MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000800040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1981
• Content Type: MFR

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6 November 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Provided to DCI this date at his request to help him bone up on TNF
and SALT issues:
1. Memorandum dated 21 January 1981 drafted byl -1 Subject:
Admiral Turner's Contribution to SALT together with Appendix rganization
for SALT.
2. Copy of Admiral Turner's only public statement on SALT (read at
SFRC meeting 2 August 1979).
3 Revised DCI Turner's testimony before the SSCI, SFRC, SASC -- summer
and a111 979 together with Harold Brown's testimony before the SSCI -- summer
1979.
Executive Secretary
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21 January 1981
Copy--L
SUBJECT: Admiral Turner's Contribution to SALT
1. During Admiral Turner's tenure as DCI, he decided to make SALT a
major item for his personal attention, and he contributed materially to both
the analysis and presentation of SALTrelated intelligence.
2. The Intelligence Community's role in the SALT II negotiations is
summarized in general terms as follows:
-- Assessing the size, capabilities, and future potential
of the Soviet strategic forces to be limited by the
agreement
Providing timely, responsive support to policy-making
agencies and officials in the process of developing
US positions and in negotiating the agreement
-- Providing assessments of the US capability to monitor
proposed Treaty provisions
This memorandum will address Admiral Turner's contribution to the second
and third of these responsibilities. His involvement with the SALT aspects
of the intelligence analysis of Soviet strategic forces is the subject of
a separate memorandum prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs.
3. Admiral Turner's personal involvement with the SALT process lent
considerable weight to the Intelligence Community's voice in shaping the
critical policy decisions during the final months of the negotiations. The
telemetry encryption issue is a case in point. He served as a strong and
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SUBJECT: Admiral Turner's Contribution to SALT
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effective advocate for the Intelligence Community on that issue; as a
consequence, the SALT II language was supplemented at the Summit by a
statement by Brezhnev which puts the US in a stronger position with
regard to the continued availability of this important intelligence
source. A copy of two memorandums from Admiral Turner to Dr. Brzezinski,
of the draft letter from the President to Chairman Brezhnev on telemetry
encryption proposed by Admiral Turner, and of an analysis of Brezhnev's
response appear at TAB A.
4. In the same vein, Admiral Turner's efforts were 1 r ely responsible
for the final outcome of the negotiations on ICBM and SLBM 25X1
Attached at TAB B
are some of the papers prepared for the DCI on this issue.
5. With respect to SALT monitoring, Admiral Turner summarized the DCI's
responsibilities as follows:
-- Insuring that intelligence collection and analysis
capabilities are adequately tasked to monitor Soviet
strategic forces
-- Monitoring Soviet activities related to compliance
and reporting the results to policy-making officials
-- Providing intelligence support to the US component
of the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission
6. An important event bearing on SALT monitoring
This resulted in a detailed re-
assessment of our capabilities to monitor SALT and other arms control agree-
ments, and sparked a number of proposals for new collectors to help fill the
gap. Admiral Turner played an active role at each stage. An example of
the results of this analysis as applied to SALT monitoring appears at
TAB C.
7. Admiral Turner also has taken an active interest in the way in
which SALT monitoring is conducted and reported. Attached at TAB D is a
series of memorandums illustrating the DCI's concerns in this area.
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8. Attached at TABs E and F are examples of the presentation of the
Intelligence Community's findings on SALT monitoring. The draft of
Admiral Turner's testimony for the Senate Select Committee's hearings on
the SALT II Treaty (TAB E) was prepared by the SALT Support Staff with
major substantive inputs from Admiral Turner. By the same token, he took
a strong personal interest in the presentation of the data in the Inter-
agency Intelligence Memorandum on US capabilities to monitor the SALT II
Treaty (TAB F). In these areas, as in other aspects of presenting the
Intelligence Community's SALT monitoring capabilities and responsibilities,
the DCI frequently sought the advice of his intelligence chiefs.
9. In his involvement with each of these areas of SALT, Admiral Turner
relied for analytical support on the SALT Support Staff, on the NFAC
production offices, and on the interagency SALT Nbnitoring Working Group.
He was a critical reviewer of the intelligence analysis presented to him,
but did not tamper with the analytical judgments. Admiral Turner sought
to present an accurate and balanced picture of present and future in-
telligence capabilities as they relate to SALT monitoring, and to ensure
that the Intelligence Community's analysis of Soviet SALT compliance was
timely, accurate, and complete. He did not, of course, take any positions
on the merits of the Treaty.
10. In the broader perspective, Admiral Turner's concern for meeting
the diverse intelligence requirements posed by the spectrum of present and
future arms control agreements led him to establish the Arms Control In-
telligence Staff on 1 January 1980. It replaced the SALT Support Staff, and
was vested with the expanded responsibility of providing a single focal point
in the National Foreign Assessment Center for staff oversight of the in-
telligence aspects of all arms control activities involving the US Government.
The Staff is responsible for providing intelligence support to SALT, LRTNF,
and ASAAT, and monitors NFAC participation in all other arms control activities.
In particular, the Staff is charged with maintaining close contact with those
Intelligence Community components responsible for developing requirements and
capabilities relating to US monitoring of all arms control agreements. In
this respect, the Staff serves as a focal point for assessing the impact of
arms control generally on the Intelligence Community's collection and
analytical capabilities.
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MEMOR.M lUM 1-OR: Executive Secretary/0/DDCI
Attached is the summary of Admiral Turner's
contribution to SALT, as you requested. We have,
of course, voluminous files on SALT, and stand
ready to supplement this memorandum in any areas
Admiral Turner might wish.
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Date 21 January 1981
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