PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000800030002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: IR

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PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -? OFFICE OF TRAINING
ON
INTELLIGENCE
APRIL 1915
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Until World War II, the conduct of foreign
intelligence activities by the United States
government was sporadic, and most Americans were
not aware of them. Presidents of the United .
States, who have always borne the responsibility
for the national security, have made statements,
particularly in recent years, that have both
acknowledged the existence of intelligence ac-
tivities and revealed their importance in support
of governmental policies and functions.
Selected Presidential statements dealing
with U.S. intelligence activities have been
extracted for presentation in this pamphlet.
Although the statements of George Washington
were written while he was the commanding general
during the American Revolution, they are signifi-
cant enough to warrant inclusion here. The
terms of both Presidents Lincoln and Wilson were
marked by major wars, but neither appears to
have made a significant statement on the subject
of intelligence.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING - FEBRUARY .1975
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There was no
centralized intelli-
organization
gence
in any modern concept
of the word during
the American Revolution.
The Americans and British
both employed agents to
secure information on
troop deployments and
strengths, and there were
officers specifically
charged with intelligence
functions, although almost
without exception these functions
were added to officers' regular line duties. Thus,
Major John Andre handled intelligence matters for
Britain's General Clinton in New York and when Andre
become Adjutant General of the British Armies in
America, he continued to conduct certain special in-
telligence cases, including the defection of General
Benedict Arnold from West Point.
General Forman, an American line officer in New
Jersey, was Washington's intelligence chief in that
area for a time. In connection with his intelligence
activities, General Forman wrote Governor Livingston
of New Jersey in February 1782 as follows:
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"I presume Your Excellency is not unacquainted
that I am at the particular request of General
Washington impZoyed in obtaining intiZegence re-
specting the enemies movements at New York &c.
By the Generals Letter to me of the 25 Inst. he
in a very pointed manner asks my particular
exertions as affairs at this time demand the best
Inti Zegence. "
General Washington kept closely informed on
all intelligence matters and was perhaps the most
able American intelligence officer prior to
General William Donovan, Director of the Office of
Strategic Services during World War II. General
Washington often levied intelligence requirements
on his intelligence officers and then made his own
estimates of the military situation based on the
evidence they acquired. He directed what we now
call psychological warfare campaigns and had a
fine feel for intelligence activities.
"The necessity of procuring good Intelligence
is apparent & need not be further urged -- all
that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the
whole matter as secret as possible. For upon
Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of
the kind, and for want of it, they are generally
defeated, however well planned and promising a
favourable issue."
Letter from General Washington
to Colonel Elias Dayton,
then his intelligence chief
in New Jersey, 26 July 1777.
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"I have received your Letter of the 4th,
containing an apology for sending an agreeable
piece of intelligence which you have since
discover'd to be false; mistakes of this kind
are not uncommon and most frequently happen to
-?hose whose zeal and sanguineness allow no room
for scepticism when anything favourable to their
country is plausibly related."
Letter from General Washington
to Daniel Clymer, Deputy Commissary
General of Prisoners,
11 November 1777 .
Three of General Washington's best spies were
seized for prosecution by the American authorities
in New Jersey under misapprehension that they were
British agents. These prisoners could not disclose
their true role. However, Washington learned of
their capture and wrote the Governor of New Jersey
for their release.
"Upon these Considerations I hope you will put
a stop to the prosecution, unless other matters appear
against them. You must be well convinced, that it
is indispensibly necessary to make use of these means
to procure intelligence. The persons employed must
bear the suspicion of being thought inimical, and
it is not in their power to assert their innocence,
because that would get abroad and destroy the con-
fidence which the Enemy puts in them."
Letter from General Washington
to Governor William Livingston,
20 January 1778.
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"I thank you for the trouble you have taken in
forwarding the intelligence which was inclosed in
your Letter of the ZZth of March. It is by comparing
a variety of information, we are frequently enabled
to investigate facts, which were so intricate or
hidden, that no single clue could have Zed to the
knowledge of them in this point of view, intelligence
becomes interesting which but from its connection
and collateral circumstances, would not be important."
Letter from General Washington
to James Lovell,
1 April 1782.
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In 1846, certain
members of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs
raised a furor over the
alleged misuse of foreign
intercourse funds by
Daniel Webster, while he
served as Secretary of
State. Portions of these
funds, known as Secret
Service Funds, were avail-
able for unvouchered use
on the certificate of the!
President that their ex-
penditure had been for
confidential purposes. A~
resolution of the House of
,
Representatives requested`Pres d nt James:K. P
lk
.
to furnish the House with all ords of exper itures
of these confidential Secret Se'r ice Funds during
Webster's tenure as Secretary of State udder Presi-
dents Harrison and Tyler. In denying the request of
the Douse of Representatives, President Polk wrote:
"The experience of every nation on earth has
demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which
it becomes absolutely necessary for the public
safety or the public good to make expenditures the
very object of which would be defeated by publi-
city. ... In no nation is the application of such
sums ever made public. In time of war or impend-
ing danger the situation of the country may make
it necessary to employ individuals for the purpose
of obtaining information or rendering other
important services who could never be prevailed
upon to act if they entertained the least appre-
hension that their names or their agency would in
any contingency be divulged. So it may often
become necessary to incur an expenditure for an
object highly useful to the country; ... But this
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object might be altogether defeated by the
intrigues of other powers if our purposes were
to be made known by the exhibition of the
original papers and vouchers to the accounting
officers of the Treasury. It would be easy to
specify other cases which may occur in the history
of a great nation, in its intercourse with other
nations, wherein it might become absolutely neces-
sary to incur expenditures for objects which could
never be accomplished if it were. suspected in
advance that the items of expenditure and the
agencies employed would be made public."
President Polk's message
to the House of Representa-
tives, 20 April 1846.
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"Apropos of your memo-
randum of November Z8, Z944,
relative to the establishment
of a central intelligence
service, I should appreciate
your calling together the
chiefs of the foreign intel-
Zigence and internal security
units in the various execu-
tive agencies, so that a con-
sensus of opinion can be
secured.
"It appears to me that
all of the ten executive de-
partments, as well as the
Foreign Economic Administration, and the Federal
Communications Commission have a direct interest
in the proposed venture. They should all be
asked to contribute their suggestions to the pro-
posed centralized intelligence service."
Memorandum from President
Roosevelt to Major General
William J. Donovan, Director
of the Strategic Services,
5 April 1945. Written just
a week before the President's
death, it authorizes Donovan
to continue planning for a
postwar centralized intelli-
gence service.
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AIIII 11 11111, 1
President Truman was con-
scious of rivalry among U.S.
intelligence organizations both
during and after World War II.
He realized that reorganiza-
tion was necessary and that
a reorganization plan neede
to be developed, from com-
peting proposals, which
would not exacerbate these
rivalries. The following
reflects President Truman's
thinking on the subject prior
to the establishment of the Central
Intelligence Group in 1946 and ultimately
of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.
"I considered it very important to this coun
to have a sound, well-organized intelligence system,
in the present and in the future. Properly deveZope
such a service would require new concepts as well as
better-trained and more competent personnel. ... it was
imperative that we refrain from rushing into something
that would produce harmful and unnecessary rivalries
among the various intelligence agencies. I told Smith
(Director of the Bureau of the Budget) that one thing
was certain--this country wanted no Gestapo under any
guise or for any reason."
Memoirs by Harry S.
Truman, Volume One:
Year of Decisions.
"A President has to know what is going on all
around the world in order to be ready to act when action
is needed. The President must have all the facts that
may affect the foreign policy or the military policy of
the United States. ...
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"Before 1946 such information as the President
needed was being collected in several different places
in the government. The War Department had an InteZZi-
gence Divison--G-2--and the Navy had an intelligence
setup of its own--the ONI. The Department of State,
on the one hand, got its information through diplomatic
channels, while the Treasury and the Departments of
Commerce and Agriculture each had channels for gather-
ing information from different parts of the world--on
monetary, economic, and agricultural matters.
"During World War II the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation had some operations abroad, and in addition
the Office of Strategic Services, which was set up by
President Roosevelt during the war and placed under
the direction of General William J. Donovan, operated
abroad to gather information.
"This scattered method of getting information for
the various departments of the government first struck
me as being badly organized when I was in the Senate.
Our Senate committees, hearing the witnesses from the
executive departments, were often struck by the fact
that different agencies of the government came up with
different and conflicting facts on similar subjects.
It was not at first apparent that this was due to the
un-co-ordinated methods of obtaining information.
Since then, however, r have often thought that if
there had been something like co-ordination of infor-
mation in the government it would have been more diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed
in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days
the military did not know everything the State Depart-
ment knew, and the diplomats did not have access to
all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and the Navy,
in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep
each other informed as to their plans.
"In other words, there had never been much atten-
tion paid to any centralized intelligence organization
in our government. Apparently the United States saw no
need for a really comprehensive system of foreign intel-
ligence until World War II placed American fighting men
on the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa and on the
islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific.
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"The war taught us this lesson--that we had to
collect intelligence in a manner that would make the
information available where it was needed and when
it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable
form. If it is not intelligent and understandable,
it is useless.
"On becoming President, I found that the needed
intelligence information was not co-ordinated at any
one place. Reports came across my desk on the same
subject at different times from the various depart-
ments, and these reports often conflicted. Conse-
quently I asked Admiral Leahy if anything was being
done to improve the system. Leahy told me that in
Z944, at President Roosevelt's direction, he had
referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff'a plan for cen-
tralized intelligence work prepared by General Donovan.
This plan, so Leahy told me, provided for an organi-
zation directly under the President and responsible
only to him. The Navy, however, had worked out a
counterproposal under which there would be a central
agency to serve as an over-all intelligence organiza-
tion, but with each of the departments responsible
for national security having a stake in it. Much of
the original work on this project was done by Rear
Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Deputy Chief of Naval
Intelligence.
"Sometime later I asked Secretary of State Byrnes
to submit his recommendations for a way to co-ordinate
inteZZigence services among the departments, explaining
t;hat I had already asked Leah7i to look into the subject
fbut that I wanted the State Department's recommendations
since the State Department would need to play an impor-
tant role in the operation.
"Secretary Byrnes took the position that such an
organization should be responsible to the Secretary of
State and advised me that he should be in control of
all intelligence. The Army and the Navy, on the other
hand, strongly objected. They maintained that every
department required its own intelligence but that there
was a great need for a central organization to gather
together all information that had to with with over-aZZ
national policy. Under such an organization. there would
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be a pool of information, and each agency would con-
tribute to it. This pool would make it possible for
those who were responsible for establishing policies
in foreign political and military fields to draw on
authoritative intelligence for their guidance.
"In January 1946 I held a series of meetings in
my office to examine the various plans suggested for
a centralized intelligence authority."
Memoirs by Harry S. Truman,
Volume Two: Years of Trial
and Hope.
"Whether it be treason or not, it does the
United States just as much harm for military secrets
to be made known to potential enemies through open
publication, as it does for military secrets to be
given to an enemy through the clandestine operations
of spies. ...
"...I do not believe that the best solution can
be reached by adopting an approach based on the theory
that everyone has a right to know our military secrets
and related information affecting the national security."
Statement read by President
Truman at a news conference,
referring to an executive
order on the handling of
classified information,
4 October 1951.
"When I became President--if you don't mind me
reminiscing a little bit--there was no concentration
of information for the benefit of the President. Each
department and each organization had its own informa-
tion service, and that information service was walled
off from every other service in such a manner that
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whenever it was necessary for the President to have
information, he had to send to two or three depart-
ments to get it, and then he would have to have some-
body do a little digging to get it.
"...And finally one morning I had a conversation
with Admiral Leahy, and suggested to him that there
should be a Central Intelligence Agency, for the bene-
fit of the whole government as well as for the benefit
of the President, so he could be informed.
"And the Admiral and I proceeded to try to work
out a program. It has worked very successfully. We
have an intelligence information service now that I
think is not inferior to any in the world.
"We have the Central Intelligence Agency, and
all the intelligence information agencies in all the
rest of the departments of the government, coordinated
by that Central Intelligence Agency. This agency puts
the information of vital importance to the President
in his hands. He has to know what is going on every-
where at home and abroad, so that he can intelligently
make the decisions that are necessary to keep the
government running. ...
"...You are the organization, you are the inteZZi-
gence arm that keeps the Executive informed so that
he can make decisions that always will be in the public
interest for his own country, hoping always that it
will save the free world from involvement with the
totalitarian countries in an all-out war--a terrible
thing to contemplate.
"Those of you who are deep in the Central InteZZi-
gence Agency know what goes on around the world--know
what is necessary for the President to know every morn-
ing. I am briefed every day on all the world, on
everything that takes place from one end of the world
to the other, all the way around--by both the poles
and the other way. It is necessary that you make that
contribution for the welfare and benefit of your govern-
ment.
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"T came over here to tell you how appreciative
Z" am of the service which I received as the Chief
Executive of the greatest nation in the history of
the world."
Remarks of President Truman
to a CIA Orientation Course,
21 November 1952.
Inscription on the photograph of Presi-
dent Truman, which he presented to CIA:
"To the Central Intelligence Agency, a
necessity to the President of the United State
from one who knows.
Harry S. Truman
June 9, Z964"
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"America's fundamental
aspiration is the preserva-
tion of peace. To this end
we seek to develop policies
and arrangements to make
the peace both permanent
and just. This can be done
only on the basis of com-
prehensive and appropriate
information.
the proper interpretation.o f those facts' ' p`ea?time
the necessary facts are of a different natuv,,`~?. T,~'hey
deal with conditions, resources, requirement's, and atti-
tudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct
interpretation are essential to the development of
policy to further our long-term national security and
best interests. To provide information of this kind
is the task of the organization of which you are a
part.
tions of his opponent, and"
"In war nothing is
more important to a com-
mander than the facts
concerning the strength,
dispositions, and inten-
"No task could be more important.
"Upon the quality of your work depends in large
measure the success of our effort to further the
nation's position in the international scene.
"By its very nature the work of this agency demands
of its members the highest order of dedication, ability,
trustworthiness, and seZfZessness--to say nothing of the
finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot
be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the work
of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often
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even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration
is rooted in patriotism--their reward can be little
except the conviction that they are performing a
unique and indispensable service for their country,
and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates
their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.
"The reputation of your organization for quality
and excellence of performance, ... is a proud one.
"Because I deeply believe these things, I deem
it a great privilege to participate in this ceremony
of cornerstone laying for the national headquarters
of the Central Intelligence Agency. On this spot
will rise a beautiful and useful structure. May it
long endure, to serve the cause of America and of
peace."
Remarks of President Eisenhower
at the cornerstone-laying ceremony
for the CIA building,
3 November 1959.
"T have made some notes from which I want to
talk to you about this U-2 -,incident. ...
"The first point is this: the need for intel-
ligence-gathering activities.
"No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means
that we must have knowledge of military forces and
preparations around the world, especially those capable
of massive surprise attacks.
"Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essen-
tial. ...
"...ever since the beginning of my administration
I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible
way, the information required to protect the United
States and the free world against surprise attack and
to enable them to make effective preparations for
defense.
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"My second point: the nature of inteZZigence-
gathering activities.
"These have a special and secret character.
They are, so to speak, 'below the surface' activi-
ties.
"They are secret because they must circumvent
measures designed by other countries to protect
secrecy of military preparations.
"They are divorced from the regular visible
agencies of government which stay clear of opera-
tional involvement in specific detailed activities.
"These elements operate under broad directives
to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of
force--with operations oupervised by responsible
officials within this area of secret activities.
"These activities have their own rules and
methods of concealment which seek to mislead and
obscure-- ...
"Third point: how should we view all of this
activity?
"It is a distasteful but vital necessity.-
"We prefer and work for a different kind of
world--and a different way of obtaining the infor-
mation essential to confidence and effective
deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present
weapons, are the only answer. ...
"My final point is that we must not be dis-
tracted from the real issues of the day by what is
an incident or a symptom of the world situation today."
Statement by President Eisenhower
at his news conference of 11 May
1960, following the shooting down
of a U-2 by the Soviet Union.
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"...Accordingly, at this morning's private
session, despite the violence and inaccuracy of
Mr. Khrushchev's statements, I replied to him on
the following terms: ...
"In my statement of May ZZth and in the state-
ment of Secretary Herter of May 9th, the position of
the United States was made clear with respect to the
distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a
world where nations distrust each other's intentions.
We pointed out that these activities had no aggres-
sive intent but rather were to assure the safety of
the United States and the free world against surprise
attack by a power which boasts of its ability to
devastate the United States and other countries by
missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is well
known, not only the United States but most other
countries are constantly the targets of elaborate
and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union."
Statement by President Eisenhower
concerning the positions taken by
Chairman Khrushchev at the opening
of the Paris summit conference,
1.6 May 1960.
"During the period leading up to World War II
we learned from bitter experience the imperative
necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence
information, ...
"Moreover, as President, charged by the
Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign
relations, and as Commander-in-Chief, charged with
the direction .of the operations and activities of
our Armed Forces and their supporting services, I
take full responsibility for approving aZZ'the
various programs undertaken by our government to
secure and evaluate military intelligence.
"It was in the prosecution of one of these
intelligence programs that the widely publicized
U-2 incident occurred.
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"Aerial photography has been one of many methods
we have used to keep ourselves and the free world
abreast of major Soviet military developments. The
usefulness of this work has been well established
through four years of effort. The Soviets were well
aware of it. ...
"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs
intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance
can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we
learned that even negotiation itself can be used to
conceal preparations for a surprise attack. ...
"...It must be remembered that over a long
period, these flights had given us information of
the greatest importance to the nation's security.
In fact, their success has been nothing short of
remarkable. ...
"I then made two facts clear to the public:
first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been
undertaken with my approval; second, this government
is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or another,
of military activities of the Soviets, just as their
government has for years engaged in espionage activi-
ties in our country and throughout the world."
President Eisenhower's radio
and television report to the
American people, following
the Paris summit conference,
25 May 1960.
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"As I think you know, I wish you and your
associates in the Central Intelligence Agency well
in the tremendously important job,you do for our
country. Upon the work of your organization there
is an almost frightening responsibility; I know
all members of the CIA will continue to do the
best they can for all of us."
Letter from President Eisenhower
to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director
of Central Intelligence, 18 Janu-
ary 1961, at the conclusion of
the Eisenhower Administration.
"For: The Central Intelligence Agency
An indispensable organization to our
country.
Dwight D. Eisenhower"
Inscription on the photograph of
President Eisenhower, which he
presented to CIA.
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"I want, first of all,
to express my appreciation
to you all for the oppor-
tunity that this ceremony
gives to tell you how grate-
ful we are in the government
and in the country for the
services that the personnel
of this Agency render to the
country.
"It is not always easy.
Your successes are unheralded--
your failures are trumpeted.
I sometimes have that feeling
myself. But I am sure you
realize how important is your work, how essential it
is--and how, in the long sweep of history, how signi-
ficant your efforts will be judged.
"So I do want to express my appreciation to you
now, and I'm confident that in the future you will
continue to merit the appreciation of our country,
as you have in the past."
Remarks of President Kennedy
at the CIA Headquarters,
28 November 1961, on present-
ing the National Security
Medal to Allen W. Dulles, the
retiring Director of Central
Intelligence.
"...it is my wish that you serve as the govern-
.ment's principal foreign intelligence officer, and
as such that you undertake, as an integral part of
your responsibilities, the coordination and effec-
tive guidance of the total United States foreign
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intelligence effort. As the government's principal
intelligence officer, you will assure the proper
coordination, correlation, and evaluation of inteZ-
Zigence from all sources and its prompt dissemination
to me and to other recipients as appropriate. In
fulfillment of these tasks I shall expect you to
work closely with the heads of all departments and
agencies having responsibilities in the foreign
intelligence field. ...
"As directed by the President and the National
Security Council, you will establish with the advice
and assistance of the United States Intelligence
Board the necessary policies and procedures to assure
adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activi-
ties at all levels."
Memorandum from President Kennedy
to the Director of Central
Intelligence, 16 January 1962.
"I wish to express to you, the members of the
United States Intelligence Board, and to the indi-
vidual members of the intelligence agencies my deep
and sincere appreciation for your outstanding service
to our Nation--and the Free World--during the recent
international crisis.
"In the course of the past few months I have had
occasion to again observe the extraordinary accomplish-
ments of our inteZZigence community, and I have been
singularly impressed with the overall professional
excellence, selfless devotion to duty, resourcefulness
and initiative manifested in the work of this group.
The fact that we had timely and accurate information,
skillfully analysed and clearly presented, to guide
us in our judgments during this crisis is, I believe,
the greatest tribute to the effectiveness of these
individuals and agencies. The magnitude of their
contribution can be measured, in part, by the fact
that the peace was sustained during a most critical
time.
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"It is; of course, a great source of strength
to-'me to know that we have such dedicated and skilled
men and women in the service of our Nation. in these
of peril. Although I cannot personally commend
ember;of the intelligence community for their
appreciation of a grateful Nation."
my deep admiration for their achieve, rents,. and the
In.telZigence Board, my personal word of commendation,
individual efforts, I would like you to convey to
them, through the members of the United S.tate,s,
Letter of commendation,from
President Kennedy to John A.
McCone, Director of Central
Intelligence, in the latter's
capacity as Chairman., of the
United States Intelligence
Board, 9 January 1963, after
the Cuban missile crisis of
October 1962.
Viet-Nam. I can find nothing, and I have looked
through the record very carefully over the last
nine months, and I could go back further, to indi-
catethatthe CIA has done anything but support
policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to
execute it in those areas where it has competence
" We have worked very closely together, in the
National Security Council in the last two months
attempting to meet the problems we faced in South
and responsibility. ... I can just aesu
flatly that the CIA has not carried out it
itiesbut has operated under clo-se
the Director of Central InteZZigenc
with.-the cooperation of the National,t
and under my instructions.
ounci Z
hink `that while - the CIA `jnay have made
and`, has had many successes which mayga unheralded,
in my opinion in this case it is unfair to charge
mistakes, as we all do, on different occa
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ou
endent
control
operating
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them as they have been charged. I think they have
done a good job. "
Statement by President Kennedy
at a news conference in response
to a question on whether CIA
was conducting unauthorized
activities in South Vietnam,
9 October 1963.
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"...we have committed
our lives, our property, our
resources, and our sacred
honor to the freedom and
peace of other men, indeed
to the freedom and peace of
sacrifices that Americans
IL; ??' Is.~\, ?;' 1'f R- F,!,
all mankind. We would dis-
honor that commitment, we
would disgrace all the
have made if we were not
every hour of every day
vigilant against every
threat to peace and free-
dom. That is why we have
the Central Intelligence
Agency in this country.
"The purpose of this effort, Zike the purpose of
all that we do, is to strive for an orderly, just,
and peaceful world. In this effort more than in many
others a high order of selflessness, of dedication,
of devotion, is asked of men and women. The compensa-
tion of them comes not in fame, certainly not in rewards
of salary, but the reward of the sure knowledge that
they have made a contribution to freedom's cause.
"For the leadership of this vital agency this
nation has been very fortunate to have the services
of outstanding Americans: Allen Dulles, John MaCone,
now today Admiral William F. Reborn."
Remarks of President Johnson
at the swearing-in ceremony of
Vice Admiral Raborn as Director
of Central Intelligence and
Mr. Richard M. Helms as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence,
28 April 1965.
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!'You know it is my hope that we can continue
to build and strengthen the effectiveness of the
Agency, making full utilization of-the imagina-t
talent assembZe?d in the organization. I h:op
to assure and encourage all your employees to`real-
ize that their personal abilities and super
;;performance ' do `not go unnoticed or. unrecognized
"Our intelligence must.be unquestironably the
best in the world. You have my full support in
our effort to make it so.
Letter from President Johnson
to Vice Admiral William F. Rab irn
Director of Central Intelligence,
regarding the . appointment of
Mrs. Penelope Thunberg, CIA,
to the U.S. Tariff , Commission,
29 July 1965.
"The interests of national defense and seu
rity require sustained effort on the, part of the
Intelligence Community to supportme and other
officials having policy and command responsibili-
ties. Efficient management and direction of
the complex activities which make up the total
foreign intelligence effort are essential to meet
day-to-day national requirements and to ensure
the development and application of advanced means
for the collection, processing, analysis , estimat
ing and reporting of intelligence information."
Memorandum from PresidentJohnson
to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, 19 October 1965, on the`
foreign intelligence activities
of the United States.
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"In 2-1/2 years of working with these men
I have yet to meet a '007.' I have met dozens
of men who are moved and motivated by the highest
and most patriotic and dedicated purposes--men
who are specialists in economics, and political
and history, and geography, and physics,
ience
,
sc
and many other fields where Logic and analysis
are crucial to the decisions that the President
of their country is called upon to make. Through
arned that
L
h
e
ave
my experience with these men I
their most significant triumphs come not in the
secrets passed in the dark but in patient reading,
hour after hour, of highly technical periodicals.
"In a real sense they are America's pro-
fessional students; they are unsung, just as they
are invaluable."
Remarks of President Johnson
at the swearing-in ceremony
of Mr. Richard M. Helms as
Director of Central Intelligence,
30 June 1966.
"Your countrymen ... cannot know of your
accomplishments in the equally crucial business
of the Central Intelligence Agency. For it is
the lot of those in our intelligence agencies
that they should work in silence--sometimes fail
in silence, but more often succeed in silence.
"Unhappily, also, it is sometimes their lot
that they must suffer in silence. For, like all
in high public position, they are occasionally
subject to criticism which they must not answer.
"Secrecy in this work is essential.
Achievements and triumphs can seldom be adver-
tised. Shortcomings and failures often are
advertised. The rewards can never come in
public acclaim, only in the quiet satisfaction
of getting on with the job and trying to do well
the work that needs to be done in the interests
of your Nation.
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"The best intelligence is essential to the
best policy. So I am delighted that you have
undertaken, as far as security permits, to tell
the public that it is well served by the Central
Intelligence Agency.
"I am glad that there are occasions from
time to time when I, like my predecessors in this
office, can also express my deep confidence in
the expert and the dedicated service of the per-
sonnel of the Central Intelligence Agency."
Remarks of President at the
presentation of the National
Security Medal to Vice Admiral
William F. Raborn for his
services as Director of Central
Intelligence, 17 August 1966.
"This is a day when you should all be proud--
especially those among you who have been a part of
the Agency since its founding.
"Twenty years ago, this country had no broad-
scale professional intelligence service worthy of
the name. Today, it has a strong and vital one--
the best in the world.
"Twenty years ago, you began with a vague
assortment of functions and a varied assortment
of people. Your purposes were not well understood
inside the Government, and barely understood at all
outside. Since that time, you have become a dedi-
cated and disciplined core of professionals, with
clearly defined responsibilities.
"Those responsibilities are vast and demand-
ing. You give us information on which decisions
affecting the course of history are made. Your
product must be as perfect as is humanly possible--
though the material you must work with is far
from perfect.
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"You must keep pace with developments in a
tremendously complex society, a society which, as
Mr. Helms has said, 'gropes for answers to challenges
its founding fathers could never have conceived.'
"You have built a solid foundation in these
past twenty years. America relies on your con-
stant dedication to the truth--on your commit-
ment to our democratic ideal. I believe our
trust is well placed. "
Message from President Johnson
on the occasion of the 20th
anniversary of the founding
of CIA, 18 September 1967.
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"...Going back during the
eight years I was Vice President,
I sat on the National Security
Council and there I learned to
respect the organization, its
Director and its reports that
were made to the Council, and
through the Council to the
President of the United States.
"And in a sense, then, I
took upon this organization as
not one that is necessary for
the conduct of conflict or war,
or call it what you may, but in the final analysis as one
of the great instruments of our government for the preser-
vation of peace, for the avoidance of war, and for the
development of a society in which this kind of activity
would not be as necessary, if necessary at all.
"It is that that I think the American people need
to understand, that this is a necessary adjunct to the
conduct of the Presidency. And I am keenly aware of
that. I am keenly aware of the fact that many of you
at times must have had doubts, perhaps you have not,
but perhaps there may have been times that you have
had doubts about your mission, the popularity of what
you do in the country, and I want to reassure you on
that score.
"I realize that in this organization the great
majority of you are not in the kind of covert activi-
ties which involve great danger, but I also know
that some of your colleagues have been involved in
such activities and are involved in such activities.
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"I know, too, that there will be no Purple
Hearts, there will be no medals, there will be no
recognition of those who have served far beyond the
call of duty because by definition where the CIA
is concerned your successes must never be publicized
and your failures will always be publicized.
"So that makes your mission a particularly
difficult one. It makes it difficult from the stand-
point of those who must render service beyond the
call of duty. And I recognize that and I am deeply
grateful for those who are willing to make that
kind of sacrifice.
"So, finally, I would simply say that I under-
stand that when President Truman in Z964 sent a
message to the CIA, he put an inscription on it
which, as I recall, went something like this:
To the CIA, an organization which is an absolute
necessity to any President of the United States.
From one who knows.
"I know. And I appreciate what you do."
Remarks of President Nixon at
CIA Headquarters, 7 March 1969.
"This organization, the CIA, has a distinguished
record of being bipartison in character. It is a
highly professional group. It will remain that in
this Administration ... ."
Remarks of President Nixon
at the swearing-in ceremony
of General Cushman as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence,
7 May 19 6 9 .
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"... I have ordered the Central Intelligence
Agency, early in this Administration, to mobilize its
full resources to fight the international drug trade,
a task, incidentally, in which it has performed
superbly.
"Let me interject here a word for that much
maligned agency. As I have often said, in the field
of intelligence we always find that the failures are
those that are publicized. Its successes, by defi-
nition, must always be secret, and in this area there
are many successes and particularly ones for which
this agency can be very proud."
Remarks of President Nixon to
Senior U.S. Narcotics Control
Officials attending the
International Narcotics Control
Conference at the Department
of State, Washington, D.C.,
18 September 1972.
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"In the world in which
we live, beset by continuing
threats to our national se-
curity, it is vital that we
maintain an effective intel-
ligence and counterintelli-
gence capability. This
capability is fundamental
in providing the safeguards
that protect our national
interests and help avert
armed conflict. The Central
Intelligence Agency has had
a notable record of many
successes in this field,
but by the nature of its
operations, such successes
and achievements cannot be
divulged publicly.
ntfaZ'in this republic that we meet our
secuty regrements and at the same time avoid impair-
ing our democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms.
Intelligence activities must be conducted consistently
with both objectives."
Statement of President Ford
on the establishment of a
commission to investigate
press allegations against
the CIA, 4 January 1975.
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"In a world where information is power,
a vital element of our national security lies
in our intelligence services. They are essential
to our nation's security in peace as in war.
Americans can be grateful for the important,
but largely unsung contributions and achieve-
ments of the intelligence services of this
nation.
"It is entirely proper that this system
be subject to Congressional review. But a
sensationalized public debate over legitimate
intelligence activities is a disservice to this
nation and a threat to our intelligence system.
It ties our hands while our potential enemies
operate with secrecy, with skill and with vast
resources. Any investigation must be conducted
with maximum discretion and dispatch, to avoid
crippling a vital national institution.
"Let me speak quite frankly to some in this
chamber and perhaps to some not in this chamber.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been of
maximum importance to Presidents before me. The
CIA has been of maximum importance to me. The
Central Intelligence Agency and its associated
intelligence organizations could be of maximum
importance to some of you in this audience who
might be President at some later date.
"I think it would be catastrophic for the
Congress or anyone else to destroy the usefullness
by dismantling in effect our intelligence system
upon which we rest so heavily."
Excerpt from Foreign Policy
Address by President Ford
before a Joint Session of
Congress on April 10, 1975
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