THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050063-2
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• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
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CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORGANIZATION
The National Security Act of 1947 does not make detailed provision for
the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. It provides that the
Agency shall be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence and that he."shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Ben-'
ate,, from among the commissioned officers of the Armed Services or from among
individuals in civilian life".
With one exception, noted below, the Director is free to organize the
Central Intelligence Agency as he.choosee and to appoint to Positions within
the organization persons of his own selection as well as to terminate their
employment without regard for normal Civil service procedures.
In this chapter we discuss the administrative organization of the Central
Intelligence Agency, leaving for Chapter X, when we have completed our exami-
nation of the various activities of the Agency, an appraisal of the over-all
direction of the organization in relation to its assigned mission.
In carrying out his task of organizing the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Director has designated as his immediate subordinates a Deputy Director
and an Executive Director. Assisting this directing group in a staff capacity
are the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS); the General
* General order of the Central Intelligence
1948, which ie o come effective shortly abolishAgenavf
es the abolishes t dated September 14,
Director. poet of Executive
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Counsel who handles all legal and legislative work; the Advisory Council, a
small staff which represents the Director in handling communications intelli-
gence matters; the, Executive for Administration and Management, in charge of
financial and budgetary matters, administrative services, supply and general
housekeeping, personnel and management advice and surveys; and the Executive
for Inspection and Security, responsible for internal security policies and
investigations, physical security arrangements, inspections and audits. (For
Organization Chart as of December 15, 194.8, see Annex No. 5).
The Interdepartmental Coordinating and P7,anning Staff (ICAPS), comprising
persons nominated by the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, has
the primary responsibility for assisting the Director and the Intelligence
Advisory Committee with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities.
(See Chapter IV).
The other' functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are performed in
five Offices*, each headed by an Assistant Director. These are the Office of
Reports and Estimates (ORE), Office of Special Operations (OSO), Office of
Policy Coordination (OPC), Office of Operations (00), and Office of Collection
and Dissemination (OCD). A chart showing the personnel strength of the various
parts of the Agency as of December 24, 1948 is given in Annex No. 6.
The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to "correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" is assigned to the
Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). However, as we will point out later,
(See Chapters V and VI) a clear distinction has never been made within the
We understand that since this report was written steps are being taken to
create a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence. .
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Office of Reports and Estimates between the duty of correlating national in-
telligence and perfo3rming other miscellaneous reporting activities which are
more in the nature of "static" common service functions.
The "operating" services of common concern which have been assigned to
The-Central Intelligence Agency are carried out by three Offices. The bffice
of Special Operations is responsible for foreign espionage and counter-espionage
(See Chapter VIII). The Office of Operations is charged with
the exploitation of intelligence information found in foreign docu-
ments, press and other publications (See Chapter VII). The Office of Policy
Coordination is charged with conducting secret operations abroad under a spe-
cial mandate from the National Security Council which stipulated that the As-
sistant Director, Office of Policy Coordination, must be nominated by the
Secretary of State, and that his appointment by the Director is subject to
approval by the National Security. Council. This is the only case, as mentioned
above, in which the National Security Council has prescribed internal arrange-
ments within the Central Intelligence Agency or limited the appointive author-
ity of the Director. (See Chapter IX).
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines a variety of functions,
each somewhat differently related to the over-all mission of the Central In-
tellligence Agency. It performs static services of common concern in that it
compiles and maintains certain biographical, library and other reference mate-
rials. It also performs a coordinating function in handling intelligence col-
lection requests of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other departments.
Finally, it performs administrative functions such as the reception and dis-
semination of documents and reports. (See Chapter IV). .
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ADMINISTRATION
The administrative requirements of an organization such as the Central
Intelligence Agency, which carries out overt and covert activities, many of
which are highly specialized, cannot be expected to conform to normal adminis-
trative practice. The entire organization is, to some extent, affected by
special security requirements, and these are particularly difficult to handle
with respect to secret intelligence and related operations.
It is for these reasons that we are opposed to proposals for increasing
the degree of administrative centralization in the Central Intelligence Agency*.
In particular, the administrative problems associated with secret work abroad
are of such an unconventional. character that they need to be given special
treatment. (See below, page ).
Administrative arrangements which do not at first sight appear to be ef-
ficient or economical may be necessary in the Central Intelligence Agency.
Personnel requirements for certain types of work cannot conform to normal Civil
Service standards, and the demands of security often impose special and unusual
procedures. This situation must be understood not only by those responsible
for the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency but also by
Congress and the Bureau of the Budget.
The charge is sometimes made that there are too many administrative per-
sonnel and that the Central Intelligence Agency organization is top heavy in
this respect. The Executive for Administration and Management and the
* General Order provides for the centralization under an Executive for
Administration former Executive for Administration and Management) of all
budget, services, personnel and management functions, both overt and covert.
This measure is, in our opinion, unsound and contrary to the principles
advocated in this report.
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Executive for Inspection and Security together represent a large number of
This figure does
not include personnel performing administrative functions in other parts of
the organization. The criticism directed against numbers should perhaps be
more properly directed against policies and procedures (See Chapter R).
BUDGET
The Central Intelligence Agency appears to have no serious budgetary
problem and is favored by adequate Congressional support. The budget proposals,
as approved by the Director, are submitted each year with the authorization of
the National Security Council to the Bureau of the Budget where they are
handled by one official who has full security clearance. Then the budget is
supported before special sub-committees of the Appropriations Committee of the
two Houses of Congress. After approval, arrangements are made with the Bureau
of the Budget so that various parts of the budget are appropriated to other
departments. Thus, there is no official appropriation to the Central Intelli-
gence .Agency, but there are a number of separate blanket and unidentified ap-
propriations to other departments, which act as the vehicles for transmitting
the funds to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget have refrained from examining
in detail the internal workings of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to
determine the justification for the budget. It is important that such dis-
cretion and security be continued and that special treatment be accorded.
However, in order to justify this, it is necessary that the National Security
Council continuously assure itself as to the proper management and operations
of the Central Intelligence Agency, serving as the informed sponsor of the
Agency and as the protector of its security.
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In summary, we believe that the present arrangements for handling the
difficult question of the budget for the Central Intelligence Agency are sound
and that the Agency has not been hampered in carrying out its present respon-
sibilities for lack of funds.
SECURITY
Although there is no evidence of any laxness in the administrative ar-
rangements for security, there area number of circumstances and policies which
detract from the general security of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is
very difficult to create adequate security, other than mere physical security,
around an organization which was publicly created by statute, employs about
and encompasses a wide variety of activities. The.
fact that some of these activities are carried on tea matter of public record;
the existence of others and particularly operating details, are highly secret.
Yet, by combining in a single organization a wide variety of activities, the
security of the covert activities risks being compromised by the lower stand-
ards of security of the overt activities.
In the Washington area, the Agency occupies about twenty buildings, all
of which can be readily identified as buildings of the Central Intelligence
Agency. In various cities throughout the United States, the regional offices
of the Office of Operations conduct their business under the name "Central
Intelligence Agency". Over
publicly identify them-
selves with the Central Intelligence Agency which has unfortunately become
publicized as a secret. intelligence organization.
This security problem is an aftermath of the wartime period, with its
public dramatization of espionage and other secret operations and a rapid
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turnover of personnel. Intelligence has become a subject of general discus-
sion to which the publicizing of inter-agency rivalries has contributed. I
During the past year, there have been newspaper and
magazine articles concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and its secret
activities abroad.
Lest further incidents of this character occur, every effort should be
made to prevent the public disclosure of secret
information relating to the
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the National Security
Act (Section 102 (d) (3)), the Director of Central Intelligence is made re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. This mandate appears to give the Director authority to resist
pressure for disclosure of secret information.
If, however, in his relations with Congress or with other government de-
partments, the disclosure of secret information is sought from the Director,
and if he has any doubt as to whether he should comply, it should be established
practice for him to refer the question to the National Security Council in
order that it may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
We believe that other steps can also be taken toward an improvement of
security. There should be greater flexibility in the Central Intelligence
Agency's organization by distinguishing between those functions which are
written into the statute and hence are public and those whose existence, and
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certainly whose operations, should remain secret. The two should be adminis-
tratively and functionally separated, and appropriate concealment should be
given to the secret activities as discussed below. (See page
At the same time, a serious endeavor would need to be made to reverse the
present unfortunate trend wherein the Central Intelligence Agency finds itself
advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization so that it may
be presented instead to the public as the centralized coordinator of intelli-
gence. If so it can help to cover rather than uncover its secret operations.
Even with these specific steps, in the long run only organizational discipline
and personal discretion will insure security.,-
PERSONNEL
The Central Intelligence Agency labors under a difficult personnel prob-
lem, in part because a comprehensive intelligence organization such as this
has extremely varied personnel requirements. It is handicapped in meeting
them because of the sensitive security considerations which limit recruitment,
the anonymity which should properly be demanded of a large part of its person-
nel, and the special relationships which need to be maintained with the other
branches of the Government. It needs persons with highly specialized talents,
as well as persons with broad experience. It requires personnel who are fa-
miliar with the problems of the agencies which the Central Intelligence Agency
serves and with which it works.
The youth of the organization and the conditions of change and uncertainty
which have prevailed in our central intelligence organization during the past
few years have made the task of recruiting and holding personnel even more
difficult.
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Persons who might otherwise be qualified and interested in air intelli-
gence as a career have been discouraged from entering this field or have left
it.
On the whole, morale within the Central Intelligence Agency is not good.
The chief reasons appear to be uncertainty as to the future of a career in in-
telligence, the widespread criticism of the performance of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and dissatisfaction with leadership. Among the civilians there
is a realization that military personnel who come and go occupy many of the key
positions; and among some of the military there is often discontent arising
from a lack of interest in intelligence and a belief that a tour of duty in
the Central Intelligence Agency will not lead to Service advancement.
Delay in obtaining security clearances has caused particular difficulty
in recruiting personnel. Although the security of its personnel needs to be
beyond question, procedures and restrictions should not be so rigid that secu-
rity is obtained only by sacrificing talent, imagination and initiative.
There is a relatively high proportion of Service personnel in key posi-
tions in the Central Intelligence Agency. Although this figure has decreased
over the past year, Service personnel still occupy the three top positions.
In certain instances, officers have been accepted for responsible positions
who are without adequate intelligence experience or aptitude. There are the
further drawbacks that Service personnel are in many cases assigned for a
brief tour of duty, preventing continuity.
It is important that highly qualified Service personnel be included in
responsible positions where they can use their particular background and
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training, and work for the closer association of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Services. On balance, we believe that the proportion of Serv-
ice personnel now in key positions is too high.
In our terms of reference, we are asked to submit our findings and rec-
ommendations as to the "utilization and qualifications of Central Intelligence
Agency personnel". It is difficult to make any sweeping judgment on this
subject. The Central Intelligence Agency is a large, sprawling organization
which combines many diverse functions and has correspondingly difficult person-
nel requirements. Moreover, the organization has grown fast and, in many
cases, quantity has been attained at the expense of quality. Many able per-
sons have left the organization and few qualified ones have been attracted to
it. On the higher levels, quality is uneven and there are few persons who are
outstanding in intelligence work.
An appraisal of the directing personnel of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy and of general administrative policies goes so much to the heart of this
Survey that we reserve discussion of these questions until a later chapter.
(See Chapter X).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOI&fENDATIONS
(1) The centralization of all administration in one office is undesirable
since secret operations require their own separate administration.
(2) The present arrangements for handling the difficult budgetary ques-
tions of the Central Intelligence Agency are soundly conceived, and the Agency
has not been hampered in carrying out its present responsibilities by lack of
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(3) To assist the Director in carrying out his statutory duty of protect-
ing intelligence sources and methods he should, in cases where the disclosure
of secret information is sought from him and he has doubt as to whether he
should comply, refer the question to the National Security council in order
that it may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
(4+) In the interest of security, the Central Intelligence Agency should
increasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence rather
than its secret intelligence activities in order to reverse the present un-
fortunate trend where it finds itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret
service organization. In this way it can hel,p to cover up rather than to un-
cover the secret operations entrusted to it.
(5) The placing in key positions of a large percentage of military per-
sonnel, many of them on relatively short "tour of duty" assignment tends to
discourage competent civilian personnel from looking to employment in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency as a career.
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CHAPTER II
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Beginning as early as 1944 preparations were under way for the transition
from war-time Intelligence to a permanent intelligence organization suited to
our post-war needs.
In a series of discussions among the interested Government agencies as to
.how the country could most .effectively organize its permanent, long-range,
peace-time intelligence there was general agreement on some form of a central
agency. There was, however, a sharp divergence of views as to the scope of the
activities of such an agency, the authority it should enjoy, and the manner in
which it should be administered and controlled and where in the Government it
should be located. These issues were resolved at that time through the crea-
tion by Presidential letter (See Annex No. 3) of the Central Intelligence Group,
and then more definitely determined through the establishment of the Central
Intelligence Agency by Congress in'Section.102 of the National Security Act of
191+7. (See Annex No. 1t).
THE DUTIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
Section 102 (d) of this Act defines the duties of the Central Intelli-
genes Agency as follows: -
"(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national secu-
rity, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National
Security Council --
"(1) to advise the National Security Councils in matters concerning
such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies
as relate to national security;
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"(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for
the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelli-
gence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and
facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police,'subpoena,
law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further.
That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue
to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence: And provided further That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible or protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure;
"(1.) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agen-
cies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence r, affecting the national security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct."
In these provisions the' authors of the National Security Act showed a
sound understanding of our basic intelligence needs by assigning to the Central
Intelligence Agency three broad duties which had never before been adequately
covered in our national intelligence structure. These duties are: (1) to
advise the.National Security Council regarding the intelligence activities of
the government and make recommendations for their coordination; (2) to pro-
vide for the central correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence
relating to the national security; and (3) to assure the performance, cen-
trally, subject to National Security Council direction, of certain intelligence
and related functions of common concern to various departments of the
Government.
The powers given to the National Security Council and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency under Section 102 of the Act establish, in our opinion, the
framework for a sound intelligence service for this country. Accordingly, we
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do not suggest any amendments to the Act and believe it would be unwise to
tamper with this legislation until we have had further experience in operating
under it. Throughout our report we stress the vital importance of giving ef-
fect to the real intent of this legislation through the effective exercise by
the Central Intelligence Agency of those functions assigned to it by the Act
which have, in our opinion, been neglected. We refer particularly to the re-
sponsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for the coordination of intel-
ligence activities and the coordination of intelligence opinion in the form of
national intelligence estimates.
In providing for a semi-autonomous highly centralized agency with a broad
variety of intelligence responsibilities affecting various government agencies,
we have departed from the general pattern followed by other countries. There
the tendency in most phases of intelligence has been to avoid such a degree of
centralization. Under the conditions existing in the United States we believe
that the degree of centralization proposed under the National Security Act can
be justified, provided that the distinctive functions of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency are handled according to their special requirements.
As one recommendation designed to offset the disadvantages of over-
centralization in intelligence, we later propose in this report that the
branches cf the Central Intelligence Agency which are directly engaged in clan-
destine activities, such as secret intelligence, counter-intelligence, secret
operations and the like, be given a great measure of autonomy as to internal
administration,the control of their operations and the selection of personnel.
In this connection we have considered the arguments which have been fre-
quently advanced that the functions of coordination and of evaluation, on the
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one hand, should be wholly divorced from collection and operations on the
other. One argument is that the analyst will be overly impressed with the
particular items of information which his own organization collects, as con-
trasted with the information reaching him from other sources. There is a fur-
ther fear, partly substantiated by experience under the Central Intelligence
Agency, that if the sevbral functions are combined, there will be a tendency
to neglect the coordinating responsibilities in favor of the more exciting
field of operations. Finally, the point is made that by joining together a
variety of operations whose security requirements are quite different, the
possibility of providing effective security to those activities that require
it most is thereby reduced.
We appreciate the weight of these arguments but do not feel that they are
decisive. We believe that the recognition of the distinctive functions of the
Central -Intelligence Agency, and the handling of each one according to its
special requirements and in proper relation to the over-all mission, would
largely meet these objections. In particular, the granting of autonomy to the
clandestine work and adequate emphasis on the important coordinating responsi-
bilities of the Central Intelligence Agency would overcome the disadvantages
of combining these functions in one organization.
CONTROL OVER THE.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
We do not agree with the argument, often advanced, that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, or at least?Its operating services, should be placed under the
direct.control of one of the executive departments of the Government, such as
the Department of State or the National Military Establishment. The activities
of the Central Intelligence.Agency do'not concern either of these departments
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exclusively. Moreover the administrative arrangements of these departments
are not well suited to the conduct of extensive secret foreign intelligence
operations. The fact that in time of war secret activities are primarily of
concern to the military is not, in our opinion, sufficient argument for plac-
ing them under military control in time of peace. The National Security Act
is sufficiently flexible and the authority of the National Security Council
sufficiently broad to permit any necessary adjustments within the Central In-
telligence Agency so that these operations will be responsive to the needs of
the policy-making and operating departments of the Government, without sub-
ordinating them directly to these departments.
We have also considered the question whether the Central Intelligence
Agency as a whole is properly placed in our governmental structure under the
National Security Council. When the National Security Act was being drafted
doubts were expressed whether a committee such as the National Security Council
would be able to give effective direction to the Central Intelligence Agency.
It was argued that the National Security Council was too large a body, would
be preoccupied with high policy matters, and would meet too infrequently to be
able to give sufficient attention to the proper functioning of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
There is force to the criticism that a committee, no matter how august,
is rarely an effective body for the direction of the current operations of
another agency. It is true that the National Security Council cannot effec-
tively assume the task of directing such current operations, and should not
attempt to do so, except to the extent of assuring itself of compliance with
its directives. However, the Council, whose chairman is the President and
whose membership comprises the highest authority in the interested departments
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of the Government, can render effective service in determining the nature and
scope of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency within the frame-
work of the National Security Act.
We recommend, however, that provision should be made for closer liaison
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the two members of the National
Security Council on whom it chiefly depends; namely, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense. We suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence
be encouraged to seek current advice and continuing guidance from these two
members of the National Security Council on matters which may not properly be
the subject of its formal directives, or which have not reached the point of
requiring such directives. Such close association would help counteract what
we feel is a growing tendency for the Central Intelligence Agency to become a
separate and independent agency of government working to some extent in com-
petition with, rather than for the benefit of those departments of Government
which are the primary users of what the Central Intelligence Agency should
produce.
THE GENERAL MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Unless the Central Intelligence Agency performs an essential service for
each of these departments and coordinates their intelligence activities it
will fail in its mission. The Central Intelligence Agency should not be a
fifth intelligence agency superimposed onthe existing agencies of State, Army,
Navy and Air Force and a rival to them. It should not be a competitor of
these agencies, but a contributor to them and should help to coordinate their
intelligence activities. It must make maximum use of the resources of exist-
ing agencies; it must not duplicate their work but help to put an end to
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existing duplication by seeing to it that the best qualified agency in each
phase of the intelligence field should assume and carry out its particular
responsibility.
In the succeeding chapters of this report we will suggest concrete steps
for giving effect to these general principles. In doing so we will start from
the premise which we have stated above that the existing legislation affords a
good basis on which to build a central intelligence service. Furthermore, as
the most practical method of approach, we will examine what has been accom-
plished through the Central Intelligence Agency under this legislation and
suggest as we go along. the specific and, in some cases, fundamental changes
which we consider desirable. In this way we will build upon what we now have
rather than attempt to start anew and build from the ground up.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act of 19+7 establishes a
framework for a sound intelligence system and no amendments to this Section of
the Act are deemed necessary at this time.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed in .our govern-
mental structure under the National Security Council.
(3) The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered and encouraged
to establish through its Director closer liaison with the two members of the
National Security Council which it chiefly depends, namely, the Secretaries of
State and Defense.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTNITIES
The coordination of the intelligence activities of the several departments
and agencies concerned with national security was a primary reason for estab-
lishing the Central Intelligence Agency. This is clear from the early discus-
sions concerning the creation of a central agency and from the language of
Section 102 of the National Security Act.
To achieve this purpose, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned the
duty of advising the National Security Council in matters concerning such in-
telligence activities as relate to the national security and of making recom-
mendations to the National Security Council for their coordination., The Act
does not give the Central Intelligence Agency independent authority to coordi-
nate intelligence activities. Final responsibility to establish policies is
vested in the National Security Council.
This duty of advising the National Security Councii, together with the
two other principal duties of correlating national intelligence and performing
common services as determined by the National Security Council, all serve the
general purpose of coordination. In fact, these three basic duties of the
Central Intelligence Agency, although distinct in themselves, are necessarily
inter-related and the performance of one function may involve another.
For example, in performing its duty of advising on the coordination of
intelligence activities, the Central Intelligence Agency may recommend to the
National Security Council the'means to be employed in the assembly of reports
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and estimates requisite for the performance by the Agency of its second duty,
the correlation of national intelligence. As another example, the Central In-
telligence Agency may recommend, in accordance with its duty to make recommen-
dations for the coordination of intelligence activities, that a particular in-
telligence function be performed henceforth by the Agency itself under its
third duty of providing services of common concern more efficiently accom-
plished centrally.
The statutory limitations upon the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of the Na-
tional Security Council were obviously designed to protect the autonomy and
internal arrangements of the various departments and agencies performing in-
telligence functions. The Secretaries of departments who are members of the
National Security Council are in a position to review recommendations of the
Central Intelligence Agency concerning their own departments, and provision is
made that other departmental heads may be invited to attend meetings of the
National Security Council when matters pertaining to their activities are under
consideration. In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of
the Central Intelligence Agency, it is clear that the Agency was expected to
provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated intelligence
system. In practice, the National Security Council has, almost without excep-
tion, approved the recommendations submitted to it by the Central Intelligence
Agency for the coordination of intelligence activities.
The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities"
which are to be coordinated under the direction of the National Security Council,
or specify the departments whose activities are covered. Presumably all
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intelligence activities relating to the national security are included, from
collecting information in the first instance to the preparation and dissemina-
tion of finished intelligence reports and estimates. The criterion, a very
broad one, is "such intelligence activities ...... as relate to the national
security" and not the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or
locale of the intelligence activity. Thus, practically no limitations are set
upon the scope of the intelligence activities with which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is to concern itself.
THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION
Three organizations assist the Director of Central Intelligence in dis-
charging his responsibilities respecting the coordination of intelligence ac-
tivities: the interdepartmental Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), with
its Standing Committee; the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
(ICAPS) of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of Collection and
Dissemination (OCD), also in the Central Intelligence Agency.
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (IAC)
The membership of this Committee, created by National Security Council
Intelligence Directive No. 1 of December 12, 1947 (See Annex No. 7), includes
the Director of Central Intelligence, the heads of the intelligence staffs of
the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the head of the Joint In-
telligence Group of the Joint Staff and the Director of Intelligence of the
Atomic Energy Commission. It is the direct successor to the Intelligence Ad-
visory Board which was created by President Truman in his letter of January 22,
1946 setting up the Central Intelligence Group'(See Annex No. 3).
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Beginning with the discussions that preceded the creation of the Committee
there have been two different concepts as to its proper mission. On the one
hand was the view, held in the various departments, that the Committee should,
in a sense, be a "governing board" for the Central Intelligence Agency. On
the other hand, it was argued that Congress had set up the Agency autonomously
and that any interdepartmental committee should serve merely in an advisory
capacity at the discretion of the Director. The solution established in Intel-
1,igence Directive No. 1 lies between these views.
In practice, the role of the Committee has not been significant, and in
our opinion, this has been one of the reasons for the weakness of the present
arrangements for the coordination of intelligence. In this chapter and the
next we will submit our recommendations for increasing the responsibility of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, both with respect to the coordination of
intelligence activities and the preparation of intelligence estimates.'
The members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee pre authorized to pass
upon recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence to the National
Security Council and upon directives proposed by the Director in implementation
of National Security Council Intelligence Directives. Although it is incumbent
upon the Director to transmit to the National Security Council dissents of
members of the Committee to his recommendations, the Committee may not prevent
the Director from making his recommendations , to the National Security Council
regardless of dissents. Where unanimity is not obtained on a proposed direc-
tive among the military department members of the Committee, the Director is
required to refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it
to the National Security Council.
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The activities of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have been largely
confined to taking formal. action, usually by voting slips, upon directives
proposed by the Director of Central Intelligence to be submitted to the National
Security Council or upon implementing directives. These actions are prepared
for the Committee by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and
the Committee's own Standing Committee of departmental representatives. The
Committee has met only infrequently and has had little to do with the continu-
ing coordination of intelligence activities or with the preparation of coordi-
nated intelligence estimates.* This situation isprobably due to a combination
of circumstances, including the failure of the Director to appreciate the
moving responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for. bringing about
coordination, lack of mutual confidence among the departments and the Central
Intelligence Agency and a general failure to understand how a coordinated in-
telligence system can be brought about.
The conception of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is sound. It is
sound because interdepartmental coordination in such a complicated field as
intelligence cannot be achieved solely by directives and without the fullest
cooperation of the interested departments. It requires frequent consultation
and continuing collaboration on all important questions. The Intelligence
Advisory Committee should be the medium for accomplishing this, but it will
not succeed if it continues to meet only infrequently, and avoids serious
grappling with intelligence problems and continuous consultation on questions
of common interest.
*On this subject, see Chapter V and particularly page where there is a dis-
cussion of the ad hoc committee set up in March, 1948.
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INDEPARTME PAL COORDINATING AND PIANNi1 STAFF (ICAPS)
This was set up as a staff unit of the Director of Central Intelligence
to assist. him in his responsibilities for the coordination of intelligence ac-
tivities. Its members are representatives nominated by the intelligence or-
ganizations of the State, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments; the senior
State Department representative is the Chairman of the group.
The assigned task of ICAPS is to review the intelligence activities of
the Government, and assist the Director in initiating measures of coordination
for recc?endation to the National Security Council. In order to accomplish
this mission effectively, it should have intimate knowledge of the organiza-
tions, responsibilities, activities and priorities of the various intelligence
agencies. Actually, its achievements reflect inadequate knowledge of these
subjects and failure to appreciate the breadth of the responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency for coordination of intelligence activities.
ICAPS has been largely concerned with the coordination of intelligence
activities by assisting in the preparation of the nine National Security Council
Intelligence Directives and the four implementing directives of the Director
of Central Intelligence.
It was originally expected that ICAPS would act as an active secretariat
or working staff for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, but owing in part to
the infrequent meetings of the Committee, this has not happened. Moreover,
wNaas developed oonfusicnnbetween the functions of ICAPS and those of the
Standing Committee ooIDtprising representatives from the staffs of the members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the result that responsibilities
are divided and unclear. Moreover, the status of the members of ICAPS has-been
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ambiguous because it has never been entirely clear whether the group was pri-
marily a staff of the Director of Central Intelligence or a committee repre-
senting the member agencies. This has left the group with divided loyalties
and uncertainty as to its mandate.
The position of ICAPS has been rendered more difficult because its members
have been given operating responsibilities which are not only unrelated to
their primary task of assisting to formulate plans for the coordinating of in-
telligence, but are responsibilities which seem to belong more properly to the
operating branches of the Centre,l Intelligence Agency. Thus, one member of
the staff serves as the full-time liaison officer with the Joint Intelligence
Group of the Joint Staff. This i
purely an intelligence research and report-
ing function in which the Office of Reports and Estimates has almost exclusive
interest. Moreover, 'the official liaison officer from the Central Intelligence
Agency to the National Security Council staff is the Chairman of ICAPS. This
function also concerns matters affecting primarily. the Office of Reports and
Estimates and, in fact, a representative from that Office now also works with
the National Security Council staff.
In these and other ways ICAPS has acquired operating rather than planning
functions and has become, to some extent, a buffer between the operating parts
of the Central Intelligence Agency and outside agencies. In carrying out both
of these functions, it is not in close touch with the intelligence branches
of the Central Intelligence Agency. There are numerous complaints that it is
not only failing to carry out its own mission properly, but actually impedes
the other parts of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out theirs.
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In general, we have found that ICAPS, staffed by individuals whose exper-
ience with problems of intelligence organization is not extensive, and lacking
a clear and firm mandate, has failed to undertake a broad and effective pro-
gram of coordination of intelligence activities. It has been allowed to dis-
sipate its energies in activities for which it is not suited and neglect its
primary mission. It has not given the impression within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency or outside that it grasps the nature of the responsibility for
coordination of intelligence activities which are imposed upon the Central
Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council by the National Security
Act.
OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSE4fliATION (OCD)
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines three functions, only
one of which is directly related to the task of coordinating intelligence
activities.
In the first place, it acts as.a service organization for the other Of-
fices of the Central Intelligence Agency by procuring intelligence data from
other agencies and by disseminating to those agencies the intelligence collected
or produced by these Offices. Its second task is the provision of certain
services of common concern for the benefit of the Central Intelligence Agency
and other agencies. These include the maintenance of an intelligence library
and of certain central registers and indices.
Finally, the Office of Collection and Dissemination performs certain co-
ordinating functions with respect to the collection of intelligence. It proc-
esses all intelligence requests received by the Central Intelligence Agency,
whether these are merely documentary or require field collection. It canvasses
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the collection capabilities of the Agency and all other appropriate agencies
in order to determine how best to meet these requests. Thus, if the Office of
Naval Intelligence should roquea4-eq& the Central Intelligence Agency dnforma-
1
tion enFtrd petableum producing capabilities of various foreign countries, the
Office of Collection and Dissemination would determine the intelligence re-
sources which should be tapped in satisfying the request. If the request can-
not be satisfied within the Central Intelligence Agency, it will determine what
outside agency is capable of procuring necessary information and will be re-
w
M agency. In the course of this
sponsible for forwarding the request tov
action, the Office of Collection and Dissemination will attempt to discover
whether any other agency has a similar requirement for information which might
be combined with the original request. In this manner the Office assists in
coordinating the requirements and collection requests received from within the
Central Intelligence Agency and from outside agencies.
It is obvious that this function of coordination is designed to meet cur-
rent requests and does not involve a broad responsibility continuously to mon-
itor and coordinate the collection procedures and requirements of the various
intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Such a re-
sponsibility would force the Office of Collection and Dissemination into the
position of a central clearing house for all collection requirements and re-
quests of all agencies. It would be impractical to have such an arrangement
due to the mass of administrative detail involved and the resulting delay in
the satisfaction of the requests. In practice, direct inter-agency requests,
not requiring coordination, may by-pass the Central Intelligence Agency
completely.
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The formal accomplishment of over-all coordination is represented mainly
by nine Intelligence Directives approved by the National Security Council upon
recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and four implementing directives which
need not be discussed here.
The National Security Council Intelligence Directives* provide for the
coordination of intelligence activities in various ways. The basic Directives,
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 seek to achieve coordination of intelligence activities by
allocation of general areas of responsibility to the several departments and
to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Directive No. 1, as we have pointed out, establishes the general arrange-
ments for such coordination. It sets up the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
discussed above, to advise the Director of Central Intelligence, specifies the
procedures for the issuance of Intelligence Directives and defines the-duty of
the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to,the.production of "national
intelligence." Insofar as practicable, the Central Intelligence Agency "shall
not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Depart-
ments and Agencies, but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities."
The Directive provides for exchange of information between the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and the departmental agencies,'and authorizes the assignment of
officers to the Central Intelligence Agency by the departmental organizations.
It also includes provision for the Central Intelligence Agency to request au-
thority to inspect intelligence material in agencies of the Government.
*See Annexes No. 7-15 for the texts of the Directives.
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Directive No. 2 allocates responsibility for the collection abroad of
overt intelligence among the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force by
establishing "certain broad categories of agency responsibility." Political,
cultural and sociological intelligence are assigned to the State Department.
Military, naval and air intelligence are assigned to the respective Services.
The collection of economic, scientific and technological intelligence is allo-
cated to each agency "in accordance with its respective needs." The Directive
provides for coordination of these collection activities in the field by the
senior United States representative.
Directive No. 3 is an elaborate definition of categories of intelligence
production, i.e., basic, current, staff, departmental and national intelligence,
and it assigns the responsibilities of the departmental agencies and the Central
Intelligence Agency in intelligence production. The same areas of "dominant
interest" are specified as for intelligence collection, and the production of
"national intelligence" is reserved to the Central Intelligence Agency. How-
ever, the terms of the various definitions are broadly drawn, the exceptions
are numerous, and confusion of intelligence functions has continued despite
the effort to eliminate it by definition.
Directive No. 4 provides that the Central Intelligence Agency shall take
the lead in preparing a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objec-
tives, and from time to time shall indicate the priorities attaching to these
objectives.
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The original proposal for coordination in this field sub-
mitted by the departments was that an Executive Order be issued setting up an
independent, departmental board to control communications intelligence; this
would not have been under the National Security Council. In opposition to
this concept, the Central Intelligence Agency proposed that the Director of
Central Intelligence be responsible for coordinating communications intelligence
activities with the advice of the Board. As finally resolved, the Board, and
not the Director of Central Intelligence, was given the coordinating responsi-
bility, but it was placed under the National Security Council and the Central
Intelligence Agency was given membership.
Four of the Directives, Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, assign certain "services of
common concern" to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority granted
in the National Security Act (Section 102 (d)). These are coordinating actions
in the sense that, by common agreement, they assign to the Central Intelligence
Agency primary or exclusive responsibility for conducting certain intelligence
activities of common concern. Directive No. 5 provides that the Central In-
telligence Agency will conduct all espionage and counter-espionage operations
abroad except for certain agreed activities and it also provides that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency will coordinate covex;t and overt collection activities.
(See Chapter viii).
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Directive No. 7 gives the Central Intelligence Agency authority for the
exploitation of domestic sources of foreign intelligence, and provides for the
participation of departmental agencies in this activity. (See Chapter VII).
A fourth "service of common concern" is provided in Directive No. 8 which
assigns to the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility for maintaining a
central file of biographical data on foreign scientific and technological
personalities.
This group of Intelligence Directives allocates responsibilities to the
Central Intelligence Agency in fields which have been conceded to be those of
common concern where work can beet be done centrally. This is also true of
the allocation to the Central Intelligence Agency of responsibility for the
conduct of secret operations (other than intelligence) abroad (Office of Policy
Coordination) which was accomplished by direct National-Security Council action
(NSC 10/2) and not by Intelligence Directive submitted through the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. (See Chapter 1X). In all of these cases where particular
functions of common concern have been assigned, the allocation of functions
has been generally accepted as sound.
THE DEGREE' OF COORDINATION ACHIEVED
.In spite of these formal. directives for the coordination of intelligence
activities, it is probably correct to say that departmental intelligence ac-
tivities are substantially unaffected by the program of coordination envisaged
.by the National Security Act except where the Central Intelligence Agency has
been given exclusive responsibility for certain activities.
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In general, there is an absence of effective coordination under the lead-
ership of the Central Intelligence Agency and there is virtually no supervision
of the gays in which the various directives are carried out, except.that the
Central Intelligence Agency controls those common service activities assigned
to it. Conflicts of jurisdiction and duplication of activities remain. In
many cases they have not been resolved, which is hardly surprising after such
a short time, but they remain unrecognized and unacknowledged.
Despite the provisions of Directives Nos. 2 and 3 in regard to the allo-
cation of dominant interest, each department collects and produces the intel-
ligence it chooses according to priorities it establishes. The very large
loopholes in these directives and the absence of any continuously effective
monitoring of their implementation makes this possible. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency itself has become a competitive producer of intelligence on sub-
jects of its omn choosing which can by no stretch of the imagination be called
national intelligence. (See Chapters V and VI). The amount of undesirable
duplication among intelligence agencies is considerable and the absence of co-
ordinated intelligence collection and production is serious.
In our opinion, certain essentials for the improvement of this situation
would include: continuous examination on the initiative of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency of instances of duplication and failure of coordination; direc-
tives which establish more precisely the responsibilities of the various de-
partments; and the effective carrying out of plans through close inter-depart-
mental consultation at all levels. To a greater or less:r degree, all of these
essentials are lacking at the present time.
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Clearly, as pointed out above, the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to coordinate intelligence activities is subject to directives of the
National Security Council. However, the responsibility to advise the National
Security Council and to make recommendations for coordination is squarely placed
on the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore, lack of authority in a specific
situation should not deter the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising its
responsibility to submit recommendations so that proper coordination will re-
sult. If there are doubts as to how the coordination should be affected, it is
the duty of the Agency to ask the National Security Council to resolve them.
The coordination of intelligence activities today is particularly important
in three fields illustrative of the general problem, namely -- scientific in-
telligence, domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence affecting the na-
tional security, and communications intelligence.
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE*
The field of scientific and technological intelligence is obviously one
-,which may overshadow all others in importance. At the present time there is
no proper coordination of effort in this field, which is one in which there is
a broad area of common interest. In fact, this diffusion of responsibility is
confirmed in National Security Council Intelligence Directives Nos. 2 and 3
which allocate collection and production responsibilities for scientific and
technological intelligence to "each agency in 'accordance with its respective
needs."
*Since this report was written, steps are being taken to create in the Central
Intelligence Agency a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence and to trans-
fer it to the Nuclear Energy Group now in the Office of Special Operations.
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Each of the military Services collects scientific and technological in-
telligencein accordance with its own program and produces such reports as it
chooses. The Central Intelligence Agency performs certain central collecting
services through its Office of Operations and Office of Special Operations.
The Office of Special Operations also houses the Nuclear Energy Group which is
the central governmental unit for interpreting atomic energy intelligence.
Separate from it is a Scientific Branch in the Office of Reports and Estimates
which was expected to become the central group for stimulating and coordinating
scientific intelligence. It has not yet filled this role. The Research and
Development Board does not itself actively engage in scientific intelligence
but has an important interest in the field. Its needs should therefore be
given major consideration in plans and arrangements for coordination.
In summary, responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts are unco-
ordinated, atomic energy intelligence is divorced from scientific intelligence
generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at authoritative
intelligence estimates in the scientific field, with the possible exception of
atomic energy. Here is a situation which must have priority in coordination of
intelligence activities. In Chapter VI we propose certain steps which toms
within the scope-of this survey.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-IN'T'ELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY
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(see Chapter VII), responsibility for the other activities
is scattered among the State Department, the Armed Services, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the-Central Intelligence Agency. There is little effec-
tive coordination among them, except on a case basis.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has primarily security and law
enforcement responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important area of
intelligence. This includes domestic counter-espionage and counter-sabotage,
control of communist and other subversive activities and surveillance of alien
individuals and groups. All of these, functions are closely related to the com-
parable activities abroad of the Central Intelligence Agency. They all have.
an important intelligence aspect, particularly today when intelligence from
domestic and foreign sources is so closely related. The fact that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is primarily concerned with security and law enforce-
ment may result in a failure to exploit the intelligence possibilities of a
situation and may create difficulties in reconciling the intelligence with the
security interests.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is today not part of the existing ma-
chinery for coordination of intelligence through the Intelligence Advisory
Committee or otherwise. There is no continuing manner whereby domestic intel-
ligence and oounter-intelligence are related to over-all national intelligence
in order to serve the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act
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"of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government depart-
ments and agencies in the interest of national security."
In our opinion, the Central Intelligence Agency has the duty under the Act
to concern itself with the problem of coordinating those phases of domestic
intelligence and counter-intelligence which relate to the national security
and should submit recommendations on this subject to the National Security
Council. This is not inconsistent with the stipulation of the National Security
Act that the Central Intelligence. Agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powers, or internal security functions." It would in fact serve to
carry out the program of coordination set forth in the Act in a broad field
which has hitherto been largely neglected.
A step toward bringing about the coordination we recommend would be to
provide for closer association of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the
intelligence agencies by making it a member of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIONCE
A further problem in the field of coordination of intelligence activities
is that of ccmmauiioations intelligence.
We have not made an on-the-spot examination of commtimications intelligence
and, in view of the necessarily stringent security restrictions, it seemed un-
wise that a non-governmental committee such as ours, without specific mandate
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to go into the whole subject, should press such an inquiry. Accordingly, the
Survey Group is not in any position to express a judgment upon the efficiency
of the present arrangements for the production of communications intelligence
through the separate establishments of the Army and the Navy. We have, however,
generally considered the problem of conmmanications intelligence insofar as it
relates to; the over-all arrangements for the coordination of intelligence
activities.
We consider that coordination of communications intelligence is of most
vital concern not only to the Services but to the Department of State for the
formulation of policy and to the Central Intelligence Agency for its operations
and other activities. The procedure by which the United States Communications
Intelligence Board was established conformed to what should be the normal func-
tinning of the arrangements for the coordination of activities in that the
Board was established by National Security Council Intelligence Directive
adopted upon the recommendation (albeit divided) of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
To be effective, comnmanications intelligence must be properly coordinated
at all stages, from collection and production*.to dissemination and use. It
may be noted that one of the prime objectives of coordination in this field is
to assure prompt receipt of the product of communications intelligence by its
essential users in State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, as
well as in the Services. As we have noted in our subsequent chapter dealing
*We understand that, at the direction of the Secretary of,Defense, a committee
comprising representatives of'the three Services is completing a study of the
question of creating a joint' organization for the production of commnunioations
intelligence.
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with secret intelligence operations (Chapter VIII), there is some reason to
believe that these operations and communications intelligence activities are
not at the present time sufficiently closely coordinated so as to provide for
each the maximum support for the other 'a work.
We further believe that the reoaamtendation we have made in this chapter
for the coordination of intelligence activities could best be achieved with
respect to commamioations intelligence by making the Director of Central In-
telligence permanent chairman of the United States Commnmioations Intelligence
Board.
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED COORDINATION
In order to remedy the existing situation in respect of coordination of
activities, several steps are necessary. The Director of Central Intelligence
must show a much greater concern than hitherto with the general problem of oo-
ordination of intelligence activities which is one of his essential statutory
duties. His is a responsibility to all of the departments concerned with na-
tional security; it can be properly discharged by leadership, imagination,
initiative and a realization that only a Joining of efforts can achieve the
desired results.
The other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee must also share
in the general responsibility for carrying out the intent of the National Be-
o rity Act by quickening their interest and exhibiting a spirit of active co-
operation. No amendment to the Commsittee'a charter as not forth in Intelligence
Directive No. 1 appears necessary to bring about this improvement.
In tie next chapter where we deal with the question of national intelli-
gence estimates we propose that the Intelligence Advisory Committee assume a
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more active role in producing these estimates. In our opinion, this would not
only improve the relevance and quality of the estimates but would help give
the Committee the impetus and the background it needs to deal effectively with
the coordination of intelligence activities. More than any other stage in the
intelligence process, the consideration of estimates should reveal the defi-
ciencies and overlaps as well as the accomplishments in intelligence.
We believe, as stated above, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
should be added to the permanent membership of. the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee. We also believe that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Staff
might be dropped from the regular membership. The role of the Atomic Energy
Commission in intelligence is a limited one and confined to a highly specialized
field. The representation of the Joint Staff upon the Intelligence Advisory
Committee appears to be largely duplicative in view of the predominantly Serv-
ice membership of the Committee. However, they, together with other interested
agencies such as the Departments of Treasury and Commerce and Research and De-
velopment Board and the National Security Resources Board, should have ad hoc
membership whenever matters of direct concern to them are being considered.
Within the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency the
Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) should be set up
clearly'as an integral part of the Agency, charged with the task of seeking
out, studying and developing, in consultation with the other parts of the
Central Intelligence Agency and outside agencies, plans for the coordination
of intelligence activities. It should have m responsibility for current oper-
ations, except that certain current tasks of coordination (such as some of
those now performed by the Office of Collection and Dissemination) might be
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carried out under its direction. The reconstituted ICAPS which might appro-
priately be called "Coordination Division" should be small. Its members should
be persons interested in, and qualified to deal with, problems of intelligence
organization. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the Director must
look upon this reorganized. and strengthened group as his major support in ful-
filling one of his most difficult assignments under the National Security Act,
that of advising the National Security Council on the intelligence activities
of the Government and making recommendations for their coordination.
It is our belief that the relationship between certain of the functions
presently performed by ICAPS and the Office of Collection and Dissemination
should be considerably closer. ICAPS is responsible for the promulgation of
plans and policy in relation to the coordination of collection activities. As
one of its tasks, the Office of Collection and Dissemination coordinates actual
collection and dissemination and in some respects ,is in position to implement
the general plane and policies for coordination. Constantly dealing with the
day-to-day "working level" problems of collection,the Affice of Collection and
Dissemination is in a good position to make recommendations in regard to the
improvement of collection procedures and the coordination of collection
activities.
Wq, therefore, recommend that the collection and dissemination functions.
of this Office be placed under the new Coordination Division subject to future
determination of the extent to which individual Offices may conduct their own
dissemination. (See Conclusions to Chapters VII and VIII). We further recom-
mend that all of the library, index and register functions be separated from
the Office of Collection and Dissemination and be placed in a centralized Re-
search and Reports Division as described in Chapter VI.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECCtvDATIONS
(1) The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Na-
tional Security Act with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities,
which is one of the most important ones assigned to the Central Intelligence
Agency, has not been fully discharged.
(2) One of the important areas where more active efforts at coordination
are needed, is the field of scientific intelligence. (See Chapter VI).
(3) Another important area is that of domestic intelligence and counter-
intelligence insofar as they relate to the national security. To improve co-
ordination in this area and between it and the entire intelligence field, we
recommend that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
(4+) The Director of Central Intelligence should be made permanent chair-
man of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.
(5) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived, but it
should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in
the continuing coordination of intelligence activities.
(6) The Intelligence Advisory Committee should consist of the Director of
Central Intelligence and representatives of the Departments of State, Army,
Navy and Air Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other departments
and agencies would sit as ad hoc members when appropriate.
(7) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff should berecon-
stituted as a staff* responsible only to the Director of Central Intelligence
*In this chapter we have called this new staff "Coordination Division." It
should be noted that this name and other names we have given to proposed
branches of the Central Intelligence Agency are only for purposes of illustra-
tion and simplification and not given as a formal recommendation.
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with the task of developing plans for the coordination of intelligence
activities.
(8) The responsibilities of the Office of Collection and Dissemination
with respect to the coordination of collection requirements and requests and
the dissemination of intelligence should be carried out under the new Coordi-
nation Division. This is subject to future determination of the extent to
which individual Offices may conduct their own dissemination.
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CHAPTER VI
SERVICES OF CO MON CONCERN: INTELLIGENCE
RESEARCH AND REPORTS
PROPOSED RESEARCH AND REPORTS DIVISION
We have recommended in the preceding chapter that there be created a
small, high-level Estimates Division to concern itself primarily with the cor-
relation of national intelligence, subject to final approval by the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee. If the responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the production of national intelligence is assumed by this Esti-
mates Division, there will remain certain research and intelligence reporting
functions now being performed by the Off ice of Reports and Estimates which
might properly be performed as a service of common concern by a newly con-
stituted "Research and Reports Division". Other activities of the Office of
Reports and Estimates should be discarded as being superfluous or competitive
with the proper activities of departmental intelligence.
There is presently within the Office of Reports and Estimates a nucleus
for the proposed Research and Reports Division in fields of common concern.
It includes the Scientific Branch, which should be strengthened and have re-
attached to it the Nuclear Energy Group; the Map Branch, which produces maps
and map intelligence as a recognized common service; the Economic and Trans-
portation Panels; and some elements from the Geographic Branches. To these
there should be added the Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations
(See below page ) and the library, biographical and other registers and in-
dices presently maintained by the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
Generally speaking, this Division will be responsible for authoritative
research and reports. in economic, scientific and technological intelligence,
' Top SECR jjp
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the maintenance of central reference facilities, and such other matters as are
deemed of common concern. To the extent necessary it will also coordinate the
activities of the other agencies in these fields. Its staff should include in
appropriate cases adequate representation from the State Department and Serv-
ices so that, subject to'policy guidance from the principal consumers, its
products will represent the coordinated opinion of the best available talent
and should be fully responsive to the requirements of the consumer agencies.
In this chapter we suggest the type of activity which should be discon-
tinued as unessential or duplicative, the type of activity which should be
retained as common service and some activities, not presently carried out in
the Office of Reports and Estimates, which should be performed by the proposed
.Research and Reports Division as services of common concern. It would be the
responsibility of the National Security Council, acting on the advice of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to
determine which of these central services might properly be performed, and we
believe that the Coordination Division (Reconstituted Interdepartmental Co-
ordinating and Planning Staff) should examine this problem and prepare the
necessary plans.
PERIODICAL SUMMARIES
The Office of Reports and Estimates presently produces current intelligence
in two principal forms: a top secret Daily Summary and a secret Weekly Summary.
The former comprises abstracts of a small number of incoming and outgoing
cables received during the preceding twenty-four hours. Approximately ninety
per cent of the contents of .the Daily Summary is derived from State Department
sources, including both operational as well as intelligence material. There
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are occasional comments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of the
summary, but these,for the most part, appear gratuitous and lend little weight
to the material itself. The result is a fragmentary publication which deals
with operations as well as Intelligence, without necessarily being based on the
most significant materials in either category. In a summary of this type, cir-
culated to the President and the highest officials of the Government, there is
an inherent danger that it will be misleading to its consumers. This is because
it is based largely on abstracts of State Department materials, not in histor-
ical perspective, lacking a full knowledge of the background or policy involved
and with little previous consultation between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the State Department. Moreover it is incomplete because it is not based on
all the most important materials.
The Weekly Summary is more widely circulated than the Daily Suanary, but
also represents primarily political reporting and competes for attention with
several departmental weekly summaries., particularly those of the State Depart-
ment and the Department of the Army.
Still another periodical publication is the monthly "Review of the World
Situation."
These summaries, particularly the Daily, are the subject of considerable,
controversy and are received with expressions ranging fran moderate interest
to strong criticism. The Weekly and the Daily are to a certain extent duplica-
tive in that the State Department, to which political intelligence has been
assigned as an area of,dami.nant interest,also disseminates its own operational
and intelligence summaries on the highest levels. Az both Summaries consume
an inordinate amount of time and effort and appear to be outside of the domain
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of the Central Intelligence Agency, we believe that the Daily, and possibly
the Weekly, Summary should be discontinued in their present form. We do, how-
ever, appreciate the fact that, to some extent, there may be a need for such
summaries and we suggest that the newly constituted Coordination Division ex-
amine the situation to determine whether there is such a need and how it can
best be met.
MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND M14ORANDA
The Office of Reports and Estimates also produces a variety of other re-
ports, studies and summaries. Somme of these are strategic and basic studies
on foreign countries or areas, presenting the political, economic and military
situation. Others are intended to be estimates of current international prob-
lems. These are formal reports,dealing with a variety of subjects ranging from
"Possible Developments in China" to "Opposition to the ECA". These estimate-
type reports are circulated throughout the various agencies for the purpose of
obtaining concurrence or dissent. it the fact that they are so circulated in
no way means that they are properly coordinated estimates which represent the
best thinking on the subject under review. They often deal with topics which
are not particularly relevant to departmental problems or national issues,
with the result that the various agencies often feel that it is an imposition
to be burdened with the responsibility for reviewing these documents, making
appropriate ocunents and noting concurrence or dissent.
The Office of Reports and Estimates also initiates more informal reports
by means of intelligence memoranda produced spontaneously or in answer to spe-
oific requests. These are not coordinated by circulation through the other
agencies. Subjects again differ widely and include such topics as "Soviet
Financing of the French Coal Strike"
Y
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Much of this production is academic, tends to duplicate work in other de-
partments, has little relation to national intelligence, and is not produced
as a recognized service of common concern. On the other hand, some of this
production might, subject to general agreement, be performed as a central com-
mon service. In our opinion, the newly constituted Research and Reports Divi-
sion should refrain from the production of essentially political studies and
miscellaneous reports and should concentrate its effort upon the production of
reports in those fields clearly assigned to it as recognized sorvices of com-
mon concern.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
Under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, the Central.
Intelligence Agency is charged with preparing an outline for tho National In-
telligence Survey -- an extensive series of basic studies on all countries and
areas of the world -- and with coordinating the necessary dopartmontal contribu-
tions. This study has been assigned to the Office of Reports and Estimates, not
as the producer, but rather as coordinator of the'program,undor specifications
and priorities approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This coordination
is achieved through the allocation of topics for research and production for
the particular purpose of the Survey series,but there is no provision for cen-
tralization or coordination of current production in these fields.
Under this series, various chapters and sections have boon farmed out to
the State Department,the Services, and other qualified agencios. For instance,
the Army has been assigned the responsibility for the sections on transportation
and communications. The assignment of these sections dries not mean that Army
is recognized as having either primary interest in or continuing responsibility
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for intelligence with respect to transportation and communications. For the
purpose only of the handbooks,the National Intelligence Survey eliminates dup-
lication of production in certain fields and provides temporary editorial
coordination of basic intelligence through the allocation of topics. It does
not solve the problem of centralizing or coordinating continuing research and
production in the fields of common interest.
ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE
The Office of Reports and Estimates appears to have made no serious attempt
to produce coordinated estimates or authoritative intelligence in the fields
of economic, technological and scientific intelligence, in which no department
is recognized as having a dominant interest. The six Geographic Branches, the
Scientific Branch and a number of the. Consultant Panels are variously. interested
in these fields but have seldom produced authoritative intelligence contribu-
tions therein. We have found in our examination of the Central Intelligence
Agency,State Department and the three Service intelligence agencies that there
is much duplication and little coordination of production on these subjects.
Although often along parallel lines, studies are independently produced by the
various agencies and do not, therefore, represent the-best available coordinated
opinion.
There has been an attempt in National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tive No. 3 to guide the effort of the various agencies into coordinated chan-
nels by the allocation of certain fields of dominant interest, but in the
fields of economic, scientific and technological intelligence, each agency is
authorized to produce in accordance with its needs. Thus, it is in these
fields, not left open to all agencies and for which responsibility is now
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divided and diffused, that the proposed Research and Reports Division could
perform a valuable service of connnon interest by centralizing or co.ordina',ing
research and intelligence production.
Our Service intelligence agencies have been assigned fieldscf dominant interest
and they will continue to produce military intelligence within their fields.
However, even if each intelligence
agency confines itself almost entirely to
the production of intelligence within its field of dominant interest, there
remains a vast area of common interest in such necessary supporting fields as
economic, scientific and technological intelligence.
The economic field could include, for examaple,industrial production, eco-
nomic resources, metall-urgy, fuels, power, communications and telecoammunications.
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.These are some of the subjects where there is present duplication among our
agencies and in which a great economy of effort and improvement of product
would result if intelligence were produced centrally.. We recognize that the
requirements of the various agencies in these matters of canon concern will
differ, and that each agency will need to adapt to its own particular problems
the intelligence produced in these fields. To provide an effective contribu-
tion, the centrally produced reports on economic and industrial matters must
represent the most authoritative coordinated opinion on the subject and must
be accepted as such by the various consumer agencies. A principal new consumer
would be the Estimates Group, recommended in the preceding chapter.
-Few aspects of intelligence are more important than the science and tech-
nology and yet little success has been achieved in this country toward coor-
dinating intelligence collection and production in these fields. Among the
agencies which are interested and in a position to.contribute are not only the
Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the three Services, but
also the Atomic Energy Commission and the Research and Development Board.*
We believe that there is an obvious need for more centralization of scien-
tific intelligence. Where centralization is not practical there should be the
closest coordination among the existing agencies through the use of committees
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such as the present interdepartmental atomic energy intelligence committee
which works in consultation with the Nuclear Energy Group of the Office of
Special Operations (See below, page ). A strong Scientific Branch, as'a com-
mon service within the Central Intelligence Agency, would be the logical focal
point for the coordination and appropriate centralization of scientific. intel-
ligence. There appears to be no overriding reason for the segregation of the
Nuclear Energy Group within the Office of Special Operations, and it would be
preferable to re-attach this Group to the Scientific Branch, even though some
insulation may be necessary for security reasons.*
To fulfill its responsibilities as the chief analytical and evaluating
unit for scientific intelligence, and consequently as the principal guide. for
collection, the Branch would have-to be staffed by scientists of the highest
qualifications. We appreciate that in such a Branch it would be impossible to
obtain a leading scientist for each of the many segments of scientific and tech-
nological intelligence, but we believe that a staff of moderate size and of
high quality can cope with the normal research and evaluation,co-opting, where
necessary, personnel from such organizations as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.
CONCLUSION$ AND RECOMMMATIONS
(1) In addition to the Estimates Group recommended in the previous Chapter,
there should be created out of the present Office. of Reports and Estimates a
Research and Reports Division, to accomplish central research in, and coor-
dinated production of, intelligence in fields of common interest. The staff
We understand that since this report was written steps have been taken to
create a separate Office of Scientific Intelligenc3 which is to include the
Nuclear Energy Group.
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of this Division should include sufficient representation frcan the State De-
partment and the Services to insure that their needs are adequately met.
(2) The Coordination Division (reconstituted Interdepartmental Coor-
dinating and Planning Staff) should be given the responsibility for studying
the actual scope of the Research and Reports Division and for recommending
those services of common concern which should be performed centrally.
(3) The propriety of the preparation by the Central Intelligence Agency
of essentially political summaries should be reviewed, taking into considera-
tion the need for such summaries, the existence of a number of duplicating
stmnnaries and the particular capabilities of the individual departments to
prepare them.
(4) The various reports, studies and summaries which are not national
intelligence or recognized services,of cammaon concern should be discontinued.
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CHAPTER IX
SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE CONDUCT OF SECRET OPERATIONS
RELATIONS BETWEEN SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET OPERATIONS
The collection of secret intelligence is closely related to the conduct
of secret operations in support of national policy. These operations, includ-
ing covert psychological warfare, clandestine political activity, sabotage and
guerrilla activity, have always been the companions of secret intelligence.
The two activities support each other and can be disassociated only to the
detriment of both. Effective secret intelligence is a prerequisite to sound
secret operations and, where security considerations permit, channels for
secret intelligence may also serve secret operations. On the other hand, al-
though the acquisition of intelligence is not the immediate objective of secret
operations, they may prove to be a most productive source of intelligence.
It was because of our views on the intimate relationship between these
two activities that we submitted our Interim Report No. 2, dated May 13, 194B,
"Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence," which was a
comment on proposals, then before the National Security Council, for the ini-
tiation of a program of secret operations. In that report we made the follow-
ing observations:
"In carrying out these special operations, the Director fo-f secret
Operation and his staff should have intimate knowledge of what is being
done in the field of secret intelligence and access to all the facilities
which may be built up through a properly constituted secret intelligence
network. Secret operations, particularly through
support
of resistance
groups, provide one of the most important sources of
secret
intelligence,
and the information gained from secret intelligence
must
immediately be
put to use in guiding and directing secret operations. In many cased it
is necessary to determine whether a particular agent or chain should
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primarily be used for secret intelligence or for secret operations, be-
cause the attempt to press both uses may endanger the security of each.
"The Allied experience in the carrying out of secret operations. and
secret intelligence during the last war has pointed up the close relation-
.ahin of the two F_ I
THE OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
The National Security Council in creating within the Central Intelligence
Agency, in accordance with Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act,
the Office of Special Projects (now known as the Office of Policy Coordination)
recognized these views to the extent that both secret intelligence and secret
operations were included within the same organization. However this action
did not go as far as we had recommended, with the result that the Office of
Policy Coordination (secret operations) and the Office of Special Operations
(secret intelligence) are not bound together by any special relationship and
operate as entirely separate Offices.
Although it is too early to appraise the accomplishments of the Office of
Policy Coordination which has been in existence only a few months, experience
has, in our opinion, already shown that the organizational relationship be-
tween it and the Office of Special Operations should be closer. Although the
problems with which the two Offices are concerned are so intimately related,
there is no arrangement for coordinating their operations under common direc-
tion except insofar as they are both under the Director of Central Intelligence.
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Even this relationship is weakened by the fact that NSC 10/2 creating the Of-
fice of Policy Coordination provides that "for purposes of security and of
flexibility of operations and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency,
the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components
of Central Intelligence Agency." Thus,complete separation was made mandatory.
The Office of Policy Coordination, whichis the only Office in the Central
Intelligence Agency created by direct order of the National Security: Council,
is also given a special position in that its charter provides that the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "insuring, through desig-
nated. representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense,
that covert operations a,'e planned and conducted in a manner consistent with
United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities" and
that disagreements between the Director and these representatives shall be re-
ferred to the National Security Council for decision. Furthermore, the Chief
of the Office of Policy Coordination can be appointed only upon nomination by
the Secretary of State and approval by the National Security Council.
In practice, the Office of Policy Coordination enjoys a position which
gives it direct ties to the Department of State and the National Military
Establishment and support from them not enjoyed by the Office of Special Opera-
tions. Consequently, the two activities which should be closely integrated
are in fact operating with different outside guidance and support, with dis-
similar charters, and they occupy a different status within the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
In our opinion, this situation is unsound. The close relationship between
these two activities, as pointed out above, needs to be recognized along with
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the fact that secret intelligence requires the same degree of control and sup-
port from the State Department and the Military Establishment as secret opera-
tions. As recommended in Chapters VII and VIII, we propose therefore that
these two activities be closely integrated (along with parts of the Office of
Operations) in a single Operations Division which would enjoy considerable au-
tonomy, in accordance with our over-all recommendations for changes in the
organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.
As we have stated above the operations of the Office of Policy Coordina-
tion have been so recently initiated that it is premature to comment upon them
in any detail. We believe, however, that the Assistant Director in charge of
the Office of Policy Coordination is proceeding wisely in building slowly in
this most difficult field.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The close relationship between covert intelligence and covert opera-
tions and the fact that the latter is related to intelligence affecting the
national security justifies the placing of the Office of Policy Coordination
within the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Office of Policy Coordination should be integrated with the other
covert Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, namely,the Office of Special
Operations, an and these
three operations should be under single over-all direction (Operations Divi-
sion) within the Central Intelligence Agency.
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The Foreign Documents Branch is engaged in completing its exploitation of
large quantities of materials captured during the recent war. In addition, it
monitors current press and periodical publications and besides these routine
translations it occasionally translates specific documents upon request. It
also maintains for the various consumer agencies a continuing program of
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abstracting from periodical publications specific materials in such fields as
electronics, transportation, etc.
There is a constant and large flow of production from the Foreign Docu-
ments Branch in the form of extracts from the foreign press; current periodical
abstracts, both general and technical, dealing with items of intelligence value
contained in Soviet and other foreign periodicals; an industrial card file rec-
ord-for inclusion in the Foreign Industrial Register of the Office of Collec-
tion and Dissemination; biographical intelligence reports; a bibliography of
Russian periodicals, special accession lists and various translations of cur-
rent material to meet continuing requirements.
Inasmuch as it is virtually impossible to have a large pool of expert
translators who are at the same time specialists in various fields, it is most
important that the work of an agency such as the Foreign Documents Branch be
performed in close relatio
Sumer agencies. It would
The preferable
for the Foreign Documents Branch to be a part of the.proposed. Research and
Reports Division suggested in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER X
THE DIRECTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
GENERAL APPRAISAL
We have reserved for this final chapter on the Central Intelligence Agency
the discussion of the post of Director. An appraisal of the qualifications
and achievements of the directing personnel is only possible in light of an
examination of the entire organization. Within the scope of his mandate under
the National Security Act, it is the Director who must guide the organization
to the attainment of its objectives, establish its operating policies and win
the confidence of other branches of the Government.
This is not an easy task. The Central Intelligence Agency has a diversi-
fied and difficult mission to perform. Its success depends, to a large extent,
on the support it receives from other agencies which may be ignorant of its
problems and suspicious of its prerogatives. It has peculiar administrative,
personnel and security problems and has to handle. complicated operating situa-
tions. Moreover, the pressure to build rapidly has been strong and there has
been little time in which to demonstrate substantial accomplishments.
We believe that these difficulties cannot alone explain the principal de-
ficiencies which,we have discussed in previous chapters. The directing staff
of the Central Intelligence Agency has not demonstrated an adequate under-
standing of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that
mandate effectively.
The duties of the Central Intelligence Agency in regard to the coordina-
tion of intelligence activities have not been fulfilled. The responsibility
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for the correlation of national intelligence has not been carried out in such
a manner as to provide the policy makers with coordinated national intelligence
estimates. Some activities are being carried out by the Central Intelligence
Agency which largely duplicate the work of other departments and agencies, and
there has been no adequate attempt to coordinate or centralize others. Gen-
erally speaking, satisfactory working relations have not been established with
other departments and agencies. Within the Central Intelligence Agency in-
adequate guidance as to the intelligence requirements of the Government, is
received from the Director. These deficiencies exist in spite of a broad stat-
utory mandate, reasonable appropriations and support from the National Security
Council.
Administrative policies within the Agency contribute to this situation.
The internal organization does not reflect an appreciation of the Agency's sev-
eral distinctive yet inter-related missions under the National Security Act:
In fact, the scheme of organization tends to blur and impede the performance
of the organization's essential intelligence functions under the Act. The
Directorate has given positions of pre-eminence to officials who are primarily
administrators yet exert policy control over the intelligence Offices without
being qualified to do so. There is little close consultation on intelligence
and policy matters between the various stratified levels. Although the heads
of the several Offices are allowed considerable latitude in conducting their
respective operations, they do not share substantially in the determination of
over-all policy.
THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN DIRECTION
We have also considered the question whether the Director ought to be a
civilian. While we recognize that the statute provides that he may be either
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t, () r~ 8ECR F;T
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civilian or military we have reached the conclusion that he should be a civil-
ian. We do not mean to exclude the possibility that a Service man may be se-
lected for the post but if this is done he should resign from active military
duty and thereafter work as a civilian. In such a case appropriate provision
should be made so that he does not lose his retirement benefits.
We have reached the conclusion that the Director should be civilian be-
cause we are convinced that continuity of tenure is essential and complete in-
dependence of service ties desirable for carrying out the duties of the Direc-
tor. The post cannot properly be filled as a more tour of duty between mili-
tary assignments. Unless there is such continuity of service and complete in-
dependence of action, the Director will not be able to build up the esprit de
corps, the technical efficiency, the loyalty of home staff and field workers,
which are essential to the success of the enterprise. We agree with the intent
of the provision of the National Security Act that the Director "shall-be sub-
ject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or oth-
erwise)" by the Service departments, but do not feel that this provision can
alone offset the disadvantages to which we have pointed.
It is inevitable that there should be rotation in the Service intelligence
agencies, though in recent years that rotation has been far too rapid in the
top ranks. However, in the Central Intelligence Agency there should be-sta-
bility and continuity of leadership.
Finally, we recommend a civilian Director because we believe that in work-
ing out a well balanced top echelon committee (the reconstituted Intelligence
Advisory Committee) for appraising and coordinating Government intelligence,
the strong, and properly strong, representation of the military intelligence
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Services on such a body should be balanced with an equally strong civilian
We have considered the argument that the Director of Central Intelligence,
because of the high security requirements of the post, should be a man perma-
nently devoted to Government service, amenable to the disciplines of the Serv-
ices and free of political ambitions or entanglements. We believe that the
qualifications of the Director of Central Intelligence, whether his past ex-
perience has been in civilian'life or in military or other Government service,
should be on so high a level that'there would be no more doubt as to the loyalty
and responsibility of the Director than of the Secretary of State or the Sec-
retary of Defense. In appointing the Director of Central Intelligence with the
responsibilities he must carry today, we must select a man to whom we would
willingly entrust any position of responsibility whatsoever in our Government.
(1) The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency has not dem-
onstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate of the organization or the
ability to discharge that mandate effectively.
(2) Administrative organization and policies tend to impede the carrying
out of the essential intelligence functions of the Central Intelligence Agency
under the Act.
(3) Continuity of service is essential for the successful carrying out
of the duties of Director of Central Intelligence.
(4) As the best hope for continuity of service and the greatest assur-
ance of independence of action a civilian should be Director of Central In-
telligence. If a Service man is selected for the poet he should resign from
active military duty.
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The Survey Group hag been primarily concerned with exining the structures,
In the sxAxiAation of ti.e Servie:e intelligence agencias, a tphasis ties been
stion, activities and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence
cod o}., their contribution to national intelligence and their relation to the
Central luteiligence Agexncy. On the basis of this stuudy, the Survey Group does not
t' q
egardia
administration or their r ethodu of collecting information. d producing intelligence..
onsibilities
The ,National Security Act, in providing for the ayateaatic coordination of
also safeguarded the role of the Services in intelligence by providing
in Section 102 (d) (3) treat "the) depsrtaente and other agencies of the Government
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlates and disseminate departmental int- 611i-
gence.* Subsequently, the National Security Council in Intelligence Directive No.
No. 9) defined departmental intelligence as etk t intelligence needed by
or independent Agency of the Federal Government, and the subordinate
units thereof, to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful reesponsibilitios."
The mission of the military services involves the enormous responsibility of
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the security of the United States. It is inouu=bent upon teem to produce
or obtain fro other agencies the . ntelligence necessary to fulfill this mission.
past this reeponeibility has been discharged to a large extent by the
8ervicea acting independently and without the benefit of systematic coordination,
Althqugh it is now ger era.lly reeco&iizsd that such coordination is ur ;eatly needed,
there is !:till, .w tendency on the part of the Services to strive to create -their
rte .ned s y s ?ten:s of intelligence.
This tendency
in part franc the military doctrine that
,ttion s : oc-rr i:ran~l a ~6"octr xie which has been irate
production
Liecestary intel3igec c* in the eta
o rec - ire the
or the coriander re
The doctrine so construed can only result In. an obviously unsatisfactory and
at self-sufficiency. As a matter of fact, at all tt `f levels
intell ence must be a4ple ;tinted by c