condition . 13
XII? Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . ? . . . 13
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . 14+
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . ... 15
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN INDONESIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
The major current goals of the Communist Party of Indonesia
(PKI) are to gain general acceptance as a genuine nationalist party
in Indonesia, to perfect the party organization and to consolidate
control over a variety of front groups, including the largest of the
labor federations in Indonesia. In pursuing these aims the PKI has
attempted to recoup such prestige as it lost, first, in the course of
the Madiun uprising in September 1948 and, second, as a result of a
series of arrests of Communist leaders by the Indonesian government
in August 1951.
Secondarily, the PKI attempts, especially through the activities
of its front organizations, to cause Indonesia's "independent foreign
policy' to be directed in such a way that ties with the Soviet bloc are
strengthened at the expense of relations with the West. Thus, the
PKI advocates the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR,
non-cooperation with the UN embargo on shipments of strategic items to
Communist China, increased trade with the Soviet bloc, and rejection
of US economic. and military aid.
The political climate in Indonesia, characterized by a lack of
cohesive policy on the part of the major political parties and a
general uncertainty as to the direction Indonesia will take in the
immediate future both domestically and internationally, enhances the
PKI's capability to pursue these several objectives concurrently.
While present emphasis is on furthering the domestic political fortunes
of the party,'particularly with the prospect of general elections in
the next year, past experience suggests that should the requirements
of international Communism demand it, a quick reversal might be
effected, and international considerations be given precedence.
At this stage it is not clear whether the PKI hopes to achieve
its ultimate goal of direction of the Indonesian state through peace-
ful constitutional means, involving subversion of non-Communist
groups, or through eventual armed insurrection. It is likely that
the party's internal consolidation is pursued with both possibilities
in view.
In its attempt to gain popular acceptance, the PKI has been
able to capitalize on existing anti-colonial sentiment and has taken
a strong stand on a number of issues which also form a part of the
programs of other political parties. Thus, the PKI advocates abroga-
tion of the Round Table Conference agreements with the Netherlands,
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
termination of the activity of the Netherlands Military Mission,
"restoration" of Western New Guinea (Irian) to Indonesian control,
and nationalization of such foreign enterprises as the North Sumatra
oil fields and the Bangka and Billiton tin mines. These pronounced
aims of the PKI,,shared as they are with other political groups,
appear to be only means to enhance the national standing of the party.
More general tactics directed toward this same end are the
publicly announced support of the-present Wilopo government by the
PKI and efforts apparently undertaken in various localities to form
a series of "Representative Councils" under PKI leadership. These
united front tactics were justified in a party statement issued in
explanation of the first Communist support rendered an Indonesian
government since Madiun:
The formation of.the Wilopo cabinet opened rather extensive
possibilities to the PKI and the other people's organi-
zations to work publicly; they need no longer perform under-
ground activities as they did during the Sukiman...cabinet
receding government7...This is the conclusion; in the
present condition, tie PSI and the people have to choose one
of these two; a democratic bourgeois government or a
fascist bourgeois one....
On several occasions since the end of the war, the PKI has
stressed the desirability of a united front. The PKI has also
attempted in'the past year to seize the initiative in organizing
celebrations of national holidays.
At the same time that the PKI has endeavored to reestablish a
patriotic reputation by positive action, it has refrained from
outspoken opposition to the government's programs, thus trying to
overcome a reputation for negativism. In conformance with this policy,
the PKl.was relatively restrained in recent Parliamentary debates
critical of the leadership of the armed forces and the Ministry of
Defense, and took care to deny complicity in the resulting anti-
Parliament demonstrations. In paying lip service to respect for
democratic institutions the PKI has probably also been concerned for
its political future should anti-Communist military leaders seize
a larger measure of control.
The PKI- has attempted to appeal to all social groups, and has
had its greatest success in the organization of labor. SOBSI
(Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the PKI-contfolled
trade union-n a e~ion, dominates the Indonesian labor movement and
is an affiliate of WFTU. SOBSI's potential for disruptive activity
was demonstrated in 1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
strikes in vital industries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations,
transportation, petroleum and some estate rubber production were
brought to a virtual standstill. Since that time, the Indonesian
government has restricted labor activity through a series of committees
to which labor disputes are to be referred for compulsory settlement.
Although SOBSI organizations have refrained from disruptive activity
in the past several months in conformity to the PKI program of
cooperation with the government, a potential for renewed agitation
exists. Among the more important other PKI front organizations in
Indonesia are women's, youth, students, and peasants organizations,
the People's Cultural League and the Indonesian Committee for World
Peace.
These groups echo the PKI program and propaganda in parlia-
ment, communicate Communist propaganda to mass groups, attempt to
enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist causes, and
participate in national conferences and international meetings of
Communist front organizations. SOBSI and two peasant organizations
are represented in the Indonesian parliament. Although there is no
separate Chinese Communist Party organization in Indonesia, many of
the same purposes are accomplished within the Chinese community by a
separate series of front organizations.
In addition to controlling completely the activities of the
above organizations, clearly recognizable as Communist front groups,
PKI members attempt to infiltrate other mass organizations. An
article published in the official PKI organ in February 1951 on "The
Role of the PKI and Mass Organizations" statess
"Communists who are assigned to join organizations, such as
labor unions which are under the leadership of Trotskyites
or Social Democrats, are not to leave such organizations,
for-that would mean that we were allowing these masses to
continue under the leadership of those who are really
enemies of the people.... Therefore, we Communists may not
refuse to work in a mass organization, no matter how
reactionary it is."
Communist efforts are also made to infiltrate ministries of
the government, the police and military forces. Apart from the
known presence of Communists in the Ministries of Labor and
Information, there is little evidence to indicate the degree of
success enjoyed by the PKI to date in attaining this objective.
Since the abortive Madiun rebellion in 1948, the PKI has, in
general, refrained from violent activity. Nevertheless, the party
controls several small armed bands and is believed to continue
attempts to infiltrate other dissident organizations.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-4-
The PKI in the course of its past history was often divided in
its leadership and evidenced the same lack of cohesion and direction
that characterized most other Indonesian political groups. Today, fol-
lowing the injection of considerable new blood into the party, there is
every evidence that the PKI adheres closely to policy as transmitted
through international Communist channels. Liaison is believed to be
effected through the Chinese Communist Embassy and at international
Communist meetings. Should the dictates of international Comnmmism
so demand, the PKI today would probably not hesitate to reverse its
tactics, even at the risk of weakening seriously its domestic position.
III. CAPABILITIES
The PHI today. is better organized and better led than at amy time
in its past history. The party appears to be enjoying a considerable
degree of success as a result of its policy of cooperation with the
Indonesian government and its espousal of generally popular causes. As
long as it adheres to this policy of united.front tactics its potential
for expanding membership and enhancing its following would appear great.
At the same time, the fact that the other major political parties advocate
much the same program and are not faced with the PKI's constant problem
of establishing' its identity as an indigenous party,. militates against
the party's becoming so strong that it might participate in an Indonesian
government,
One major purpose of the party's united front tactics has been to
assure that it will not lose its present parliamentary representation
when general elections are held. It is not possible to forecast election
results at this time, but judging from the Indian experience in conduct-
ing elections with a largely illiterate electorate, the organization of
the PHI, particularly among front organizations, will probably assure it
representation disproportionate to its real popular support.
As a vehicle for gaining sympathy for international Commnmist
causes, the PKI is limited in its success among politically articulate
Indonesians by a general awareness of the nature of.Cism and the
role played by front organizations, and by suspicion of the motives of
advocates of either side in the cold war. The party's appeal among the
masses, in turn, suffers from a lack of awareness on.the part of most
Indonesians of all but immediately pressing local problems. Nevertheless,
PKI propaganda as delivered through the several front organizations
capitalizes on the strongly nationalist sentiment of the people. Thus
it is probable that the people as a whole are more susceptible to Communist
propaganda influence than the more politically sophisticated leadership
groups.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET SECURITY INFORu.TION
It-is unlikely that the PEI-will in the foreseeable future be
able to wage organized warfare against the Indonesian state, but it
may be expected that all opportunities will be developed to subvert
dissident groups with an eye toward future eventualities. The party
does continue to possess the capability of disrupting economic life
through the activities of the labor unions it controls, but such
activity would run counter to the law and might jeopardize the
reputation for Cooperation and concern for the natioial iriterOst
that the party has been nurturing so Carefully.
SECRET - SECURITY INF'OR)(ATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATIOK
CCHMUNISM IN INDONESIA: ASSETS
I. NU)IERICAL STRENGTH
Estimates of Indonesia Commnmist Party (PKI) strength vary from
30,000-100,000 but no details are available. No separate Chinese: Com
munist Party organization. is known to exist in Indonesia, although the.
Chinese oomaunity, as noted below, possesses its own mass front organi
zations. The PKI is strongest in Java and Sumatra and party activity
seems best organized in the major cities, but little information is
available concerning regional organization.
Much of the leadership and probably a large portion of party
membership are middle class intellectuals, but the bulk of party sym-
pathizers are unskilled agricultural and industrial laborers and farmers.
A majority of the party leaders have been educated or trained abroad, and
Samaun, one of the PKI'S founders, is in Moscow where he is credited with
playing a major role in Soviet planning for Indonesia. Other Indonesian
Comnnuiists are known to be in Prague, Pei ping and Amsterdam.
Beset by undistinguished and ineffective leadership throughout
most of its history of three decades, the PKI in the postwar period has
experienced a new vigorous direction on the part of both the overt Central
Committee and its underground directorate. Party leadership today may be
divided between a small group of older prewar members and a majority group
of more recent leaders -- averaging.30-35 years in age -- who have ac-
knowledged adherence to the party or front organizations only in the post-
war period.
While the government's security action of August 1951 against the
Communists increased pressure on the party and for a time restricted its
freedom of action, the most prominent and important leaders of the PKI
escaped capture at the time, and many lesser lights have since been re-
leased. There has been no evidence of dissension within party ranks in
the past two years, and the present leadership appears prepared to under-
take whatever action party strategy demands.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
No general elections have been held in Indonesia to date. The PKI
occupies 15 seats (7 percent) out of 220 in the provisional Parliament.
If satellite parties and fellow travellers are included, a total of 40
seats (19 percent) are controlled by the PKI.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Current PKI policy is to refrain from violent activity and to
enhance its popular support through ostensible cooperation with the
government and other political parties. Past experience in the post-
war period, however, indicates that the party will not hesitate to en-
gage in violent action when strategy so demands.
In September 190 during negotiations between the Republic and
the Netherlands, the PKI undertook an armed uprising at Madiun in
Republican held territory. Party strategy at that time was apparently
aimed at precipitating a renewal of Dutch military action against the
Republic in the course of which the PKI hoped to seize leadership of
the Indonesian resistance. Premature action on the part of some of the
rebelling units and prompt counteraction on the part of the Republic
resulted in the suppression of the Communists after considerable loss
of life. In August 1951, the Communists led-a raid on Tandjung.Priok, port
area of Djakarta, in order to test the party's ability to execute this
type of maneuver as well as the government's-capability of coping with
disruptive activity. It was this action that hastened the Indonesian
Govermment's decision to effect a series of security sweeps, in the course
of which many prominent' Communists and fellow-travellers were arrested.
The Indonesian Communists are believed to have infiltrated dis-
sident organizations currently engaged in armed insurrection and may
possess small armed bands of their own, but reliable information on this.
subject is lacking. Judging from their conduct of and participation in
non-violent demonstrations, Party members presumably would be available
in major cities for conducting violent demonstrations.' Although the PKI
probably has an organization for violent action and the quality of leader-
ship is greatly improved over 191+8, the success of any large-scale insur-
rection would probably depend on complete Conn mist subversion of existing
dissident groups or units of the armed forces. PKI control of most or-
ganized labor, the largest farmers' organizations and important youth groups
might provide considerable backing for. whatever violent action the Party
might undertake. -
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COWUNISIK
The PKI enjoys the same freedom as other Indonesian political
parties, but the Indonesian Goverment limits the extent to-which the
PKI and its allied organizations can engage in propaganda attacks on
friendly states and the degree to which it may express its international
ties. Thus, pictures of international Communist leaders are occasionally
prohibited at Communist rallies, and propaganda films of a flagrant- nature
are banned. In August 1951 the Government, fearing another attempted
coup, arrested mmaerous outstanding Commmists and fellow travellers.
SECRET - SECURITY fl FORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The Party's past experience with the ability of the Indonesian
Government to curtail overt activity has presumably led it to form an
underground organization. However, no details are known regarding the
size or efficiency of such an organization. An elaborate array of front
organizations and the probable existence of numerous undercover party
members would seemingly enable the PKI to maintain its structural or-
ganization and engage in limited activity in the face of Government re-
pression of the Party proper.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
The number of Commmnists in key industries is not known but is
appreciable in view of the strength of PKI dominated unions.
SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the trade
union branch of the PKI, dominates the Indonesian labor movement and is
an affiliate of the WFTU. It is represented in the Provisional Parlia-
ment, where it holds four seats. SOBSI claims three million members,
although its actual membership is estimated at about 800,000. Its largest
affiliate is SARBUPRI, a federation of estate workers unions which cllma
a membership of one million as against an estimated actual membership of
350,000. Other important SOBSI affiliates exist among ship, dock, rail-
road, transport, sugar, and oil workers.
SOBSI's potential for disruptive activities was demonstrated in
1950 when it spearheaded a campaign of widespread strikes in vital in-
dustries throughout Indonesia. Harbor operations, transportation, petroleum
and some estate rubber production were all brought to a virtual standstill.
Because of the threat to security, strikes were banned by local military
commanders in several provinces in late 1950, followed by a nationwide ban
in February 1951. In October of the same year the ban was replaced by a
comprehensive decree calling for a three-week cooling-off period and es-
tablishing committees of government officials for the compulsory settlement
of disputes where voluntary mediation failed. A series of disruptive har-
bor strikes in March and April 1952 were settled by committee action. A
strike of sugar estate workers in mid-1952 was called off only after the
government threatened.to arrest strike leaders. For the last several months
there have been no strikes by SOBSI organizations, apparently in response
to the PKI's avowed policy of cooperation with the government.
Attempts by leaders of various non-Communist parties, particularly
the Socialist, Labor and Masiumi parties, to organize non-Communist unions
capable of challenging SOBSI's domination of labor have been largely unr-
successful. The lack of capable union organizers and funds and the desire
of various party leaders to bolster their own political strength have thus
far prevented the formation of a lasting united non-Communist federation
embracing all non-Communist labor groups.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
VI. CCH4UNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL. AND
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Front Organisations
The most important Communist front organizations are described
briefly below:
1. Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia (IPPI), Indonesian Youth and
Students Union. This group claims a membership of 50,000 to
75,000, and is second in its field only to the Moslem youth
organization. It is especially influential in the secondary
schools and is affiliated with the international Students Union.
2. Pemuda Rakiat, People's Youth. With an estimated membership of
30#000 this is the most active politically of the numerous
Indonesian youth groups. Pew.7da Rakjat is affiliated with the
World Federation of Democratic Youth.
Gerakan Wanita Indonesia'Sedar (GERWIS), Enlightened Indonesian
Women's Movement. CERWIS does not possess nearly as extensive
an organization as the older. women's organizations, although it
is the most active politically. To date it has been unable to
influence the national Congress of Indonesian Women to affiliate
with Women's International Democratic Federation, of which GEIMIS
is a member.
~. Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), Indonesian Farmers Corps. This
group is strongest in Central Java and is represented in
Parliament.
Rukun Tani Indonesia (RTI), Indonesian Farmers Union. RTI,
active in West Java and South Sumatra, and BTI are the two
most powerful Indonesian farmers organizations. Plans are in
the offing for merger of the two groups.
Indonesian Committee for World Peace. This organization has
branches in major cities and appeals to many non-Communist in-
tellectuals.
7. Lembaga Kebudaiaan Rakiat (IEKRA), People's Cultural League.
Apparently the successor to the Chinese-Indonesian Cultural
league,. this group also has branches in major cities.
The above groups all serve as instruments for ooammmicating Communist
propaganda to mass groups, lend their names to the support of Communist
causes, attempt to enlist the support of non-Communist groups for Communist
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
causes, and participate on behalf of Indonesian women, youth, etc., as
the case may be, at international 'Communist conferences.
Within the Chinese community the most important Communist organiza-
tion appears to be the Min h She (People's Life Society), incorporating
a great many women's, youth, educational, professional and sports associa-
tions. Little detailed information is available concerning its activities,
but it appears to be the most active organization today among the overseas
Chinese community. When the Chinese Communist Ambassador arrived in Indonesia
he was greeted by representatives of 180 Chinese associations, which may
serve as an indication of the complexity of the organization of the Chinese
community in Indonesia.
In addition to the above group, perhaps a majority of the Overseas
Chinese Associations ( Lug Hui), which have existed since the
prewar period organized on a regional basis, have declared their support
for the Communist cause. Many of these have been brought together in a
series of Communist-dominated United Overseas Chinese General Associations.
The Chinese schools are a further vehicle for transmitting Communist
propaganda,, and a large number of these are known to be Communist-dominated.
A majority of Chinese labor unions are believed to be affiliated with SOBSI,
the overall Indonesian Communist labor organization. In North Sumatra, at
least, the Chinese Communist Farmers Association is a member of the broad
farmers front dominated by the Indonesian Communists.
Few details are available concerning the operations, leadership or
membership of this array of organizations. Chinese Communist leadership
has been active in seizing control of a good many associations whose members
were apathetic to the political implications of Commmist efforts. In some
cases comparable non-Communist organizations exist, generally organized by
the K[f, but in general, the Comumanist-dominated organizations are predominant
in the overseas Chinese community.
B. Infiltration of Non-Communist Organizations
The fact.that many of the non-Communist mass organizations in
Indonesia are inclined to the left and have programs that bear a striking
similarity to those under Communist discipline makes it difficult to dis-
tinguish all organizations that might properly be included in this category.
It seems probable that the PKI attempts to infiltrate all such organizations.
An article in the official organ of the PKI states, "It is the fundamental
duty of the Communists to give gradual training to all mass organizations
and to supply them with progressive leadership." This publication also
declares, "Every Communist must work hard to unite all kinds of mass or-
ganizations into one mass organization." It appears to be the PKI'ob
jective gradually to merge infiltrated organizations into larger Communist-
dominated front groups.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
It is doubtful whether any of the non-Communist mass organizations
consciously support Communist programs, but there is often considerable
agreement between the Communist and non-Communist groups. The distinction
between the two groups is often only in the degree of eagerness to take
sides in international issues and willingness to affiliate with inter-
national Commiunist front organizations.
VII. Ct7WUNIST INFILTRATION INTO COVERNMFNT
A number of Commmnists are known to hold positions in the Ministry
of Labor and Information and in their regional offices. The total number
of Communists and Communist sympathizers in these offices is not known,
but the ratio to total personnel is believed to be small. The arrests of
August 1951 ferreted out a number of Communists and Communist sympathizers
in the Ministry of Labor.
Dialan Baru (The New Road), often cited as a guide for PEI members,
declares, "The armed forces must receive special attention as the most im-
portant instrument of national power. Armed forces cadres and personnel
must be given special attention in line with their role as the most important
instrument for the defense of the National Revolution." Although it.is.as-
sumed that the PKI has attempted to infiltrate units of the armed forces,
little evidence exists to indicate success to date. There are no known
Communists or Communist sympathizers at the top levels of the armed forces.
The same publication further states, "The police and associated personnel
must learn the meaning of the National Revolution.... The police must be
led by progressive cadres." Nevertheless, the mobile brigade,-national
police force, is regarded as the most reliable of the Indonesian government
security forces and there is no evidence of Communist success at subversion,
VIII. COM1J ST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
ALtar , the national news agency is believed to be influenced by
either Partai Murba, a so-called "nationalist Communist" party, or by the
PKI,1 and a number of newspapers, avowedly independent, are believed to be
operated by PKI members or sympathizers. Nevertheless, the fact that the
Communists advocate many of the same issues that form part of the
programs of major non-Communist parties and Con mmist publications share many opinions
with the non-Communist majority of the press makes it difficult to assess
Communist influence on public opinion formation. It would seem that the
influence exerted by the Communists on public opinion media is limited and
of much less importance than the impact on public opinion of the activities
of Communist-dominated front organizations.
1. Adam Malik, head of Antares is thought to be a member of Partai Murba, but
the possibility exists that Murba itself is today a PKI front. In any
case, attitudes of the two parties on most issues are similar,.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
IX. CC UNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Past experience indicates that attempts at infiltrating all political
parties are probably made by the PKI. In.1948, several leading members of
the Socialist and Labor parties joined the PKI in the Madiun rebellion pro-
claiming themselves to have been Communists for a number of years. Little
concrete information is available, however, to support the above assumption.
Partai Mur_gb , which describes itself as "nationalist-Communist," has
a program that differs from that of the PKI only in refusing to subscribe
to a world Communist order. P~ Murba cannot be described as Titoist or
Trotskyist, since it acknowledges a position of world leadership for the
USSR. has four seats in Parliament, and has its own series of labor
unions and front organizations. Failure of the PKI strongly to attack Murrba
suggests the possibility that since the death of its founder, Tan Ma]aka.,
who strongly opposed the PKI, the party may have been infiltrated by PKI
members.
X. C 4IUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Newspapers and Periodicals
B Herah (.Red Star) is the official publication of the PKI.
Formerly restricted to Party members B_t nn Herah is now available to
the general public, but its circulation is not Down. The- most important
of the other Communist newspapers is Sin Po, with a Chinese edition of
about 20,000 circulation and an Indonesian edition of about 15,000 cir-
culation. There are seven other known communist dailies, none of which
is believed to have a large circulation. In addition, a large number of
Communist or pri.st books and pamphlets are sold at virtually all
bookstores in Indonesia.
B. Publishing Houses
B Merah and all important PKI propaganda publications, in.-
cluding translations of foreign Communist writings, now are published by
the. Jaiasan Pembaruan (Modern Institute) in Djakarta, a corporation in
which the PKI is reported to have a financial interest. Jaiasan Pembaruan
may have replaced the translating committee Komisi Penterdjemah) formed.
in March 1951 by members of the Politburo. This committee was charged
with translating books and essays on Communist theory such as Lenin's
State. and Revolution, and Liu Shao-ch'i'c On the Party. Three other
known Communist publishing houses are the "Widjaja" publishing house
and the Life Press Publishing Company, both in Djakarta, and the.Hwang...
Lung (Yellow Dragon) Publishing Company in Makassar.
C. Ccumunist Propaganda from Abroad
The Soviet magazine Nej Times and the Soviet novel Star, both in
English, have been seen on sale in Medan, Sumatra. Other specific foreign
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 33 -
Communist publications available in Indonesia are not known., but trans].a-
tion of Soviet writings is a constant part of PKI propaganda efforts, and
a great number of Chinese Communist publications, including textbooks, are
distributed among both the Chinese and Indonesian comumities.
The Soviet radio devotes one hour a day and Pei ping radio a half
hour. daily to broadcasts in Indonesian. The effectiveness of these programs,
which is difficult to judge, is limited by the fact that only-about 230,000
radio sets are registered in Indonesia. --
II. FINANCIAL CONDITI
Party dues are collected monthly on a sliding scale in proportion
to income, but do not exceed 1- percent of gross income. Details concern-
ing other sources of Party revenues, including possible subsidies from
abroad are not known. The PKI has had some difficulty in the past in
financing its publications, but organizational capabilities of the party
do not seem to have been hampered by want of funds. Demonstrations or-
ganized by the PSI and its affiliates appear well-supplied with posters,
etc. It does not appear that the party will suffer in the foreseeable;
future from financial difficulties.
XII. SOVIET_SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Neither the USSR nor the East European satellites maintain diplo
matic missions in Indonesia. There is a Taos representative and a Czech
consul-general in Djakarta, however, both of whom are reported to be en-
gaged in political activity.
Commmist China has an embassy in Djakarta and consulates at
Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, Banjermasin, and Djogjakarta. The.embassy
staff is reported limited to fifteen persons, and in July 1951 the Indonesian
government refused the entry of sixteen additional members. No details are
available concerning the consulate staffs.
In 1951 the Chinese Communist representatives were active in or-
ganizing demonstrations on the part of the Chinese community. The poor
reception accorded this activity by many Indonesians has caused greater
restraint to be exercised so that the band of the Chinese Communist embassy
in such affairs in the past year has not been obvious.
There is no Soviet-Indonesian Friendship Association, and the
Chinese-Indonesian Friendship Association appears to have been superseded
by the People's Cultural League, the size of which is not known.
SECRET --SECURITY INFORMATION.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 11,...
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
No meetings of Communist international organizations have been held
in Indonesia.'
The following is a list of meetings of Communist international or-
ganizations held abroad, which are )mown to have been attended by Indonesian
Communists during the past two years:
Meeting
International Students Union
Executive meeting, Peiping
World Federation of Democratic
Youth Executive meeting,
Budapest
lste Known Size Indonesian
Representation
April 1951 1
May 1951 1
World Federation of Trade Unions
Conference,. Vienna
Berlin Youth Festival
World Federation of Democratic
Youth Annual Council Meeting,
Berlin
Moscow Economic Conference
International Student Conference,
Bucharest
World Peace Council, Berlin
Peiping Peace Conference
Netherlands Communist Party
Congress
Vienna Peace Congress
Czech Communist Party Cbngress,
Prague
July 1951 2
August 1951 53
August 1951
April 1952
July-August 1952 unknown
July 1952 unknown
September 1952 about 10
November 1952 2
December 1952 16
December 1952 2
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-15-
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NE MORK
Close relations are maintained by the PKI with the Communist
parties in the USSRR, the Netherlands, and Commnuiiat China. Leaders of
the PKI have received training in these three countries, and, as noted
above, Samaun, one of the founders of the PKI is in Moscow.
Perhaps the most striking example of compliance with international
Communist directives took place in 1948. Indonesian delegates to the
Congress of the Communist Party of India and the Calcutta Youth Congress
held early that year reported home the adoption of a policy of armed in-
surrection. In September, following also the return of Muso, Samaun'a
lieutenant, from Moscow, the PKI instigated the Madiun rebellion.
A more recent example of direction from abroad was the criticism
of SOBSI by WFTU representatives at the 1952 SOBSI national congress for
not maintaining proper liaison with WFTU international headquarters and
il
t
a
.
for failing to report SOBSI activities in sufficient de
Representatives of WFTU and foreign Commuunist trade unions have
ng from
attended past congresses of SOBSI, and a sixteen man delegation
held
Peiping is known to have been present at the national you
in Djakarta in November 1952. Apart from liaison that is assumed to take
place at such meetings, it is believed that the Chinese Communist embassy
is used as a channel of communication for the PKI.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-665.!
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MALAYA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . . 1
'I. Objectives ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ASSETS ... . . . . . . ... . . 5
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 5
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action . 5
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 7
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . .. . 9
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . . 9
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . 10
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
CCUMUNISM IN MALAYA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
Communist guerrillas, 95 percent of whom are Malayan Chinese,
have been carrying out hit-and-run warfare against the British and
their supporters in the Federation of Malaya since mid-1948, when
the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its fronts and labor organiza-
tions were banned. Documents captured near the beginning of the
guerrilla campaign'indicated that the objective of the MCP was to
drive the British out of Malaya. This was to be accomplished in
three successive phases by:
1) disrupting the economy
2) setting up governments in "liberated" areas
3) joining up liberated areas.
The inability-of the party to achieve its first goal --
disruption of the economy -- in the first three years of the campaign
has according to other, more recent, captured documents, brought
about a revision of party policy from one of indiscriminate and un-
bridled terrorist activity to an attempt to guide guerrilla warfare
away from activities harmful to the interests of workers and peasants
and toward military targets. This move, combined with others, is
calculated to broaden the base of party support.
MCP recognition of the necessity for this changed course of
action has aroused some speculation, unsupported by any evidence,
that the party, in admitting this initial failure, may also have
reached the conclusion that it is incapable of achieving its ultimate
objective through its-own efforts, but must preserve itself as a
guerrilla force until an outside power can undertake the "liberation"
of Malaya.
During the past six months it has become increasingly apparent
from the lessened number and changed character of terrorist incidents
that the MCP, probably in response to progressively more effective
pressure by British Security Forces, has put into effect its new
strategic policies. The MCP's aim -- to gain the support of laborers
and peasants -- has required modification, rather than abandonment,
of guerrilla warfare tactics. A party directive indicates that
military and police targets may be attacked, but that the destruction
of dwellings and public utilities, and the seizure of food without
compensation is to be discontinued. The destruction of mine and
estate property is also prohibited, since it affects the livelihood
of laborers. Urban organizations, particularly labor unions, are to
be infiltrated or, if necessary, secret unions formed.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
The MCP's chief guerrilla organization, the Malayan Races
Liberation Army (MRLA) is estimated to have from 3,000 to 5,000
members. Grouped into twelve regiments, the MRLA.usually utilizes
the company or the platoon as its operating unit. The MRLA is
supported by the MIN YUEN, or Peoples Movement, which is
responsible for furnishing supplies, intelligence, and recruits to
the MRLA. Rather than a single organization, the MIN YUEN is a
collection of organizations controlled by party executives for work
among the masses. Among the MIN YUEN organizations are groups of
armed men-numbering about 4,000, cooperating closely with the
MRLA. It is through MIN YUEN organizations that intelligence is
secured, men recruited, and funds obtained. While some financial
support comes from regular contributions by members'of MIN YUEN
organizations., the bulk of the funds collected apparently comes
from the "protection" money paid by Chinese businessmen, estate
owners, and tin mine operators. The MIN YUEN probably numbers
upwards of 10,000 members.
MCP activity capitalizes on anti-British sentiment and, to
some extent, the economic rivalry between the Malayan Chinese and
the paramount British economic group. Since 1949 the nationalist
character of the party has been stressed in propaganda., but there
is little indication that this line has been effective.
Despite the receipt of one small shipment of arms from
Thailand, there is no evidence that the MCP regularly receives
material aid from outside Malaya. There is reason to believe,
however, that some trained leaders have been infiltrated from
China. Propaganda circulated covertly by the party'follows the
lead of Peiping and Moscow broadcasts for the most part and it
is likely that these broadcasts serve as one of the chief means
of liaison between the MCP and both these Communist centers.
Malaya is not characterized by the existence of either a
strong unified nationalist movement or depressed economic condi-
tions that could be exploited by the Communists. The guerrillas
do not have widespread public sympathy, and the movement appears
to be inspired by a hard core of Communists acting in response to
the policies of international Communism. The party has sustained
itself largely by intimidation of the Malayan Chinese community.
The recent change in-the MCP's strategic policy away from wide-
spread terroristic activity and the intimidation of peasants and
laborers is in part at least an admission of the failure of this
course of action. The effectiveness of new emphasis on gaining
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
the support of peasants and. laborers, conducting a more selective
terrorist campaign, and infiltrating labor unions and other
organizations, cannot yet be evaluated.
Over the past four years the British, utilizing military
political, psychological, and socio-economic measures, have
'successfully contained but have failed to suppress the Communists.
In addition-to the difficulties of guerrilla warfare in the jungle,
the failure of the Malayan Chinese to cooperate in the anti-guerrilla
campaign, political apathy, and the lack of a Malayan national
consciousness have contributed to the inability of the British to
eradicate the guerrillas.
The diversity of Malaya's population has prevented the
development of a national consciousness and hampered British attempts
to arouse an anti-Coimnunist spirit based on nationalism. The
largest elements of the population, the Malays (49 percent) and the
Chinese (38 percent) form separate, mutually antagonistic communi-
ties. Major causes of the friction are the Malay fear of eventual
domination by the energetic Chinese whom they regard as alien, and
the Chinese resentment of the favored position traditionally accord-
ed the Malays by the British.
In contrast with the non-committal attitude of the Chinese
toward the present struggle, the Malays support the British,
forming the bulk of the police and staffing most of the lower
echelon administrative posts. Traditionally oriented toward China
as the Motherland, the Malayan Chinese have sought to preserve
Chinese culture through their schools and their family life.
Loyalty to the Motherland is basically cultural rather than political,
however, and the majority of Malayan Chinese are committed neither
to the Communist regime in Peiping nor to the Nationalists in
Taipei. Apart from a few leaders, political apathy has extended to
Malayan affairs, the primary Malayan Chinese interest in Malaya being
.commercial. The Malayan Chinese attitude is also due to the
emergence of a strong government in China to which the overseas
Chinese feel that they may eventually be able to look for protection
of their interests; to the fact that the majority of the Communist
guerrillas are Chinese; and to the British failure to demonstrate
clearly the ability to eradicate the guerrillas. Moreover, the
Chinese fear local reprisals should they aid the British, or the
punishment of their relatives or the confiscation of their property
in China should they openly support an anti-Communist drive.
The new Communist course of action is likely to pose new
problems to the British, particularly since the infiltration of
labor unions is to be attempted. Nevertheless, it is likely that
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY.INFORLATION
the British, now organized more effectively and imbued with better
morale under the leadership of Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, will
continue as during the past year to make slow progress against the
guerrillas. It is unlikely, however, that the British will be
able to wipe out the guerrillas completely; at the same time it is
improbable that the guerrillas, without outside aid, can make the
British position untenable. The eventual outcome of Malaya's
Communist problem is probably to a large extent dependent upon
events outside Malaya.
SECRET - SECURITY INFOM TION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
Although more than l5,000 persons, or about 0.3 percent of
Malaya's population, are controlled or strongly influenced by Communism,
the MCP itself is estimated to have only 3,000 to 6,000 members drawn
almost wholly from the'peasant and laborer class of the Malayan Chinese
community. Some 600 to 800 members are estimated to constitute the "hard
core" of the party and to have been active in the MCP for more than ten
years. During World War II, these hard core members took part in the
British-aided guerrilla organization known as the Malayan People's Anti-
Japanese Army. Probably not more than 1,000 members have been associated
with the party for more than five years.
The actual leaders of the MCP are virtually unknown, but from the
fact of continued guerrilla resistance over the past four years and from
the statements of surrendered guerrillas it would appear that these
leaders are determined.,-aggressive., well-trained men. Despite the strong
leadership of the party, however, some of the rank and file members have
become discouraged at the continual hardships of life in the jungle and
have surrendered to British Security Forces. Nevertheless, few of those
surrendering have been associated with the movement for a long period,
and it is probable that the hard core of the party has remained virtually
intact for the past four years.
-5-
COMMUNISM IN MALAYA: ASSETS
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
No general elections have been held in the Federation of Malaya.
The MCP, banned in mid-1948, has, of course, entered no candidates in the
few municipal elections. that have been held.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Communist forces are estimated to consist of 3,000 to 5,000
members of the Malayan Races Liberation Party (MRLA) and approximately
4,000 armed members of MIN YUEN organizations. Despite guerrilla
casualties in surrendered, captured and killed, amounting to half the
estimated Communist force over the past four years, total guerrilla
strength continues to be set at a constant level by British sources
because of steady recruitment by the guerrillas. Lack of arms apparently
prevents any expansion of guerrilla forces.
All Communist support organizations, necessarily covert, are
blanketed into the MIN YUEN or People's Movement. It is from these
organizations that the MRLA receives recruits, funds, food, and
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-6-
information. The MIN YUEN has a strength estimated at 10,000 or more.
MIN YUEN organizations and their functions are: .
1. Self Protection Units -- to supply food
2. Protection Corps -- to sabotage and ambush
3. Armed Work Force -- to propagandize and organize
4. District Unit -- to propagandize and organize
5. Suicide Squad --- to assassinate reactionary leaders
6. Labor Protection Corps -- to lead strikes, to sabotage,
to propagandize
7. Reserve Corps -- to train executives
8. Executive Committee of the Masses -- to gather information
and food
9. Sympathizers Cells -- to train prospective party members,
to gather funds and food, and to act as couriers.
The guerrillas have employed hit-and-run tactics against police
stations and villages, ambushed patrols, sabotaged transportation and
public utilities, and attacked rubber estates and mines. Newly adopted
tactics will, according to a captured directive, confine such attacks
to military and police targets, or to the property of "reactionary
capitalists." In the past, the guerrillas have received support because
of their ability to intimidate the rural and to some extent the urban
populations. However, the recent resettlement of some 400,000 Chinese
"squatters," who were living on the fringe of the jungle, into controlled
and protected "new villages" has removed one major source of guerrilla
support. Henceforth, the guerrillas must rely more upon Malay villagers,
estate labor, and urban dwellers. Whether the newly adopted policy of
paying for, rather than simply requisitioning food, and of safeguarding
the interests of peasants and laborers will prove effective in winning
voluntary support remains to be seen.
The guerrillas have been unsuccessful in achieving the economic
disruption of Malaya, but their tactics have nevertheless affected
adversely the economies of both Malaya and the United Kingdom. Prospecting,
on which the future of the tin industry in part depends, has been prevented
for the past four years.. Rubber trees have been slashed, and a large-
scale program of replanting made impossible. Nevertheless, current
production has not been seriously affected, and it will probably be a
number of years before Malayan production feels the full affect of the
present situation.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The expense of the anti-guerrilla campaign to the Federation
has prevented the undertaking of needed economic development projects,
while the expense of maintaining troops in Malaya and of contributing
to extraordinary expenses of local government has constituted a
financial drain on the United Kingdom.
Guerrilla warfare has hampered the rapid achievement of political
innovations desired by the populace and sponsored by the government as a
means of encouraging Malayan nationalism as an anti-Communist force.
Thus, while political progress toward autonomy has been slowed by
guerrilla warfare, it is the opinion of high-ranking officials that
political advance is nevertheless imperative if Malaya is to remain
non-Communist.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Government banned the MCP, its fronts,-and its labor organiza-
tion in mid-1918, when it also adopted Emergency Regulations placing
extraordinary powers in the hands of the administration. British Security
Forces consist of about 10,000 soldiers and 60,000 regular and special
police. In addition, a part-time Home Guard of 140,000 has been recruited.
The Home Guard and most of the special police are employed on static
guard duty. In addition to the military campaign, the Government has
undertaken special measures under the Emergency Regulations, as well as
broader social, political, and economic steps designed to create a
climate unfavorable to the growth of. Communism.
By the end of 1952, more than 100,000 Chinese "squatters" living
on the edges of the jungle and beyond administrative control had been
moved to protected "new villages" beyond the easy reach of Communist
forces that had been intimidating them as a means of getting food,
funds, and information. During 1952, as in previous years, several
thousand Malayan Chinese and a lesser number of Indians were deported
from Malaya, and additional thousands were detained. Moreover, in
several instances entire villages were punished for refusing information
to Security Forces or ignoring warnings to cease sheltering or feeding
guerrillas. Under the Emergency Regulations all inhabitants have been
required to carry identity cards; carrying arms without a license has
been made a capital offense; the movement of food has been restricted;
pro-Communist newspapers have been banned; and the solicitation of
money or food for the guerrillas has been made a capital offense. An
additional important regulation has placed in the hands of a comptroller
the power to direct any person into the police or military forces or to.
perform any other duty.
The announced British aim has been to guide the colonial
territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth
and, as a means to that end, to do everything possible to establish
the required economic and social conditions. The Federation Government's
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
efforts in this direction has been given a sense of urgency by the
belief of high-ranking Federation officials that such measures will
provide a long term solution to the problem of Communism. Inter-
racial harmony is seen as a prerequisite to the development of Malayan
nationalism, and organizations, including political parties, embracing
all communities in Malaya have been encouraged. Local elections have
been held in several municipalities, while some public members (as
opposed to government officials) of the Legislative Council have been
given respon3ibility for government departments as a first step toward
cabinet government. Citizenship provisions have been relaxed to allow
a much larger number of Malayan Chinese to qualify, and agreement has
been reached that a certain proportion of Malayan Chinese will be
allowed in the Malayan Civil Service. In the field of education,
regarded as a critical element in "Malayanizing" the Chinese, the
decision has been taken to establish national schools based on the
Malay and English languages.
Economic development, although slowed by the present guerrilla
prcblem, has aimed at expanding the national income by improving and
diversifying agricultural production, encouraging light industry, and
improving power supply and communication.
Propaganda measures, both with the guerrillas and with the
civilian population, have been intensified recently. Leaflets, posters,
radio, and mobile public address systems are used. One of the most
effective measures has been the use of surrendered guerrillas to recite
their unfortunate experiences with the Communists to a group of villagers.
The recent change in tactics by the MCP would seen to indicate
that measures taken by the Government have,.at a minimum, been effective
in containing the guerrillas. The party's new tactics, however, will
force the Government to adopt new methods, particularly since the in-
filtration of labor unions is to be attempted. Since police training
has been directed toward the conduct of operations rather than the
collection of intelligence it is possible that the new Communist methods
may achieve some success before being checked by the Security Forces..
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
A policy of encouraging responsible trade unionism was inaugurated
shortly after World War II in Malaya. In the early stages, the Malayan
Communist Party gained control of the labor movement, organized general
labor unions on a regional basis and finally established a top-level
executive body known as the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions
(PMFTU), which claimed affiliation with the World Federation of Trade
Unions. The P1FTU was declared illegal in June 1948. Subsequently,
many unions rapidly disintegrated. and many labor leaders went underground.
Despite the fact that organized labor remains a Communist target,
the Federation Government continues to encourage trade unionism as a
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-9-
means of developing social responsibility and combatting Communism.
Under government guidance, trade unions have been rebuilt and a modest
nucleus of non-Communist unions now exists as a basis for further
expansion. A Malayan Trade Union Council, which was formed in March 1950,
subsequently affiliated with the International Confederation of Trade
Unions.
. No labor unions in Malaya are known to be Communist infiltrated
at the present time and no Communist influence on the leadership has
been observed. While Communists have forced strikes among rubber
tappers in certain areas of Malaya, Communist pressure was exerted
from outside the unions rather than from within.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL. CULTURAL. AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
There have been no indications of Communist influence in social,
cultural, or professional organizations. It is highly probable, however,
that there has been some Communist infiltration of Chinese secret societies.
.VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
There is no known Communist infiltration into the Government
of the Federation of Malaya.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
There is some evidence pointing to the infiltration of the
faculties of Chinese schools by operatives of the Chinese Communist Party.
The placement of'pro-,Communist teachers in Chinese schools appears to
have been accomplished at times with the connivance of school trustees.
Such infiltration appears to be designed not only to spread Communist
doctrine but to recruit students to go to China for completion of their
education.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
There is no known Communist infiltration of any of the Malayan
political parties.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Publications of the MCP, usually attributed to various of the
District Committees, are mimeographed news sheets circulated clandestinely
or covertly posted in a public place. Publications which have appeared
with some regularity include Freedom NNeews, Workers' ress, and Workerst
and Students' News. The numbers copies c rrccuu ated i s own.
At one time, large numbers of Communist or pro-Communist Chinese
publications were imported from Hong Kong. The police, however, have
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
10 -
now undertaken to prevent such trade, and overt importation has ceased.
There is presumably some clandestine circulation of such publications.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
No information concerning the financial condition of the MCP
is available.
XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Neither the USSR and its European satellites, nor the Pei-p'ing
regime, maintain diplcmatic, trade, or cultural missions in the Federation
of Malaya.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
No Communist international organizations maintain installations
within Malaya, and no conferences of such organizations have been held
in Malaya.. Communist sources have reported the presence of.Malayan
representatives at meetings of various Communist international organiza-
tions. Since 19148, however, these representatives have been Chinese
who at one time lived in Malaya. No representatives have left Malaya
specifically to attend a particular meeting, or could be said to represent
any particular Malayan organization. Many have been deportees.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The MCP is thought to maintain its closest ties with Communist
organizations in Thailand, and in Sumatra, Indonesia, and with the
Chinese Communist Party. It is assumed that at the present time
instructions to the MCP are relayed through Pei-p'ing and Moscow radios,
which have not only given propaganda support to.the MCP but have, prior
to the adoption of a new propaganda line by the MCP, indicated what
that line should be.
The beginning of a campaign of violence in 19148, already favored
by some MCP leaders, was given impetus by the decisions of the Second
Congress of the Communist Party of India, held concurrently with the
Calcutta Youth Festival sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic
Youth and the International Union of Students in early 19148.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.5
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . . . 1
I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 1
Ii. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
IV. Supplementary Data. on the Chinese Communists
in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action . 6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . ... . 7
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . 7
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . . 8
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . . . 9
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties 9
X. Communist Propaganda Media 9
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . 10
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . 10
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . 10
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The leadership of the Philippine Communist Party apparently does
not believe that the situation will favor a drive for immediate power for
some years to come. They regard the present period as a preparatory one
and place main emphasis on organizational and propaganda work. Their
principal immediate objectives in rough order of priority, appear to be:
1. To win over the masses to the Commmmist cause.
2. To discredit anti-Communist parties and leaders.
3. To weaken the close ties existing between the
Philippines and the US.
4. To prevent further dissipation of the party's
military arm.
Although the Philippine Communists consider the workers and the
landless peasants as the backbone of their movement and plan to concentrate
their organizational propaganda efforts on them, they are also striving to
enlist the support of bourgeois groups with a popular front program. In
order to facilitate its work of laying a basis for a seizure of power, the
Philippine Communist Party has outlined a program calling for the intensifica-
tion of what it calls "legal" and "illegal" activities among the masses.
(Although all Communist activities are illegal in the Philippines and have
been driven underground, the Communists consider as illegal only their
military activities and activities directly relating to the support of
their military arm.) Their program consists of (1) revival of popular
front political parties; (2) infiltration of cadres into Government agencies.,-
i.e.... schools, military forces, into strategic industries, and into or-
ganizations and groups, i.e., labor unions, peasant organizations, women's
and youth organizations, etc.; (3) increased indoctrination of the rank and
file of the movement; and (4) intensification of propaganda activities.
Party planning apparently envisages the possible negotiation of an amnesty
settlement with the Goverment which would enable it to expand its non-
military activities. Tactics for the 1953 Presidential and Congressional
elections seem to call for support to candidates allegedly sympathetic to
Communism.
Communist propaganda planning calls for an intensification of the
"peace" and "national independence" themes. "Peace" appears designed to
bring about a weakening of public support for the Government's anti-Communist
policies in both the domestic and foreign fields. "National independence"
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFOFOIATION
will attempt to place blame for all the ills of the Philippines on US
policies and US influence on its "puppets" -- the major Philippine political
parties. The Communists are charging that US military and economic aid
programs are disadvantageous to the Philippine masses. Both themes are
to be infused into all party activities and, with suitable adaptations,
directed to all classes of the populace.
Communists are using their military arm, the People's Liberation
Army (HMB), for disrupting Government operations, e.g. assassinations of
prominent anti-Communists, sabotaging the economy, procuring supplies, and
as an agency for recruiting the more violent malcontents among the masses.
At present, however, a policy of conserving HIS strength and limiting its
operations appears to be in effect. It may be that in the face of continued
Government pressures and in order to gain from the Government freedom of
operation for their organizational and propaganda programs, Philippine
Communists might further reduce their military activities.
III. CAPABILITIES
The Philippine Communist Party, which in 1950 was strong enough to
carry on widespread and well-coordinated armed rebellion, had by 1953 reached
a low point in revolutionary potential and no longer constituted a serious
threat to the Philippine Government. The party's once formidable military
arm, the 11MB, now has capabilities for only small-scale raids and ambuscades,
while the party is reduced to attempts to infiltrate and organize front
groups in the face of very severe government repressive measures. Moreover,
the party is suffering from a serious shortage of capable executives and
theoreticians, its organizational apparatus is scattered and harassed by
increasingly effective Government intelligence operations, its propaganda
output is small and distributed with difficulty, and its finances are in a
precarious state.
Whether the PKP can again develop sufficient strength to threaten the
stability of the Philippine Government depends mostly on factors outside the
control of the PKP. For the future strength or weakness of the PKP hinges
on (1) whether or not the Philippine Government continues its strong anti-
Communist programs; (2) whether or not the US can maintain effective eoo-
nomic and military aid to the Philippines; and (3) whether or not the
Philippine Government increases its efforts to alleviate social and economic
ills. In the event of fraudulent elections in 1953 with accompanying civil
disorders and a loss of popular support for the Government, or the accom-
modation of one or the other major political parties to amnesty negotiations,
a situation probably would be created in which short term Commumist objec-
tives and planning could operate with a fair degree of success. However,
Communist tactics and planning appear to envisage a lengthy period of
time as necessary before they will be in a position to effectively challenge
the Philippine Government with a resurgence of their military arm and
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFO) ATION
widespread mass support. With the uncertainties at present threatening
the continuance of a strong anti-Communist policy on the part of some
Government leaders, and in the absence of an effective Government reform
program, it appears that the defensive strategy of the pKF is well suited
to Philippine conditions through 1953.
IV. SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE CHINESE CCBIIUNISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Because of excellent security practices, very little information re
available concerning the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the Chinese
Communists in the Philippines. Nevertheless, to judge by their known ac-
tivities, their objectives include the following:
1. To gain the loyalty and financial support of the
Chinese community -- numbering about 200,000 --
for the Chinese Communist cause, and, conversely,
to subvert and discredit Kuomintang forces in the
Philippines;
2. To construct an effective espionage network;
3. In general, to establish a firm mass base for more
violent revolutionary action in the future, and;
4. To support the Philippine Communist movement in any
manner which does not jeopardize fulfillment of the
first three objectives. Available evidence indicates
that the Chinese Coinmmnists in the Philippines place
highest priority on the objectives involving the
Chinese community.
In order to attain these goals, Chinese Communists employ a variety
of tactics, including infiltration, some terrorism, and propaganda. Up to
now, Chinese Communists have concentrated on infiltration of Chinese or-
ganizations, particularly secret societies, chambers of commerce, and
schools. However, some Chinese Communist infiltration of intelligence
agencies of the Philippine Government has been reported. Chinese Communists
extort contributions from rich Chinese merchants by threats of violence to
them or their relatives in China. Some propaganda materials, most of which
apparently are smuggled into the country, are distributed among the Chinese
oommmity.
Apparently, the Chinese C,om~munists in the Philippines still have
fairly considerable capacity for future espionage, infiltration, and
propaganda activities. The Philippine Government round-up of Chinese
Communist suspects in December 1952 evidently did not cause material
damage to the Chinese Communist apparatus in the Philippines. Nevertheless,
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
the Philippine Government and the Kuomintang organization in the Philippines
are united in opposition to Chinese Communist activity there. The great
majority of the Chinese in the Philippines apparently are either anti-
Communist or politically neutral. The ability of Chinese Communists in
the Philippines for forming front groups or labor unions is, very limited.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
COMMUNISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: ASSETS
1. NUMERICAL STRFaTGTH
The membership of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) probably
numbers about 3,000 to 5,000. There are about 8,000 to 10,000 Huks,
the Peoples' Liberation Army or military arm of the PKP, who are not
PKP members and an estimated 40,000 members of Communist-dominated
mass organizations. The number of people influenced by partial, but
significant, Communist infiltration of non-Communist organizations is
unknown.. Altogether, Communists and those strongly influenced by
Communism are estimated to account for 0.2 percent to one percent of
the total population. Chinese Communists are estimated to number
2,000-3,000 but there are no data on the number of members of
organizations controlled or influenced by them. PKP membership
increased from 1946 to 1950 but declined during 1951 and 1952; there
has been a great increase in Chinese Communist strength since 1946.
Approximately 90 percent of PKP members and following are located
in Central and Southern Luzon with the balance in Northern Luzon and
scattered localities in the Visayas and Mindanao. The leadership has
come primarily from Manila, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan in
Central Luzon. Chinese Communists are primarily in Manila and the towns
and cities of Southern Luzon, Cebu, and Iloilo. The bulk of the PKP
membership and sympathizers are peasants while Chinese Communists are
primarily merchants, school teachers, and administrators.
Party members are for the most part poorly indoctrinated in
Communist theory,. have little education, but as a result of continuing
governmental suppressive action, are probably reduced now to a loyal
and hard working core. Morale and discipline among ordinary party
members is generally good, although some instances of financial dis-
honesty and sexual profligacy have occurred. The fanatical well-
indoctrinated "hard core" probably amounts to 20 percent in the case
of the PKP and 30 percent for the Chinese Communists. In the case of
the PKP, few have been members more than ten years.
The top leaders of the PKP apparently are not of high caliber
but the Chinese are of generally good quality. According to William
Pomeroy, the.American Communist who served with the Huks for two years,
the various leaders displayed poor executive ability, poor ideological
training, or lack of flexibility. Taken as a group, the PKP leadership
has suffered from shortages of good executives,and theoreticians since
at least 1948. On the other hand, most top PKP leaders are hard
working, resourceful, and hardened by the conditions of harassment
under which they live. They-have close connections with the common
people and are responsive to their motivations. For the most part they
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
are fairly young men in their late thirties or forties, and many have
had only military experience during World War II and afterward as an
occupational background.
The Communist Party is not a legal political party in the
Philippines and cannot run candidates on a ticket of its own. During
the last general elections the PKP called for a boycott of the
elections. Chinese Communists in the Philippines apparently do not vote
and do not have an electoral strategy.
All political parties in the Philippines receiving votes in the,
last elections are avowedly anti-Communist.
The military arm of the PKP, the Peoples" Liberation Army (HMB)
or Huks, numbers between 8,000-10,000. Not all of these are active at
any one time. Approximately half are farmers who only occasionally
participate in Bilk raids, ambuscades, etc. BMB units operate as
guerrillas with the strength of individual bands varying between five
and 100. They have no heavy weapons but an ample supply of small arms
in fair to poor condition. So far as is known, the HUB receives no
military support from outside the Philippines but may receive military
advice from China. However, there is no definite information on the
number or duties of Chinese Communists operating with the HUB..
Opposed by approximately 23,000 government troops, the HMB
retains capabilities for small scale raids, ambuscades, kidnappings,
assassinations, and the dissemination of Communist propaganda. As a
result of their depredations, nearly one-third of total government
expenditures goes to the armed services. While the HMB does not threaten
the stability of the government, they nevertheless are a drain on its
financial resources, hinder economic development, and tend to disrupt
the food supply situation.
HMB strength and activity is concentrated in Central and Southern
Luzon; their plans for expanding operations in the central and southern
islands apparently have been abandoned for the present. In the face of
the increased effectiveness of government military action against them,
it is doubtful whether the HMB can expand its activities in the near
future unless in the event of a fraudulent national election in 1953.
HMB operations are hindered also by the improved discipline of the
Philippine Army which has had the result of gaining the cooperation of
many townspeople and peasants. While a sizeable number of local
residents in Central Luzon remain sympathetic with the HMB or are
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
fearful of HMB reprisals, large numbers are now supporting the Army's
efforts to eliminate HMB activities. Still, approximately 40,000
members of PKP mass organizations and Communist sympathizers aid the
HMB in the collection of intelligence, procure food and recruits, work
at HMB "production bases" in the Sierra Madres where root crops are
grown, or act as couriers. They enable the HMB to sustain its present
rather low level of activity.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TGNARD COMMUNISM
The Philippine Government and both major political parties are
anti-Communist and no overt Communist activities are permitted. Although
the PKP has not been outlawed by Congress, in 1951 a Philippine Court
ruled that the PKP was a seditious and illegal association. Although
this decision has been appealed, the Supreme Court probably will uphold
the lower court's ruling. In any event, all PKP members and members of
auxiliary organizations are subject to arrest. All front organizations
are underground and severely hampered by government agencies. In areas
of the Philippines where Communists are most active, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail is denied to them. All
Chinese Communist activities are also forbidden and individual Chinese
Communists are subject to deportation to Taiwan on the sole grounds of
Communist membership.
Very little is known of the "underground" activities of Filipino
or Chinese Communists. PKP organizations apparently are poorly trained
and organized and with the exceptions of aiding Huks, collecting
intelligence, and passing on word of mouth propaganda, do not appear
to be very active.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
During 1951, Communist influence in the Philippine Labor move-
ment was reduced drastically, and at present there are no Communist
unions or known significant infiltration of labor unions or key
industries: The possibility of Communist infiltration exists. Party
members have been ordered to make lists including all factories, the
organizational status of laborers and leaders therein, and the problems
of the laborers.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL,
AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Communist front organizations apparently have been identified
by the government and driven deeply underground in the Philippines.
There appears to be no known significant infiltration of non-Communist
organizations by Philippine Communists.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Since the suppression by the government of the large front labor
organizations in 1951, the largest mass organization probably has been
the National Peasants Union. It has an estimated 4,000-10,000 members
located mostly in Central Luzon and was formerly the largest peasants'
organization. For the type of organization it is, it appears to have
had good leadership, and were the present severe restrictive measures
of the government to be relaxed, it probably could be considerably
expanded.
Two other known Communist mass organizations are the National
Women's League and the National Youth League. In 1951, the former
had a reported membership of 1,500 and the latter 2,200, but again,
these organizations are underground and very little is known of their
present activities.
All known Chinese Communist organizations have gone underground.
These include the Hwa Chi Comrades Association, the Anti-Japanese and
Anti-Collaborators League, and the K'ang Fan. There appears to have been
a significant infiltration of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in several
cities and reports indicate a possible infiltration of the leading
Chinese anti-Communist association -- the Anti-Communist Anti-Soviet
Salvation Association.
Present Communist planning calls for the organization and infil-
tration of various mass organizations -- youth, women, intellectuals,
etc., but to date there is no indication that they have made significant
progress with these plans. From Cavite Province comes a report that a
'"peace" organization (Katahimikan ng Mahirap - Peace for the Poor) was
being organized.
Party theory conceives of two main types of infiltration
activities: "legal" and "illegal." "Legal" infiltration activities
consist of working toward a policy-making position within an organiza-
tion, subtly exerting influence on its policies, and standing-by to
replace an "illegal" cadre if the latter.is arrested. "Illegal"
activities include industrial sabotage and recruitment of new members
for the HUB. A party member sometimes engages in both types of
activities simultaneously.
There is no known significant infiltration of the government by
Communists. That some infiltration has occurred was evidenced by the
court conviction in May 1951 of an official of the Department of Foreign
Affairs for participation in the Communist rebellion, and in 1952, of a
Nacionalista Congressman on a similar charge. There are reports of
suspected Communist sympathies on the part of fairly prominent
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Administration officials, but these have not been confirmed. In the
past there has also been some Chinese Communist infiltration of the
Military Intelligence Service.
There is no known Philippine Communist influence in Philippine
public-opinion-forming circles, although a few journalists are reported
to hold views sympathetic to Communism. There is some Chinese Communist.
penetration of Chinese schools and possibly one radio station.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST
POLITICAL PARTIES
There is no known Communist infiltration of the non-Communist
Philippine political parties.
Current Communist periodicals are the Mapagpalaya (The Liberator),
Titis (the Spark), and Freedom. They appear at uncertain intervals and
none probably has a circulation exceeding 10,000. They are clandestinely
mimeographed in several or perhaps all-Party Regions at HMB camps.
Information on Chinese Communist publications is not available.
Two publications, Hungary, and The Working Youth in the Rumanian
People's Republic, have been received unsolicited by individuals in
Manila and Dumaguete and by the Philippine Education Company. There is
no regular importing of Communist publications from abroad, but
occasionally US Communist Party publications and Chinese Communist
newspapers are smuggled in, the latter from Hongkong.
There are no Communist radio stations in the Philippines, with the
possible exception of one station in Manila (the Kuo Tai Station) which
in October 1952 was organized by an alleged Chinese Communist. Further
information on this station is unavailable. There are no foreign
Communist broadcasts directed specifically at the Philippines. The
reception and size of audience of Peiping's daily 30-minute broadcast
in English to Southeast Asia or its programs in Mandarin, Cantonese,
and Amoy dialects to overseas Chinese are unknown.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
In recent years PKP theoreticians have emphasized the significance
of finance and supply operations, both of which are called finance in
PKP terminology. Data about the actual financial status of the PKP as
of January 1953 are not available. Although foreign sources, notably
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
the US Communist Party and Communist-dominated American labor unions,
furnished fairly considerable financial aid to the PKP in the prewar
period, the PKP apparently has received very little material assistance
from abroad since world War II. In 1951, the party leadership
promulgated a "one year program" for the PKP during fiscal year 1952, and
expected party revenues for this period were budgeted at the fantasti-
cally high figure of US $4,621,000. The captured American Communist,
William Pomeroy, testified in mid-1952 that only "a tiny fraction" of
this sum was collected. Party finances in 1952 probably were below those
during 1950, for example. The PKP "Statement of Income" for the first
six months of calendar year 1950 lists total party income for that
period as US $10,750. Apparently, the greatest source-of income is
from raids and extortion practices. (In contrast, according to the
PKP "Statement of Income," only $28.50 was realized from the sale of
Titis in the period April-June 1950.)
Data on the income of the Chinese Communists are unknown. Several
business. firms are controlled by the Chinese Communists, but revenue
figures from these sources are not available. Probably the over-all
health of the Chinese Communists is better than that of the PKP, in
view of the generally good financial standing of the Chinese community.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
There are no Soviet or'satellite establishments diplomatic or
otherwise in the Philippines.
XIII. COMMUWIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Since the suppression of the various Communist front organiza-
tions in the Philippines, there has been no evidence of any affiliation
of Philippine groups with Communist International Organizations. There
are no installations or meetings of these latter within the Philippines
and no known receipt or transmission of funds to or from them.
Philippine Communists, however, have attended several Congresses or
Conferences held abroad. One Filipino reportedly attended the meeting
of the International Union of Students in Peiping in 1951, and Teodosio
Lansang (alias Manuel Cruz) attended the Berlin and Vienna Peace Council
meetings in 1951 and 1952 respectively, and the Asian and Pacific Peace
Conference in Peiping in 1952. There was no known attendance at such
meetings by Chinese Communists in the Philippines.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The internal communication network of the PKP is a primitive one
consisting primarily of the use of women couriers. The Philippine Army
is supposed to have located the main north-south courier route on Luzon
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800080001=4
which ran down through the Sierra Madres. Inter-island communication
is by boat, and here there are infinite possibilities for'the Communists
to choose. There are reports that important leaders have radio .
receivers and that the Chinese Communists had established a transmitter
in the Batanes Islands. Chinese Communists apparently have excellent
covert communication and courier systems.
Contacts with the outside, of which China is most important and
US next, must be clandestinely arranged. The many islands and the long
coastline of the Philippines offer many places for-couriers.to land.
There are reports of couriers landing in Manila, Albay Province, and
various places in the Sulu Archipelago. landings from unidentified
submarines off the east coast of Luzon are frequently reported but are
to date unconfirmed. Most couriers apparently are Chinese who, after
their arrival in the Philippines, manage to move about from place to
place with no great trouble.
The correlation of some PKP activities with general Communist
strategy in the Far East possibly is effected at international Communist
conventions and through couriers, but detailed proof of this is lacking.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-665.6
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THAILAND
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . i i
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I. Objectives . . . . . ... . 1
II. Tactics .. .. .. 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? ? 2
ASSETS ... . . ? 4
I. Numerical Strength . ? . .. . 4
He Electoral Strength . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? . .
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . .. .. .?. 6
V. Communist Influence in Labor . ? ? . ? . . . ? . . ? ? 7
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . 8.
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? ? . . . . . . 10
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 10
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 10
Z. Communist Propaganda Media .. .. ? . . . 10
XI. Financial Condition .. .. .. .. . ... 13
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . .. . . . ? 14
XIII. Communist International Organizations . .. . . . . ? 15
XIV. Communist Communication Network ? ? . ? . ? ? . . .. 16
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
COWUNISM IN THAILAND: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
The immediate goals of the Communists in Thailand are not easily
discernible at the present moment, since the current vigorous anti-
Communist drive of the Thai-authorities has presumably forced Communist
leaders to reconsider their past strategy.
Before November 10, 1952, the date when the Thai Government
began its most recent attempt to suppress Communist activity, the imme-
diate Communist objectives in Thailand appear to have been:
1. To expand and improve their own organizations, in preparation
for the time when domestic events or external assistance might
make a direct drive for power possible.
2. To mobilize all varieties of domestic sentiment against the
present ruling group.
3. To undermine popular support for US policy in Asia and for
Thailand's pro-American international orientation.
4. To render material and propaganda assistance to Communist-led
rebels in Indochina and Malaya.
In the current crisis, these objectives have probably been sub-
ordinated to the overriding need to ensure the survival of key
personnel. If the Thai police persevere in?:their suppression of overt
Communist activity, Communist strategy will probably be altered to give
greater attention to underground organizational work and less attention
to propaganda activity.
Two distinct Communist organizations have developed in Thailand:
the Thai Commmnist Party (TCP) and the Chinese Communist Party in
Thailand (CCP(.T)). The TCP is small and appears to be dominated by
the larger and better organized CCP(T). Two distinct parties are
maintained, however, because of the long-standing antipathy with which
many Thai regard the Chinese and the desire to create the appearance
of an indigenous Communist movement.
The CCP(T) has attempted to gain strength by recruiting personnel
for training, both in Thailand and in China- by soliciting funds for
local expenses and for transmission to the mainland; by penetrating
Chinese schools, labor unions, business organizations, and regional
associations; and by utilizing newspapers, some of which are subsidized,
to carry propaganda.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
The Thai Communist Party remains small and relatively ineffectual.
Its efforts have been confined largely to propaganda work. Because the
Party, as such, is illegal, its overt activity has been carried on in
the face of official tolerance or apathy. Although the TOP has met
with some success in creating "front" organizations to carry its
message -- most notably the National Peace Committee of Thailand --
agitation has had an impact only among certain groups of people.
Teachers and students, writers and newsmen, some lower grade govern-
ment officials, political opposition elements; and recently some
Buddhist groups have been the major targets.
Both Thai and Chinese elements have used a variety of appeals
in a "broadside" propaganda barrage designed to contain themes attractive
to diverse groups. The principal themes-have been:
1.' Denunciation of US "imperialism" -- responsible for the
"sufferings" of the Thai people -- which is leading Thailand
toward war.
2. Denunciation of the Thai Government -- for allowing itself to
become the "puppet" of the US; for failure to provide for the
people's welfare while exploiting labor and taxing the popula-
tion heavily; for suppression of political rights and for
unequal treatment of minorities; and for its internal corruption.
3. Emphasis on the strength of Communist China.
4. "Demonstration" of the compatibility of Buddhism and Communism.
In recent months there seems to have been an intensified effort
to expand activity into the provinces, both to infiltrate administrative
services and to build a mass base among the peasantry which has thus
far been unresponsive to the Communist message. This change may be partly
attributable to more effective police control in Bangkok, but it
indicates the essentially long-range nature of Communist activity.
Two other Communist groups are concerned chiefly with creating
conditions in bordering countries which might, eventually, promote
local Communist objectives. Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist groups
in northeast Thailand are supporting the rebellions in their own
countries, securing money, arms, and supplies. These elements, however,
appear to be operationally distinct from both the TOP and the CCP(T).
Communist groups in the southern provinces, largely an adjunct of the
COP(T), are aiding Mayalan Communist guerrillas who occasionally enter
Thailand.for rest and resupply.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Local Communist groups appear to receive guidance, and probably
some financial support, from Chinese Communist liaison groups and
through the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, but the precise pattern of
external direction is unclear.
Prior to the initiation of repressive measures by the Thai
Government in November 1952, the CCP(T) had gained control of most
Chinese labor unions, but never utilized its capability of instigating
minor violence through strikes and sabotage. The TCP had, during the
preceding year, increased the range, quantity, and quality of its
propaganda activities.
The future capabilities and prospects of the Communist movement
will be directly determined by policies of the Thai Government. As
long as the present governing military coup group remains cohesive,
its control of the country will be firm. Police and military units
are believed capable of controlling any overt action initiated by local
Communists. Although it will probably not be possible to suppress the
covert dissemination of Communist ideas or to eliminate underground
organizations, there is no prospect for a successful overthrow of the
government as a result of local Communist activity.
The policies which the Thai Government will pursue will, in
turn, be heavily conditioned by external developments. Its performance
in the past has been somewhat ambivalent. Official adherence to an anti-
Communist policy at home and support of the West internationally con-
trast with apparent toleration of any Communist activity which was not
judged adirect threat to the present regime. Disclosures of Communist
plotting uncovered in the course of recent police actions seem to have
alarmed some top government leaders, and the present repressive policies
may be continued. On the other hand, an extension of Communist control
in adjacent areas in Indochina, Burma, or Malaya would be apt to produce
sudden retrenchment.
The Thai Government has historically sought to ride the balance
between contending forces in Asia,. accommodating its policies to the
dominant foreign power. Its future actions might well be governed by
similar expediential calculations. If the Thai Government considered
Chinese invasion imminent, it is probable that only direct and force-
ful intervention by the US to protect the integrity of Thailand would
prevent a swift reorientation. At such a time, indigenous Communist
elements. would find renewed opportunity to exploit existing Thai
discontent with the Government and general Chinese resentment over the
repressive measures previously imppsed on that large and strategic
minority.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-4-
CCHMUNISM IN THAILAND: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
Several Communist parties operate in Thailand and total membership
figures cannot be determined.. The Thai Communist Party (TCP) is quite
small, with an estimated 50-100 members; the overwhelms majority of
Communists in Thailand belong to minority groups. The Chinese Communist
Party in Thsilm3 (COP(T)) is the largest organization, with an estimated
2,000 members. Viet Minh and Cambodian Communist cadres have been active
in the northeastern and eastern provinces, but the. number of Party members
is unknown.
The Overseas Chinese in Thailand have been subject to strong pressures
for adherence to Communism and as many as 100,000 may be controlled or
strongly influenced by Communists. If 25,000 (one-half the estimated Indo-
chinese refugees) is added to this total to allow for -the possible incidence
of Communists or sympathizers among the Indochinese minority, the percentage
of the total population of Thailand under Communist discipline or strongly
influenced by Communists would reach a probable maid. mm: of 0.7 percent.
TCP members have been recruited primarily from professionals, with
lawyers and writers predominating. The TCP also exerts some influence among
a s:oa11 group of students at Bangkok universities.
The CCP(T) is largely composed of businessmen and merchants; laborers
comprise the bulk of the Chinese population controlled or influenced by the
COP(T).
Most of the Indochinese refugees were originally farmers and laborers
but most are now merchants and artisans due to the Thai government's
restrictions on entering some occupations. Communist agents have been able
to control and organize many Indochinese by infiltrating and dominating
village and welfare. organizations.
The center of known Communist strength is in the Bangkok metropolitan
area where the TCP and the CCP(T) are believed to have covert headquarters.
Two other areas of concentrated activity are the southern border region
and the northeastern section of Thailan : Ban Phai, Hhon Kaen, and Nong
Nhai are reported to be centers of the Communist apparatus in the northeast;
Songkhla and Hat Yai are principal centers in the south with much activity
along the Sadao-Betong frontier region.
Much of the membership of the TCP appears to be opportunistic. In
contrast, probably the entire membership of the CCP(T) is "hard-core."
The Communnist organizers among the Indochinese minority are presumably
well-indoctrinated Viet Minh agents of the "hard-core" category.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The leadership of the CCP(T) is vested in a central executive com-
mittee of, according to one report, 36 members. A special characteristic
of this central group is that many of its members are businessmen of long
residence in Thailand; very few are believed to be professional revolu-
tionaries with a long history of Communist activity. It is believed that
membership in the CCP(T) increased as a result of the Communist conquest
of China to the present estimated figure of 2,000.
Insufficient evidence precludes analysis of the quality of TCP
leadership or the stability of party membership. There probably has been
little change, however, in the total strength of the TCP since 19166.
The number of Communists in the Indochinese minority grew enormously
during the 19166-1950 period as a vast number of refugees. entered Thailand.
Membership figures among this group have probably been fairy stable for
the past two years (1951-1952).
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Even though political parties have been prohibited in Thailand, a
recent Thai law specifically outlaws the Communist Party as well as member-
ship in any type of Communist organization. This restriction plus complete
goverment control over. electoral procedures virtually eliminates Communist
participation in elections. As a further handicap, the great majority of
Communists in Thailand are found in minority groups and are largely without
voting privileges.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The Communists have not adopted violent action as a means of further-
ing Communist objectives in Thailand. Violent action, however, has occurred
in the southern Thai provinces where raids, murders, and kidnappings are- used
in intimidating the local Chinese populace to supply and finance the Malayan
guerrilla forces operating' along the Thai-Malay border,
Cammniaist activities in Thailand have so far been largely limited to
fields of organization, propaganda, and espionage. There have been no
strikes or sabotage, and, except in the, southern provinces, no murders or
violence of any kind that can be definitely attributed to Communist elements.
Nor do the.Conmunists appear to be in a position to carry on this type of
\direct action in the near future.
Although during World War II some Communists were probab involved
in' the Free Thai resistance movement, no indigenous Communist military
resi>l,tanoe organization developed in Thailand, and no Communist insur-
rectionary attempts have-ever occurred in Thailand. Rumors of'CommrUnist
involvement in various cope d!etat have never been confirmed. If any
SECRET - SECURITY. INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
MCUT - SECURITY INFORMATION
-6-
Coiivmmi.sts were involved, it was probably on an individual basis and not
as the result of a concentrated Ccmmmist effort to overthrow the govern,
Mont, In fact, it has apparently been Communist policy to avoid involve-
ment in the periodic political oou that are attempted in Bangkok. In
view of the apparent lack of preparation for military action, no armed
Communist insurrection seems to be contemplated in the immediate future.
Various unconfirmed reports, however, describe the organizing of
a Conamist underground armed force designed to accomplish sabotage or
guerrilla operations. Probably some tentative plans have been drawn up
and perhaps a small number of weapons have been cached, but there. is no
evidence of the existence of a Communist para-military organization in
Thailand. Government restrictions and police surveillance seriously limit
Communist ability to arm and train a pare-military force in Thailand.
No reliable information is available regarding Commmnist plans
for a military resistance organization in case of war. The estimated
maximmm number that could be organized for this type of activity is per-
haps 5,000 to 10,000 Chinese. Although a few CCP(T) leaders are reported
to have had guerrilla experience in China, most of the leadership for
guerrilla operations would have to be imported. Arms which were acctmYUlated
immediately after World War II are reported to have been shipped to Indo-
china to supply the Viet Minh between 1948 and 1950, and perhaps others
have been sent to Malaya. Present stores of weapons and equipment for
guerrilla action are believed to be negligible.
IV. GOVERNM T POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The military group heading the government since 1948 has always
been avowedly anti-Communist. Implementation of governmental repressive
measures, however, has been sporadic and largely ineffectual and Communist
propaganda efforts (the major activity) multiplied.
In November 1952, the government's anti-Communist efforts were in-
tensified, a law was passed outlawing Communism, and the police began a
series of mass arrests of Communists and fellow-travelers. Three major
Communist-sponsored newspapers were closed in December, In January 1953
arrests were continuing. The government has announced intentions to
round up all Ca uxunists and sympathizers in TE+ai land.
As of January 1953, no front organization was operating in Thailand
since many Communist or fellow traveler leaders were in jail or hiding from
the police. Communist propaganda output had dwindled to a trickle as police
censorship over newspapers was strictly enforced, a number of editors were
arrested, and several leading Communist dailies were suppressed. Communists
still dominated the large Central Labor Union, but- government sponsorship-of
a rival trade union presented a serious challenge to continued Communist
control of the major portion of organized labor in Thailand.
SECANT - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Strict warnings by security police accompanied by' an increase in
patrol activity have usually sufficed to prevent the formation of anti-
government or protest demonstrations by Communists or any other group.
Only in the southern provinces on the Malayan frontier has Thai authority
been seriously endangered by extensive Communist activity. A gradual in-
crease in police efficiency in this area, however, has been discernible
recently, and continued cooperation with Malayan authorities could probably
reduce this threat.
Although the Thai government did not outlaw membership in Conmmnist
organizations until November 1952, the Communist organizations in Thailand
have in effect been "underground" for at least five years. The Communists
have been fairly efficient in covert party activities such as arranging
illegal entries into Thailand, sending students to China for training, and
smuggling of limited amounts of goods and arms to Indochina and Malaya.
Espionage is probably well developed.
V COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
The numerical strength of Communists in various occupations is-not known. The Conmuunist-controlled Central Labor Union (CLII), however, repre-
sents a majority of the workers in the important rice milling and rice ex-
porting industries and the majority of all stevedore workers. Other oc-
cupational areas in which the CLU has organized unions include tugboats,
merchant marine, streetcars, oil companies, saw mills, match factories,
textiles, the tea trade, the Bangkok vegetable growers,,the Makkasan rail-
road shopworkers, tobacco factories, ice factories, bakeries, watchmaking
and goldsmithing, wood and metal processing, various service industries,
hotels, restaurants, coffee shops, and laundries.
Only about 2 percent of the labor force Thailand is organized.
Of this amount somewhere between 50-75 percent is organized in the CLU
which had about 50,,000-m re in 1952. Approximately three-quarters of
the strength of the CLU is in the Bangkok-Thou Buri area and 95 percent
of its members and leaders are believed to be Chinese. Since February 7,
1949, the CLU has been a member of the WFTU. The WFTU does not maintain
an office in Thailand and contact between CLU and WFTU is often concealed.
The Executive Committee of the CLU is believed to control four
geographic trade union federations with approximately 50 local branches:
(1) the Bangkok Federation of Trade Unions, (2) the Chachoengsao Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, (3) the Ubon Federation of Trade Unions, and (4) the
Songkhla Federation'of Trade Unions. The Executive Committee of the CUT
reportedly also has immediate control over some local unions in areas where
no federation has been established. In addition, a number of local unions
are not members but are affiliated with the CLU.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
The Thai Government's continued antagonism to the CLU, expressed
through its active sponsorship of the rival Thai National Trade Union
Congress, is serving to reduce the preponderant position of the CLU.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL,
AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Front Organizations
Since the end of World War II a number of Communist-front organi-
zations have been reported in Thailand. The great majority of these
failed to develop beyond the initial planning stage, and claims of ex-
tensive membership have not been substantiated. No Thai front
organizations are known to be active at present. On the other hand,.a
few Chinese associations of long standing are now Communist-dominated;
these remain active and are likely to survive the current anti-Communist
drive of the government.
1. Communist-sponsored fronts. A student organization called the
Union of Thai Students (UTS) with a claimed membership of 3,000 affiliated
with the world-front International Union of Students (IUS) in September
1951. In January l953'the strength of this organization was estimated
to be a maximum of.80-100. The Thai government discourages political
activity among. students and no student movement not sponsored by the
government is likely to gain much strength or importance. The UTS has
been of little consequence; if it still exists it is probably located
in Bangkok.
The National Peace Committee of Thailand (NPCT) was organized in
1951 to support the Communist-sponsored peace petition. The Communists
have used the NPCT to organize and foment opposition to the policies
of the Thai government and as apropaganda outlet. A number of prominent
journalists, opposition politicians, students, writers, and other in-
tellectuals dominate the organization. It is affiliated with the World
Peace Council and delegates were sent to the Asian and Pacific Peace
Conference in Peiping in October-1952. Thai representatives have also
attended other "peace" meetings. Until recently, membership was re-
ported to be from 70-100. As of January 1953, however, most members
of the NPCT were in jail awaiting trial. Police repressive measures
will probably limit the usefulness of this organization in the future.
Several women's organizations have been organized in the past
by both Thai and Chinese Communists; they failed to gain popular sup-
port, however, and no women's "front" organization is known to exist at
present.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
2. Organizations captured by Communists. The Chao Chou Hui Kuan
(Swatow Association with 7,000 members is the largest of seven-Chinese
regional or dialect associations in Thailand. The leaders of this
organization are Communists or sympathizers and the association has
strong contacts with individuals and groups in China. The majority of
the members are in the Bangkok metropolitan area and the-leadership
has considerable influence in the Chinese community. It publishes a
monthly magazine, operates several schools, sponsors a small clinic
which provides cheap medical care for the poor,.sponsors athletic'
events, and performs countless welfare tasks.
The Pao Te Shan Ttang (Philanthropio Association) with head-
quarters in Bangkok is the most important and most influential organi-
zation of its kind among the Chinese. Its board of directors contains
some prominent Communists and sympathizers.. Nearly all of its philan-
thropic work is carried on in Bangkok but it is nation-wide in so far
as contributions come from Chinese throughout the country. More than
any Chinese association, this welfare association has the means and the
opportunity to contact most of the Chinese in Thailand. Its prestige
and charitable work make it an effective medium for the spread of
Communist influence.
Be ':Non-Communist Organizations Infiltrated by Communists
The only significant non-Communist Thai organization penetrated
by the Communists and fellow-travelers is the Press Association of
Thailand (PAT) composed of newspapermen and journalists from non-
government publications. Since the PAT strongly opposes the govern-
ment's press censorship policy (which policy directly affects the
effeotiveness..of Communist propaganda), this organization has been
utilized by Communists to denounce the government.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Bangkok), with a membership
of 5,000 individuals and firms, includes both pro-Kuomintang and pro-
Communist cliques. It. is the most influential Chinese organization in
Thailand and often assumes the role of spokesman for the Chinese
community. Despite strenuous efforts Chinese Communists have been
unable to dominate this organization, though they still remain a
significant minority within it. .Penetration and domination of the
_
Chinese Chamber of Commerce would enable Communists to exercise a
strong influence among the Chinese minority in Thailand.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
There is no known Communist influence at policy levels of the
Thai government or any of its agencies. Frequent rumors of contacts
between certain government officials and Communist agents are without
substantiation.
.VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Communists have been able to achieve only limited success in
penetrating or controlling public opinion forming circles in Thailand.
The only appreciable influence of Communists on. education is through
the CCP(T) which controls a few Chinese schools. Apparently efforts
have been made by Communists to infiltrate Buddhist organizations,.but
so far these attempts have been unsuccessful. Soviet bloc films are
shown occasionally in a limited number of theaters in Bangkok and the.
provinces. Careful government control of the local broadcasting system
has prevented any use of this medium by Communists, The prevalent
custom in Thailand of permitting considerable leeway to individual
newsmen makes it possible for-fellow-traveler writers (often.subsidised
by the Communists) employed by neutralist and uncommitted newspapers
to inject Communist propaganda into the non-Communist press. However.,
it should be noted that it is often difficult to distinguish between
non-Communist criticism of the government and Communist propaganda.
Ix.
COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON;-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Political parties as such are prohibited in Thailand and the
only legal political organization is the pro-government bloc in the
National Assembly. Communist influence in that body is either totally
absent :or negligible.
The government has alleged that the Free Thai followers of ex-
premier Pridi Phanazrong are influenced by Communism and that these
individuals represent.a cohesive political opposition movement:
Although it is true that several former Pridi-ites are prominent fellow-
travelers, it is believed that the majority are not pro-Communist.
Inasmuch as there is no longer a formal Free Thai organization,
Communist tendencies have become largely a matter of individual
predilection.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Communist propaganda content in-Thailand follows the current
party line quite closely with special adaptations for the local
situation. Daily items for Chinese and Thai publications usually are
furnished by the New China News Agency (NCNA)'and Radio Peiping.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 11 -
Several daily newspapers regarded as party organs are supported by
the Communists. In addition, a number of fellow traveler publications
and newsmen apparently receive subsidies from the CCP(T) or the Soviet
Legation. A few Communist films have been imported into Thailand; the
principal theater exhibiting this type of film is the Sri Ayuthia in
Bangkok.
A.
Newspapers and Periodicals
Name
Circulation
Publisher - Remarks
1.
Communist
Ch'uan Min Pao
6
000
Ordered t
,
o cease publi-
cation by Thai government
December 1952.
Nan Chen Pao
1,000
Puangohon
Ordered to c
ease publi-
cation by Thai government.
December 1952.
2,
Pro-Communist
Daily Mail
10
000
Prae Kha
C
,
o
o., Ltd.
Khao Phap
4,000
Phim Thai
15
000
Thai Pha
itk
,
n
an Co., Ltd.
(reportedly CCP(T)
controlled)
Chung Yuan Pao
10-12,000
Chung Yuan Wan Pao
12,000
Kuang Hua Tsao Pao
3,500
Kuang Hua Pao
3,500
Lok Mai (weekly)
Thai Kan Phi
m Press
Phim Thai Wan Chan (weekly)
Thai Ph
itk
an
an Co., Ltd.
SSCR$T - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Siam Samai (weekly) Thai. Phanitkan Co., Ltd.
Siang Thai (weekly) Ordered to cease publication
by Thai government in
December 1952.
Yuk Mai (fortnightly) Thai Sathit Press
Akson San (monthly)
B. Imported Publications
Most imported propaganda material is in Chinese, printed in
Peiping, Shanghai, or Hongkong. Smaller shipments of Communist
publications are received in Thai and English, and a relatively
insignificant proportion of imported propaganda material is in Russian.
The major Communist publication outlet for Thailand is the "Overseas
Chinese Book Store" in Bangkok, which carries about 600 assorted titles
of books, magazines, and other publications.
At various times the government has banned the importation of
specific Communist publications but a large variety continued to be
shipped in without restriction and sold openly by the Communist book-
store. In December 1952, however, the bookstore was raided by the
police and many items were confiscated. Government restrictions may
limit the usefulness of this outlet in''the future.
The Soviet Legation distributes a semi-weekly Thai-language
information bulletin which includes articles on Communist ideology,
life in the Soviet Union, verbatim accounts of speeches by Russian
delegates in the tflJ, and official propaganda.
The Viet Minh organization in Bangkok disseminated propaganda
until suppressed by the Thai government in 1950. However, a few
Viet Minh pamphlets published in Rangoon have circulated in Thailand.
All domestic broadcasting stations are government controlled,
thus precluding any Communist influence.
Several programs from Communist stations abroad can be heard.
in Thailand. Moscow Radio broadcasts two half-hour programs daily in
English and Radio Peiping has two daily programs in Thai, each of
one-fourth to one-half hour duration. Programs in Chinese and English
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
13 -
can also be heard on this Chinese station. The size of the listening
audience is unknown.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
The TCP and the CCP(T) apparently have adequate financial re-
sources for their present limited programs, although no information is income* available on Communist elements neThailandaalsonistiunkn~?
Vietnamese
Some
Within Thailand, funds are obtained from numerous sources.
revenue is undoubtedly derived from membership fees, labor union revenues,
and private donations. Also profits presumably accrue from trading
transactions of party-controlled business firms and from the sale of
party publications. Several Chinese business firms have apparently been
established specifically to.provide financial support. These include
the Fah Dan Thai Co., Ltd, and the Andar Company which market Soviet,
Chinese Communist,.and satellite goods. The Andar Company's branch in
Hongkong is reported to have handled gold shipments to Bangkok for use
in defraying party expenses. The "Overseas Chinese Book Store" in
Bangkok was established to sell party publications. Although informa-
tion.is lacking on the amount of financial support given by these
business undertakings, it is known that at least in part they subsi-
dize Communist information services in Thailand.
Supplies and funds extorted from Chinese rubber growers, in the
southern provinces are used locally to support the Communist guerrilla
bands operating along the Thai-Malay border. Reports indicate that this
region probably is being well organized in support of Communist activi-
ties.
The parties derive funds from external Communist sources as well
as from their activities within Thailand. The Soviet Legation reportedly
imports currency in the diplomatic pouch for the financial support of
Communist activities. Also Chinese Communist officials are believed to
have brought funds to Bangkok for CCP(T) operations.
It is not clear, however, whether, on balance, the Communist
movement in Thailand is the beneficiary of outside financial assistance
or a source of revenue for other elements in the. world Communist con-
spiracy. The funds regularly solicited or extorted from Chinese residents
in Thailand for transmission to Communist China could conceivably
much larger than any funds received by the TCP and the CCP(T) from other
parties.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 14
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
No Communist regime maintains a diplomatic establishment in
Thailand except the Soviet Union. The USSR is represented in Thailand
by a Minister and Legation in Bangkok. The Legation occupies 108
Sathon Road, Bangkok, which formerly was a hotel building. In addi-
tion, 6 Krung Kasem Road houses the Eksporthleb Office and provides
accommodations for the. business staff of Eksporthleb. The offices of
Sovexport Film and TASS are at 21 Tung Mahamek, Bangkok; each has a
Russian representative in charge. The ECAFE office in Bangkok usually
has two Russian employees; in the past they had contacts with the Soviet
Legation.
The total number of Russians at the Legation, including families,.
remains about 30 to 40, only five of whom claim diplomatic rank: the-
minister, three secretaries, and a.commercial attache.. The remainder
of the Soviet Legation personnel are called "officials" on.their appli-
cations for police identity cards, but it is assumed-that some of then
have duties at least as important as the diplomats. The business staff
of Eksporthleb remains about two although the wives and older children
of these officials occasionally work in the office.
Since the Legation's overt activities, with the exception of
official functions, are confined almost wholly to propaganda, it.is-
believed most if not all of the personnel are engaged in propaganda
activities. The Soviet Legation issues a Thai-language semi-weekly
bulletin on a rather irregular basis. It is believed that certain books-
containing basic Communist doctrine, which have appeared during the past
several years, were subsidized by the Legation. In addition, it is be-
lieved that certain ideological instructions and special feature arti-
cles are provided Thai fellow-traveler and Communist publications.-
According to various reports, translations of such works have been done
on a contract basis by Thai, several of whom are minor government offi
cials.. It is likely that the Soviet Legation subsidizes certain Thai
fellow-traveler publications since they obviously could not exist on
receipts from their limited circulation and advertisement, and the Thai
Communist Party is not believed to be able financially to support the
large number of such publications being printed.
The Eksporthleb office keeps close contact with the Legation and
it is possible that income from Eksporthleb is utilized for subsidizing
propaganda activity. Certainly Eksporthleb's existence could not be
justified by the extent of its business.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION-
-
15
XIII. COIAMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
No Communist international organization maintains a branch
office or other installation in Thailand, and no meetings of these
organizations have been held within the country. Local Communists and
fellow-travelers, however, have attended meetings abroad to an increas-
ingextent during the past two years. Few if any of these delegates
have returned to Thailand. Recently, when members of the largest and
the most publicized delegation to an international front meeting evaded
police restrictions and departed for Peiping, the government announced
that legal steps would be taken upon their return. No funds are known
to have been received by local Communists from international organiza-
tions, but it seems probable that at least part of the, travel expenses
of the representatives abroad is paid by international organizations.
It is not known whether Thai organizations have contributed to the sup-
port of Communist international organizations.
Attendance of local Communists at meetings of international
organizations held abroad is summarized below:
Meeting
Date
Size of Local
Representation
Berlin Peace Conference
Feb. 1951
2 delegates
International Union of
Students Conference,
Peiping
Apr. 1951
1 observer
Berlin Youth Festival
Aug. 1951
4 delegates
International Union of
Students Council Meeting,
Warsaw
Sept. 1951
1 delegate
Youth League Meeting,
Moscow
Sept. 1951
1 delegate
World Peace Council,
Vienna
Nov. 1951
3 delegates
Preparatory Conference
for Asian and Pacific
Peace Conference, Peiping
June 1952
2 delegates
SECRET -.SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Size of Local
Meeting Date Representation
Extraordinary Session,
World Peace Council,
Berlin July 1952 1 delegate
Asian and Pacific Peace
Conference, Peiping Oct. 1952 11 delegates
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NET-WORK
Bangkok is probably the center of the Communist communication.
network in Thailand and may be the center for Southeast Asia. Because
use of regular mail is considered unsafe, the Communists rely on courier
facilities and radio communication. The Chinese Overseas Bookstore is
reported to be the center of. communications between Bangkok and "under-
ground" Communists in the provinces, and a CCP(T) courier system appears
to be operating efficiently and regularly between Bangkok and Songkhla
in southern Thailand.
A clandestine radio network has reportedly been established by
the Communists in Thailand, for both internal and external communication.
Although non-government transmitters are illegal, a number are in
operation, many of them owned and operated by Chinese commercial firms
to transact' business outside the country. Some of these Chinese-operated
transmitters are. probably used by the CCP(T).Communists in Bangkok and
.Hat Yai are reported to have radio communication with Penang, Kuala
Lumpur, and Singapore. Assertions that the Soviet Embassy operates a
radio transmitter seem plausible but are thus far unconfirmed.
The Chinese Communist Party in Thailand (CCP(T)), as a branch of
the CCP in China, maintains close relations with the parent body.
Without.. exception, the leaders of the CCP(T) have received training in
China. High-level Chinese Communist intelligence and propaganda offi-
cials from a liaison office in China are frequently reported on covert
visits to the CCP(T) organization in Bangkok and in the southern Thai
provinces. Although the precise pattern of external direction cannot
be determined, rumors of reorganization of' the CCP(T), intensification
of its propaganda and espionage activities, and fund-raising efforts
frequently coincide with these reported visits.
The Thai Communist Party (TCP), on the other hand, apparently has
the most direct contact with the Soviet Legation in Bangkok of any Commu-
nist group in-Thailand.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269.R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Vietnamese Communist cells in eastern Thailand have closer ties
with Viet Minh groups across the border than with China or the TCP.
In the southern provinces, the Communist organization (predominantly
Chinese) seems to coordinate its efforts with the guerrilla activities
of the Malayan Communists, indicating direct cooperation between what
are, in effect, two branches of the.CCP.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.7
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, JAPAN
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CON TENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . *.D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ASSETS . . 6
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . 6
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . e . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 13
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism 21
Ve Communist Influence in Labor 23
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and 24
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . 28
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation. . .
29
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 33
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . , . . ? . . ? . . . . , 37
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . .. . . . 40
XIII. Communist International Organizations . .. .. .. . 42
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . 1 43
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN JAPAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS,AND CAPABILITIES
In compliance with the requirements of Soviet foreign policy,
the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) currently seeks as its principal
short-term objective to undermine the alliance between the United States
and Japan. In pursuit of this general objective, it seeks in particular
to discredit the Japanese peace treaty, the agreements under which US
forces are stationed'in Japan, and all efforts to improve Japan's
capacity for self-defense. Simultaneously, the party seeks to develop
attitudes favorable to an orientation toward the USSR and Communist
China or at least to promote and strengthen neutralist attitudes.
The JCP does not ignore domestic objectives; rather it seeks as
far as possible to link them to the-anti-US campaign. Where the achieve-
ment of a domestic goal conflicts with the policy dictated by the inter-
national interests of the .USSR, it is the domestic goal that is
sacrificed. Barring a change in the international policy of the USSR,
there appears to be no immediate liklihood that the JCP will alter its
objectives or their relative priority rating.
Simultaneously with the pursuit of its general objective, the
party is embarked on the covert preparation of a para-military organiza-
tion to be employed when and as required in the international interests
of the USSR.
The current program of the JCP is a dual operation in which a new
policy involving extensive underground activity is being pursued side by
side with an overt popular front policy. The party is, thus:
1. Attempting to secure the widest possible popular following, and
2. Creating an underground apparatus, including a para-military
organization, in preparation for the ultimate implementation of
a program of violent action.
A. Popular Front Tactics
The groups to which the Communist Party directs its appeals are
so numerous as to include almost all Japanese except the large scale
industrial and financial interests, the national leadership of the
Liberal Party which controls the government, and to a lesser extent the
leadership of the conservative-opposition Progressive Party. The
Communists have devoted particular attention to workers, farmers, youth,
and intellectuals.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Elements in the Japanese situation which the Communists seek to
exploit in the effort to secure members and sympathizers and to cultivate
attitudes favorable to the achievement of their objectives include:
1. Fear of war and, specifically, fear that Japan may become involved
in war not in pursuit of its own interests but as an involuntary
participant in the conflict between the US and the USSR.
2. Resentment of the US position in Japan including the presence of
US troops, military activities involving interference with normal
activities, and what may be regarded as US control of Japanese
policy.
3. Fear of the economic burden imposed by defense measures and by
curtailment of trade with Soviet bloc countries especially China.
4. Fear of retrogression toward reactionary government policies,
repression of civil liberties, withdrawal of trade union rights,
etc.
5. Desire to normalize diplomatic relations with countries still
technically at war with Japan.
The Japanese Party follows the familiar Communist tactics of:
establishing front organizations, national and local, to cover the
interests, aspirations, and activities of most of the major elements of
society; linking such fronts in federations and congresses of various
kinds; and utilizing the fronts to support the partyrs position on
national and international issues. In the schematic terms of the JCP
program, the front groups would become components of the "National
Liberation Democratic United Front" whose envisaged role is that of a
popular base for the overthrow of the existing government and establish-
ment of a people's revolutionary government. At present probably the
most active and effective front groups are those operating in the
functional areas of promoting "peace" and relations with Communist
China, especially those of trade.
At present, of Japan's total union membership of approximately
6 million, only 7% are believed to be Communist Party members or
sympathizers. The present capacity of the JCP to manipulate or benefit
from the activities of the trade unions is therefore not a consequence
of numerical strength or control of positions of leadership. It arises
rather from the fact that an important segment of labor's leadership,
politically aligned with the left Socialist Party, supports policies
closely parallel to many of the positions assumed by the JCP,
particularly in the area of foreign policy. In the face of this
situation and in view of the JCP*s continuing incapacity to reassert
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFOI3 ATION
itself as an independent force in the Japanese trade union movement,
the party appears to have dissolved what little remains of its own
once-powerful trade union federation. It now appears to be seeking to
infiltrate Sohyo, the Left Socialist controlled federation which, with
.a claimed membership of approximately 3 million, is the largest in
Japan.
The JCP has been active in national and local elections seeking
to utilize the campaigns to: seat Communists and sympathizers; promote
propaganda objectives; and form alliances with other groups. In they
October 1952 election for the lower house, JCP overtures to other left-
wing groups for a united front campaign were rebuffed; the party polled
only 2.5% of the total popular vote; and it failed to seat a single
candidate.
B. Underground Tactics
The JCP program for underground para-military action apparently
envisages a three-stage development:
1. Establishment of an organization to plan and carry out violent
action, subversion, and sabotage, training of cadres for these
purposes and their organization into a national network, and
indoctrination of the masses with the.necessity of armed action;
2. Formation of armed "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations
among workers and farmers and conduct of local partisan
activities involving initially sabotage and harassment and
ultimately attacks on military facilities and equipment;
3. Conversion of these "resistance" and "self-defense" organizations
into a revolutionary "people's army" to carry out a general armed
uprising.
The party is now engaged in the first of these phases and has
probably made only limited progress toward its objectives. Nevertheless
in the first half of 1952, the party carried on a campaign of violent
action which demonstrated the existence of well-organized and trained
action squads. Since mid-1952 however, in accordance with party directions
to avoid actions that would alienate the masses, there has been no
significant mass violence although continued espionage and sabotage
efforts have been reported.
So long as the party is able to continue on a legal entity, its
overt organization, its "front groups," its limited penetration of
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
non-Communist organizations and parties, and its participation in
orthodox political activities enables the party to continue its efforts
to encourage popular discontents and divide the Japanese from their govern-
ment and its policies. The party's efforts in this regard are facili-
tated by its ability to exploit the frequent parallels existing between
its own position and that of groups and organizations, particularly of
the Socialist left, not subject to direct Communist influence and
control. Also, despite the widespread popular support presently accorded
to Japan's present policy of close alignment with the US, the Party
is able to exploit dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the peace
and security treaties and with present restraints on mainland trade.
Present evidence indicates that the JCP including its under-
ground organization now has a significant potential for espionage,.
'sabotage, and propaganda, as well as for promoting at least limited and
sporadic incidents of mass violence. The party is not believed capable
of undertaking armed insurrection without external military assistance. The
covert Communist para-military organization could, however, provide
valuable assistance to an external attack upon Japan.
A number of factors appear to work against any great increase
in the overt or covert capabilities of the JCP. Official restraints
on party activities may be expected to become more effective as
Japanese police and intelligence services are strengthened and further
suppressive measures maybe undertaken, particularly if the party again
resorts to violence or other forceful activities that disturb the public
peace. The party's open identification with and virtual subordination
to the interests and policies of the Soviet Union and its doctrinaire
insistance upon certain manifestly unpopular policies -- notably the
demand for overthrow of the Emperor system -- limit the party's
general popular appeal and make unlikely possibilities of fruitful, if
transient cooperation, with extreme rightist elements. Finally, even
the present limited continuance of illegal and violent activities, in
the light of popular revulsion against the party's militant program during
the first half of 1952, serves to undercut its efforts of exploiting
and developing Japanese discontent under conditions of close alignment
with and dependence upon the United States. These limitations upon JCP
capabilities extend to its efforts to recoup electoral support for the
party and to infiltrate and gain control over the trade union movement
and non-Communist left wing organizations and parties.
In sum the JCP has the capacity to exploit, intensify, or keep
alive friction between the US and Japan. It does not, however, have the
capacity seriously to undermine the US-Japanese alliance. While the
creation of an underground structure including a para-military organiza-
tion has given the JCP a greater capacity to resist suppression and to
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFOrLATION
resort to violent action when and as required by the tactics of inter-
national Communism, the party should not within the foreseeable future
become capable of sustained armed insurrection without external military
assistance.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN JAPAN: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
A. JCP Membership and Following
As of July 1952, the officially registered membership of the
JCP was 48,596.1 This represented-a decline of approximately
60,000 (or more than 53 percent) since February 1950, when the
partyts registered membership had reached its postwar peak of
108,593; this membership continued to drop through mid-1952,
although the downward trend appeared to have slowed down during the
first half of 1952 (the decline during that period was 2,500) as
compared with that in 1950 (43,500) and 1951 (18,000).2
In addition to registered members, it is estimated that there
are 30,000-$5,000 unregistered or secret JCP members. Most of these
probably are former registered party members whose resignations or
explusions were actually faked. These unregistered members are
probably equally subject to party direction and discipline. The total
1. Registered membership. refers. to figures filed periodically with
the Japanese Government, a procedure required until July 1952
of all Japanese political parties.
2. Post-war party registered membership:
Date
Registered
Membership
Increase
or Decrease
May 1946
4,500
--
May 1947
13,378
/ 8,878
May 1948
18,088
/ 4,710
May 1949
57,000
/ 38,912
(February 1950
108,593
/ 51,593)
May 1950
99,317
- 9,276
May 1951
58,035
/ 41,282
July 1952
48,596
- 9,437
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 7 -
of registered and unregistered or secret members thus is probably
between 80-85,000 persons.
The JCP is believed to have imposed stricter admission
qualifications and security precautions on prospective members than
in the past. Thus, the apparent decline in the overt membership
would not, from the party's viewpoint, necessarily indicate a loss
but, rather, may suggest a strengthening of effective control and
discipline over its membership.
The JCP following includes: 1) An estimated 100,000
to 250,000 non-member sympathizers who actively participate in
Communist-sponsored movements. 2) An estimated 500,000 to
650,000 "leftists" who may be classed as "passive" sympathizers
through their occasional participation in pro-Communist movements.
Altogether, it is estimated that one million persons are
strongly influenced or under Communist Party control. This total
is slightly over two percent of the total adult population and
corresponds roughly with the number of votes cast for Communist
and fellow travelers in the recent election.
B. Geographic Distribution and Class Composition
Party membership and sympathizers are concentrated in the
major metropolitan areas, notably the two-primary industrial centers
of Tokyo-Yokohama and Osaka-Kobe. (Tokyo alone has 16,000 known
party members.) The northern island of Hokkaido, three prefectures
in central and northern Japan (Nagano, Gumma; and Niigata, and
northern Kyushu) are other leading areas of concentration. In
general, the party's centers of strength are urban and its areas
of weakness rural.
The classes from which the bulk of party membership and
following is drawn has been estimated recently as follows -- an
estimate generally in alignment with class breakdowns applicable
to. party membership as of December 1951:
1. These figures apply to Japanese. In addition there are an
estimated 80,000 active and 350,000 passive supporters. among
the Korean minority. (See III C, p. 8.)
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INF0R1IATI0N
- 8 -
50 percent from Japanese intellectual, professional
and white collar groups;
30 percent from industrial workers;
10 percent from rural workers;
10 percent others (e.g., national minorities, unemployed,
eta -- outcaste class --, etc.)
The age breakdown of party membership has been estimated
recently as follows: under 20 years, 18 percent; 20-29 years,
37 percent; 30-39 years, 24 percent; 40-49 years, 12 percent;
50-59 years, 6.5 percent; above 60 years, 2.5 percent. The
average length of party membership is estimated to be three to
four years.
C. Quality of Party Membership
The improvement of the quality of membership is currently one of
the party's major internal problems. From 1945 through early
1950, the party, is keeping with its posture as a bona fide
political party, operated on a mass membership policy. -Since
Cominform criticism of its policies in January 1950, and
especially since the revision of party. rules and regulations in
early 1951, the party has sought to weed out unreliables, indoctrin-
ate the remainder more thoroughly, and in general convert itself
into a hard-core organization. The extent of this task is suggested
by the fact that the great bulk of its membership has. joined the
party since the surrender. Even allowing for additional secret
members in the period 1945-1950, it is apparent that the vast
majority of the membership is comparatively young in age and in
experience in party organizations and activities.
The quality of the membership in terms of its capacity for
following abrupt changes in the party line has not been put to test
recently. However, the Cominform criticism resulted in internal
dissension of such bitterness as to support a supposition that the
party, despite the overt. reconciliation of differences in the new
program announced in late 1951, might again show internal fractures
in the event of a change of line.
The new program, with its dualism of "legal," overt activity
and of underground preparation for violence, has provided other
tests of the quality of.the membership. That the party has an
efficient underground apparatus, that it has mounted violent
demonstrations, that it is organizing pare-military units bespeak
a significant degree of readiness to risk or incur hardships in the
course of illegal action. At the same time, the overt warning
carried in the Cominform journal in mid-1952 against excessive
violence of the sort perpetrated that spring, and the circumstances
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
surrounding that warning suggest that significant elements of the
party, perhaps including its top leadership, lack the sophistication
and discipline demanded by the program.
D. Quality of Party Leadership
The top leadership of the party, generally confined to prewar
Communists, is considered to be of fairly high quality. It includes
persons trained in Moscow and comprises those hardened through years
of repression and adversity. Nearly all of this level of leadership
is now underground, where, despite deficiencies of the sort previously
mentioned, the development of an efficient organization gives testi-
mony to their administrative capability. Opportunists and dilettantes
are believed to have been generally weeded out. However, the leader-
ship may be evaluated as relatively weak in its capacity to comprehend
and handle ideological matters. The leadership failed to adjust its
policies despite clear tokens of Moscow's displeasure before the
publication of the Cominform criticism; it failed to resolve the
theoretical differences in which the party schism thereafter focussed
for more than a year; and its level of ideological discussion has
invariably been low.
The leadership of the overt organization consists of thIrd-
rate figureheads.
The core of the party -_ those party members at all levels
who carry the principal burden of leadership and crganizational
activity and who may be expected to continue party activities under
most adverse conditions and abrupt changes in line -- may be
estimated at approximately 25,000.
SECRET - SECURITY INFOPMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 10 -
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
In the October 1952 House of Representatives general election,
the JCP nominated one candidate each in all but 10 of the 117 election
districts. These candidates polled 897,000 votes, or approximately
2.5 percent of the total valid ballots as compared with 2,985.,000 votes
(9.7%) for JCP candidates in January 1949. None of the JCP candidates
was successful in 1952, while 35 had been returned in 1949.
The JCP officially recommended 9 non-communist candidates,
one each in 9 of the 10 districts in which no JCP candidates were
entered. These recommended candidates, (four running under their
party labels; five as independents) received a total of 200,000 votes
and only one was successful. The portion of this vote attributable
to Communist support cannot be isolated. However, the JCP added this
total to the 897,000 won by its own candidates to attain its claim of
1.1 million pro-Communist votes.
The JCP also identified a list of 12 candidates (four
Progressive, five Left Socialists, and one Right Socialist, one
Labor-Farmer, and one independent) as "Patriotic candidates,"
signifying their general acceptability, although all but one of these
twelve competed with the Party's own candidates. These twelve
received a total of 475,000 votes. Ten of these twelve were success-
ful.
Beyond this it is difficult to identify candidates who may
be labeled fellow-travelers in some degree. Only-Labor-Farmer
candidates who received an aggregate of 261,000 votes may be regarded
collectively as pro-Communist oriented. Two Labor-Farmer candidates
had JCP support or approval.
The Left Socialist Party whose policy toward relations with
the U.S. security arrangements, rearmament, etc., is very similar
to that-of the JCP, officially spurned the JCP' s "united front"
platform. In any event, close cooperation between the two parties
would probably have been unlikely in most of the some 80 election
districts where they both nominated candidates. Only in four
districts are Conununits known to have obtained more votes than their
Left Socialist rivals. (Six Left Socialist candidates had JCP
support or approval). On the other hand, it is conceivable that
Communist and Left Socialist votes were "pooled" in the 30 districts
where the Left Socialists had no candidates but the Communists
did. In the Third District of Hokkaido, neither the Left Socialists
nor the Communists nominated a candidate and it is probable that at
least some of their support went to the Labor-Farmer candidate.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 11 -
Alth.ough the JCP has claimed partial credit for the electoral
advance of the Left Socialist Party as a group (3,494-,000 votes,
54 seats), the degree to which this claim might be justified cannot
be judged. The following table presents a comparison of communist
electoral strength with the strength of other major parties:
October 1952 House of Representatives Election
Party
Votes
Percent
Seats
JCP
897,000
2.5
0
Liberal (conservative
govt party)
16,928,000
48.0
238
Progressive
(conservative-
opposition)
6,421,000
18.2
85
Right Socialists
(opposition)
4,024,000
11.4
57
Left Socialists
..(opposition)
3,494,000
10.0
54
Independents
(mostly conserva-
tive)
2,364,000
6.7
21
Other
1,159,000
3.2
11
Total
35,287,000
100.0
466
Slightly less than one-third (31%) of the Communist vote in
October 1952 came from urban areas (comprising the entire prefectures
of Tokyo and Osaka plus the districts in which are located the larger
cities, namely, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, Kyoto, Sendai and Fukuoka),
and over two-thirds, from the rural districts. The ratio of urban
vote was exceeded only by that of the Right Socialists (36%); the
Liberal Party drew 15% of its vote from the urban districts, the
Progressives, 14%, and the Left Socialists 21%.
Numerically, the heaviest Communist vote was found in Tokyo
Metropolis and Osaka Prefecture. In Tokyo where the total valid
ballots numbered 2,480,000, the Communists polled more than 93,000
(3.7%), as compared with 1,025,000 votes (41.30) for the Liberals,
562,000 (22.7%) for the Right Socialists, 312,000 (12.60) for the
Progressives, and 303,000 (12.2%) for the Left Socialists. In
Osaka Prefecture, Communist candidates obtained 91,500 votes (6.00)
out of 1,503,000 valid ballots; in the same prefecture, the Liberals
again received a plurality of 690,000 votes (45.9%), followed by
the Right Socialists (288,000 -- 19.1%), the. Progressives (248,000 --
16.5%), and the Left Socialists (149,000 -- 9.9%). In the four
major cities other than Osaka and Tokyo, Communist returns were as
follows:
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Kyoto
26,000
Nagoya
24,000
Yokohama
13,400
Kobe
11,600
7.9
6.3
3.4
3.9
Of the rural prefectures, where conservative parties without
exception returned large majorities, Nagano had numerically the
largest Communist vote (46,700 -- 4.97). In Hokkaido, Communist
candidates polled 42,500 votes (2.9%), while the Labor-Farmer Party
obtained nearly 110,000. votes (6.77). The vote for Communist and
Labor-Farmer candidates was significant in two other prefectures:
Okayama (Communist -- 21,000 or 2.8% and Labor Farmer -- 82,500
or 11.3%) and Ibaraki (Communist -- 20,000, or 2.4% and Labor Farmer --
54,000 or 6.0).
The JCP's very poor showing as compared with previous
performances cannot be attributed to diminution of Communist interest
in election activities except in the indirect sense that:
1) abandonment of the Nozaka line altered the position
of parliamentary tactics in the hierarchy of Japanese
Communist values;
2) the campaign of violence that for a time appeared to
be the most conspicious expression of the new line,
although terminated well before the election,
alienated a large number of former party supporters.
In the self-criticism in which it has engaged since the
election, the JCP has not disavowed its basic campaign strategy --
the attempt to secure a united front, primarily with the Left
Socialists but also with other groups, on the basis of neutralism,
antiAmericanism, and opposition to rearmament. Self-criticism
has instead focused on tactics and has indicated that the Communists
find themselves guilty of: attempting to impose revolutionary
activity on the people prematurely; failing to clarify to the
people the party's role as the protector of their daily interests;
and failing to integrate the struggle to achieve current popular
objectives of various classes and interest groups with the struggle
for an "anti-imperialist" popular front. In a recent enunciation
of the party's campaign policies to be followed in the forthcoming
election for half the members of the upper house, scheduled for
May, 1953, it is emphasized that the party "must support, encourage,
and endeavor to join hands with each and every political force that
is opposed to the Yoshida Administration."
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
13 -
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Violent action has become an important policy and organizational
question for the JCP only relatively recently. The Cominform criticism
in January 1950 of the party's theory of peaceful revolution, and more
particularly the new party program of late 1951 and accompanying covert
policy statements, made it clear that underground preparation for vio-
lent action was to be undertaken concurrently with implementation of the
above-ground united front program. The fact that the party is now .
partly underground and that its program demands a continuation of legal
and illegal, overt and covert operations makes it difficult to isolate
the party's organization for violent action from its total organization,
although the policy concerning violent action has become relatively
clear.
A. Current Party Policy on Use of Violence
By contrast with policy on preparation for violence, policy on
use of violence was not explicitly indicated in Cominform criticism,
the new party program, or accompanying covert statements. However,
organized violence soon became a prominent feature of Communist-led
demonstrations. This militancy began with an attack on US military
personnel during a Communist demonstration in Tokyo on May 30, 1950, and
reached its peak during the first half of 1952 when a series of armed
clashes with the Japanese police occurred in many parts of the country.
Episodes of mass violence on February 21, May 1, and May 30, 1952 gave
evidence of participation by well-organized and trained Communist action
squads. During the same period and previously there were also numerous
episodes involving organized civil violence on a smaller scale, such as
police harrassment and demonstrations against tax and grain collection.
In July, however, an article in the Cominform journal attributed
to TOKUDA Kyuichi, secretary-general who has been underground since
mid-1950, in effect criticized resort to violence of a character that
would alienate the party from the masses. Since then, there has been
no significant mass violence, although continued efforts in. the line
of espionage and sabotage' have been reported. Labor disputes, even in
those unions subject to Communist direction or strong influence, have
not been marked by violence. Party statements on the matter imply that
resort to mass violence has not been repudiated in principle, but de-
clared premature and inexpedient under present circumstances.
Armed insurrection is the ultimate goal of the JCP's "Military
Policy," but the achievement of this goal is placed in the distant
future and is declared attainable only after the populace has been
thoroughly won over to the popular front and been made ready for a
general uprising under the leadership of the party.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 14 -
B. Party Organization for Planning and Execution of Violent Activities
1. Organization. The party's organization for violent action is a
part of its underground organization which, since 1950, by all evidence
has become the central machinery of the party, including its overt
organization and operations. The JCP Central Committee, whose members
were purged in 1950, has never been restaffed in the overt structure
of the party. Instead a covert "Political Bureau," staffed by purged
members of the former Central Committee and other selected leaders, is
secretly directing the legal Central Guidance Department and coordinating
the overt and covert activities of the party from the underground.
Under these covert executive bodies the party has evidently developed
a nation-wide underground structure parallel to, and closely coordinated
with, the existing legal organization. Most recent information on the
structure of the covert organization reveals that while the regional,
p efectural, district, and cell chain of command of the overt organiza-
ti% n is retained, regional boundaries have been revised and six region-
al subdivisions (as compared to nine in the overt structure) are now
.controlled by organs designated as "bureaus" to distinguish them from
the regional committees of the overt structure. The number of members
in each of the new regional bureaus is set at five, as compared with
some twenty members in each of the regional committees. A similar
reduction in the number of members in the covert prefectural committees
has been reported. In general, the organs of the underground apparatus
are considerably smaller and more efficiently organized in order to
insure security.
In the evolution of a covert structure, the JCP has given
special emphasis to the development of a para-military organization
which would be capable of planning and executing a program of violence
under the over-all direction of the underground "Political Bureau."
Information. to date indicates that the para-military organization is
composed of:
1) The "Military Affairs Committee" (also called the
"Y Organization"). This committee, apparently
established in mid-1951 directly under the covert
Political Bureau, constitutes a covert central ad-
ministration to plan and operate a program for
para-military organization and action, espionage,
and subversion. It is believed to include specia-
lized units designated Yl, Y2, Y3, Y4, and Y5 for
operations directed, respectively, against Japanese
security forces, civil police and investigative
agencies, US forces, industrial targets, and military
bases. Y4 is also reportedly charged with direction
of the nuclear self'-defense corps.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
2) Local counterparts of Military Affairs Committee.
Agencies planned, though not yet reported as in
being, to direct and coordinate actual operations
at local levels, and responsible to the central
Military Affairs Committee.
3) Nuclear Self-Defense Corps (Chukaku jiei tai).
Action groups composed of up to 10 militant, able-
bodied, disciplined party members, organized in
factories, villages, towns, schools, to conduct
agitation, sabotage, and harrassment; also to
develop larger bodies of militants from among
populace.
Available evidence indicates that the JCP covert organization
for the execution of its violent action programs is still in the pro-
cess of establishment, although the party has made significant advances
in this direction since 1950. In the case of the nuclear self defense
corps -- the basic units of the organization for militant action --
estimates as of May 1952, on the basis of data obtained in a few pre-
fectures, placed the total membership at between two and three thousand.
Later estimates range up to 16 thousand for those who have received
some form of para-military training. On the whole, it seems probable
that establishment of the corps and of the lower echelons of the "Y
organization" has taken place only in limited areas and that a nation-
wide network of such units does not yet exist. Similarly, gradual
progress appears to.have characterized the development of a cadre to
direct the activities of the various military units.
On the basis of scattered reports, centers of strength appear
to be the major industrial areas of Tokyo-Yokohama, Osaka-Kobe, and
northern Kyushu, and in Hokkaido.
2. Quality of leadership, mobility, available arms and equipment.
High quality leadership is believed to be scarce, and limited for the
most part to the top echelons of party pars-military structure. A
number of factors indicate that leadership on the lower, operating
levels is at a premium: the party's military program has been in effect
for only a little more than a year; it demands a structure of scope and
character which the party has never had in the past; implementation of
the program has been accompanied by frequent indications that the devel-
opment of competent cadre is a prime problem; and present JCP policy,
which envisages an interweaving of its military-action and political-
action programs, demands a high level of sophistication and discipline
of its personnel.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Mobility is not believed to be a prime objective of present JCP
military planning, which envisages rather a network of small local
units mobile only within a limited area.
Arms and equipment presently available consist of relatively few
firearms and of crude though effective weapons of harrassment, sabotage,
and street fighting, such as gasoline-filled bottles, teargas, time-
bombs, hand grenades, and tire-punching tools.
3. Plans and capabilities. Present indications are that the current
stage of JCP organization for violent action is such as to restrict its
use to more limited programs of sabotage and the instigation and leader-
ship of relatively sporadic incidents of mass violence. It is believed
that the principal task of such para-military organizations as are in
being include training, organization, and self-development, espionage,
and non-violent agitation. Undoubtedly, members of the para-military
organizations also serve as integral parts of the underground security
system protecting the missing top-level leaders.
In part, the limited nature of the JCP organization for violent
action when compared with the eventual-goal of "armed revolution" is
reflected in the militant action program as envisaged by the party
itself; without setting any precise time-table for the fulfillment of
its plans, the party apparently envisages three stages of development:
1) The establishment of the Military Affairs Committee
and its local counterparts and creation of the
nuclear self-defense corps and their organization
into a national network. Simultaneously, the
masses are to be prepared psychologically to accept
the necessity of armed action. Only this stage
appears to be regarded as current.
2) Formation of armed "resistance" and "self-defense"
organizations among the workers and farmers; con-
duct of partisan activities in localized sectors,
initially involving sabotage and harrassment and
ultimately attacks on military facilities and
equipment.
3) Conversion of these "resistance" and "self-defense"
organizations into a revolutionary "people's army"
to carry out a general armed uprising.
Whatever its expectations, the capabilities of the JCP for ex-
panding the organization for violent action and for advancing the pace
of its plans in this regard appear relatively limited under conditions
currently prevailing.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
17 -
Apart from the increasing effectiveness of Japanese government
countermeasures, the present level of economic activity and living
standards, the prevailing Japanese support for Western alignment and
suspicion of the Communist bloc, the current disrepute of the JCP, and
the greater attraction and greater feasibility of alternative methods
of seeking personal, group, and national objectives all. militate
against conclusion of the first phase let alone transition to the
second. Nevertheless, the JCP undoubtedly has the capability further
to expand, organize, and consolidate small action units composed of
present members of the party, and to enhance their capacities for
terrorism and other more or less limited subversive activities.
At present, however, Communist policy appears to recognize that
progress in the pare-military program to embrace significant elements
of the population not now Communist-inclined necessitates a wider and
more profound popular disaffection with the Japanese government and
its policies and, indeed, the structure of Japanese society itself.
Moreover, such progress neoess_itates avoidance of actions bringing
severe and widespread popular censure on the party.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 18
C. JCP Ability to Rally Elements of the Population to Violent Action
Despite the party's preparation for violent action, its
capacities for such actions have not been tested since mid-1952. The
Communist-led episodes of mass violence in the spring of 1952 demon-
strated a high quality of leadership insofar as the organizing and
directing of demonstrations involving the use of force is concerned.
They also demonstrated that the party apparatus possessed a store of
crude though effective weapons for street fighting. Finally,. they
indicated that the party had a sizeable force available for mass
violence.
That the party since mid-1952 has improved its organizational
and leadership for violent action seems altogether likely in view of
policy emphasis on such preparation. It also seems likely that the
party has made progress in equipping itself for violent action, es-
pecially in view of repeated reports of secret party pamphlets and
instructions dealing with the tactics of and the manufacture of wea-
pons for street fighting. (There is, however, no reason to believe
that the party has any significant stock of firearms.) On the other
hand, such advances have probably been at least offset, if not out-
weighed, by advances in the over-all efficiency of the civil police
and in at least the size and equipment of the National Safety Force,
a nuclear army trained among other things to cope with civil insur-
rection.
Accordingly, the Communist capacity for mass violence would
seem to rest largely with the quality and numbers of the human
resources at the party's command and on the character and circumstances
of the action.
In general, the Japanese body politic at present includes few
elements sufficiently disaffected to be led into violence without
previous training and/or incorporation into.the party's apparatus.
Thus, the party cannot count on converting mass demonstrations sponsored
by non-Communist groups into violent demonstrations. The 7,000 parti-
cipants in the Tokyo May 1 riot of 1952 represented roughly two percent
of the estimated three or four hundred thousand persons participating;
throughout the nation some 35,000 took part in violence out of the
total of 1,000,000 leftists and labor union members assembled. The
most volatile elements are found in the Korean minority, the radical
wing of the student group, and to some extent the day-labor ("free"
labor) group. These elements have been drawn into Communist-inspired
violence either by prearrangement or because their smaller-scale
demonstrations have proved susceptible to Communist exploitation.
Where the party itself has. sought to generate mass demonstra-
tions including violence, as opposed to exploiting occasions sponsored
by other groups, the results have been far less impressive. The
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
In these terms, the JCP has the following assets;
1) An estimated several thousand, at a minimum,
organized in nuclear self-defense or similar
corps. Estimates of numbers trained in some
form of para-military exercise range to 16,000.
2) An estimated 80-85,000 party members, of whom
perhaps a half might be considered to be of
superior quality in terms of loyalty and disoi-
pline. (The size of the party's underground is
estimated at around 30,000.)
4) An estimated 500-650,000 passive supporters,
comprising those who occasionally or in varying
degrees support the JCP or JCP front activities.
An estimated 100-250,000 active supporters,
comprising those who consistently play an active
role in supporting JCP programs and activities,
to whom an estimated 80,000 members of the
Korean minority may be added.
observance of the "Third Anti-Colonialization Struggle Day" on
February 21, 1952, brought out a total of some 6,000 leftists in rallies
and demonstrations in 26 different localities throughout the country.
Disturbances occurred chiefly in Tokyo, where about 900 out of an esti-
mated total of 3,000 demonstrators were involved in rioting. In a pre-
May Day rally in Tokyo on April 26, 1952 approximately 1,000 laborers,
students and Korean clashed with the police. On May 30, 1952, the JCP
attempted under the guise of an anniversary celebration for Japan's
"labor martyrs" to stage a repetition of the May 1 display of mass
violence. JCP directives reportedly called for a "nation-wide armed
struggle" and ordered "action corps" to execute raids against police
stations and tax offices. Demonstrations took place in various parts
of the country but large numbers were not mobilized and nothing approach-
ing the party's professed goal materialized. Again the most serious in-
cidents took place in Tokyo where roughly 1,000 demonstrators fought
with police.
Assuming continued economic and political stability in Japan,
the JCP in the foreseeable future is likely to prove no better able
than in the past to rally significant, non-Communist elements of the
population to mass violence -- especially as the public and the police
have now been alerted by the violence of last spring. Accordingly, its
future capacities for mass violence will depend largely on the human
resources it is able to marshall under its own standard.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
To these may be added perhaps 350,000 comprising
the adult portion of those registered as north
Koreans (400,000) plus those believed to be north-
Koreans among the unregistered (estimated 200,000).
While the foregoing elements to some extent would overlap, they
provide a rough idea of the pattern of present party support. This
pattern has developed under circumstances in which the party has re-
mained legal, its activities have been preponderantly non-violent, and
the chief pressures against it have been those of public opprobrium as
contrasted with the pervasive police repression of the prewar period.
Thus it is believed that only a minor portion of the million or more
listed as party supporters or sympathizers constitutes the party's man-
power for violent action.
Accordingly it is estimated that. at present, under optimum oondi-
tions, the party could order out between 20,000 and 50,000 to execute
acts of violence in connection with mass demonstrations, although con-
siderably more might be brought out to participate non-violently.
Where Korean issues are prominent these totals might be augmented by
elements from among the north Korean active supporters of the JCP.
This is based in part on the participation in violence on May 1, 1952,
and in part on the estimates of the party's hard core which is assumed
to include.its para-military forces.
It is believed that for violent action of guerrilla or insurrec-
tionary nature, the party's potential might range initially between
16,000 and 20,000. This is based on estimates of para-military forces
with some allowance for progress and also for party elements not re-
gularly engaged in para-military training which might readily be
assimilated into such action. If this action were called for in con-
nection with external attack, the figure might multiply in, the event,
that a Communist takeover seemed assured of success. The increments
would be drawn from the membership of the party and its active sup-
porters who might render effective services in the form of sabotage and
harrassment.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 21 -
The post-treaty Japanese Government has made clear its
hostility to Communism and its intention at least to maintain the
restrictive policies it previously had followed under occupation
direction. These policies, although neither as comprehensive nor
as effective as the pre-surrender government's program of repression,
nevertheless have limited the party's capabilities and have forced
it to seek greater protection underground and to rely more heavily
on front organizations.
The legal basis of such political freedom of action as the
party and its fronts possess rests on broad constitutional and
statutory protections introduced during the occupation and designed,
like similar protections in the US, to foster and safeguard political
rights. Particularly during the latter half of the- occupation,
however, activities of the party and its fronts were severely circum-
scribed by the operation of supra-constitutional regulations laid
down by the occupying authorities under powers stemming legally from
the terms of surrender. The top leadership of the party was driven
underground, the publication and distribution of major party organs
banned, and other disabilities imposed under these regulations.
Despite such disabilities, the JCP remained a legal political party,
represented in the Diet, and continued to carry on a variety of both
legal and illegal political activities.
Since the end of the occupation on April 28, 1952, the party's
freedom of action has continued to be limited. Laws passed during
the occupation including provisions designed to bar Communit s from
governmental employment remain in force. Some-of the occupation
restrictions have been carried on in newly enacted legislation.
Almost all local governments have passed laws for the maintenance of
public peace which have acted to curb Communist demonstrations.
The question of whether those charged with offenses against occupa-
tion regulations -- notably including the party's top leadership
underground for two and a half years -- still remain liable to criminal
prosecution in post-treaty Japan is now under judicial review.
The most important new law has been the Anti-Subversive
Activities Law, Passed in July 1952. This law, an adjunct to the
Criminal Code.and designed to suppress organized threats to the
government,' permits the government to prohibit the publication and
distribution of subversive literature, to suspend or dissolve
subversive groups posing a clear threat of violence, and to take
action against officers and members of .such groups. The law, however,
contains provisions which aim to inhibit arbitrary exercise of these
powers. Perhaps in part for this reason, the government has moved
very cautiously in implementing the law; only two persons have been
reported indicted under the law, and no convictions have been reported
to date.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Rel 07i
02 -
Mqq
In more general terms, the Communists have derived some
advantage from the difficulties besetting law enforcement and judicial
agencies now operating within a social and political' structure less
amenable than.in pre-surrender days to tight control. Comprehensive
anti-Communist measures have been opposed by a variety of groups, not
confined to those of leftist persuasion, for such reasons as fear CC
governmental abuses, reluctance to antagonize the Soviet bloc, and
belief that the Communists would be less controllable if driven under-
ground completely.
On the other hand, new law enforcement and intelligence
agencies have been added to the existing surveillance and control
network, and the police organization has been trained specifically to
meet Communist-inspired disturbances. The government is also sponsor-
ing, officially and unofficially, counter-propaganda campaigns. The
party's loss of official representation in the Diet's Lower House as
a result of the October elections deprived it of an advantageous
national forum. In addition to this evidence of a dropping-off in
the party's popular support, opposition to official restrictive
measures now may be less effective because of popular reaction to
Communist-inspired violence during the first half of 1952.
The threat posed by governmental restrictions has caused the
JCP to concentrate on developing an efficient underground organiza-
tion and to emphasize front activities. The capability of the under-
ground for circumventing governmental control measures is indicated
by the fact that out of nine well-known, top echelon leaders of the
JCP wanted by the police, only one has been apprehended after over
two and a half years of intensive investigation. Another indication
is the ability of the underground party press to publish illegal
newspapers and pamphlets despite repeated efforts of the police to
suppress its operation. The party's increased emphasis on fronts has
also complicated the problems of governmental control agencies. The
effectiveness of front activities, however, has been reduced by greater
public alertness and by counter-propaganda.
The freedom of action of the party and its fronts seems likely
to be circumscribed more narrowly in the near future, although the
party will probably not be outlawed. It seems probable that the
government will: 1) introduce new restrictive legislation, perhaps
including a bill regulating mass demonstrations that would standard-
ize local regulations; 2) apply less cautiously existing legisla-
tion such as the Anti-Subversive Activities Law; 3) emphasize
"preventive" action in the operation of its control network; and 4)
step up its counter-propaganda activities, possibly by stronger appeals
to nationalist sentiment.
The government at present has the power to maintain surveillance
and control over overt activities. Its capacities for dealing with
covert activities are less complete, due in part to inadequacies in
its intelligence system. Its police and military forces are capable
of coping effectively with mass violence and armed insurrection,
although the party could undoubtedly launch, and for sometime sustain,
a program of limited and sporadic sabotage and small-scale violence.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 23
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
No estimates are available for the number of Communists
or sympathizers employed in specific key industries, Roughly ten
percent (153,000) of the workers in heavy industries and in coal
and metal mining are believed to be Communists. The major trade
unions in these industries, however are not Communist controlled.
Since, apart from heavy industries and coal and metal mining, the
major focus of Communist influence is among government office
workers union, the overall proportion of Communists in all key
industries (mining, chemicals, primary metals, transportation,
communications, and other public utilities) probably is not
significantly greater than 7 percent.
Only three unions in key industries may be considered to be
nationally controlled by the JCP: 1) the All Communications
Workers Union (600); 2) the All Japan Metal Workers Union (27,000);
and 3) the Council of Greater Chemical Industry Workers Union
(5,000). In addition to the three unions above comprising a member-
ship of 32,600, there are five unions with a total membership of
115,000 that are not controlled but are strongly influenced by the
JCP on the national level. The ratio of C oamunists to non-Communists
in these unions is unknown.
There are four major unions in key industries with a total.
membership of 850,000 whose policies have paralleled those advocated
by the JCP. The leadership of these unions is almost exclusively
in the hands of trade unionists closely supporting Left Socialist
Party programs. There is no conclusive evidence as to whether the
close parallel between the policies and actions of these unions and
that of the JCP is a consequence of a positive pro-Communist orienta-
tion on the part of nominally non-Communist leaders, or of their
strong Left Socialist bias. The JCP has consistently attempted to
exploit this parallelism, whatever its origins, and through it to
advance its tactic of- infiltration into non.. -Communist unions.
Since the period 1948-50 when overt Communist membership and
influence was virtually extinguished by the anti-Communist drive in
Japanese trade unions, the JCP has been unable to regain the degree
of leadership and control exercised before that date. Despite
indications that left-wing trade unions are aware of the threat of
Communist exploitation and infiltration and despite a resurgent
anti-Communist movement among Right Socialist trade unionists, the
parallel between Communist policies and programs and those of non-
C omnunist, left wing trade unionists does render a major segment of
organized labor vulnerable to Communist tactics of propagandistic
exploitation and of infiltration of membership and leadership.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
24 -
VI. COIAMSNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The same threat to its legal existence that caused the JCP
to develop and strengthen its underground organization has led the
party to emphasize front activities in an attempt to circumvent
repression. While front organizations have always played an
important role in the Communist program of propaganda and agitation
among the populace, they have recently been given more attention
by the JCP. Party directives issued late in 1952 have called upon
party members to exert tighter control over leading front organiza
tions at the policy level. The usefulness of these organizations
to the Communists, however, has been reduced by the fact that their
status as fronts in most cases is well known. Moreover, their
operations in the future may be further limited by tighter govern-
mental controls, by official and unofficial counter-propaganda
efforts, and by the activities of some competitive groups with
an anti-Communist orientation. In any case, the significance of
the role played by front groups remains an open question. Some
Japanese, tncluding a large segment of the intelligentsia, have had
a proclivity for positions similar to those advocated by front
groups, such as "neutralism," but this proclivity may not have been
induced by the front groups, and might not be removed even if the
front groups disappeared entirely.
National and local front organizations in Japan often center
their activities around either a general theme (such as "peace"
,or promotion of trade relations with Communist China) intended to
appeal to broad segments of the population or a specific theme
(such as opposition to increases in university tuition rates)
intended to appeal to local or special interests. Cultural and
professional front groups have tended to concentrate in the Tokyo
area; a number of front organizations have their headquarters in
a single building in Tokyo sometimes referred to as a "Communist
nest.!" Increased attention, however, has been paid recently to the
development of local cultural fronts in non-metropolitan areas.
One of the principal activities of many front groups is the publica-
tion of propaganda organs designed to reach persons outside as well
as within the areas of concentrated population.
In addition, following familiar practices, the Communists
have attempted persistently to infiltrate various types of non-
Communist social, cultural, and professional organizations. The
Communists reportedly exert varying degrees of influence, ranging
from very slight to moderate, within a number of non-Communist
organizations, such as: the Japanese Science Council (an organiza-
tion including some of Japan's top scientists), the Japan Cultural
Cooperative Union, the Japan Peace Promotion Peoples Congress (which
was originally Socialist-sponsored), the New Japan Women's League
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 25 -
(a non-partisan-league of women voters), the Pacific Problems
Research Society (the Japan branch of the Institute of Pacific
Relations), the Democratic Nurture League (which provides advice
to parents on the "democratic" upbringing of children), and the
Japan Organ Publications Association ?which was designed to
coordinate and improve leftist publications).
Among the most active front organizations are the usual
"peace" and Soviet bloc "friendship" groups. The two major peace
fronts are the Japan Peace Protection Committee and the Overall-
Peace Patriotic Movement Council, which may merge in the near future.
They are affiliated with the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council.
Presumably these organizations will continue to be used for general
propaganda operations, signature campaigns, and the like, and may
derive some benefit from the current JCP de-emphasis on violent
activities. Exact membership figures are not available, but the.
membership at large is believed to include non-Communists holding
a variety of political views. Among the "friendship" groups are
the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society, with a registered membership
of 8,000; the Japan-Korea Friendship Society, whose exact member-
ship figures are not available; and the Japan China Friendship
Society, which in December 1951 had a membership of 700.
Promotion of trade with Communist China is fostered not
only by the Japan-China Friendship Society, but also by two other
active groups specifically devoted to this theme. The Japan-China
Trade Promotion Council and the Japan-China Trade Promotion Associa-
tion reportedly receive some support from non-Communist commercial
firms and individuals interested in trade prospects with the Chinese
mainland. Membership data .is unavailable, but the strength of these
groups apparently is concentrated in.the Tokyo and Kansai regions.
The largest and most active minority group fronts are among
Koreans in Japan. It has been estimated that a substantial majority
of the approximately 600,000 registered and 200,000 unregistered
Koreans in Japan are sympathetic to the North Korean regime. Some
20 Korean organizations in Japan have been reported either Communist-
controlled or dominated. Durrently among the most active groups
are the Korean Democratic Racial Front, which apparently includes
a majority of the Communist and pro-Communist Koreans in Japan in
its membership, and the Fatherland Defense Committee, which reportedly
includes the more militant and extremist elements among the Korean
minority. The former is affiliated with the North Korean Democratic
Front for Unification of the Fatherland. There are reports of an.
effort to revive the Korean League, which under the name of the
League of Koreans Resident in Japan was once the dominant Korean
front in Japan. Before its dissolution by occupation authorities
in 1949, its membership was reportedly about 400,000.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET -- SECURITY INFORMATION
26 -
The principal student front organization is the National
Federation of Student Self-Government Associations (Zengakuren),
which is affiliated with the International Student Congress. The
only nationwide university student organization, it reportedly
has some 200 chapters throughout Japan. About 20 percent of its
total membership of approximately 150,000 are estimated to be active
Communists or sympathizers, who have tended to overshadow and
dominate non-Communist student participation. Currently the organiza-
tion reportedly is attempting to recoup its lose of membership
during the past two years, as well as. to organize and penetrate the
few existing high school youth groups. The two principal fronts,
among high school and other non-university youth are the Japan
Democratic Youth Association, with an estimated membership of 20,000,
and the Japan Youth Fatherland Front, with an estimated membership.
of 50,000. Both are reportedly affiliated with the Soviet-inspired
Federation of Democratic Youth. There is no evidence indicating
that these groups will undergo extensive expansion or increase their
activities significantly in the near future.
A number of cultural front organizations in the fields of
music, art, literature, entertainment, and general cultural promotion
have been identified . Most are relatively small but active propa-
ganda organizations, reportedly including in their membership some
notable names in Japanese cultural circles. The major general
cultural promotion group apparently is the Japan Cultural Peoples
Congress. In the entertainment field, the People's Theatrical
Group and the Progressive Troupe are the most publicized and most
active. The former includes 363 Communist or pro-.Communist repre-
sentatives of some 60 theatrical organizations. The latter, which
reportedly includes 26 known JCP members, has recently sent out
small groups on a "road-show" basis in an effort to reach more people.
Local Communist units are encouraged to exploit for propaganda
purposes audiences attracted to such performances as these. Several
literary groups operate as front organizations, although specific
data is lacking. Apparently the most active is the New Japan
Literary Society, which has 1,700 members and publishes a monthly
periodical.
There are a few front organizations for professional groups,
most of which have a small membership. Two of the most useful from
the Communist viewpoint are the Liberal Lawyers Group and the Tokyo
Joint Law Office, which-supply legal counsel for Communists. The
latter includes in its membership the more radical wing of the
Liberal Lawyers Group, and the most able Communist lawyers in Japan.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-
- 27
The New Japan Physicians' League, the chief medical front,
consists of about 50 doctors and several operating clinics concen-
trated in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. One of the most influential
academic front groups is the Democratic Scientists' Association.
In the field of research, there are several small, but
relatively influential, front groups devoted to disseminating
propaganda in the form of selected data and "analysis" relating to
Communist doctrine and conditions in Communist-controlled countries.
Among these groups, whose name are indicative of their interests,
are: the China Research Institute, the Soviet Research Association,
the Marx-Lenin Research Institute, the World Policy Research
Institute, and the Soviet Data Correspondence Company. However,
several competitive anti-Communist research organizations have been
established in Japan recently, in addition to the research and
information activities of several government agencies.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET --SECURITY INFORMATION
- 28
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Although there are indications that the JCP has attempted per-
sistently to infiltrate the government at all levels, and particularly
such key agencies as the National Safety Force, National Rural Police
and other security organs; there is no evidence that the party has
penetrated the top policy echelons. The Japanese government has been
fully conscious of the potential threat posed by the JCP in this re-
spect, and consistent efforts have been made to discover and discharge
party members and sympathizers from agencies responsible for public
safety and national security. JCP efforts in this direction are
certain to continue, however, and it is possible that party members
and sympathizers are present in limited numbers at lower echelons of
the government and security agencies. Recent police counter-espionage
has revealed that the JCP has obtained detailed knowledge of police
plans through "Y-31" operations, otherwise known as the"Anti-Police
Action Guidance. Department" of the covert organization. There is no
indication, however, that such. infiltration ag has occurred is suffi-
cient to subvert the administration of government or to impede the
effective use of security agencies in coping with a serious threat to
public order and safety.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 29 -
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
The extent of direct Communist influence upon public-opinion
leadership groups is believed to be slight. "Purges" carried out in
1949 and 1950 further reduced the number of Communists employed in
educational, press, radio and entertainment enterprises. The majority
of public-opinion leaders, whose prestige is usually based on social
and family background, financial strength, and political connections,
and whose influence is quietly but persuasively exerted, is politically
conservative.
The extent of indirect Communist influence, while no doubt
larger, is almost impossible to determine with any accuracy. One of
the difficulties involved in any assessment is the fact that the out-
look of some non-Communist groups may in certain particulars coincide
with that of the Communists. Such a situation permits the Communists
to claim or be credited with a greater influence than perhaps is de-
served. A large segment of Japants intelligentsia is inclined to be
sympathetic politically with the left-wing, and many such Japanese
have been attracted for some years by Marxist theories and terminology.
However, the number of actual Communists or fellow-travellers among
this group is believed to be relatively small compared to those who
adhere to Socialist principles or programs.
There are indications of some Communist youth activities in the
secondary schools and suggestions that individual teachers and admin-
istrators may be either Communists or pro-Communist, but there is no
evidence indicating that any significant Communist influence has been
exerted on youth or the local communities from these sources. The
Japan Teachers Union, the most important organized group among Japanese
school teachers, apparently supports the left-wing Socialists, so that
on certain specific issues the view of the Teachers Union has paral-
leled that of the Communists.
At the University and College level the percentage of active
Communist or pro-Communist professors or administrators is believed to
be relatively small. A few professors were dismissed during 1949 in
connection with the "purge". Many professors alleged or known to be
Communists or sympathizers apparently focus their attention upon the
theoretical aspects of Communism. In a few universities, particularly
Osaka Municipal University, a number of faculty members have been
identified as party members or fellow travellers. The extent of direct
influence exerted by Communist and fellow-travelling faculty members
cannot be isolated from the totality of Communist influence operating
on the student body.
In the entertainment field, individuals, who are either active
Communists or pro-Communist, are known to be in the employ of
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-30-
non-Communist enterprises, but their influence apparently is very
limited. Some known Communists or sympathizers were purged from the
entertainment industries in 1949 and formed active front organiza-
tions devoted to propagandizing through entertainment media. These
small groups are very active and are considered important by the JCP.
Evidence pertaining to the size of their audiences and their influence
is otherwise only fragmentary.
Radio enterprises and the non-Communist press carried out a
purge of known Communists and sympathizers in 1950. As a result, more
than 600 persons were dismissed from various metropolitan and local
newspapers and from the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan. Although
a few individuals may have escaped the purge and others have infil-'
trated these organizations, there is no evidence that they either hold
key positions or exert any significant degree of influence. However,
a few individual publishing houses which publish and promote the dis-
tribution of Communist literature, such as the San Ichi Book Company
of Osaka and Kyoto, may be controlled by either Communist or pro-
Communist.
It is highly doubtful that either Communists or sympathizers
have acquired any positions of influence within Buddhist and Shinto
institutions in Japan. There is no evidence suggesting that the few
Buddhist groups which recently have publicly advocated a program for
world peace have been under any direct Communist influence.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The extent of direct influence by Communist party members or
sympathizers upon the policies and activities of moderate and ultra-
right wing parties and organizations is negligible. Neither major con-
servative party is in any sense responsive to direct Communist influ-
ence and both have adopted uncompromising anti-Communist positions.
Scattered and unconfirmed evidence suggests the presence of a
very limited number of Communist party members or sympathizers in a few
of the ultra-rightist, nationalistic organizations. Particularly in
the field of foreign policy, the radically nationalistic cast of the
policies advanced by many of these organizations is of benefit to Com-
munist Party propagandistic efforts and conceivably is susceptible to
limited Communist exploitation. Despite the similarity of certain of
their objectives, there is no reliable evidence of even limited co-
operation between the Communist Party and ultra-rightist organizations.
Non-Communist, left-wing parties and organizations are more
vulnerable to Communist exploitation and infiltration. It is diffi-
cult, however, to estimate with precision the extent of Communist Party
influence in Japanese political, economic, and cultural organizations
that generally exhibit either a radical or moderate socialist orienta-
tion. For a minor segment of Japan's non-Communist left, the presence
of Communist party members or sympathizers in positions of leadership
undoubtedly has enabled the party to exert a positive, although not
necessarily determining, influence on policy and activities. Such
appears to be the case in certain non-Communist trade unions, both at
the national and local levels, in certain segments of the Japan Farmers,
Union (Nichino), in the Labor-Farmer Party, and among the extremist
faction of the Left Socialist Party.
A major segment of the non-Communist left - including the bulk
of the Left Socialist Party and those trade unions and farmer organi-
zations_closely allied with it at the leadership level -- currently
supports policies and programs frequently paralleling positions assumed
by the JCP. Despite the probable presence at the leadership levels of
these groups of a limited number of Communist sympathizers, if not actual
party members, this parallelism of policies and even of action programs
does not appear to be the result of positive Communist influence. A more
adequate explanation of the parallelism may be found in a tendency toward
a doctrinaire, Marxist view of Japan's domestic and foreign problems, a
radical socialist response to particular domestic political and economic
circumstances, a political opportunism or, at most, a tolerance toward
the Communist Party itself. While such circumstances render this segment
of the non-Communist left potentially vulnerable to JCP exploitation or
infiltration, present evidence does not indicate that the Communist Party
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 32
is able to exercise a positive and continuing influence on the formu-
lation of policy and action programs. Moreover, despite the frequently
close similarity of their policies, these groups consistently, since
1919, have rejected JCP "United front" overtures.
Any estimate of the significance either of direct Communist in-
fluence in non-Communist left-:ring organizations and groups or of their
potential exploitability by the Communists must be weighted by con-
sideration of the actively anti-Communist segment of Japan's left-wing.
Generally affiliated with the Right-Wing Socialist Party, this segment
includes the so-called "right-wing" trade unions, farmers organizations,
and quasi-political groups which increasingly have adopted positions of
categorical, opposition to the JCP and have sought to avoid policies
closely identified with the Communist Party. Even within organizations
whose leadership is closely allied to the Left Socialist Party, opposi-
tion right-wing socialist factions frequently act to moderate extremist
leadership and serve as a counter to Communist Party efforts to influ-
ence significantly policy and action programs. Finally, it is signi-
ficant that despite the apparent numerical superiority of the socialist
left-wing, based principally upon the membership of trade unions whose
leadership supports the Left Socialist Party, the Right Socialist Party
polled a greater proportion of the total vote in the recent general
elections. Assuming that Communist influence increases significantly
within the socialist left, there is reason to believe that the moderate,
socialist right-wing will form the core around which a majority of those
now supporting more radical leadership will reorganize.
In sum, it is believed that only in the minority, extremist seg.
ment of the socialist left is Communist influence sufficient to exert a
positive influence on action programs and policies, although even here
such influence is not necessarily constant or determinant. Nevertheless,
the parallel between the policies and action programs of the major
portion of the Socialist left and many of the positions taken by the
JCP, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, is of considerable
advantage to the Communists.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORM TTION
- 33 -
Communist propaganda is disseminated in large quantities through
a large variety of mass media. Published materials include newspapers,
periodicals, pamphlets, leaflets, and posters produced and distributed
both overtly and covertly. Certain party publications, including
Akahata (the official JCP newspaper), were forced underground as a re-
sult of suppressive action initiated in the summer of 1950 under
authority of an occupation ordinance. Although this ban is no longer
in force, the publications affected (some of which have reemerged as
overt publications) have not been able to recover their former influ-
ence.
Most of the available data on Communist publications pertains
primarily to those official or quasi-official organs controlled directly
by JCP headquarters. Overt publications currently are published by the
JCP Publications Bureau. The principal overt newspaper, Akahata ("Red
Flag") is regularly published every third day plus frequen elemental
"extras." Its present circulation is estimated at 85,000. Zenei
("Vanguard") and Atarashii-'3ekai ("New World") are the two lea ng
monthly periodica s controlled y party headquarters, each has a cir..
culation of approximately 20,000. The weekly paper To Katsudo Shishin
("Party Activity Guide") apparently is an important publication w h n
the party, although no circulation statistics are available.
Several party organs continue to be clandestinely produced and
distributed. Heiwa to Dokuritsu ("Peace and Independence"), presently
the principal clandestine paper, was last reported to be a daily with
an estimated circulation of 100,000. Naigai Hyoron ("Foreign and
Domestic News"), apparently a daily, has actual`appeared irregularly
under a variety of disguised titles. It is estimated that the 5,000
copies printed reach 100,000 persons. To Kensetsu Sha ("Party Con-
structor") apparently is an important p- l c3 alion, athough specific
data on its circulation is not available. The party presumably sponsors
the Japanese edition of the Cominform Journal, Kokyo Heiwa no tame ni,
Jimmin Minshu Shugi no tame ni ("For a Lasting Peace, for a Peo ie's
emocracy . K -weekTy paper; it reportedly is a translation of the
European version and has appeared under a variety of disguised titles.
Party propaganda organs are supplemented by the extensive propa-
ganda activities of the numerous front organizations. The various
Soviet bloc "friendship" fronts sponsor several publications dedicated
to promoting "friendly relations," as well as to encouraging the es-
tablishment of regular political and economic relations between Japan
and Communist--controlled countries. The Japan-Soviet Friendship
Society sponsors two publications, the monthly periodicals Sovietto
Nyusu ("Soviet News") and Soviet Shiryo ("Soviet Data"). I is es i-
ad that s 0,000 copies of the~ormer are printed, but no specific
data is available regarding the latter publication.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-34-
The Japan-China Friendship Society sponsors two bi-monthlies,
Nippon to Chugoku ("Japan and China") and Chugoku Jijo ("China Digest").
rcu aUonWata is not available.
At least three publications are devoted to promoting the Soviet-
inspired "peace campaigns" in Japan. The Japan Peace Protection Com-
mittee sponsors the publication of Sekai Heiwa ("World Peace") and
Heiwa no tame ni Kokusai Shiryo ("Int`rna ona. Research Materials in
the Cause of 1 ceWj,bothibi-monthlies; an estimated 3,000 copies of
the former, and 5,000 of t'he latter are printed. Kowa Shimbun ("Peace
Newspaper"), a weekly sponsored by the Over-all Peace Patriotic Move-
ment Council, is the largest of its type and has an estimated circu-
lation of 60,000.
The Japan Peoples Relief Society, which is dedicated to the pro-
tection of civil rights against "'oppressive police action" sponsors
Jinken Mimpo ("Peoples Human Rights News"'). Some 8,000 copies of this
paper are published every ten days. The Japan Repatriates League
publishes 4,000 copies of the Shinboku Shimbun ("Friendship Newspaper")
for its members.
Various publications cater to special population groups. Fujin
Sengen ("Women's Manifesto"), sponsored by the Japan Women's Democratic
oune 1, is published every ten days and has an estimated printing of
2,000 copies. The Women's Democratic-Club sponsors the Fujin Minshu
Shimbun ("Women's Democratic Newspaper"), a weekly with an est ma
circulation of.70,000. The monthly periodical Kagaku-sha ("Scientist")
sponsored by the Democratic Scientists Association has an estimated cir-
culation of -30,000. The New Japan Literary Society sponsors the Shin
Nippon Bungaku ("New Japan Literature"), a monthly periodical which has
an es 1im_af072,000 circulation. The educators front,. the Japan Demo-
cratic Education Association, sponsors Akarui Kyoiku ("Bright Education"),
a monthly periodical reportedly reaching ,00Oreaders.
Miscellaneous publications which apparently are published by
private firms and which are considered important propaganda organs in-
clude Jiyu Nippon Hoso (Radio Free Japan Broadcasts), a weekly containing
transcripts off"-ad3o Free Japan (RFJ) broadcasts which is published by
Sekai News and Kaiho no Koe ("Voice of Liberation") a semi-weekly paper
published by the same company.
Party and front organization propaganda organs apparently are
supplemented to some extent by the importation of publications from
Commuiist-controlled countries.
It is impossible to ascertain the impact of such imported publi-
cations because precise data is not available. Since April 28, however,
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 35 -
there has been no prohibition on the import of publications from these
areas. Apparently all types of Communist publications are available on
the open market in Japan, including Isvestia and Pravda from the Soviet
Union and People's China from Co s na. is presumed from
newstand 0-bookstore advertising that other major publications from
these areas are readily available.
There are no Communist-controlled broadcasting facilities in
Japan and the extent of Communist or pro-Communist infiltration of
existing broadcasting firms apparently is negligible. Propaganda
broadcasts, however, are beamed to Japan from Moscow, Peiping, and
Pyongyang as well as from Radio Free Japan, a Communist-controlled
station located in Peiping. With the exception of the medium wave
broadcasts of Radio Free Japan, all the programs apparently are broad-
cast on shortwave. Although Japan has approximately 9,000,000 radio
receiving sets, only about 5 percent are capable of receiving shortwave
broadcasts. In an attempt to cope with this problem, the JCP has en-
couraged the development of "listening clubs," and also has published
transcripts or selected portions of important broadcasts. Broadcasting
schedules and the names of sets capable of receiving various foreign
programs are also publicized. In at least one instance, names of firms
where radios could be converted to shortwave have. been published.
Radio Free Japan now makes four one-hour broadcasts daily and
uses two medium and two shortwave frequencies. Monitor reports indi-
cate that its shortwave broadcasts are very difficult to tune and fre-
quently the medium wave broadcasts are very faint.
There are five broadcasts daily from Moscow in Japanese, two of
45 minutes each and three of 30 minutes each, while Radio Peiping
broadcasts two programs daily of approximately a half-hour each. Ac-
curate data on Pyongyang broadcasts is unavailable at the present time.
Reliable data pertaining to the listening audiences of these
various overseas broadcasts is unavailable. However, because of the
poor quality of reception and the limited number of receiving sets
capable of tuning these broadcasts, it is presumed that the audiences
are relatively small and generally limited to those Communists or
sympathizers who would go to considerable effort to listen.
Although the importation of foreign propaganda films is under
control, the JCP and front. organizations have either produced movies
or encouraged the showing of those domestic and imported films which
they believe have propaganda value because they present the "proletariat"
viewpoint. Films of this type produced in Japan include "The Stormy
History of Hakone" by Zenshir,za in collaboration with the North Star
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 36-
Motion Picture Company, "Being a Mother and Woman" by Kinuta Pro-
ductions, "Mountain Echo School"' sponsored by the Japan Teachers
Union, "Foghorn" by Toho, and "Oh We're Still Alive" produced by
Zenshinza. Attendance at the showings of such foreign films as
"Bitter Rice," produced in Italy, is also encouraged.
Special propaganda media include mass demonstrations and rallies,
sound trucks, and other facilities used in connection with election
campaigns, special lectures, and study groups. Local "struggle" cam-
paigns arising from local grievances are also exploited topromote
Communist propaganda. In the past house-to-.house signature drives
have also provided a highly personal means for spreading the party
line.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
37
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
Statistics on the financial status of the JCP are only frag-
mentary. Information on the party's financial status not only is a
closely guarded party secret but, since the development of an under-
ground structure, party finances apparently are handled separately
for the covert and overt organizations.
Available statistical evidence is so inadequate that it permits
no quantification of the JCP's financial health. What statistical
evidence is available, however, together with other evidence drawn
from party activities seems to indicate that at least since 1951 the
party has been faced with persistent but not crippling difficulties
in financing both its overt and covert organizations and operations.
Regular sources of income, such as party dues and the sale of party
publications, do not appear to be providing a significant portion of
total revenues, and the burden now appears to be carried by donations
from wealthy party supporters, special contributions, front organiza..
Lions, illegal activities, and Communist sources outside Japan. Evi-
dence of continued financial difficulties. is to be found in the fre-
quent reports of party drives for improved collection of dues and more
thorough party accounting systems, of the suspension of subsidies to
certain organizations, and of reductions in the number and salaries of
paid party workers.
The impact of straitened financial circumstances appears to have
fallen principally upon the JCP's overt organization and operations.
Despite these indications, however, it is believed that the party as a
whole continues to have access to sufficiently large funds from one
source or another to continue active operations in all fields of effort
and there is no indication that it will be forced to suspend any of its
major operations in the near future. Indicative of the extent of the
party's resources is the fact that, despite its slight chances of
success, the party expended at least 4 11,220,570 in the 1952 election
campaign.
Be Revenues
The JCP derives its revenue from party dues, sales of party pub-
lications, illegal covert activities, private donations, contributions
of business firms interested in trade with the Chinese mainland, Com..
munist-controlled labor and front organizations, and international Com-
munist organizations and the Soviet or.Soviet satellite governments.
Very little detailed information is available on any of these sources.
A possible indication of declining revenue during the past two
years has been the increasing reliance on special fund-raising campaigns.
In the most recent major campaign, during September 1952, a goal of
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-38-
4 100 million was set. Despite several extensions, it is believed that
the party failed to raise as much as 50 percent of its goal.
1. Dues and Party Publications. No recent figures are available on
the total revenue collected from party dues. During 1949, when party
membership was at its peak (approximately 110,000 registered members),
income from dues is believed to have been only about two million yen
monthly. All recent evidence, however, indicates a decline in revenue
from this source, and the party frequently has admitted difficulty in the
collection of party dues.
A similar decline in revenue appears to have been experienced in
the sale of party publications, once one of most lucrative sources of
revenue. Circulation of these publications appears not to have re-
covered from the suppressive measures carried out by the government
from June 1950 to April 1952.
2. Donations. Although the party apparently continues to receive
substantial donations from wealthy party members and from certain busi-
ness interests, there is evidence that donations to party election cam-
paign funds no longer provide an important source of extra income.
Total contributions, as reported by the party, for the 1947 and 1952
Lower House general elections were 1- 5,155,543 and * 520,570 respectively.
No figures are available regarding income from party.,.controlled
business firms and from commissions in east-west trade. Such business
enterprises as have been identified as controlled by party members are
small (many of them being book stores or small merchandising enterprises)
and it is not likely that these make a significant contribution to the
party coffers. Nor is it likely that the party has received any sub-
stantial income in the form of commissions from east west trade deals.
There is evidence, however, that the party has received substantial dona-
tions from non-Communist firms interested in supporting party efforts to
promote trade with the Chinese mainland.
No significant estimate is possible of the amounts received from
Communist-controlled labor unions and front organizations. In view of
the relatively limited membership of Communist-controlled unions, their
frequently loose organization, and the low state of union finances in
general, it is unlikely that these unions provide an important source of
income to the party. (A possible exception here is the All-.Japan Auto-
mobile Workers Union which contributed It 25,000 to the party's 1952
election campaign.) Incomplete information, however, suggests that front
organizations provide a major source of party funds, both to the overt
and covert structures, and are an important means by which funds are
channeled to the party from sources within and outside Japan. Thus, the
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-39-
party reportedly anticipated that front organizations would provide al-
most X 2 million to its election campaign fund in September 1952. In
addition, these front organizations frequently are the agency through
which a variety of fund-raising drives -- such as the "peace" fund cam-
paigns - are undertaken. A sizeable portion of such contributions
probably is forwarded to the party. The fronts often are able to obtain
funds from sources which would not normally contribute to the party
directly.
3. International Support. No figures are available on the total of
funds forwaRed to the from international Communist organizations or.
from Communist governments, although incomplete reports suggest that
these sources provide an important supplement to the party's total rev-
enue. On at least two occasions, the transfer of funds to JCP front or-
ganizations from the Chinese mainland has been confirmed: 1) a donation
.of $114,000 from the Chinese Communist Peoples Relief Association to the
Japan Peoples Relief Society, a JCP front; 2) of a total of It 3 million
remitted during early 1952 by Japanese residents on the mainland to their
families in Japan, over * 1 million is believed to have gone to the party
itself or front organizations. In September 1952, the party reportedly
expected "Chinese sources" to provide * 1 million toward its election
campaign fund. Although there is no confirmation of reports that the
Soviet mission in Japan has supplied the party with funds, it is possible
that such contributions have been made.
lt. Other Revenue. In addition to the sources of income noted above,
unevaluated reports allege that a substantial portion of the party's
revenue is derived from covert, illegal operation. Black-marketeering,
smuggling, trade in narcotics, extortion rackets, and other illegal
operations frequently have been reported as sources of party funds.
The JCP has never released publicly any complete and accurate
statement of its total assets and liabilities. As of March 1951, how-
ever, the party's. finance department reportedly-listed the following as
party assets:
Land
*
20,000,000
Buildings
Y.
27,000,000
Equipment
Y
13,000,000
Others
Y
2,000,000
62,000,000
As of the beginning of the fiscal year 195152, the party's total lia-
bilities reportedly were ; 77,000,000.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-1j0-
XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Among the factors contributing to Communist strength must be in-
cluded the diplomatic establishment of the Soviet Union in Japan and
its political activities.
A Soviet mission -- the remainder of the office of the Soviet
Delegate to the Allied Council for Japan which constituted the official
Soviet representation during the occupation -- continues to exist in
Japan although without official acceptance by the Japanese Government.
The mission occupies a building in central Tokyo that has been closed
to the public for over six months and that has been reported kept under
surveillance by Japanese authorities. The number of persons attached
to the mission has steadily dwindled, 24 official members departed in
September, 7 "unofficial" members left in November. Available informa-
tion places the total official personnel still remaining at 39, plus 14
dependents.
According to Japanese Government sources, the group of 39 Sovief
nationals reported still officially attached to the mission can be
broken down by function as follows:
Officers
Others
Political Section
5
3
Economic Section
4
6
Consular Section
1
1
Press Section
1
-
Military
3
1
Administrative Section
2
12
16
23
This breakdown should probably be regarded with suspicion, in
view of the Soviet practice of masking functions and particularly in.
view of the abnormal position of the mission. There is no information
available as to how many of these officials may be engaged in propaganda
activities. At present the mission conducts no known propaganda acti-
vities of an overt, orthodox character. The only activities along
these lines reported in recent months have been an occasional newspaper
story based on a press interview or on a private conversation between a
Soviet official and Japanese. Even these activities may be construed
as propaganda only in the sense that any Soviet moves have propaganda
significance. On the other hand, it must be assumed that a major func-
tion of the mission is the clandestine operation of covert propaganda
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 41 -
activities, in which a large part of the personnel may be engaged. Pre-
sumably the Soviet Mission still extends some assistance and guidance to
the JCP and front groups. An ng the front groups worthy of mention in
connection with political activities of the Soviet Mission are= The
Japan-Soviet Friendship Association with a registered membership in
December 1951 of 8,000; the Japan-China Friendship Association reported
to have a membership of 700; and the Japan.-Korea Friendship Association,
the membership of which is unknown.
Although the mission previously had sought informally to include
Japanese government personnel in its propaganda functions, it was only
on November 7, 1951, for the first time since the surrender, that high
Japanese government officials were formally invited to a mission re-
ception. Since April 1952, there have been no official functions; how-
ever, the mission has evidently maintained informal and personal contact
with some Japanese businessmen.
There are no other Soviet or satellite establishments or missions
in Japan. No diplomatic or other official relations between Japan and
the Communist bloc have been established. None of the Communist bloc
countries that had declared war on Japan have signed a peace treaty.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-42-
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Although international Communist organizations apparently have
no official installations in Japan, a number of Communist-controlled
or dominated front groups are either affiliated with or maintain close
liaison with various international Communist organizations. In the
fall of 1949 pro-Communist labor organizations in Japan sponsored the
establishment of the World Federations of Trade Unions Japan Liaison
Office to maintain relations with the Communist-dominated World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions. Two Japanese youth organizations, the Japan
Democratic Youth League and the Japan Youth Fatherland Front are af-
filiated with the Soviet-inspired World Federation of Democratic
Youth. The National Federation of Student Self-Government Associa-
tion, the only nationwide student organization in Japan, is affiliated
with the International Students Union. The small but active Womens
Democratic Club in Japan is affiliated with the Women's International
Democratic Federation.
No meetings of Communist International Organizations are known
to have been held within Japan. Local Communists, however, have
attended the following meetings of international Communist organiza-
tions held abroad:
Meeting
Date
Known
Representatives
World Peace Council
Berlin
February 1951
1
World Peace Council
Vienna
November 1951
1
Moscow Economic
Conference
April 1952
3
Peking Asian-Pacific
Peace Conference
October 1952
i1
Vienna Peace
Conference
December 1952
3
It is not improbable that Japanese Communist groups have received
some funds from international Communist organizations. It appears less
likely that funds have been transmitted from Japan to such international
organizations. However, no concrete evidence of such transmissions is
available.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-43-
XIV.. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
Information regarding the JCP communications network is scattered
and incomplete. The party's underground structure reportedly includes a
specific liaison organization (designated by the code symbol "T")
directly responsible either to the covert politburo or to one of its two
immediate subdivisions. Within the "T" organization, special groups re-
portedly are responsible for the distribution of covert organ papers,
the maintenance of liaison with the various specialized covert depart-
ments, the transmission of directives and notifications to regional units,
and the maintenance of communications network between the covert central
organs and lower echelons. Although no detailed information is available
on the extent of the communications network at lower echelons, there have
been indications that the party on several occasions has had to undertake
a reorganization of its system of internal communications in the interest
of greater efficiency and security against the danger of compromise.
Substantial evidence indicates that since 1950 the JCP has de-
veloped several code and cipher systems for communication between central,
regional, and prefectural headquarters. In addition, the party reportedly
maintains an emergency warning system involving commercial telegraphic
communications according to prearranged texts. While comparatively
simple, this system appears to be a very important part of the JCP com-
munications net.
The bulk of the party's foreign liaison apparently is undertaken
through the commercial mails, with various front organizations serving
as the principal channels. There is evidence, however, that a covert
international courier system is maintained by the party. Scattered re-
ports indicated that courier bases are maintained on small islands off
the west coasts of Hokkaido and Kyushu. During 1950>51, one such courier
net for agents commuting between North Korea and Japan was uncovered by
US intelligence agencies. The principal covert JCP international courier
and communications system for which relatively detailed information is
available is "Maritime Organizations". Comprised of party members em-
ployed in shipping, this organization receives directives and ccmmunica.>
tions from, and transmits communications to, Communist China and the
Soviet Union and assists members and couriers illegally entering and
leaving Japan. It is believed that the 14 Japanese delegates who il-
legally left Japan to attend the Pei-piing Asian and Pacific Peace Con-
ference, October 1952, traveled by means of the network.
There is no indication that the JCP maintains any substantial
system of radio communication, either for internal or external use.
Unverified reports indicated only limited use of radio communication.
One such report which described the transmitter as part of the JCP
"international communications division" indicated transmission between
northern Hokkaido and Vladivastok. During a recent investigation,
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
44
Japanese security agencies arrested a Japanese radio operator who al-
legedly had transmitted periodic communications from the JCP to the
Soviet Union. Radio Free Japan broadcasts, while apparently not used
to transmit detailed instructions and guidance to the JCP, does serve
to supplement the distribution of propaganda material within Japan and
to provide local guidance to party members and units in the more remote
areas of rural Japan.
Despite the limitations of this international communications net-
work, recent reports indicate that the JCP is making increasingly fre-
quent contact with Communist Parties in other countries. The bulk of
the party's foreign liaison appears to be with the Chinese Communist
Party and is generally carried on by such front organizations as the
China Research Institute and the Japan.-China Friendship Association.
Although apparently less extensive, the party's connections with the
USSR are believed to be at least as important as those with Communist
China.
The degree to which the JCP has been the object of specific in-
structions and criticism from the Soviet Union or Communist China is
not fully known, although, since 1950, known instances of such in..
structions and criticism have been of decisive importance for party
policy.
The first known instance of Cominform intervention in JCP affairs
occurred in January 1950. Taking the form of a bitter criticism of the
Nozaka theory of peaceful revolution, this attack, published in the
Cominform Journal, ultimately resulted in the theoretical reorientation
of the JCP to accommodate the concept of violent revolution and in the
initiation of efforts to create a covert organization capable of support-
ing paramilitary action. This criticism was supported, although in a
more conciliatory tone, by the Pei ping Jen Min Jih Pao which also called
on the party to correct its past errors. -Me same organ, on September
1950, intervened in the internal struggle which accompanied the JCP=s
response to the original Cominform struggle and although Pei ping
supported the dominant JCP faction it urged a more conciliatory treat-
ment of party dissidents. Such an attitude subsequently was adopted
by the JCP leaders. The most recent instance of international. Communist
intervention occurred in July 1952, this time in a signed article of
TOKUDA Kyuichi, Secretary General, appearing in the Cominform Journal.
This criticism of the party for its excessive concentration on strikes
and demonstrations at the expense of parliamentary activities was
followed by a marked dimunition of JCR-inspired acts of violence.
SECRET ?? SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.8
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ALGERIA
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
11
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES .
. ?
I. Objectives . ?
.
II* Tactics . . . ?
III. Capabilities . . . ? . ? ? ? .
..
. r
ASSETS . . . ? . . . . .
. .
I. Numerical Strength . . .... . . .. . . . . . ?
? ?
4
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? .
. ?
4
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
4
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. . . .
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . .
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
5
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? .. . ... .
6
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
. .
6
Parties . . . . . . . e ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
X. Communist Propaganda Media ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 6
XI. Financial Condition . . . . ? . . . . . . . 7
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . .. 7
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . .. . . . . 8
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . .. ... 8
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN ALGERIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The over-riding immediate goal of the Algerian Communist Party
since August 1946 has been to persuade the local independence movements
to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation
ultimately for a revolution for "national liberation" and against
French control and American imperialism. In the meantime, the Communists
are seeking through propaganda, to destroy sympathy for the US and the
UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans, and to increase
local hostility toward the French administration. The serious economic
grievances of the population -- both native and French -- receive
particular attention from the Communists, who have a strong influence
in the country's largest labor union. However, the Algerian Communist
Party, in common with all other Communist groups in North Africa is
faced above all with the task of recovering its own strength.
II. TACTICS
Having failed thus far to achieve a common front with the
nationalists, except for the limited and now dormant front established
in mid-1951, the Communists have attempted instead to participate,
uninvited, in nationalist demonstrations, encouraging any tendency
toward violence. Similarly, Communist propaganda pamphlets and news-
paper articles have dealt at times entirely with nationalist grievances
and aspirations without placing them in a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist
framework. Thus, in pretending to make the nationalist cause their
own, the Communists try to impress upon the popular mind the need
and desirability of reviving and extending the common front of 1951.
Occasionally, coincidentally with such tactics, they berate the
nationalist leadership for their refusal to join them in a new popu-
lar front, for demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for
cooperating with the French even in a minor way.
III. CAPABILITIES
To date, the small Algerian Communist Party has had only
limited influence on the Algerian nationalist movements, largely
because (1) the nationalists realize that such ties would alienate
many sympathizers in non-Communist areas; (2) the local Communist
party is largely French in membership, and (3) the present nationalist
leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism and
the devotion of Communism to a foreign power whose domination the
nationalists would dislike as much as that of the French.
As an autonomous unit, the Algerian Communist Party is weak.
While it dominates Algeria's largest labor federation, the Algerian
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
CGT, the latter is no more able to maintain a general strike without
support from non-Communist labor unions than is its counterpart in
France. Moreover, while the Communist-dominated CGT includes possibly
50 percent of organized labor in Algeria, it is estimated that only
about one-fifth of the Algerian labor force (estimated at. 400,000) is
organized at all. French officials continue to hamper Communist party
activities of all kinds in Algeria.
The present capabilities of the Algerian Communist Party re-
main minimal either for achieving its own current local objectives
or for furthering Soviet policy. Its own membership is small and
believed declining although it has lost only slightly in percentage
of total votes received in elections during recent years. The leaders
of the two nationalist parties seem to be unwilling.to resume the
former cooperation, even on the limited scale provided by the
Algerian Front for the Defense and Respect of Liberty -- which was
organized in mid-1951 primarily in.protest against administrative
interference in the June 1951 elections.
This limited victory was achieved when the leading figures
of the extreme nationalist movement led by Messali Hadj, the moderate
nationalists led by Ferhat Abbas, and the Association of Ulema which
comprises the leading teachers and scholars of the Islamic tradition,
united with the Communists in July 1951 in the Algerian Front. How-
ever, each nationalist party to the alliance joined for the furtherance
of its own ends and not through any basic sympathy with the objectives
of international Communism. The Communist victory was based upon
their initiative in taking advantage of local grievances, and the
Front's program centered upon the issues of civil liberties and civil
rights and French administrative control over Moslem religious affairs.
The Moslem parties remained unwilling to let the Communists jointly
appeal with them to the Moslem masses on the broader issues of
nationalism and "neutralism." All three Moslem groups may also have
hoped, by their association with the Communists, to frighten the US
into bringing pressure to bear on France to make more political
concessions.
The disparate aims of the four groups prevented the Front from
achieving either importance or permanence. Although the Front has
given Communist speakers the prestige of appearing on the same plat-
forms as the Moslem parties and enabled them to take such occasions
to propagate the Communist line in international affairs, it is doubt-
ful, unless conditions in the Arab world further deteriorate, that the
Communists will be able to convert the particular "neutralism" of the
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-3-
Arab nationalist parties in Algeria into a pro-Soviet view of World
affairs. Nonetheless, the Communists meanwhile have had an excellent
opportunity to acquaint most of the educated Moslem leaders of Algeria
with Communist tactics and perspectives.
The Communists will doubtless continue their efforts to join
forces with the nationalists, and there is some danger that should
the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives,. they would accept
Communist support rather than look to the West. While it is doubtful
that the Communists will capture control of are- Algerian nationalist
movement, Communist influence might lead to the adoption of more
anti-Western policies and to increasing resort to direct action on
the part of the nationalist groups.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 4-
COOUNISM IN ATGEM: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
No information is available concerning the numerical strength
of the Algerian Communist Party, the membership of Communist controlled
organizations, or the number of persons controlled through Communist
infiltration of non-Caamwnist organizations. The usual estimate for the
Algerian Party for several years has been 15,000 persons. However,
recent developments point to a decline of membership and hence this
figure appears too high. Indications are that the bulk of the members
are found among Frenchmen especially workers, artisans, and lower
bracket civil servants. The number of Moslem members and number of
general sympathizers apparently varies with economic conditions. The
hard core is primarily composed of Europeans. Strongholds of the move-
ment are Algiers and Oran, which elected the only two Communist members
from Algeria to the National Assembly. There are also regional head-
quarters at Constantine, Bone, Sidi-Bel-Abbes and Blida.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Even allowing-for the fact that Algerian elections are not
entirely free, the Communist Party's electoral strength is small. In
the elections to the National Assembly, cantonal and by-elections, the
Communists have polled an average of 20 percent of the votes. In the
Algerian Assembly, they have captured only one seat out of 75.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Because of lack of both funds and members, the Communist Party
is unable to employ violence at present. It is conceivable, however,
that Communist agitators will try to use the discontent among the native
population to stir up riots, or to exacerbate disturbances created by
others. The Communist Party has tried to impart a political complexion
to the strikes and work stoppages which have occurred during the last
years, although their causes have been economic. The degree to which
Communist plans for violent action in Algeria can be made effective
will depend primarily on the degree of cooperation which can be achieved
with the nationalist movement, which has most popular support in
Algeria.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Algerian Communist Party is a legally recognized organiza-
tion which is permitted to operate openly and, on the whole, without
any disabling restriction in Algeria. Members of the party are permitted
to compete with candidates of other indigenous political parties for
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET -. SECURITY INFORMATION
election to public office, to publish and circulate newspapers, and to
convene "mess"meetings. Repression of local Communist groups or the
Communist press by the French Administration has generally been sporadic.
To date, repressive measures employed by the French authorities have
served as irritating and discomforting restrictions on the Algerian
Communist Party but have not been sufficiently extensive and crippling
to drive it underground.
V. CG?fTNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
No information is currently available concerning the number of
Communists in Algerian defense plants and other key industries.
Communist influence in the Algerian labor union movement is
enhanced by the refusal of the French Administration to allow the native
population to establish its own labor organizations. Official recognition
is restricted to the Communist-dominated CGT (Confederation Generale du
Travail), the Force Ouvriere, and the CFTC (Christian Trade Confederation).
It is estimated., for example, that out of a total labor force of approxi-
mately 400,000 workers (of which some 80,000 are in commerce, industry,
and government unions), the Communist-controlled CGT has maintained some
45-50 percent of union membership. Among some of the more important
strategic labor organizations with which the CGT has affiliations are
the General Confederation of Agriculture, the Inter-Union Central
Committee of Government Employees, the Railroad Workers' Union,
Electricity Workers Union, and the Union Algerienne des Travailleurs
des Ports et Docks. Moreover, the Algerian Communist Party, either
independently or through the CGT, has been quick to throw its support
to striking groups throughout Algeria, no matter whether members of the
CGT or independent elements. While the Communists do not possess
numerical superiority in the CGT, their dominant position permits them
to disrupt the transport, stevedoring, telecommunications, and mining
activities of Algeria if sufficiently popular causes can be found.
The Algerian CGT, as an affiliate and subordinate of the French
CGT, is a member of the Communist-front WFTu.
VI. COM4JNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The Algerian Communist Party has organized and subsidized a number
of specialized social, cultural, and professional organizations.
Generally, these groups are established either on a temporary basis to
acquire French and Algerian support for short-term Communist-inspired
programs (such as soliciting signatures for the Stockholm Peace Petition),
or are organized on a long-range basis with yearly allocations of funds.
Normally, the latter groups formulate programs seeking (1) the re-estab..
lishment of Algerian independence and sovereignty; (2) the awakening
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
of feminist political and social self-consciousness; and (3) the indoc-
trination of Algerian youths with Communist ideology. Among the more
important of these front organizations are the Communist Youth Federation,
France-USSR, Les Amis de la Democratie, Secours.Populaire d'Aledrie,
Uni Al n g$ enne d Or ions a Je s e C , Union des
Femmes d'Algdrie, As= ration des tudiants Musulmans and Section
EtudiantEe du Comite d'Action des Intellectuels Algdriens pour la naix.
While no information is available concerning the overall strength of
these organizations, their number is estimated to be extremely small. In
the case of the last two groups, for example, it is reliably reported
that their combined membership does not exceed 300 youths. Moreover,
they are generally concentrated in the cities of Algiers, Oran,
Constantine, and Philippeville.
No information is available concerning the infiltration of non-
Communist organizations in Algeria. Occasionally individual members of
certain Moslem groups, such as the Association of Ulema, are noted as
having attended certain People's Peace Congresses. but these individual
deviations do not mean that these groups as a whole are Communist
oriented or dominated.
VII. COMMJNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
There is little concrete information available concerning the
infiltration of Communists into the Algerian administration. Unconfirmed
reports indicate that there has been some Communist infiltration in the
lower governmental echelons. However, the number, influence, and areas
of concentration of these elements, though unknown, is small at this time.
VIII. COM?4JNIST INFLUENCE ON. PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Some journalists working for conservative journals and a small
number of primary and secondary school teachers are thought to be
Communist. No reliable information is available.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NOK-CONMNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
(For connections with nationalist parties, see Part I under
Capabilities.)
X. COr 1UNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
The Algerian Communist movement publishes and circulates one
Arabic-language and three French-language newspapers. These include
the Alger Republicain and Le Courier Algdrien, which are published daily;
Libertd, which is a weekly newssheet, and the Arabic-language New
Algeria, a monthly. Alger Retiublicain, which is perhaps the most
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-7-
important Communist newspaper in Algeria, utilizes the presses of the
Societe Nationale des Edition de Presse, is estimated to have a total
circulation of approximately 20,000, and is published by Pierre Laffont
under the directorship of Henri Alleg (member of Central Committee of
Algerian Communist Party). Libert is also estimated to have a total
circulation of 20,000 and is also printed by SNEP.
Alger Republicak is not a member of the local newspaper syndicate
because it does not pay its employees the official minimum wage. The
paper claims to do so, and has noted that its employees turn back part
of their wages voluntarily in their desire to keep the paper solvent.
Alger Republicain is the only newspaper in Algeria to print schedules
of the broadcasts of the Soviet and satellite radios. It is assumed
that all Communist newspapers in Algeria, because they have considerable
difficulty in making ends meet, are subsidized in part from France.
The French Communist Party is also active in providing supple-
mentary reading material for native consumption in Algeria. Recent
reports indicate, for example, that The Principles of Leninism by
Joseph Stalin,has been published in Arabic by the Colonial Section of
the French Communist Party and is currently being circulated in Algeria.
The Algerian Communist Party has established a small book store in
Algiers to further the circulation of each propaganda material. There
is a paucity of material coming directly from the Soviet Union and its
satellites.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
Little is known of the financial situation of the Algerian
Communist Party. Recent reports indicate that the party finds itself
in a rather difficult position financially and is being subsidized, at
least in part, by the French Communist Party.
In the quarter beginning July 1, 1949, the Algerian Communist
Party is reported to have distributed party funds as follows:
(a) 5,400,000 francs (approximately $15,500) for assistance and relief;
and (b) 3,200,000 francs (approximately $9,000) for, propaganda --
700,000 francs for the department of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine,
and 2,500,000 francs for Arab villages and the territories of the south.
XII. SOVIET SATEILITEOFFICIAL ASSETS
The Soviet Consulate General at Algiers ceased to function on
October 15,.1951. Its affairs were subsequently transferred to the
consular section of the Soviet Embassy in Paris. It was reported that
this action was taken by the USSR on its own initiative and without any
intervention on the part of the French Government. The closing of the
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-8-
Soviet Consulate General currently leaves the USSR and its satellites
without any official representatives in Algeria, or in French North Africa.
XIII. COMMMIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATI( S
The Algerian Communist Party has been a continuous supporter of
international peace conferences. Most recently, representatives attended
the Vienna World Congress for Peace. Members of the Algerian Communist
Party also attended the Berlin Peace Conference which was held in the
summer of 1952. During 1951, the party claimed to have acquired 100,000
signatures in its campaign to gain Algerian support of a Communist-
inspired resolution calling for the conclusion of a peace pact among the
five major world powers.
XIV. CG M JNIST COWNICATION NETWORK
No information is available concerning the channels by which
confidential information is transmitted among members of the party.
The Algerian Communist Party maintains its closest ties with the
French Communist Party, which appears to serve as the parent, or guiding,
organization. The French Communist Party's hierarchy has been critical
of the inability of the Algerian Party to remain. solvent, strengthen
its current ties with the nationalist parties, formulate a program of
action capable of attracting a larger number of native Algerians, and
provide sufficient discipline within the party.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.9
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, EGYPT
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . .
1
I. Objectives .. ? .. ..
1
II. Tactics ? . .. .. ? . .
1
III. Capabilities . . . ..
3
ASSETS . ? .. ?
!~
I. Numerical Strength ? .. . . . . . . ... ? .. .. ?
4
II. Electoral Strength . . ? . . . . . . ? . * ? . . ? . ? .
5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . .
..
5
Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . ? .. ? . .
..
5
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
5
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . .
. .
6
VIII.. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
. .
7
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . . .. .
. ?
7
X. Communist Propaganda Media . .
.
7
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
? ?
7
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets ... . . .
.
7
XIII. Communist International Organizations .. . . . .
. .
XIV. Communist Communication Network .. . . . .. ?
. .
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN EGYPT: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The goals of Communist activity in Egypt cannot be stated in terms
of the pronouncements and major activities of a specific Communist Party.
There does not appear to be any single organized Communist Party in Egypt
nor do any of the groups engaged in Communist propaganda and activities
appear to be capable of giving central direction to the actions of the
others.
The goal of what Communist activity exists in Egypt is to discredit
the West and weaken Western influence. In particular, Communists attempt
to stimulate local efforts to oust the British., to prevent the establish-
ment of a broad defense scheme which could act as a substitute for the
present British military establishment, and to agitate against the
acceptance of Western assistance, such as the Point Four program. Since
the intent of these goals is to achieve a political vacuum in the Middle
East, their success would fulfill the major policy requirements of the
USSR. The party is far from possessing power to secure these aims,
however; thus,. its principal immediate objective is the creation of a
stronger and more effective party organization.
II. TACTICS
Communist activity in Egypt is small and fractionalized, partly
because a large part of its work is carried on among certain minority
elements, such as Copts, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Italians, operating
within the framework of separate minority organizations often connected.
with similar groups abroad. In part also, Communist work. is the work of
separate individuals operating within existing parties or organizations,
particularly among youth groups. At present the tactical aim of such
activity apparently is to form, surreptitiously, a united national front
of these splinter groups and leftist elements in the Socialist
and Wafd Parties and in the Moslem Brethren. An attempt will undoubtedly
be made; to reach the membership of other parties, such as the New
Nationalist and new labor and peasants' parties. Certain women's organi-
zations such as the Bint al-Nil (the Moslem Ladies' Society) and the
Feminist Union, have become interested in the possibility of attracting
local attention and getting some international recognition by cooperating
with the Communist movement, and have espoused Communist aims and sent
delegations abroad to Comma~nist-sponsored conferences.
For example, the Wafdist Vanguard, a leftist group in the Wafdist
Youth, is now headed by 'Abd al-IAihazin Hamuda, formerly Egyptian press
attache in Washington, who was deported from the US in April 1952 as a
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Communist. Ahmad Husayn, president of Egypt's Socialist Party,
is an opportunist who was pro-Fascist prior to World War_II and since
1945 has made numerous pro-Communist statements and has reportedly
received financial subsidies from the Communists. Ahmad Taha, pro-
Communist brother of the murdered Lt. 'Abd al-Qadir Taha (who is regarded
as a martyr to their cause by the Liberal Officers), is prominent in
Egypt's embryonic labor movement. He plays upon his fraternal connection
to enhance his prestige and to ingratiate himself with the Liberal
Officers, who hesitate to snub him because of his brother's memory. He
is seeking to oust the present anti-Communist leader of the Egyptian
labor federation movement in order to secure that key position for himself.
Several efforts have been made under the Parties Law of September 8,
1952 to secure recognition of a number of pro-Communist political parties,
but all have been turned down by the government. Until the recent out-
lawing of all Egyptian political parties, Muhammad al-Bindari, former
Egyptian Minister to the USSR and leader of the Egyptian Partisans of
Peace, was bending every effort to secure recognition of a Communist
front party under the guise of a "national liberation" group, with members
drawn from among Partisans of Peace and other left-wingers.
In the days immediately after the military coup of July 23, 1952,
the Communists, who were apparently. taken by surprise, supported the army
officers against King Farouk and his entourage and pursued a policy of
"wait and see," on the domestic reform program of the military group. By
September 1952, the Communist movement had decided that the Nagib regime
was its enemy. Since that time, the Communists have engaged in a campaign.
of vilification directed particularly against Nagib and 'Ali Mahir, who
was Prime Minister during the first month after the coup. Pamphlets have
been distributed among army personnel characterizing the coup as an
"Anglo-American imperialistic plot," and General Nagib as a "stooge of
the imperialists" and as another tyrant, exactly like Farouk, who must
therefore be liquidated. It is said that the Communists inspired the
violent strike of textile workers at Kafr al Dawwar in August 1952 and
that they organized an anti_Nagib conspiracy among non-commissioned army
officers in August or September 1952, which proved abortive.
The Communists seize every opportunity to sow dissatisfaction in
Egypt. When a member of a prominent landowning family who also heads an
important Bedouin tribe was imprisoned for attacking the police in protest
against the application of the land reform law to the family landholdings,
local Communist propaganda took the line that Nagib was persecuting the
tribesmen. When it became apparent that the military regime intended to
purge party leaders, including Mustafa al-Nahas and other prominent
members of the Wafd Party, the Communists took the line that Nahas was a
national leader who should be retained as the president of the Wafd. The
Communists have taken advantage of anti-British feeling in Egypt to urge
the use of force in ousting United Kingdom troops. Since the economic
and political measures cr the Nagib regime have led to some decline in
SECRET - SECURITY INFO MATICK
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
T3T
business and industrial activity and resulted in rising unemployment,
Communists are almost certain to exploit the dissatisfaction among urban
labor which will follow any reduction of the already low standard of
living.
Another possible field for the expansion of Cammmniat influence
in the near future would seem to lie among the fellahin. The Nagib
regime has removed the legal prohibition against agricultural labor unions,
and has established agricultural cooperative societies as part of its
program. of land reform. The Communists can be expected to infiltrate and
attempt to gain control of both. Still another fertile field for CommdLnist
activities has been among students, both in universities and secondary
schools, and particularly in youth movements. This group is especially
vulnerable to Cammunist propaganda, since many Egyptian students apparently
feel that a Communist econcey and form of government could be adopted
without the abandonment of Islam. )hny student riots, organized to protest
against the British, against martial law, and against "imperialism"
generally, have no doubt been sparked or stimulated by Communist agitators,
working within the youth groups. Guerrilla warfare against the British
in the Canal Zone, carried on mainly by youth groups in para-military
organizations or student groups in late 1951 and early 1952, was partly
Comiminist-inspired.
III. CAPABILITIES
The ultimate objective of the few disciplined and thoroughly
Moscow-oriented Communists in Egypt -- the establishment of a Communist
state subservient in foreign policy to the USSR -- is far beyond the
capabilities of the present Communist movement.
As for the more immediate goals outlined above, the Communist
movement may be able surreptitiously to keep up its propaganda against
the UK and the West and against Western-sponsored regional defense
organizations or programs such as Point 4. Some of the influence and
capabilities of the Communist movement in Egypt before the July 1952
military coup have been reduced at least temporarily by (1) the counter:
attraction of the new regime's direct attack on economic and social
maladjustments, and (2) the adherence of certain previously left-wing
and opportunist writers and leaders such as Fhthi Radwan and Rashad
al-Barawi to the now military regime, in which their basic desire for
power and their bent toward nationalism find greater satisfaction than
in their previous fellow-travelling role. In mid-January 1953, moreover,
the new regime also arrested a considerable proportion of the known
Communists in Egypt, and banned the publication of all newspapers whichL
have fairly consistently supported the Communist line on international
and domestic questions.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
There is no Communist Party as such in Egypt. Communist activity
in the country is carried on among a number of splinter groups, whose
total membership is probably not over 4,000. It was reported in
September 1952 that an organization called "The Nucleus of the Egyptian
Communist Party" had recently been founded, with units in both Cairo
and Alexandria. Most of its leaders were reported to be drawn from
among technicians and industrial plant employees; its main source of
funds reportedly was an Egyptian engineer named Satd Muhammad Hasan.
Most Communist sympathizers are centered in Cairo and Alexandria,
and a rather high proportion are members of minority groups -- Copts,
Armenians, Greeks, and Italians. Several Egyptian feminist organiza-
tions appear to be involved in front activity, having sent representa-
tives to the Vienna Peace Congress of December 12, 1952. Madame Siza
Nabarawi, head of both the Egyptian Feminist Union and the Women's
Movement for the Popular Struggle, Madame Ragiyah Hamzah of the
Bint-al-Nil (Daughters of the Nile), and Madame Haja Zaynab al-Ghazali,
president of the Moslem Women's Society, attended the Vienna meeting.
Students are another segment of the population where Communist
sympathies appear to exist. A number of members of the Wafdist Vanguard,
a part of the Wafdist Youth, are connected with the Communist-front
Partisans of Peace. Student demonstrations against the British and
against martial law have on occasion been exacerbated by Communist
agitators.
There is no reliable information available on the quality of the
party membership in terms of its willingness to incur hardships or cling
to the party line. Fourteen "hard-core" Communists were imprisoned after
the "Black Saturday" rioting (January 26, 1952), and have not been
released.
There are no outstandingly effective leaders among the various
Communist groups. Kamil al-Bindari (The Red Pasha) has attempted on
several occasions to form a Communist political party, as has Fathi
al-Rawli, the editor of al-Mu'arda (The Opposition). Their attempts
have been unsuccessful, which may be attributed partly to the firm
attitude of successive Egyptian Governments towards the Communists as
well as to the opportunistic and.dilettantist character of the latter's
activities. The feminist groups which have taken on a pro-Communist
coloration have definite dilettantist overtones in this aspect of their
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET.- SECURITY INFORMATION
activity, and are more likely to be using it as a lever' to secure politi-
cal recognition of womenta rights than from any sincere conviction re-
garding Communist tenets.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
The Communists have never appeared on the Egyptian ballot, and no
clearly identifiable fellow-traveller candidates are known to have
participated in any election.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The Egyptian Communists apparently have no'military organization
for violent action. However, some student disorders and nationalist
demonstrations were undoubtedly supported and exacerbated by Communist
agitators. Communists have participated in anti-UK guerrilla activity
in the Canal Zone. The number of guerrillas with military equipment
might.be a few hundred.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
As a result of an attempted counter coup in mid-January 1953,
the Nagib government has-banned all political parties. The coup was
attributed to army-Wald-Communist collaboration, and as a result all
existing Communist publications were banned and a number of Communist
leaders, including Fathi al-Rawli, editor of al-14u'arda, and Yusuf
Hilmi, Secretary-General of the Partisans of Peace, were jailed. There
is no definite information available on.a Communist underground, but it
may be safely assumed that there is such a movement, although it is
probably-quite weak at this time.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
Egypt is not extensively industrialized and imports practically
all of its armaments. The pro-Communist elements have had some success
in infiltrating the labor unions and have been attempting to gain control
of Egypt's labor federation movement. Under normal conditions they
could be expected to try to gain control of agricultural unions and the
agricultural cooperatives set up under the Land Reform Law. However,
since the Nagib government is apparently taking strong measures to
repress pro-Communist activity, such efforts can be expected to fail.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The partisans of Peace is the only significant fellow-travelling
Communist-controlled organization. It draws support from such groups as
urban youth, particularly students; women; and cultural and professional
circles.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 pproved Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATIIII
Probably several thousand Egyptians are sufficiently sympathetic
to Communism to attend occasional mass meetings or read the organiza-
tion's paper, Al-Katib, when it was published. Centers of strength are
Cairo, Alexandria, and in the provinces of Miniah in Upper Egypt, and
Mansurah in Lower Egypt. The Partisans of Peace, though stronger than
insignificant
are
any other known Communist organizations a ptin EgYPt, organizations.
influence compared with
The leaders, such as Kamil al-Bindari, Yusuf Hilmi, and Said al Din
Kamil, seem to be mainly professional men and intellectuals; they are
neither Moscow-trained Communists nor skilled professional revolutionaries.
However, they have read the Communist classics, are informed about
affairs, and are capable of carrying on propaganda
epparticularly
ties which are fairly successful with the Egyptian public,
when they parallel the slogans of nationalism and anti-imp
The Egyptian Partisans of Peace have often sent delegations to
Communist-inspired"peace" conferences. The most recent was held in
December 1952 in Vienna at which Rashad, pthelpresident of the ilmi,
the secretary-general, and delegation, represented the Egyptian organization.
The Partisans of Peace reportedly plan to expand by establishing
committees in the armed forces, particularly among the NCOts. Social
committees are to be formed in towns and villages where they do not
already exist. Their objectives are to (1) exploit the popularity in
Egypt of the idea of neutralism and non-involvement in the East-West
conflict, and (2) make the Partisans of Peace the leading exponent of
this idea.
The Partisans of Peace probably are capable of a considerable
expansion of their organization and an increase in the range and effective-
ness of their activities if they are permitted to operate in relative
freedom. It seems unlikely, however, that the authorities, a grow to
specifically the present military regime, will permit
formidable size. The Partisans of Peace do not seem capable of seriously
challenging the policies of the military, but might become much more
dangerous if (1) there is a breakdown of orderdueerto2factiional disputes t among the members of the present military j,
suffer a series of foreign policy setbacks which are widely ascribed to
its having been too subservient to the Western powers.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
of
There is no reliable information available of on the eexxaac armed
Communist and Communist-sympathizer penetration go
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
services, police, and national industries. A situation which bears
watching is the reliance of the military junta on civilian advisers
who have manifested pro-Communist tendencies in the past, notably Fathi
Ridwan and Rashad Barawi. However, as noted above under "Tactics," most
such men were determined opportunists who joined the Communists under
the previous regime because they were frustrated in their desire for
high office.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
As indicated in "Tactics" above, there is considerable attention
to Communism as a system in public opinion forming circles. Even in
the non-Communist press, there are individual reporters who are quite
sympathetic to certain aspects of Communism. However, such people -are
often unclear as to the extent to which they are supporting Communism
or simply taking up a Communist cudgel against the West. Those'Egyptian
newspapers which at least occasionally print a pro-Communist article
have a combined circulation of over 100,000.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Since political parties were banned in Egypt effective January
16, 1953 (for a three year period), this question is no longer relevant.
However, before this action, pro-Communist elements apparently had some
success in infiltrating the Wafd youth groups, the Ikhwan, and the
Egyptian Socialist Party (formerly Young Egypt).
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
There are some consistently and by local standards sensationally
pro-Communist newspapers such as al-Mur'ardah, edited by Fathi al-Ramli;
al-Katib, edited by Yusuf Hilmi, and'a1- alayin, but it is not known
whether they are currently being published since such papers are
frequently banned or temporarily suspended. No well-established paper
is pro-Communist.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
The financial position of the Egyptian Communist Party has always
been precarious.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Soviet and satellite countries having Legations in Cairo are manned
by the following staffs: USSR, 11;Poland,1; Bulgaria, 1; Hungary, 4;
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Rumania, 1; Czechoslovakia, 6. None of these states have trade or
cultural missions in Egypt. USSR and satellite Legations are reported
to have personnel engaged in propaganda activities. Probably all
personnel make some attempt to Osel1M Egyptians whom they meet on the
advantages of the Commminist system.
The Soviet Legation and probably some of the satellite Legations
have receptions on their national holidays. Egyptian Government officials
are invited and. many attend. The effect of these activities appears to
be insignificant.
XIII. CO4MUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The Egyptian Student Union, which may be a member of the Internation-
al Student Union, is reportedly organized under Partisan of Peace leader-
ship. It urges students in various parties, particularly the Wafd and
the Socialist, to join its organization.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
No reliable information available.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.10
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, GREECE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . ?
0
ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES .
. .
1
I. Objectives . . . . ...
. .
1
II. Tactics . . . . . .
? ?
1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . .
.
2
ASSETS . . . . . . . .
..
4
I. Numerical Strength . . ? . . . .
4
II. Electoral Strength . . . .
.
5
III. , Military Strength and Crganization for Violent Action
6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . ? . . . .
. .
9.
V. Communist Influence in Labor .. .. . ?
. .
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural., and
Professional Organizations . . . . ? ?
? ?
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . .
. .
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
. .
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . ?
. ?
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . .
.
12
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.13
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . ? . . . .
. .
14
XIII. Communist International organizations . . . . . .
. .
14
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . ? ? . . ? ?
. .
14
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented. in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20?: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN GREECE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The Communist revolt in Greece at the time when the country
was liberated from Nazi occupation (December 1944), and the guerrilla
war which the Greek Communist Party (KKE) undertoo1 in the fall of
1946 demonstrated that the major and ultimate objective of the
Communists is to bring Greece within the Soviet orbit. Since the
defeat of the Communist guerrillas in the summer of 1949, the outlawed
KKE has confined itself to political action designed to reorganize
their underground apparatus in Greece and, in addition, to establish
a front which can operate legally and openly.
The immediate objective of the KEE seems to be to promote its
domestic political fortunes by reestablishing prestige among the
left wing elements. of the population. Its propaganda hammers away at
the alleged connection between poverty, "repression," and the increasing
power of Greek "reactionaries" and Greece's participation in Western
defense activities. The burden of the Greek defense budget and
Greece's need to withdraw from the "war camp" are particularly stressed.
II. TACTICS
The principal taotical objective of the Communist Party appears
to be to broaden the membership of its front organization, the "United
Democratic Left" (EDA), which in the 1952 elections gained about
12 percent of the popular vote, by seeking to win another 20 percent
of the electorate now constituting the left wing of the Progressive
Democratic Party (EPEK). Thus, the Communists hope to make EDA Greece's
principal opposition party.
The KKE has on several occasions told voters that they could
find "reliable" candidates in "all the parties" who could be supported.
This would suggest that the Communists have infiltrated even into the
more conservative political circles. Surer evidence indicates that
they have recovered much lost ground among labor. Through the ESKE
(United Trade Union Movement), which is the labor arm of EDA, the
Communists have infiltrated labor unions to an extent that may make them
capable of wielding considerable influence at the next Panhellenic
Congress of the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE). This
situation, however, is causing the present labor executive of the GSEE
to take steps to block ESKE fron gaining control of locals and attaining
a position of influence in the Confederation. The success which the
Communists have had in recovering their operational position within
labor is principally due to their ability to establish a united front
with the union membership itself. Their attempt, however, to carry out
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
broad front tactics by formal alliance with the leadership of labor
unions and political parties has met with little success. EPEK rebuffed
the latest such attempt just prior to the elections.
Although EDA, despite its constitutional conduct, has steadily
become less a front group and more the KISS itself under a different
name, the new Greek Government controlled by the Greek Rally has shown
so far no inclination to take action against it. It is possible that,
while EDA hopes to attract additional members under the new right-wing
regime, the Greek Rally Government may let EDA continue in its present
legal status in order to splinter its center opposition.
III. CAPABILITIES
The political capabilities of the KKE appear to have been blocked
for the time being with the rise of a strong ,government.
As a result of the elections of November 16, 1952, the present Greek
Government, headed by Marshal Alexander Papagos, gained about 49 percent
of the popular vote and, under a revised electoral system, about 80
percent of the seats in Parliament. This governmental strength, which
the Communists probably did not expect to develop, could serve as an
effective deterrent for the next four years against Communist subversive
activity and infiltration in the institutional life of the country.
Nonetheless, the Communists, despite the fact that they failed to elect
any deputies, enjoy an electoral base for political consolidation and
maneuver.
The prospect of the KKEts gaining a position of significant
influence is contingent on the capability of the Greek Rally to hold,
or increase its popular support, and to the ability of the center
coalition, composed of the Liberal Party and EPEK, to cooperate in
carrying out a constructive opposition policy. The Communists probably
anticipate that both pro-Western groups, the Greek Rally as well as
the Liberal-EPEK coalition, will disintegrate, since both political
groups are made up of heterogeneous political elements. Since the
Greek Rally is held together by the prestige of Marshal Papagos and the
opposition by the patriotism of General Plastiras, the political life
of the country thus centers on two personalities who are at their
career's and. This fact gives hope to the Communists, who are also
encouraged by the economic situation, which imposes a low standard
of living on the population.
Unless overall Soviet strategy requires them to sacrifice EDA
and go completely underground to resume their tactic of terroristic.
activity, the Greek Communists will seek to increase their strength
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
with time through a program of relatively moderate political action and
propaganda. While the Communists for the time being apparently are not
planning to resume large-scale sabotage inside Greece, there are about
20,000 Greek Communists in the satellite countries who are kept in training
for possible reinfiltration into Greece. The Greek Government, however,
is acutely aware of this threat, and continues accordingly to budget for
strong and vigilant police and gendarme forces.
The KKE has a reservoir of about 200,000 male voters and as many
women to servo as an echelon of supply and support for any underground
organization. The returns of the last three elections have shown that
the KKE has a constant popular support of about 10 percent of the voters.
It is therefore significant that, with this small percentage of popular
support, the KKE was capable of disrupting the country for almost
three years (1946-49). It is also noteworthy that the Communists were
able to preserve their electoral strength after the liquidation of the
guerrilla war. The election returns make two points clear: (1) the
absence of defection among the rank and file of the Greek Communists;
and (2) the capability of the KKE, whose top leaders operate from within
the Soviet orbit, to exercise remote control over its organization
in Greece.
While the Communists are presently aiming at strengthening and
enlarging the legal status and political base of EDA, they may also
have made progress in building up their underground by their partially
successful campaign for the release of the Communist internees in
concentration camps and prisons. The ultimate influence of the
Communists, however, will depend on the degree to which the anti-
Communist parties can cooperate in solving domestic problems, especially
improving Greece's economic situation.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
No reliable figures are available on the membership of the Greek
Communist Party (KKE). In 1949 Soviet sources claimed as many as
75,000 members. The Greek elections of 1952 revealed about 180,000
Communist sympathizers. Of these, the number of card-carrying members
is probably not more than 100,000, of which 30,000 might constitute the
hard-core.
There are probably 150,000 individuals in organizations controlled
by the communists, and an additional 300,000 persons are influenced by
partial, but significant, Communist infiltration of non-Communist organ-
izations. In all 12 to 15 percent of the total population is subject to
direct Communist influence or control, or some 900,000 to 1,000,000.
These figures are not documentary; they are merely the best estimate that
can be made. The regional distribution of KKE strength is indicated in
the following table, which shows areas in which the Communist-front party
EDA is strongest as reflected in the November 16, 1952 elections:
Voters
(male)
Percent of
Total Voters
Athens
30,000
15.5
Corfu
6,000
25.0
Drama
4,000
16.3
Canea (Crete)
7,000
25.0
Heraklion .(Crete)
6,000
16.2
Kavalla
9,000
29.0
Lesvos (Mitilini)
15,000
39.5
Patras
4,000
12.5
Piraeus
17,000
24.3
Rethymnon
2,000
11.1
Salonica
24,000
25.3
Serres
6,000
13.6
Veria
4,000
14.3
Volos
6,000
21.4
The bulk of party membership and sympathizers are drawn from
industrial and agricultural workers, and secondarily, and to a,decreasing
extent, from the intellectual-professional stratum. Additional pertinent
data on the KKE membership are reflected in the following statistics of
the Seventh Conference of the M. held October 1-6, 1945:
(a) Total representatives 228, of whom 26 were women.
(b) Social composition of the representatives:
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 SECR T - SECUiiITY INF'ORM~TION
Workers
119
52.2%
5%
3
Artisans
8
.
9.6%
Agrarians
26
11.4%
Employees
12.7%
Professionals
29
8 8
3.5%
Intellectuals
11
4.8%
Students
5
2.3%
Unspecified
(c) Of these representatives, 105 had prison, exile, or
concentration camp experience.
(d) Length of membership in the KKE:
63 representatives joined before 1930
75 representatives joined before 1940
85 representatives joined after 1940
(e) Age of the representatives:
73 between 20-30 years of age
100 between 31-40 years of age
46 between 41-50 years of age
3 between 51-60 years of age
1 between 61-70 years of age
(f) The average age of the Central Committee membership
was 41 in 1945-46.
No data are readily available on the length or annualntt goveer
of the membership, the number of members of over years
lation
any relation
the decline in membership since 1946. If.membership has o re10
to the voting strength, the M has had a consistent average ofp1lar
percent of the popular vote in the last four elections.
vote has not declined since the elections of 1946, but its card-carrying
membership must have declined since the party is illegal. Probably
more than 20,000 Greek Communists are outside the country.
The KKE leadership can be characterized as youthful, enthusiastic,
individualistic, and immature; despite the limitations imposed by these
qualities, they have developed a high sense of party discipline and a
tightly-knit organization.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
The official returns for the Actually, 9elections won more than 164,848
votes for the Communist-front EDA.
SECRET SECURITY INFORt4ATI0"
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
180,000 votes -- about 12 percent of the total. The following tabulations
compare the EDA vote with that of opposing parties and show its regional
distribution:
Comparison with other parties:
EDA popular vote 12.0%
Vote for the government party 49.3%
Vote for the center opposition 36.5%
97.8%
Independent vote 2 2%
100.0
Centers of largest FDA vote:
Area
Communist
ED1
Government
0oposition
independent
Athens
29,572
91,262
72,330
725
Corfu
5,629
11,199
7,005
0
Drama
3,694
12,069
10,946
0
Kavalla
8,650-
11,617
10,512
7
Larissa
3,466
6,530
5,569
50
Lesvos (Mitilini)
14,831
15,567
7,414
0
Lefkas
2,429
2,490
a/
2,899
Salonica
23,227
36,555
32,397
0
Samos
1,702
6,735
6,662
24
Trikkala
1,588
8,141
7,369
695
Veria
3,553
12,330
11,429
0
Volos
6,143
11,991
9,129
0
Xanthis
0
8,183
2,689
(7,677)
(agrarian)
a. The center opposition supported an independent candidate.
b. In the January 1953 by-elections, EDS made substantial gains: it
received 43,037 votes as against 47,232 for the government party
and 23,946 for the center opposition.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
A. World War II and 1944 Insurrection
During World War II, the Communists controlled the principal
resistance movement, the National Liberation Front (EAM). The principal
centers of EAM strength were in Attika, Central Greece, Macedonia, Crete,
and in the major Aegean Islands. Although no reliable estimate is
available of the number of people who participated in the resistance,
there were probably more than 500,000 men and women active in EAM, who
probably had the sympathy and support of more than 50 percent of the
Greek population. Most of those who supported EAM before the December
1944 uprising were not Communist sympathizers and few were aware of
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Communist control of EAM or of Communist tactical and political ob-
jectives. EAM's military arm, ELAS, could have resisted the Axis more
effectively if it had not been primarily concerned with achieving
political domination. It is doubtful if EAM-ELAS contributed much to the
liberation of Greece or to the success of the Allied military effort.
During the war. ELAS claimed as many as 65,000 armed members and
it is with this force that it launched the December 1944 revolt. The
revolt was probably supported by 35 percent of the Greek population and
was terminated by British intervention.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORm4kTION
B. The Guerrilla War, 1946-49
In the fall of 1946, the Communists began another armed insurrection,
using guerrilla tactics. The principal objective was to bring Greece
within the Soviet orbit and, secondarily, to prevent the West from:,
creating a situation of strength in a strategic area.
The uprising had the support of about 10 percent of the population
and approximately 40,000 persons participated in guerrilla activity. Of
these, a maximum of 25,000 were actively engaged in operations; probably
another 10,000 were in reserve outside of Greece. The government forces,
including the police-gendarmerie and the civil guard, totaled some
250,000.
The overwhelming sentiment of the Greek people was anti-guerrilla,
but morale fluctuated and was affected by international conditions and
domestic issues. In areas controlled by the Communists, the guerrillas
had some local support, but on the whole it was forced rather than
voluntary. Since the guerrillas failed to hold populated areas for any
length of time, their effectiveness in propaganda and espionage was
spasmodic. There were no non-Communist insurrectionary groups which the
KKE could exploit.
The principal areas controlled by the guerrillas were along the
frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. By the middle of 1948,
guerrillas had appeared throughout the mountainous regions of Greece and
in the islands of the Aegean, Lesvos (Mitilini),.and Samos. The main
operations took place at Grammos Vitsi and at the juncture of the Greek,
Albanian, and Yugoslav borders; tactical operations were conducted in
Peloponnessos and Central Greece.
Beginning with hit-and-run operations by bands of 10 to 50,
guerrilla tactics had developed by 1948 to attacks on toxin by forces of
from 100 to 2,000 men. In 1949, the guerrillas tried to employ orthodcx
military tactics involving holding operations.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Logistic support of the guerrillas came primarily from Albania,
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The volume of this support has not been
estimated satisfactorily.
The guerrilla war seriously affected Greek economic and political
stability and it was primarily US aid and advice which saved the country
from a complete collapse. The insurrection postponed the economic and
social reconstruction of Greece for three years and divided Greek
political circles on both domestic and foreign policy.
C. The Present Situation
Current KKE policy is to refrain from any activity which will
provoke drastic measures against its underground apparatus or against its
front organization, EDA. KKE does not now appear to have the strength
and popular support to resort to violence, and there is no prospect for
a Communist armed uprising in Greece at present. Although no violent
demonstrations have taken place since the defeat of the guerrillas in
the summer of 1949, the Communists are capable of limited acts of violence
for diversionary purposes. The Communists could organize orderly demon-
strations through EDA but will probably refrain from doing so for the
time being in order to avoid jeopardizing their front organization.
No information is available on Communist plans for creating or
activating military resistance organizations in the event of war. It
is reasonable to assume, however, that such plans exist or are being
formulated by the top KKE leadership. In an East-Vest war, the Greek
Communist apparatus would be capable of sabotage. In a localized war
between Greece and an orbit country (Albania or Bulgaria), Greek Communists
would split on the national issue and the KKE would find it difficult to
carry out sabotage to any appreciable extent. On the outbreak of conflict,
the present EDA leadership would either withdraw or be liquidated and KKE
underground operatives would try to take over, although many Communist
cells would probably break up in the event of a localized Balkan war.
Circumstantial evidence indicates that the KKE has stocks of
hidden weapons and equipment in Greece, and more can be infiltrated from
Albania and Bulgaria and from across the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. A
maximum of some 20,000 to 25,000 combat-trained Greek Communists, both
men and women, are readily available to the KKE from within the Soviet
orbit; this figure could be increased to about 30,000 to 40,000 by drawing
upon other Greeks living in the orbit. Underground recruiting in Greece
could yield about 5,000 persons in the initial stages.
In some respects, the Communist underground apparatus in Greece
is a paramilitary organization. Vestiges of the wartime OPLA (Organ-
ization for the Protection of Popular Security) still exist. It was re-
organized in 1947 as CDA (Democratic Security Organization), the
terroristic and assassination unit of the M.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORWTION
ODA -- or its current equivalent -- is presently inactive, but
it is probably kept in a state of readiness. Its strength is not known
but. it is reasonable to assume that it is centered in Athens-Piraeus and
Salonica. ODA is a mobile organization and its members probably possess
enough weapons -- pistols for the most part, and hand grenades and sub-
machine guns in some cases. The quality of its leadership is difficult to
determine on the basis of available information, but usually the most
fanatic and capable KKE members, many of whom have a criminal record, are
recruited for this branch of Communist activity.
A variety of interlocking "self-defense" units have been reported,
but little is-known of their present status. For example, the OA
(Self-Defense Organization) was subordinated in January 1951 to KOSSA
(Communist Organization of the Army and Security Corps). QA is also
known as the "People's Avengers" (Laikoi Ekdikitai). Units of the OA are
organized in three groups of three men each, under the command of a tenth
man who is also responsible for the weapons. These "vigilance" officers
are kept ready, under pseudonyms, for any assignments calling for
violence.
It is not known whether the MIA (Wide Popular Self-Defense),
created in 1945, is still in existence. This was the first para-military
organization formed by the Comtmmnists after the collapse of the December
1944 revolt. The Narrow Self-Defense and the Democratic Army (the
Communist guerrillas) were able to draw upon MIA for well-disciplined re-
inforcements.
Sufficient data are not available to evaluate the current status
of these paramilitary branches of the KKE. However, their capacity for
expansion and action is contingent upon the success of the Greek security
organs in uncovering "vigilance" operators. To date, the record of the
Greek police in this respect has been good.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Greek Communist Party (EKE) and its affiliated organizations
were outlawed in 1947. A leftist party appeared in the elections of 1950,
which developed as the legal front of the NIC; under the name United
Democratic Left (EDA). There is enough evidence of its ties with the EKE
to warrant suppression, but neither the recent government of the center,
nor the present right-wing government of the Greek Rally have taken action
against it. Under the center government, EDA's weekly party organ and
youth organization were suppressed. Under the Rally government, however,
the party enjoys the freedom accorded to the opposition parties and its
daily newspaper continues to be published. The. government has the capa-
bility and popular support to repress any Communist-front group.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
While the effectiveness of the underground organization of the 8M
cannot be estimated, some idea as to its efficiency can be gleaned from
the effective support it gave EDA in the elections of 1952. The MM was
able to resolve the divided opinion in EDA on electoral tactics, ordering
the front group to run its own ticket and preventing cooperation with the
center parties.
V. C04MUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR'
There are no data available on the number of Commmmists in defense
plants and other key industries, such as railways, ccmmnunicatione,
shipping, and chemical industries. In Athens Piraeus and Salonica,
probably 30-50 percent of the industrial workers are EDA sympathizers. The
percentage of Communist sympathizers in the communications system is
smeller, since it is mostly under indirect government supervision.
The General Confederation of Labor (GSEE) has managed to prevent
Communists from holding crucial posts in its organization, and has been
countering Communist infiltration. ?EDA su ports the labor organization
known as ESKE (United Trade Union Movement), which was organized in
June 1950. Its membership is not Down. There are, in addition, several
unions strongly influenced by ESKE on the national level,.such as the
Tobacco Workers' Union in Salonica, which has about 5,300 members, . but' the
total number of-Communist members is difficult to. determine.
None of the labor organizations operating within Greek law are
affiliated with international Communist confederations, such as WF"1V. What"
the KKE calla the "elected" GSEE (which exists now only in Com unist propew.
ganda) belongs to the WFTU. The present GSEE is regarded by the K as
"appointed," and is affiliated with the pro-Western ICFTV.
VI. C0 E4UNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL. AND PRO FESSIONAL T
Organizations which were known to be Communist-controlled are out-
lawed, but the KKE continues to use their names in its propaganda. Some
of them went underground and many were absorbed by )A. Little is knawsa
of EDA activity in these fields.
The extent of Communist infiltration into non-Communist organi.
zations cannot be estimated, either in general or in connection.v th
particular organizations. Available reports on Communist infiltration are
inconclusive.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERZ~'.
A. National and Mianicipal Legislatures
There are no known or declared Communists in the national legis-
lature. The Parliament elected in 1951 had 10. A. deputies, who voiced
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
the Communist line in domestic and international affairs, out of a total
of 258 members. The .present Parliament, elected on November 16, 1952, has
no EDA representation.
On the local level, the Communists. through the "Democratic Front"
(now EDA), attained a majority in 13(665%) municipal councils of a total
of 218 which were elected April 15,.1951. Of the total municipal council-
men elected (1,840), about 10 percent (187) belong to the "Democratic
Front." Ectreme leftist mayors of the "Democratic Front" were elected in
11 municipalities:
Egaleo in Attika - A. Stingos
Vyron in Attika - A. Kostantileris
Elefsis in Attika - Geo. Rigos
Kaisariani in Attika - D. Manolidis
Keratsini in Attika - A. Patsilinakos
Kifissia a in Attika - J. Varouxakis
Nikea in Attika - D. Karakoulouxis
Haidari in Attika - M. Koutsokos
Patras in Attika.. - V. Roufos
Kavalla in Kavalla: - Emm. Melissakis
Larissa in Larissa - D. Karathanos
a. A resort community for wealthy Athenians.
B. Armed Forces
While the influence of.the Communists and their sympathizers in
top levels of the armed forces is nil, the lower ranks contain a leftist
element of about 2-5 percent. Two percent of the army vote in 1951, was
for EDA, as compared with its civilian vote of about 10 percent. (In the
1952 elections, the army did not take part. as, a separate entity.)
The underground organization of the KKE for the armed forces,.known
as KOSSA (Communist Organization of the Army and Security Corps) s pre-
sumably has agents in military circles. Little evidence has been reported
of its effectiveness.
C. Police
No data are available on Communist infiltration in the police and
security services.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
D. Administration
The number of Communists in the national and municipal administration
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
cannot be ascertained. No estimate exists of the percentage of civil
servants who voted for EDA. The total number of civil servants in the
national government is about 80,000. It is probable that about 20-30
percent are EDA sympathizers.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Data inadequate to draw reliable conclusions.
IX. CONW?UNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-CONMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Communist influence in right wing organizations and parties is
difficult to ascertain inthe case of Greece. It is reasonable to assume
that the Communists have planted their agents in conservative circles,
whose object is probably to affect the top levels rather than influence
the rank and file. It is probable that some of the 31 deputies of the
left-of-center party EPEK have Communist connections. There is enough
evidence for at least one to be suspected as a crypto-Communist,
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
A. News-papers and Periodicals
Communist newspapers and periodicals are illegal in Greece.
Nevertheless, the Communist underground prints and circulates
clandestinely the principal long-standing organ of the KKE,'Rzosnastis,
and other old or new titles, which appear at varying intervals and in
various parts of Greece. Another publication of the' EKE appearing
irregularly is Neos Cosmos (New World), which reproduces texts of Central
Committee pronouncements. Youth publications are: Flow. (Flame), organ
of the Communist underground student organization which shows Athens as
its place of publication; and Leventia (Youthful Manhood) and Neos
Agonistis (New Fighter), organs of the KKE youth organization, EPON.
Publication of the clandestine Communist papers is irregular and the
number of copies circulated unknown.
EDA puts out a number of publications, which are not as openly
Communist as those published clandestinely by the M. Its first official
organ, Dimokratiki, which began publication in August 1951, was suppressed
by the center government on January 19, 1952. No circulation figures of
EDAts publications are available. During the election period (October-
November 1952), the caretaker government allowed EDA to publish Av i
(Dawn) as a daily organ, and its publication has continued under the right
wing Greek Rally government. It started as a weekly, claiming 50,000
circulation. Its circulation figures as a daily are not available. EDA
published a weekly called Isonolitia (Civil Rights Equality), but infor-
mation on its present status is not available. It also published
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Frouri tis Irinis (Guardians of Peace), which was suppressed, together
with Dimokratiki, on January 19, 1952. This was intended to disseminate
the youth organization EDNE's propaganda on the Communist peace campaign.
It is not known if another publication took its place.
1. Printing Establishments. Underground Communist printing establish-
ments exist. Indicative of how well the underground press operates is the
fact that Rizospastis has had a continuous (although irregular) publication
since the M. was outlawed in 1947.
2. Import of Publications from Abroad. Communist publications can
only be smuggled into Greece, and consequently, few are imported from
abroad. No data are available on this traffic in Communist literature.
There is some ground for suspicion that certain issues of R'z~ ospastis
are printed abroad. Soviet-satellite diplomatic establishments in
Athens issue frequent press releases. The Soviet Embassy is not known to
release publications of any significance.
B. Radio
There are no domestic broadcasting stations in Greece controlled
or influenced by Communists. Communist broadcasts, however,, are beamed
to Greece from Moscow and all satellite capitals. The main station
broadcasting in Greek is radio "Free Greece," operating probably from
Rumania as the KKE's principal medium of communication.
Radio "Free Greece" has proved effective in communicating with
the KKEts underground organization. It can be heard in most parts of
Greece and reaches the Greek communities in the Near East. No attempt
has been made so far to estimate its audience. Greek broadcasts from
Radio Moscow and satellite countries are secondary to radio "Free Greece.
They frequently quote KNE broadcasts. The size of their audience in
Greece is also unknown, but is certainly less than that of radio "Free
Greece."
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
The financial condition of the KKE is unknown. The underground
in Greece counts on collections and contributions from party members and
sympathizers. It is unable, however, to extract sizable funds by ex-
tortion as it used to do before it was outlawed, although it still uses
this method on a very limited scale. Evidence indicates that for oper-
ations and specific activities in Greece funds have been imported from
abroad. On the basis of available data no estimate can readily be made
of the total financial assets of the KKE.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- l4 -
XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
A. -M tic Establishments
The only Soviet bloc countries with which Greece has diplomatic
relations are the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Embassy in Athens
.is small, consisting (as of October 1952) of about 5 individuals, headed
by a charge d'affaires, all of whom are listed as living in the
chancellery. The Czechoslovak Legation in Athens is small.
There is practically no political activity on the part of orbit
diplomatic. representatives in Greece. Reports in 1946 and 1947*indicated
that bloc undercover agents have operated in Greece, but there has been
no information of their existence since then. If the bloc diplomats in
Greece are now engaged in political activity of any significant nature,
it must be covert. The only Soviet reception reported was held on
November 7, 1950. It was well attended by the foreign diplomatic corps
in Athens.
The USSR and Poland had representatives on the UN Balkan
Commission in 1947, but subsequently withdrew their delegates. Since
then, no Soviet bloc representatives have participated in UN observation
groups in the Balkans.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The KKE participates in Communist international organizations
and conferences, but since the party is illegal there is no opportunity
for participation-from within Greece. EDA conducts no observable relations
with international Communist bodies. This is left to the KKE, which
operates from within the Soviet orbit and through its agents in Western
capitals.
XIV. 001?MUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
A. Courier System
An underground courier system of the KKE exists. This has been
established by the arrest of Communist agents by the Greek police, but
information on the efficiency of the system and points of contact is not
readily available.
B. W/T System
The clandestine W/T station in Kallithea (near Athens), which the
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMTION
Greek police discovered and raided on November 34, 1951, was in operation
for several years. This suggests, and there is evidence, that more W/T
stations are in operation. About the same time another clandestine W/T
station at Glyfada (outside Athens) was uncovered. Bucharest (Rumania)
was the focal point of traffic from and to these stations.. It was rumored
in May 1952 that another secret transmitter had been discovered in the
Kilkis area of Northern Greece. Nothing farther was reported of this, bat
indications are that the Communists have enough transmitters in Greece
to carry on their espionage uninterruptedly.
It has been established from the messages captured from the W/T
transmitters in Kallithea and Glyfada that EDA receives instructions from
KBE leaders in the Soviet orbit. This was also seen clearly from the
radio "Free Greece" broadcasts in connection with the recent elections in
Greece. KKE ordered EDA to run on its own ticket, and this was carried
out without deviation. EDA was also in consultation with the KKE on the
selection of candidates.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.11
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, INDIA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES. . . ? 1
I. Objectives . .. . 1
II. Tactics . . . . . . 3
III. Capabilities .. ? 3
ASSETS . . . . . . 5
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . ... . . . . . .. . .. 5
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . 6
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 8
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 9
V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . . ? . . . . . . . ? 9
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . . . 14+
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . ? ? 15
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . ... . . . . 16
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Xi. Financial Condition . . . . .. .. . . .. . . 24
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets .. . . . . . . . . . 25
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . .. . . . 26
XIV. Communist Communication Network ? 28
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN INDIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
The objectives of the Indian Communist Party, as set forth in
an article by its General Secretary, A. K. Ghosh, in the December 1952
issue of For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, are defined as
the "liquidation of all vestiges of British rule, defense of the
National independence and sovereignty threatened by the American
aggressors," the "preservation of Peace," and. the "promotion of a life
of happiness for the people." Yrhile current developments do not pro-
vide many striking opportunities for the party to work towards the
fulfillment of the first objective set forth above, the party does
attack India's membership in the Commonwealth and British vested
interests in India on every.possible occasion. Frith regard to the
second objective, the US Technical Assistance program and activities
provides a major target and it is clear that an immediate objective
of the CPI is to hinder so far as possible the community development
projects undertaken with US financial and technical aid, and to dis-
courage public cooperation with these projects.
An additional set of objectives in the general field of foreign
affairs is given in a list of the basic tasks facing the party drawn
up by the General Secretary in the spring of 1952 following the general
elections. These include a five-power peace pact; "solidarity with
colonial peoples fighting for freedom"; friendship and closer economic
ties between India and the USSR and China; withdrawal of the Kashmir
issue from the-UN; and the development of a peace pact between India,
Pakistan, and Ceylon. In the main these objectives primarily fulfill
tho foreign policy requirements of the USSR rather than promote the
party's domestic political fortunes.
However, as indicated in many party. documents, Indian Communists
are most actively concerned with building the party's organizational
strength, particularly among labor and peasant groups, and some of
the party's most prominent immediate objectives are designed to further
this end. Among the basic tasks facing the party today, as outlined
in the General Secretary's post-election report, are the follcwing:
the development of a broad-based mass movement for civil liberties,
including repeal of the Preventive Detention Act; intensification of
the movement for linguistic provinces; the building of a, "united move-
ment for help to the people in the famine-stricken areas" to force
government to increase relief measures, and "to mobilize people for
adequate rations and against rise in prices of food-stuffs."
Barring the dictation of a new line by Moscow, it now appears
improbable that the party will in tiic immediate future revise its
objectives or shift the relative emphasis among those it now pursues.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
2 -
II. TACTICS
Present tactics of the CPI are characterized by attempts (1) to
form, where possible, working alliances with left-wing or other anti-
Congress political organizations with a view to building a united front;
(2) to win a direct following and popular support among all social
segments, particularly peasants, workers, students, and intellectuals;
(3) to utilize constitutional procedures; and (4) to exploit its mem-
bership in the central and a number of the state legislative assemblies.
Insofar as the party abides by constitutional procedures a
principal method of propaganda consists in its legislative activities
which enable party leaders in both the central and state legislatures
to put forward the party line and to express their opposition to the
Congress government program. In recent months there have been numerals
and recurring opportunities for the party legislators to press their
demands for civil liberties and for the formation of linguistic provinces.
A principal motif of the party's propaganda appeals outside the legis-
latures is its use of "peace" movements to win support. To a certain
extent the Communists specialize their appeals to various groups, and
the "peace" propaganda is largely directed towards intellectuals,
students, and other urban groups, whereas among peasants the emphasis
is on agrarian problems.
The Communist Party does not hesitate to form alliances with
left-wing or even, sub-rosa, with anti-Congress right-wing political
parties in the legislative assemblies and for election purposes, when
some advantage is to be gained. Such inter-party arrangements are not
always for the purpose of augmenting the party's voting strength, but
are sometimes designed to reduce the strength of the Congress-dominated
faction and if possible to keep that party out of office. On occasion,
and to a limited extent, sacrifices have been made by the. party to
preserve such alliances and, where they have broken down, as in Madras,
it has so far been due to. the action of the allies rather than the
Communist Party.
There is little evidence that the Communists at present, in
spite of their emphasis on the development of a united front, are
making concessions in their program to win the adherence of groups
usually considered beyond their reach. The party's extra-territorial
loyalties, for example, are a definite liability as far as all non-
Communist groups are concerned, yet the party does little to play them
down. On the other hand, the Communists are able to capitalize on the
anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism which is universal in India, and
on the definitely pro-Chinese sentiments of the literate population.
Dissatisfaction with prevailing domestic policies of the Congress
government is played upon with considerable success.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Although the party is now work-''g along constitutional lines,
the leaders have not hesitated to state from time to time that the
Communists would resort to violence to attain their ends should this
become necessary. In fact, along with legitimate activities the party
or those directly under its influence has continued to engage in armed
violence in certain areas, notably South India and PEPSU (Patiala and
East Punjab States Union). There are indications that party leaders,
foreseeing the possibility of a ban on Communist activities in certain
States, or even in the country as a whole, are preparing for increased
underground activity.
At the present time, the party uses trade unions and "pease"
movements as vehicles of propaganda, and to a lesser extent, as pressure
groups. In rural areas where direct action has been resorted to,
peasant organizations are used to stir up the agrarian population and
to enlist support for subversive activities.
The recent general elections revealed a marked weakness in
Communist influence among the working classes. Probably partly because
of this lack of strength and capability, the party in recent months
has seldom resorted to strike tactics in the trade unions which they
control. Communist labor leaders, however, frequently join in or
support strikes which they have not instigated, and claim credit for
any concessions secured.
With regard to the methods used by the Communist Party to recruit
and retain members, it is believed that active proselytising is carried
out among student groups and labor organizations, and that a certain
selection is exercised through a period of indoctrination and probation.
Discipline appears to be strict, and to work fairly effectively to
retain members in the party.
There is growing evidence that the CPI receives both instructions
and financial help from agencies and organs of the USSR in India. An
important source of financial aid is the large number of books and
printed materials brought into the country as part of the Soviet informa-
tion program and sold at low cost for the benefit of the Indian Communist
Party. It is possible that party leaders are now under the direct
influence and guidance of the Soviet Embassy officials.
Insofar as a major current objective of the Indian Communist
Party is to build up its organizational strength, the party is probably
in a stronger position than ever before to achieve a degree of success.
The party's victories in the 1951-52 elections have enhanced its capa-
bilities for political action in the sense of providing a platform for
party propaganda and for attacks on the government policy and program.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Hitherto, the party has suffered from dissension within its
ranks and has periodically been greatly handicapped by a lack of unity
among the leaders and a confusion based on conflicting views regarding
policy and tactics. The establishment, during the past few years, of
increasingly direct contacts with Soviet Union officials should go far
towards reducing this factionalism and confusion, and so increase the
party's organizational strength.
How far the party will succeed in its efforts to increase its
influence and widen its control over the trade unions is doubtful.
The results of the general elections revealed that the party had
little strength in this sector, and it may not even with increased
efforts be able to make such headway against its rivals, the labor
organizations dominated by the Congress and the Socialists.
Conditions seem somewhat more favorable for success in enlisting
peasant support and building up effective peasant organizations.
Agrarian unrest is widespread, and prospects for substantial improve-
ment in rural standards of living in the near future are not bright.
The Communists do not appear to be making much headway with the
movement for a United Front of leftist parties, and it is probable that
an alignment of non-Communist leftist groups will have the effect of
isolating the Communist Party.
To a considerable extent,party capabilities in respect to
organization depend upon the attitude of the Indian Government and the
various state governments towards the party. Present indications are
that the governments' attitudes are gradually crystalizing and that the
dangers inherent in the Indian Communist movement are receiving more
and more recognition. It is possible therefore that the Indian
Communist Party, at least in certain areas, may be driven underground.
The party's capacities in regard to building. organizational strength,
and to achieving its other objectives, would be, thereby, greatly
impaired.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-5-
COMI4JNISM IN INDIA: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
The Communist Party of India has an estimated membership of about
50,000. This figure reflects the probable increase since October 1951
when the party claimed.30,000 members. The size of the party's following
is roughly indicated by the more than 4,700,000 votes received by
Communist Party or front candidates for the national legislature in the
1951-52 general elections.
While the geographic distribution and class composition of the
Communist membership is not definitely known, analysis of recent election
returns indicates a concentration of Communist strength in south India
(Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, and Madras) and West Bengal, and greater
Communist support in rural areas than in the major industrial centers
of the country. The larger segment of its urban support consists of
middle-class intellectuals and white collar workers rather than members
of the industrial working classes.
The quality of the party membership has seldom been tested, and
no useful conclusions can yet be drawn. During the Telengana disturbances
in 1948-50, numerous small bands of Communist-affected "hostiles" ravaged
the countryside and eluded several thousand government troops for an
extended period. In the general elections of 1951-52, the party line of
constitutional opposition was generally adhered to, but Communist strength
grew more from general anti-government sentiment than from the popular
appeal of Communist 'doctrine.
Stability in point of total membership is not a characteristic of
the Indian Communist Party. In February 1948, the party claimed 100,000
members; in October 1951, only 30,000. This decrease was caused by
internal dissension and a policy of repression on the part of the central
and state governments. Since the election campaign of late 1951, member-
ship has increased to an estimated 50,000.
In its fluctuations since 1946, Communist Party membership has
probably never fallen below 20,000. This would appear to represent the
"hard core," almost one-half of the present party. This "hard. core"
seems to be strongest in those areas of greatest electoral strength and
is drawn from practically every social classy with probably a majority
from the urban middle and working classes. Members of the "hard core"
as a whole are estimated to average 30 years of age, with 8 years of
membership in the party; leaders of the "hard core" average 45 years of
age with 20 years of membership.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The Communist leadership is in general well-educated and able,
but the party has lacked leaders with the qualities necessary to attract
the Indian masses. The effectiveness of the leadership has also been
lessened by personal rivalries and disputes over policy and tactics.
From 1948 until 1951 there was serious dissension within the party with
several strong local leaders unable to establish clear title to national
leadership. The most serious internal differences were, however,
resolved by mid-1951 and since that time the leadership has functioned.
more harmoniously. Since the 1951-52 elections, the several provincial
segments of the party have found a focus in the national Parliament,
.where the Communist delegation effectively directs party activity
throughout the country, ably assisted by Communist representatives in
provincial legislatures.
II. EIECTORAL STRENGTH
The Communist Party, together with front or fellow-traveller
affiliates, polled 4,712,009 votes in India's first national elections,.
held between October 1951 and March 1952. These votes represent 4.45
percent of the valid total cast and won the party 23 seats in the House
of the People, the lower house of Parliament. Other Marxist, far left
splinter parties received approximately 1,500,000 votes (about 1.4
percent of the total) and four seats. The over-all Communist and near-
Communist vote, including an, approximation for independents on whom
specific data are not available, was between six and seven percent of
the total vote.
In elections to the state assemblies, the total Communist vote
was somewhat larger, approximately 6,100,000 or 6 percent of the total.
Other far left parties gained approximately 1,200,000 votes or one
percent of the total. Independent candidates with Communist sympathies
would probably increase the far left vote by about another one percent.
By-elections since M rch 1952 do not indicate any trend in
Communist Party strength.
A comparison of Communist electoral strength with the strength
of other major parties in the national Parliament (489 seats) follows:
Party -
Votes
Percent of Total
Seats Won
Congress (government)
47,528,911
44.85
362
Communist and fronts.
4,712,009
4.45
23
Socialista
11,126,344
10.50
12
Kisan } zdoor Prajaa
6,158,782
5.81
9
a. These two parties recently united to form the Socialist-Praja
Party, with a total of 21 seats.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
There are no major parties supporting the Congress Party in the House
of the People.
The Communist Party vote is concentrated in the southern states
of Hyderabad, Travancore-Cochin, and Madras and in the northeastern
states of West Bengal and Tripura. The tables below indicate the
comparative strength of the Communist. Party in those states as shown
in the 1951-52 elections.
Hyderabad Assembly (175 seats) Percent of votes Seats won
congress
41.84
93
Communist
20.88
42
Socialist
11.37
11
Independents
14.46
14
Travancore-lCochin Assembly (108 seats)
Congress
85.4
43
Communist (United Front of Leftists)
21.4
32
Socialist
15.0
11
Independents
17.5
11
Madras Assembly (375 seats)
Congress
35.05
152
Communist
12.90,
62
Kisan Mazdoor Praja
8.82
35
Socialist
6.58
13
Other parties
21.76
34
West Bengal Assembly (238 seats)
Congress
38.94
150
Communist
10,76
28
Kisan Mazdoor Praja
8.97
15
Jan Sangh
5.65
9
Independents
21.61
16
Tripura Electoral College (30 seats) a
Communist
43.10
12
Congress
18,17
9
Independents
21.72
6
This state is without a--legislature but selects an electoral college
which elects the state's representatives to the upper house of
Parliament, the Council of States.
SECRET , SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
III, MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The present policy of the Indian Communist Party is to refrain from
violent demonstrations, except perhaps to a limited degree under special
circumstances, but at the same time to maintain close contact with
dissident groups and to join demonstrations when they occur. Most recent
demonstrations cannot be attributed to the Communists alone, although
they have contributed significantly to some of those which have occurred.
In December 1952, a series of demonstrations were staged to protest a
state sales tax in Saurashtra, and two Communists were on the committee
of 10 which directed the action. Communists were conspicuously present
in the Hyderabad City riots over the employment of non-Hyderabadis and
in the massed demonstrations demanding the formation of a separate state
of Andhra. Over the past year, there has been continuing but sporadic
violence against landowners in PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States
Union) in which it is thought the Communists have had a leading part.
It is known that the Communists are attempting to strengthen their
underground apparatus but details are not available and nothing is known
concerning any plans that the party may have for engaging in violence in
the future. There have been reports of armed Communist groups in Tripura
and considerable numbers of Communists in Hyderabad are believed to have
arms. There may also be small armed groups elsewhere. Several thousand
members of the party have had past experience in riots and other violent
tactics, but any precise estimate of their number is impossible.
It is impossible to estimate the maximum number that the Communist
Party could mobilize for violent demonstrations at present, but where an
issue of importance to a specific group was involved, particularly a
problem concerning regional susceptibilities, several thousand people
could certainly be rallied.
In March 1948 the party inaugurated a policy of violence and terror
on the assumption that India was ripe for a proletarian revolution.
Strikes; sabotage of railways, munition plants, and public utilities;
mutiny in infiltrated armed services; arson; bomb-throwing; and murder
were the weapons used in this civil warfare, and there was a consequent
alienation of public sympathy from the Communist cause. In South India,
the Andhra branch of the party, although opposed by the Communist high
command, followed the Chinese path of agrarian revolt and of building
rural bases of armed strength, and succeeded in bringing a large area
on both sides of the Madras-Hyderabad border under Communist control.
There is no reliable estimate of the total number of people involved
in the 1948-50 period of violence but over 5,000 Communists were jailed.
There were probably 2,000 to 3,000 involved in the Telengana area of
Hyderabad and Madras. Other centers of violence where possibly several
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY 1NIFORMATION
_9 -
hundreds were engaged were in the states of Assam, Tripura and Manipur, and
Calcutta in northeast India, and in the Tanjore and Kerala parts of
Madras state and in the state of Travancore-Cochin in south India.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TCWARD CO*dJNISM
The Communist Party, although outlawed in several states during the
1948-50 period of violence, is now legal throughout India and with its
front organizations has full freedom in parliamentary and other legal
activities. Under the constitution, the national and state governments
have the powers of preventive detention in cases involving the security
of a state, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of
essential supplies or services. Ordinarily, detention without trial
beyond three months must be authorized by an Advisory Board composed of
persons who have the qualifications of High Court Judges but the Preventive
Detention Act of 1950, renewed and amended by the House of the People,
permits detention for periods up to a year without reference to an Advisory
Board in cases involving India's security, defense, or foreign relations;
the security of a state; or the maintenance of public order. The Advisory
Board may authorize a continuance of imprisonment so that in effect the
government may detain a person indefinitely. During the period of
Communist violence in.1948-50, the government made extensive use of the
power of preventive detention.
Since independence, the size of the Indian police forces has been
appreciably increased. The central Intelligence Bureau and the state
Criminal Investigation Departments are believed to have an extensive
network of informers in the Communist Party and its fronts. The higher
levels of army and police forces, and most of the lower ranks, are
loyal to the government and at present the government appears capable
of repressing the party to a great extent, although undoubtedly some
Communist leaders would escape detection and some underground activity
could continue.
V. COM41JNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
Most of the 3,000 primary unions in the country belong to one of
the four major federations of unions. Since the federations are closely
identified with political parties, affiliation is largely a matter of
political rather than economic considerations. The largest federation
in the country, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (IITUC) has a
total membership of 1,435,258, and is affiliated with the Congress Party.
The All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) was the only central labor
organization in India prior to World War II and was non-partisan in
character; it came,under Communist control during the war, and remains
today an organ of the Indian Communist Party. It has 606,194 members
organized in 729 unions. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) is the labor
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
organ of the Socialist Party, representing 464 unions with 704,987
workers. The United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), established in 1949
as a reaction against the policy of violence imposed.by the Commmists
on member unions of the AITUC, represents about 300,000 workers.
Indian labor unions do not exert the same control and discipline
over members that US unions do. Frequently, the unions are nothing more
than very loose associations of workers who have little organization,
pay no dues, and do not operate as a united force. Thus, figures as to
total strength, which all unions greatly exaggerate, may be very
misleading.
Information available does not permit a comparative analysis of
union strengths within industries. There is no industry which can be
said to be unionized by any particular federation; all groups have
influence in various industries. Geographically, Communist trade union
strength is greatest in Calcutta, the Andhra area of Madras, and Bombay
city. Of the total unionized labor force in India, the Communist unions
may have very roughly 10-.25 percent.
Some of the locals in the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) may
be influenced by Communists but no specific evidence is available.
At the end of 1950, AITUC claimed 729 unions but a complete listing
of them including the plants involved, is not available. Some specific
information for Bombay, which is evaluated by the collector as probably
true, is given in the three tables below:
Industry
Communist Union
Approximate
--strength
Textile
Mill Mazdoor Union
20
000
Silk
Reshern Mazdoor Union
,
800
Railways
Central Railways Labor Union
4
000
Indian Navy
Dock Yards
Armari Godi Kamgar Union
j,
2
000
Seamen
Bombay Seamen's Union
.9
000
4
Oil industry
Petroleum Workers' Union
,
3
500
Air India
Air India Employee's Union
,
500
Ordnance
Depots
Il a
400
Bombay Gas Co.
a
900
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 11 -
In the textile industry the following plants are affected:
Jain Manufacturing Company Mill Number 1
Digvi jay Mills
Bombay Dyeing (Textile Mills)
Elphinstone Mills
India United Mill Number 1
New China Mills
Western India
Finlay Mills
Madhusudan Mills
Shriniwas Mills
Gold Mohur
New City of Bombay
Tata Mills
In addition, the Communists have considerable (approximately 70
percent) influence among the workers of the following enterprises:
Crompton Parkinson (Works) Ltd.
Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company
Britannia Biscuit Company
Acme Manufacturing Company
Mukund Iron and Steel Company
Tate. Oil Mills
Lever Brothers Ltd..
Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company (Dalda)
Glaxo laboratories
Mazagaon Docks Ltd.
Metal Box Company of India
Automobile Products of India
VI. COMMJNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The All India Youth Federation is a Communist-controlled organiza-
tion affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Its
numerical strength and its strength relative to that of other youth
organizations are unknown, but all youth organizations in India are
known to be weak. The Federation's leadership is mediocre. The organiza-
tion has as its objective the establishment of a united front with other
youth groups. Its capabilities are probably very moderate.
The All India Students Federation (AISF) is Communist-controlled
and is affiliated with the International Union of Students and the World
Federation of Democratic Youth. Its membership probably does not exceed
a few hundred and its leadership is ineffective. The AISF convention in
June 1951 stated that the organization's first aim was the unity of the
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
student movement, which was to be achieved not by an insistance on the
acceptance of a particular philosophy or ideology but only by promoting
the day-to-day interests of the students.
The Mahila Atma Raksha Samita (MARS) is a Communist-controlled
women's organization. Its membership probably does not exceed 200
and the organization is relatively unimportant as compared with the
All India Women's Conference, a non-party but predominantly Congress
organization. The leadership of MARS is inferior to that of the All
India Women's Conference. A member of MARS attended the November 1949
meeting of the Women's International Democratic Federation, but it is
not known whether MARS is an affiliate.
The All India Progressive Writers Association (AIPWA) is a
Communist-controlled professional organization. The size of its member-
ship is unknown, but there are provincial branches in Bengal, Uttar
Pradesh, and Bombay and local ones in Bhopal, Hyderabad City, Bangalore,
and Gauhati. Although weaker than similar non-Communist groups, the
AIPWA is nonetheless very active and some of its members have substantial
literary reputations. Its main objective is to contribute to the over-
all Communist propaganda effort.
The membership of the Communist-controlled Indian People's
Theater Association (IPTA) is unknown but there are branches throughout
India. In comparison with other similar groups it ranks fairly high and
the quality of its leadership is good. It contributes to the Communist
propaganda effort through such media as plays and dances. Its
capabilities are fairly good..
The All India Friends of the Soviet Union (AIFSU) has branches
in Bombay, Calcutta, Lashkai, Jamshedpur, Muzaffarpur, Madanpalle,
Nellore, Ahmedabad, and Wardha. Its numerical strength is unknown.
AIFSU's primary function is to conduct propaganda through cultural
exchanges.
The Indo-China Friendship Association has branches in Calcutta,
Bombay, Patiala, Debra Dun, and probably elsewhere. No information is
available on the number of members or the quality of its leadership.
Like AIFSU, it is primarily concerned with cultural exchange as a
propaganda weapon.
The All India Peace Council (AIPC) has over a score of provincial
and sub-provincial branches. Its main centers are in Calcutta, Madras,
and Bombay. The AIPC is associated with the World Peace Congress and
sends delegates to major Communist-sponsored international "peace"
meetings. Its primary purpose is to serve as a vehicle for Communist
"peace" propaganda.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
There are no known Communist front organizations based on racial,
religious, or nationality distinctions, although the Communist Party
directs special appeals to the minority communities. The Chinese
consulate has made strenuous efforts to organize and control the roughly
10,000 Chinese -- about half of India's Chinese population -- resident
in Calcutta. At present the community is split with the Communists
controlling perhaps 30 percent of it.
There is also fragmentary information which indicates that efforts
have been made by agencies of the Czechoslovak Government to win over
the tiny Czech communities centered in Batanagar in West Bengal.
In addition to the above organizations, which represent the most
important groups created or captured by the Communist Party, there are
a number of others of lesser importance controlled by or infiltrated by
Communists. Information concerning these is almost entirely absent. A
list of some of these organizations is presented below:
Playback Singers Association
India Cultural League
Kerala Tyojalali Sava Sangh
Vichar Vikas Mandal
Tyagaraj Gyan Sabha
Teachers' Association
The Progressive Group
Kerala Kala Mandalam
City (Bombay) Yuvak Mandal
C. Ward City (Bombay) Vidyarthi Mandal
Deddhar School of Music
People's Academy
The Madanpura Youth
Trichi Scheduled Cast Federation
Trichi Press Worker's Association
Scientific Workers Association
Progathisil Yuvak Sangh
Vile Parle Youth League
Progathi Mahila Sangh
Lawyers' Association
The organizations appearing in the above list are almost all .
located in Bombay city. Comparable Communist-infiltrated or -controlled
organizations can probably be found in all the major cities and large
towns in India. The listed organizations represent fronts in which the
Communists are active, such as youth, labor, women's, students',
untouchables', professional, and cultural groups. The Communists are
also active in sports associations and in refugee organizations.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
There is evidence of Communist infiltration into the Indian'
Institute of Science and the Association of Scientific Workers of India.
It is probable that other non-Communist organizations of this nature
have also been infiltrated.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
As far as is known, there are no Communist Party members in the
executive policy-making bodies of the central government or, with the
possible exception of the State of Kashmir, of the states of the Indian
Union. The Congress Party controls the national government and all
state governments except in the state of Patiala and East Punjab States
Union (PEPSU) where a United Front of right-wing parties controls the
government. This United Front has recently made an opportunistic deal
with the three Communist members of the state's legislative assembly
but this does not give the Communist Party much influence in the state
government.
There have been conflicting reports of Communists or fellow-
travelers in the Kashmir government but the extent of Communist influence
is unknown.
A few high officials of the Indian Government, such as V.K. Krishna
:Tenon and K.M. Panikkar have approximated certain parts of the Communist
line in their utterances but the amount of influence they exert within
the government is uncertain.
The number of Communists or sympathizers in the armed services
is unknown but believed to be small, as strenuous efforts have been made
to uncover and dismiss them.
Reports indicate that Communists are attempting to infiltrate the
police forces. In general, there has been only limited success, although
in West Bengal, Travancore-Cochin, and Madras infiltration has been more
extensive than elsewhere. In early January 1953, there was a fairly
serious revolt by the civil police in Madras which the military helped
to it down. It was reported. that the Communists controlled the executive
or negotiating body of the Madras constabulary association. There is no
evidence of Communist influence at the top levels of the Indian police.
India's Atomic Energy program is very small and is limited to
mineral surveys and research. It is not known whether
Communists have any influence within the three man Atomic Energy
Commission which directs the program. There may be some Communist
influence among other research scientists.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
15 -
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
It is evident that the extent of Communist influence in public-
opinion-forming circles is considerable, although an estimate in
numbers cannot be given. This is particularly the case in entertainment
media. A number of films produced in India in recent years may contain
Communist propaganda. Films imported into India from the Soviet Union,
China, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary represent a very small percentage of
total film imports, but they add to the Communist propaganda effort;
non-commercial showings of imported Communist films are said to be
extensive. The consensus among the motion picture industry and the
movie-going public is, however, that Soviet films are boring and
valueless as entertainment. The Communists appear to have made a
considerable study of the forms of communication and entertainment in
rural India, and some of the more important folk forms have been adapted
by them for use in dissemination of propaganda. Dances,, plays, and
dance-dramas are also used by the Communists for propaganda purposes in
the urban areas. The Indian Communists encourage the composition of
propaganda songs by staging competitions.
Communist propaganda from time to time finds its way into the
non-Communist press. There is some Communist infiltration of the
reportorial staff of certain papers. The vernacular langauge press uses
Soviet news agency handouts rather frequently, largely because limited
financial resources make them appreciative of any kind of matter which
is already translated for them and which can be passed on to their
printers with a minimum of editorial work. A number of non-Communist
newspapers which have large circulations relative to other Indian
newspapers and which use TASS material (including reprints from the
Soviet press) are listed below:
Name
Place of publication
Language
Circulation
National Herald
Lucknow
English
1+0,000
Indian News Chronicle
Delhi
English
15,000
Nation
Calcutta
English
10,000
Sansar
Benares
Hindu
15,000
Pratap
New Delhi
Urdu
25,000
Tej
Delhi
Urdu
20,000
Milap
New Delhi
Urdu
20,000
Vir Bharat
Delhi
Urdu
12,500
No information is readily available on the presence of party
members or sympathizers in All-India Radio. Radio Moscow and Radio
Tashkent make daily transmissions to listeners in Southeast Asia and
English-language programs emanating from Radio Peiping can be heard in
India.
SECRET - SECURITY-INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 16 -
Communist influence in Indian educational institutions is '
significant. A considerable number of professors and instructors have
been and are associated with Communist front organizations and Communists
have infiltrated both the leadership and general membership of student
federations.
The number of people subject to Communist influences through these
non-Communist channels is unknown.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
There is some Communist influence, not believed to be extensive as
yet, in the Akali Dal, a Sikh communal party. The size of the Dal's
membership is not known but in the 1951-52 elections it received slightly
over 1,000,000 votes.
Several small leftist parties which are fairly strongly influenced
by the Communist Party are listed below:
United Socialist Organization
Socialist Republican Party of India
All-India Forward Bloc (Marxist)
Revolutionary Socialist party of India
Socialist Unity Center
Revolutionary Communist Party of India (Das Gupta Group)
Bolshevik party of India
Indian National Army
peasants' and Workers' Party
The Dravidian Federation
All but the last two of these have their principal strength in
Bengal. The peasants' and Workers' party has most of its following in
Bombay and Hyderabad and the Dravidian Federation is primarily a Madras
party.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
A list of Indian Communist newspapers and periodicals is given
below. It is probably not exhaustive.
Frequency of place of
publication publication Publisher Circulation
Communist monthly Bombay M.B. Rao n a
Crossroads weekly Madras G. Alavandar, 25,000
Janasakthi
Printing Press
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 17 -
Name
Frequency of
publication
Place of
publication
Publisher
Circulation
Desabhimani
daily
Calicut
n a
n a
Jai Gujarat
weekly
Ahmedabad
n a
n a
Janashakti
do
Patna
n a
n a
Peop e s
-
--
--
Strength)
Janashakti
do
Quilon
A.V. Vasavan
n a
Janashakti
daily
Madras
n a
5,000
Janashakti
weekly
do
n a
1,000
Janayugam
monthly
do
n a
n a
(People's
-
--
Age)
Jan jug
weekly
n a
n a
people's
Age)
Janvadi
monthly
Bombay
V.M. Kaul
n a
Voice of
the people)
Jugantar
n a
n a
n a
n a
New Age)
Kamalan
weekly
Ernakulam
n a
(Travancore-
Cochin)
Lokyug
do
n a
n a
n a
people's
Age)
Mashal
daily
Calcutta
n a
Torch Light)
- -
Nai Zindagi
n a
Bombay
United Fine Arts
n a
(New Life
Lithographies
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Frequency of
Name publication
- 18 -
Place of
publication
Publisher Circulation
Nevalokan
daily
n a
n a
12,500
(New World)
Navayugam
weekly
Trichur
n an
5,000
(New Age
Naya Daur
(New Age
Naya Dabera
Hyderabad
Hyderabad
n a
Lakshman Shastri
n a
(New Dawn)
Naya Zamana
Lucknow
n a
1,500
(New Age_
Prajashakti
bi-weekly
Vijayawada
n a
20,000
(people's
Strength)
Swadhinata
Calcutta
n a
In ependence)
Soviet Land
monthly
New Delhi
TASS representative
n a
n a = not available
Indian communist-front organization
list is probably not complete.
organs are listed below. The
Frequency of
place of
publication
publication
Abhidaya
monthly
Vijayavada
Progressive Writers
Association
Indo-Soviet
Bombay
All-India Friends of
Journal
the Soviet Union
Naya Adab
do
Progressive Writers
Association
Naya Sahitya
do
Allahabad
All-India progressive
Writers' Association
Parichaya
do
Calcutta
Progressive Writers
TIER cator)
Association, Bengal
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 19 -
Frequency of
Place of
Name
publication
Publication
Publisher
Student
bi-weekly
Bombay
All-India Federation
of Students
Trade Union
monthly
do
All-India Trade
Record
Union Congress
Unity
do
Calcutta
Indian Peoples
Theatre Association
The following is a list of pro-Communist, disguised publications;
Name
Frequency of
publication
Place of
publication
Agrani
n a
Kanpur
neer)
- -
Agramani
weekly
Calcutta
Bombay
Blitz
do
Chaya patha
do
n a
China Review daily
Calcutta
Dainadin n a
Bengal State
Etathupaksham daily
Ernakulam
Hans
Swan)
monthly
Allahabad
Ilm-o-danish
do
Bombay
Knowledge)
Indian Struggle n a
India Today
monthly
Allahabad
Janata
people)
bi-weekly
Bezwada,
publisher Circulation
n a n a
n a
Blitz publica- 25,000
tions, Ltd.
do 1+5,000
n a n a
n a n a
n a n a
n a n a
n a.
n a
n a n a
O.P. Sangal n a
Kavitilaka press n a
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Janavani
Janvadi
(Voice of
the people)
Kerala Bhoomi
(Kerala Land
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Frequency of
publication
20
Place of
publication
Publisher
Circulation
weekly
Madras
n a
1,500
monthly
Bombay
People's Book
n a
weekly
n a
Vallathol
Printing and
Publishing
House
n a
Manjil
n a
Mannuni
monthly
Madras
Vanguard)
Marxist
weekly
Trichur
Calcutta
Nai Chetna
n a
n a
Nav Yug
n a
Bombay
Naya Duar
weekly,
New Delhi
Naya Zamana
do
Lucknow
(New Age
Oolaga Anasiyal
(World Po itics) do
Madras
Pravaham
(The Current) monthly n a
7 Days)
n a
New Delhi
n a
Senguntha
Mitha Press
Marxist
Publishing House
n a
n a
n a n a
n a n a
n a
n a n a
n a n a
S.R. Sundara
Rajan
15,000
Vijaya printing
n a
and Publishing
Hot e
- -
n a
n a
n a
n a
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Frequency of
Name publication
- 21 -
Place of
publication
Publisher
Sada jug n a
Calcutta
n a
Our Age)
Sapthik Adhikar weekly Lucknow
Lakshmi Das
Public Opinion do n a
Sanj Vartaman
press
Satyajug daily n a
n a
Age of
Truth)
The Behar n a patan
n a
Herald
Viddi Velli monthly Madras
V. Vijaya
(Morning Star)
Baskaran
Visal Andhra do Madras
n a
(Greater
Andhra)
n a = not available
Circulation
n a
n a
n a
n a
n a
2,000
n a
A considerable volume of Communist non-periodical literature is
published in India, including books, leaflets, and pamphlets. These
publications include works written in India as well as translations and
reprints of material written abroad. Translations are made into all of
the important literary languages of India.
houses:
The following is a list of Communist-controlled publishing
Peoples Publishing House, Ltd. Bombay (main office; branches
in 6 other cities)
New Age Printing Press
Soviet Writer Publishing House
Marxist Publishing House
Bombay
n a
n a
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-22-
No information regarding the quality of their equipment is available.
The following Communist publications are imported from-the
countries indicated:
Soviet Literature World Student News (organ of
t e International Union of
Soviet Woman Students)
Soviet Union Czechoslovak Life
New Times CHINA
News China Pictorial
RUMANIA People's China
For a Lasting Peace, For China Monthly Review
a Peoples Democracy (organ
of the Comi orm Chinese Medical Journal
World Youth (organ of China Reconstructs
the World Federation
of Democratic Youth) FRANCE
Labour Monthly
World Trade Union Movement
organ of the World Fedir-ation
of Trade Unions)
In addition to the periodicals listed, a considerable quantity
of books and pamphlets are imported into India from the USSR and Communist
China. Some titles are; Advancing to Communism, Two Collective Farms,
Public Education in the USSR, Mother and Chid Care in the USSR, The
Truth About American Diplomats, Conspiracy Against Peace, The C inese
People's Liberation Army, China Fights for Peace, and China's Youth
March Forward.
TASS news agency publishes a bulletin entitled News and Views
from the Soviet Union and a periodical entitled Soviet Land, in English,
Hindi, Bengali, and Telegu.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
No broadcasting stations are controlled by Communists. The
extent of Communist penetration into the government-controlled broad-
casting service is unknown but probably slight.
The following programs are received from stations in the USSR:
Radio Moscow
Radio Tashkent
GMT 1400-1445 - English
GMT 1500-1530 - English
1445-1500 - Hindustani
1600-1615 - Bengali
1500-1530 - Bengali
1615-1630 - English
Although Radio Peiping has no special service directed to India, its
signal is audible in India beginning at 0900 GMT, 1330 GMT, and 2200
GMT. These programs are in English.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY IIF0RD'ATION
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
Party membership fees are fixed by the Central Committee and
are paid monthly, or, in the case of peasants, less frequently; no
information is available on the size of the fees. Income from them
goes to the district committee. The district, provincial, and central
committees are also empowered to fix and collect levies on the income
of party members. Individuals occasicnally donate sums of money
to the party. The publication, distribution, and sale of party
pamphlets, leaflets, and books, mainly by the Peoples' Publishing
House, Ltd. of Bombay, is an economic enterprise of the central
organization of the Communist Party. The sale of publications from
abroad is also a source of party income. The maintenance of a party
press is believed to be a considerable drain on the party's finances.
It has been reliably reported that the World Federation of
Trade Unions sent about $2,800 to the Secretary-General of the
Communist-front All-India Trade Union Congress in 1951. It is not un-
likely that grants from parties in other countries as well as from
international front organizations augment the Indian party's income.
There have been occasional reports that Soviet and satellite govern-
ments are directly subsidizing the Indian Communist movement but there
is no conclusive evidence to this effect. There have been reports
recently that the Chinese Embassy in India has extended financial aid
to local Indo-China Friendship Associations.
No information regarding revenue received from party-controlled
labor unions or front organizations is available, but receipts from
such sources are probably small if not non-existent. No estimate of
the party's total assets is possible.
It is believed that the disruption of the party organization
as a result of government repression and the inner-party factionalism
which arose in early 1948 out the party off from financial resources
which it had previously commanded. The central organization was
apparently having a difficult time meeting expenses during the first
half of 1951 and by the middle of the year it had hardly a month's
reserve of funds. This same situation seems to have obtained in all
the provincial and district organizations. In mid-1951 the expenses
of the central organization amounted to about $1,400 a month; this
was increased to about $2,000 monthly by the additional work of
organizing a campaign in connection with the general elections,
reviving and intensifying the work of all front organizations, and
preparing for the holding of an All-India Party Congress. The provincial
and district committees also participated in this additional work and
their limited finances also were heavily strained.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATICN
- 25 -
It is believed that a significant percentage of the income
of the Indian Communist Party goes for the maintenance of party
organs, very few of which are self-supporting. For example, one
Communist periodical which began publication in May 1951 reportedly
had incurred an indebtedness of approximately $2,400 by October of
that year. From time to time Communist publications such as
Crossroads, Swadhinata, and the Indo-Soviet Journal have had to make
special appeals to their readers and to the general public for
contributions to help the publications meet their obligations.
XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi has the following staff:
Ambassador Secretary
Counselor Commercial Counselor
3 First Secretaries Commercial Attache
4 Second Secretaries 3 TASS representatives
2 Attaches Pravda representative
Third Secretary Film distributor
At least 7 clerical employees
The TASS News Agency's main office is located at Travancore
House, Curzon Road, New Delhi. It also has a branch in Calcutta.
More than 100 Indian nationals are employed by TASS.
The Soviet Trade Agency's main office is located at
4 Camac Street, Calcutta.
The Czech Embassy in New. Delhi is staffed by a Charge d'Affaires,
a Second Secretary, two Third Secretaries, and a Commercial Attache.
No information on the clerical staff is available.
There is a Czech Consulate in Bombay, but no information is
available on its staff.
The Czech Trade Commission in Bombay is headed by a Trade
Commissioner. No data are available on the staff.
The Hungarian Legation is staffed by a Charge d'Affaires, a
Commerical Counselor, and two Attaches. No information on the clerical
staff is available.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY IN DRMATION
-26-
The Chinese Embassy at New Delhi has the following personnel:
Ambassador
2 Counselors
Counselor for Consular Affairs
Counselor for Commercial Affairs
Military Attache
2 Assistant Military Attaches
First Secretary
2 Second Secretaries
2 Third Secretaries
Attache
No information is available regarding'the clerical staff.
The Chinese Consulate General in Calcutta is headed by a
Consul General assisted by two Consuls and a Vice Consul. No informa-
tion is available regarding the clerical staff.
A Czechoslovak Oultural Festival which was held in Calcutta
from Febru.Fry 23 to March 2, 1951, showed puppet films in English and
a full-length Czechoslovak feature film in English, Lost Frontiers;
a lecture on planned economy in Czechoslovakia was also given. Czech
and Russian pamphlets, books, and magazines in both Bengali and
English were displayed on the sidewalk for public perusal and purchase.
The University Institute Hall, where the festival was held, contained
an exhibition of photographs of Czech industry, peasant life, and
architecture. Samples of Czech textile work were draped about various
stands. An estimated 15,000 people attended the exhibition.
The Chinese Consulate at Calcutta held an exhibition of photo-
graphs of alleged atrocities by American troops and of life in Communist
China. This exhibit drew large crowds.
The Soviet Embassy sponsors film shows and exhibits and gives
entertainments; its officials participate in front organization activities.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
No international Communist organizations maintain offices in
India. The only meeting of a Communist international organization held
in India in recent years was the Southeast Asian Youth Conference, held
in Calcutta in February 1948; it was sponsored jointly by the World
Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of
Students (IUS). The IUS executive committee is scheduled to meet in
India in January 1953.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Indian Communists have attended the following meetings of
international organizations held abroad:
Meeting
Third World Festival of
Youth and Students (co-
sponsored by WFDY and
IUS
WFDY Council Meeting
(7th Annual)
WFDY Executive Comrit-
tee Meeting, 1952
WFDY Executive Commit-
tee Meeting, 1951
IUS Council Meeting
(5th Annual)
IUS Council Meeting
(6th Annual)
IUS Executive Commit-
tee Meeting, 1952
IUS Executive Commit-
tee Meeting, 1951
IUS Executive Commit-
tee Meeting, 1950-51
Date and Place Number of Indian Representativ
August 5-19, 1951
(East Berlin)
August 23-28,1951
(East Berlin)
January 20-24, 1952
(Copenhagan
May 24-27, 1951
(Budapest)
August 31-S tember 7,
1951 (Warsaw)
September 6-10, 1952
(Bucharest)
March 14-18, 1952
(Budapest)
April 24-28, 1951
(Peiping)
January 13-18, 1951
(East Berlin)
World Federation of October 1-4, 1952
Trade Unions(W1FTU) Inter-
national Conference
(Textile and Clothing
Workerst Trade Depart-
ment)
WFTU Administrative
Committee Meeting (Land
and Air Transport Work-
ers' Trade Department)
(Berlin)
July 16-19, 1951
(Vienna)
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
1 known
1 known
1 known
1 known
A few Indians attended
1 known
Undetermined number
1 known
6, reportedly
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Meeting
SECRET - SECURITY Il'CF.MATION
28
Date and Place Number of Indian Representatives
Women's International February 1-6, 1951 2 known
Democratic Federation(WIDF%East Berlin)
Council 'fleeting
WIDF Executive June 20-24, 1951 1 known
Committee Meeting (Sofia)
1st International Con- April 12-16, 1952 19 known
ference in Defense of (Vienna)
Children (sponsored by
WIDF)
WIDF Executive July 18-22, 1952 1 known
Committee Meeting (Bucharest)
World Peace Council February 21-26, 1951 2, reportedly
Plenary Session (East Berlin)
World Peace Council May 5-7, 1951 1 known
(Executive Meeting) (Copenhagen)
World Peace Council November 1-7, 1951 8 known
Plenary Session (Vienna)
Moscow Economic Con- April 3-12, 1952 28 known
ference (Moscow)
World Peace Council July 1-6, 1952 2 known
Plenary Session (East Berlin)
Asian-Pacific Peace October 2-12, 1952 52, reportedly
Conference (Peiping)
World Congress of December 12-20, 1952 30, reportedly
Peoples for Peace (Vienna)
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The Indian Communist Party is believed to have an extensive
courier system within the country, but little reliable information
regarding it is available. It has been.reported that the TASS employees
sometimes serve as couriers, and that motion picture film shipments are
used to convey party messages.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFDRMATION
Charges that the party operates an extensive wireless system
throughout India were made in June 1952 in the Indian Parliament.
Confirmatory evidence of the truth of these charges is lacking,
however.
The closest foreign tie of the Indian Communist Party is believed
to be with the Communist Party of Great Britain. The Indian party for
many years has maintained correspondence with the British party and in
particular with R. Palme Butt. The Communist Party of India follows
gs best it can the general policy laid down by the Cominform. It has
been definitoly established that the Indian Communist Party directs the
activities of the Communist Party of Pakistan in East Pakistan, and
there is ample evidence that the Indian party and the Communist Party of
Nepal maintain close liaison. In addition, there have been a number
of reports of contacts between Indian and Chinese Communists. It has
also been well established that the Indian Communists are in contact
with the Communist Party of Burma.
There is strong evidence that on two occasions criticisms and
guidance from the Communist Party of Great Britain have exerted a
dominant influence on the policies of the Indian Communist Party. In
1942, the Indian party was tardily brought to adopt the new line
regarding World War II as the result of strong pressure from the British
Communist Party. The Indian Party had continued to condemn the war
long after world Communism had dubbed it a "people's war." Intervention
from the British Communists appears again to have been a decisive factor
in the Indian Communists' shift to a united front policy in 1951, which
is probably attributable to a letter received by the Indians from
R. Palme Dutt in the fall of the preceding year.
Numerous active Communists from abroad have visited India in
recent years. Among these are: Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet, in
October 1950; D.N. Pritt, a British lawyer, in the autumn of 1950;
Mrs. Jessie Street, in July 1950; Malcolm Nixon, the Secretary of the
WFDY, in May 1952; and M. Joliot-Curie.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-665.12
COh9MUNISM IN TEE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IRAN
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPART}}NT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CON SITS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . ? . . . . ? . . ? . . : . ? ? ? ? ?
? .
ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES .
. .
1
I.
Objectives . . . . .
? .
1
II.
Tactics ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
2
III.
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. ?
6
ASSETS . . . . . . . . .
. .
8
I.
Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . .
. ?
8
II.
Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
8
III.
Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
9
IV.
Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . .
. .
10
V.
Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . ? . . ? . .
? .
11
VI.
Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional organizations . . . . . . . ? . . .
. ?
12
VII.
Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . ?
? ?
17
VIII.
Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
. .
18
IX.
Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties ? . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ? .
? .
18
X.
Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . ? ? . . .
?,?
18
XI.
Financial Condition . ? ? ? ? . ? . . ? ? . ? . .
. ?
19
XII.
Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . ? . . ? ? . ? ?
? ?
19
XIII.
Communist International Organizations . . . . ? ?
. .
20
XIV.
Communist Communication Network . . ? . ? . .. ?
. .
20
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries-of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out;.and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN IRAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The major Communist objective in Iran appears to be to get control
of the Iranian Government by constitutional means. Communism is repre.
sented organizationally in Iran by the Tudeh (Masses) Party, which emerged
into public life in 1943 as a coalition of Iranian Liberals and Communists.
The Tudeh Party was declared illegal in February 1949 but has been main..
tained since then clandestinely and has operated overtly through a variety
of front organizations, of which the "Peace Partisans" and "The Society
to Combat Imperialism" are the most prominent.
In moving toward its primary objective of getting control of the
government through constitutional means, the Tudeh Party appears to have
the following concurrent high priority intermediate goals: (1) legaliza-
tion of the Tudeh Party; (2) replacement of Mosadeq as Prime Minister;
(3) control of the key Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice;
(4) control of the M%jlis (lower house of Parliament), if necessary by
a coalition group; (5) neutralization or elimination of the Shah;
(6) neutralization or elimination of the traditional governing groups;
(7) transfer of the management of factories and services to union
organizations; (S) confiscation of large landholdings for distribution
to peasants, thereby neutralizing or eliminating large landlords;
(9) neutralization or conversion of intellectuals ; (10) elimination of
all Western political influence; especially that of the US;
(11) neutralization of UN influence; and (12) establishment of closer
cooperation, especially in the economic field, with the Soviet Union.
These objectives are set primarily to increase the capability of
the Tudeh Party to exercise political power both through the ballot and
the mechanisms of mass demonstrations, riots, and intimidation, employed
to undermine public confidence in the authorities. Although the elimina-
tion of all Western, especially US influence, in Iran would fulfill a
Soviet foreign policy requirement, the alleged threat to Iran arising
from that source provides the Tudeh Party currently with one of its most
valuable tools in seeking non-Communist cooperation.
The current top priority short-term Tudeh goal appears to be to
utilize its Communist-educated, disciplined, devoted, and effective
organization to expand its influence in non-Communist circles. The
degree of concentration on other objectives is opportunistic. For
instance, the government's decree increasing the peasants' share of
agricultural production was utilized by the Tudeh Party to arouse support
for its goal of confiscation of large landholdings; similarly, the
ineptitude and ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Labor in protecting
workers has been repeatedly used by the Tudeh Party to destroy non-Tudeh
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
unions and strengthen its own. Tudeh leadership has shown great
flexibility and alertness in exploiting opportunities for advancing
its objectives as they arise.
There are no significant incompatabilities among these
short-term Communist objectives, which are designed to destroy the
capacity of the present governing groups to prevent ultimate Communist
control of the entire bureaucracy and the army. Incompatabilities
are likely to become apparent only after these short-term objectives
have been achieved and the ultimate Tudeh objectives are exposeds
(1) the complete Sovietization of Iran, including (a) neutraliza-
tion of the middle class, (b) establishment of a single political
party, (c) imposition of police rule, and (d) replacement of the
current curriculum in schools, colleges, etc., by the curriculum used
in the USSR; and (2) transformation of Iran into a Soviet Satellite
state.
If the Tudeh believes it can muster an overwhelming prepon-
derance of force, it might rapidly shift its strategy of achieving
control through constitutional means to achieving it through a coup
d'etat. Failure of such an attempt would result in the destruction
of the organization and. the indefinite postponement of success by
legal means. We have no evidence to indicate that this shift in
tactics is likely in the immediate future, although serious dis-
affection in the armed forces or simultaneous tribal and urban dis-
turbances throughout the country could present an opportunity. The
obstacles to movement which winter snows and spring floods present
in the mountainous tribal areas make disturbances there unlikely in
any case before May.
II. TACT ICS
The underlying strategic policy of the Tudeh Party is threefold:
(1) it is designed to build up a direct following among all social
groups; (2) it attempts to enter working arrangements with or gain
covert control of non-Communist political groups; and (3) it attempts
to weaken by subversion and intimidation non-Communist political and
social groups. Since the Tudeh Party is illegal, its efforts to
build up a hard-core following are largely covert, although its
activities through front organizations and its-newspapers are, in
effect, overt. The Tudeh Party carries on its propaganda wherever
there is an opportunity and in the manner best suited to the recep-
tive capacity of the target. Emphasis is placed upon factors and
grievances which affect the immediate personal lives of the particu-
lar audience and therefore varies in accordance with their background,
prejudices, and aspirations.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-3-
The bulk of the membership appears to be in urban centers,
where the industrial and educational life of the country and
governmental machinery are concentrated and where ease of communi-
cation and association facilitate organization. The Tudeh Party
is apparently also attempting through sports clubs to establish
a body of young men highly trained in the technique of street fight-
ing to supplement the unorganized bands of thugs who have partici-
pated prominently in past Tudeh demonstrations. There is no evidence
that an effective pare-military organization as yet exists.
Given the economic and social conditions in Iran'since 1945,
it is probable that the Tudeh Party would have made more progress
in the postwar period if non-Communist National Front groups had
not emerged with objectives which in many respects duplicated those
of the Tudeh Party. Tudeh propaganda promises a higher standard of
living for 90 percent of the Iranian population, "social justice,"
"national independence," and cultural autonomy. All of these objec-
tives have very broad popular appeal in Iran. Furthermore, the
experiences of Iranian students abroad, as well as both Western and
Soviet propaganda during and since World War II, encouraged Iranians,
especially in urban centers, to expect and demand improvements in
their economic and social conditions, but did not make clear alter-
native methods for achieving these.
Primarily through its newspapers and pamphlets and through
discussion at cell meetings, the Tudeh Party, aided by radio propa-
ganda from the USSR, has kept up a continuous barrage of criticism
designed to destroy public confidence in the ability and good in-
tentions of the governing groups in Iran. The members of the party
are engaged actively in collecting damaging information.' There is
a sufficient basis of truth in the Tudeh accusations of official
injustice, disloyalty, and incompetence to provide confidence among
hearers in the exaggerations and untruths disseminated. Furthermore,
by claiming credit for improvements in the working conditions of
various groups of laborers, and by providing financial aid for Tudeh
demonstrators injured or under arrest, the party has established
sufficiently convincing evidence of its claims that it constitutes
the only effective defense against "exploitation." In a country
where official promises have remained traditionally unfulfilled,
these small positive Tudeh actions have been effective, especially
in urban areas.
Tudeh activity in Iran has been greatly aided since.March 1951
by the controversy over oil nationalization, which led to a concentra-
tion of resentment against the UK. Under the guise of patriotic
support for the national struggle to free Iran from alleged British
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
-4-
control, the Tudeh has been able to gain experience in the use of
mass demonstration and has provided some of its members with practical
experience in street fighting and the use of slogans.
The party has also been aided by the activities of ultra-conser-
vative Moslem leaders, such as the Majlis President, Mullah Kashani,
whose agitation for the return to Islamic principles arouses misgiv-
ings in the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minority groups. Further-
more, sections of these minority groups were among the most active
collaborators with Soviet officials during the Allied occupation of
Iran. Their inability to emigrate and their fear of Soviet perse-
cution in the event of another Soviet invasion of Iran encourage
especially the younger people among them to join in Tudeh activities
in the hope of ultimate personal gain or safety. The Tudeh Party
has also been aided by the revolutionary policies and propaganda of
the National Front group which, though less extreme, has seriously
weakened the power of the traditional governing groups in Iran.
Conditions governing foreign trade have also aided the Tudeh
Party. The limited and.costly transportation system in Iran makes
exporters in the northern regions particularly vulnerable to attractive
commercial offers from the Soviet Union. The proximity of those areas
to the USSR and the fear of another Soviet invasion also incline
merchants in the north to cooperate with the Soviet Trade Delegation
and, indirectly, the Tudeh Party.
The major propaganda line which the Tudeh Party employs to
build up local support is that the present governing groups are.un-
willing and unable to establish and carry out policies which will
improve the lot of the Iranian masses. It therefore argues that
only through the united action of the people under the guidance of
the party can a program of reform be executed which will provide the
people with necessities and assure them social justice, health,
education, and-opportunity for self-advancement.
In moving toward its major current objective of replacing the
government, the party utilizes its front organizations, such as the
Peace Partisans, to discredit the West, especially the US, in the
hope of forcing the government to weaken its position by rejecting
aid from the US. It uses its trade unions to discredit the Ministry
of Labor and to frustrate by strikes and repeated complaints official
attempts to maintain some degree of stability in industrial enterprises.
In the same way, the great variety of front organizations which
relate to practically every phase of activity in Iran are used to
hamper whatever steps the government may take toward orderly reform
and to spread and increase popular distrust and dissatisfaction with
officials and government organizations.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
5
New members of the Tudeh Party are recruited by personal
solicitation of old members after a thorough period of investigation.
The new recruit's interest is usually based upon some personal
grievance which Tudeh promises to remove. The recruit's active
interest is maintained by a sense of purpose, of comradeship, of
membership in a secret, exclusive organization, and of conviction
that in the end he will be on top and his enemies destroyed. any'
ttthe he financing
have littled detailed information about
some cingiof the par
beyond the fact that members pay d ,
rived from the sale of newspapers and publications, and that some
is derived from Communists abroad and indirectly from foreign com-
mercial transactions.
Before the Tudeh Party was declared illegal, the composition
of its directing committee was well known. It was composed of
Iranians with various degrees of Soviet training. They are now
dispersed, some in Europe, some in the USSR, but is. is probable that
some are in hiding in Iran and that they continue to direct policies
there. The extent of direction from Soviet or satellite sources is
not known, but it is probably significant. Control or influence in
non-Communist organizations (excluding fronts) is achieved by infil-
tration or bribery.
The characteristic Iranian emphasis on individualism promotes
disunity in organizations and so facilitates the acquisition. of key
posts by any determined minority acting as a unit. As a matter of
policy, the Tudeh Party appears to prefer that the most prominent
posts be filled by non-Communists, so long as the voting power and
ideological direction remain in Tudeh hands.
The Tudeh Party has been greatly handicapped in its efforts
to obtain control by constitutional means by the fact that it is
illegal and that the elections have never been free. It therefore
,resorted in the 1952 elections to the following devices: (1) support-
ing candidates proposed by front organizations; (2) bribing or making
deals with candidates supported by either Mosadeq or Kashani. Support
for front candidates was not only urged by Tudeh newspapers, but
was promoted by instructions delivered in Tudeh cell meetings. In
order to obtain Majlis representation, the Tudeh is now expressing
its willingness to join with any political group. So far, however,
the disadvantages to non-Communists of. such association appear to
have prevented the success of this tactic. It is possible, should
the National Front group leaders come into conflict over, say, the
succession to Mosadeq, that some leader might accept the collabora-
tion of the Tudeh Party. But at the present time the prospects are
that any resort to such collaboration would unite the remaining non-
Communist opposition and assure them the victory.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-6-
III. CAPABILITIES
In the absence of muoh more serious disaffection in the army,
simultaneous uprisings by various elements throughout the country, or
some unexpected Soviet action, it is not believed that the Tudeh
Party has the ability to get control of the Iranian Government by force.
The ability of the Tudeh Party to achieve its major current objective
of gaining control through legal methods will be in inverse pro-
portion to the effectiveness of the.present government in relieving
traditional economic and social pressures on the bulk of the popula-
tion and meeting the aspirations of the younger educated groups who
provide an important element of National Front 'support. Tudeh
leaders at present probably feel that they have no'alternative than
to bide their time while consolidating their strength, knowing that
.any non-Communist government will be forced by continued financial
and political difficulties to adopt strong regulatory measures which
will increase strife between the "haves" and the "have nots." If
the National Front government is unable to meet the mounting pressures,
it is probable that Tudeh will receive added strength and, will obtain
effective representation in the Majiis through elections and pressure
on deputies.
The ability of the Tudeh Party to.exploit opportunities favor-
able to its current goal of gaining control of the Iranian Government
stems primarily from four factors: (1) it is the only united and
disciplined political party; (2) it has developed the techniques of
the controlled use of mass demonstrations, strikes, riots, and inti-
midation for political purposes; (3) its policy of opposition to or
evasion of established authority strikes a sympathetic chord with
most Iranians who are acquainted from personal experience with social,
political, and economic injustices; and (4) the centralization in
Tehran of control over governmental machinery provides Tudeh with a
compact, crucial target. Because of these factors the Tudeh Party
is likely to increase in power, unless it represents a clear political
threat to a non-Communist government which would then try to destroy
it. At the present time, the existence of an active Tudeh Party is
politically advantageous to Mosadeq in conducting both his internal
and foreign policies.
Under those circumstances, it is probable that the Tudeh Party
will be permitted to continue to operate through -front organizations.
It will attempt to further Soviet policy by discrediting and, if
possible, forcing the rejection of US aid to Iran. The party may be
expected to pursue its efforts to hamper the government's attempts at
reform by complaining that actions taken are too slow or too limited
and by publicizing instances of dishonesty or incompetence. It will
also persist in using Tudeh unions to disrupt industrial and trans-
portation operations.
.SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The disunity of the non-Communist forces in Iran and their
internal jealousies and conflicts will facilitate the expansion of
Tudeh power and influence, despite the relatively small membership
in the Tudeh Party. However, with patience and persistence, a non-
Communist government can, with outside assistance, gradually improve
the conditions which now provide the Tudeh Party with its major
sources of support. Barring some unexpected development such as a
political disintegration of the National Front, a serious crop failure,
an unfavorable export market, or an abrupt change in Soviet tactics,
the probability is that Tudeh strength in Iran will not increase
proportionately more than non-Communist strength through 1953.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
The current estimate of card-carrying members of the Communist
Tudeh Party in Iran is from 20,000 to 35,000, with an estimated hard-
core of 1,000. The membership may be roughly estimated at 8,000 in
Tehran, 5,000 in the Azerbaijan area, 4,000 in the Caspian region,
1,000 in Isfahan, and 3,000 in the-Abadan area. The hard-core member-
ship derives principally from industrial and transport workers,, students,
teachers, professional men, and government employees. Members of
organizations controlled by the Communists may be estimated at from
60,000 to 80,000; those in non-Communist organizations which have been
infiltrated by the Tudeh Party,160,000; and the total controlled or
strongly influenced by the Tudeh Party at from 170,000 to a maximum
of 400,000, or from 1 to 2.3 percent of the estimated population.
The party's members and followers may be estimated in the major cities
at 30,000 in Tehran, 20,000 in Azerbaijan, 10,000 in the Caspian
region, 4,000 in Isfahan, and 12,000 in the Abadan area.
The bulk of the party members and sympathizers come from among
skilled and unskilled workers, peasants, teachers, students, minor
government employees, professional men, Kurds and religious minorities
(Assyrians, Armenians, and Jews)._ The individuals are of all ages,
with an estimated average membership in the party of three to seven
years. Possibly 4,000 members-of the party have been active for
over five years, with the "hard-core" members, who are in the 25 to
i5 year age group, active for an estimated period of five to seven
years. The quality of the "hard-core" leadership is believed to
range from average to good. No information is available regarding
the annual turnover of membership.
The number of Tudeh sympathizers is extremely variable, depend-
ing upon specific issues raised and concurrent circumstances at a
given time. This fact, combined with the covert character of most
Tudeh activities, makes estimates of Tudeh membership and following
'open to question. Although the general trend has been toward in-
creased membership, the party's following appears to have dropped
sharply following the re-conquest of Azerbaijan in December 1946,
and the banning of the Tudeh Party in February 1949. On both of
these occasions, the party tightened up its membership requirements,
and the stricter policy also contributed to the drop in adherents.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Rigged elections, as well as the illegal status of the Tudeh
Party, make estimates of electoral strength of doubtful reliability.
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The Tehran elections, alone, provide a reasonable basis for estimates.
There the Tudeh and supporter vote totalled 28,841, or roughly one-
quarter of the over-all vote. All successful candidates supported
the National Front government. Of the 80 nationally elected repre-
sentatives, 6 from Azerbaijan (4 from Tabriz) are alleged. to have
Communist connections. It is probable that some urban centers, such
as Isfahan, the proportion of votes from Tudeh members and sympathizers
was also roughly one-quarter. Current major Tudeh objectives and
tactics are (1) to increase the party following to support its own
candidates if the ban is lifted, otherwise to support "front" candi-
dates or non-Communists who are amenable to bribery; (2) to plug
simultaneously for free elections.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The current Tudeh policy appears to be to refrain from armed
insurrection, but to fight back vigorously if attacked by other
groups or the police. In recent cases of violent demonstrations, the
estimated numbers of Tudeh followers involved ranges from 100 to
5,000. The number which could be brought out now for violent demon-
strations under the most favorable conditions is estimated at a
minimum of 35,000, a maximum of 200,000. The maximum number of party
members capable of leading violent demonstrations.in key places
probably does not exceed 500. On the basis of speculation, the party
is probably capable of directing violent demonstrations in Tehran,
Tabriz, the Caspian area, Isfahan,.and the Abadan area. Quality of
leadership is probably average to good, and equipment is believed to
include small.arms and home-made bombs as well as knives, clubs, etc.
Tudeh sources claimed that 120,000 participated in the 1945
attempt to set up separate Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments under
the protection of the Soviet Army; however, the actual force was
probably not more than 50,000. There have been no reports that
effective Tudeh para-military organizations exist. The party has
?relied upon groups of miscellaneous thugs in violent demonstrations.
It is believed to be training young men for street. fighting, but no
organized units are known to exist as yet. The maximum force avail-
able throughout Iran now for armed insurrection is estimated at
200,000, but the number would depend on the issue involved and other
circumstances. The quality of leadership would probably be good.
The supply of available weapons and ammunition is probably inadequate
now to equip potential manpower.
No current plans or proposals for creating or activating a
military resistance organization in case of war are known. In case
of an East-West war, it is probable that Iran would lose its indepen-
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
dence in a matter of days. Under Soviet occupation or domination,
practically all able-bodied men and, to a lesser extent, women, would
probably ultimately be mobilized to support the USSR in its resistance
to the West. This number can be roughly estimated at a maximum of
1,000,000. Leadership, arms, and equipment would have to be provided
by the USSR.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Tudeh Party and its labor front, the Central United Council
of Trade Unions (CUCTU), were declared illegal in February 1919. Since
then they have been operating largely clandestinely, but also overtly
under the cloak of marW front organizations. Tudeh activities are
hampered by (1) the governmentia imposition of martial law in the
Tehran and Abadan areas; (2) a new press law which provides means of
suppressing Tudeh publications; (3) new decrees forbidding the carrying
of weapons and the holding of meetings without police permission; and
(1) failure to weaken significantly the repressive potential of the
police and-army. The government has the means to suppress Tudeh and
its front organizations effectively, but is unlikely to do so as long
as (1) the existence of the Tudeh threat is politically advantageous
in carrying out internal and foreign policies and (2) the Tudeh is
regarded as presenting no clear and crucial threat to the maintenance
of power by a non-Communist government.
The Communist Party, however, has exhibited impressive ability
to circumvent repression in Iran. This record has been achieved
largely as the result of (1) a skillful, organizational set-up whereby
even its own members know only a few within the organization; (2)
skillful direction of overt activities on the part of Communist groups;
(3) skillful use of front organizations; (1) the parallel revolutionary
and anti-Western propaganda and activities of the National Front (now
in control of the government); (5) the lack of concerted effort by the
government to repress Communist activities; (6) bribery of government
officials; and (7) infiltration among officials within the Ministry
of justice and'prisons. Although the government has declared martial
law in Tehran and Abadan-Khorramshar (oil industry area), Communist
organizational activity continues uninterrupted. Repressive action by
the government, such as imposition of martial law, does have positive
results, particularly in reducing the occurrence of demonstrations.
In the field of press publication, however, repressive action does
not appear to be very effective. Government efforts to combat
Communist organization of labor usually takes the ineffective form
of trying to persuade the workers to join non-Communist organizations
which are led by known government "stooges" or by men who are not
trusted by the workers.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The National Front government is currently encouraging non-
Communist groups, such as the Pan-Iranists, SOMKA, and the Workers'
Party, to clash in street fights with Communist-led demonstrators,
and the police in each clash tend to act as a shield for these non-
Communist groups. It should be kept in mind also that the existence
of a genuine Communist "menace" in Iran is a useful factor in any
government's efforts to obtain foreign economic aid and therefore it
is probable that Prime Minister Mosadeq is not sincerely desirous of
eliminating Communist activity in Iran. Tudeh front organizations,
of which the most prominent are the Peace Partisans, the Society to
Combat Imperialism, the Tudeh Youth Organization, and the Tudeh
Women's Organization, are unhampered in their organizations. Their
activities are controlled by the provisions of martial law and their
utility to the Tudeh is primarily through the appearance of their
members at mass demonstrations. Their propaganda parrots the lines
set by Moscow.
The size of the Tudeh "underground" organization in Iran is
estimated to be at a minimum 20,000, maximum 35,000, with concentra-
tion in Tehran, Isfahan, Azerbaijan, the Caspian region, and the
Abadan area. The efficiency appears to be considerable in view of
the success with which security is maintained. Communications appear
to offer no difficulties.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
The number of Communists in key industries in Iran is estimated
to vary from 5 to 25 percent of the total labor force in such industries.
There are an estimated 6,000 in the following categories; railway
workers, 1,000 -- many in key operational positions; communications
unknown, but believed to be significant; arms plants and arsenals, 200
in the Tehran area; oil workers, 3,000 to 5,000; bus and trick drivers,
1,000 in a strong Tudeh unit.
The membership in the Tudeh Central United Council of Trade
Unions is estimated at 6,000, although the clandestine nature of this
operation raises some doubt of the estimate. The number of active,
dues-paying members of Com anist unions at least equals and probably
exceeds the total number of workers belonging to non-Communist trade
unions. However, only 1/10 of the total industrial workers, and only
1/30 of the total workers in professional services and distribution
trades are organized. Communist influence is exerted through factory
councils set up under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Labor. In
many cases Tudeh members are in control. The extent of their influence
is indicated by the fact that the government postponed the 1952 annual
congress for elections of the workers.' representatives on the High
Labor Council for fear of possible Tudeh control. Tudeh unions do
not have decisive control of the labor force in any key industry.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The strongest Tudeh unions are among railway workers, especially
at the hub of traffic, Tehran. The railway is the principal distri-
buting agency for imports and exports and for the movement of internal
fuel supplies to sub-stations. Another strong union is that of bus
and truck drivers. Provincial areas are entirely dependent upon these
services for merchandise and passenger traffic. In Tehran, especially,
Tudeh unions among the workers at the silo where the city's grain
supply is stored, and among the bakers who prepare the city's daily
bread supply, present a potential threat.
The affiliations of these unions are not in all cases confirmed,
but all are believed to be associated with the Communist-dominated ?RFTU.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL
AND 0 ION ORGANIZATIONS
The principal Tudeh youth organizations are the Tudeh Youth
Organization and the Iranian Democratic Youth Club, which serves as
the Youth Organizations front. The estimated membership is 4,000 to
6,000, mostly in Tehran. There are no other youth organizations as
such in Iran, although youths do have an opportunity to engage in
organized activities in the schools and colleges and in political
activity through the following National Front associated organizations:
(1) the Pan-Iranists, (2) SOMKA (National Socialists), and (3) the
Workers' Party. The Tudeh Youth Organization is affiliated with the
World Federation of Democratic Youth and appears to be well led. It
often works through the Democratic Youth Club to avoid arrest and its
members have, along with the Communist-front Society to Combat Imperial-
ism, been in the forefront of Tudeh demonstrations. The Tudeh Youth
Organization is considered to be a school for training young members
to become members of the Tudeh Party itself. The party enjoins TYO
members to "struggle for peace" and strengthen their contacts with
the masses. Membership is open to youths 12-23 years of age. There-
fore, the Tudeh Youth Organization could potentially include the bulk
of students from the fifth grade up to and including college levels.
Unless the non-Communist government can meet adequately the aspirations
of young Iranians for employment and opportunities, an increase of
members in the Tudeh Youth Organization is probable.
B. Students
The principal Tudeh organizations among students are: (1) Iranian
Students' Organization, (2) Students' Organization of Tehran University,
(3) Society of tewish Students of Tehran University, (4) Students
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Organization of Tabriz University, (5) Tudeh Association of Higher
Normal School Graduates, (6) Tudeh Association of Primary Normal School
Graduates, (7) General Council of the Faculty of Science Students'
Organization, and (8) Karaj Faculty Tudeh Organization.. The estimated
strength in various centers is 2,000 in Tehran, 500 in Tabriz, and
100 in Shiraz. In demonstrations at Tehran University, Communists
have been able to get support from as much as 1/3 of the student body.
In early 1952, it was estimated that 30 percent of the secondary
school teachers were affiliated with Tudeh. There are no comparable
organizations in the universities and these are believed to be affiliated
with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International
Union of Students. They also have contacts with the Iranian Students
Organization In Paris.
The leadership appears to be good. The major current objectives
are to (1) lead strikes at the universities; (2) campaign for a reduc-
tion in tuition fees, entrance requirements, and graduation or passing
marks; (3) campaign for various popular issues affecting the welfare
of students; and (4).attempt to organize a conference of students of
the Near and Middle East. At Tehran. University, expansion and action
capabilities appear to be favorable, though probably less so than six
months ago, since the government is beginning to exhibit more interest
in controlling demonstrations, weeding out Tudeh students and professors
and encouraging aggressive non-Communist organizations to counteract
Tudeh demonstrations.
Principal Tudeh organizations among women are the Iranian
Women's Organization and the Society for the Protection of.Children.
Membership figures are unavailable. These groups are associated with
the Women's International Democratic Federation and the International
Preparatory Commission for the Protection of Children. These groups
agitate for women's rights; spread Communist ideology among women,
girls and children; and exploit the humanitarian appeals inherent in
any child-welfare program. The Iranian Women's Organization is unlikely
to play a large role except under a Communist government, but the Pro-
tection of Children program appears to have favorable prospects.
D. Racial, Religious,. Nationality Minorities
The organizations which Tudeh has established to work among
minorities are principally the followings
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATICK
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
(1) Armenian
(a) Progressive (youth organization)
(b) Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization
(a) Church Women's Union
(d) Armenian Communist Party
(2) Azerbaijani
(a) Azerbaijan Democrat Party
(b) The Azerbaijan Society
(3) Kurds
(a) Kurdish Democrat Party
(4) Jews
(a) Society of Jewish Students of Tehran University.
Membership in the Armenian groups is estimated at 80 to 200,
princiaplly in Tehran; in the Azerbaijani groups at 20,000, principally.
in Azerbaijan; in the Kurdish group at 4,000, principally in Azerbaijan.
Membership of the Jewish group is unknown, but small. The Armenian
group is opposed by the majority of Armenians, but appears to have con-
siderable potential for terrorist activities. There is no organized
opposition to the other groups except from the government. The leaders
of these groups are not ]mown, nor their international affiliations,
if any.
The objectives of these groups appear to be:
(1) Armenian: to organize the entire Armenian Community
to participate actively in Tudeh plans.
(2) Azerbaijani:.(a) The Azerbaijan Society to act as a front
in Tehran for the Democrat Party, (b) the latter to carry
out subversive activities comparable to those being under-
taken by Tudeh outside of Azerbaijan. Principal current
theme is cultural and political autonomy for Azerbaijan.
(3) Kurds: to conduct similar subversive activities
in north-western Azerbaijan appealing for Kurdish
cultural and political autonomy.
(4) Jewish: Unknown.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 15'-
Capabilities for expansion and action among all of these groups
appear to be good. The grievances toward the central government among
the Azerbaijanis and Kurds are such that the presence in those areas
of strong military establishments is probably the only deterrent to a
general uprising today.
E. Sports Groups
The Tudeh sports organizations are the Tudeh Mountaineers League,'
the Tudeh Wrestlers League, the Tudeh Swimmers League, and the.Tudeh
Basketball Players Association. The membership is probably small and
unimportant from the point of view of sports, but significant in pro-
viding training for street fighters and expanding contacts. In view
of the increasing general interest in sports in Iran, the capabilities
of these groups for expansion are good.
F. Cultural Groups
The principal Tudeh organizations are the Artists League, the
Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization, and the Society for Combatting
Illiteracy. There are no competing organizations. The illiteracy
program is the most effective since it reaches people. unaffected by
the regular school system through lack of opportunity or means to
attend. The objective in organizing these groups is probably to
provide additional targets for propaganda, but the illiteracy program
has, in addition, the purpose of teaching Tudeh members or potential
recruits to read and write so they can understand written orders and
submit written reports and begin to read Communist literature. The
capabilities of the Artists League appear limited, but those of the
Armenian group are probably favorable among younger Armenians, and
those of the Illiteracy Society are likely to be very favorable and
an increasingly effective Tudeh tactic.
C. 'Professional Groups
The principal Tudeh organizations among professionals are
(1) The Iranian Society of Democratic Lawyers, (2) The Judicial Society
of Iran, (3) Union of Teacher Training College Graduates (4) Tudeh
Medical Assistants Union, (5) Tudeh Union of Government Employees,
and (6) National Association of Democratic Journalists. The member-
ship is unknown but probably small. There are no effective non-Communist
organizations in these fields, although the Communist membership is
probably numerically a small proportion of the total employment. The
jurists group is probably well-led and is affiliated with the Inter-
national Association of Democratic Jurists (IADJ).
Tudeh objectives through the legal groups appear to be to
assure support for the Communist line regarding (1) international law,
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURT~'Y INFORMATION
-16-
(2) the role of the UN in establishing peace, and (3) the "correct"
interpretation of Iranian laws and the constitution. The teachers,
organization is designed to spread the party line and add to the
embarrassments of the government; that of the government employees,
to facilitate Tudeh infiltration and eventual take-over; and that
in the press, to enlist sympathetic Tudeh treatment in the press
and support Tudeh's opposition to any restrictive official actions
or legislation. The capabilities for expansion and action in all
of these fields appear to be good.
H. "Peace" and Other Organizations Supporting Pro-Soviet, Pro-Satellite
and Anti-Western Programs
The principal "peace" and anti-Western Tudeh front organizations
are-(1) The Iranian Association for Peace, which has 10,000 to 15,000
dues-paying members concentrated in Tehran and Tabriz, although 900,000
signatures have been claimed by the organization; (2) The Free Iran
Society, membership unknown, but concentrated in Tehran; (3) The
Iran--Soviet Cultural Relations Society, with an estimated membership
of 500, also concentrated in Tehran; and (4) The National Society for
Combatting Imperialism in Iran with an estimated membership of 15,000,
concentrated in Tehran, Abadan, Khorramshar, Isfahan, and Resht.
The "Peace" group has no effective opposition and has been
very successful in attracting support from all classes. It is believed
to provide the headquarters for overt Tudeh activities. The Free Iran
Society is actively opposed by the Tehran Chamber of Commerce and the
Cultural Society by the Iran-America Relations Society, although there
is some overlapping of membership. The anti-imperialist group is
effectively opposed only by National Front groups. The direction of
the associations appears to be generally very good and the Peace
Partisans and cultural groups are affiliated with the international
Communist fronts, the former with the International Partisans of Peace
Movement, and the latter with the Soviet VOKS organization.
The current objectives of these Communist organizations appear
to be as follows: for the Peace Partisans, to urge all Tudeh members
to join the front and to recruit membership from all classes, especially
from those who would not join Tudeh or other more obviously Communist-
controlled groups; for the Free Iran Society, to band together
businessmen and small industrialists and to obtain an embargo against
foreign, especially US, imports; for the Cultural Society, to serve
as a propaganda tool for VOKS, directed primarily toward younger
Iranian intellectuals; for the anti-Imperialist group, to capitalize
on the oil dispute between the UK and Iran and on the xenophobic
atmosphere prevailing in the country to destroy Western influence.
This organization has been used as the principal agency for conducting
mass demonstrations,
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The capabilities for expansion and action of these organizations
appear to be as follows: the Peace Partisans apparently have reached
the peak of their ability to expand rapidly. However, a war scare
would enhance the capability greatly. Aggressive action against its
headquarters and demonstrations by groups adhering to the National
Front, such as Pan-Iranists and SOMKA, aided by the police, has tended
to reduce the field of activity. For the Free Iran Society, pros-
pects appear to be limited because imports are being reduced by
exchange shortages. For the Cultural Society, prospects are faitly
good since the fact that it is ostensibly an Iranian Society permits
the USSR to circumvent the Iranian Government's decree forbidding
activity by foreign information centers outside Tehran. For the anti
Imperialists, the prospects will vary with the intensity of the
UK-Iran oil controversy. The government has recently severely limited
the freedom of this group to hold demonstrations.
No adequate information is available to provide the basis for
a reliable estimate of the degree of Tudeh infiltration of non-Communist
organizations.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Less than 200 individuals participate in top policy-making
bodies in Iran. None is known to be Communist and perhaps not more
than six to ten can be regarded as potentially sympathetic to Communism.
However, any estimates must be treated with reserve as the willingness
of non-Communists to cooperate with Communists would depend upon the
specific issue and concurrent circumstances. Furthermore, bribery
and pressure may lead to cooperation on either side. The highest
estimates of Tudeh infiltration in the armed services are 1500 in the
army, 600 air force, 110 gendarmerie, and none navy. Sympathizers'
may number 5,000 or more, depending upon the specific issue involved
and circumstances. The potentialities of infiltration do not differ
greatly from those among Iranians outside the armed forces. The
extent of Tudeh influence in top levels is believed to be negligible.
at the present time.
The National Police Force consists of approximately 20,000 men.
The force is undoubtedly penetrated by Communists but the percentage
is probably not very high as the police are notoriously susceptible,
in any event, to bribery. The little information available concerning
influence at the top indicates that penetration has not been accomplished.
There is no reliable information on Tudeh penetration in the
administrations of nationalized industries, but there may be 60.to
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
100 Communists among them, with sympathizers numbering perhaps 300,
depending upon the specific issue. Their influence is of varying
significance, but not yet controlling in. any instance.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
It is estimated that the number of Communists and sympathizers
actively engaged in trying to mold public opinion numbers from 20,000
to 35,000, with a potential audience of 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 depend-
ing upon the issue raised. The number of persons strongly influenced
by the Communists regardless of the issue is estimated at a minimum
of 170,000 and a maximum of 400,000. The influence on ostensibly
non-Communist efforts to mold public opinion cannot be estimated with
any precision as most newspapers and publications at times espouse
causes encouraged by the Communists and accept material for publication
from all sources.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Although there is undoubtedly some Communist infiltration of
these groups, adequate information is not available to make an estimate.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of Tudeh influence would depend upon
the specific issue involved and concurrent circumstances. Almost
identical Tudeh and National Front attitudes on some issues make it
virtually impossible to determine what influence is Tudeh and what is
non-Tudeh. Under such circumstances, Tudeh potential is high but its
influence appears at the present time to be slight.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
The principal current propaganda media in Iran are newspapers
and publications and instruction in Tudeh cells, effectively supple-
mented by numerous broadcasts from Soviet radio stations in Persian,
Turki (Azerbaijani), and Kurdish. Of the 27 Tudeh publications now
appearing, the principal ones are Besuye andeh, a Tehran daily
morning paper with an estimated circulation of 6,000 to 8,000; Shahbaz,
a daily evening Tehran paper with an estimated circulation of 3,;
Farhan ian, a weekly publication with an estimated circulation of
7,; and Dehqanan Iran, a weekly publication with an estimated
circulation of 2,000. These are.all published in Tehran by the Haghsh
Jehan press, which is supplied by TASS via the Soviet Embassy with
world-wide news coverage, and probably also with newsprint. The
quality of the press appears to be adequate despite mobster raids by
partisans of the National Front. It is probable that the presses
which print the clandestine Tudeh papers and publications are located
in the provincial centers and in Tehran, perhaps in some satellite
Legation.
SECRET - SECURITY-INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
So far as is known neither the Soviet nor satellite missions
publish overt propaganda, although they all assist in the importation
of publications from abroad in Russian, Persian, and Turki. Further-
more, Soviet newspapers such as Pravda, and a great variety of cheap
Soviet books are available in quantity in the bookshops and newsstands
of Tehran and provincial cities. No information is available on the
financial assets of importers.
Internal broadcasting facilities in Iran are controlled by.the
government and do not appear to be either controlled or influenced at
the present time by Communists. It was reported In 1952 that there
was a clandestine station in Tehran making infrequent broadcasts. The
Communist radio programs, which are believed to have a significant
listening public, come from the USSR. Radio Moscow broadcasts half-
hour programs in Persian four times daily; Radio Baku gives programs
in Persian three times daily; Radio Tashkent beams half-hour programs
in Persian twice daily; and Radio Democrat (Azerbaijan) has programs
seven hours a week in each language -- Persian, Turki, and Kurdish.
It is the last station which is most vicious in its propaganda and
which has probably the most effective impact on Iranians.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
The major source of Tudeh revenue appears to be from membership
dues and sales of publications, although no precise information is
available. Considerable aid comes from Soviet-Iranian trade through
private deals. and some from Communist organizations abroad, but no
figures are available. Most commercial deals with orbit countries
are carried on by official government agencies, but detailed inform-
ation is.lacking. The Tudeh Party appears to have adequate funds,
although reports indicate the necessity for continuous pressure on
members to pay their dues and increase sales.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 19 -
XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
The following diplomatic personnel including and above the rank
of attache are officially listed in Iran: USSR - 25; Czech - 3;
Rummanian - 11; Polish - 1; and Hungarian - b. The total for all
five countries is officially set at 37, but the actual staffs includ-
ing service workers is probably nearer 150. All are currently
located in Tehran, except for the temporary movements ofmembers of
the Soviet Trade Delegation and the trips of various officers to
and from the Soviet Union, usually via Pahlavi or Tabriz. The
principal sections of the Soviet Embassy are (1) diplomatic, (2)
consulate-general, (3) trade delagation, (4) VOKS, (5) Soviet hospital,
(6) TASS, and (7) information and cultural services. It is estimated
that the number of persons engaged in propaganda activities is between
50 and 100.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The Soviet Hospital in Tehran has a staff of about 20 Soviet
doctors and nurses. It is well-run, but fees are high and there
is no free clinic. Exhibits of Soviet films, paintings, etc. are
periodic and shown either by invitation at the Soviet Embassy or
at the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society. The Soviet Embassy has.
claimed that 100,000 people in Tehran read Russian, although the
actual number is probably nearer 50,000. The Iran-Soviet Cultural
Society has an estimated membership of 500, mostly in Tehran,,and
provides the principal machinery for the dissemination of overt
propaganda among the upper classes of Iran.
Soviet domination and active operation of the Caspian Sea
Fisheries under a concession due to expire January 31, 1953 provides
the USSR with an invaluable means of unrestricted communication
between Iran and the USSR, as well as the opportunity of supporting
Soviet personnel and conducting activities in the Caspian area.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
None of the Communist international organizations have instal-
lations in Iran at the present time; nor have ary of them held
congresses or conferences there. Fifteen Iranians attended the
Moscow Economic Conference in 1952 and five Iranian Communists
attended the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party the same
year. There is some evidence that the Tudeh Party has received
funds from Communist organizations abroad although information re-
garding the amounts is unavailable. There is also some evidence
that Iranian Communists sent some funds to aid Egyptian Communists
and North Korean war casualties, although, again, the amounts are
unknown.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
Tehran is the center for all Tudeh communications activity in
Iran. Sub-centers appear to exist in Isfahan, Abadan or Ahwaz, Tabriz,
Resht, and Meshed. The courier system, probably operating through
the Tudeh truckers union, appears to be very effective. International
terminals appear to be Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Warsaw, Geneva, Zurich,
and Prague, and communications seem to be effective. It is assumed
that the Soviet and, satellite missions in Tehran provide pouch
service as well as radio communications through their own services.
The closest contacts are believed to be with the USSR, which
serves as the principal source of instructions, literature, and news-
print. France is the principal headquarters for overseas activity
among Iranian students, and Egypt is the main recipient of Iranian
Communist donations and propaganda support.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
1
it"
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The principal recent non-Soviet or satellite foreign emissaries
have come from Italy, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. In 1952, Pietro
Nenni, leader of the Italian Socialist Party and vice-President of
the World Council of Peace Partisans visited Tehran; in 1951, Yusuf
Hilmi, Secretary-General of the Egyptian Peace Partisans came from
Cairo with the declared objective of organizing a "conference of peace
supporters to be attended by Middle, Near Eastern, and North African
delegates.? And Munim Ghazali, Secretary of the General Students,
Organization of Egypt arrived, probably for the same purpose. Also
in 1951, Arif al Din, Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party, visited
Tehran; and in the same year ,Abd-al-Riaz.Hashimi and Mustafa al-Aria,
well known members of the Lebanese Communist Party, came to Iran.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.13
COMMUNISM IN THE WORLD :
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IRAQ
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
. Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . . .
. .
ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES .
. .
1
I. Objectives . . ? . . .. . ? ? . . . . . . . _ . ? .
. ?
1
He Tactics . . ? . ? . .. ? ? ? . . ? ? ? ? . ? ? .
? .
1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . ? ? *G `000 000
2
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . .
~+
I. Numerical Strength . . . .
~+
II. Electoral Strength .. .. ..
5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
5
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . .
. .
5
V. Communist Influence in Labor ..
.
6
VI. Communist Influence in Social.. Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . ? . .
. .
7
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . ? ? . .
. .
9
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
..
10
IX. Communist Infiltration of NDn--Communist Political
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
X. Communist Propaganda Media ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
10
X1. Financial Condition . . ? . . .. .
. .
11
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . .
11
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . .
. .
12
XIV. Communist Communication Network .
12
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN IRAQ: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The Communist Party of Iraq, outlawed since its inception in
1927, had by 1951 been reduced to near impotence by a series of govern-
ment roundups and trials. In that year, the party set out to rebuild
its strength: it redefined its aims, called for the expulsion of
all undesirable. elements, and decreed that party cadres were hence-
forth to operate as a disciplined core under the cover of other broader
groups. The party's program, issued in October 1951, aimed principally
at (1) propagandizing the World Peace Appeal; (2) infiltrating and
encouraging the trade union movement and organizing the workers of the
State Railways; (3) organizing a campaign for the interests of slum
dwellers; and (4) encouraging the formation of legal political parties
representing labor groups. The party paid particular attention to
the trade unions, but an attempt to organize a central Trades Union
Congress was blocked by the Iraqi Government.
The failure of a general strike called in connection with a
nationalist memorial celebration on Portsmouth Treaty Day in January
1952 served to demonstrate the weakness of their October program.
The party then began a new and somewhat more successful push to
bring students and young intellectuals into the Communist fold by
emphasizing nationalist themes and most recently concentrated upon
the formation of a broad popular front in opposition to the present
government and Western influence.
II. TACTICS
Changing Soviet policies, frequent government repression, and
factionalism stemming from its own organizational weakness, have led
the Iraqi Communist Party to engage in frequent shifts in tactics and
immediate objectives. At present, the party champions, directly or
through front organizations, the most popular issues of the day --
anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. It has likewise attacked govern-
ment corruption and economic injustice, tying these themes to its
anti-Western campaign by accusing the present ruling elements of
being subservient to the British. Civil disorders have been fomented
or prolonged and the party has not infrequently joined with other
groups, including some of the extreme right in such endeavors. As
in other Near Eastern countries the party has also made use of the
national aspirations of various minority groups, especially the Kurds,
whenever it appeared expedient to do so.
In the latter half of 1952 the party profited from a favorable
combination of factors. The establishment of the weak government of
Prime Minister 'Umari in July 1952 resulted in four months of relative
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
freedom from government suppression. The government, uneasy at the
prospect of trouble in the period of transition toward the elections
of January 17, 1953, made little attempt to restrain the opposition
parties, including Communists.
At the same time the party began to develop more vigorous
leadership, received increased support from the Soviet Legation and
possibly from the Syrian Communist Party, and developed a more popu-
lar propaganda line. In April 1952, Sharif al-Shaykh became Secretary
General of the Iraqi Communist Party after his attendance at the
Berlin Peace Conference and a visit to Moscow. His task has been to
reorganize the party. Soviet support to the party apparently consists
largely of Soviet propaganda carried out covertly. by Soviet Legation
officials in Baghdad, who established contact with the Iraqi Lawyers'
Association, provided it with newsprint, and utilized it as a dis-
tribution point for Arabic language propaganda printed locally or
in the USSR and Prague.
Of particular significance in enhancing party strength and
unity was the recent emphasis on promoting a nationalist united
front. This tactic was apparently being carried out in response to
a policy directive by Khalid Bakdash, leader of the Syrian Communist
Party, delivered in August 1952. Bakdash called for cooperation
with all democratic groups for the purpose of forming a national bloc
in which Communists would play an important role. Communist influence
soon increased in the leftist National Democratic Party (NDP) and
the neutralist United Popular Front (UPF), both extremist nationalist
groups with little representation in Parliament.
The riots of November 22-25, 1952, and the abolition of all
political parties and arrest of opposition leaders which followed,
also frustrated Communist attempts to work through the Iraqi opposi-
tion parties. The imposition of martial law in Baghdad province
has likewise contributed to keeping the party more or less dormant,
and may compel it to search for yet another method of operation,
III. CAPABILITIES
The greatest. handicap to the formation of a united front
movement in Iraq is the need of the Iraqi Communist Party to utilize
local party organizations, none of which has as yet great organiza-
tional strength and forcefulness. As in its unsuccessful attempt to
organize trade unions late in 1951 in order to achieve greater in-
fluence in Iraqi national life, the party has once again found that
the government can exercise sufficient pressure to collapse the
broader organizational base of its movement. The Iraqi Communist
Party organization remains largely intact. However, the important
party functionaries are known to the government and could presumably
be arrested comparatively easily.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
4
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The open manipulation of the January 1953 elections has assured
the government, still dominated by the traditional elements grouped
around former Premier Nuri a-Sa'id and the Palace, of an overwhelm-
ing victory. Whether the opposition groups will decide or will have
the chance to carry on activities outside Parliament, since they
cannot function within it, remains to be seen. Unless the serious
and fundamental organizational weaknesses of the opposition movement,
especially those of the Communists, can be overcome, a Communist-
dominated popular movement is unlikely to emerge in the near future.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
COMMUNIST( IN IRAQ: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
. Now estimated at 10,000 members, the Communist Party of Iraq
contained only half that number a year ago. Its membership lacks
internal organizational strength and resources.
Though capable of attracting new followers rather rapidly under
weak, yet reactionary governments, the Iraqi Communist Party will,
at present, fade rapidly if subjected to determined suppression.
The degree of Communist Party control over other organizations
is hard to determine in an area where the party is still seeking to
gain support primarily by championing issues already popular locally.
The party appears to have achieved some penetration of the National
Democrats and the United Popular Front, and several labor unions.
The unions are small, poorly organized, and of no political importance.
The two parties, officially disbanded after the riots of November 22-
23, 1952, but still operating informally have, on the contrary, an
influence out of proportion to their numerical strength because they
are vehicles for the extreme nationalists, the discontented young
intellectuals of Baghdad, and the emerging, dissatisfied middle
class. Altogether, a maximum of 12-15,000, or 0.3 percent of the
total population of about 5,000,000, may be under Communist influence.
Most of these are to be found not among the poor, most of whom are
still bound to traditional ways, but among educated, urban, and
Westernized groups -- young intellectuals, minor civil servants,
teachers in secondary schools, and members of religious and ethnic
minorities. Communists and Communist sympathizers are strongest
in Baghdad, where all political life centers, less so in Basra, the
Kurdish provinces of Sulaimaniya and Erbil, and in Najaf and
Kerbela.
While the bulk of the membership is illiterate, poorly
disciplined, and inexperienced organizationally, the leadership
core, derived primarily from the effendi and college group, tends to
be contentious and jealous for prestige and power, and given to
forming splinter movements. Under pressure, they have easily given
up and turned state's evidence. Wholesale hangings during 1948
and 1949, and frequent arrests since, have sharply reduced the
number of Communists whose membership dates back to an earlier
period. The average age of the leadership is 19-30 years.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
C
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-5-
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Iraqi elections are closely manipulated by the government and, since
the Communist Party is illegal, no Communist candidates are allowed.
Fellow-travellers, broadly defined by the government to include almost
any opposition, are discouraged and hampered in every way possible.
The present party chief, Sharif al-Shaykh, was temporarily arrested
in 1911.8 when he attempted to stand for election from Sulaimaniya.
Communists last ran for Parliament in 1937, when 11 were elected as
independents or through legal parties. Parties as such are of no
significance. The January 17, 1953 elections took place under martial
law, and parties, which are in most cases merely convenient labels for
the followers of individual politicians, have been banned. Comparison
of party electoral strength is therefore neither meaningful nor possible.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
There have been no Communist attempts at insurrection in the
past. The maximum opportunity for armed uprising in the near future
would be through inciting tribal insurrection either.in Iraqi
Kurdistan, which has an irredentist nationalist movement, or among
the Shia tribes of the south Euphrates. The Kurds might raise a
force of 150,000 to-200,000 men, well-led, and redoubtable fighters.
But they possess only rifles and limited ammunition, and while
capable of giving the Iraqi army a sharp encounter, could be contained
without too much trouble unless promptly reinforced from outside. At
present, however,. the party has not the organization, strength,
impetus, freedom, nor weapons to attempt to promote any such excitement.
Since demonstrations are an acknowledged and time-honored
form of political activity-in Iraq, the Communist Party.is prepared,
as in the November 1952 riots in Baghdad, to cooperate, invited or
uninvited, with any political group in fomenting or aggravating a
riot. No recent riot, however, is known to have been initiated and
carried on exclusively by Communist followers. The recent claim
made by the local Communist Committees of Basra, Najaf, and
Sulaimaniya in reporting to the Central Committee in December 1952
that they were capable of taking over and holding for a short time
previously chosen key locations, typifies above all the romantic
immaturity of many minor Communist functionaries in Iraq.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
Membership in the Communist Party, taking part in any of its
activities, or publishing any matter expressing approval of its
doctrines carry penalties ranging from seven years imprisonment to
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORb!&TION
outlaw certain unions, notably the railway and Basra port workers'
unions. About 14 unions are still recognized by the government,
but none is of national scope. The two now reported to be Communist-
controlled (January 1953) are not of strategic importance -- the
cigarette workers and auto drivers, both in Baghdad. The dearth of
capable labor leadership has permitted the Communists to gain influence
on the directing level.in most unions at some time. The recent
strike patterns indicate, however, that such influence is not decisive.
No clearly political strikes have taken place in the past two years.
Communists. may have aggravated disorder in strikes stimulated by
economic grievances in Basra, Habbaniya (British military airport),
and also in two oil-fields. Iraqi unions are not affiliated to WFTU.
The ICFTU recently sent a delegation on a regional tour which included
Iraq, and plans are being laid for a regional office to assist non-
Communist unions in the area. This should go far toward minimizing
causes of labor discontent and providing a more effective non-
Communist channel for their expression.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
A. Front Organizations
1. Students' Union. Also called the Council of Iraqi Students
Union an the U ono Youth,l this organization maintains groups of
probably not more than 20 to 30 students each in several colleges,
Particularly the Law, Medical, and Higher Teachers' Colleges. It
is reported that several of the leaders are maintained and financed
in college by the Iraqi Communist Party in order to foster political
activity among students. Their leadership talent is not conspicuous
but Iraqi students have a tradition of political activity and are easily
responsive to political agitation. It was this Students Union which
was particularly active during the November 1952 riots in Baghdad.
3o far as is known, there are no non-Communist student organizations.
The Union has sent, or attempted to send, a representative to World
Youth meetings since 1949; for the last two years, the government
has denied passports for this purpose.
2. Committee for Aiding Justice. A front group within the Iraq
Lawyers' Association, the Committee for Aiding Justice is now
.l. This organization may be iTe"ntioal with the Young Men's
Democratic Association, said to have 500 members.
SECRET - SECURITY INFOI&ATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
the most active and effective center of Communist activity in Iraq.
(See B-1 for a discussion of the degree of infiltration of the
Lawyers' association.)
3. Partisans of Peace (Ansar al-Salam). Principally confined to
Baghdad, this organization seems to be a secondary activity for most
of the Communist and left-wing adherents of other organizations.
Its actual membership is unknown. It was launched in 1950. The
present chief of the Iraqi Communist Party, Sharif al-Shaykh,
attended the Berlin Peace Conference in April 1952. The leaders of
this front are predominantly Shia, including a respected divine and,
until they were subjected to prosecution, two of Iraq's most noted
living poets; they may have been mislead by an idealistic appeal to
religious sentiment. Membership seems to have fallen off. Activity
has been limited to rather mild demonstrations and to collecting.
signatures for various petitions and protests, which have had
incidental propaganda value to the Communist cause.
4. Armenian Progressive Society. The leader of the Iraqi branch
of this regions organization cen ered probably in Jerusalem) is
Krikor Bedrosian, an influential Communist. courier during and since
World War II and a member of the Iraqi Central Committee, at present
serving a five-year prison term. Its strength is unknown, though
probably small.
B. Infiltrated Organizations
1. Lawyers' Association. The Communists have shown considerable
shrewdness and ability in gaining control of this, the one professional
organization for lawyers in Iraq. By rigging elections, they have
now managed to place Communists in both the presidency and vice-
presidency, and, more important, Communists and Communist-sympathizers
now hold all but one post on the powerful &dministrative Committee
and all but two on the Disciplinary Committee.
Infiltration of the Lawyers' Association is of considerable
significance, because (1) all practicing lawyers in Iraq are
required to belong; (2) the Association has semi-juridical powers,
i.e., it can disbar lawyers who they believe have violated professional
ethics; and (3) the social status of lawyers is high, and the legal
profession plays a dominant role in Iraqi politics.
.Announced Communist aims vis-'a-vis the Lawyers' Association
are to use it (1) to spread propaganda; (2) recruit among students
and intellectuals and other]awyers; (3) give wider currency and
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
greater respectability to Communist aims and propaganda lines; and
(4) use the courts wherever possible as a platform from which to
spread Communist attitudes and defend Communist suspects. This
activity can be easily expanded because the current Communist line
is especially appealing to frustrated young graduates of the Law
College who. greatly exceed the number that can be absorbed into
government service and the current opportunities for private practice.
This group has regular contact with the Central Committee of the
Iraqi Communist Party and also with the Soviet Legation in Baghdad,
through Boris Hhlysov, an attache,
2. Political Parties. Until officially banned at the end of
November V5 Z,, two le Wing political parties, the United Popular
Front and the National Democratic Party (both of which were infiltrated
to some degree) readily collaborated with the Iraqi Communist Party
and Peace Partisans toward their common aims of (1) abrogation of the
Iraq-British Treaty and withdrawal of British forces, (2) full
sovereignty, (3) nationalization of foreign oil concessions, etc.
These parties had no particular brief for world Communism; collaboration
was based solely on. what they conceived to be identity of interest on
local issues. The IragiCommunist Party on its part was prompted by
specific directives to use existing parties as a base to form a
popular front movement. The parties have recently been banned, but
the respective groups are meeting informally; it is not yet clear
what form of organization the political opposition will assume or
how much Communist influence it will contain.
3.. New Iraq Stage Group. Reported in July '52 to have presented
a play at Fine Arts Institute attacking the government and using a
Communist line. Nothing further known of this group.
VII. CONUUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
No Communists are believed to be in government at the policy-
making level. Small numbers have been discovered from time to time
in the army, where the main effort has been directed toward the non-
commissioned grades, especially in the technical services. The.
latest such discovery, in September 1952 involved about 30 students
in the Military Technical School;.16 students were convicted. A few
police have turned to Communism, including several among the guards
at the detention camp for political prisoners, where most Communists
under sentence are held; police are somewhat more vulnerable to
Communist appeal than the armed services because of lower pay, prestige,
and morale.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 10 -
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Since the current Communist propaganda line is virtually
synonymous with that of a large segment of the nationalist press, it
is easy to place Communist propaganda material and thus emphasise
party line themes without much prompting. All radio broadcasting
originating in Iraq is goverznaent owned and free of Communist
taint although not less anti-Western in its leading political commentary.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COZTUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Until the dissolution of all political parties in November 1952,
the Istiglal party, a small group of right-wing extremists, occasionally
collaborated with the Communists in common tactics and demonstrations.
One or two members of the central committee of the United Popular
Front, as well as the secretary of the National Democratic Party
and a member of its administrative committee are suspected to be
Communists. For an account of Communist infiltration into the Lawyers'
Association, see VI.-B-1 above.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. MEDIA
A1-Qa'idah,lcirculation unknown, is the official organ of the
Iraqi ommur_ist Party. It is produced clandestinely and distributed
by hand. In recent weeks it seems to be'printed on a press; formerly
it was turned out on a Roneo machine. This small operation does
not reach the general public, hence has far less impact than
nationalist papers which, at times, echoed the Communist line. All
conspicuously pro-Communist papers have been closed down subsequent
to the martial law regime late in November 1952. There are no
Communist owned or controlled printing establishments in Iraq.
In 1952 a Lebanese Partisans-of-Peace-inspired book entitled
America, the Land of Fictitious Freedoms was picked up in Baghdad.
I pro a ly-reached t re country throug the distribution system.
of the publishers who have branches in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad.
Soviet Legation Baghdad is believed to be financing and
actively directing the recently expanded program of propaganda, both
imported and locally printed. USSR broadcasts in Arabic are heard
in Iraq.11 hours per week from seven short-wave transmitters. The
time is a convenient one attractive to Iraqi listeners: 800 to
8:30 p.m, and 91.30 to 10:00 p.m. daily, with additional hours on
Friday afternoon, the Moslem sabbath. Programs are received clearly,
in good and fluent neo-classical Arabic and (in the case of
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Azerbaijan Democratic clandestine station) good Kurdish. Listening
to Moscow broadcasts is forbidden in Iraq, but there are indications that
a good many do listen. Soviet broadcasts, however, pay little
attention to internal Iraqi affairs. They emphasize any difficulties
in Iraqi relations with Western powers. Azerbaijan station is also
listened to widely in the Kurdish areas, both in Iraq and Syria, where
it is about the only clearly-heard Kurdish-language broadcasting
except for the very limited programs in Kurdish of Radio Baghdad.
C
Very little is known regarding party finances. The party is
said to be so-poor as to be able only to pay small living allowances
to its central cadre, its funds derived chiefly from sale of its
publications, which in turn may be subsidized by the Soviet Legation.
Subscriptions are solicited from members for special activities, such
as sending of delegates to international front meetings. Occasional
assistance may come from the party in Beirut or Damascus, and the
Iranian Tudeh Party reportedly furnished a printing press. Until the
large-scale Jewish exodus in 1950-51, the Iraqi Communist Party
obtained large contributions by threatening wealthy Jews with future.
difficulties if they did not contribute to the now defunct Communist
front organization, the Anti-Zionist League.
The Soviet Legation at Baghdad, the only official Soviet or
satellite agency in Iraq, has an . attache, Boris Khlysov, who
is the contact man with the Iraqi Communist Party's propaganda group
and the lawyers' Association Dell. Overt propaganda activities of
the Legation are not extensive] they appear to be limited to occasional
invitational film showings at the Legation. No Iraqi-Soviet "friendship"
societies are known to exist.
The following are examples of information material hauled out
by the Legation:
The Social and State Structure -of the USSR, V. Karpinsky. In
English, oscow, the Foreign Languages lishing House, 1948.
Paper bound, 182 pp.
Golden Prague (novel), Alexander Gonchar. In_English. FLPH
Moscow-1990"-,(The Stalin Prize Novel 1947-48).
The Years of War 1941-1945, Vassili Grossman, English. Same
Publis5er, 1946. 451 pp.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 12 -
Soviet Literature Monthly No. 2 of 1950, Moscow, in English.
Voks Bulletin 1950, No. 62.
The English edition of New Times.
XIII. COMMJNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Iraqi delegates have attended:
World Federation of Democratic Several unidentified
Youth - 1949 Kurdish delegates alleged
to represent Iraqi
Kurdistan
Peace Movement - 1950; 1951 Sharif al-Shaykh went
from Syria to this meeting
and returned via Moscow
to Iraq to become
Secretary-General of the
Iraqi Communist Party.
At some of the international front meetings Iraq has been "represented"
by Arab students residing in Europe and probably deputed to go by
Yusuf Ismail (alias Mustan), head of an Arab Communist group in Paris.
This device served to overcome the denial ofpassports to personnel to
attend such meetings.
XIV. COMMUNIST COM!4JNICATION NETW(I K
General supervision of the party in Iraq is thought to be
exercised by the Syrian Communist Party. Instructions originating
with Khalid Bakdash of Syria were last intercepted in the fall of
1951. An irregular system links the internal branches of the party,
including members serving jail sentences. Contact with the Tudeh
of Iran is maintained both through the Basra branch, which keeps in
touch with Khorramshar, and via the northern border villages of
Zaynawi and Khanaqin. The border is easily crossed at many points.
Also, the considerable pilgrim traffic to and.from Iran to the
Shia holy cities in Iraq offers excellent cover for passage of
messages or personnel, and one very difficult to screen. Four Tudeh
agents were reported to have come into Iraq in this way in 1952.
SECRET .. SECURITY INFORMATION
?
0
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.1+
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ISRAEL
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . ... . ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I. Objectives . . . . . . ? . . . 1
He Tactics . . .. ? . .. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1
III. Capabilities . . ? . ? . . ? ? 3
ASSETS . . . . ? . . . . . .
I. Numerical Strength . ? . . . .,.
II. Electoral Strength . . . . . .. .. .. .
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
IV. Government Pblicy Toward Communism . . ... .. ? .. 6
V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . ..? .. ? . . 6
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . .. . ? . . ? ? .. ? 6
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government .. ... . ? . 6
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . ?
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties ? ? ? 7
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . ... . 7
XI. Financial Condition .,. 8
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 8
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . .. . ? . 9
XIV. Communist Communication Network . ? ? . ? ? . ? ? ? . 9
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM. IN ISRAEL: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
As expressed in the June 12, 1952 resolutions of the Israel
Communist Party Central Committee, the major objectives of Israeli
Communists are to (1) increase their influence among the working
class and the new immigrants; (2) capitalize on economic conditions
resulting from the government's austerity policy; and.(3) establish
a Communist-controlled united front by creating peace committees
wherever possible, expanding the activities of its front organizations.
and seeking to organize common action with the extreme leftists of Mapam.
Internationally, the party attacks Israel's resumption of relations with
West Germany, opposes Israeli cooperation with the Weston military
defense, and instead makes propaganda for the Soviet-sponsored 5 power
peace pact, and increased commercial relations with the Soviet bloc.
In June 1952, the party's leader Samuel Mikunis said that, once
in power, the Communists would (1) void all treaties.with."warmongers";
(2) nationalize all foreign concessions; (3) dismiss all US experts
and US army officers present in Israel as advisors: (4) call for the
formation of a popular militia; and (5) adhere to the UN 1947
resolution on Palestine calling for the formation of a."democratic"
Arab state in Palestine, and call for the return of Arab refugees and
the restoration of their property.
The Communists no doubt. find it difficult to gain the adherence
of the working manses while at the same time attacking Mapai's economic
policies. Labor has been the chief beneficiary of the socialist
program of Mapai and there are far more dissatisfied elements among the
middle class than among labor. Moreover, by paying increased attention
to the Arab minority in.Israel, which like the Communists is anti-
Zionist and has many grievances against the existing Israeli regime,
the party, which can now marshal only five percent of the electorate,
is also creating greater difficulties for itself in gaining recruits
among Israeli Jews.
The underlying strategic policy of the Israeli Communist Party
has a double aim. Among the Arab minority, the aim is to attract
Arabs to the party and the USSR so that when and if a separate Arab
state is set up in former Palestine, in conformity with the 1947 UN
resolution, this state will be Communist-controlled. As a parallel
activity, Soviet diplomatic and religious personnel are
attempting to entice the Greek Orthodox Arabs, who form a large
proportion of the Arabs in Israel, away from Greek leadership
SECRET - SECURITY INFCPXATION .
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
and orient them towards the Moscow Patriarchate. -Among the Jewish ?
majority, the aim is to get control of all leftist and trade union
organizations and create new ones with a view to isolating Israel
from the West and orienting it toward the USSR. The Israeli Communist
Party also directs Communist activity in Jordan, the. main object of
which is to oust the British.
The Israeli Communist Party at present is committed to
constitutional procedures but may soon find it difficult to operate
because of government repression and popular indignation caused by the
current Soviet anti-Zionist campaign. There is no information on any
preparations for underground activity.
The party's principal motifs in propaganda appeals are: (1) the
Mapai government is permitting the US to prepare Israel as a spring-
board for an attack on the USSR and the precipitation of World War
III; (2) bad economic conditions are due to excessive Mapai arms
expenditures to support US aggressive aims; (3) justice must be
given to the Arab minority and discrimination against them must cease.
These themes in turn are carried through specialized media or
organizations to the Arab minority, to intellectuals (for example,
through the Academic Committee for Peace), immigrants from satellite
countries (for example, through propaganda issued in.Hungarian,
Rumanian, and Bulgarian in addition to Hebrew and Arabic), and, in
still other ways, to students, and women.
Among Arabs, the party has been able to capitalize chiefly
on its attitude toward minorities, championing equal treatment for
them. Among Jews, the party has benefited from sympathy among some
for the official ideology of the Soviet state and the assistance
which the Soviet bloc gave Israel at the beginning?of the state's
existence. Among the latter, it has 'also found support because the
Soviet regime put an end to Czarist pogroms and was-thought to have
outlawed anti-Jewish discrimination. The USSR has also had some
success in portraying itself as the principal force which destroyed
Hitler and as the main enemy of fascism. The fact that there are
still some 3,000,000 Jews in the USSR and satellite countries whose
future might be jeopardized if Israel were to adopt a position of
open antagonism to the USSR has until recently kept the Israeli
Government from repressing Communist activities.
The party's voting power in the Kneset (Parliament) and in
municipal councils is augmented by tactical alliances-.with the left -
wing of the Mapam Party and by supporting motions of other parties
(even right wing) which attack the government. As a labor party,.
SECRET - SECURITY INFO2MATI0N
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
the Communist Party is a, member of Histadrut (general federation of
labor unions and parties) and its key members participate in high
Histadrut councils. Communists have occasionally also gained' -
control or influence in non-Communist organizationsby cultivating
the left-wing elements (especially Mapam) within such groups while-
simultaneously attacking their right-wing opponents. This is
facilitated by the pronounced doctrinaire factionalism which is
characteristic of Israeli organizational life. The same tactics and
conditions also work against the Communists. On occasion non-Communists
have expelled Communists from collective settlemxents. The only trade
union which the Israeli Communist Party is known to control is the
Congress of Arab Workers. Its appeal here is based. on the party's
opposition to Zionism and the Mapai government, and upon its championship
of minority rights against discrimination by the majority.
The principal source of new Jewish members seems to be from
Communists or sympathizers arriving among new immigrants, especially
from the satellite countries, Iraq, and North Africa. New Arab
members seem to be recruited mainly from the Nazareth and Haifa
(including Acre) areas, where Arab demands for equal pay and treatment
with Jews and cessation of harsh treatment by the Israeli security
forces have been championed by the Israeli Communist Party. The party
also attempts to exploit traditional Greek Orthodox friendship for
Russia.
III. CAPABILITIES
The outlook for the Israeli Communist Party to carry out its
current objectives and further Soviet policy is diminishing daily.
The disappearance of Mapam leader Mordecai Oren in Czechoslovakia,
followed by the Prague trials and the case of the Jewish Soviet
doctors have resulted in an increasing number of phyaical attacks
against local Communist institutions, including Soviet Embassy
property; a Russian bookstore, and Israeli Communist Party head-
quarters in Jerusalem. On January 15, 1953, the Israeli Government
forbade the circulation of the Israeli Communist Party newspaper,
Qol ha'Am ("Voice of the People") among members of the armed forces and
the party- may find its operations increasingly hampered. Histadrut
is reported considering the expulsion of the Israeli Communist Party
from its ranks.
The developing situation will probably lead to a rapid decline
in the party's influence among the Jewish majority at large and also
among members of Mapam, where the extreme left elements can be
expected to come under increasingly heavy fire. It is likely,
therefore, that any increase in the relative and absolute strength
of the Israeli Communist Party will be confined to the Arab community,
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
which can be expected by approve rather than resent the anti-Zionist
moves of the Soviet bloc.
The conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalism, together with
the anti-Zionist orientation of the USSR and Communism, have historically
been the greatest disadvantages under which the Communist movement
has had to labor, As the Arab-Jewish antagonism has increased, it has
become increasingly difficult for the Communist movement to weld both
Arab and Jewish elements together into a single effort of cooperation.
In the past, Soviet anti-Israeli moves, such*as Soviet support in the
UN for the internationalization of Jerusalem have always caused
considerable defection from the party and reduced its influence.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN ISRAEL: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
In the absence of concrete information, Communist Party strengtl
in. Israel may be roughly estimated at about 5,000. The membership is
drawn largely from unskilled labor and white collar workers, particular
among Jewish immigrants from the Balkans and the Arab countries. Party
membership is concentrated largely in the cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa,
Nazareth, Jerusalem, and Rehovot, Arab membership especially in Nazaret
and Haifa.
The number of "hard-Dore" Communists is unknown, but their
quality does not seem'to be high. Nothing is known regarding the
quality of the party membership in terms of its readiness to incur
hardships or cling to the party line.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
The Communist Party vote in the 1951 election was 27,234 or
about 3 percent of the total vote. In addition, the extreme left
Mapam Party polled-86,,095 votes. In the same election, the other
major parties received the following number of votes
Mapai (government party)
256,456
General Zionists (opposition)
111,394.
Ha Po'el ha-Mizrahi (government)
46,347
Herut (opposition)
45,651
The Communist vote in the five cities where they are largely
concentrated compared with `the other principal parties as follows:
General
Communists
Mapai
Mapam
Zionists
Tel Aviv
6,240
59,700
150600
46,600
Haifa
4,369
42,800
15,300
21,400
Nazareth
3,146
246
325
478
Jerusalem
1,221
20,200
2,600
7,100
Rehovot
368
4,000
1,100
1,400
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
There have been no recent cases of violent demonstrations, and
it is estimated that not more than 300 persons could be recruited for
any such demonstration. Although the policy does not seem to be to
create violent demonstrations, probably because of efficient suppressive
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
methods of the Israeli police, orderly demonstrations of citizens
carrying banners protesting against government policies have been
organized by the Communist Party. Probably less than 500 weapons
could be gathered by the Communists in case of a Soviet-Western war.
There are no reports that the Communist Party in Israel sponsors azy
paramilitary organizations.
IV. GOVERN9dENT POLICY. TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Israeli Communist Party and its front-organizations.have
full freedom to operate openly lfut are watched by Israeli security
services. Communists have been quietly ousted from'the army.
Communists have freedom to travel abroad to Communist and front
conferences. The policy of the government toward the party will
probably become unofficially more repressive in the future, and the
state is capable of controlling the party by force.
V. CCMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
Since Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor,"is controlled
by the government Mapai Party, it is unlikely that the Communist Party
has been-able to gain much of a foothold there. No data are available
regarding the number of Communists in key industries, but it may be
assumed that the proportion would be roughly the same as that shown
for voting strength in the principal cities of concentration.
Histadrut has no affiliations with international Communist
confederations, having left the WFTU in 1950.
VI. C OAMUNIS T INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL
The following organizations are known to be Communist-front:
Israel-USSR Friendship League, Organization of.Democratic Women
(affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation),
Tarbut La'am, Israel Peace.Comnittee (affiliated with the World Peace
Council), Democratic Youth Federation (affiliated with World
Federation of Democratic Youth), and the Academic Committee for Peace.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Of the 120 members of the Israeli Hnesset (Parliament), 5 are
Communist and 4 are extreme left Mapam members who have been closely
identified with the Communists. The number of Communists on the
SECRET - SECURITY INFCIZMATION
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
various parliamentary committees is shown below, together with the
total membership on these committees:
Committees
Communist
members
Total
members
House
1
.23
Finance
la
15
Economic
1
'15
Foreign Affairs and Defense
lb
15
Home Affairs
1
15
Constitution, Legislation and
1
23
Law
Public Services
1
15
Labor
1
15
Total
8
136
a. eme left Mapam member Moshe Sne ,
b? Extreme left Mapam member Jacob Rift in.
The number of Communists and O=nunist-sympathisers in the armed forces
is unknown. It is believed that the extent of their influence in top
lovel positions is nil. The number of, Communists and Communist_
sympathizers in the police and security services is probably small.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
The number of people influenced by Communist propaganda in non-
Communist-controlled educational, religious, or entertainment groups, or
in. the non-Communist-controlled radio and press is believed to be not
over several thousand.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-CM MIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa*ir, the far left-wing group of Mapam, has been
ideologically close to the Communists and cooperated with them. This
influence and recent Soviet anti-Zionist moves has caused Mapam to split,-
with only a minority joining the pro-Communist faction,
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
There are five known Communist publications in Israel.
Qol is a Hebrew daily, which also publishes weeklies in Bulgarian,.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
Hungarian, and Rumanian. Circulation of the daily Qol h&'Am is about
2,000. The circulation of the weeklies is unknown. Pr-el srael, a
Yiddish weekly, has a circulation of 300 to 400. Circulation figures
for the Arabic-language monthly al-Ittihad and the Hebrew monthly Ha-
Derekh are unknown. No information is a ailable regarding the Ara !o-
anguage al-Darb. Qol ha'Am is believed to have its own printing
press, but no ng Mfger is known regarding Communist printing
facilities.
Over 50,000 books per year, including technical and non-technical
publications, are imported from the USSR. They are dumped on the market
regardless of import quotas and at only nominal prices. It is presumed
that they have a wide circulation, Lepac, Ltd., a Tel Aviv bookshop,
is controlled by the Communist Party. It imports only Soviet books and
is currently under investigation by the-Israeli Government for using..
surreptitious means to surpass its import quotas.
The Israeli Communists do not control any radio facilities but
have been allowed to speak occasionally over the government-controlled
Israeli Radio.
A 1951 survey of 1,737 Israelis showed that 28 percent regularly
listened to Soviet bloo broadcasts. Those listening to USSR stations.
were mostly of Polish (39 percent), Russian (24 percent), and
Rumanian (10 percent) origin. Russian was the most popular language
with 12 percent of those interviewed.
.XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
In March 1950, the Israeli Communist Party collected over
M,000 in a fund drive. In 1952, the party announced a fund-raising
campaign with the ambitious goal of IL15,000. It is not known whether
the local party receives help from Soviet or satellite legations or
consulates. In 1950 Jewish Communists and fellow-travelers were said
to be preparing a world-wide fund-raising campaign under the slogan
of aid to Israel. -Tarbut la'Am ("Popular Culture") clubs were used as
a front for this purpose in North and South America. Amounts
collected are unknown, but one organization is said to have remitted
$6,000 in goods and cash from the United States.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
The USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania have both Legations and
consulates in Tel Aviv. Hungary and Bulgaria have Legations in Tel Aviv.
Poland has consulates in both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
41
41
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
XIII. C=1UNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of
Democratic Youth (YPFDY), and the Women's International Democratic
Federation (WIDF) have affiliated organizations in Israel. (See above
under VI.) Two Israeli delegates attended the 19th Party Congress
in Moscow in October 1952, one went to the World Peace Council meeting
in Berlin in July of that year, and one left for Prague in January
1953 to attend the World Federation of.Democratic Youth Conference.
XIV. COMMUNIST COGEMCATION NETWORK
Soviet Embassy personnel appear to be cultivating Greek
Orthodox Arabs in order to exploit the old antipathy between Arab and
Greek Orthodox Church members and their Greek clergy. It is not
known whether any financial assistance is given to the local-Conounists
or whether there would be argt prospect of military assistance in case
of an East-West conflict.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
On
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
n -6165.15
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MOROCCO
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET -'SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . ? . . ? ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I? Objectives ? . . . . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1
II. Tactics ? . ? . ? . .. ? . . ? ? . . ? . . . . . . . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . ? . . . . . . ? . . . . . ? 2
I. Numerical Strength . . .
II. Electoral Strength ? ? ? . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 5
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. .. . . . ? ? ? 5
V. Communist Influence in L a b o r . . . ... . . .. . . ? 6
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and 6
Professional Organizations . . .. . . . . .. . ? .
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? . . ? . ?. 6
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ? . ? 6
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties .. . . . . . . . .. ? . . ? ? .. . . 7
X. Communist Propaganda Media ... . ? ? ? 7
XI. Financial Condition ? . ? .? 7
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . .. . . 7
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . .. ? . .. 7
XIV. Communist Communication Network .. ? ? . ? ? ? . ? ?
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
CO14MUNISM IN MOROCC01: OBJECTIVES. TACTICS. AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The over-riding immediate goal of the Moroccan Communist Party
since August 1946 has been to persuade the local independence movements
to join with the Communists in a united national front in preparation
for a revolution for "national liberation" and against French control
and American imperialism. In the meantime, the Communists are seeking,
through propaganda, to destroy sympathy among Moroccans for the US and
the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense plans and to increase
local hostility toward the French administration. The serious economic
grievances of the population -- both native and French -- receive
particular. attention from the Communists who have a strong influence in
the cauntry's largest labor union. To achieve its immediate goals,
however, the Moroccan Communist Party is faced above all with the task
of recovering its own strength.
II. TACTICS
Having failed thus far in achieving a common front with the
nationalists, the Communists have attempted instead to participate,
uninvited, in strikes, demonstrations, and riots initiated by the
nationalists, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly,
Communist propaganda pamphlets have dealt at times entirely with
nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework. Thus, in pretending to make the
nationalist cause their own, the Communists try to impress upon the
popular mind the need and desirability of a common front. Occasionally,
such tactics are accompanied by attacks on the nationalist leadership
for their refusal to join them in a popular front, for demonstrating
faith in the US or the UN, or for cooperating or conducting negotiations
with the French. Moreover, Communists have been known to facilitate
the arrest of nationalists and to claim credit for successful nationalist
demonstrations.
1. Since the Communists have no party in Spanish Morocco and, in fact,
are unable to operate in that zone to any appreciable degree, this
discussion is confined to the French Zone and Tangier.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
III. CAPABILITIES
To date, the small Moroccan Communist Party has had practically
no influence on the nationalist movement, largely because (1) the
nationalists realize that such ties would alienate many sympathizers in
non-Communist areas; (2) the nationalists are concerned with maintaining
close ties with the Sultan; (3) financial support for the nationalist
movement' is derived primarily from Morocco's upper middle class; (/+) the
local Communist Party is largely French in membership, and (5) the present
nationalist leadership is aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism
and the devotion of Communism to a foreign power whose domination the
nationalists would dislike as much as that of the French. Moreover, the
Moroccan Communist Party, never large, has declined to its lowest postwar
strength.
The capabilities of the Moroccan Communist Party at this time
remain minimal either for achieving its own current local objectives or
for furthering Soviet policy. It has always been hampered by the poor
quality of its leadership. This is evidenced by the success of the
Istiglal, Morocco's largest nationalist party, in infiltrating the
Communist-dominated labor federation, UGSCM (Union G4'nirale des Syndicats
Confea1r4 du Maroc, Moroccan affiliate of France's Communist-controlled
CGT). Although Moroccans are legally forbidden to belong to unions and
carry on union activities only by official toleration, Istigial has been
able to gain control of the organization. Three factors have been largely
responsible for the decline of Communist influence among labor: (1) the
ability of certain nationalist leaders, (2) the ineffectiveness of Communist
leadership, and (3) deportation by the French of the ablest and most in-
fluential Communists in the party and the Union. There is little likelihood
of early improvement in the Communist leadership potentials either in the
party or its labor federation.
In his statement to the Central Committee of the Moroccan Communist
Party in late 1951, Ali Yata (Moroccan Communist Party leader, now deported
and imprisoned) perceived certain additional and fundamental reasons for
the party's failures. He noted that the party had become so panicky that
excessive secrecy prevented the organization from getting anything done.
From November 1950 to the end of 1951, the Central Committee had held only
one meeting and that lasted only one day. For two years, no sectional or
regional meetings had been held except in Rabat. Not a petition for the
Stockholm Peace Appeal or a Five Power Conference had been circulated
up to that time.
A more fundamental problem remained unsolved, Ali Yata said, Those
sections having primarily Arab membership neglect Morocco's European
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
minority, believe it dishonorable to use the French language, and have
even rid themselves in an "arbitrary and authoritarian" manner of comrades
who had retained some colonial prejudices instead of helping such men
change their minds. In sections in which French membership predominates,
All Yata often found a "paternalistic, colonist" attitude shown toward
Moslem members.
The Moroccan Communist leaders also find themselves in a dilemma
because of conflicts in nationality among its membership. In pretending
to be part of the Moroccan nationalist movement, the Communist Party
alienates local French residents of the middle class who fear for their
safety in an independent, nationalist Morocco, and loses many local
skilled French workers who fear the competition of native labor without,
however, gaining the support of nationalist Moroccans. This last group
will continue to join instead the core of the nationalist movement - the
Istiglal Party. Membership in Istiglal, though not without its dangers,
at least does not put any Moroccan under the double jeopardy of being
suspect as both a Communist and a nationalist as well as defenseless against
present police controls and the future uncertainties of Communist intentions,
All Yata, in his 1951 diagnosis, considered the weakness of the party
to stem above all from the fact that it presented itself merely as a part
of the nationalist movement. Although All Yata stated that it was correct
for the Moroccan Communist Party in August 1946 to place "national liber-
ation" at the center of its program, he criticized it for subsequently
using the traditional bourgeois nationalist concept of "independence" to
mean formal independence without any social content, thus sacrificing the
distinctive content of the Communist Party's program. The party, he charged,
dealt with all major nationalist problems, but failed to relate them to
the daily needs of the laboring man. Thus it neglected the "vanguard" and
the "fundamental armies" of national liberation until even the labor union
movement "ceased to be oriented by us," while the nationalist movement
itself was left to seek independence both through the UN, an instrument
of "imperialists," and through the United States which now "occupies"
Morocco.
The French Government throughout 1952 has been increasingly firm
in its repression of the Moroccan Communist Party. Some of the non-
Moroccan leaders have been deported, and virtually all others not pre-
viously arrested for some infraction, have been held under arrest since
the December 1952 riots which followed the death of the Tunisian labor
leader, Ferhat Hached. The Moroccan Communist newspaper L'Espoir,.long
suspended from publication because of financial difficulties, had re-
appeared during 1952 but both the Communist Party and its press have
been legally proscribed since the December 1952 riots.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-4-
The Communist labor federation maintains considerable strength in
railway, highway transport, power, and electrical communications unions.,
and some strength in port unions, but it lacks capabilities for pro-
ducing a complete tie-up by strikes in even a single industry without
the assistance of one or both of the two anti-Communist European labor
federations.
The effective leadership of the Moroccan Communist Party and
almost all of the hard-core has always been European. With the member-
ship estimated now at not more than 4,000 or 5,000, this probably still
remains true. The Moroccan Communists who have thus far found the
majority of their recruits among French residents have more recently had
some limited success among young French-educated Moslem intellectuals.
If the effectiveness of its leadership were not at such low ebb,
the Communist potentials in Morocco, even given the present membership,
might present a totally different picture. During the past year, an
unhealthy political atmosphere has developed in which an astute
Communist leadership might find more fertile ground than at any time
since the end of World War II. This situation is the outgrowth of a.
combination of factors, including (1) severe French repressive actions
against the nationalists, (2) the exile or arrest of all the principal
nationalist leaders, and (3) the total failure of the nationalists to
achieve any of their aims during the past two years. Because of the
small number of Istiqlal members of leadership calibre and the
impatience of younger, more radical, yet inexperienced members, the
absence of such essentially moderate Istiglal leaders as Balafrej,
leadership of an effective nationalist "underground" might become the
prize of outsiders. However, the Communist Party appears at this time
to be too impoverished financially and too feeble in membership,
organization, leadership, and influence to capitalize on the opportunity
presented to them by nationalist frustrations and the absence of the
relatively moderate, anti-Communist and experienced top nationalist
leadership.
The Communists will probably continue their efforts to join
forces with the nationalists; and, in the long run, there is some danger
that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives they would
accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it
presently remains doubtful that the Communists will capture control of
the nationalist movement in Morocco, Communist influence might ultimately
induce the nationalist groups to adopt more anti-Western policies and
increasingly to resort to direct action.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
I. NUMERCAL STRENGTH
The Communist Party of Morocco is known to be quite small;
however, the exact size of the present membership is not known. A
total strength of about 3,000 members would seem to be a reasonable
estimate in terms of the known activities of the party. While the
Moroccan Communist Party has recently-been most active in urban areas
of the French Zone, particularly in Casablanca,' the geographical dis-
tribution of party members is not known. The effectiveness of the party's
leadership has diminished greatly as the result of the recent arrest of
many of the principal leaders by the French Protectorate authorities.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Since no general election has ever been held in any of the three
zones of Morocco, and since, in local elections, the native electorate
by law and by choice is always very restricted, the electoral strength
of the Communist Party of Morocco cannot be estimated.
III.. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The origin of the December 1952 riots in Casablanca and elsewhere
in the French Zone in Morocco is not definitely known. Probably it was
essentially nationalist, although Communist agitators may have worked
individually to provoke increased violence. Because of the relative
weakness of the Communist Party, it has apparently hesitated to instigate
violent demonstrations on'its own initiative during recent months. But
party members may well have capitalized upon situations stemming from
grievances voiced by nationalists and others. At present, the party has
no ability to rally sizable elements of the population to violent action.
It can only capitalize upon the discontent aroused by other, more popular
groups.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
In the Spanish Zone, the local authorities have, of course, been
relentless in their suppression of Communism ever since the advent of the
Franco regime. In the French Zone, the Communists were tolerated, though
hampered by the Protectorate authorities, until Eecember 1952. Since
then, the party has been officially outlawed, its newspapers suppressed,
and its leaders either arrested or deported fron the country. In
addition, a number of less-important Communists have been taken into
custody. In the international zone of Tangier, where Communist groups
are still permitted, the local police restrain Communist agitation whenever
such agitation can be construed as a possible threat to public order.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-6-
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON LABOR
Because of the numerical weakness of the Moroccan Cosa^'unists,
no reliable estimate can be formed of their strength in key industries.
Despite their modest numbers, the Communists, because of their discipline
and energy, were for some time able to wield control over the largest
labor federation in the French Zone, the General Union of Confederated
Syndicates of Morocco (UGSCM), which is affiliated with the Communist-
dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of France. But the Communists
eventually proved unable to withstand'a bid for control by the more
numerous and better-led nationalists. Although important posts in the
UGSCM are undoubtedly still in the hands of Communists, it is generally
believed that leadership of this organization has, within the past year
or so, definitely passed into the hands of the nationalists. The
remaining two labor federations in the French Zone, the French Confeder-
ation of Christian Workers (CFTC) and Workers Force (FO) are both anti-
Communist.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Although a considerable number of Communist front organizations
were established in French Morocco immediately after World War II, few
if any of these enjoyed any continued success. Consequently, by December
1952, when the Protectorate officials outlawed the Communist Party, most,
if not all, of these front organizations had already ceased to function.
Although information is not complete on the subject, it seems probable
that if any such organizations exist at present, they are small and
relatively inactive.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
No information is available regarding the number of Communists and
Communist sympathizers at the higher levels of the government, including
the armed forces, either in the Spanish or in the French zones. The number
appears, however, to be extremely low. Insofar as the number of Communists
and sympathizers in agencies of the government administering nationalized
industries is concerned, no figures are available; but Communists are known
to work at the lower levels in railroads, ports, telephone and telegraph
installations, and in mining operations.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Except for occasional illegal pamphlets, the Communist press.is now
non-existent in Morocco. Since radio broadcasting is a government monopoly,
no Communist influence has been felt in this field. There is likewise no
evidence of Communist infiltration in religious organizations. Though
Communists are known to hold?posts in the school system in the French zone,
it seems probable that the number of such persons is small in terms of the
total number of teachers.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
In the Moroccan Socialist Party, there is no evidence of Communist
influence. However, in the nationalist Istiglal Party, which follows an
anti-Communist program, there are certain individuals, some of whom work
as labor leaders in Istiglal-controlled labor federation (UGSCM), who
are said to follow the Communist "line."
Reports of unknown reliability have also circulated that certain
opportunistic leaders of some of the smaller nationalist splinter groups
have upon occasion voiced pro-Communist sentiments.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Suppression of Communism in the Spanish Zone is so rigorous and
of such long standing that apparently very little propaganda activity
takes place in that area. With'the outlawing of the Communist Party in
the French zone toward the end of 1952, Communist propaganda in that
region has been confined to occasional clandestine handbills and pamphlets.
At least one of the pamphlets is thought to have been printed outside
Morocco and smuggled in for distribution. Prior to the suppression of
the Moroccan Communist Party, two Parisian Communist dailies circulated in
the French Zone; but their total circulation was only about 225 copies daily,
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
No specific information is available regarding the financial
resources of the Moroccan Communist Party. The small scope of the
party's activities before it was suppressed indicate that they were small.
The infrequency with which the Communist "weekly" newspaper appeared is
further evidence of the party's financial weakness. Urgent appeals to
the public for donations were very frequent.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites have consular,
diplomatic, or trade representatives in any part of Morocco. Though the
Soviet Union is entitled by treaty to participate in the international
administration of Tangier, it has never availed itself of this privilege.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
As a result of the recent outlawing of the Communist Party of
Morocco, Communist international organizations can no longer function
actively in Morocco, except in the international zone of Tangier. Even
before the suppression of the Communist Party in the French Zone, Communist
international organizations had ceased to be active in that area. Infor-
mation is not available concerning the existence or operation of such
organizations in the international zone.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The Connrunist Party of Morocco, like those of Algeria and Tunisia,
is under the direction of the French Communist Party. The influence of
the French Communist Party is known to be exerted, at least in part, by
bench representatives to Moroccan Party Congresses. Furthermore,
Communist couriers are known to pass through North Africa from time to
time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.16
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, PAKISTAN
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword . ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I. Objectives e . . . . ? ? ? 1
II. Tactics . ? 2
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 4
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . 6
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . ? 6
He Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . ? 6
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 7
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . ? . . . 7
V.? Communist Influence in Labor ? . . . . ? ? . . ? . . .
VI. Communist Influence in Social.. Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . ? 8
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . . . . . ? ? 9
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . .
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . ? . . . . . *a . . . . . ? ? . . . . . ? 10
X. Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
XI. Financial Condition . . ? ? . ? . ? . . ? . . . . . . 11
XII. Soviet.Satellite Official Assets . . ? ? 11
XIII. Communist International organizations . . . ? ? .. . 12
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . ? . . ? . ? ? . 12
SECRET -. SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP86B00269R000800b80001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN PAKISTAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
The broad aims of the Communist party in Pakistan are to root
out the vestiges and influence of Anglo-American "imperialism" in
Pakistan and to.end the present regime in Pakistan and set up a
"people's democracy." To achieve these larger goals, specific short-
term objectives of the Communist party include (1) the withdrawal of
Pakistan from the Commonwealth and the sterling bloc; (2) the nationali-
zation of British-owned commercial enterprises in Pakistan; (3) the
removal of British personnel from all branches of the Pakistan Govern-
ment and especially from the armed forces; (4) the reorientation of
Pakistan's import-export policy and the country's trade relations with
a view to making the economy less intermeshed with that of the Western
powers; (5) a change in status of Pakistan from a dominion to a
republic; (6) the removal of the Kashmir issue from.the UN; (7)
the reduction of Pakistan's defense expenditures; (8) the dissolution
of the present Constituent Assembly and its reelection on the basis of
a broadened franchise; (9) the withdrawal of the draft of basic princi-
ples for the new Constitution recommended to the Constituent Assembly's
Basic Principles Committee; (10) the repeal of laws granting the
government the power to arrest persons without trial; (11) the con-
fiscation of the holdings of large landowners without compensation.
These objectives have been keyed primarily to the requirements of
international Communism, with secondary emphasis on promoting the
domestic political fortunes of the party. There are no indications
now that the, objectives, all of which are being pursued simultaneously,
are likely to be revised in the near future.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
H. TACTICS
The party organization in Pakistan is following a united front
policy. It appeals for the support not only of the working class but
also of the peasantry and some bourgeois elements. Cutting across
class boundaries, it appeals for the support of "anti-imperialist, anti-
capitalist, anti-feudal, and democratic elements." It does not reject
support from any quarter, left or right.
Communist attempts to build this united front appear to follow
constitutional procedures and avoid or at least deemphasize illegal
activity and violence. To employ, or urge the use of, force would tend
.to alienate the public, thereby isolating the party, and would also in-
vite vigorous repressive action by the government. Opportunities do
exist, however, for open activities and agitation. Past attempts to
build a united front while employing violence have failed and there is
no evidence at present of any positive preparations for launching a
campaign of violence in Pakistan. While the present policy of the
party in general envisages, neither the advocacy nor the instigation
of violence, it does allow participation in outbreaks of violence in-
stigated by others if fairly broad-based and deemed likely to benefit
the party; under special circumstances, the party might be prepared to
instigate violence on a limited scale. Even with regard to strikes,
the party has directed its members to avoid fomenting strikes on the
labor front, but has also advised them to lend full support when spon-
taneous strikes do break out and then to make every effort to end them
successfully and quickly.
The present program of building a united front and observing
constitutional procedures assigns a prominent place to propaganda and
agitation. Among the major propaganda themes employed in Pakistan are
that (1) Pakistan is independent in name only and that imperialism,
with which the present government is allied, still dominates the coun-
try, exploiting, it and retarding its cultural and economic development;
imperialism, the Communists say, prevents industrialization and impedes
the liquidation of feudal and semi-feudal systems of agriculture; (2)
foreign imperialist domination of Pakistan can be ended, and real pro-
gress achieved, as in China, only after the local bourgeois and feudal
elements, and the Moslem League governments representing them, are de-
feated and power transferred to the people; (3) they can be defeated if
the people unite; (4) in more and more areas of the world, especially
in Asia, the democratic forces are already rising up against the crack-
ing imperialist system and its native servitors; (5) the imperialists
will not hesitate to involve the world in a global war and in fact have
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
already launched their aggressive war in Korea; and (6) the USSR and
the People's Democracies strive for peace and support the people of
Pakistan and the colonial countries in their struggle for true
independence.
The party makes a concentrated effort to relate its major propa-
ganda themes to the interests, problems, and grievances of specific
sections of the population -- students, workers, women, etc. In parti-
cular, the Communists seek to capitalize on nationalist, anti-imperialist
feelings and economic interests by linking the rise in the cost-of-living
to "capitalist-imperialist" preparations for war. In order to identify
the party with the aspirations of the various sections of the population,
they also agitate for a minimum wage law, agrarian reform, increased
educational facilities, lower school tuitions, free medical aid, civil
liberties, peace, and aid to refugees from India. In order to guide
popular feelings on these issues in the direction the party desires,
much of this propaganda and agitation is carried out through the various
Communist front organizations tailored to reach and attract such special
interest groups as peasants, workers, writers, students, women, and
youth.
Communication between the party in Pakistan and Communist forces
outside the country probably does not represent any great difficulty:
Communist publications are being imported, individual Communists and
delegations come to, and go from, Pakistan fairly frequently, and both
the USSR and Communist China maintain Embassies in the country. The
transfer of funds is not so easy. Various roundabout devices are re-
sorted to, prominent among them being the retention by the party of
proceeds from literature shipped in from Communist countries.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
The ability of the party to attain its objectives is not great
now and present indications are that it will not increase significantly
within the next few years. An important factor severely limiting this
ability is the condition of the party itself. It is a small organiza-
tion and appears to have only a small popular following. Its representa-
tion in the central and provincial legislative assemblies of Pakistan
is negligible. In the past, the party has been plagued with internal
dissension and disunity and this may still characterize to some extent
the organization in Vest Pakistan. Also, the party appears to be
financially weak. The party's own view of its deficiencies in East
Bengal toward the end of 1951 was that it was disorganized at the sub-
provincial levels, inefficient, lacking in sufficient mass contact and
sympathy, inadequate in assuring publicity, and weak financially. Its
financial position was in fact so bad that the party in East Bengal was
even considering closing down the Provincial Center and some of the
sub-provincial branches unless funds were forthcoming in the near future.
Another important factor limiting the capabilities of the party
is the strong position of the Moslem League and its attitude towards the
Communist party. The League is the largest single political party in
Pakistan and has the largest popular following. It led the movement
for the establishment of Pakistan and has been the party in power at
the national, provincial, and sub-provincial levels since the inaugura-
tion of the Dominion in August 1947. Moslem League governments do not
hesitate to move against the Communist party when action is called for
and the party has been hit hard on several occasions by the repressive
measures taken against it by the government. The association of two
top Pakistani Communists with the abortive Rawalpindi conspiracy in
early 1951 exposed the party to such government repression as to practi-
cally inactivate it and its front organizations for a period of several
months. The student demonstrations leading to rioting in Karachi during
the first half of January 1953 presented the government with another
opportunity, which it was quick to seize, for moving against the
Communists.
Despite the party's lack of ability to achieve its short-term
objectives through its own unaided efforts, the Communists in Pakistan
may possibly see some of their short-term objectives fulfilled in the
next few years. This is possible largely because some of the short-
term objectives of the Communists correspond to the goals of other
diverse groups. The withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth, for
example, is demanded by the Jinnah Awami Moslem League, the largest
 .Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
opposition party in Pakistan, and by a number of other groups, some of
them fanatical Moslem societies. There is a significant amount of
popular sentiment for severance of ties with Britain and it is possible
that within the next few years this sentiment, based on a .variety of
motivating factors, may prevail.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 6 -
COMNNNISM IN PAKISTAN: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
No precise figures are available for the membership of the Communist
Party of Pakistan. The total almost certainly does not exceed 5,000 and
may be considerably smaller. However, there may be as many as 50,000
members of organizations under Communist control. Even if all of these
are considered to be strongly influenced by the Communist Party -- an
assumption probably not justified -- the proportion of Communists and
devoted followers in a total population of approximately 76,,000,000 is
well under 1/100 of one per cent.
Geographically, the Communist membership and following is con-
centrated most heavily in the provinces of Punjab and East Bengal and in
the capital city of Karachi.
Communist Party members and sympathizers in Pakistan are drawn in
largest part from the educated urban middle class. This is notably the
case in West Pakistan; in heavily populated East Pakistan, the party's
following apparently includes a proportionately larger number of workers
and peasants. Very little is known about the tenacity with which members
cling to the party. However, the precipitous decline in membership after
the exposure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy in March, 1951 (See Section III)
and recurrent reports of frequent internal conflicts in the party indicate
that at the present time the Communist movement in Pakistan is not
particularly significant.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Pakistan has had no general elections since it emerged as a nation
in 1947. Partial elections held in Punjab province in 1951 brought a vote
divided as follows:
Number of
Estimated Percentage
Party
Seats Won
of the Vote Cast
Moslem League
143
51.1
Jinnah Awami Moslem
31
18.3
League
Independents
16
23.7
Azad Pakistan Party
1
2.0
Jama'at-i-Islam
1
4.4
Islam League
0
.4
Communist
Q
.1
Total
192
100.0
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
In the Northwest Frontier Province in 1951 three self-styled
"Communist sympathizers" ran on the ticket of the Jinnah Awami Moslem
League, the dominant Moslem League's major opponent. All were defeated.
It is probable that Communist vote-getting power would be greater
in East Bengal (East Pakistan) than in any of the West Pakistan provinces.
The test of the party's overall electoral potential will not be made until
the first general elections, which are not expected to be held before late
1953 and probably considerably later. The Communist Party proposes to
participate in these elections.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The present policy of the Pakistan Communist Party in respect of
the use of violence appears to be one of making common cause with other
groups whenever demonstrations occur. The party has little or no inde-
pendent capability for violent action. As was demonstrated in the Dacca
riots of early 1952 and the Karachi riots in January 1953, however, it is
ready to seize opportunities to join in demonstrations and to attempt to
turn them to Communist purposes.
In March 1951, the Pakistan Government arrested a small number of
civilians and high ranking army officers on charges of conspiring to
establish a military dictatorship and eventually a Communist state.
Fifteen individuals were brought to trial and 14 were convicted.
Although the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, as it is known, evidently
did show connections between Communist members and sympathizers and a
number of ranking army personnel, there is little evidence to suggest that
Communist influence in the Pakistani armed forces is now other than
negligible.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Communist Party is a legal political organization in Pakistan
and is free to conduct political activities openly. Communist leaders,
however, are kept under close surveillance by Pakistan authorities. Both
the provincial and the central governments in Pakistan are vested with
sweeping powers to deal with threats to public safety. The central
government, for instance, is authorized by the Pakistan Security Act to
detain individuals, disband organizations, and censor or ban publications
under specified conditions. Neither provincial nor central authorities
have hesitated to exercise these powers and have shown themselves able to
withstand Communist agitation against the application of public security
legislation. There is no evidence that the Pakistan authorities could not
deal effectively with any likely Communist threat to the security of
the state.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
Communist influence among Pakistan workers is believed to be
reflected mainly in the Pakistan Trade Union Federation (PTUF), a Communist-
dominated organization affiliated with the Communist international con-
federation, the World Federation of Trade Unions. PTUF affiliates are
estimated to have no more than 25,000 members, or from 5 to 10 per cent of
the unionized workers in Pakistan. Factional differences occurred in the
PTUF in 1951 and were still in evidence at the organization's annual con-
ference in April, 1952.
Few other details are available on the PTUF. In particular, data
on the size and location of its individual affiliated unions are largely
lacking.
A small number of labor organizations led by members of the Jinnah
Awami Moslem League, the Pakistan Socialist Party, or by former members
of the PTUF may be subject to some measure of Communist influence. The
limited information available indicates that these organizations are of
negligible importance in Pakistan labor.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Only sketchy data are available for the Communist front organ-
izations active in Pakistan. Summaries of these data follow:
Appealing to youth and student groups are the East Pakistan Youth
League, with headquarters in Dacca, East Bengal, the East Pakistan Youth
Federation, and the Democratic Students' Federation. The last named
organization, which is centered in the West Pakistan cities of Lahore and
Karachi, is reported to have about 200 members and an additional 300
sympathizers.
The Purba Pakistan Mahila Samiti is the Communist-dominated women's
organization in East Pakistan. It maintains contact with the Women's
International Democratic Federation.
Front organizations in "cultural" and professional fields are:
(1) The Pakistan-Soviet. Cultural Association, with
branches in Karachi, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Lyall-
pur, Okara, Multan, Sukkur, Shikarpur, Hyderabad, and Dacca,
is engaged in organizing lectures, conferences, and dis-
cussions on various aspects of life in the USSR.
(2) The Pakistan-China Friendship Society, with
branches in Lahore and Kan:chi and perhaps in other cities
of Pakistan, is devoted to promoting Pakistani good will
toward Communi t China.
SECRET - SECURITY INFOFiJ4ATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
(3) The Pakistan-Czechoslovak Cultural Society was
reportedly established in December 1951. No other in-
formation about the organization is at hand.
(4) The All Pakistan Progressive Writers' Asso-
ciation which has units in Karachi, Lahore, Gujranwala,
and Lyallpur, includes several writers of the first
rank and the Association is probably the most important
Communist propaganda organization in Pakistan.
(5) The All-Pakistan Theater Association, the
main body of which is in Karachi, is closely related
to the Progressive Writers' Association and the member-
ships of the two organizations overlap.
(6) The Three Arts Circle, located in Karachi,
also promotes Communist propaganda.
(7) The "peace" front in Pakistan is the Pakistan
Peace Committee, with branches in Lahore, Gujranwala,
Karachi, Peshawar, and Dacca. It is a standard Communist
"peace" organization and presumably works under the
guidance of the international Communist "peace"
movement.
None of these front organizations is presently a major or even
a significant force in Pakistan. The membership of the various fronts
is small. and to a considerable extent duplicating.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
The Pakistan Constituent Assembly, which serves both as a central
legislature and as a constitution-making body, has among its 79 members
three known Communist sympathizers. There are no known Communists or
sympathizers in the executive branch of the central government, and there
are very few in the provincial governments. With the exposure of the
Rawalpindi conspiracy, the Pakistan armed forces are believed now to be
substantially free of Communist influence at any level. And there is no
indication of extensive Communist infiltration into the police and security
forces of the states and central government.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
The Communist Party itself has virtually no impact on Pakistani
public opinion, but some Communist influence is nonetheless exercised
through front organizations and psrty-controlled or influenced publications.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFO 0
IX. C01240IST INFILTRATICN OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
The Jama'at-i-Islam, a right-wing religious-political organization
devoted to furthering the principles of Islam, is known to have limited
relationships with Communist front organizations, but the degree of
Communist infiltration is insignificant.
The small Pakistan Socialist Party has had some association with
Pakistan Communists since its break with India's Socialist Party in 1947.
A more important organization, the Azad Pakistan Party, which was
founded in Lahore in 1950, is reported to have a Communist cell within
its ranks. The leading figures in the Azad Pakistan Party are the wealthy
Punjabi fellow travellers, Mian Iftikharuddin and Shaukat Hayat Khan.
Communist influence in this leftist party is therefore believed to be
substantial.
The Jinnah Awami Moslem. League, which has thus far constituted the
principal opposition to the dominant Moslem League, includes among its
members a few known Communists and sympathizers. Their influence is
presumably of some consequence although the party cannot be classified
as Communist-controlled.
The Civil Liberties Union of West Pakistan, an organization whose
chief aim is to promote agitation against the provincial and central
governments on the issue of civil liberties, is considered a united front
of several opposition parties rather than a Communist-controlled organ-
ization. Its leaders have, however, included prominent Communists and
sympathizers.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Two students' papers, the Students' Voice and the Students' Herald,
about which few details are available, are believed to be the only outright
Communist periodicals in Pakistan.
Pro-Communist domestic publications are the Pakistan Times of Lahore,
published by Mian Iftikharuddin, with a circulation of 18,000-?_0,000; the
Socialist, with a circulation of 1,000; and Imroze2 also published by
Iftikharuddin, with a circulation of 3,000.
Printing establishments available to Communists, if not under
Communist control, are the People's Publishing House in Lahore,, the
Pakistan Times Press in Lahore, and the Imroze Press in Karachi and Lahore.
The quality of the work done by these publishing houses is good.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
There is a substantial flow of Communist propaganda material into
Pakistan from India, the United Kingdom, and from Soviet/satellite countries.
Imports of periodicals from the USSR were halted by the Pakistan author-
ities after the disclosure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy in March 1951.
However, the Soviet Embassy, the Czechoslovak Legation, and the Chinese
Communist Embassy provide channels for the inflow of Communist books,
pamphlets, and periodicals. Communist books and pamphlets are sold widely
and cheaply in Pakistan cities.
The Soviet Embassy in Karachi issues occasional press releases in
the Bengali and Sindhi languages and a regular weekly bulletin in Urdu.
The Communist Party of Pakistan has no domestic radio facilities and
no apparent influence over radio programs. Moscow programs beamed to India
and Pakistan are broadcast daily in English, Hindustani, and Bengali. A
program from Tashkent, in English and perhaps Bengali, is also beamed to
India and Pakistan daily.
XI. FINANCIAL C0NDITION
The Communist Party of Pakistan apparently has limited funds. For
a period of more than a year, from March 1950 to May 1951, the party in
West Pakistan is reported to have spent only the equivalent of US $8000
to ?$10,000. Available information is that the East Pakistan party is
chronically in financial difficulties and presumably financially weaker
than the West Pakistan organization.
Sources of Communist Party income, in addition to or apart from
subsidies from abroad, are membership dues, donations, levies on the
incomes of party members, sales of propaganda material (supplied in largest
part from abroad by the Communist movement), and, it is reported, profits
from trade with the Coimnznist bloc.
No data are available as to the absolute or relative importance of
these various sources of income. A Karachi firm entitled Traders is reported
to have been set up under Commmznist Party auspices to conduct trade with
the USSR, with the profits to be divided on a 30-70 basis between the firm
and the party; no information has been received as to success or failure
of this enterprise.
XII. SOVIET-SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Official missions from the Communist bloc countries to Pakistan.
are the Soviet Embassy, with a staff of 14 officials; the Chinese Communist
Embassy, with eight official personnel; the Czechoslovak Legation, the
Polish Trade Mission, and the Hungarian Trade Mission. These three
European satellite missions have a total of seven officials and an unknown
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 -p-roved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 12 -
number of clerks. The Soviet and Chinese missions engage in limited overt
propaganda activities as the dissemination
showing of motionfpicturestions like
New Times and
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
None of the Communist international organizations maintains offices
in Pakistan.
Pakistani representatives appear frequently at meetings of Communist
international organizations. Recent movements of Pakistani Communists
and sympathizers to Communist meetings abroad are summarized in the
table:
llowin
f
g
o
Date Size of Pakistan
Meeting Delegation
International Economic Conference
aratory Committee) (Copenhagen) Oct. 1, 1951
(Pre
1
p
World Peace Council (Vienna) Nov. 1-7, 1951
2-3
2
rld Economic Conference (Moscow) Apr. 3-10, 1952
W
17-
3
o
Peace Movement (Peiping) May 28, 1952
5
Vienna Peace Congress (Vienna) Dec. 1952
4
South Asian Conference of Youth and Feb. 19-28, 1948
9
Students (co-sponsored by WFDY
and IUS) (Calcutta)
Asian-Pacific Peace Conference (Peiping) Oct. 2-12, 1952
30
World Congress of Peoples for Peace Dec.12-20, 1952
(Vienna)
1st International Conference in Defense Apr.12-16, 1952
of Children (sponsored by WIDF)
(Vienna)
XIV. COI1MTJNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
No detailed information is available on Communist communications
systems and techniques in Pakistan. The geographic separation of East and
West Pakistan poses a difficult communications problem for the Communist
party in Pakistan; in practice, at least, party units in East Pakistan
appear to be under the direction of the Indian Communist Party rather than
under the authority of the Pakistan Party.
South Asian Stalinist parties have traditionally looked to the
British Communist Party for guidance, and Communist emissaries to the
subcontinent have frequently been from UK or Commonwealth Stalinist groups
Coommunist, who representedethe Ernest
in the past. a .hi,hCrankingsAustralianCommunists
Thornton., g
SECRET - SECURITY INFORIATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
World Federation of Trade Unions at the 1950 conference of the Pakistan
Trade Union Federation; T. E. McWhinnie of the WFTU secretar3,at, who
was in Lahore in February 1952; and Ivor Montague of the World Peace
Council, also in Lahore in February 1952.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.17
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD]
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY SYRIA - LEBANON
OFFICE OF ThTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY I!1PORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword ? . . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ii
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I. Objectives . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . ... . ? . 1
He Tactics . . ? . ? ? ? ? . ? . ? . . . . . .. ? ? ? . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . .. ... . .. . .. 3
ASSETS 5
I. Numerical Strength .. .. . .... . .. .. .. 5
II. Electoral Strength .. ? ? .. ....... ? ? 6
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 6
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. . . . . ? .. ? 6
V. Communist Influence in Labor .. . . .. . .. . . 7
Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional. Organizations . . . ? . ? . . . . . . ? 8
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . ? . ? . . . 9.
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation ? . . 12
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . . . . . . . . 12
X. Communist Propaganda Media .. .. . . 12
XI. Financial Condition .. . .. . . ? . . 14
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets .. 15
XIII. Communist International organizations . ? . ? .. . ? 15
XIV. Communist Communication Network .. ? ? ? ? . ? . ? . 16
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
c__, ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN SYRIA AND LEBANON: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, the oldest, largest,
and best-organized Communist movement in the Arab world, was outlawed
in Syria in December 19+7 and in Lebanon in January 1948. Always
closely linked since their inception in 1924, the Syrian and Lebanese
Communist Parties became separate entities at the end of 1943, following
the dissolution of the Comintern, but by January 1951 had merged again
into a single organization.
Khalid Bakdash, a Moscow-trained Communist of Kurdish descent,
has been the leader and theoretician of the Communist movement in
Syria. and Lebanon since 1935. Bakdash, head of the joint Central
Committee of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party as now constituted,
and other highly-placed members of the Communist Party hierarchy and
the principal Partisans of Peace organizers in Syria and Lebanon are
in close contact with the Soviet Legations in Beirut, Lebanon, and
Damascus, Syria. Bakdash is believed also to coordinate Communist
activities in Iraq and to exercise a certain amount of influence over
the Jordanian Communist Party, which, however, is controlled by the
Arab Section of the Israeli Communist Party.
Syria and Lebanon are declared, from the Communist viewpoint,
to be in the phase of "democratic national liberation." The objectivckk.
are: (1) to put an end to "imperialist political and economic
domination" and eliminate the agents of the "imperialist powers"; (2) to
liquidate the remnants of feudalism in Syria and Lebanon; and (3) to
establish a popular democratic regime. In September 1952, Bakdash
described the specific duties of the party as follows: (1) extension
of the campaign.for peace and national independence through mass
movements against the military projects of the Western powers and
against the "treacheries" of the rulers in Syria and Lebanon; (2) the
establishment of democratic freedom for the masses; (3) dissemination
of propaganda concerning the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union;
(4) attraction to the Partisans of Peace of the masses and notables,
irrespective of social position, even regardless of their opinions of
the internal situation.
II. TACTICS
The Communist Party in Syria has been forced to slacken both
overt and covert activities since the establishment of the Silu-Shishakli
military regime, though some front organization activity persists. The
Partisans of Peace operates legally in Lebanon, where most party energy
is channeled into "peace" activities. Communist strategy in both
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
countries continues to be concerned primarily with: (1) strengthening
the labor unions and extending the labor movement among the unorganized
masses; (2) encouraging political activity among the workers, particularly
in support of "peace" and in opposition to the military projects of the
"imperialist" powers; (3) organizing activities among the peasants in
support of their demands for land and water. The holding of peasant
conferences and the formation of committees to defend and direct these
demands is an immediate goal.
Propaganda targets for the creation of a people's-national front
movement have been members of government, the.press, minorities
(particularly the Armenians, the.Greek Orthodox, and the Kurds), teachers,
student groups, intellectual and professional elements, women's
organizations, and villagers. Up to the present, Soviet and Communist
propaganda has made progress primarily by capitalizing on the parallels
between (1) its alleged goals and those of local nationalism, and (2)
the rising discontent of the urban bourgeoisie with the corruption,
self-interest, and monopoly of power of the governing groups.
Communist agitation among industrial workers in Syria has never
reached serious proportions. Only two unions are considered to be under
threat of Communist control, the Mechanical Loom Operators (Aleppo, no
estimate of membership) and the Mechanics (Damascus, 187 members).
Communist membership in these two unions is probably small. In Lebanon,
Mustafa al-'Aria, the leading Communist, is president of both the
Printers' and Typesetters' Union and of the Federation of Labor Unions,
an unincorporated body of some 19 unions. Of an estimated total
Federation membership of 10,000, only a small portion (300) can be
considered Communist. The majority of the members are leftist or
neutral and willing to benefit from 'Aris'e enegetic leadership. The
Hotel, Cafe, and Restaurant Union (800 members) is powerful and
Communist-controlled. 'Aris is also a member of the Executive Committee
of the World Federation of Trade Unions and has been a delegate to
many Communist World Congresses.
Few Communists in Syria and Lebanon pay regular dues, and the
party depends largely upon contributions from wealthier members and
sympathizers. Some of the contributions go toward party operations,
most of the money being used for Partisan of Peace campaigns and special
causes for which appeal is made locally. It is assumed that funds are
also received from various outside sources, through the Soviet Legations
or in the form of "presents" from front groups abroad.
The Communists have never succeeded in electing their candidates
to either the Syrian or Lebanese Parliaments. In the 1951 Lebanese
general elections, however, it is believed that only direct interference
by the government prevented the elections of at least one pro-Communist
deputy.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
_3 -
III. CAPABILITIES
Communist capabilities for recruitment appear greatest among
the students and professional men, especially those in the legal
profession. Strongly nationalist reactions among politically sensitive
elements in Syria and Lebanon against the Western "imperialist" and the
US and UK role in the establishment of Israel have tended to make even
wealthier men sympathetic toward the USSR as the enemy of the US and the
UK. Some of these have become interested in Communism, or at least in
participating in various front activities. This same intense nationalism,
however, is also a danger to the Communist movement and has caused
considerable deviationism within party ranks.
The general trend in the area toward some form of socialism is
a factor which the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party has been able to exploit.
Lack of ideological sophistication among the various socialist parties
of Syria and Lebanon has also made it relatively easy for the Communists
to penetrate into some of them.
The strongest factor limiting Syro-Lebanese Communist Party
effectiveness is that the party promotes the interests of a foreign
country -- the Soviet Union. Communism is also still widely held to
be anti-religious and to be destructive off.mily life. Religion and
family life are the two poles around which the life of the average
Syrian and Lebanese revolves. Communism has had the strongest appeal
for groups looking for outside support for nationalist or separatist
demands, but the enthusiasm of some of these groups for the USSR has
been noticeabZr tempered by a dislike of Communism as a political and
economic system and by an antipathy toward all foreign,_including
Soviet, control. The working class in Syria and Lebanon contains large.
numbers of religious and ethnic minorities -- especially Armenians --
whose leadership cannot easily be imposed on Arabs and Moslems. The
Kurds have shown a reluctance to join a Soviet-led Kurdish independence
movement in the absence of large-scale Soviet support. Among the
villages, in the autonomy-minded Druze and Alawite areas and among the
tribesmen in the Jazirah, the predominant concern with regional and
clan loyalties, rather than a political or class-conscious awareness
of economic, social, and ideological problems is the principal barrier
to Communist effectiveness among the masses. Widespread illiteracy
among the workers and peasants of Syria has hampered the spread of
written propaganda.
Before the advent of reform-minded governments in Syria and
Lebanon during 1952, nationalist organizations, both of the left and
the right, accomplished much of the disruptive work the Communists
SECRET- SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-4+ -
would normally have expected to do themselves. Major Communist
opportunity in Syria and Lebanon appears to lie not in the present
strength of the movement itself, but in the weaknesses of the regimes
in power.
The Syro-Lebanese Communist Party remains incapable of developing
effective cadres in rural and urban areas and has not yet overcome the
cultural and political estrangement of intellectuals from workers, city
from countryside. Communism, theoretically appreciated according to
Stalinist classics, and energetically pursued, appears to be embodied
in Syria and Lebanon in only a handful of over-worked leaders. Should
the present ruling groups fail to remedy the outstanding social and
economic inequities in Syria and Lebanon, however, the traditional
bulwarks against Communism will be seriously weakened.
SECRET -.SECURITYINFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
C0141UNISM IN SYRIA AND LEBANON: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
Always closely linked since their inception in 1923, the
Lebanon and Syrian Communist Parties split along geographical lines
after the dissolution of the Comintern in 1944, but merged again into
a single organization in January 1951. The Syrian section, which is
closely supervised by the party's founder and prime mover, a Kurdish
Moslem named Khalid Bakdash, has traditionally been stronger than the
Lebanese. However, under the increasingly authoritarian Silu-Shishakli
regime, Syrian Communists have been severely hampered in their activities
in the past year, and the party is now virtually inactive in Damascus.
The most recent estimates place the total Syrian membership in
the neighborhood of 10,000 and the Lebanese at around 15,000; if sympa-
thizers are included, these figures might be increased to 12,000 in the
case of Syria, and 20,000 in Lebanon. There are approximately 30 front
organizations in Lebanon, and some 25 such groups in Syria.
From its beginning, the Syrian Communist Party made particular
efforts to recruit among minorities with nationalist or separatist
aspirations, or among those with a keen sense of their unequal position
in the Syrian state -- Kurds, Alawites, Druzes, and Armenians. An
estimated 45 percent of the total party membership in Syria are
Armenians. Among the Moslems, the party has attracted professional men,
writers, lawyers, students, and white collar workers. Except for
Palestine Arab refugees, few workers and peasants have thus far joined,
and Communist influence is not significant among the labor unions.
There are perhaps 2,500 hard-core Communists in Syria; and around
4,500 in Lebanon, coming mainly from trade unions and minority groups.
The leaders of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Party have demonstrated
little discipline, initiative, or administrative ability, leaving the
accomplishment of their party's tasks to particular individuals, rather
than to effective cadres. Moreover,'as Bakdash has asserted, they
"usually think only within the framework of the situation and activities
of existing branch committees and cells 5nd often within 7 narrow
provincialism which does not look beyond its quarter or city....They
do not think of anything new." There is also a high turnover in
personnel in both the Syrian and Lebanese sections.
Communist Party membership in both Syria and Lebanon is con-
centrated principally in the cities and larger towns. The following is
a rough estimate of the distribution of party strength by towns:
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Syria Lebanon.
Aleppo ....4,000 Beirut ........8,000
Damascus ..2,000 Tripoli ........ 4s,000
Horns ......1,000 Mount Lebanon..3,000
Latakia ...l,000
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
Although Communism was legally outlawed in December 1947 in Syria
and in January 1948 in Lebanon, the party has continued to present
candidates in local and national elections in both countries. In April
1951, for example, a known Communist candidate was permitted to ran
openly for public office in the Lebanese general elections. In Syria,
the Democratic National Front, a Communist political front organization,
presented a list of its candidates for the Syrian national elections held
in 1949. In both contests, however, the Communists were defeated, regis-
tering some strength only in Beirut, Aleppo, and Damascus.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The Lebanese Communist Party habitually attempts to exploit local
dissidence and unrest by organizing mass demonstrations and riots -- or
more commonly projecting themselves into those already taking place.
Although Communists in Damascus are disinclined to risk a serious clash
with the armed forces, particularly the security police, they are known
to have participated in demonstrations by both leftist and rightist
groups. On October 12, 1951, aPartisans of Peace meeting in Horns clashed
with police and was broken up with the temporary arrest of more than 100
of the estimated 800 participants; seven Communists were arrested. Before
Colonel Shishakli's coup in November 1951 there were reports of clashes
between small groups of Communists and members of the anti-Communist
Syrian Social National Party, nearly all of which occurred in the Latakia
area. Since the coup, Communist demonstrations and open clashes with
opponents have virtually. ceased.
The party is said to have terrorist and goon squads in the Aleppo
area; but their numbers are probably small and their equipment scanty.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD C04MUNISM
Although both the Syrian and Lebanese parties have been legally
proscribed, successive Syrian and Lebanese administrations, with the
exception of the short-lived, firmly anti-Communist Za'im regime in Syria
in 1949, have not been consistent in their efforts to curtail Communist
activities. It has been only recently that the Silu-Shishakli government
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFOBN TICN
in Syria has clamped down on Communist -- including front organization -
activities. It refused exit visas to delegates to the Berlin Youth
Festival. Partisans of Peace pamphlets have been seized and distributors
of tracts sent to prison. Demonstrations have been frustrated in
Damascus, but the police found it more difficult to cope with Communist
and front organization activities in Aleppo and Homs, which are located
in expanding industrial and agricultural areas. The illegal Syrian
Communist Party confined its overt activities to issuing pamphlets and
staging demonstrations, but was aided also by several Syrian newspapers
which have often echoed the Communist line.
The party has more freedom in Lebanon, where Communist printing
facilities operate with only occasional obstruction from the Lebanese
security forces. Beirut is the regional headquarters for Communist
propaganda, and Communist literature printed locally and abroad is
disseminated to other countries uncensored by the Lebanese authorities.
V. C04MUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
The manipulative labor strength of the Lebanese Communist Party
is exceedingly small and is concentrated in essentially non-strategic
labor organizations. In the Lebanese "Federation of Labor Unions", an
unincorporated body of some 19 unions headed by the prominent Communist
Mustapha 'Aris, only about 300 workers of the total 10,000 membership are
estimated to be Communist Party members. Only the independent Lebanese Hotel
Cafes, and Restaurant Workers Union (approximately 800 members) is
Communist-dominated.
The Conzress of Syrian Workers is the oldest and the major
Communist front organization among Syrian labor, having been formed under
Communist auspices in 1945. This clandestine organization, which'claimed
a membership of 17,250 (probably greatly exaggerated) in 1950, is
affiliated with the WFTU.
The Congress has not been successful owing to poor discipline and
to opposition from both labor and government. On the propaganda front,
it has not been nearly as active or as effective as the "peace" groups.
In December 1951, in conjunction with the Republican Student's Party,
it unsuccessfully attempted to stir up a public protest against the
repression of student groups in Barcelona and.the jailing of pro-
Communist individuals in Greece.
Key Communist labor organizers from Lebanon (Sa'd ad-Din Mu'minah,
liaison man between the Syrian and Lebanese Communist labor movements),
Jordan (Muhammad Qasim) and Syria (Ibrahim Bakri) and Iraq (Muhammad
Fallah) were reported to have attended a congress in Damascus in
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
January 1952 over which Bakri presided. The following items were said
to have been on the agenda: (1) the formation of a regional union of
Near Eastern workers; (2) propaganda work within the unions; (3) bettering
the economic condition of the workers; and (4) propaganda against the
Western powers.
The Society for the Salvation of the Worker. This Syrian group,
with a current total membership of about 150, established itself in the
fall of 1950 in the town of Masyaf, in the Alawite area. Generally it
has been ineffectual in organizing labor groups in this region. Communist
labor agitation occurs from time to time in Aleppo and Latakia but as yet
has not reached serious proportions.
According to available data, only two independent Syrian unions
are under Communist control: the Mechanical Loom Operators' Union of
Aleppo (membership unknown) and the Mechanics' Union of Damascus (187
members). There are no unions or guilds in Syria which can be classified
as strategic.
VI. CON1UEIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL. CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
There are six main categories of front organizations in both Syria
and Lebanon: women's organizations, intellectuals' organizations, youth
groups, student groups, labor groups, and religious groups. In all of
these, the main propaganda theme is "peace".
A. Syria
1. The Partisans of Peace movement was built up around an inner core
of Communists and dependable fellow-travelers who planned recruitment of
members and formulated operations and propaganda programs. All of the
members of the original Syrian National Committee of the Partisans of
Peace were prominent members of the Communist Party in Syria. They formed
the core of the expanded National Committee of 12 as it existed in 1951.
By December 1951, branches had been established in all parts of Syria
except Jebel Druze, and the National Committee had managed to penetrate
the Surety Generale, the Deuxi6me Bureau, most of the government ministries,
and a number of the political parties in Syria. No figures are available
on the total membership. Financing appears to have been handled locally.
2. Women's Organizations have been established mainly by Communist
member Miss Falak Tarazi, a lawyer by education. The daughter of the
late Nuhanmad 'Ali al-'Abid, one-time President of Syria from June 1932
to December 1936, she is a protege of Mrs. Zahra' al-'Abid, president of
the non-Communist Syrian League of Women's Clubs. Most of the members
of the women's groups listed below are from the minority communities .
None of these organizations is large or influential and membership on
these groups probably overlaps to a considerable degree.
SECRY - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECTRITY INFORMATION
a. The League of Syrian Nationalist Women for the Defense of
Peace is believed to have been organized by Miss Tarazi and Wisal Farhat
Mrs. Khalid Bakdash) in September 1949. Little has been heard of its
activities.
b. The-League of Syrian Women for the Protection of Motherhood
and Childhood has been the most active of all women's front organizations.
Membership is drawn primarily from Kurdish, Greek Orthodox, and other
minority elements. They have on a number of occasions called at the US
and other Legations in Damascus to deliver their messages,
c. The-Women's Section of the Democratic Youth Organization.
The women's section had about 100 members in December 1950. Activities
of this group centered at Qamishliyah in the Jazirah (the Kurdish-
Assyrian center).
d. The League of Democratic Women as of May 1951 had a membership
of about 150 in Syria? Headquarters were in Damascus at the home of
Aminah 'Aril, wife of Najah Qassab Hasan of the Communist Party's
Damascus Regional Committee. Most of the members appear to be from
Christian and Kurdish minority elements. Activities centered on organ-
izing-female students in support of peace and on spreading pro-Soviet
propaganda in general.
e. The League for Women's Rights. Little is known about its
membership.
3. Student Organizations are believed to be confined to male students,
in conformity with the general custom of segregation of the sexes followed
in Near Eastern.countries, notwithstanding the contrary aims of other
Communist front groups.
a. The Student Youth Movement in Syria and Lebanon was headed
by Wasfi al-Bunni of Homs and Ridwan al-Shahhal of Tripoli, both very
active Communists. Bunni has recently been arrested in Syria and if his
claim of Soviet nationality is upheld he will be deported to the USSR.
b. The League of Democratic Students reportedly has a large
membership. The leaders were reported to be five Syrian University
students, one of whom, M,iharmad Amin, is the brother of the leader of the
Partisans of Peace in Syria. The activities of this group are centered
in the Syrian University and in the Third Tajhiz (government secondary
school) in Damascus.
c. Gob Sonen Hawi was founded in 1943 after the Kurdish Congress
in Erivan as a Kurdish student organization.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORM TION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
4. Youth Organizations
a. The League of Democratic Youth actively participated in
intensified front organization "peace" and "neutrality" propaganda
in Damascus. Membership is largely from the minority elements.
b. Heina, a Kurdish youth organization, was represented at.
the Berlin Youth Festival. It is reported to have begun to form
branches in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.
5. Organizations of Intellectuals,
a. The Lea a of ian Writers, a group of Communists and
fellow-travelers headed Ilya Dayrani, a member of the Greek Orthodox
Community in Syria. He is reported to be a Communist and a teacher
employed in the primary school section of the Ministry of Public
Instruction. In May 1952, membership was composed of about 25 writers.
Two of these were considered Communists and the rest fellow-travelers.
The activity of this group consisted mainly. in contributing to the
press articles of topical interest to the Communist propaganda efforts.
Translations were made of various Russian authors such as Gorki and
Tolstoy to which prefaces containing "peace" propaganda were added.
b. The League of Democratic Lawyers was reported to consist
mainly of students at the law school of the Syrian nly University. In
May 1951 it was thought to have 35 adherents. Nassuh al-Ghaffari, a
well-known lawyer and Communist Party leader, is probably closely
connected with this group. Some adherents are in the Aleppo area*
c. The League of Democratic Teachers':membership has been
estimated a or 60, consisting mostly of young (male) teachers.
Kamal 'Ayyad and Jamil Salibah, its leaders, were prominent in Syrian
educational circles.
6. Religious Organizations
A Moslem branch of the Partisans of Peace movement in Syria
was reportedly formed in February 1951.
B. Lebanon
Front organizations in Lebanon follow the same general pattern
as those in Syria. As in Syria, the Partisans of Peace is an active
front group. The League of Democratic Women is in contact with the
Syrian League for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood. The
League of Democratic Students., and ague of Democratic Lawyers.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
also have branches in Lebanon. The Congress of Homeless Palestinians,
organized in 1949, is directed by Communist sympathizers in contact
with the Beirut Regional Committee of the Syro-Lebanese Communist
Party. It has branches at six refugee camps and at the American
University of Beirut. Firm action by University officials is be-
lieved to have greatly diminished Communist activity among the students.
The ruling that demonstrations cannot be held on University grounds
has proved a deterrent to Communist activity among American University
students.
"Zareh Nubar," a pro-Communist Armenian literary club was
recently formed in Beirut for the propagation of literature on Soviet
Armenia. Affiliated clubs are to be opened in Damascus and Aleppo,
Syria.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
Recent reports indicate that both the Syrian and Lebanese
Communist Parties have managed to place a number of their members
and sympathizers in the more sensitive agencies of the Syrian and
Lebanese Governments. Thus, for example, the Syrian Army's Deuxijae
Bureau and Police Security department are known to have been penetrated
by-several Communists who are currently supplying information to
local Communist regional committees concerning anticipated repressive
measures to be undertaken by the military and security forces against
the Syrian Communist Party.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
12 -
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
Communist penetration of the Syrian and Lebanese school system
is reported to have reached significant proportions. Communist activity
at present consists not so much of establishing Communist groups 'per se
among students or penetrating their existing organizations as in organ-
izing them into front groups. These groups exist not only in the Syrian
University in Damascus but also in its engineering school in Aleppo, in
the government secondary schools (particularly in Aleppo), and in schools
conducted by the. various religious communities in both countries
(particularly the Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities). The teaching
profession has been penetrated primarily at the university and government
secondary school level, especially in Syria. The dean of the Syrian
University is said to be a Communist and there are several professors
who may possibly be members. A number of Palestine Arab refugee teachers,
employed by the Syrian Ministry of Public Instruction, have been dis-
missed for "Communist tendencies." The only front organization aimed
specifically at the teaching profession appears to be the League of
Democratic Teachers.
Moreover, the government's official radio station in Damascus is
reported to be heavily penetrated by Communist Party members and fellow
travellers who have managed to secure relatively important administrative
and operational positions.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
Communist penetration of other Syrian political organizations,
such as the Arab Socialist and Resurrectionist Parties, was reported
to be quite extensive prior to the promulgation of a Shishakli-inspired
decree in April 1952 outlawing all Syrian political associations and
parties. The leaders of these parties were subsequently forced to flee
Syria after an abortive plot against the existing regime was uncovered.
Cells of a paramilitary character have reportedly been formed by the
neo-fascist Islamic Socialist Front in Aleppo. This group, an offspring
of the Ikhwan (Moslem Brethren) movement probably would not be adverse
to accepting Communist tactical support in subverting the present regime.
The Syrian Communist Party has also established some liaison with the
clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Gregorian Armenian community,
groups which maintain some influence with their own parochial political
organizations.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Beirut serves as the geographic focal point for the distribution
of Communist propaganda material in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq.
From Beirut, the clandestine party organs Nidal ash-Sha'b, As-Salem,
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 13 -
and al-Yanbu (Partisans of Peace publications which are currently
proscribed in Syria), and AlTaria are distributed to many of these
areas. Most of these papers suffer froi insolvency and local governmental
suppression. Consequently, they appear only sporadically.
Before its suppression early in 1951, the weekly organ Al-Sa
was said to have printed 4,000 copies per issue, but the proportion of
copies sold to those distributed free is not known. It may be signifi-
cant that, unlike other Syrian newspapers, most issues of -SaYam do
not have the price indicated on it. The paper was printed.at the Matba 'at
Dimashq (Damascus Press) in Damascus.
At-Tana is the monthly magazine published in Beirut by Antun
Tabit, head of the Partisans of Peace organization in Lebanon and possibly
also in Syria, where the magazine until,; recently circulated as well.
Nidal ash-Sha'b is a clandestine Syrian and Lebanese Communist
Party newspaper, probably printed in Beirut, which began to appear after
the closing of the party's paper Sawt ash-Aha'b in December 1947.
Vidal ash-Sha'b is published by a "Joint body.of the Syrian and Lebanese
Communist Parties," which Bakdash heads.
Prior to the general-emalgatation'of the press instigated by the
Shishakli regime in Septenbe, 1952, there were seven Syrian newspapers
which at times gave evidence :'of Communist influence. Many of these were
political party organs which, like other Syrian papers, had a small cir-
culation (not over 2,000 copies for each issue) and were financially
insolvent. These papers were: n-Nasr, a Damascus daily; Al-Ishtirakiyah,
a Damascus weekly; Al-Hurrivah, a daily published in Aleppo; Al-Manar,
of Damascus; A1-Hadarah, a Damascus daily; Al-Hawadith, an Aleppo daily;
and Sada al-Ittihad, a Latakia daily.
The Soviet campaign to subvert the Syrian press appears to date
from the beginning of 1948, following the suppression in December 1947
of the Beirut-published cwt ash-Sha.'b (Voice of the People), organ of
the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties. Soon after this event, Soviet
funds formerly allocated to this paper seem to have been diverted to
(1) supporting the clandestine Nidal ash-Sha % and pamphlets, and (2)
subsidizing and bribing of the editors and staff of existing newspapers.
A number of editors are reported to have been offered newsprint and/or
cash to adopt the Soviet line. The seven above-listed newspapers appear
to have succumbed to Communist blandishments.
Book publishing and distribution are now carried on from Beirut.
Some of the Beirut publications have recently turned up in England
and probably are circulating in Syria too. One volume which is
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION '
known to have been issued recently in Beirut is a tome by Vladimir
Pozner (member of the French Communist Party and ex-Hollywood screen
writer) called USA - The Land of Fictitious Liberties, translated into
Arabic by 'Abdallah Sha'ito.
No Russian-language publications are known to circulate in Syria.
Apart from the Soviet orbit, Paris is an important source of Communist
propaganda material. The Al-Yaqazah publishing house in Damascus prints
and distributes books translated from Russian into Arabic by the "League
of Syrian Writers." Distribution points for Communist literature include
the Gloria Bookshop in Beirut (owned and operated by Haygazun Najarian).
On sale at this shop is the official journal of the Cominform, printed
in Arabic, as well as The USSR in Construction, a propaganda tract from
Moscow, printed in French and English. The house of Aram Yeretizian, an
Armenian Communist who lives in the Noshajian area of the Armenian quarter
of Beirut, is the main center for all Communist pamphlet distribution among
the Beirut Armenians.
The Syrian Broadcasting. Station in Damascus on occasion broadcasts
materials, particularly in news commentaries, which parallels the Communist
propaganda line. The direction of the station has in the past been in-
filtratecl by leftist, if not actually Communist, personnel at a high level.
Ahmad ad-'Assih, a left-wing member of the Populist Party was director of
the station for a time in 1949 and since late 1951 has been Acting Director;
Kamal 'Ayyad, director in May 1951, was a leader of the front organization
called the League of Democratic Teachers and was a suspected Communist.
Najati Kassab Hasan, a Communist leader in Damascus, has assumed a position
of importance in local newspaper and radio circles. He is regularly pub-
lishing articles in the Damascus newspaper al-Nagaad and recently has
begun broadcasting over the Syrian Broadcasting System.
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
Few Communists in Syria and Lebanon pay regular dues, and the
party depends largely upon contributions from wealthier members. Some
of the contributions go toward party operations, most of the money being
used for Partisans of Peace campaigns and special causes for which appeal
is made locally. It is thought that funds are also regularly received
from various outside sources, through the Soviet Legation, or in the form
of presents from Communist groups abroad. Thus, for example, while no
Syrian publications are financed directly by the Soviet Union, cash sub-
sidies disguised'as payments for advertising space or bulk purchases of
particular issues are made by the Soviet press attache or by the TASS
Agency representative to these papers when they publish TASS articles.
This indirect form of subsidy avoids compromising the newspaper proprietor,
who frequently has little control over editorial policy, and the trans-
action is arranged privately between the editor and the Soviet press or
TASS representative.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Syrian Communist Party finances do not appear- to be on a budget
system, but are dispensed according to monthly commitments and resources.
Party dues and contributions from non-Communist friends seem to be per-
sonally disbursed by party leader Bakdash. However, the increased vigi-
lance of the security forces of the present anti-Communist Syrian Govern-
ment has severely hampered the fund-raising activities of the Communist
Party in Syria.
XII. SOVIET OFFICIAL ASSETS
The Soviet Legation in Beirut may be acting in part as the dis-
tributing center for Cominform material for Syria and Lebanon.- Its
activities in the propaganda field are both overt and covert; the latter
seem to be under the direction of Feodor Bespalov, Second Secretary of
the Soviet Legation. The Soviet Legation in Damascus appears to occupy a
secondary position in this respect.
The only two overt Soviet propaganda agencies in Syria are VOKS
and TASS. Although VOKS has an active center in Beirut, in Damascus it
seems to do very little in the way of overt work and appears to serve
mainly as a cover for the covert activities of the Second Secretary of
the Soviet Legation (Feodor.Pisarenko), which consist of (1) guiding the
propaganda and other activities of the local Communist Party into con-
formance with the party. line of international Communism, and (2)
collecting intelligence information.
TASS activities, until the recent Syrian Government clamp-down on
the press and on foreign information activities, appear to have had three
main aspects: (1) the distribution of TASS news and Soviet.Press Infor-
mation bulletins issued by the Press Section of the Soviet Legation in
Beirut; (2) the influencing of Syrian newspapers with cash or newsprint
to print Soviet-produced or inspired items and otherwise adopt a line.
favorable to the USSR; and (3) the transmission to.the USSR of local
press items, frequently planted, for propaganda use by the Soviet and
satellite press, radio, etc. In addition to being disseminated to the
press through regular TASS channels, TABS and Soviet Press Information
bulletins have been reported as having been distributed clandestinely
by hand following the ban imposed by the Syrian Government on all foreign
publications of this nature. The A1-Yagaza1c book shop iri D7i ascus, the
largest publishing house in Syria, is subsidized by the Soviet Legation.
XIII. COi?'Q4UNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Nearly all Communist front movements in Syria and Lebanon are
geared today to the theme of "peace". Responsibilit for organizing groups
in these two countries (and the Near Fast as a whole) was delegated to
Khalid Bakdash and to a Middle East regional office of the World Peace
Council, which was established in Beirut about May 1951. This office
formed a Lebanese National Committee for a Conference of Peoples of the
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Near and Middle East and North Africa which about December 1951 issued
a proclamation calling for the convening of such a conference to combat
Western inspired mutual security moves. No such meeting, however, ever
took place.
Six Lebanese delegates attended the Berlin Youth Festival held in
July 1951. They were: Victor Mughabghad, Kamil Mohammad Tawfiq al-Harb,
Robert Vahan Garabedian, Khalil 'Ali, Philippe Iskandar al-Rasi, and
Ilyas Musa Fahad. All of these returning delegates were subsequently held
for trial by the Lebanese Surete' Ggn;&rale.
Despite an official Lebanese security board decision not to approve
passports of any Lebanese intending to participate in the Moscow Economic
Conference of April 1952, a hitherto little-known Lebanese, Hussayn
Sij'han, was able to attend by travelling via Egypt and Czechoslovakia.
Upon his return to Beirut,Sijthan was eminently successful in acquiring
audiences among the businessmen of the community to listen to his glowing
praise of life in the Soviet Union.
The leader of the Partisans of Peace in Lebanon, Antun Tabit,
presented a report to a session of the International Peace. Council which
met in Berlin in July 1952. It dealt with the "Struggle of the Middle
Eastern people for peace and against war."
Khalid Bakdash was accompanied by Mustafa al-tAris, Farajallah
al-Hilu, Wasfi Bunni, Artin Madoyan, and Ohannes Aghabashian to the 19th
Communist Party Congress, which convened in Moscow in October 1952. At
this meeting Bakdash personally addressed the October 11 session and
promised that "we, the Communists of Syria and Lebanon will do our best to'
be worthy of the great honor of being called Stalints disciples."
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The Soviet Legation in Beirut is the distributing center for
Cominform and front organizations material for Syria and Lebanon. Beirut
is the nodal point of Communist propaganda in Syria as well as Lebanon,
Iraq, and Jordan. Khalid Bakdash and other highly-placed members of the
Communist Party hierarchy, such as officials of the central command and
the principal Partisans of Peace organizers, are in close contact with
the Soviet Legations in Damascus and Beirut.' From the central command
of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party, printed propaganda and directives
are handed down to the Regional Committees. Instructions are sometimes
delivered directly to representatives of district committees by the
central committee, thus by-passing the regional committees. It is believed
that theArmenian section of the party has its own lines for channeling
directives and propaganda.
SECRET - SECURITY INFOPMTION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET'- SECURITY INFORMATION
The Aleppo regional cormiittee is-said to have 20 shock groups
(terrorist squads), having no fixed headquarters, whose personnel is known
only to the Regional Committee. The personnel of these groups is also
.used for courier service between Aleppo and Damascus and between Aleppo po and
the regions under its jurisdiction (Deir ez-Zor and Qamishliyah).
clandestine newspaper Nidal ash-Sha'b,'the Lebanese Partisans of Peace
periodical At Ta , tracts, and other publications are delivered from
Beirut to Aleppo via Tripoli and Homs. Official party circulars and
instructions are transmitted from Damascus by courier, and presumably
are received direct from the Soviet Legation. Subversive printed matter
is said to be given out by the Soviet Legation in Beirut for smuggling
into Turkey via the Kurdish areas of north Syria. .
SECRET - SECURITY INFOR1TION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.18
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, TUNISIA
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION,
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . .
1
I. Objectives . . . . ? . .
1
He Tactics . ? . . . . . . . .
1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . ? . . .
1
ASSETS . . ? . . ? . . ? ? .
4
I. Numerical Strength . _ . . ..
~+
He Electoral Strength ? ? ? ? ?.. ? ? . ? ? ? ?
1.
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 4
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism .. . .
?
5
V. Communist Influence in Labor ? . . .
.
5
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations .. ..
.
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . ? ? ? ? ?
. ?
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation .
. .
6
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
6
Parties . . . . .. . . . ? ? ? ? . . . . ? . ?
. .
X. Communist Propaganda Media ? . .. . ? . ? . . . ?
..
6
XI. Financial Condition .. . ? . . . ? ? ? ? . . ? .
. ?
6
XII. Soviet-.Satellite Official Assets . . . . .. .. .
. ?
6
XIII. Communist International organizations . ... . .
. .
6
XIV. Communist Communication Network ? ? . ? . ? ? . ?
? ?
7
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to. achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN TUNISIA: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I . OBJECTIVES
The over-riding immediate goal of the Tunisian Communist Party
has been to persuade the local independence movements to join with
the Communists in a united national front in preparation ultimately
for a revolution for "national liberation" and against French control
and American imperialism. In the meantime, as in the rest of French
North Africa, the Communists are seeking, through propaganda, to destroy
sympathy for the US and the UN, to foster suspicion of Western defense
plans and to increase local hostility toward the French administration.
The serious economic grievances of the population also receive
attention from the Communists. To achieve its immediate goals, however,
the Tunisian Communist Party is faced above all with the task of
reversing the steady trend toward decline in its membership and
influence.
II. TACTICS
Having 'failed thus far in achieving a common front with the
nationalists, the Communists have attempted instead to participate,
uninvited, in strikes, demonstrations and riots initiated by the
nationalists, encouraging any tendency toward violence. Similarly,
Communist propaganda pamphlets have dealt at times entirely with
nationalist grievances and aspirations without placing them in a
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework. Thus, in pretending to make the
nationalist cause their own, the Communists try to impress upon the
popular mind the need and desirability of a common front. Occasionally,
such tactics are accompanied by attacks on the nationalist leadership
for their refusal to join them in a united national front, for
demonstrating faith in the US or the UN, or for cooperating or conducting
negotiations with the French. Moreover, Communists have been known to
facilitate the arrest of nationalists and to have claimed credit for
successful nationalist demonstrations.
III. C BILITIES
To date, the small Tunisian Communist Party has had practi-
cally no influence on the nationalist movement, largely because (1) the
nationalists realize that such ties would alienate many. sympathizers
in non-Communist areas, (2) the local Communist parties are largely
French in membership, and (3) the present nationalist leadership is
aware of the opportunistic nature of Communism and the devotion of
Communism to a foreign power whose domination the nationalists would
dislike as much as they do that of the French.
The capabilities of the Tunisian Communist Party at this time
remain minimal, either for achieving its own current local objectives
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
or for furthering Soviet policy. It has always been evidenced by the
notable failure of its efforts to persuade the nationalists ---
especially the principal nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, and the
labor federation allied to it - to form a united national front with
the Communists. The Communist labor federation, USTT (Union .
Syndicale des Travailleurs de Tunisie) has been unable to penetrate
the nationalist UGTT (Union G(ner'ale Tunisienne du Travail) to any
appreciable degree. Moreover, the USTT has been completely outmaneuvered
by the nationalists whose rival union has steadily gained in membership
and influence at the expense of the Communists. There is little
likelihood of an early improvement in the caliber of Communist leadership
in the party or its labor federation.
The French Government throughout 1952 has been increasingly firm
in its repression of the Tunisian Communist Party. Some of the non-
Tunisian leaders have been deported, and virtually all of the others
are being held under arrest. Both of its newspapers are suspended,
and a clandestinely printed substitute for its proscribed French-
language weekly, plus occasional mimeographed pamphlets and leaflets,
,represent the maximum of its apparent propaganda capabilities at this
time. The Communist labor federation maintains its strongest position
in port, mining, electrical communications, and railway but it lacks
the strength to produce a complete tie up by strikes in even a single
industry without the assistance of at least one or more of. the other
three Tunisian labor federations.
The effective leadership of the Tunisian Communist Party and
almost all of the hard-core has always been European. With the
membership estimated now at not more than 4,000, this probably still
remains true.
If the effectiveness of its leadership were not at such a low
point, the Communist potentials in Tunisia, even given the present
membership, might present a totally different picture. During the
past year, a political atmosphere has developed in which an astute
Communist leadership might find more fertile ground than at any time
since the end of World War II. This situation is the outgrowth of a
combination of factors, including (1) severe French repressive actions
against the nationalists, (2) the exile or arrest of the principal
Neo-Destour party and union leaders, (3) the death of the able,
influential labor chief, Ferhat Hached, (4) the total lack of Neo-
Destour progress in achieving nationalist aims during the past two
years, and'.(5).the greater inclination of Tunisian nationalists to
accept aggressive tactics as evidenced by increasing riots and
sabotage. However, the Tunisian Communist Party appears at this time
to be too impoverished financially and too feeble in membership,
SFLRI T - SECURITY INFORMAITION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
organization, leadership, and influence to capitalize on the
opportunity presented by nationalist frustrations and the temporary
dislocations among the relatively moderate, anti-Communist, and
experienced top Neo-4)estour leadership.
The Communists will probably continue their efforts to join forces
with the nationalists. In the longer run, there remains some danger
that should the nationalists fail to achieve their objectives they would
accept Communist support rather than look to the West. While it
presently remains doubtful that the Communists will capture control of
the nationalist movement in Tunisia, Communist influence might ultimately
induce the nationalist groups to adopt more anti-Western policies and
more frequently to resort to direct action.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
Exact figures on the membership of the Tunisian Communist Party
are not available. But from what is known of the party and the scope of
its activities, a maximum estimate would be 3,000 members. There are,
in addition, probably a thousand or so "fellow travelers." It may,
therefore, be concluded in the light of these estimates, that the
Communists control only about one-tenth of one percent of the total
population of the country. Because of the relative weakness of the
Co-!imunists, it is difficult to estimate their geographical distribution.
It is, however, safe to assume that they possess cells in most, if not
all, of the principal cities. Information regarding Communist strength
in the countryside is not available. Information is also lacking with
regard to the proportion of Communist "militants" within the party
ranks. The relatively limited scope of Communist agitation would,
however, indicate that the number of party "militants" is very likely
less than one thousand. Leadership of the party, in contrast to that
of the nationalists, has not been outstanding.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
No popular elections have ever been held in Tunisia. In local
elections, only a restricted number of natives can vote. Hence it is
not possible to form any reliable estimate of the proportion of the
local population which might be induced to vote Communist.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Although there have been many violent demonstrations and acts of
sabotage in Tunisia during the past two years, some may but none are
known to have been initiated by the Communists. Political violence of
this type has usually been traceable directly to the Tunisian nationalists;
however, the Communists regard an increase in tension between the
nationalists and the French as favorable to their own interests. For this
reason, it is possible that Communist agitators have helped to provoke
incidents leading to violence. If this has been the case, however, they
have been careful to remain in the background. In the light of present
information, it appears that the Tunisian Communist Party, because of its
lack of popular support, is unable to rally sizable elements of the
population to violent action except insofar as it can capitalize upon
nationalist sentiment aroused by other groups.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-5-
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The Tunisian Communist Party was recognized as a legal political
party in 1943, and was permitted to operate with relative freedom for
some years thereafter. But during the past two or three. years the French
authorities have steadily restricted its activities. During the riots
of early 1952, several Communist leaders were arrested, and some are still
under detention. After the murder of the prominent Tunisian labor leader
Ferhat Hached in December 1952, additional Communist leaders were arrested,
and Communist publications were suspended. Today, Communist meetings and
demonstrations are prohibited, and foreign Communist newspapers are banned.
No information is available concerning t_he present underground activities
of the Tunisian Communists.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LABOR
The number of Communists in key industries is not known. For
several years the Communists have controlled one of four labor federations
the Union Syndicate des Travailleurs de Tunisia (USTT). In 1948 the
strength of this organization was estimated by the French authorities at
between 25,000 and 26,000 members. But the USTT is known to have since,
lost a great many of its members to the. nationalist unions and to other
labor groups. The exact extent of its numerical decline, though
considerable, is not known.
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
After World War II, the Communists in Tunisia followed their usual
practice of establishing organizations with seemingly nonpolitical ob-
jectives. These groups included -- in addition to labor unions -- youth
groups, cultural societies, peace groups, women's organizations and social
service groups. But these organizations did not flourish, and today the
few that remain are relatively inactive. Now that the French authorities
have undertaken rigorously to curtail Communist activity in Tunisia, the
membership and activities of such "front" groups may be expected to decline
still further.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
No information is available concerning the number of Communists
and Communist sympathizers at the higher levels of the government, including
the armed forces. Undoubtedly, however, the number is quite small, for
the French policy is to remove such persons whenever found. Figures are
likewise lacking with regard to the number of Communists and sympathizers
in those agencies of government administering nationalized industries. It
appears likely, however, that Communists occupy some low-level jobs in
ports, railroads, telegraph and telephone installations, and mining
operations.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
VIII. COT01UNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
The publication of Communist newspapers has been suspended
indefinitely by the French authorities in Tunisia. Inasmuch as radio
broadcasting is government-controlled, the Communists exert no influence
through that medium. There is no indication that Communists have infil-
trated religious organizations in Tunisia. Though some Communist school
teachers have been reported, they are not thought to be numerous.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
No information is available concerning Communist penetration of
non-Communist political parties in Tunisia. Repeated Communist attempts
to forra a coalition with the Neo-Destour, the principal nationalist party,
have been rebuffed in terms so strong as to indicate that Communist in-
fluence in the leading circles of that party is negligible. Some leaders
in the Old-Destour Party, one of the smaller nationalist groups, have at
times collaborated in specific Communist-front activities.
X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
Prior to their suspension in March 1952, Tunisia's two Communist
weeklies had a total circulation of about 6,000 copies, a considerable
number of which were given away each week. The indefinite suspension, by
the French authorities, of all Tunisian Communist publications and the
ban on foreign Communist literature, have reduced Communist printed
propaganda to illicit handbills, which appear only occasionally. .
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
Specific information regarding the financial resources of the
Tunisian Communist Party is not available. Evidence exists that the
Tunisian Communist Party has upon occasion received financial aid from
the French Communist Party. Such aid, however, has apparently been
relatively small, for it has not saved the Tunisian Party from continual
financial embarrassment.
XII. SOVIET SATELLITE OFFICIAL ASSETS
Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites have diplomatic,
commercial, or cultural missions in Tunisia.
XIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
None of the front groups affiliated with Communist international
organizations are at this time active in Tunisia. Nor have any congresses
of Communist organizations been held in Tunisia in recent years. Certain
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Tunisian Communist leaders have, however, attended conferences of
Communist-sponsored organizations in other countries. Information is
incomplete, but Tunisian Communists are known to have attended such
meetings in the Soviet Union, Red China, Poland, and Italy since 1950.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATION NETWORK
It is known that the Tunisian Communist Party, like the Communist
parties of Algeria and Morocco, is directed by the French Communist Party,
and that representatives of the French Party attend meetings of the
Tunisian Party and transmit advice and instructions at that time. Though
Communist international couriers are occasionally reported to pass through
North Africa, detailed information is not available on the subject.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.19
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, FRANCE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTI WT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFCR NATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I? Objectives 1
II. Tactics 2
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ASSETS . . . . 6
I. Numerical Strength .. 6
II. Electoral Strength .. .. . 7.
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 8
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . .. . 9
V. Communist Influence in Labor . .. . .. .. . . . . . 11
Vi. Communist Influence in Social., Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . .. . . . . . . . . . . 13
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government ? . .. . ? . ? 14
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . ? 15
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . ? . ? . ? . . . . e .. ? . . . . ? ? ? 16
X. Communist Propaganda Media .. . 16
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . ... .. . . . . . ? 19
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . .. . . ? . . . ? 19
XIII. Communist International organizations . . . ? .. .. 21
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . .. . . .. . . ? 22
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
C
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis. of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information.
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Ca4MUNISS'i IN FRANCE: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
The French Communist Party's immediate objective, and the one
which promises to remain foremost for the duration of the cold war,
is the establishment of a government in Paris which would break off
France's alliance with the West. Short of this major goal, the
Communists are chiefly interested in hampering specific pro-Western
policies of the present anti-Communist French Government. Among these
policies, the key ones are those of waging war on the Communists in
Indochina and of participating in NATO and related plans for rearming
Western Germany, especially the EDC., Accordingly, the Communists-are
intent on securing immediate peace in Indochina on Ho Chi Ninh's termsp
withdrawal of US forces from NATO bases in France, progressive reduc-
tion in armaments, and rejection of any arrangement for rearming
Western Germany. Always accompanying these specific goals are the
Communists' various efforts to create a general frame of mind which
is suspicious. of the US, dubious of self-defense efforts, and scepti-
cal of the strength and viability of the West as a whole. Realizing,
in brief, the' difficulties involved in making French opinion pro-
Soviet, the Communists currently set their sights on encouraging
neutralist and defeatist tendencies.
There is no doubt that these Communist objectives are geared
primarily to the furthering of Soviet foreign policy and impair the
party's ability to promote its own popularity. The conditions under
which the French Communists adopted their stand on the Indochina war
is instructive in this connection. For some months after hostilities
broke out in Indochina, in December 1946, between the French troops
and Ho Chi Minh, the Communists, who were then participating in the
cabinet, avoided taking an anti-national position on this issue.
Accordingly, when the government made it clear, in March 1947, that
it had no intention of opening negotiations with Ho, the Communists
went along with this policy. It was not until after the Moscow
Conference had ended the following month, with a break between the
USSR and the West,; and with France definitely associating herself
with the US and Britain, that the Communists parted company with the
other parties in the government. In short, the Communists did not
fashion their stand on Indochina on the basis of local French atti-
tudes toward the war but, rather, on Soviet foreign policy require-
ments.
In the same way, the Communists' handling of the German
rearmament issue illustrates the fact that their objectives are
tailored to fit the needs of Soviet foreign policy.. Left to their
own devices in shaping their policy toward German rearmament, the
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
French Communists would unquestionably oppose all forms of such rearma-
ment, thus enabling them to take a strong and consistent stand on a
question which is traditionally of the greatest national concern.
Instead, however, the party has been obliged, as a result of Soviet
approval of East German rearmament, to modify its original position of
thoroughgoing opposition to German rearmament and to distinguish
between the rearmament of "democratic" East Germany and "imperialist"
West Germany.
II. TACTICS
In pursuing their major objective, the French Communists' tactics
are those of the "United National Front." This means, as the Communists;
repeatedly point out, that they wish to make common cause with indi-
viduals from all social groups regardless of their religious or
political bent, on the basis of a broad program of "peace, national
independence, and democratic liberties." In accordance with this policy,
the Communists have set out to win the support not only of industrial
workers and peasants, but also of white collar workers, shopkeepers,
businessmen, and professional people. In contrast with the French
Popular Front of the 1930's, the present United National Front is not
an effort by the Communists to form alliances with entire non-Communist
political parties and their leaders, but an attempt to attract indi-
viduals and groups from all political parties and sections of society.
Moreover, the Communists are not currently seeking, as they did in the
1930's, to remain in the background but are, instead, clearly announc-
ing that they intend to remain at the head of the movement they hope to
develop.
The Communists' current tactics have been adopted in response to
the increasingly unfavorable situation in which the French Communist
Party finds itself. At present, and for the past five years or so, the
party, despite its continued hold on about a quarter of the electorate
and an important part of the trade union movement, has been facing
increasing difficulties. This is evident, first of all, in the declining
numerical strength of the party itself and of its various related organi-
zatj.ons. Moreover, the party and its affiliated organizations have
been increasingly unable to translate the numerical strength they retain
into political action geared to attainment of their major political ob-
jectives. Finally, the non-Communists have become increasingly
anti-Communist and united in their opposition to the Communists regard-
less of how much they disagree on other issues. As a result the
Communists find themselves so isolated that alliances between themselves
and non-Communist parties are out of the question.
In attempting to break out of their isolation, the French
Communists try to establish a minimum basis of agreement with
SECRET - SECURITY INFCRMTION
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
non-Communists by proposing that these latter elements go along with them
on issues which'involve the practically universal fear of war, the sub-
sidiary but almost equally important fear of Germany, and the widespread
dissatisfaction with certain aspects of French society. Thus the
Communists' basic appeal is to the sense of international. insecurity, on
the one hand, and, on the other, to the deep dissatisfaction which has
long existed -- and. which would exist in the absence. of the Communists --
with what is widely regarded as the inadequate living standards, the
inequality, and the generally restrictive nature of present French
society. Accordingly, French Communist propaganda within the past year
has emphasized such motifs as bacteriological warfare, West German
rearmament, the war in Indochina, the Moscow Economic Conference, and
various anti-American themes. At all times the Communists have tried
to show that-these international causes are inextricably linked with
pressing domestic problems, such as wages, housing for workers, heavy'
taxes, and the maintenance of democratic liberties. These latter
problems, the Communists assert, can be met only if France unloads
herself of the burdens placed on her as a result of her membership in
the Atlantic alliance.
In making all these appeals, the French Communists have at their
disposal propaganda mechanisms which still remain large and active,
despite their decline in size and effectiveness in recent years. In
addition, they have an extensive network of front organizations,
although there is increasing evidence that these organizations are
steadily growing less important in fact than they may seem on paper.
They also continue to dominate an important segment of the trade
union movement, where their current tactic is to make their appeals
as attractive as possible by couching them in exclusively economic
terms. As a logical extension of this tactic the Communists seek to
encourage unity of action between their own union organization and
the non-Communist unions. Finally, as a political party the
Communists try to play down those domestic issues which divide them
from non-Communist Frenchmen and to emphasize their alleged champion-
ship of "peace" and higher living standards for the great majority of
the country.
III. CAPABILITIES
Broadly speaking, and assuming there is no major change in the
international situation, the prospect for the next several years is
that the French Communists will remain incapable of creating a "United
National Front" so numerically strong and powerful as to force the
government to take cognizance of it in forming foreign policy. The
likelihood is, rather, that the French Communists will remain locked
up in their present isolation, incapable of affecting government policy
and continuing gradually to lose their numerical and organizational
strength and to display an ever increasing lack of dynamism.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
The decline of the French Communist Party in size and influence
since the end of the war, and particularly since 1947-48, has been very
considerable. For these past several years,'moreover, the party has
displayed an ever increasing lack of dynamism and an inability to
translate its remaining numerical strength as a political party and
trade. union movement into political actions. At no time since the big
strikes of 1946-48 have the French Communists displayed any capacity
for rallying considerable non-Communist trade union support. During
1952, on the two or three occasions when the Communists made particular
efforts to give a show of popular strength in the form of mass.demon-
strations, only the small corps of party militants turned out.
At the same time, the French Communist Party remains one of the
world's largest Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc, and it
promises to do so for some time. In France itself it is a major politi-
cal party, an important power in the French trade union movement, and
a large and active propaganda machine. The party derives still further
significance from the fact that it has had some success, although how
much it is difficult to estimate, in penetrating the civil service, the
lower levels of the armed forces, and various sensitive industries and
communications services.
The major factor contributing to the Communists' considerable
staying power as a political party and force in the trade union move-
ment is the party's ability to express the psychological revolt of
many Frenchmen against existing social and economic conditions. The
great majority of the 5,000,000 Frenchmen who vote Communist unques-
tionably do so because they regard themselves as underprivileged and
exploited by other members of society, and because they believe that
the Communist Party is concerned with ameliorating their lot. Like-
wise most of those who belong to the Communist-dominated trade union
(CGT) do so because they view it as the only trade union organization
which is strong and effective enough to wrest higher wages from
employers. That the Communists, rather than a purely national French
party, have succeeded in winning a near-monopoly of the strong protest
sentiment which exists both in French politics and trade unionism is
due largely to the evolution of the Socialists. While retaining their
revolutionary vocabulary and traditions, the Socialists have long
since become reformist in outlook and receive their chief support from
government and other white collar workers rather than industrial labor.
Under these conditions the Communists have become the heirs to the
tradition of the extreme left, always an important tradition in French
politics, and over the years they have succeeded in developing the
conviction on the part of the majority of their supporters that they and they alone -- hold out the promise of "democratic" social and
economic reforms.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
C
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORI':ATION
In more specific terms the party's outlook, judged both by the
evidence of its decline and the signs of its staying power, may be
summarized as follows:
In terms of party membership some further contraction can
be-expected. No drastic reductions are anticipated, however, since the
more opportunistic members have already been lost by the party and its
present membership may be assumed to be quite stable.
Organizationally, it is unlikely that the party will be split
or seriously hampered by a purge which the Marty-Tiflon affair in the
second half of 1952 may foreshadow.
The front organizations may be expected to maintain their paper
strength, but will be unable to gain non-Communist support for their
various causes. The drawing power of the "peace" movement, in particular,
will remain very limited, primarily because the character of the "peace"
organization and its propaganda has become increasingly transparent.
The present volume of Communist propaganda can be expected to
remain about the same since the party has the financial capacity to
maintain its propaganda program. As the public becomes more familiar
with the Communists' techniques, however, it becomes less receptive
to their propaganda. Nevertheless, some of the Communists' slogans
will unquestionably continue to be picked up by non-Communists and
used without their Communist labels.
A continued decline of Communist influence within the Communist-
led trade union (CGT) can be expected, and the CGT will remain incapable
of actions threatening the government. If the CGT were to follow its
current policy of purely economic emphasis for any length of time its
outlook might be brighter, but such a development is unlikely.
The Communist electoral and parliamentary position will remain
fairly stable. As already indicated, the Socialists have a limited
capacity for weaning away Communist voters, and the other non-Communist
parties have very little such capacity. moreover, there are as yet no
indications, despite the decline in the actual number of Communist
voters, that the percentage of the Communist vote is decreasing. The
decrease in the number of Communist voters can be turned into a per-
centage decline only if the non-Communist parties succeed in maintaining
their voting strength as the Communists lose theirs, and to date they
have not done so because of abstentions by their supporters. Nevertheless,
the non-Communist parties will unquestionably continue to keep the
Communists in a state of isolation and, in this way, prevent them from
participating in the formation of national foreign and domestic policies.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-6-
COMMdUNISM IN FRANCE: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
Estimated membership of the French Communist Party (FCP), at the
close of 1952, is about 450,000. It is not known how many persons, out
of the total population of 40,000,000, are strongly influenced by the
Communists. Judging by the votes of that half of the population which
actually goes to the polls, it would appear that one out of four Frenchmen
responds to some aspect of Communist activity.
Geographically, FCP membership is concentrated in half a dozen
centers: Paris and its industrial suburbs, the mining area of the north,
the major port cities (La Pallice, Bordeaux, Marseille, Le Havre, Dunkerque),
and the manufacturing centers of south-central France (especially Lyons
and St. Etienne).
Industrial workers are the preponderant element in FCP membership.
Shortly after the war the party had a much more diverse class composition,
but the loss of lower middle class elements since 1947-48 has reestablished
the heavy predominance of workers in the party.
Party sympathizers, judging from what groups vote Communist, have
more varied backgrounds. According to the poll published last spring by
Realit6s, a magazine similar to Fortune, the largest groups which vote
Communist are factory workers (38%) and women who are not employed outside
the home and who are presumably members of workers' families (22%). Thus
40 percent of the Communist voters come from groups other than the industrial
working class. According to the poll, these groups include agricultural
workers (8%) and a variety of lower middle class groups -- white collar
workers, servants, tradesmen, farm operators, civil servants, small bond-
holders, and retired persons. Only four percent comes from the liberal
professions, other intellectual circles, and industrial cadres. But
individuals of this type, and particularly the intellectuals are given
so much publicity by the party that they sometimes seem more numerous
than they are.
FCP members are as a whole well disciplined. Nearly all of the
party's major leaders are men who accepted the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact.
For a time after the war the party, as a result of its rapid expansion
during the war and immediately thereafter, included a considerable number
of members who were imperfectly disciplined. As this element left the
party, membership declined from about 850,000 to 450,000 between 1947
and 1952, with the big drop (from 850,000 to about 600,000) taking place
between 1947 and 1948. The present membership appears to represent a
fairly stable group of convinced Communists who are fully aware of the
party's anti-national character. Judging from a Communist Party statement
SECRET - SECURITY INFOft L' TTON
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFOfti6STiOi
of a year ago, the current annual rate of turnover in FCP membership in
about 30,000, or approximately seven percent.
Leadership of the FCP is, generally speaking, competent, with the
party weeding out less effective leaders from time to time. The long
absence of Secretary-General Thorez, who has been under medical treat-
ment in Moscow since November 1950, however, has left the party without
strong d unified leadership at the top. One result of this situation
has ap ntly been that of making personal differences among members of
inner cir le, such as figured in the Marty-Tillon case, more significant
than they were formerly.
While the party's internal differences between the end of the war
and 195]. ere restricted to its lower echelons and to the fellow-travelling
fringe, the Marty-Tillon case of 1952 affected the party's high command,
as Marty was a member of the secretariat and both men belonged to the
Politburo. The basic issue in this case appears to have been the extent
to'which the party should seek the cooperation of non-Communist elements.
Both Marty and Tillon apparently believed that the French Communists
should have proceeded on their own to seize power when France was liberated
in World War II, and since that time they seem to have been strongly out
of sympathy with the policy of collaborating with "peace partisans" and
other groups remote from Communist discipline. At the same time, personal
rivalries and antipathies undoubtedly played a part in the conflict between
the two men and other FCP leaders, and it is probable that Thorez'
absence also helped lay the party open to discord.
With the party's action against Marty and Tillon still incomplete
it is not clear whether these two men will be merely the first in a series
of French Communist leaders who will be disciplined for their impatience
with current FCP tactics. It can only be stated that during the past
year the FCP has shown greater signs of internal dissension than at any
time since the end of the war and that this dissension seems likely to
grow as the party gives further evidence of its increasing ineffectiveness.
There are no current indications, however, of any internal Communist crisis
capable of disrupting the party or of producing an anti-Stalinist revolt.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
In national elections, the FCP polls about 5,000,000 votes out of
a total of 19,000,000 votes cast, or slightly more than 25 percent. This
vital statistic-on French Communist electoral strength leads to three
important observations:
1) The FPC receives more votes than any other French political
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
party. It has held this record with remarkable tenacity throughout the
postwar period, having been edged out of first place in only one (June 1946)
of the four postwar national elections. The Communists' position as the
leading party must be seen, however, in the context of the French multi-
party system, in which the non-Communist parties are so numerous that it is
very difficult for any single one of them to become the nation's largest
party. Despite the FCP's electoral lead, therefore, it is decidedly in
the minority as the half dozen parties supporting the present Mayer govern-
ment represent about 11,000,000 voters, while the Communist voters number
about 5,000,000.
2) Despite its position as the largest party, the FCP has been
losing votes since the early postwar period, and partial elections held
since the last national election of June 1951 show that this trend is
continuing. That the Communists retain their lead and their percentage
strength while losing votes is due to the abstention of non-Communist
voters. The decline in Communist votes can be turned into a percentage
decline only if the non-Communist parties succeed, as they have not done
to-date, in maintaining their voting strength as the Communists lose theirs.
3) The FCP has a nationwide following throughout all geographical
areas of France. Of the 103 electoral districts in the 1951 elections,
there were only four in which the Communists polled 10 percent of the vote
or less. This record for well-distributed support was untouched by any non-
Communist party.
At the same time there are certain regions where the Communists
are particularly strong. These include Paris and the neighboring regions,
extending to the industrialized areas on the northern coast; the center
and southwest; and the Rhone valley and the southeast, including the
Mediterranean coast.
The FCP continues to lay heavy emphasis on maintaining and extend-
ing its-electoral strength, even though the non-Communist parties devise
various means of preventing the Communists from translating their electoral
strength into representational strength. In elections the Communists are
obliged to run alone since the non-Communist parties are unwilling to form
electoral alliances with them.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
Current FCP policy definitely emphasizes non-violent action, but
this emphasis does not exclude the possibility of demonstrations, riots,
or strikes should the party believe that such actions might secure popular
support or be necessary from the point of view of Soviet foreign policy
requirements.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
W
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMaTION
-9-
The last example of a violent demonstration by the FCP was the
May 28, 1952 series of anti-Ridgway riots in Paris and some other towns,
and the flurry of strikes which ensued. This episode was clearly designed
to support Soviet propaganda to the effect that Ridgway was as unpopular
in France as he had been in Japan, where the Communists had led a demonstra-
tion at the time of his departure. On the occasion of his arrival in Paris
the Communists staged demonstrations at several points in the city, and
equipped rioters with clubs and other crude weapons for their fights with
the police. The French police,who promptly cracked down on the rioters
and arrested a large number of their leaders, have recently estimated that
about 30,000 persons participated in these demonstrations in Paris and a
number of provincial towns. The small size of this figure shows the FCP's
current inability to rally popular support for violent action against the
government.
The FCP organization for planning and executing violent activity
is believed to be the Service d'ordre, under the direction of the party's
Central Committee. This Service, which is supposed to lead and control
demonstrations called for by the party, is reportedly a small organization,
depending for its "troops" on the militants of the party's various federa-
tions.
Another source of personnel for party demonstrations and the nucleus
for any para-military action in the future is the Francs-Tireurs et Partisax
which stems from the wartime resistance period. The membership of this grot
is estimated at something under 50,000, and it is apparently a loosely
organized body. Some of its members are persons with resistance experience,
inasmuch as the Communists played a leading role in the military side of
the anti-Nazi underground movement. Others, however, may be presumed to be
new and untested. In any case, the spirit of the Francs-Tireurs is reported
to have been adversely affected by the recent Tillon affair as Tillon was
formerly the head of this organization.
No large Communist arms caches have been found in France since the
war, and it is not likely that any useful supplies of this sort exist.
It would be contrary to the party's interests to maintain supplies of this
kind, assuming it could do so effectively, because the discovery of them
would expose the party to severe official reprisal. In the event of an
all-out Communist attack on national defense, it is probable that the party
would rely primarily on sabotage action by technical experts in strategic
positions and on the presence of party members in various positions in the
national economy, rather than on para-military action.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISM
The FCP is a legal political party and as such enjoys freedom of
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET -_SECURITY INFORMATION
- 10 -
action within the limits of the law. During the past several years, however,
and particularly since 1948, the government, without directly attacking the
FCP as such, has considerably restricted Communist activities through a series
of practices and restrictions. designed to maintain public order and protect
national interests.
Thus the government has transferred known Communists or Communist
sympathizers from sensitive positions in the armed forces, the civil service,
and the nationalized industries. It has frequently banned Communist demonstra-
tions. In Parliament, the practice has developed of referring vital business
to subcommittees inasmuch as the rule providing for proportional representa-
tion on committees does not apply to subcommittees. Special press laws have
also been enacted with a view to preventing deputies, who enjoy parliamentary
immunity, from directing newspapers. Several directors of Communist publica-
tions have used this protective device in the past. Moreover, foreign
Communist publications have been prohibited.
Despite the increasing stringency of the government's measures against
the Communists, the party has thus far been inconvenienced rather than
actually curbed. Its leadership and major front organizations are still
virtually intact. Party members are not formally prohibited from holding
trade union posts and government positions (including teachers' positions
filled by the state), and the Communist-led trade union is recognized as a
collective bargaining agent. Moreover, persons arrested for disturbing the
peace in Communist demonstrations are usually given short sentences, and FCP
leaders are still able to travel to the Soviet Union and to various inter-
national front organization congresses where Soviet leaders are present.
In 1952, the government began to fill some of the gaps in its anti-
Communist program by initiating a series of actions aimed directly at a
number of top Communist leaders. To this end the government has requested
the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of six Communist deputies in order
to prosecute them, as well as several other FCP and front organization leaders,
on the charge of attacking the external security of the state. Parliament
has not yet lifted the Communist deputies' immunity, however. Parliament
has also been requested by the government to consider a bill which would
provide the government with legal means for dismissing Communists from the
civil service, but no action has been taken on this proposal either.
Limits on the French Government's anti-Communist action have existed,
though to an increasingly less important extent, for three main reasons;
(1) the very size of the Communist problem, which renders it extremely
difficult for the government to weed out party members from all positions-
which might be identified as sensitive; (2) the widespread reluctance,
especially on the part of the non-Communist left and center parties, to
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 11 -
infringe on the principle of civil liberties lest the type of political
witch hunt that was carried on by Vichy be repeated; (3) French public
opinion generally does not attach any special stigma to Communists and
fellow travellers, and it is still widely believed that a person may vote
Communist or belong to a Communist-controlled trade union-or other organiza-
tion without being disloyal.
V. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE-.IN LABOR
The number of Communists in France's key industries is unknown.
Since the members of the Communist-controlled trade union federation
(Confederation Generale du Travail, CGT) are by no means all Communists,
as repeatedly indicated by the fact that the Communist leaders of the CGT
cannot rally union rank-and-file.in behalf of Communist political causes,
the strength of the CGT in a particular industry provides only a very
rough and uncertain index to Communist strength in that industry.
With this important reservation in mind about the CGT as an indicator
of Communist strength, it may be pointed out that the CGT is stronger than
any other union in nearly every key industry of France. This strength
remains, despite the great decline of the CGT during the past five years,
in the mines, the railroads, communications, docks and shipyards, and the
metallurgical industry. In all these cases, however, correct perspective
is maintained only if it is borne in mind that only from one-fourth to one-
half of the total working force is unionized.
In the realm of organized labor as a whole, the CGT is unquestionably
the strongest single force and, in fact, stronger than the several non-
Communist unions together. CGT membership is currently estimated at
1,500,000, while most of the remaining 1,000,000 organized workers are
divided between the Catholic CFTC (about 600,000-700,000 members) and the
Socialist FO (about 300,000-400,000 members).
The Communists are able to maintain this lead primarily because the
CGT is still considered by a large number of French workers as the only
"real" trade union in-France. It has behind it a long tradition and
prestige as a Marxist labor organization -- an important factor in a country
where labor is strongly class-conscious. Moreover, when it leaves political
issues alone and concentrates on economic demands, it still tends to
function as the strongest and most aggressive champion of labor.
The non-Communist unions, for their part, have remained weak, and
unquestionably they have suffered from their widespread reputation of being
connected with the government. Neither have the free trade unions found it
possible to move toward close cooperation. They continue instead to be
deeply divided by personal rivalries among their leaders and by the anti-
clerical issue.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
While the Communists control the largest portion of organized
labor, they have only succeeded in enrolling a fraction of the total
number of wage-earners, estimated at 11,000,000. Thus the CGT is strong
primarily in the sense that the non-Communist unions are weak and that
the largest group of French workers is unorganized. Relatively strong
though the CGT still is, moreover, it is only one-fourth as large as it
was in 1946-47, prior to the wholesale defections it suffered as a direct
result of the political strikes it called in the early stages of the cold
war.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFOIATION
-13-
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND
POMIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Communist front organizations in France, viewed in berms of their
number, geographical distribution, and occupational or interest coverage,
are very extensive. There are still well over 100 such organizations,
each with a network of local organizations, and they are geared to the
interests of a wide variety of groups, notably youth, students and
teachers, women, nationality minorities, sports enthusiasts, veterans,
and numerous professional groups. In addition there are, besides the
CGT, the Peace Movement and a wide variety of cultural organizations.
.The actual strength of these front organizations is impossible
to assess, partly because their memberships overlap and are far from
stable, and partly because some of the organizations, such as the
Peace Movement particularly, have very loose rules concerning member-
ship. In, any case, most of the fronts now appear to be nothing more
than paper organizations, and in practically all cases they are so
dependent on their Communist members that they can be said to have
almost no strength apart from the Communist Party.
Of the front organizations the one to which the FCP currently
gives the most attention and care is the Peace 14ovement. Its active
supporters are estimated at 50,000, most of whom are Communists,
and it has an organization, at least on paper, which covers all of
France. The basic units in the organization are the Committees of
Peace, which are set up either at a place of work or in a neighborhood.
Strong efforts are made to include non-Communists in these committees,
but except for a few who accept honorary posts or support occasional
specific "peace" activities, leadership at all levels is Communist.
An insight into what lies behind the Peace Movement's nation-
wide facade was offered in the famous Duclos notebook,. which the police
seized at the time of his arrest in the anti-Ridgway demonstration
last May. According to Duclos, the Peace Movement no longer has any
effective organization below the regional level. That the movement
has been losing strength is also indicated by the decline of its press;
Before its weekly newspaper, Action, folded up in May (for failure to
follow the new party line in support of East German rearmament, as
well as for financial reasons), its circulation had fallen from
75,000 to 30,000.
Of all the other fronts, the most important are those for
women, youth, and various veteran and resistance organizations
stemming out of the two world wars. The women's organization
SECRET - SECURITY INFOF4ATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
_ 14 -
(1'Union des Femmes Frangaises) still has local and regional units as
well as a national office, although many of its local branches are
reported to engage in little activity. Most of the work of the organiza-
tion now appears to be done by women members of the FCP rather than by
non-Communists, although a considerable number of non-Communist women
are still willing to sign their names in signature campaigns.
The major front organization for youth (Union de la Jeunesse
kepublicaine de France) is important to the FCP both as a training
group for the party and as the means of injecting a mass element into
various Communist actions which can be represented as being of particular
interest to youth. Thus the youth organization, under the close
supervision of the FCP itself, concerns itself particularly with .such
issues as'length of military service and the war in Indochina.
The various veteran and related organizations are primarily
concerned with the particular grievances and demands of their members,
and they make a special effort to secure the participation of non-
Communists. Nevertheless, their activities, like those of the other
front groups, are clearly carried on by Communist members, and
consequently have no genuine popular character.
VII. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION INTO GOVERNMENT
An over-all view of Communist infiltration into the French
Government may be given by indicating the extent to which Communists
are known to be present in various governmental bodies:
A. National Government
1. The Cabinet. No Communists have been present in the cabinet
since they were expelled from the government in May 19147.
2. Parliament. In. the lower house of Parliament (the National
Assembly), the Communists have 100 seats out of a total of 625, while
they have 15 seats out of a total of 320 in the consultative upper
house (the Council of the Republic).
3. Civil Service and Nationalized Industries. In the civil
service and nationalized industries, the num er of Communists in high-
level positions is now believed to be negligible, but the number in
minor positions probably remains sizeable.
14. The Internal Security Forces. In the internal security forces,
Communist Influence is t oug t be slight. In the civil police,
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION.
- 15 -
however, there is apparently some infiltration. During the past year,
20 members of the Paris police force were suspended and 60 were trans-
ferred to non-sensitive posts because they were suspected of Communist
membership or leanings.
5. The Armed Forces. The relatively few Communist officers in the
armed forces are almost all of junior rank. No Communist senior officer
holds a post of command.
6. The Atomic Energy Commission. The French atomic energy commission
was reorganized in 1951 with a view to eliminating Communist influence.
Fragmentary reporting indicates, however, that some Communists and
Communist sympathizers continue to be employed at the lower levels of
the organization.
B. Local Government
In the field of municipal government, the Communists claim
about 2,000 mayors out of a total of 37,930, and they have about
30,500 seats out of a total of 166,209 on the municipal councils. In
the departmental councils, the Communists have 78 seats out of a
total of 1,500.
VIII. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
In circles and public institutions important in forming public
opinion, Communists or Communist sympathizers are unquestionably present,
but always in a decidedly minor way. Thus it appears that Communists
have some influence among primary and secondary school teachers.as a
result of their presence in the autonomous teachers' union. There are
no estimates, however, on how many teachers either belong to the FCP
or go along with some of its major causes. There are also some
Communists on the faculties of the universities, but no estimate of
their number is available.
In the Catholic Church there are a few individuals, including
some "worker priests" and the small group of Christian Progressives,
whose social philosophy has led them to support the Communists,
usually on such specific issues as peace and improved working-class
living conditions. The abbe'Boulier is, as the most prominent of the
Christian Progressives, frequently pointed to by the Communists as
alleged proof of Catholic support for the"peace" movement and related
causes. As far as is known, however, there is no considerable number
of Communist sympathizers among either the parish priests or the higher
clergy.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 16 -
In the programs currently produced by the nationally-owned
French broadcasting system (Radio Diffusion Fran ise RDF) there
appears to be very little Coimmunis i uence. ter the war RDF
was heavily infiltrated by the Communists, but since then the govern-
ment has taken all, or nearly all, pro-Communist broadcasters off the
air. An estimated two-thirds of RDF's technicians, however, are
believed to belong to a Communist-controlled trade union.
IX. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES
No non-Communist parties are believed to have been infiltrated by
Communists. On the fringe of the FCP, however, there are two small
parties, the Union of Progressives and the Unity-Socialist Party. Both
of these groups are so obviously appendages of the FCP that they cannot
be regarded as non-Communist parties which have been infiltrated by
the Communists.
R. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA
The chief propaganda medium for the FOP is the local Communist
press. A mid-1952 review of Communist publications shows that the
FCP and its related organizations publish three daily newspapers in
Paris, 14 dailies in the provinces, 61 provincial weeklies, and 83
journals of greatly varying content and format. There are comics for
children,,film and sports reviews, picture magazines, literary journals,
a law review, international news reports, and professional magazines.
for teachers, doctors, and specialized workers of various kinds.
Circulation figures for these publications vary widely,. but it
appears that at.least a dozen of the publications have circulations
of over 100,000. In fact some of them (such as 1'Humanite Dimanche
with a reported circulation of about 300,000) area a cove this
figure. Nevertheless, circulation of the Communist press, including
that of the official party organ, 1'Humanite has unquestionably
been declining. L'Humanite's circ ation, as of January 1953, is
estimated at 174,000 wi about 145,000 copies being sold and the
rest given away), as compared with 2211,000 in 1950 and 450,000 in 1947.
While the circulation of the entire French press is at a postwar low,
1'Humanite appears to have.suffered particularly heavy losses, and
the same can apparently be said for a considerable number of other
Communist publications. In the provinces, the 14 Communist dailies
had a total circulation in 1952 of 639,500, compared with 756,600 in
1951. Despite its difficulties, 1'Humanite has increased from six to
eight pages within the past year, indicating that the party is
continuing to pump money into the paper to keep it alive.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFONMATION
- 17 -
To facilitate the printing and distribution of their various
publications the Communists maintain a number of firms of their own,
usually thinly disguised as commercial enterprises. These firms include
a considerable number of publishing houses.,, printing companies, book-
stores, and other companies whose business it is to see to the circula
tion and sale of Communist publications.
Communist radio propaganda in France consists almost entirely of
broadcasts, in French, from the Soviet Union and the bloc.
These broadcasts are as follows:
1) Radio Moscow
Six broadcasts daily.
7:00 A.M. on 31, 41, and 49 meters
8:00 A.M. (on same wavelengths)
12:30 P.M. on 25 and 31 meters
7:00 P.M. on 41, 233, and 240 meters
8:30 P.M. on 49, 233, and 240 meters
10:00 P.M. on 41, 49, 233 and 240 meters
2) Radio Budapest
Two broadcasts daily:
9:00 P.M. on 30 meters, 50, 40 meters 50, and 252 meters
Midnight on same wavelenghhs.
3) Radio Prague
One broadcast daily: "Tonight in France."
This is the most important of the bloc's broadcasts. It
seeks to create the impression that it originates from a
clandestine station in France. On 233 meters 30.
4) Radio Warsaw
Two broadcasts daily:
9:30 P.M. on 31, 48 and 278 meters
2:45 P.M. on 31 and 48 meters.
SECRET - SECURITY INFOKMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFOI ATION
-18-
The potential French radio audience may be roughly estimated
at 28,000,000. (The number of home radio sets is something under
9,000,000. In addition there are about 100,000 radios in public places.
If it is estimated that an average of three persons listen to each set,
the potential radio audience may be set at between 27,000,000 and 28,000,000.)
How large a part of this potential audience listens to Soviet and .
satellite broadcasts is unknown. No polls have been conducted, sofar as
is known, to determine the extent to which Soviet bloc broadcasts are
heard in France.
C
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
XI. FINANCIAL CONDITION
There appears to be very little dependable information available
on FCP finances. The only fact which seems clear is that the FCPts
expenses are considerable and its means of support are not easily
visible.
In roughly estimating FCP annual expenses, it may be assumed
that these expenses are of two main kinds= salaries for party
functionaries and 'propaganda expenses. Salaries, estimated at a
monthly figure of roughly 30,000 francs, would amount to about
$5,500,000. Propaganda expenses, admittedly extremely difficult to
estimate, may be very roughly estimated at $28,500,000. Hence the
party's total expenses, according to this very tentative estimate, are
in the neighborhood of $35,000,000.
In estimating FCP income, on the other hand, there are even
fewer rough indicators at hand. The party's overt receipts (including
dues and the standard remittances by Communist deputies and adminis.
trative officials of part of their salaries) probably do not amount to
more than about 10 percent of the party's total expenditures. How much
income the party receives from its publications, the CGT, and front
organizations is unknown; nor is it known how much revenue the party
secures from controlled business firma. Such sources as these, however,
probably do produce some income.
It is also possible that the FOP secures some funds from the
Soviet Union and the satellites through various channels, including
especially the Communist-controlled Commercial Bank for Northern Europe.
This bank, which.handles the accounts of most of the Communist
organizations, is believed to be the intermediary for the movement of
funds from the Soviet Union, the bloc countries, and the international
offices of the major front organizations. In the winter of 1948-49 the
National Assembly became disturbed by reports that this bank was allegedly
giving advances to the FCP, but their concern came to nothing when it
appeared that there was nothing irregular in the Bank's activities.
It has also been reported that the WFTU, through its contacts with the
CGT, has occasionally made arrangements for contributions by unions of
the satellite states to French strikers.
The Soviet Union and satellites maintain diplomatic establishments
in Paris, with their missions being fairly small in size. According to
the official French diplomatic list of January 1952, these missions were
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
made up as follows:
Number in-Diplomatic Mission
Soviet Union
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Embassy
Is gat ion
Legation (charge)
Embassy
10
Finland
Legation
5
Hungary
Legation
8
Poland
Embassy (charge)
7
Rumania
Legation (charge)
3
The Bulgarian, Finnish, Hungarian, and Polish missions included persons
specifically charged with press or cultural affairs, but how many
individuals are actually engaged in propaganda activities is unknown.
The Soviet Embassy, for its part, publishes the monthly Etudes Sovietiques.
The French branch of TOSS is also a Soviet propaganda instrument
and liaison agent of note. . _T W occupies part of the office of the
Soviet Information Bureau in Paris, and some of the personnel of TASS
and the Soviet Information Bureau appears to'be interchangeable.
Also noteworthy is the considerable number of Soviet or satellite
"friendship" societies. By far the most important of these societies
is France-USSR with an estimated membership of about 60,000 throughout
the country. Its local departmental organizations are clearly-directed
by the Communist Party, and, like the other front organizations, it has
no independent leadership and existence. Most of its non-Communist
members merely attend meetings occasionally. The pamphlet published by
the organization, France-USSR, has a circulation of about 117,000, which
is a fair sized circulation for a periodical of its kind in France.
Additional activities of France-USSR inolude holding lectures, showing
films, helping to distribute Soviet books and magazines, and sending
delegations to the Soviet Union. It appears that about a half dozen such
delegations have been sent annually in recent years.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
I
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Other "friendship" societies, all of which seem to be little more
than paper organizations, are=
Amities Franco-Polonaises (French-Polish Friendship Society)
France-Albania (France-Albania)
Franoe-Bulgaria (France-Bulgaria)
France-Espagne (France-Spain)
France-Hongrie (France-Hungary)
France-Roumanie (France-Rumania)
France-Tchecoslovaquie (France-Czechoslovakia
IIII. COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
None of the Communist international front organizations currently
has its headquarters in Paris. The French Government expelled the head-
quarters of the following organizations in 19512 the World Federation
of Trade Unions, the Peace Movement, the World Federation of Democratic
Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the Interna-
tional Association of Democratic Jurists. The French national organizations
which are affiliated with these internationals continue, however, to have
their headquarters in Paris.
During the past two years (1951-52) only one of these international
organizations held a meeting in Paris. The First International Conference
for a Peaceful Solution of the German Problem, sponsored by the Peace
Movement, was held in Paris May 12-14, 1951. This meeting was attended
by 226 delegates from 13 European countries. No information is available
on the number of French participants.
A check on the participants in attendance at the various interna-
tional front organizationst meetings, whether of working committees or
full congresses, shows that French delegates were invariably present.
Such meetings, moreover, are fairly frequent, and a review of them
indicates that the international front organizations offer opportunities
for approximately 50 contacts each year between French Communists or
pro-Communists and Soviet or satellite representatives. The WFTU hold
22 conferences of various kinds from mid-1951 to mid-1952; the
International Federation of Resistance, 7 meetings during approximately
the same periods the Peace Movement, 12 sessions from January 1951 to
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 22 -
November 1952; the woments organization, 5 sessions from early'1951 to
July 1952; the lawyers, 5 from September 1951 to November 1952; and the
World Federation of Democratic Youth, 16 meetings from August 1951 to
the close of 1952.
XIV. COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
The FCP has no problem in maintaining connections with the Soviet
Union and other portions of the international Communist apparatus outside
France.
As pointed out in the preceding section, FCP leaders and Communist
sympathizers have numerous contacts with the Soviet Union and the satel?.
lites, as well as with Communists outside the Soviet bloc, through the
meetings of the international front organizations.
In addition about a dozen FCP leaders travel to Moscow fairly
frequently. That they bring back, at least occasionally, fairly specific
instructions is indicated by the discussion in Duclost notebook of the
way in which the directive for a change in the FCPts emphasis was
transmitted from Moscow to the FCP in the spring of 1952. This directive,
Duclos indicates, was given to Billoux by Thores, and it may be assumed
-- although this point is by no means.certain -- that the latter had
cleared this directive, at least in principle, with Soviet leaders.
.Various delegations of Communists and pro-Communists who are
leaders of the major front organizations also go to Moscow on missions.
France-USSR is particularly active in this connection.
The Soviet Embassy in Paris has good opportunities for keeping
in touch with the FCP. A number of reports on contacts between the
Soviet Embassy and the party indicate, however, that the Embassy tends
to deal with the FCP through France-USSR, and specifically through its
president, Fernand Grenier, rather than directly.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
C
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
IR-6165.20
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: -
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE NETHERLANDS
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword . i i
OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES . . . 1
I. Objectives'** .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? 1
ii e Tactics ? . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I. Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . ? 4
He Electoral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ? ? . 4
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action 5
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism . . . . . . . . . . 6
V. Communist Influence in Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and
Professional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government . . ? ! ? . . ? 9
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation . . . 10
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political
Parties . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
X? Communist Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
XI. Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets . . . . . . . . . . . 12
XIII. Communist International Organizations . . . . . . . . 13
XIV. Communist Communication Network . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities
of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is di-
vided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics,
and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific
"assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive check-
list provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current
major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry
them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives
assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the
evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational
potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time,
providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information
is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the sec-
tion on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather
the best available to the Department at the present time.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
ii
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: OBJECTIVZS, TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES
I. OBJECTIVES
In the Netherlands, the Communists' (CPN) principal objective is
to detach the Netherlands from the Western camp and their secondary
objective is to obstruct as much as possible the progress of Western
unity under US leadership. During the June 1952 electoral campaign,
for instance, the first point in the Communist program was the creation
of a "peace loving and independent Netherlands." According to the
Communists, this goal could best be reached by holding a Big Five
conference, increasing East-West trade, halting rearmament, withdrawing
Dutch units from Korea, seceding from NATO, cooperating with a united
and "peace-loving" Germany, and breaking off all agreements between the
US and the Netherlands.
Since the government and all non-Communist political parties and
labor groups in the Netherlands support moves toward Western unity, a
closely related objective of the CPN is that of weakening the established
political and social order by creating divisions and distrust between
the government and the people and between the leadership and the rank
and file of the non-Communist parties and labor unions. Although the
Dutch Communists are interested in promoting their own growth, this
objective is generally subordinate to the aim of advancing the strategic
interests of the USSR.
II.. TACTICS
In order to attain its objectives the Dutch Communist Party seeks
to win a direct following among all social groups. At their 16th
Congress in Amsterdam last November, the Communist leaders issued a call
for a "National United Front with all who are against the Americans
and their collaborators," even including members of right-wing parties
and classes. The Communists argue that once reactionary leadership
has been repudiated by the rank and file of the various parties, no
further obstacle will stand in the war of fruitful cooperation between
the "democratic" and Communist parties.
In their propaganda, the Communists generally relate political
issues to economic demands, arguing that the workers' low standard of
living is caused by the government's "war policy." Although the Dutch
Communist Party poses most frequently as the champion of the underdog,
advocating government construction of low-cost housing, reduction in the
cost of living, and greater benefits for pensioners, it makes an attempt
to be all things to all men. It appeals to the nationalism and anti-
A-nericanism of some extreme right wing groups; it appeals to the moral
scruples of religious groups by attacking "immoral films and reading
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
matter, such as American cartoons and newspapers"; it appeals to the
bitter memories of the Nazi occupation in its protest against clemency
for German war criminals and the rearmament of Germany; it appeals to
Dutch business interests by playing up the economic advantages to be
derived from an increase in East-West trade. Above all, it seeks to
exploit the universal desire for peace and the fear of another war.
The principal instruments in this campaign to gain a direct
following among a great variety of social groups are the Dutch Peace
Council and the Netherlands-USSR Association. By holding "peace
congresses," "peace rallies," and "peace weeks," by agitating against
the unloading of American arms and by collecting,signatures for the
Stockholm Peace Appeal and later the appeal for a rive Power Peace
Pact, the Netherlands Peace Council has sought to obtain mass support
for Communist objectives. On the whole, its efforts have had little
success. The Netherlands-USSR Association has reportedly been slightly
more successful in its efforts to advance Soviet prestige through
cultural media and has also served as a recruiting ground for new
Communist members. In the labor field, indications are that the
Communist leaders have abandoned hopes of building up their own
Communist-dominated Unity Trade Union Central (Eenheids Vakcentrale,
EVC) at the expense of the non-Communist unions, m=are concentrating
Instead on direct infiltration of these unions, especially the
Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions, which is most closely allied
with the Netherlands Labor Party.
III, Capabilities
The constant decline in numerical strength of the party and its
front organizations (with the possible exception of the Netherlands-
USSR Asso ciation) during the postwar period is a clear indication of
the ineffectiveness of Communist propaganda. From a peak of 53,000
early in 1947, Communist membership dropped to about 33,000 by the end
of 1949. Since then it has apparently remained fairly constant;
estimates range from 33,000 to 40,000 with the lower figure probably
being more accurate. In the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament,
Communist representation dropped from ten seats in 1946 to six following
the June 1952 election. The Communists polled 6.16 percent of the total
valid vote in this election (328,571), compared with 7.74 percent in
1948 (381,953). Membership in the Communist-dominated Unity Trade
Union Central declined from an estimated 200,000 in 1945 to an estimated
70,000 in 1952. Circulation of the official Communist daily De Waarheid
dwindled from an estimated peak of 400,000 in 1945 to the present
estimated circulation of 100,000. The newspaper has been in serious
financial difficulties at least since 1947. Periodic drives to increase
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
the number of subscriptions have apparently met with little success.
There is no prospect that the Dutch Communists will succeed in
gaining sufficient popular support among the democratic parties and
labor groups for their current anti-American policy to enable them to
place any serious obstacles in the way of the official Netherlands
policy of cooperation with the US and other Western nations. Certain
supporters of the Labor Party and of the extreme right-wing parties
are highly critical of American leadership but all these elements
distrust the Communists far more then they do the US. Only a sharp
increase in unemployment and a worsening of the local economic situation
would be likely to siphon off support from the Labor Party to the
Netherlands Communists,
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
-4-
C0112, UNISI-i IN THE NETHERLANDS: ASSETS
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
The estimated membership of the Netherlands Communist Party is
33,000. The aggregate membership figure of organizations controlled
by Communists is about 125,000, but the actual total may be less as
many individuals belong to more than one front organization and many
members of such organizations as the Communist-controlled trade unions
are not Communists. Slightly more than three percent of the popula-
tion is influenced strongly enough by the Communists to vote the party
ticket. The bulk of the party membership and sympathizers is drawn
from the industrial working class and from members of the lower middle
classes living on small pensions, with a few intellectuals, professional
people, and white collar workers furnishing the rest. Geographically,
Communist strength is greatest (1) in the highly urbanized and indus-
trialized provinces of North and South Holland, including the three
largest cities of the country, Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam,
(2) in the industrial Twente section of the province of Overijssel
and (3) in certain poorly developed, isolated rural sections, notably
the eastern corner of the province of Groningen. In this latter area,
the town of Finsterwolde (population: 3,240) has a Communist-dominated
town council.
The "hard core" of the Communist Party is only about 10 percent
of the total party strength, or roughly 3,000. This hard core fur-
nishes the militant leadership of the party. The rest of the member-
ship is, on the whole, apathetic but continues to vote for the party
in spite of numerous shifts in party line and tactics. The average age
of the party leaders is between 45 and 50, and most of them joined the
organization before the war. Several of the top leaders have been
active in key posts in the party for fifteen or twenty years. Since
the strength of the party prior to the war was never more than 10,000,
at least two-thirds of the membership joined within the past five years.
The "hard core" leadership is drawn almost exclusively from the laboring
classes and is concentrated in the city of Amsterdam. A considerable
number of old-guard Communists are located in some of the villages in
the northern tip of the province of North Holland and in the small
towns and villages of the province of Groningen. The membership of
the party, which reached a maximum of 53,000 in 1947, dropped to
33,000 by 1950 and has remained constant at that level.
II. ELECTORAL STRENGTH
The Communist Party obtained 6.16 percent (328,571) of the
5,335,064 valid votes cast in the parliamentary elections of June 1952,
compared with 7.74 percent (381,953) of 4,932,959 valid votes in the
1948 parliamentary elections, and 6.8 percent (329,365) of the 4,843,630
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
valid votes in the elections for the Provincial States in 1950. At
present all non-Communist parties, except the People's Party for
Freedom and Democracy and the small Political Reformed and Catholic
National Parties, are represented in the government. Since these
three parties are as opposed to Communism as these parties in the
governing coalition, the Communist Party is isolated in its opposi-
tion. Following is the breakdown of votes and seats in the Second
Chamber of the Dutch States General following the elections of June
1952.
Party
Number of
% of Total
Number of
Votes
Vote
Seats
Party of Labor
1,545,414
28.97
Catholic Peoples Party
1,529,464
28.67
30
Anti-Revolutionary Party
605,269
11.31
12
Christian Historical Union
Peoples Party for Freedom
476,175
8.92
and Democracy
471,005
8.83
Communist Party Netherlands
328,571
6.16
Political Reformed Party
129,134
2.42
Catholic National Party
144,435
2.71
2
The Communists obtain the greatest number of votes in the cities
of Amsterdam (22.35 percent of the total vote in the June 1952 parlia-
mentary elections), Rotterdam (9.6 percent), and The Hague (6.6 percent).
The Communists also are strong in the province of Groningen where they
received 9.0 percent of the total valid votes in 1952.
As Communist overtures to several of the democratic parties in
1952 to form a "National Unity Front" were unsuccessful, the party
campaigned independently in the June elections that year. Its faction
in Parliament is completely independent from the other opposition
groups.
III. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION FOR VIOLENT ACTION
The current policy of the Communist Party is to pose as a law-
abiding, peace-loving organization. Communists have been active in
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORP-ATION
leading meetings and parades protesting commutation of the sentences
of war criminals and the rearmament of Germany, however, these demon-
strations have had no violent aspects.
During World War II, the Communists participated in the anti-
German resistance, but, with the exception of some individuals, they
seem to have played only a subsidiary role.
The Dutch Communists are believed to have some arms available
in hidden caches although nothing specific is known, nor is there
any detailed information on plans for execution of violent action.
According to current reports the Communists plan to seize control of
the railway network and to sabotage Dutch transportation in the event
of war. The Netherlands Railways authorities are well aware of these
plans and are closely scrutinizing any employees whose loyalty is
questioned. There are also reports of an "agitation center" in
Amsterdam which trains Communists for various tasks, but it is believed
that this center concentrates on propaganda and developing leader-
ship in the party, rather than on schemes for violent action.
The Dutch Communists have no known paramilitary organization,
and could probably rally no more than a 1,000 men for active guerilla
warfare in the event of an East-West war. An attempt at armed insur-
rection in peace-time is most unlikely in the Netherlands, for the
Communists probably would have available to them for such an attempt
only the several hundred "hard-core" members in the Amsterdam area.
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMUNISAN
The Communists are a legally recognized party in the Netherlands
and relatively few restraints have been imposed on their activities.
The Dutch Constitution was amended in 1948 to grant the govern-
ment wide powers in times of national emergency. This constitutional
provision was implemented in 1952 by a law enabling the Queen in times
of emergency, at the suggestion of the ihiinister of the Interior and
with the approval of the States-General, to suspend normal legislative
and judicial functions and to grant sweeping powers to the :Minister
of the Interior, the Queen's Commissioners in the 11 provinces, and
the Dutch mayors. Although these powers have never been invoked,
they act as a restraining force upon the Communists. At the time of
the passing of the bill, there was some talk in Communist circles of
going underground, but such a step will probably not be taken unless
the government becomes far more restrictive in its policy towards the
Communists.
SECRET - SECURITY INFORA,iATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
A further hindrance to the Communists is the practice of keeping
Communist members of most town councils, provincial states and the
States General from participating in key administrative and legislative
committees.
Since December 1951, civil servants have been prohibited by the
Dutch government from being members of the Communist Party, its women's,
youth, and labor organizations. Many of the municipalities of the
kingdom have followed the lead of the national government in this
matter. Members of the Communist party working for the government of
the city of Amsterdam have been seriously inconvenienced by this action
and some of them have resigned their membership in the party as a re-
sult.
The Communist trade union federation is not recognized as a
bona fide bargaining agent by the government.
Most of the trade unions in the Netherlands are combined into
four major federations. In the Catholic and Protestant federations,
the Communists are barred from membership. Of the 400,000 members in
the Socialist federation (The Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions),
less than one percent is Communist.
The Communist Unity Trade Union Central (Eenheidsvakcentrale
EVC) claimed 164,000 members in 1951, although its actual strength is
probably no more than 70,000. Its four most important components are
the General Union of Transport Workers (Algemene Bedrijfsbond Transport),
which includes the dockworkers and claimed 13,000 members in 1951;
the General Union of Workers in the Building Trades (Algemene Bond van
Werkers in de Bouwnijverheid) with 33,600 claimed members in 1951; the*
Union of Dutch Government Personnel (Bond van Nederlands Overheidspersoneel),
which controls many of the manual laborers in the employ of the city
of Amsterdam and claimed 18,900 members in 1951; and the I-?etal Workers'.
Trade Union (Bond van Werknemers in de I?~etaalnijverheid en Aanverwante
Bedrijfstakken) with 27,110 claimed members scattered through the
aircraft, shipbuilding and other defense industries. The actual mem-
bership of these unions is probably one-half the claimed membership.
The Communists are not in control of any key industries, but-
could probably considerably damage the economic life of the port of
Amsterdam where the Communist transport workers' union controls a
large number of longshoremen. Communist workers are too few in such
vital industries as aviation and electronics to be a grave security threat.
The Unity Trade'Union Central is affiliated with and active in
the work of the WFTU.
SECRET - SECURITY IIIFORI?ATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
VI. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL,
AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION
The most important Communist front organizations in the Netherlands
1) The General Netherlands Youth Federation (Algemeen Nederlands
Jeugdverbond) which has somewhat less than 5,000 members, a ou a o
whom are concentrated in Amsterdam. It is the youth movement of the
Communist Party and due to its weakness, offers practically no competi-
tion to non-Communist organizations in the same field. Its leadership
is composed of "hard. core" party members who control the organization,
but the Federation suffers from a lack of trained youth leaders. The
organization is an affiliate of the World Federation of Democratic
Youth. It is attempting to recruit new members by emphasizing hobbies
rather than politics, but its capabilities for any expansion of membership
or activity are limited.
2) The organization of Progressive Student Youth (Organisatie
van Progressieve Studerende Jeugd), an affiliate of the In erne Iona
U ion of tudents IUS , is composed of several hundred secondary school
students. It is relatively unimportant in youth and student circles
and its efforts to influence the texts used in secondary schools have
been unsuccessful. The organization is in financial difficulties and
its membership is quite static.
3) The Netherlands Women's Movement (Nederlandse Vrouwenbeweging,
NVB) is the women's auxiliary of the Communist Party. Founded in
it has about 5,000 members and is affiliated with-the Communist front ,
Women's International Democratic Federation. Its membership is fairly
constant and the possibilities for growth are negligible. The
Netherlands Women's Movement supports the Communist Party in all cam-
paigns and actions.
4) The Netherlands-USSR Association (Vereniging Nederland-USSR)
was formed in March 1948 through a merger of many oca groups o
stimulate friendly relations and establish social and cultural ties
between the two nations. Originally appealing to non-Communists as well
as to Communists and their sympathizers, its strict adherence to the
party line has eliminated most of the non-Cormmunist elements. The
Association claimed a membership of 13,000 in 1951, but half that figure
is probably more accurate.
5) The Netherlands Peace Council (Nederlandse Vredesraad) co-
ordinates the work of various "peace" comma ees w is unction on a
regional, local, and factory level. The Council claims a circulation of
20,000 for its organ Vrede (peace). The Council supports such movements
SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800080001-4
as the Stockholm Peace Petition, the Moscow Economic Conference, etc. Of
late its rallies and meetings in behalf of world peace and its open con-
demnation of the US and the West have received only a luke-warm reception.
6) The Workers' Cultural Union (Arbeiders Bond voor Cultuur),
founded in 1948 and claiming 10,000 members n January 1,-fs in#ended
to promote the cultural development of the workers along Communist lines.
Its leadership has been rather inactive, and the Union itself is closely
allied with the Union of Socialist Choral and Musical Societies in the
Netherlands (Bond van Socialistische Zang-en Muziokverenigingen in
Nederland) whose purpo a m-em ersiip -? in Novain er 1949 was 1* 600. The
Musical Society's purpose is to enliven the meetings of Communist and
Communist front organizations.
7) The United Resistance, 1940-1945 (Verenigd Verzat, 1940-1945)
organization claims a membership of 1,000 and is a 1 37Esd with the
international Communist front organization, the International Federation
of Resistance Fighters (FIR).
8) The Committee for Help to Indonesia (Comite Hulp aan Indonesia)
and the Indonesian Association (Perhimpoenan Ind