LETTER TO MR. M. F. CORREA FROM W. J. MCNEIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050048-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: May 3, 1948
• Content Type: LETTER

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
3 May 1948
PERSONAL
Dear Matt :
I am enclosing a memorandum on the proposed.
Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence, the
contents of which I thought would be of interest
to your committee making a study of C.I.A.
Sincerely,
Mr. M. F. Correa
Cahill, Gordon, Zachrey
& Reindel
63 Wall St.
New York, 5, N.Y.
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Iftop" OFFICE OF THE SECk ARY OF DEFENSE Noof
WASHINGTON
29 April 1948
iiriELIORMMUM FOR Mr. n.J. McNeil
SUBJECT: Proposed Joint Congressional Commission on Intelligence.
On April 21st, Representative Devitt of Minnesota proposed the creation
of a joint Congressional committee on intelligence, composed of three members
each from the Senate and House Committees of Foreign Relations, Armed Services
and Judiciary -- a total of 18 in all. Hearings of the Committee would be pri-
vate, except where by majority vote the Committee orders public hearings. The
Committee is charged "with the responsibility of making a continuing study of
the programs and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the In-
telligence Services of the Department of National Defense and the Department of
State. It is required to evaluate the operations of those agencies and to review
the progress achieved in the execution of their programs."
Representative Devitt stated that Admiral Hillenkoetter had told him "that
while he believes there is much merit to the independent position of his agency
in the field of Government, he feels somewhat at a loss for the lack of some
specific committee of the Congress to whom he can turn for confidential guidance
and counsel, and to whom he can resort for needed, changes in the legislative
operations of his agency."
I would like to point out what 1 consider to be serious objections to the
proposal:
1. "Evaluation of the operations of intelligence agencies" presupposes
special capacity on the part of the evaluators. Presumably they must
be possessed of substantial criteria against which the success of the
operations may be compared. Furthermore, they must be sufficiently
well versed professionally in intelligence to understand not only the
general nature but the detailed requirements of successful operation.
They must be without any question absolutely secure personally with a
thorough understanding of the implications of security breaches. Their
interest in the success of intelligence operations must be so single-
minded as to render unthinkable the use of their special knowledge for
any political advantage.
I submit it as unlikely that 18 members of Congress, from whatever
committee selected, could possess the necessary qualifications, if
indeed any one of them would do so. The constitution of the Committee
would inevitably change with some frequency and a good committee one
year might be a bad committee-the next.
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29 ~il 19)48
2. A major reason for placing CIA under the National Security Council was
to avoid the publicity which would be directed at its operations if it
were to stand out as a separate agency subject to normal Congressional
scrutiny. Its relations with Congress should be carried on through the
screen of the National Security Council, which of all Government agencies
should be in position to give the Director 'rconf idential guidance and
counsel." It is curious that the Director should feel.it necessary to
seek direct contact with Congress instead of recoiling from it and seeking
in all possible ways to avoid it for security reasons. In so far as possible
the Director of CIA should avoid becoming a figure of public interest in
order to devote his entire energies to directing the operations of his
agency. He should be protected from the constant strain of external,
amateur inquiry, and he should certainly protect his subordinates from
such inquiry.
3. I .old experience with the committee on atomic ener 25X1
posed committee on intelligence would b
l~pro-
ear a resew an ce , indicates
certain additional dangers ;n er
en
It is to be anticipated that some at l
east of the 18 committee members
would be irresistibly tempted to make use for political purposes of in-
formation available to them. The denial to them of operational informa-
tion on security grounds would almost certainly result in undesirable
disclosures for the sake of personal publicity or from a mistaken con-
ception of the public interest. It is not probable that any layman
could have sufficient judgment as to the implications of such disclosures
unless he were cognizant of the entire operation through integral associa-
tion with it.
5. It is likely that the Committee members would be subject to political
pressure on the part of important constituents to use the CIA as an informa-
tion gathering service for the benefit of the constituent. Historical
parallels of intelligence services of other nations would suggest a high
degree of possibility that this would be the case.
6. The functions of the proposed committee appear to duplicate the statutory
function of the National Security Council as regards CIA. Provision for
inclusion on the staff of the Executive Secretary of a small, professionally
qualified "buckling" staff for intelligence should obviate the necessity
for the 4ongressional Committee.
Stephen B.L. Penrose, Jr.
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