NPIC AS AN INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION MECHANISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000800050009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 17, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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DRAFT
NPIC/OD:ACL:mt
17 Jan 63
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Executive Director
SUBJECT: NPIC as an Intelligence Evaluation Mechanism
REFERENCE: Action Memorandum A-151 from Executive
Director, dated 8 January 1963
1. In response to referenced memorandum, this paper is
offered as a collection of comments and experiences bearing
upon the position of NPIC as an intelligence processing
mechanism essential to CIA statutory responsibility.
2. As you well know, statutory responsibilities indicate
that for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities
of the several government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security it is the duty of CIA to:
a. Advise NSC in matters concerning such intelligence
activities as relate to national security.
COMMENT: NPIC and its predecessor organizations within CIA have
been involved for almost ten years in major national
security problems and it continues to be responsible
for the photographic detection and initial description
of SovBloc threats to national security which are
rapidly reported by the DCI to the President and the
J Eccludc~ ar;, T"f~t!IA~~v' National Security Council. The classic P.I. warning
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on 16 October 1962 which launched the "Cuban Crisis"
is well known to all. Less well known are the many
other warnings of Soviet missile and other military
developments and world deployments in the past ten
years of cold war which came from photography. The
important common ingredient to all of them is that
they were discovered or confirmed by NPIC and rapidly
reported upward. Without the resources of NPIC
these threats at worst could have been missed or
delayed in their detection. At best, the reporting
or confirmation could have been delayed while the sepa-
rate P.I. organizations in Army, Navy, Air Force
and CIA could complete their reportings and somehow
coordinate their findings on many details and combine
them in a single warning to be delivered by someone
to the President.
With NPIC in full operation these coordination problems
have been eliminated or reduced and the Chairman of USIB
is not confronted simultaneously with two or more P.I.
reports on the same area of threat. Even where there
have been major differences on a National Estimate,
the minority group has not sustained major disagreement
with the joint service type of P.I. reporting provided
by the NPIC. This type of disagreement could be grossly
more complicated if the many separate details of
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r"'* SUBJECT: NPIC as an Intelligence Evaluation Mechanism
being used to further cross confuse the fundamental
differences of analytical procedures applied in
arriving at the estimate.
b. Make recommendations to the National Security
Council for coordination of such intelligence activities as
relate to national security.
COMMENT: Much of the foregoing commentary applies equally well
to this statutory responsibility. The important point
to be made here is that CIA clearly recognized. the dif-
ficulties of coordinating many separate photographic
intelligence activities as related to national security
and therefore supported the recommendation that a
National Photographic Interpretation Center be established
for this and other reasons. NSCID #8, dated 18 January
1961, establishes the NPIC to ensure that the capabilities
of the departments and agencies represented on the
Intelligence Board are most efficiently utilized for
the foreign intelligence exploitation of photography.
Further, in centralizing this responsibility, the National
Security Council directive states that the NPIC as a
service of common concern shall be provided by the
Director of Central Intelligence. Few national leaders,
if any, have had any criticism of the NPIC (earlier CIA/PIC)
joint photographic intelligence reporting and handling
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SUBJECT: NPIC as an Intelligence Evaluation Mechanism
most productive intelligence programs ever embarked
upon by the U.S. In fact, many commendation letters
have been received in the DCI's office from satisfied
consumers ranging from the White House and U.S.
military commands to leaders in foreign governments.
The Kirkpatrick Report, among many other things,
confirmed the fact that CIA had demonstrated its
ability to run an interagency photographic interpretation
center.
c. Correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
national security.
COMMENT: Photography, as much if not more than any other resource,
has become the yardstick by which information of
physical nature is evaluated, confirmed, or denied.
Therefore, photographic interpretation results from
NPIC are prime ingredients used by CIA analysts in the
process of evaluating intelligence related to national
security. If the NPIC were not under the direct
control of the DCI, it would be absolutely necessary
to have a first class photographic intelligence
division within CIA which could provide the details
necessary for the DCI's evaluation and confirmation of
ground information from other sources.
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d. Perform for the benefit of existing intelligence
agencies such additional services of common concern as the NSC
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
COMMENT: The NSC for this and other reasons has already rendered
its judgment confirming CIA control of NPIC in NSCID
#8. Many other services of common concern could be
cited here ranging from such tasks as briefing a
foreign chief of state, providing support for overseas
tactical intelligence reporting, providing aerial
plots, film evaluations and operational support, providing
a central film repository, assisting DOD and CIA in
planning future collection systems, coordinatingland
administering a joint R & D and procurement program
involving highly specialized optical-mechanical
equipment valued at millions of dollars with considerable
savings to the government on unit costs because of
combined CIA-Service contracted procurement and many
other tasks. All of these functions have been executed
in such a manner under CIA control that a whole new
ordering m f efficiency has entered the U.S. photographic
intelligence process. The Cuban story is just one tip
of the iceberg. Another tip showed in May of 1960 when
even the Soviets were impressed with the advanced
quality of U.S. aerial photography. Other tips might
be traced backward in the inversion of the so-called
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ment policy which faces a Soviet strategy of local
incidents and surprise aggressions. We are forced
to meet this with an increasingly mobile "fire
department" technique, with limited forces holding
the line at widely separated danger zones across
the world. Advance knowledge is of the essence
in this conflict of maneuver. Of all developments
to date, photography is capable of providing the
greatest density of information in the shortest time
compared to all other collection media. CIA has
clearly shown that it understands the business of
aerial reconnaissance and photographic intelligence
and that it is capable of managing it for the common
good of all. Any investigators of the evolution
of U.S. aerial reconnaissance intelligence systems
from 1950 to 1956 might be surprised and not too
happy with some parts of the U.S. record - particularly
as they relate to systems of information control,
handling.of requirements and lack of provision for
services of common concern.
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3. In conclusion, I would offer my personal view and
recommendation after more than twenty years experience in the
field that photographic intelligence is right at the very core
of national intelligence and that the NPIC must be directed by
CIA if it is to properly discharge its statutory responsibilities.
With the NPIC removed from its control, CIA would have to
establish a strong independent photographic intelligence
capability to handle its several statutory responsibilities
ad
-e
y cited plus other departmental P.I. work and support of
its clandestine services.
After working either as a military photo interpretation
officer, in military P.I. organizations or with military P.I.
officers, since 1942 I've had ample opportunity to observe,
make comparisons and draw conclusions. Most of the finest
photo interpreters I know came from military organizations.
In fact, most of the civilian photo interpreters at NPIC were
once military officers. Their opinions also reinforce mine
in that we prefer to seek a career in a civilian organization.
Despite a respect for military training and experience, we feel
that much remains to be done to establish incentives for militate
careers in intelll ence. Toooften, as the Beacon Hill Report
noted, "almost anyone can be an intelligence officer". A man
who failed as a navigator after months of training might find
himself transferred to intelligence where he is expected to make
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good with no training. The most important attribute of the finest
interpreter beyond his keen eyes, I.Q., curiosity, and hard work
is continuity of experience. Years of dedicated digging into
specific subjects and/or geographic areas sharpen the P.I.'s
perception to that required for top performance. Frequently in a
military controlled P.I. organization the bright and promising P.I.
officers are swept out by rotation. New inexperienced personnel
arrive as replacements. However, the photo interpretation
problems have not been correspondingly decreased in number or
complexity.
Training, continuity of experience and an attractive
career incentive are required in the photographic intelligence
field as practiced at the NPIC. CIA is presently in the best
position to provide most of these needs.
ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director
National Photographic Interpretation Center
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