BASIC AUTHORITIES AND AGREEMENTS WHICH CIA HOLDS WITH USAF/NRO; RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE NRO ORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 24, 1963
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 200
24 January 1963
SUBJECT : Basic Authorities and Agreements which
CIA Holds with USAF/NRO; Recommended
Modifications and Suggestions Regarding
the NRO Organization
1. Pursuant to your request the attached draft sets forth
the various agreements which CIA holds with the United States
Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office regarding our
reconnaissance projects.
2. We have also included several proposed modifications
to the NRO Agreement which would provide CIA with a greater
role in the overall NRP.
3. We have taken the liberty to present this draft in the
form of brief paragraphs rather than the typical memorandum
or staff study form to facilitate their extraction into an overall
final paper should you so desire.
Deputy Assistant
(Special Activities)
NRO and USAF review(s) completed.
FT
MORI/CDF
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D RA F T
1. The basic authority for the Central Intelligence Agency
to engage in overhead reconnaissance activities stems from within
the authorities granted CIA by the National Security Act of 1947 and
the Central Intelligence Act of 1949.
2. On 5 November 1954 the Technological Capabilities Panel
("Land Panel"), Office of Defense Mobilization submitted to the DCI
a report indicating why overflight of the Soviet Union was urgent and
feasible and why that activity was 'appropriate for CIA, always with
Air Force assistance. " (TS-115018-A)
3. On 23 November 1954 the IAC cited serious gaps in our
intelligence covering the Soviet Bloc areas, particularly in relation
to our ability to determine the capabilities of the Soviet Union to
launch nuclear attacks against the U. S. It suggested a belief "that
we could have a substantially improved capability of filling these gaps
through the use of aerial reconnaissance and photography, and that
today these methods are the most practicable additional means to this
end. " (unnumbered Memo signed by IAC members)
4. On 24 November 1954 the DCI prepared a memorandum on
Reconnaissance recommending: approval for the existence of a
National requirement for reconnaissance overflights; direct the
Secretary of Air Force and DCI to establish a collaborative project
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for procurement and testing of the necessary aircraft and
equipment; direct Secretary of Air Force and DCI to conduct at
the earliest possible date the reconnaissance overflights, and
to do so in such a way as to reduce the risk of involvement of the
U. S. to the minimum practicable. (TS No. 103085 -- no addressee,
presumably Higher Authority).
5. On 24 November 1954 the President approved the reconnaissance
project in a meeting at the White House. (unnumbered Memo for
Record signed by General Cabell, who also attended the meeting).
6. Project OILSTONE (called AQUATONE; CHALICE; and now
IDEALIST by CIA) Agreement between USAF and CIA was signed by
General N. F. Twining for USAF on 3 August 1955 and cosigned by
A. W. Dulles for CIA on 4 August 1955. The Agreement stated that
"there is in existence a Project Headquarters, headed by a CIA Project
Director to which an Air Force Officer will be assigned to serve as
Deputy Project Director --- the Project Headquarters will establish
operational units, stationed at bases overseas after completion of
training in the ZI --- the Project Headquarters will be responsible
for any continued research and development, operational planning,
and the direction and control of operations in the final phase of the
Project when overflights are being launched from bases overseas ---
FIT
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the third phase will be of active operations from overseas bases.
This phase follows the decision as to operational readiness. In
this third phase, the final decision as to execution and timing of
actual overflight missions shall rest with the Project Director
subject to such guidance as he received from higher authority. The
line of command shall be direct between operational units and the
Project Director. " (TS-142557/D)
7. The concept of developing a supersonic aircraft was
studied intensively and endorsed by the President's Science Advisory
Committee. The design specifications for the major systems of a
supersonic reconnaissance aircraft were established during 1958
and the first half of 1959 under project GUSTO. Lockheed and
Corvair developed competing airframe designs with Lockheed
eventually winning selection as prime contractor in late summer
1959 as Project OXCART.
8. Project OXCART Agreement which defined the organization
and delineation of responsibilities of USAF/CIA was co-signed by
General Thomas D. White for USAF on 15 February 1960 and
Mr. A. W. Dulles for the CIA on 18 February 1960. The Agreement
stated that "there is in existence a Project Headquarters headed by
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a CIA Project Director. An Air Force Officer is assigned as
Deputy Project Director. Project Headquarters will establish
an operational unit presently planned to be stationed in the Zone
of Interior --- the Project Headquarters will be responsible for
any continued research and development, operational planning, and
the direction and control of activities in the final operational phase
of the Project when overflights are being launched --- the third
phase will be that of active operations --- the final decision as to
execution and timing of actual overflight missions shall rest jointly with
the CIA and the USAF, subject to such guidance as may be received
from higher authority, and in accordance with notification, coordi-
nation, and support procedures currently employed in Project
OILSTONE. The line of command shall be direct between operational
units and the CIA. (TS 4403 (OXC-0321))
9. Project CORONA was authorized by the White House on
15 April 1958 and responsibility was assigned to the Advanced Research
Projects Agency, DOD, for general management of the vehicle
development; to the Air Force Ballistic Missiles Division for detailed
technical supervision of vehicle development and operations; and to
CIA fo.r development of reconnaissance equipment and for management
of collection requirements, security, cover and operations.
SET
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10. On 7 July 1959 Mr. Roy W. Johnson, Director, ARPA,
and Mr. Richard M. Bissell, CIA Project Director co-signed a
memorandum delineating the Agency responsibilities for Project
ARGON. In that memorandum it was agreed that "in order to
obtain maximum security, it is essential that CIA exercise control
of ARGON: this control to range from complete control in such areas
as security and cover to joint control with ARPA in other areas
such as the direction of the technical aspects of the project, including
payload and 117L vehicle and systems --- the CIA-DPD Control
Center will be the central location for operational control ---
political approvals for ARGON launches will be the responsibility
of CIA with DOD support, and with ARPA providing technical justi-
fication for flights --- ARPA and CIA will maintain joint technical
control throughout the operational phases of the ARGON program.
(ARG 0007; AA-0001).
SERT
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"The Division of Responsibility within the NRO. " An informal note
on a carbon file copy within OSA states that Mr. Bissell had received
Dr. Charyk's agreement to the document by telephone prior to sub-
mitting it to Mr. Coyne. In that document, the NRO was acknowledged
as being headed by co-directors, each of whom would act using the
authority of his overt position within his own organization. With
respect to major programs, it allocated responsibilities of the CORONA/
MURAL/ARGON to CIA as primarily responsible for targeting,
operational planning, and control of payload operation; development and
procurement of photographic payloads and nose cones; and finally security.
The Air Force was charged with launch scheduling and launching; orbit
and recovery operations; and the development and procurement of
boosters, orbit vehicles, and ELINT payloads. In the SAMOS Program,
the Air Force was held primarily responsible for SAMOS with CIA in
the supporting role particularly in target and security planning. The
OXCART Program was the primary responsibility of the CIA. with the
Air Force in a supporting role. With respect especially to the later
configurations of SAMOS and to other advance systems, the document
stated that "consideration will be given to gradual modification of this
distribution of responsibilities. In general, it is clear that Air Force
zNr _T
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11. On 6 September 1961 General C. P. Cabell, as Acting DCI,
concurred in a memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Roswell L. Gilpatric on the National Reconnaissance Program. The
memorandum defined the management of the National Reconnaissance
Program (NRP) and officially established on a covert basis a National
Reconnaissance Office to manage the NRP. The Office was placed
under the co-direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and
the Deputy Director (Plans), CIA. It was charged to include a small
special staff of personnel drawn from DOD and CIA. The Office was
granted the charter of direct control over all elements of the total
reconnaissance program, whether over or covert. The memorandum
went on to state that "the management and conduct of individual projects
or elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be
assigned to the CIA as the operational agency. " In effect then, the
National Reconnaissance Office encompassed de facto, if not de jure,
existing agreements between the CIA and USAF.
12. On 7 December 1961, Mr. R. M. Bissell, the DD/P and co-
director of the NRO, submitted to Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a document titled
EGET
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elements will retain primary responsibility for operations and for
fuel development and procurement. For the most part, these
activities not only can but must be 'white, ' that is conducted in a
reasonably public fashion. CIA's main contribution will be in
target planning, serving as the Communications channel for
operational control and security and that development and procurement
which must be 'blacks. if
13. On 20 March 1962, Dr. Scoville as the DD/R forwarded in
a memorandum to the DCI an agreement for the management of the
National Reconnaissance Program. In that agreement, which had
been concurred in by Dr. Charyk, the Central Intelligence Agency was
tentatively assigned the primary responsibility for OXCART and CORONA
and future truly covert satellite projects.
14. On 2 April 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Under Secretary of the Air
Force, forwarded a memorandum to the DD/R stating the delegation
of responsibilities for the LANYARD Project. Within that Project,
contract administration of the payload and those portions of the recovery
system which must be procured under covert contract were assigned
SECRET
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the responsibility of CIA. Technical management of all aspects of
LANYARD including the payload were assigned to the Director of
Special Projects, OSAF (General Greer). Operationally the CIA was
charged with the responsibility for pre-mission planning and on-orbit
operational decisions in the same manner as currently followed in the
CORONA Project.
On 5 April, Dr. Scoville replied
to Dr. Charyk stating CIA's agreement to accept responsibility for
the operational aspects of the LANYARD Program as well as contractual
administration for payload and certain recovery systems.
I I25x1
15. On 2 May 1962, the Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense
co-signed the agreement between the Secretary of Defense and Director
of Central Intelligence on the responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance
Office. In that document, CIA was designated as an executive agent for
the Director, NRO for those covert projects already under its management
and such additional covert projects as are assigned to it by the Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director, NRO
was held responsible for funding the National Reconnaissance Program.
The agreement stated that
I CIA will be responsible for funding covert projects for
which it has management responsibility. Secondly, the D/NRO was
T
E
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charged with the responsibility for all NRP contracts with CIA, as
executive agent of the D/NRO, responsible for administering
procurements and contracting for covert projects for which it is
assigned responsibility. The D/NRO was held responsible for advance
plans (post calendar year 1962) in support of the NRP. In view of the
DCI"s major responsibility to the NSC for all intelligence programs,
all NRO advance planning will be coordinated with CIA.
16. On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense his agreement that Dr. Joseph Charyk be named Director of
the NRO.
17. On 6 July 1962, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to
the President on Intelligence Matters, directed a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence wherein
he remarked that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in its report
to the President noted the agreements that had been reached between
the DCI and the Secretary of Defense with respect to the organization,
management, and functioning of the NRO with the following comment:
"We believe that the actual structure of the documents is inadequate
to support an efficient organization when the present experienced and
distinguished group moves on to other tasks. We therefore recommend
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a continuing study of a more satisfactory, permanent documentary basis
for the NRO with particular references to existing NSC directives with
which the present NRO plan may be in conflict. " Mr. Bundy indicated
that the President had approved the Board's recommendation and was
therefore requesting the DCI and the Secretary of Defense that
appropriate implementing action be taken and that a joint report of
the progress made be furnished to the President and the Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board by 15 September.
18. On 23 July 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Director, NRO forwarded
a memorandum to NRO Program Directors and the Director of the
NRO Staff outlining the organization and functions of the NRO. In
outlining the overall concept of the organization and operation of the
NRO, Dr. Charyk established the NRO as an operating agency separately
organized, concealed entirely within other agencies using personnel
and other resources of these agencies on a full- or part-time basis as
required. The NRO was designed to consist of the D/NRO, the NRO
Staff, the NRO Program Directors, and their Project Directors, and
any Staff Officers at that present time. At that time, there were two
NRO Program Directors: the Director, Program A being responsible
for the NRP satellite effort; and the Director, Program B responsible
for the NRP conducted by the NRO through utilization of CIA resources.
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The activities and office of the Program B Director were to be covered
by his overt duty as Deputy Director (Research), CIA. Program
Directors would be responsible directly and solely to the D/NRO. The
D/NRO assumed responsibility for all funding of the NRP. All covert
funds would be budgeted by the CIA, and all covert NRP contracts
let by the CIA as executive agent for the D/NRP. Funds would be
transferred to appropriate services and agencies on an incremental
funding basis based upon specific approval of assigned NRP work by
the D/NRQ The D/NRO would assign operational control for aircraft
projects to the appropriate Program Director. The NRO Staff will
keep the D/NRO currently informed of the status of such operations.
In the case of satellite projects, the NRO Staff would be responsible
for actual mission planning from the standpoint of specifying desired
targets to be covered, desired on-orbit target program options and
approval of the actual mission target program. The staff would also
make all on-orbit selection between target coverage options based on
weather or intelligence factors. The NRO Staff also would be respon-
sible for the NRO interface with USIB and for NRO coordination of all
peripheral reconnaissance activities. Prior specific approval of the
D/NRO would be required for any matter of the NRO or NRP to be
processed with higher authority.
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19. On 17 October, D/NRO assigned DOD to manage and
operate all FIRE FLY drones against Cuba under NRO supervision
and with CIA assistance in ELINT, contracting, and security.
20. On 17 October, in a memorandum addressed to DD/R, the
D/NRO assigned NRO: management responsibility for the development
of the AQ-12 drone project to Director, Program B. Dr. Charyk
went on to state, "In view of the potential importance of this effort,
I believe that it should be established now on a separate project basis
under a full-time project manager reporting directly to you. I am
prepared to assign Lieutenant Colonel Henry Howard from NRO Staff
to the Director, Program B for this important task. "
On 26 October, in a memorandum signed by the DD/R to D/NRO,
Colonel Ledford, Director, Program B, assumed managerial responsibility
for the AQ-12 drone project and concurred in assignment of
Lieutenant Colonel Howard as project officer for the AQ-12.
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D R A F T Pa e Fourteen
21. a. With the advent of the National Reconnaissance Office
certain problems and incidents have occurred which would suggest
that the NRO in its present form is not functioning as desired, and
too often has been the arena for misunderstanding between the Air
Force and the CIA. Resolution of differences has not been without
a price paid in widening the gulf which is rapidly increasing between
a once harmonious USAF and CIA relationship.
b. Possibly this more properly a sign of
the times and not the NRO. Possibly the responsibilities of the
reconnaissance programs have evolved to the stage where their
size and operation make clear cut management no longer realistic
or detainable within the Governmental environment that presently
exists.
c. It is difficult tQ isolate a turning point in the USAF/CIA
relationship and to point to any one act or series of acts which have
prompted the erosion that has taken place. Whatever the reason, it is
fair statement of fact to conclude frankly that during the short reign
of the NRO the USAF/CIA relationship has deteriorated to the point
where mutual trust is now hesitant and there is speculation on either
side of "power grabs" by the other.
d. The major problems with the NRO have been called to
your attention. We are reluctant to surface the minor ones, realizing
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that the replay of any incident is subject to a loss of objectivity
and context; and their narration cannot solve but merely accentuate
the situation.
22. In an attempt to seek resolution of the present situation, we
have considered the following courses of action, which if implemented,
should orient the National Reconnaissance Office to-a point where
CIA would play a managerial, as well as a coordinating role in the
National Reconnaissance Program. They are:
a. Appointment of the Director and Deputy Director, NRO
as full-time positions. The CIA and DOD respectively represented
in one of the two positions. Since the D/NRO is technically charged
with the direction and control of the National Reconnaissance Program,
a case could be made for the D/NRO to be a CIA employee to avoid
any valid criticism in case of an overflight mishap that the program
was directed by a Pentagon personality and hence an aggressive act.
This same reasoning could also suggest that the D/NRO report
directly to the DCI. In either case, both the Director and Deputy
Director, NRO should be qualified to appreciate the technology
involved in reconnaissance programs.
b. The NRO staff should not be an operating organization
involved in the day-to-day operational and contractual decisions
but more properly should assume the role of a classic staff, without
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command functions, charged with normal executive and administrative
c. Whenever possible the NRO staff should be manned
with equal members of representatives from each agency and service
contributing to the National Reconnaissance Programs. These
representatives, as full-time members of the NRO, would also
provide the necessary NRO coordination with their respective services.
It may be desirous to assign a NASA representative to the staff in
order to take advantage of the technical progress and achievements
of that orgarization.
d. Assign the Director, Program A to the Washington
Area where he would control Program A's activities while taking
the advantage of the proximity of national requirement s as well as
simplifying the coordination of its operations with the NRO. This
objective would hold true of Program C Director and any additional
Program Directors.
e. Empl9y the use of the Joint Reconnaissance Center
to coordinate specific reconnaissance activites. By so doing it
would obviate the need for the NRO to maintain a duplicate facility.
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f. Assign all national reconnaissance, including that
of SAC, to a NRO Program Director who would assume NRO
responsibility for the operations through the appropriate service
or agency command.
g. Locate the Director, Deputy Director and NRO
staff in one office area, preferably outside of CIA Headquarters
and the Pentagon on neutral ground for all services and agencies.
The Director/NPIC has indicated optimism that sufficient space could
be made available in his immediate or adjacent office area. There
is considerable merit in the logic of co-locating the NRO and NPIC.
h. Designate the Director, Program B as responsible
for coordinating the processing and dissemination of intelligence
product acquired by all national reconnaissance programs. He
should also be responsible for the technical monitoring of the
processing itself and the development of new processing and exploi -
tation equipment for the NRP.
23. Another modification of the NRO would simply charge the
D/NRO with the role of a NRP coordinator with the responsibility
to recommend to the Secretary of Defense and DCI the assignment
of projects with the NRP to specific Agencies or Services. A small
rT
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D R A F T Page Eihteen
staff would assist him in the coordination but all policy guidance
and direction of the NRP would stem jointly from the DCI and
Secretary of Defense with operational control of the projects
resting with the Agency or Service so assigned.
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24. A third approach would dissolve the NRO and assign the
responsibilities for the development and conduct of the national
reconnaissance program to a newly established subcommittee fo USIB.
Although the committee approach is not the classic answer to better
management, proper coordination of the NRP would be more readily
attainable and possibly with greater representation and appreciation
of each member's interests than through the present NRO.
a. The subcommittee would recommend to the Chairman of
USIB those agencies or services responsible for the development of
specific reconnaissance systems and those responsible for the operation
of the reconnaissance vehicles now in being. This would not preclude
joint operations such as now exist with the Air Force and CIA in the
IDEALIST, OXCART, CORONA/MURAL and LANYARD Projects.
b. The committee would in effect be the brokerage house for all
activity and information regarding reconnaissance projects and
reconnaissance systems. Representation on such a subcommittee would
be limited to those departments, services, and agencies concerned
with the actual conduct of the reconnaissance program, and such other
members as the Chairman, USIB may direct. Such a forum would
permit equal voice and representation for all services as well as place
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Ina.
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the program within that governmental structure, namely USIB,
primarily concerned with the overall national intelligence interests.
c. Unresolved disagreements within USIB would be referred
by the Chairman to the Special Group, or higher authority if necessary,
for resolution.
25. In the final analysis, we suggest, rather than attempt to
renegotiate our position in the NRO with USAF/ DOD and risk
continual friction and claims of parochialism that we turn to the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to examine the
NRO and the present USAF/CIA relationship and make recommendations
to the DCI, not only in the field of policy guidance and general organization
of the NRO, but also in the specifics of implementation procedures such
as project assignments; delineation of responsibilities; budget approvals
and appropriations; and the preparation and approval of Special Group
papers.
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