REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

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• Content Type: REPORT

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T OF TIM QUANTICO
'VUI HILITIES PANEL
10 Joan 1955
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25 July 1155
i; vi 1 Z~aiVuUiA .FO.&: Assistant Director for National Estimates
: Report of the Quantico Panel
1. You are aware that Nelson Rockefeller arranged a series of
i.eetings at Quantico of a Panel of eleven consultants early in June as a
part of the preparation for the Summit Conference. Under date of 13 June
Director received a copy of the report oT this Panel which, you have no
~Joubt seen.
2. I wish particularly to draw to your attention and that of the Board,
fab 2, one of the supporting papers prepared by individual members of
1. 1.
Panel. This one is entitled "The Requirements for US-NATO to Win
in the Arms Race with the USSR." It was written by Dr. Ellis A. Johnson,
:)irector, Operations Research Office.
3. This document was quite fundamental to the thinking of the whole
!?anel. It is addressed to the broad subject of present and prospective net
c ~pabilities. I am quite certain that some of the judgments it contains are
too sweeping but I would argue very strongly indeed that any net capabilities
study must take fully into account the evidence and argumentation advanced
by Dr. Johnson if the resulting estimate is to be worthwhile. I say this in
further support of the argument in my memorandum to you, dated 23 June
1,)55, subject "Board Memorandum on Soviet Policy in Coming Negotiations"
to the effect that our national estimates seem to me often to underemphasize
ne current and prospective progress of the technological rivalry between
be US and the USSR and the implications of development in this rivalry.
Lx I
~
RICHARD M. BISSE
L, .] R.
i;ci w/attachment Special Assistant to the Director
Quantico Report for Planning and Coordination
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June 13, 1955
As you know, during the week just past a panel of eleven
consultants knowledgeable in several aspects of US-USSR relations
met at Quantico on my invitation to consider Communist bloc
vulnerabilities, an area of concern to the Planning Coordination
Group. The panel conclusions and recommendations and ten papers
prepared by individual panel members are contained in a report
transmitted to me June 10.
I believe this report to contain many suggestions of
interest. A copy for yourself is attached.
Your participation and that of members of your agency
during the course of the panel discussions was very beneficial.
May I take this opportunity to express my thanks for your
cooperation.
Sincerely,
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant
Attachment:
Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel
(Copy No. 42)
The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
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Quantico, Virginia
June 10, 1955
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Dear Mr. Rockefeller:
At your invitation, a group of eleven persons
knowledgeable in many fields important to the American-Soviet
Struggle, have met as a Panel at Quantico, Virginia, from 5-10
June, to explore methods of exploiting Communist bloc vulnera-
bilities at this crucial state of world affairs. As your
designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I am
herewith transmitting the reports and recommendations of our
group.
All of us appreciate the freedom of action you gave us
to develop our own guidelines of investig"tion. We soon
discovered that several significant vulnerabilities could be
identified and that. fruitful courses of action could be
developed cnly if we looked at the total political and security
problems facing the U.S. at this juncture.
We have no expectation that we have produced either a magic
formula for positive U.S. action or a substitute for the staff
considerations currently under way in the responsible Government
Departments. We offer these recommendations and the papers
that underlie them as a supplement to those considerations. It
is our hope that responsible officials will find our efforts
constructive and that use can be made of the many concrete
suggestions included in the Panel results.
The over-all report of the Panel and its four appendices
represent a general group consensus. We had neither the time
nor the data to make, as individuals, definitive commitments
of judgment on all the recommendations and on every line of text.
But we forwarded these documents confident th,.t they deserve serious
consideration by the Government. We are also submitting ten
papers prepared by individual Panel members. Many ideas from
them have found their way into our joint recommendations; but
time did not permit the Panel to evaluate the texts fully. I
personally deem them an extremely interesting product of the
week's work.
All of us appreciate the contributions made by govern-
mental represent,'tives toward this Panel and, in particular,
the willing ;help of the responsible officials from your office,
the Departments of State and Defense, of CIA, USIA, NSC, and
OCB, who took of.' their precious time to join us periodically
in our discussions'.'
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The one impression which stands out in my mind is the
unanimous belief of the panel members that the U.S. now en-
joys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength
vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. The next two or three years afford
the Unwed States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong
position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice
of essential positions of strength. Such negotiation, along
with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World
strength., could create the conditions for victory in the cold
war.
May I express our appreciation for having had this
opportunity to serve.
Dr. Frederick Dunn
Director, Center of International Studies
Mr. C. D. Jackson
TIME LIFE
Dr. Ellis An Johnson
Director., Operations Research Office
Dr. Paul Linebarger
School of Advanced International Studies
Dr, Max Millikan
Center of International Studies., MIT
Dr. Philip Mosely
Director, Russian Institute
Dr. George Pettee
Deputy Director, Operations Research Office
Dr. Stefan Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air Force
Dr. Hans Speier
RAND Corporation
Dr. Charles A. H. Thomson
Brookings Institution
f lL 1
W. W. Rostow
(Center of International Studies,
Panel Chairman
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL
PURPOSE.. This report (1) makes recommendations regarding operational
positions and actions the U.S., might tae vis-a-vis the USSR (as for
example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit
the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities., and (2) offers suggestions
for related actions advantageous to the U.S,
The Panel assessed the current strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet
Bloc and the Free itbrld. It concluded that the next several years afford
the United States the opportunity to act from a strong position and to
exact from the enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent
strength by us. A full exploitation of the enemy's transitory position
of relative weakness and the Free World's actual and potential foundations
for strength requires a wide range of U.S. initiatives and actions which
transcend the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union.
RECOMMENDATIONS .
In the light of this assessment we develop in our submissions a
strategy and a broad tactical line for the forthcoming conferences and
we submit the following specific recommendations:
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c. A convention providing for free and unhampered inter-
national communications for the exchange of information and ideas.,
conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement.
d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy
and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-
developed areas.
3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in
dealing. with German matters:
a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.
b. Proper conditions for free elections.
c. Free election.
d. Unification of government.
e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's
international status.
f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has
reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of
NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO., she should be permitted to
rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs.
4. The United States should take the following actions to bring
about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy...and to worsen difficulties
between the Soviet Union and Red China:
a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance.
b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the
conference.
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A. Actions Prior to the Confe r~ ence.
1. The United States should insist that the Soviets
lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK, and to
France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the
Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.
B. Actions During the Conference.
1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments. These include:
a. Discussions of :
(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of
military installations, forces., and armaments, without limitations
provisions.
(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any
nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes.
(Proposed with reservations noted in the text.)
b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR;after rejection
of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the
safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms
convention.
2. The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals concerning exchange of persons., information and goods, covering:
a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.
I. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons
to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes.
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c, At least once during the conference, the Department of
State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Govern-
ment on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference.
id?~?of the Conference.
0. Actions Outs
Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent
to it, the United States should take the following actions:
1. General
a, Propose an international scientific conference of all
powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of
radioactive fallout.
b. The United States should convene at an early date an
exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and
other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.
c. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and
treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy.
2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:
a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, and
Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and postwar agreements
relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding
inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements.
b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air
defense, passive and active, for our European allies.
o. Seek the establishment, organization and support of
research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale.
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Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow
of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in
behalf of a Free World.
e. Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical
solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian
casualties.
f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed to
reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.
g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated
economic growth in the underdeveloped countries of the Free World.
3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:
a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to
the underdeveloped countries, including Japan, South Asia and Southeast
Asia.
b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good
relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest
to the U.S. U.S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should
openly sponsor informal ieT:rs and cultural connections there,
c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to
deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression.
d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam.
e. In order to convert a major free world problem into an
asset,launch a positive U.S, political and economic program for Formosa.,
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REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERAuILITIE PANEL
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REPO. -,,T OF THE C UAANTICO VULNE RA ILI,ITIES PANEL
TABL] OF CONTENTS
I PURPOSE
II THE GENERAL SETTING
III THE OBJECTS OF AN AiEItIC1AN STRATEGY
IV GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY
V RE, C01'MENDATIOi 13
Appendix A - Estimate of the Situation
Appendix B - ProDosals to Test Soviet l.1ii lin~;ness to
`?Cencessions aiulto 7 rove the U.S .
Position
Appendix C - The G:er 71 an G,uestion
l.- Preliminary; Diplomatic Action in
Preparation for the Summit Conference
2.- U.S. Guidelines for a German
Settlement
3 - German Elections
4 - Possible Proposals for German Unity
Appendix D - A Proposal for Graduated Disarmament
Summary of Individual Su_%porting Papers
Tab 1 - "Soviet Estimate of the Situation"
Tab 2 - "The Require.-Lents for U.S.-NATO to Win in the Arms
Race with the tBSR"
Tab 3 - "Alliance and Coalition Problems"
(a) "Does NATO Have a Position of Strength?"
(b) "Asia Policy"
(c) "Japan"
(d) "ixieasures to Cope with Free-World Fears
of the Bomb"
(e) "Air Defense of the United States and Western
Europe"
(f) "Factors Influencing the Morale of Allies"
Tab 4 - "Straining the Sino-Soviet Alliance" with Annex
Tab 5 - "An Institute for the Study of Peace"
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June 10, 1955
REPORT OF TB QJANTICO VULNERABILITIES PxJ FL
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is (1) to make recommendations regarding
operational positions and actions the U. S. might take vis-a-vis the USSR
(as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will
permit the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) to offer sugges-
tions for related actions advantageous to the U. S.
II. THE GETM L SETTING
L1. The current disposition of the Soviet leaders to sit down at the
"summit" cannot be traced to a genuine interest on their part to ease any
tensions for the sake of peace and harmony. It must be traced to a specific
Communist interest in improving the Soviet position in the international
struggle for power.
They are afraid of the transitory American superiority in strategic
airpower, stockpile, and delivery capabilities. They have realized that
this superiority is sufficient to be a guarantee of victory in a major war.
In addition, they may be afraid that American strategic airpower will be
used in the form of a surprise attack against the Soviet Union. (There is'
evidence that in recent months Soviet leaders have abandoned the time-honored,
principle of Soviet military doctrine that mass rather than surprise is the
decisive factor in war.) The Soviet leaders may be ready to attribute to
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the U. S. the intention of preventive war which they might indeed hold
themselves, if the balance of power were reversed. The apprehension of the
Soviet leaders is aggravated by their estimate that a lost war would mean
the end of Communism.
In view of this grave outlook, the Soviet leaders are interested '
in gaining time. They need time to achieve nuclear parity--a goal which
they can hope to achieve, for all practical purposes, within three to
five years. S?iore generally, they need time to shore up their political
position, repair their agricultural difficulties, and develop their economic
organization.
B. Assuming that this evaluation of the situation is correct, the
United States would play into the hands of the Soviet Union if it were to
approach the conference with the primary purpose of easing tension. It
should meet the Soviet leaders with the intention to force them to retreat;
Even if the foregoing evaluation of the situation is not correct,
the United States cannot lose anything by acting at the beginning in the
conviction that the Soviet Union is prepared to make concessions.
For years it has been United States policy that we will negotiate
with the Soviet Union only from positions of strength. It is not only true
that we now occupy such a transitory position of strength vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union but also likely that the Soviet leaders act at the present
from fear of this position of strength. We should, therefore, exploit this
strength by pressing resolutely for an improvement of our position in the
international struggle of power.
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For years, it has been United States policy that we are ready to
negotiate with the Soviet Union only if its leaders show by action rather
than words that they are willing to work with us toward the preservation of
peace. The Soviets did this in the case of Austria; we should nod press
this policy further.
Instead of meeting the Soviet leaders on their terms and permitting
them to center the discussion around issues of primary interest to them,
such as the delay of German rearmament and the splitting of NATO, and,
reduction of the U.S. atomic advantage through disarmament, the United States
should seize the initiative by presenting the Soviet Union with heavy
demands for major concessions on their part at a price that is tolerable to
The conference may present a unique opportunity to the United States
for inflicting a diplomatic defeat upon the Soviet Union, to reassert the
ideals of the Free World and to buttress peace under American leadership.
C. Moscow's possible private estimate of military weakness is
accompanied by public evidence of Soviet internal difficulties. Soviet
leaders may find this profoundly disturbing, since it could lead to the
weakening or even the destruction of Communism's ideological momentum and
mystique both'in Russia and abroad.
S ep cificaa.ly:
1. Cot.munist agricultural policy, a key element in Communist theory
and practice, is proving ineffective or worse from one end of the Bloc to
the other.
2. The withdrawal from Austria, the performance in Belgrade,
unusually rapid vacillations in Soviet policy,'and improvements in the
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relative military, economic, and political position in Western Europe have
sharply raised expectations in Eastern Europe that the satellite structure,
might change and Soviet power recede from Eastern Europe.
3. The performance of Soviet leadership since Stalin's death has'
muddied the Stalinist image of inevitable advance and of Communism as the
wave of the future'an impression strongly reinforced by recent Soviet
diplomatic actions.
4. It is fundamental that the U.S. should seek in the coming
months to exploit to the hilt this perhaps transitory position of Soviet
political. vulnerability, together with weaknesses in the Soviet's own
estimate of their position of which we are not aware, but which we may be
able to probe out and capitalize by negotiations from an attitude of
strength. Yet our actions must be tempered by realization of the facts
that there is no indication that the top Soviet leadership has lost
effective control over the Russian or the satellite peoples, and that
Soviet military strength is great al;~d. on. the rise..
17. Schematically, the purposes of Moscow's current moves appear to
10 To weaken the American military and political position in Europe
and Asia by inducing further U.S. troop withdrawals and. depriving us of the -
use of our present air bases;
2. To weaken or destroy NATO;
3, To induce a out in military outlays of the U.S. and its allies;
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1,,. To separate us from our allies by widening the area of
"neutrality"; and
5. To maximize the gap between the American and the allied policy
positions in Europe and in Asia.
E. The major lines of action the Soviets may attempt to follow
1. With respect to German unification:
ate? To propose German unification through free elections
coupled with the withdrawal of occupation troops, and to put the
blame of failure on supposed American unwillingness to withdraw
troops;
b, To accept Western terms for free elections in Germany
at the price of German withdrawal from 14EU and from NATO and to-
confront us if not now, at some time in the future, with the
possibility of Gernian acceptance; or
cs, In any case, to present proposals for German unity designed
to unhinge the American military position in Europe, including
NATO and our air bases.
2. With respect to international control of armaments, either:
at To press hard their current position on control of armaments
in an effort to separate the United States from the British and
the French; or
b. To offer more complete inspection terms of a kind difficult
for the U.S. to refuse.
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3. To press for recognition of Communist China and support
Communist Chinese steps in the Far East designed to separate the
United States from other countries.
F. An appreciation of the opportunities open to the United States
in the coming months requires an understanding of the following strengths
and weaknesses. Strengths include our present decisive superiority
in the arms race; satisfaction on balance in Western Europe with the
present NATO..WEU structure; a desire in the Free World that the U.S.
should not withdraw its forces from Germany and Europe; relatively
greater progress in Western than in Eastern Europe; our "open society";
the continued improvement in the Free World position in the Philippines,
Malaya, and Burma; the potentialities of strengthening the political,
economic, and military position of Japan and Formosa and the SEATO
powers; and the potentialities of strengthening the political and
economic position of India and the other Colombo powers.
G. Free World weaknesses include a sense of vulnerability to atomic
attack brought about by the fear that the U.S. might initiate or stumble
into atomic war as a result of Communist provocation; a sense that the
U.S. must respond to Communist aggression either by total war or by
inaction; the possible attraction to the opposition in Germany of a
Soviet proposal that Germany be reunified by truly free elections at
a cost unacceptable to us; lack of an agreed allied position on the
Far East; Japanese economic uncertainties; seeming Soviet possession of
the initiative in easing tensions; disagreena nt in the Free World over
economic policies and strategic matters;. economic uncertainties arising
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in raw materials and food-producing countries from U.S. commodity
price fluctuations; and imperfect confidence in U.S. policies and
plans.
(The foregoing appraisal of purposes, strengths and weaknesses is
expanded in Appendix A.)
III. TIC OB~TECTS OF AN
AViICAN STRATEGY
A. The next two years afford the U.S, the opportunity to negotiate
from a strong position for genuine concessions by the energy without
sacrifice of deterrent strength by us, Such negotiation can create
the essential conditions for the winning of the Cold War.' A
In the conduct of its negotiations, the U,S, should keep in mind
the continuing objectives of United States foreign policy:
1. To continue to hold the ilitary balance of power in our
favor which requires not only that we neutralize our adversaries'
striking power in weapons of mass destruction and the many implementing
weapons systems, including air defense and electronic warfare, but
also that we continue to develop flexible capabilities to undertake
military action short of total war and maintain the will to do so.
2. To increase the military, economic and political strength
and unity of the Free World and thus be prepared to forestall, check or
defeat Communist efforts at erosion conducted by limited military means,
and through propaganda, subversion, and diplomacy.
3. To determine and execute our policies in such a way as to
maximize the possib~Uty of changes within the Soviet bloc favorable to the
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U. S. interest, by effectively denying to Moscow the possibilities of
consolidation and by steadily holding out peaceful alternatives not
incompatible with the Russian national security interest, and at the
same time encouraging the Soviet satellites and Communist China to
support their own national interests wherever the latter come into
conflict with Soviet demands on them.
4. To appreciate and act upon the dramatic new opportunities for
maneuver opened to us by the current Soviet defensive posture so that
our constant goal, a roll-back of Soviet power in Eastern and Central
Europe and in Asia is steadily brought nearer and a Free Europe is
brought to life.
IV. GEQ3ERAL PRINCIPLES CF T : ?,' STRATEGY
In pursuing the objectives outlined above, we should be guided by
the following general principles, which govern the mood and attitude
with which we approach the conference. Some of these principles should
probably be enunciated by the President early in the course of the
meeting at the summit. Others relate to our behavior as the conference
and the negotiations, which presumably till follow it, proceed. The
decision as to how much of what follows should be explicit from the
start must depend on professional detailed staff work and the judgment
of the responsible negotiators,
l.. Tile will achieve the maximum political and psychological impact
from this conference if the U. S. delegation contributes at the outset
and maintains throughout a mood and positions of high diplomatic
seriousness,
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2. The Cold War has not been a contest of our choosing. We
disarmed after the war in the ho-,--)e that we could place reliance for
our security on a system of international agreements. Bitter experience
has taught us that this hope was illusory, and that for the present
our security would have to be based on cur own strength and that of
those who allied themselves with tie. We should speak and act from
our conviction that we are now in a position of relative strength.
We should stubbornly maintain and expand this position of strength
in cooperation with our allies and other friendly countries until the
very day that effective measures are actually in operation which give
us solid assurance that we and our allies are safe from the threat of
attack.. However tempting the prospect of a relaxation of tensions
uiay be, we shall not again make the mistake of confusing talk about
a relaxation of tensions with )rogress toward a fundamental solution
of world problems. We should take concrete measures to emphasize our
strength and confidence, such as those suggested below.
3. While we are quite prepared to live with the Cold War indefinitely,
if necessary, we are determined to explore seriously every real possibility
of moving, whether by large or small steps, toward reduction of funda-
mental conflicts. Continuation of the arms race is imposing heavy
costs on the entire world. A large fraction of the world's resources
are being diverted from serving the welfare of the peoples of the world
to building military establishments which we, and perhaps the Soviets,
regard as necessary to security. There are ,Many constructive tasks
of building the Soviet civilian economy an,-. raising the standard of
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living of the Soviet people which they have been unable to get on with.
because so large a part of their energies have gone into the production
of weapons. With the further development of modern methods of warfares,
these burdens will increase.
4. Even more important, the world has hanging over it the shadow
of destructive nuclear warfare, which, as Mr. i4alenkov has rightly said
could destroy modern civilization. We shall leave no stone unturned
in the pursuit of ways to effect a real reduction in this threat.
We have a series of proposals we should make at the appropriate time
for taking what we believe to be constructive first steps toward a
system of arms limitation. As explained in more detail in Appendix A,
we are prepared to accept certain of the May 10 proposals of the Soviets;
for example, a reduction of ground forces. We have proposals for the
development of a workable inspection system for control of armaments.
We also have proposals for considering alleviation of the effects of
radioactive fall-outo
5; A fundamental solution to the problem of freeing the world from
the spectre of atomic holocaust must be based on a genuinely free
Europe, with no occupation troops and no interference in the internal
affairs of any country by any outside power. Such a Free Europe,
composed of the countries from Turkey to Norway, from Poland to Spain,
is a long-run goal of American policy. Only when such a community of
nations exists, each free to determine its own course in accord with
its own culture and historic traditions, each free to engage in
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economic and cultural intercourse and political association with all
other members of the European colmiunity of nations, will it be possible
to attain Euroi lean security and cooperation based on carhop trust and
interest.
6. The United States wishes to move toward such a Free Europe
just as rapidly as possible. The question is how fast and far the
Soviet Union is prepared to go and to what extent our Allies are prepared
to support such a policy. We still hold to U.S.'policy-: hat the wartime
and postwar agreements conccrnin; the Soviet satellites for the with-
drawal of Soviet troops anc' the holding of free elections in all the
countries should be honored. It is our hope that in agreeing tc ?the
conference the Soviet Union had in mind the discussion of serious
steps toward a Free E Trope.
L Some members cf the group believe that there is a real possibility
that the Soviets will concede the withdrawal of some or all of their
forces even though we are unwilling to discuss the abandon ent of NATO.
Others believe the likelihood of this is negligible, and any attempt to
force this issue diplomatically may lead to a successful concentration
of attention by the Soviets on the issue of the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Europe which would be most damaging to American interests.
There is, therefore, some disagreement among the members of the
group on how far to proceed diplomatically beyond the enunciation of
long range American purposes. Some feel we should press diplomatically
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops only from Eastern Ger:iany and not
from Eastern Europe; others for a total withdrawal fro-iii both areas. In
connection with withdrawal frosi either area, we shall press for free
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elections. Some suggest a diplbt1tatio initiative on free
elections only. Others hold that to raise this issue at the conference
would be unworkable and possibly damaging to Allied unitya
7. The Soviets are likely to raise suggestions for the unification
of Germany. A recommended position for the U. S. to take is formulated
in Appendix C,
#3* With respect to the control of armaments, we should emphasize
that some degree of understanding and even trust is essential to any
effective armaments control scheme. We suggest a series of proposals
for the control of armaments which take into account the Russian pro-
posals of May 10, 1955. Our proposals also look to the improvement of
relations and the free exchange of people, ideas, and goods. These
proposals call first for the initiation of a system of mutual inspection
of armaments, -.ncluding forces and production faeiltties without, in
the first instance, any provisions for arms limitation. Ultimately.,
an inspection system, to be effective, should provide for free over-
flights of aircraft by reciprocally inspected aircraft, however sensitive
the USSR may be on this subject.* proposals also include those for an
expansion of economic relations and. for free exchange of information
and ideas, both by the flow of written materials and by unobstructed
radio broadcasting, and a, proposal for the freer access of persons to
all countries. These are all spelled out in more detail in Appendi:es
B and D,
*Note: Aside from our general assumption that before implementation
all these suggestions will be considered carefully by the Departmenty
It is recommended that this proposal be examined with particular
ska,tUlamu by the Department of Defense.
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V. RECOI1JENDATIONS
On the whole range of questions we examined in accordance with
the objectives defined in para. III A above,we wish to make the following
suggestions for action related to the forthcoming Four Power conference:
A. Actions Prior to the Conference.
1. The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the
Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK and to
France that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the
Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.
B, Actions Durin the Conference,
1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments. These
include:
a. Discussions of:
(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of
military installations, forces, and armaments, without limitations
provisions, (Appendix B).
(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of
any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful
purposes. (Proposed with reservations noted in the text. See Appendix B.)
b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR (Appendix D);
after rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the
arms race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a
satisfactory arms convention.
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2, The United States should be prepared to make a series
of proposals concerning exchange of persons) information and goods,,
covering:
a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.
(Appeni':.::.x B).
b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons
to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes.
B),
(Appendix
e. A convention providing for free and unhampered international
communications for the exchange of information and ideas) conditioned
on conclusion of an anti-janmiing agreement. (Appendix B).
d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and
a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-
developed areas. (Appendix B).
3. The United States should pursue the following sequence
in dealing with German matters:
a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.
b. Proper conditions for free elections.
c. Free elections
d. Unification of government
e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's
international status.
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f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany
has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral
part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be
permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs
(Appendix C).
4. The United States should take the following actions
to bring about greater Allied unity on Far..Eastern policy, and to worsen
difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red China:
a. Take steps to nut strains on the Moscow-Peiping
alliance. (Tab 4)
b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the
conference (Tab 3c).
co At least once during the conference, the Department of
State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese
Government on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference.
(Tab 3c).
C. Actions outs de of the Conference.
Outside of the conference, either concurrently ivrith it or
subsequent to it, the United States should take the following actions:
1. General
a. Propose an international scientific conference of all
powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger
of radioactive fallout (Para IV above. See also Tab 3(d)).
b. The United States should convene at an early date an
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exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic ant
other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty,
of Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power
and treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy,
(Tab 3(c)).
2. In relation to Europe, the United Staten should:
a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Romania, and
Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and pC?stwar agreements
relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding inspec-
tion to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements
(Appendix B).
b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air
defense, passive and active, for our European. allies (Tab 3(a), 3(d), 3(e)~
c. Seek the establishment, organization and support of
research and develop,ent in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale
(Tabs 2p 3a and 3 c).
d, Relax to the mgt.mum restrictions preventing the flow
of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in
behalf of a Free World (Tab 2).
e, Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical
solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian
casualties (Tab 3e),
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f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed
to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.
(U:fi7, See Tab 3(b)).
g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for acceler-
ated.economic growth in the underdeveloped countries in the free world.
(See tab 3(b))
3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:
a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to
the underdeveloped countries; including Japan, South Asia and Southeast
Asia (Tab 3(b)),
b; Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its
good relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter cf interest
to the U,S. U. S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should
openly sponsor informal nei.1s; and cultural connections there. (Tab 3(b)),
c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is Capable and willing
to deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression
(Tab 3b),*
d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam
(Tab 3(b)),
e. In order to convert a major free world problem into
an asset, launch a positive U.
Formosa (Tab 3(b)),
. Political and economic program for
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ECRET Appendix A to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities
Panel
K'.L.itTE CF TIE SITUATION
The following estimate is consistent with and supports
the general strategy set forth in the basic paper.
C
I. AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY PROBLEMS.
The forthcoming period of several months, during which several
East-West conferences will occur, must be viewed in relation to longer-
run American objectives, to the general character of the security problems
we confront, and to the specific conditions now prevailing.
1. It is the object of U.S. foreign policy to protect American
society, not merely by protecting American territory but also by denying
to any hostile power superiority of military and ideological power in
Eurasia (and ultimately, perhaps, Africa and Latin America.) The USSR
and Communist China actively seek, as a continuing goal, to gain that
superiority by reducing or eliminating US influence and power in both
European and Asian fringes of the Eurasian land-mass.
2. The whole of our effort to meet this challenge proceeds in the
context of the arms race, spearheaded by the development and large-scale
production of weapons of mass destruction and by the development of ever
greater capabilities both for delivery and defense. This arms race is
now at a particularly acute stage, and will remain so-for many years.*
It is probable that for the present and for a relatively brief future
period we hold important advantages. Our adversary's atomic stockpile
and delivery system are temporarily limited, and therefore he is extremely
anxious to avoid a major war because we might win it if it broke outs
*See Tab 2 - The Reauirements-for W -NATO to Win in the Arms
Race with the USSR.
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even though at the risk of grave damage to us and certainly at the cost
of extremely serious damage to our allies, Because of the-technological
acceleration of the arms race and the nature of our adversary, we run
the risk that he may, at some stage, achieve a technological break-
through, and that at that time he would be prepared to exploit his
advantage by initiating an attack on the United States. Or he might
use his superiority for large-scale atomic blackmail, against the
United States or other powers. Even without a technological break-
through, our opponent could gain such superiority if he maintains his
effort and we relax ours.
The United States will not exploit its current advantage by initiating
general war. If with great energy and imagination we maintain our
superiority in the arms race, we may be able to neutralize the enemy's
developing striking power and to best his defenses by further advances
of our striking power, thereby continuing to make major war unattractive
to him. This is a minimum condition for assuring our security, not a
policy for winning the cold war.
3. In its effort to win the cold war, United States foreign policy
faces four major tasks:
(a) To continue to hold the military balance of power in our
favor which requires not only that we neutralize our adversaries' striking
power in weapons of mass destruction and the many implementing weapons
systems, including air defense and electronic warfare, but also that we
continue to develop flexible capabilities to undertake military action
short of total.,wc and maintain the will to do so,,
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(b) To increase the military, economic and political strength
and unity of the Free World and thus be prepared to forestall,,, check
or defeat communist efforts at erosion conducted by limited military
means, and through propaganda, subversion and diplomacy.
(c) To determine and execute our policies in such away as to
maximize the possibility of changes within the Soviet bloc favorable
to the U.S. interest, by effectively denying to Moscow the possibilities
of consolidation and expansion, and by steadily holding out peaceful
alternatives not incompatible with the Russian national security
interest, and at the same time encouraging the Soviet satellites and
Communist China to support their own national interests wherever the
latter comes into conflict with Soviet demands on them.
(d) To bring about,,, and systematically work toward, a roll-back
of Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe, and in Asia.
II. PROBABLE SOVIET MOTIVES
The converging factors which have probably led Moscow to undertake
the current diplomatic offensive are the following:
1. Present Soviet inferiority in strategic air power in conjunc-
tion with their realization that for a limited period of time US
air power is able to win a major war and to destroy Communism in Russia
by surprise attack.
2. Conflicting economic demands and strains within the Soviet
satellite economies and societies.
3. The possibility of an effective IAIEU, including Western Germany.
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4. Conceivably, the unsettled state of the top leadership position
in Russia.
5. Soviet desire to stabilize the situation in Europe in antici-
pation of a crisis in the Far East,
The purposes of this offensive appear to be these: to weaken
the American military and political position in Europe and Asia by
inducing further U.S. troop withdrawals or depriving us of the use of
our present air bases; to weaken or destroy NATO; to induce a cut in
military outlays of the U.S. and its allies; to separate us from our
allies by widening the area of "neutrality"; and to maximize the gap
between the American power positions in Europe and in Asia.
For the present phase it seems likely that Moscow judges the
possibilities of expansion of Communist power to be more favorable
in Asia and in other underdeveloped parts of the world than in Europe.
A softening of Soviet-engendered tensions in Europe may be the prelude
to more vigorous Communist Chinese expansion efforts in Asia, where
Moscow and Peiping may judge Free World capabilities and cohesion to be
inadequate. By lowering the temperature in Europe in advance of a new
crisis in Asia, the Soviet leadership may hope to strain the free world
alliance system, possibly to the breaking point; perhaps to isolate the
U.S. or, in the case of armed conflict between Communist China and the
U.S., to make sure that the Soviet Union will not be militarily involved,
In any case, the current phase of Soviet policy seems designed to
buy time to build up a future position of greater strength based on
atomic parity with, or superiority over the U. S., from which a more
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effective political offensive might be launched.
III. POSSIBLE SOVIET MOTIVES
1. The possibility that the present Soviet diplomatic offensive
is a cover for an early surprise military attack on the U.S. is relatively
less likely than any of the foregoing, but it can not be ruled out..
2. It is even less likely that Moscow now seriously intends to
seek security by collective means and to devote resources so releassd
to long-term strengthening of the Soviet systems and the Soviet bloc.
Within the Soviet Union there may be some leaders who would prefer to
devote marginal disposable resources to strengthening the Soviet Bloc
within its present territories,, and therefore to restrain the rising
tempo of the arms race by limiting immediate Soviet ambitions and risks.
While these leaders may have some influence, there is no valid evidence..,,
that their tactics will be followed. It is judged to be one major
American purpose at the forthcoming conferences to explore the existence
of such motives or elements in the Soviet camp and to take actions,.,
compatible with the U.S. interest,, to encourage the ascendancy of those
devoted to collective security.
IV. FREE WORLD VULNERABILITY TO PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGY
1. The sense of vulnerability to atomic attack; the fear of the
U.S. initiating or stumbling into atomic war particularly in view of the
fact that its weapons superiority may be short-lived; the susceptibility
to "atomic blackmail"; and dependence on allies for the use of U.S. air
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bases and atomic weapons in case of war.
2. The sense that the United States is caught up in a position
where it must respond to Communist aggression either by total war or
by inaction;
3. Seeming Soviet posture of initiative in easing tensions.
4. The attraction to the opposition in the Federal Republic of a
Soviet proposal that Germany be reunified on the basis of truly free
elections but that foreign troops be withdrawn.
5. Disagreements in the Free World over East-West trade.
6. Lack of an agreed position on steps that must be taken regarding
the Far East.
7, The uncertainty of the Japanese economic situation.
$. Disparity in strategic and tactical thinking between the U.S.
and its allies due to security restrictions on weapons data required for
responsible thinking.
9. Lack of confidence among many Free World elements in the U.S.
policies and plans due to the appearance of purely empirical improvisa-
tion on our side, lacking in any general or logical purpose except to
oppose our adversary.
FREE WORLD STRENGTHS
1. Our present superiority in the arms race, which may be transitory
unless the U.S. takes corrective measures.
2. Increasing strength of NATO and satisfaction in Western Europe
with the present NATO-WEU structure.
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3. Free World desire that U.S. not withdraw forces from Germany
and Western Europe.
4. Relatively greater progress in Western than in Eastern
Europe.
5. Our "open" society--we can accept many kinds of relaxation and
normalization they can not accept.
6. Consolidation of internal security in the Philippines, Malaya,
and Burma., leaving cnly the Associated States currently vulnerable in
Southeast Asia.
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SECRET APPENDIX B to
Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel
Proposals to Test Soviet Willingness
To Make Concessions And to Improve the U. S. Position
The following proposals are consistent with the general policy
advocated in the basis: report. They are premised on the belief that
both the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in
avoiding an all-out nuclear conflict. Justification for the possible
use of these proposals at the forthcoming conference is set forth in
Section III.
I. The Proposals
The long-run objective of both East and West is a system of
arms control and collective security on which we can all rely and in
which we can all have confidence. It will take time to devise and con-
struct such a system. At its core must lie a free exchange of informa-
tion on armaments and-a comprehensive system of inspection tested by
trial and error.
The following specific proposals are suggested:
1. An agreement for mutual inspection of military installations,
weapons, and armaments. Until experience has been developed on the
feasibility of such inspection, this agreement would make no provision
for arms limitation. Its purpose would be to provide knowledge and
evidence on the basis of which a control plan could be devised.
2. A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality
to fly freely over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes.
The possibility of abuse of this right could be prevented by the estab-
lishment of safely located control points for the international inspection
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and registration of aircraft for flights across international boundaries.'
The convention would be so drawn as not to interfere in any way with
any nation's right to control for economic reasons commercial activities
of foreign aircraft.
3. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade. We are eager
to explore proposals for an expansion of economic relations between
nations in the Soviet orbit and those in the rest of the world. We
take it as agreed that there should be some control over international
traffic in strictly military items, but we are prepared to re-examine
existing policies with respect to other items in an attempt to normalize
international economic relations. The welfare of the Soviet peoples
could be materially advanced if the Soviet Union and the nations of
Eastern Europe took more advantage of opportunities to secure food,
consumers goods, and the like through trade with the rest of the world.
IL. An agreement for greatly increasing the freedom of persons to
travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes. We are ready to
affirm our willingness freely to grant visas to Soviet citizens and in
other ways to encourage those private exchanges of views and experiences
on which international understanding rests if the Soviet Union is pre-
pared to consider similar measures,,
s. A convention providing for free and unhampered international
communication for the exchange of information and ideas. We will give
up all restrictions now in effect in the West on the import of printed
While it is assumed that all suggestions will be carefully staffed it
.is recommended that this particular proposal be examined thoroughly by
the Department of Defense.
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materials and other communications if you will enter into an anti-
jamming agreement,
In addition we would like to press forward with other proposals
already made including:
6. The plan for pooling information and facilities for the explora-
tion of peaceful uses of atomic energy,
7. A worldwide plan for a fund for economic development of under-
developed areas in which both we and the Soviets would participate.
The idea here would be to render this kind of aid cooperative rather
than competitive between East and West as it now threatens to become.
(Reference should be made to the Pre'sidentts speech of April 19, 1953).
II. Comment
1. Our problem at the forthcoming conference is to achieve for
the United States a posture of pushing aggressively and realistically
for the reduction of international conflict without abandoning any
positions of strength important to our security.
2. It is virtually certain that we would have to reject as unsafe
any proposals for the limitation of atomic armaments made by the Russians
at the conference since such proposals could be acceptable
to us only if a complex inspection scheme were fully worked out and
tested in advance,,
3. A key political problem of the conference is thus to find a
posture which will convince our allies and the neutral nations that we have
a positive program for promoting real steps toward the reduction of con-
flict in general and some progress toward disarmament in particular.
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S E C R E T
It is submitted that these proposals could have this effect.
The stage should be set for them by an opening statement explaining
persuasively why, after a period of mutual distrust such as we have been
through, a prerequisite to the consideration of areal as against a paper
security system for Europe is the development of normalized relations be-
tween the East and West in a number of matters not directly affecting
security. We must each develop confidence that we know and understand the
position and purposes of the other. A helpful factor in achieving this would
be a much more extensive interchange of persons, goods, and ideas than has
been possible in the face of the restrictions on such interchange both of us
have set up since the war.
The tone of the opening statement should be cool and serious, avoiding
all propaganda flavor. It should try to evoke sympathetic responses in some
Soviet minds by suggesting that we can understand that they have some of
the same doubts and worries about the arms race that we have. It should
make clear that initially we are making these suggestions bilaterally with-
out fanfare, and with the intent of securing serious consideration of them
by the Soviets, not of putting propaganda pressure on them.
The proposals should be put forward not as a package, but as a
collection of ideas any or all of which we would be glad to talk about.
The Soviets should be put in a position of either rejecting ' of-them" `bne
by one, or agreeing to talk about one or more of them. Every one of them
involves concessions the Soviets will, for a variety of reasons,
find it difficult to make. All of them involve concessions on our part
FOOTNOTE: No agreement was reached on the point that the proposals
should be put forward "as a collection of ideas any or all of which we would
be glad to talk about." Some members felt that the trade proposal will be
a basis to obtain concessions on the other proposals, and that a solut ic.-
should be avoided in which the Soviets accept the trade proposal exclus.:;.,ely-
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but in no case do these concessions threaten our security. Each will
be regarded by large and important segments of world public opinion as
reasonable and their rejection by the Soviets as evidence that they
are not really ready to work toward international agreements favoring
p eace.
These proposals are set forth here without reference to the
difficulties that might arise in trying to make them accep table to the
American public. Although there may be serious difficulties in this
respect., it is believed that if the President supports the proposals
vigorously and makes plain that what we get for these concessions is
major concessions in return,, he should be able to carry the country with
The proposals are designed to accomplish the following effects:
1. They should help to reverse in many quarters in Western Europe
and in Asia the unfavorable image of the U.S. as a trigger-happy mili-
taristic power, uninterested in resolving the cold war and. abandoning
its liberal tradition of dedication to an open society. Whereas our
actual policies have not been as restrictive as many persons in Europe
and Asia believe., the impression is widespread that we are hysterically
restricting reasonable travel to the U.S.., that it was interfering with
freedom of communication by the seizure of what we designate as subversive
material, that our policies are a major obstacle to the substantial expan.-
sion of East-West trade which would occur in the absence of this barrier.,
etc.
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If the Soviets reject all of these proposals, it will be possible
for us to make abundantly clear where the responsibility for restrictions
on free movement of people., ideas,, and goods really lies. If they ac-
cept any of these proposals., we will be credited with important steps
forward in lifting the Iron Curtain, With specific reference to the
East-West trade issue, it is our conviction that if the Soviets agree
to discuss expanded East-West trade, it will rapidly become apparent
that there is very much less in this for our allies than some of them
may have thought.
2. At some point,, not during the conference, perhaps, but after
its we should make every effort to spread the knowledge of these pro-
posals through the USSR and especially the Satellites. The things we
are proposing are in part actually and in part in a symbolical sense
some of the things that the peoples of the Iron Curtain area most desire.
3. If these proposals are put forward in a serious vein and so
designed as to have the maximum possible chance of acceptances their
presentation may have great intelligence value in revealing to us just
how far the Soviet regime is prepared to go to establish its willingness
to make concessions in each of a number of directions. These proposals
lie along a continuum of acceptability, It is almost certain that the
Soviets would have to respond favorably to a proposal for expanded trade.
It is entirely possible that they would consider some form of agreement
for increased freedom of movement of persons. It is not at all incon-
ceivable that they would accept some form of inspection system, although
we would probably have to insist on a system unacceptable to them. It
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is almost certain that they will reject the free overflight proposal.
Nor are they likely to abandon their jamming program. By testing them
all along this line we can get some impressions as to how far they are
prepared to go. In addition, we may be able to observe in the details
of the Soviet reaction some differences of view among various elements
of the Soviet leadership which would be most useful to us in appraising
to what extent there are policy disagreements in the upper levels,
4. Finally, these proposals, if made with this end in view, might
have some effect in widening the actual perception of possible alternative
courses of action amongst the Soviet bureaucracy itself. Even if the
very top leadership is completely unified in its conception of the proper
strategy, these proposals are bound to come to the attention of persons
further down in the hierarchy who may, at some later date, achieve
positions of great responsibility in the USSR. If any such persons
entertain in the backs of their minds conceptions of how the Soviet
Union might conduct itself which are more liberal and less restrictive
than those characterizing current policy, it is to our advantage to take
every opportunity to bring such speculation into the forefront of their
attention. We cannot, of course, be sure that proposals of this kind
would have any such effect but it is at least a possibility which we
should exploit if it exists.
(Note -- As stated in the main report at p. 11, there was not complete
agreement among the panel on all issues and the lack of unanimity
applies to some parts of this Appendix.)
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Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
The,German question
This appendix consists of four companion_ papers relating to
various aspects of the German unification issue. These are:
Preliminary Diplomatic Action in Preparation for
the Summit Conference.
J10 U. S. Guidelines for a German Settlement.
II. German Elections.
Pa Possible Proposals for German Unity.
These proposals are consistent with the general strategy ad-
vocated in the basic paper.
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I? A PiiELIM1INARY DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN PREPARMION FOR
TEE SUM11IT CON'FLOT,ivTCE
Very frequently in preparation for a strong position at inter-
national conferences, the Soviet Union has made systematic displays of
strength, and it is doing the same at the present time. These demon-
strations of strength have included fly-bye in Moscow, and particularlly,
the imposition of a camouflaged blockade on the free sectors of Berlin.
These actions are designed to put the U.S. on the defensive and to wear
out American negotiators even beforehand. A secondary consideration in
imposing the blockade was to force bilateral conversations between Bonn
and Pankow.
It is, therefore, necessary even before the commencement of the
conference, for the U.S. to make it clear that it will not assume a defensive
posture; but that, on the contrary, it will put the Soviets into a defensive
frame of mind. Since Germany may be a central topic at the conference, it
is indispensable that the U.S. demonstrate from the very beginning that
it will not tolerate Soviet skullduggery. Without such an American
demonstration of strength, public opinion support in Germany may not be
entirely secure.
It is suggested that without delay a secret, preferably three-power,
note be dispatched to 1.oscow demanding that the various blockade measures
inhibiting the Berlin traffic be lifted forthwith and that any payments
made in compliance with those restrictions be reimbursed. (It may be
possible to ask that such a reimbursement take the form of financial
support to East German refugees in Western Germany.) The note should state
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that the fate of the conference will depend upon Soviet compliance and
it should intimate that if no such compliance were forthcoming, the U.S.
may not attend the conference. Concurrently with the secret note, we
might state publicly that the U.S. is willing to use its engineer forces
to rehabilitate the road into Berlin, the alleged poor condition of which
furnished the justification for the toll.
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IT. U.S. GUIDELIiIES FOR A G .,MviAN SETTL_ A'1ENT
There are a number of basic issues affecting unification of Germany.
The combinations of solutions to each of these issues, including the
sequential order in which individual issues may be solved, are so numerous
that greatest care is required to prevent the Soviets from exploiting
the complexity of an opaque situation.
What are the Basic Issues?
I. Elections
This problem is discussed in detail in a companion paper.
Desirable - The elections are to be held after an initial democratiza-
tion of the East German. Government, and after the means of pressure by the
Soviets and the East German. Communists have been reduced or eliminated.
The electoral system which is in force in West Germany should be applied
throughout the entire country, and the East German electoral system should
be scrapped. International supervision is another indispensable condition.
The elections are to be held as a first step in the unification of Germany.
Acceptable - The initial democratization of the East German Govern-
ment, including the reconstitution of parties, is an essential condition of
free elections, but does not require a reconstitution of the East German
Government. If the Western German electoral system is inacceptable, an
entirely new election law should be negotiated.
Unacceptable - Any situation in which the full freedom of elections
is impaired. The principle of free elections cannot be bargained away
with the Soviets for any purpose.
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Timing - During the negotiations for elections and during the
election period, the rearming of West Germany must be pursued actively
and American troops must not be withdrawn.
2, The Rearming of West Germany and All German Security.
Desirable - West Germany must be rearmed as presently planned. It
is imperative that enabling legislation in the German Bundestag provide
for the implementation of the Paris Agreements to the full. If possible.,
the time schedule for West German rearmament should be accelerated. More-
over, a strong NATO air defense system must be created with dispatch and
the German component of this system be recognized as crucial. Provision
shall be made upon unification to integrate individual members of the growing
East German forces into an all-German military establishment.
Acceptable - In general, even minor reductions of the rearmament
program and minor stretch-outs should be resisted, not encouraged, although
their effect would not be disastrous. It is a matter of quantities.
Unacce)a table - A substantial stretch-out or the abandonment of the
present program for West German rearmament must be resisted strongly, as
this might encourage Kremlin belief that Western German rearmament could be
blocked by repeated negotiations.
Timing - The fastest West German rearmament is the most desirable.
Any discussion of limiting or slowing down the West German rearmament effort
prior to, or as condition of, free elections is to be avoided. The rearma-
ment of West Germany should be completed in the period of clear--cut American
military-air superiority.
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3. Status of Forci n Military Forces in Germany
Desirable - Any change in deployment "Levels (except as outlined
in the accompanying proposal concerning the establishment of a free corridor
to Berlin) should be rejected. The Western allies must decide firmly that
during the transition period their forces will not be reduced, let alone
withdrawn.
Acceptable - Within each zone the foreign forces may be redeployed
to limited areas. All sides agree to a proportionate relation of total force
levels in both East and West Germany, based on the area and population of
each of the two zones. It would be less desirable but still acceptable,
if there were an eventual agreement to reduce foreign forces to token
strength, provided that German rearmament proceeds at a rapid pace and that
this reduction in $o reign forces be delayed until a large German Force
has come into existence.
Unacceptable - A reduction of foreign forces and involving the
de faoto elimination of American and other Western armed strength from
the German rearmament., is totally unacceptable. (Due to geographical
conditions, a Western withdrawal from Germany cannot be paired with a
Russian withdrawal from Eastern Germany to Poland but must jxe paired with
a Russian withdrawal behind the Russian border.)
Timing - Western deployment in Germany in whatever form decided
upon, must be main Gained until the formation of a unified government with
which a peace treaty can be signed.
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l,. The National Structure of Germany
Desirable - Germany should be reconstituted as a free, sovereign,
democratic, self-reliant and fully unified nation.
Acceptable - As a temporary measure, the existence of two Germanies
is acceptable, especially if it should be possible to hold democratic
elections in East Germany. The maintenance of the present status is
acceptable for a limited period,, provided the United States gives con-
vincing evidence that it favors the early unification of Germany, and
will work actively for this objective.
Unacceptable - Any direct or indirect encroachment by East Germany
or Soviet Russia on the West German Republic, including any attempts to
limit the West German Government+s freedom of action and interfere with
the German participation in the NATO alliance, must be guarded against.
Timing - The unification of the two German governments must follow
and should not precede all-German free elections. However, it would be
desirable if the East German Government, prior to elections, would assume
gradually the character of a coalition government.
5. German Borders
Desirable - The U.S. does not recognize present East German boundaries
as fixed. The definitive delineation of German borders must take into
account both Polish and German national interests. The Saar also poses
a difficult question but no comments on this issue will be made in this
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Acceptable - The present Eastern frontier is left intact, provided
the unified German government consents to a provisional status quo. In
this case, a stipulation should be made that the frontier will. be subject
to future negotiations within a specified time limit.
ppacc?ent able - Any permanent acceptance and legalization of Germany's
Eastern frontier.
Timing - The frontier question should be brought up only after Germany
has been unified and an all-German government is able to assume respon-
sibility for any settlement.
6. Limitations on German Soverei nt
Desirable - Ultimately, German sovereignty must be fully restored.
Limitations on this sovereignty, if any, should be highly temporary or be
identical with limitations placed upon the sovereignty of other nations by
mutual consent. No sovereignty limitations should be placed on Germany with-
out the German Government concurring as a full and free partner.
Acceptable - The Western powers, acting jointly with the West German
Government, might undertake to offer some security safeguards subject to
ratification by an all-German parliament. Such safeguards would be designed
to allay Russian fears about the reconstitution of German offensive mili-
tary strength. However, it is important to protect the right of the all-
German government to participate in NATO. As a variant, if Germany were to
abstain from joining NATO, it must not be prevented from acquiring defense
forces deemed adequate by her to satisfy all German security needs. Faced
by this alternative, the Soviets might prefer a relatively weakly-armed
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Germany as a member of NATO, as agUnst a very strongly armed but neutral
Germany.
Unacceptable - Any limitations imposed upon Germany unilaterally
precluding German rearmament or limiting her freedom of political choice
should be rejected flatly. Similarly, any temporary limitations on armaments
designed largely to allow the Soviets tog ain or increase teohnologioa
time lead must be rejected.
Timing - The question of armaments limitations of any form should not
be considered before the formation of an all