LETTER TO MR. DAVID M. KLAUS FROM JEANNE W. DAVIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 197
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 3, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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TIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C.? ZOSar..
Dear Mr. Klaus:
June 3, 1976
The NSC Staff has completed its review of your request for
a copy of the "Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report. " We appreciate
your patience in awaiting our response.
After consulting with other government agencies, we have
determined that, with the deletion of certain passages, this
report may be declassified and released and I am enclosing
a copy for your use.
.Certain passages contain information which remains classified
pursuant to criteria set forth in Executive Order 11652 and,
accordingly, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U. S. C.
522 (b)(1). In addition, the provisions of 5 U. S. C. 552 (b)(3)
would also apply to these passages pursuant to 50 U. S. C. 403 (d)(3)
and 50 U. S. C. 403 g. In some passages .5 U. S. C. 552 (b)(5) is
also applicable.
As you know, the NSC Staff decision to withhold certain portions
of this document may be appealed to the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs. Such an appeal should be addressed
to me as Staff Secretary of the National Security Council.
?Enclosure
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
Mr. David M. Klaus
Center for National Security Studies
122 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20002
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
and
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE.
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
. by
William H. Jackson
Mathias F. Correa
.-Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
I January 1949
SANITIZED VERSION
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN TIIE LiEAN-
1NG OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31
AND. 32 AS AMENDED. ITS 7-,'a 1rSI.IISSION
OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS
IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
January 15, 1949
National Security Council
.1aahineton, D. C. .
Attention: Mr. Sidney W. Souers
Executive Secretary
In accordance with the terms of the memorandum to the under
oignod from Mr. Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council, dated February 13, 1948, as supplemented by his
memorandum of March 17, 1948,* we submit herewith our report on "The
Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence."
On January 13, 1948, the National Security Council recommended to
the President that a group comprising individuals not in Government
service should make a "comprehensive, impartial, and objective survey of
the organization, activities, and personnel of the Central Intelligence
Agency." The group was asked to report to the Council its findings and
r@ commendations on the following matters;
"(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the present organi-
zational structure of CIA.
"(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.
"(c) The rolationohip of these activities to those of other
Departments and Agoncioa.
"(d). The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel."
As a result of this action, the present Survey Group was created and
the underaigncd appointod by the National Security Council with'the approval
Sao Annexes No. 1 and 2 for the texts of those two memoranda which
constitute the tormo of reference for this survey.
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io err..s o
Security Council wore communicated to the Group on February 13, 19!E8.
Following discuosiono with the undersigned regarding the scope of
the survey, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council,
with the approval of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and
Air Force, sent to the Survey Group on March 17, 1948, a second memo-
randum which constituted an extension of the scope of the survey as
originally set forth by the National Security Council. In particular,
the memorandum included the following provisions:
"The survey will comprise primarily a thorough and compre-
hensive examination of the structure, administration, activities
and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency
as outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council.
It will also include an examination of such intelligence activi-
ties of other Government Departin-ents and Agencies as relate to
the national security, in order to make recommendations for their
effective operation and over-all coordinatic _, Ei:bect to the
understanding that the Group will not engage in an actual physical
examination of departmental intelligence operations (a) outside
of Washington or (b) in the collection of colunicationo intelli-
gence. On behalf of the National Security Council, I will under-
take to seek the cooperation in this survey of those Government
Departments and Agencies not represented on the Council which have
an interest in intelligence as relates to national security.
-was
"It should be understood that the Survey of the Central
Intelligence Agency and its rolationahip to other Departments and
Agencies will be done for and with the authority of the National
Security Council. The survey of the intolligence activities of
the Departments of State, Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
however, will be for and with the authority of the respective
heads of thoco Departments."
It was also provided that the Survey Group should submit from time
to timo recommendations 'on? individuaLls problems, and that problems con-
corning the Contrail. Intolliron.co Agency should be given priority over
thooo involving other agencies,
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The Survey Group hau submitted two opocir,l roporto to the National
Security Council,cuuch one in connection with particular problemn boinj3
conoidorol by the Council and its members.
The second interim report, dated May 13, 191+8, do alt
with the "Relations Between Secrot Operations and Secret Intelligence."
The present report is based on'an examination and appraisal of our
national intelligence structure and operations as created by the National
Security Act of 191+7 and developed in the Central Intelligence Agency and
the individual departments and agencies concerned with national security.
In accordance with the directive from the National Security Council,
emphasis has been placed upon the Central'Intelligence Agency, but there
has also been an examination of the principal doZartmental intelligence
-agencies in order to determine their scope in the field of intelligence,
and their relations to each other and to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Our examination has been confined almost entirely to the over-all intelli-
gence organization and activities in the Washington headquarters of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State, Army, Navy and
Air Force.
We have met with members of the directorate and personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency and with representatives of other agencies.
With the assistance of our staff, we have conoultod approximately 300
persons who by virtue of their prevent position or past oxperionco are
familiar with intolligonco problems. In addition, a series of confor-
oncoa were hold at which officials of all of the intelligence agencies
wore invited to submit thoir.recommendations and suggestions and discuss
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ces wore?attoncod by representative
fere
s
n
the.;. with the Group.. Thuoo con
iron t ho Dopartmonto of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the joint Staff,
Rooearch and Devolop:acnt hoard and Atonic Energy Co::%?nission.
In concluoion, we desire to record our appreciation for tho effective
work of the staff members of the Survey Group, Robert Blum, Joseph Larocquo,
Jr., Wallace A. Sprague and Edward L. Saxe, in assembling data with regard
to our national intelligence organization and in assisting the members of
the Survey Group in carrying out the examination of our intelligence
structure on which this report is based.
Faithfully yours,
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
_ '2raathias F. Correa
? William H. Jackson
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.TABL OF CONTENTS
Lotter of Tranarnittal
Suansry. . .. ? ? ??S ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Chapter I Introduction: The Intelligence'Problom in the
United States . . . . . . 13
Chapter II National Intelligence and the National Security
Act of 1947 . ? . . . . . . . ? . . . . ? ? . . . 21
The Duties of the Central Intelligence
Agency under the National Security Act ? 21
Control over the Central Intelligence Agency 24
The General Mission of the Central Intelligence
Agency . . . . . . ? . . ? . . ? ? . ? . . . 26
Conclusions and Rocorzendations. '27
Chapter III The Organization and Administration of the
Central intelligence Agency . ? ?:,? ? 29
Organization 29
Administration . . . . . . . . 32
Budget . .
Security . . .
Personnel. ? ?, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Conclusions and Rocomnondations. . . . .
33
34
. 36
38
Chapter IV The Responsibility of.the Central Intelligence
Agency for the Coordination of Intelligence
Activities. ? . . 41
The Statutory Provisions 41
The Organization and Operation of the Machinery
?
r ? ' ?
for Coordination 4
Intolligonco Advisory Co:nnittoo. ? . . ? ??? 43
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 Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff . . . . . . . . . . . .. 46
Office of Collection and Dissc.Wlnation . . . . . 48
National Security Council Intelligence
Directives . . . . ? . . . ? . w . . . . . . 50
The Degree of Coordination Achieved. . . . . . 55
Scientific Intelligence. 55
Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
Affecting the National Security. . . . . . . . . 56
Communications Intelligence... . 58.
Proposals for Improved Coordination. . . . . . 60
Chapter
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The Organization and Activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency for the Production of Na-
tional Intelligence.. . . .'.. . . . .
Proposals for Improving the Production of Na-
Conclusions and Reco:mm-endations. . . ? . ? ? ? 63
The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for National Intelligence Estimates. . . . .' 65
The Mandate under the National Security
Act and the Directives . . 65
The Concept of National Intelligence Estimates . 68
end Reports . . . .
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ?
Proposed Research and Reports Division . . . . .
Periodical Su"lua Ties . . . . . . ? . ? ? ? . ? ?
83
83
84
Mioccllanoous Reports and Memoranda. . . . . . 86
Tho Natiowil Intelligence Survey . . . . 87
tional Estimates 76
Conclusions and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . 81
Chapter Z'I Services of Common Concorri: Intelligence Research
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Economic, Scientific itnd Tochnological
Intoll1Fenco . . . . . . . . 88
Conclusions and Recom:nond:atione . . . . . . 91
Chapter VII Sorvicce of Car_inon Concern: Tho Collection of
Overt Intelligence 93
Contact Branch . . . . . . . 93
Foreign. Broadcast Information Branch . . ? . . 101
Foreign Documonts Branch . . ? . . . . . . . . . 103
Conclusions and Recommendations, . . . . ? . ? 104
Chapter VIII Services of Common Concern: The Collection of
Secret Intelligence 107
The Charter of the Central Intelligence Agency
to Conduct Secret Intelligence Activities 108
Organization of the Office of. Special
Operations . . . ' : 110
Field Activities of Covert Intelligence 117
Security of Secret Intelligence Activities . 122
Counter-Espionage. ? . . . . . . . . . . . 121+
Communications Intelligence. . . ? ? ? ? 126
The Need for Policy Direction of Secret
Intelligence ? ' ? ._ 127
General Appraisals ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? . 128
Conclusions and Recommendations. . . . . . ? ? ? 129
Chapter IX Services of Common Corncorn: Tho Conduct of
Secret Operations ? . ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 131
Relations between Secret Intelligence and
Secret Operations 131
The Office of. Polity Coordination . . ? . ? 132
Conclusiona and Roconwi ndations 131E
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Chapter X
Chapter XI
The Direction of the Central Int.c:lligonco Agency
135
Gonoral Appraisal
135
Tha Question of Civilian Direction . . . . .
136
Conclusions and Recommendations.. . . . .
13$
The Service Intelligence Agencies . . . . .
139
Mission and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . .
139
Coordination of Service Intelligence Agencies
1411
The Status of Intelligence in the Services'
146
Conclusions and Recommendations .
149
Chapter XII
The Intelligence Functions of the Department
of State
151
The Research and Intelligence Staff . .
152
.Intelligence Relations between the State
Department and. Outside ",,sonic . . . . . . ?
157
Conclusions and Recommendations . . .
161
Chapter XIII
Conclusion
163
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ANNEXES
Page
Survey Group Terms of Reference (I): 1.icmorandum dated
Fobruary 13, 19243, from Sidney W. Soucrs, Exocutivo
Secretary, Naticnal Security Council. . . . . . . . . . . 165
2. Survey Group T4rmo of Roforonco (II): Memorandum dated.
March 17, 191;6, from Sidnoy W. Soucro, Executive Secre-
tary, National Security Council 167
3. Presidential letter dated January 22, 1946, creating the
Central Intolligonco Group. . ? 169
Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. ... . 171
Chart: Central Intelligence Agency Organization as of
January 1, 1949 . . . . . . . .
Table: Personnel Strength of Central Intelligence Agency,,
as of December 24, 1948 . . .0 . . ? . . . . . so ? . .
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1:
"Duties 'and. Responsibilities"
Nationa? Seca: ity Council Intelligence Directive No. 2:
"Coordination of Collection Activities.Abroad". . . . .
173
.174
175
178
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3:
"Coordination of Intelligence Production. . . . . . .
185
12. National Security Council Intolligonco Directive No. 6: .
"Foreign Wiroleco and Radio Monitoring" . 186.
10. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4:
"National Intelligence Obj'ectlves". . . .
3.1. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5:
"Espionage and Counter-Eopionago Operations". . . . . ,
111. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 8:
"Biographical Data
13. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7:
".Domestic Exploitation" . . . . . . . 187
3.5. National Security Council Into11igonco Directive No. 9:
of Con;raunicationci Intolligonco. . . . . ? ? '. . . . . . . . 191
Xi
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SUMMARY
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The primary object of this survey has boon the Central Intelligence Agency,
its organization and activities, and the rolationrhip of thooo activities to
the Intolligonco work of other Govern:nont agencies. Examination has been nmdo
of these other intelligence agcncios only to the extent that their activities
boar upon the carrying out by the Central Intolligenco Agency of its assigned
Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947 creates the Central
Intelligence Agency as an independent agency under the direction of the National
Security Council.. It gives to the Council broad powers in the assignment of
functions to the Central Intelligence Agency and creates a framework upon which
a sound intelligence system can be built. The-Central Intelligence Agency has
.been properly placed under the National Security Council for the effective
carrying out of its assigned function. It should, however, be empowered and
encouraged to establish, through its Director, closer liaison with the two
members of the National Security Council on -whom it chiefly depends en0 who
should be the main recipients of its product--the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense.
? The National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the National
Security Council, imposes upon the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility
for carrying put throe essential functions:
(1) The coordination of intelligence activities,
(2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the na-
tioxral security, which has boon interpreted by diroctivo as moaning the produc-
tion of national intelligence;
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(3) The porformi nco centrally of certain intelligence oorvicou of common
concern. These include services of a static nature, such as research in fields
of co on usefulness, and operational services such au the collection through
the central agency of secret intelligence.
Theso?three functions constitute the basis of an integrated system of in-
telligence and they have been used as the frame of reference for the examina-
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency and the related activities of other in-
tollig nco agencies of the Government represented on the National Security
Council, particularly the Department of State and the Departments in the Na-
tional I4ilitary Establishment.
No amendment to the provision of the Act relating to intelligence is re-
quiredat this time. What is needed is action to give. effect to its true intent.
THE i SAOI;SZ6]ZITY OF THE CLIIaT1?AL fl TELLICHrIICE AGEPICY FOR COORDIMATBIG I NTEL-
LI INCE ACP IYIT ES
Under the statute, the Central Intelligence Agency has broad responsibility
to coordinate intelligence activities relating to the national security. In
the discharge of this responsibility, the Central Intelligence Agency should
review the intelligence field and ascertain where there are gaps or overlaps.
The agency best equipped to do a particular job should fill any gaps. Where
two or more- agencies are doing similar work, the one boat equipped 'ought to
carry on the Job, and the others drop out or their efforts be coordinated.
This vitally important rooponoibility,for coordination is to be oxcrcisod
by rocoitnonding directives for approval by the National Security Council. The.
Central Intollige co Agency hnu the duty of planning for coordination and., in
row'-
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consultation with the other intelligc:nco aj oncion, of taking the initiativo in
cooking diroctivos to offcct it. Today thin coordinating function of the
Contra). Intol.ligenco Agency is not being adequately exorcised.
To assist it in carrying out this task the Central Intelligence Agency
has available the Intelligence Advisory Corsaittoe. This group includes the
,Director of Central Intelligence as chairman, the the heads of the intelligence
staffs of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
A number of formal directives for the coordination of intelligence activi-
ties have been issued by the National Security Council upon the reco aendation
.of ;the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Cozmnittee.
These directives, except those specifically assigning to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency the -carrying out of certain common services described below, have
not gone far enough in defining the scope and limits of departmental intelli-
gence activities. These activities continue to present many of the same juris-
dictional conflicts and duplication which the National Security Act was in-
tended to eliminate. Consequently, the absence of coordinated intelligence
planning, as between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service agencies and
the State Department, remains serious. What is needed is continuing 'and effec-
tive coordinating action under existing directives and also directives estab-
lishing more precisely the responsibility of the various intolligonco agencies.
The field of ccfontific and tochnological intolligonco is an example of
lack of coordination. Beoponoibilitioa are scattered, collection offorte
are uncoordinatod, atomic onorgy intolligoiico is divorcod from scientific
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intolligonco generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at
authoritative intelligence estimates in the scientific field, with the poo;siblo
exception of atomic onerry matters.
Another important oxa:epl.e of lack of coordination is in the field of do-
mostic intolligcnco and counter-intelligonco relating to the national security.
Jurisdiction over countor-intolligenco and countor-ocspionage activities is as-
signed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States and the Con-
tral Into lligonce Agency abroad. i?owever, fifth column activities and espionage
do not begin or end at our goographical frontiers, and our intelligence to coun-
ter them cannot be sharply divided on any such geographical basis. In order
to meet the specific problem presented by the need for coordination of activ-
ities in the field of domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating
to the national security, it is recommended that the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation be made a permanent member of the. Intelligence Advisory
Committee.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee so far has had little impact on the
solution of the problem of coordination, except in formally approving proposed
directives. It should be re-activated and called upon to play an important
role.
To assist tho Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his duties
to plan for the coordination of intelligence, the staff in the Central Intel-
ligonco Agency known as the Intordopartzmontal Coordinating and Planning Staff
should be roconotitutod and strengthened. It should be composed of personnel
definitely assigned to, and roe3ponsiblo to, the Director of Central Intolli-
gonco and charged, on a full-time basin, with carrying on continuous planning
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for the coordination of c1ocific intolligenco activities. This stid"f, which
might be called the "Coordination Division," should support. the Director in
fulfilling one of his most important and difficult duties under the National
Security Act.
In concluding the considoration of this moot vital problem of coordination
of intelligence activities, it should be eaphanizod that coordination can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies. With
the right measure of leadership on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency,
a major degree of coordination can be accomplichod in that manner.
THE RESPONSDILITY OF TH CMtTR1L, IrFrELLIGENCE AGETtCY FOR TIE PRODUCTION OF
ThTELLIGENCE RELATII TO TED, 1 ATIOT:AL CURITY
A long-felt need for the coordination, on the highest level, of intelli-
gence opinion relating to broad aspects of national policy and national security
'was probably the principal moving factor in bringing about the creation of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The lack of any provisicn for the prompt produc-
tion of coordinated national intelligence of this kind eras one of the most
significant causes of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure.
This typo of national intelligence, expressed in the form of coordinated
national estimntoo, transcends in scope and breadth the interest'and compe-
tonco of any single intolligonco agency. Hence, such estimates should be fully
participated in by all of the principal intelligence agencies. All jointly
should share in the responsibility for them.
With one or two significant oxcoptionu, whose occurrence was largely for-
tuitouc, the Central Intolligonco Agency hao. not as yet -effectively carried
out this moat important function.
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'i?io Office of Reports and Eotirn tuo in the Contral Intelligence Agency
guc given reopon3ibil.ity for production of national intelligence. It has,
however, been concerned with a wide variety of activities and. with the produc-
tion of miscellanooue roporto and thun,zriea which by no atrotch of the imagi-
uatiori could be conciderod national estiriates.
Where the Office of Reports and Eatitnnteo produces estimates, it usually
dodo so on the basic of its own research and analysis and offers its product
as competitive with the similar product of other agencies, rather than as the
coordinated result of the beat intelligence product which each of the . interooted
agoncios is able to contribute.
The failure of this type of intelligence product to meet the requirements
of a coordinated national estinato is not substantially mi.tig~ted by the exist-
ing procedure whereby the Office of Reports and Ectinatas circulates its esti-
mates. to the intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and ob-
tains a formal notation of dissent or concurrence. Under this procedure, none
of the agencies regards itself an a full participant contributing to a truly
national estimate and accepting a share in the responnibility for it.
It is believed that this situation can be remedied if the Central Intel-
ligenco Agency recognizes the responoibility whichithas under the statute and
aesumos the leadership in organizing its own work and in drawing upon that of the
other intolligonco agoncios of Government for the production of coordinated intel-
ligonce. Thus, within Ito own organization, the Central Intelligence Agency
should have, in lieu of the present Office of foporto and Estimates, a small
group of specialisto. which might appropri.atolybo called "Estir'uites Diviai.on."
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It would be the task of this group to review the intelligence products of other
intelligence u.ncioo and of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to prepare
drafts of national intolligenco estimates for consideration by tho Intelligence
Advisory Coi.ttoo.
The final process of coordination should take place in the Intelligonco
Advisory Commi.tteo which would review and discuss the proposed estimates. The
finished estimate should be clearly established as the product of all of the
contributing agencies in which all share -and for which all take responsibility.
It should be recognized as the most authoritative estimate available to the
policy-makers.
Where particular scientific ortochnical intelligence matters are involved,
the Intelligence Advisory Committee should secure the views of the best quail-
Tied technical exports available to them, including exports from the Research
and Development Board and the Atomic Energy Coixeission.
There should also be provision 'or the prompt handling of major emergency
situations so that, as a matter of course, when quick estimates are required,
there is immodiato consultation and collective appraisal by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee on the basis of all available information.
The inclusion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a permanent member
should assure that intelligence estimates will be made in the light of domestic
as veil as forcdig~i intelligence. Provision should be raido for the representa-
tion on the.Intolligonco Advisory Co=ittoo of other agoncioo of the Government
upon rittoro vithin their coinpotonco are under discussion,
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1001ORMAI;CE CE"ITRA1LY OIL MIMES OF COM"1?;ON CO1111Cia l
Under the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency should
perform, for the. benefit of- the existing intolligonco agcncioe, such services
of comuon concern as may.bo assigned to it by tho National Security Council.
These serricos, as now being performed by the Central Intelligence Agency,
can bo broken down into (1) static services, consisting of intelligence research
and production on certain assigned subjects which do not fall exclusively within
the function of any one existing intelligence agency, and (2) operating serv-
ices, consisting of certain types of intelligence collection and related secret
operations.
STATIC SERVICES OF C01 ,1240N CONCERN
At the present time the static services of intelligence research and re-
porting are carried out in the Office of Reports and Estimates. If the duties
of this Office in relation to the production of national intelligence are as-
signed to a newly constituted Estirntes.Division, the miscellaneous reporting
functions presently carried out by the Office of Reports and Estimates and a
part at least of the personnel engaged in them could be reconstituted as the
nucleus of a eoparato division of the Central Intelligence Agency to be known
as the "research and Reports Division." This Division would also include the
Foreign Documents. Branch of the Office of Operations and the various reference
and library functions now carried on in the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
The oconomic, ociontific and tocinzological fields are ones in which all of
Our intolligonco agencies have varying degrees of intoroct. At the prosont
time there is serious duplication in those fields of corron concern. Central
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production raid coordination by the propoood Roooarch and Reports Diviaion,
would result in gruat ocono: v of effort anti irrprovcnicnt of the product. For
oxri:hplo, the orGani.zation within this division of a scientific branch, staffed
by highly qualified personnel and oiripoworod to draw upon the scientific por-
sonnal of such organizations of Government as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Fnor3y Comi.ssion
for the purpose of dealing with. spo-
cialized scientific problems, is a project which should have the highost
priority.
This division of the Central Intelligence Agency should be staff od in part.
by representatives of the departmental intolli8ence, services so that the reports
produced would roprooont authoritative and coordinated opinion and be accepted
as such by the various consumer agencies.
The Diroctorta plying staff for coordination of activities, the proposed
Coordination Division, should revieyr the question as to what subjects might
appropriately be assigned to the now Research and. Reports Division for central
research and report and what services now centrally performed in the Cor_+,ral
Intelligence Agency night be eliminated., The Intelligence Advisory CoTmnitteo
would be the agency to determine the allocation of work, and in case of any
failure to agree the matter would be referred to the National Security Council.
OPI RATf;'G SEIWI ?iS OF C0: I.MON CON CEIM
The operating sorvicoa of common concorn prosoritly performed by the Central
Intelligence Agoncy consist of the collection, through the Office of Operations,
of cortain typos of intelligence in the United Status i.o., intelligence from
private lndividurala, firms, educational and -scientific Institutions, etc. ; the
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col.loction of eocrct intolligcnco abroad through the Office of Special Opora-
tion.i; and the conduct of cocrot oporatione abroad through tho Office of Policy
Coordination.
All of thocc services are appropriately allocated to the Central Intolli-
Bence Agency. Thoso opcraatin functions are so intor-related, and inter-
dependent that they should have co=on direction at somo point below the Diroc-
tor'of Central Intolligonco.
In its'cocrot intelligence work, tho Office of Special Operations roquiros
a clo,or linicon with the other intolligonco i goncioo, oopacially thono of the
lei 1 it:try Corvice3 and of tho State Dopau?tinont which are Ito chief conotunu,r^
H)
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and wrS.ch uhoula be ablo to Guido itn co.i loction efforts moro effectively than
t` ,.~? do at present. The cc?uattor-?intelligence function of the Office of Spocial
Oporationo roquiroo more cimphaaio and there is nood for hotter coordination.of
all Its activitioo with the military, particularly in the. occupied areas.
M O! GAIli74ATION AIM D , TION 0? TflE Ck ITRAL IYALLICENCE AG .:;CY
The principal defect of the Central Intelligence Agency is that Its direc-
tion, administrative organization and performance do not show sufficient ali-
preciation of tho Agency' s assigned functions, particularly in the fields of
intolligcnco coordination and the production of intelligence estimates. The
rosult has been that the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to become dust
one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in competition with older
established agencies of the Government departaents.
$inco it Is the task of the Director to see that the Agency carries out
its assignod functions, the failure to do so is necessarily a reflection of
inadoquacios of direction.
There is one over-all point to be made with respect to the adm.iniotration
of the Central Ixtolligonco Agency. The organ.izaticri is over-administored in
the sense that adminiotrativo considerations have been allowed to guide and,
on occasion, oven control intelligence policy to the detriment of the latter.
Under the d=ango::onts proposed in this report, the heads of the newly consti-
tutod Coordination, l!.utima,too, ponoarch and floports, and Oporatione Divisions
'would be included In tho iamodiato staff of the Director. In this way the
Directoa~, who at present relies chiefly on his adnsinistrativo staff, would
be brought into inti:?.ato contact with the day-to-'daY oporaationo of his agency
and bo able to givo policy 'gpildmico to thom..
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In co.': 1ontinL on adra+.riic,tration, the question of security should al?o be
stres:red. The Director is charged under the; law with protoctiIi? intelligence
sources c rd methods from unauthorized disclosure. Ono of the best methods of
achieving this is to correct the presort situation where the Agency is viewed
and generally publicized as the collector of secret intelligence and to bury
its secret functions within a Central Intelligence Agency whose chief recog-
nized activities are the coordination of intelligence and the production of
intelligence estintea.
In reviewing the work of the directorate, consideration has been given to
the question whether or not the Director should be a civilian. The work of
the Agency, from its very nature, requires continuity in that office which is
not likely to be achieved if a military man holds the post on a "tour of duty",
basis. For this reason, as well as because freedom from Service ties is de-
sirable, the Director should be a civilian. This recoi.endation does not ex
elude the possibility that the post might be held by a military man who has
severed his connection with the Service by retirement.
THE SE!WICE INTELLIGE CE AGINCDS AND TIIE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF TEE STATE
Dk PAFT2? U
The Service intelligence agencies and the Intelligence -orgmization of
the State Department have been reviewed from the point of view of the over-all
coordination of intelligence and of the contribution which Those agencies
should make to the ascembly and production of national intelligence.
As regards the Sorvico intolligonco agoncios, the active exercise by the
Central Intelligonco Agency of Its coordinating functions should rosult in a
more oi'ficient allocation of effort than is proaorit]y t.he'case.
The Survicc
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quostionn, leaving the Central In tolligonco it cncy to perform agreed contral
norvicou of common interact. In addition,* caritinuing rosponsibility of tho
Central Intelligence Ag ncy for coordination should be exorcised with respect
to certain Service activities, for oxamplo, espionage and countor-oapionago in
occupied areas. The Joint Intelligence Committee would continue to operate
with its membership unchanged and would concern itself exclusively with mili-
tary and strategic questions as directed by the Joint Chiefs, of Staff. The
Services would participate in the formulation of national intelligence esti-
mates through their membership in the Intelligence Advisory Comnittoo and would
share in the collective responsibility for these estimates.
In the case of the Research and Intelligence staff cf the State Department,
designated as its Intelligence Officer to coordinate these activities, to act
the conclusion has been reached that this staff, as at present constituted, is
not sufficiently close to operation end: policy matters in the Dopa rL:aont to
furiiah the necessary liaison or the political intelligence estimates required
by the Central Intelligence Agency for the preparation of national estimates.
Accordingly, it is desirable that a high official of the State Department be
as the D?partment's representative on the Intelligence Advisory Committee and,
in general, to act an liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency with respect
to the intolligonco and related activities of the two agencies and to develop
close working relations between them.
V%ilo organization charts con never replace individual initiative and
tab ]amity, the Control Intelligence Agoncy, reorganized along the functional
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lines indicutcd in this report, should be able more offoctivoly to carry out
the duties anoignod it by law and time bring our over-all intolligonco oyotom
closer to that point of officioncy which the national security demands.
The foregoing aum.:m%ry is only. a brief outline of the rain points of the
report and does not take the place of the detailed discussion in the report
and the various conclusions and recommendations at the close of the respective
chapters.
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J
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
Before considering the adequacy and effectiveness of the work of the
Central Intelligence A.Soncy and its relations to our other intelligence? agon-
Gies, a brief word of background may be helpful..
Although the Central Intelligence. Agency is largely an outgrowth of our
experience in World War II, it would be wrong to proceed from the premise that
prior to the war our Government had operated without intelligence as to the
capabilities and intentions of possible enemies or prospective allies. The
Department of State had long maintained a widespread information - gathering
service. The Army, the Davy and certain other departments of the Government
had maintained their o,.m. systems of collecting _-inforwation and producing
intelligence.
Prior to World War II, however, we had no integrated secret intelligence
service. We had not adequately exploited the available sources of overt in-
telligence. We had no central agency to coordinate intelligence collection
and production, and to assemble the best available intelligence for expression
in national estimates to guide -in the formulation -of foreign policy and the
preparation of our defense plans.
In World Wars I and II our European Allies, Groat Britain in particular,
had placed the product of their intolligenco sorvicos largely at our disposal.
While we can expect in the future assistance from the intolligonco services of
friends and allies, we have rightly concluded that we should not depend on
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15
 tl:ain for our intoll.igonco to the extent we were foiccd to. do in World War I
and during the early days of World. War II.
It was World War II which showed both our doficioncies in intelligence
and also what we could accomplish under pressure. Through the expansion of
the facilities of the State Dopartment and the military services, through' the
Office of Strategic Services -- our first move towards a central intelligence
agency -- through enlisting the best porsonnol that could be found, in and out
of Govorrnont service, we were turning out a very crQditablo porformance in
many phases of intelligence work well before the end of thy: war.
We nov recognizo that if wo are to have adequate intelligence in times of
crisis, we must prepare in time of peace, an& we have seriously turned to the
task of building up a central intelligence organization. The country has now
accepted the verdict, even if somewhat reluctantly,. that peace-time intelli-
gence is essential to security and, as many of our military leaders have said,
our first line of defense. It took us a long time to reach this conclusion,
and we are only now gradually getting'ovor our suspicions of intelligence a,:.1
our tendency to confuse it with more intrigue and the more lurid side of' es-
pionage. We are beginning to accept it as serious and honorable work arA eason-
'tial to our defense.
It is well to rocognizc} however, that an efficient intelligence organiza-
tion cannot be built overnight.
It will roquiro yoars of patient work to provide skillod poroonnol to do
the Job. Bluojn'ints and organization charts, oven legislation and ample appro-
priutiona will not take the place of coinpotont and hlglily.trainod mon and
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 vomcn. Without then we shall have ncith].
Security Council or upon implemontir, directives. Thoco actions aro prepared
for the Cor--aittoo by the Intordoprxtnonta.l Coordinating and Planning Staff and
the Ccumittoo'o oven Standing Conmi.ttoo of departmental representatives. The
Corittoo has mot only infrequently and has had little to do with the continu-
ing coordination of intelligence activities or with the preparation of coordi-
nated intelligence oatimatea.* This situation iaprobably duo to a combination
of circumstances, including the failure of the Director to appreciate the
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for bringing about coordina-
tion, lack of mutual confidence among the departments and the Central Intolli-
genceAgency anda general failure to understand how a coordinated intelligence
system can be brought about.
The conception of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is sound. It is
sound because interdepartmental coordination in such a complicated field as
intelligence cannot be achieved solely by directives and 'without the fullest
cooperation of the interested departments. It requires frequent consultation
and continuing collaboration on all important questions. The Intelligence
Advisory Committee should be the medium for accccmpliching this, but it 'will
not succeed if it continuos to moot only iriftrequantly, and avoids sorious
grappling. with intolligonco problems and continuous consultation on quostions
;On this nub joct, 1noo Chaptor V and particularly patgo 75 whore there is a dia-
encoien of the nd hoc committoo cot up in march, 1948.
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COOIMINA ;G AND PLAX[III ND LTA1T (ICAI'S)
This was not up as a staff unit of the Director of Central Intelligence
to assist him in his responsibilities for the coordination of intolligonco ac-
tivitioc. Its mombors are roprenontativos nom..ino.tod by the intelligence or-
ganizations of the State, Ar y, Navy and Air Force Departments; the senior
State Dopsr1zont representative is the Chairman of the group.
The assigned tack of IC,APS is to review the intelligence activities. of
the Covornmont, and assist tho. Director in initiating measures of coordination
for rocs ondation to the National Security Council. In order to accomplish
this mission effectively, it should have intimate knowledge of the organiza-
tions, responsibilities, activities and priorities of the various intelligence
agencies. Actually, its achievements reflect inadoquate knowledge of these
subjects and failure to appreciate the breadth of the responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency for coordination of intelligence activities.
ICAPS has 'been largely concerned with the coordination of intelligence
activities by assisting in the preparation of the nine National Security Council
Xntolligonce Directives and the four implementing. directives of the Director
of Central Intelligence.
It was originally expected that ICAPS would act as the secrotariat
or working staff for the Intelligence Advisory Com i.ttee, but owing in part to
the infrocluont meetings of the Committee, this has not happened. Moreover,
thorn has been confusion botwoon the functions of ICAPS and those of the
Standing Ceimittoo comprising roprooontativoo from the staffs of the mombors
of the Litolligonco Advisory Coamiittoo, srith the romzlt that rooponnibilitioc
to diyidod and unclear. rioreovor, the status of the movibo.rs of ICAI'S has boon
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was 1 ri
15op
roved erY~ialugvg20~ 9P 3 ?
ambiguo ll G'.LUElU
Mnxily a staff of the Director of Contral Intolligonco or a committee ropro-
sonti.. the rzombor egoncioo. This has loft the. group with divided loyalties
and uncertainty an to its mrlindate.
The. position of ICAi'S has been rendorod more difficult because its members
have boon given oporatin;y responsibilities which are not only unrelated to
their primary taok of assisting to formulate plans for the coordinating of in-
telligence, but are responsibilities which seem to bolong more properly to the
operating branches of the Central IntolliGonce Agency. Thus, one member of
the staff serves as the full-time liaison officer with the Joint Intelligence
Group of the Joint Staff. This is purely an..intolligunce research and report-
ing function in which the Office of Reports and Estimates has almost exclusive
interest. Moreover, the official liaison officer f'rontho Central intelligence
Agency to the Rational Security Council staff is the Chairman of ICAPS. This
function also concerns matters affecting primarily the Office of Reports and
Estimates and, in fact, a representative from that Office now also works with
.the I,ational Security Council staff.
In these and other ways ICAPS. has acquired operating rather. than planning
functions and has become, to some extent, a buffer between the operating parts
of the Central Intolligouco Agency and outside agencies. In carrying out both
.its planning and operating functions, it is not in close touch with the intol-
ligonco branches of the Central IntelliGonco Agency. There are numerous com-
plaints thatitionot only failing to carry out its own mission properly, but is
aoturally imlpoding the other parts of the Central Intelligence Agency in carry-
in out thuirs,
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 :Th gone pf o#@dhFrigC @~~ei4flA3/ Aa C"7 ? i ~2giaQa ~~ c oxPoz: -
junco with problcnn of intolliL;onco orgrunizaLtiori is not extensive, and lucking
a clear and firm mandate, has failed to undortako a broad and effective pro-
gram of coordination of intolligenco activities. It has boon allowed to die-
sipato its onergica in activities for which it is not suited and to neglect its
pr r. ?y decien. It has not given the impression within the Central Intolli-
gonco Agency or outr:id? that it graapo the nature of the responsibility for
coordination of intolligenco activities ''which is imposed upon the Central
Intol11Genco Agency by the National Security Act.
OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISS:. Mf ATION
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines three functions, only
one of which is directly related to the task of coordinating intelligence
activities.
In the first place, it acts as a service organization for the other Of-
fices of the Central Intelligence Agency by procuring intelligence data from.
other agencies andby dioeominnting to thoso agencies the intelligence collected
or produced by those offices. Its second task is the provision of certain
services of co=on concern for the benefit of the Central Intelligence Agency
and other agencies. These include the maintenance of an intelligence library
and of curtain central rogintors and indices.
Finally, the Office of Collection and Disaomination performs certain co-
ordinating funotions with rospoct to the collection of intolligonco. It proe-
vsc,oo all intolligenco roquostp received by the Central Intolligolzco A oncy,
whether thono call moroly for documontary material or roquiro field collection.
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 I
it ::snv:,fi 1~ ~~1F19: Aa?~ ~f~~dR~#-:c~I DK~BB OP6'9~R?~~5~ oprinCo
n? oncicrs in order to dotoraJ.ne how bent to nmeot these roquerrtr. Thud, if iho
Office of 3laval Intelligonce should request of the Contral Intolligcnee Agency
inforaigtion on the petroleum producing capabilities of various foreign coun-
tries, the Office of Collection and Dissemination would dotormino the intolli-
Spnco rosourcos which should be tapped in order to satisfy the request. if the
request cannot be satisfied within the Central intelligence Agency) it will
do- what outside agency is capable of procuring nocossaxy information and
Wi11 bo responsible for forwarding the request to ouch- agency. In the course of
this action, the Office of Collection and Dissemination will attempt to discover
whpthor any other agency has a similar requirement for information which might
s ccmb.nod with the original request. In this manner the Office assists in
&oor.dinatiug the requirements and collection requests received from within the
antral intolligcnce Aroncy and from outside agencies.
1s obvious that this function of coordination is designed to meet
our- requests and does not involve a broad responsibility continuously to Mon-
.. ,,..
i qr and coordinate the collection procedures and requirements of the various
intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Such a ro-
onnibility would force the Office of Collection and Dissomi:nation into the
opition of a central clearing house
uopts of all agonciec.
It would be
.~ P to tiio sass of administrative
hQ oatiafaction of the requests.
}}q 'oquiring coordination,
C.
complot o.ly'.
for all collection requirements and re-
impractical to have such an arrangement
detail involved and the resulting delay in
In practice, direct inter-agency requests,
ay by-paoa the Central Intelligence Agoncy
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 NATIU:ULT, SI::CURITY -COUI CIL, IN'ZELTAG:::iCE D1RTiCT7.V_Jn.
j ,ho fork"al acco.mpliah ont of ovor-all coordination in ropr. ooontud mainly
by nine Intoiligonco Directives approved by tho National Security Council upon
rocorniondrtion of the Director of Central Intelligence in. consultation with
tho IntellliGcn.ce Advisory Committco, and four inplomentinS directives which
need not be diacunrod hero.
The National Soourity Council Intelligence Directives* provide for the
coordination of intelligence activitien in various ways. The basic Directives,
'ion. It 2, 3 and 4 seek to achieve coordination of intollionce activities by
allocaticm of Sonoral areas of responsibility to the soyeral departments and
to the Central Intelligonco ASoncy.
piroctive No. an we have pointed out, establishes the general arrange-
ments for such coordination. It cots up the Intelligence Advisory Cv ittoe,
discussed above, to advise the Director of Central Intelligence, specifies the
procedures for the issuance of Intelligence Diroctiveo and defines the duty of
the Centtiral Intolli.Sonco Agency with respect to the production of "national
intolligoneo." Insofar as practicablo, the Central Intelligence Agency "shall
not duplicate the iutolligonco activities and research of the various Depart
month and AGoncioo, but shall iako use of existing intolligenco facilities."
Tho ))irectivo provi.doo for oxcliange of infornation botwoon the Central Intol-
liGonco Agoncy and tJio dopnrtnontal agenci.on, and authorizes the aooig=' ont of
officoro to the Central Intolligonco Agoncy by the dopartmontal organizations.
It also includes provision for the Central Intolligonco Agency to request au-
thority to inigioct intolligonco ra:atorial in,agoncioa of the Govorni ont.
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Directive No. 2 allocates roaponoibility for the collection abroad of
a
a
a
a
7
overt Intelligence among the Departments' of State,. Army, Navy and Air Force by
eetablicnizig "certain broad categories of agency responsibility." Political,
cultural and sociological intelligence are assigned to the State Department.
Military, naval and air intelligence are assigned to the respective Services.
The collection of economic, scientific and technological intelligence is allo-
cated to each agency "in accordance with its respective needs." The Directive
provides for coordination 'of these collection activities in the field by the
senior United States representative.
Directive No. 3 is an elaborate definition of categories of intelligence
production, i.e., basic, current, staff, departmental and national intelligence,
and it assigns the responsibilities of the departmental agencies and the Central
Intelligence Agency in intelligence production. The Sams areas of "dominant
Interest" are specified as for intelligence collection, and the production of
"national intelligence". is reserved to the Central Intelligence Agency. How-
the effort to eliminate it by definition.
ever, the terms of the various definitions are broadly drawn, the exceptions
are numerous, and confusion of intelligence functions has continued despite
Directive No. 4 provides that the Central. Intelligence Agency shall take
the. lead in preparing a. comprehensive outline of national intelligence objec-
tivAA and fti.? #4.=. +. 4J. .L_1
objectives.
1 indicate the priorities attaching to these
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Four of the Dixoctivee, Rroo. 5, 6, .7 and 8, aaaign certain "eerv'icea of
common.concern" to the Central 7ntofligenco Agency under the authority granted
in thoINatica l Security Act (Section 102 (d)). T'noco are coordinating actions
in the sonso that, by coon agreement, tdiey, assign to the Central Intolli6cnce
Agency primary or oxclusivo responsibility for conducting certain intelligence
activitioa of cct^.rr".on concern. Directive No. 5 provides that the Central In-
tolligoncIe Agoncy vill conduct all espionage and counter_eapionago operations
abroad oxeopt for certain agreed activitioa and.it aloo provides that the Cen-
tra]. Intolligenco Agoncy vi -I coordinate covert and overt collection aetiviti oa.
(Soo Chapter viii).
Directive Vo. 6 given the Central IntolliCenco Asoncy authority to conduct
all fedora]. 111o.11itori.ug of foroii n profit, and 'propt;ganda broadctaota, and direct o
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 mental aagcncioo. (Sec Chapter V11).
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Diroctivo ]o. 7 6ivc3 the Central Intolligoncc Agency authority for the
oxploitntion of domcotic sources of foreign intolligcnco, and pro-video for the
participation of departmental agencies in this activity. (Seo Chapter VII).
These Intelligence Directives allocate responsibilities to the Central
Intelligence Agency in fields which have been conceded to be those of common
concern where vorh can best be done centrally. This in also true of the allo-
cation to the Central Intelligence Agency of responsibility for the conduct of
secret operations (other than intelliGenco) abroad by the Office *of Policy
Coordination which vas accomplished by direct National Security Council action
(NSC 10/2) and not by Intelligence Directive submitted through the Intelligence.
Advisory'Coi ittoo. (See Chapter LC). in all of these cases where particular
functions of common concern have been assigned, the allocation of func:-i.ona
has boon generally accepted as sound.
T1IE DELI E 3 Or, COORDDI tTION ACII EVI D
In spits of those fornal directives for the coordination of intolligonco
activitioc, it is probably correct to nay that departmental intelligence ao
tivitioc are substantially uznaffected by this procurx?ln. of coordination except
vhoro the Central Intolligonco Agency has been given exclusive responsibility
? for cortain activities.
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 DP o:tid-
In gcnoraR ppLl?gO .9rc lgge, DJ 1 M
ernhip of the Central Intelligence Agency and thcro In virtually no supervision
of the vayo in which the various directives are carried out, except that the
Central Intolligonco Agency controls those common service activities assigned
to it. Conflicts of Jurisdiction and duplication of activities remain. In
many cases they have not only been imr solved,which is hardly surprising after
such a short time, but they remain unrecognized and u-naciarowlcdjed.
Despite the provisions of Directives Nos. 2 and 3 in-regard to the allo-
cation of dominant interest, each department collects and produces the Intel-
ligence it chooses according to priorities it establishes. The very large
r loopholes in these directives and the absence of any continuously effective
monitoring of their implementation makes this possible. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency itself has become a competitive producer of intelligence on eub-
jecte of its own choosing which can by no stretch of the imagination be called
national intelligence. (See Chapters V and VI). The amount of undesirable
duplication among intelligence agencies is considerable and the absence of co-
ordinated intelligence collection and production is serious.
In our opinion, certain essentials for the improvement of this situation
would include: continuous examination on tho'initiative of the Central Intol-
ligonco Agency of instances of duplication and failure of coordination; direc-
tiYoa which establish more precioo].y the responsibilities of the various do-
patrtmonto; and tho offectivo carry:Inq out of plans through cloco intor-dopart-
montal consultation at all lovolu. To a groator or lossor dcgroo, all of those
OL+sOnt.lals are lacking at the present time.
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 Ap v a 3/1 BDOiI$9R00~Dtl~3~9~1,13o~ac:o
Clearly , Rarep~ t t d i~. ~a,a~9 11Rc4 ct~iW.4~
Agency to coordl:lato intoll.iconco activitiua is suNoct to directives of the
fationaal Socurity Council. liowovcr, tho rcoponoibility to udvi. o the National
Security Council and torrako roc T^ ondationo for coordination is squ*arol.y placed
on the Central. LrtolliConco Agoncy. Thcroforo, lack of authority in a opocific
r3ituation should not doter the Contra]. Intelligence Agoncy from exorcising its
responsibility to cubr.:it roconmonndations so that proper coordination will re-
ault. If there tiro doubts ao tohow tho coordination mould be affected, it is
tho duty of tho A.Concy to ash the National Security Council to reoolvo tho'.n.
Th.e coordination of intelligence activities today is particularly importL t
in three fields illustrativo of the general problem; namely -- scientific in-
telligonce, domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence affecting the na-
tional security, and com unieations intollig?nco.
SCIPETIFIC D,'rBL IGEI%CE*
The field of scientific and technological intelligence is obviously one
which may ovorchadow all others in irporttmco. At the present time there is
no proper coordination of effort in, this .field, which is one in which there is
a broad area of common interest. In fact, this diffusion of responsibility is
ccnfirmod in National Security Council Intelligence Diroctivoo Nos. 2 and 3
which allocate collection and production rooponoibilitios for scientific and
technological intolliConco to "each agency in accordanco with its roopective
7Slnco thin report wau written, atom are boiang talccn to create in'the Central
? xnte11It;onaco A::~c?n oy a oola?:ito Ofi'ico of Sicionitific LitollIF;onco tuYd to trann-
for? to it Ulu Tiuccl.oar 1nloriy Group. now I n the Off] co of Special Oporationa.
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 Each of the nailitnry Sorvicoa coll.octn nciontific ? and toclnnolo3iczil in-
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tolliconco in accordance with its own procriun and producoo ouch roporto as it
chooses, The Contrul IntolliConco. Agency porforn:o certain central collocting
cervices through its Office of Operations and Office of Special Oporationa.
The Office of Spoci.al Operations also houaoo the Plucloar Bnorgy Group which in
the central 3ovcrrr.:.onta1 unit for interpreting atomic onorgy intolliuonco.
Scpa ato from it is a uoientific Branch in the Office of Roporto and ratit::atco
which van expected tobocome the central group for stimulating and coordinating
aoiontific intolligonco. It has not yet filled this role. The Research and
Devolopr:.ont Board does not itself actizoly engage in scientific intolligeuco
but has an important interest in the field. Its needs should therefore be
given era jor consideration, in plans and arrangeronts far coordination.
7n. sun cry, roeponoibilitios are scattered, collection efforts are. unco-
ordin.^t--d, atonic rnorCy intelligence is divorced from scientific intolligcnco
?gcnorally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at authoritative
intolli-once ostiratoa in the scientific field, with the possible exception of
atomic ono.- Cy. Scro is a situation which rsuot have priority in coordination of
intelligence activities. In Chapter VI we propose.cortain stops which come
within the scope of this survey.
DOMESTIC J: Tl'i.LICEIiCE AM COUI;~'1.7-II II,IC tCI 11FFECTL G TIM, TIATIO'NAL SECURITY
)nethor broad field requiring coordination is that of foreign Intelligence
derived from domestic sources and the ulliod field of domestic countor-intolli-
gonco. This includoo the exploitation of intolligonco from United St.a,toe buoi-
none fiiiao, travellers, otc., exploitation of the intolligonco pouoibilitios I
of croups and individuals of foreign,nation.r.lity in the Unni.tod St.cites, tho
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..w.... ?.. +...., ? .. ... .... .... ?w,.. ?.. ? . , ..? ....v....ww.? ? ?.I ~.. .. w..~~.?Y,S? ...... ...~?. n,n~wr w.l {i ,. .+. ,+ ..tin . ? w.
 I
roi'ting of domootic countor-into 3.1iGonco to foreign intolligunca oi:ct t1~o
coordirzntion of dcrrnootic ccuntor-oapioivago with cotn.tor-or3picnag abroad. l:-
Copt for the arploitati.on of privato eourcoa of foroi a intolligonco in the
Unitod Statoe which is contralizod in the office of Oporationi of tho Control
JAtolliCcnCO A,roncy (ono Chapter v.LT), rorcpoxicibility for the of er activition
in scattered F.raon;3 the State Doparl ent, thoixnod Sorvicoa, the Federal )3urcau
of Invoutigati.on and the Central Iutolllgcnce Agoncy. Thorn is little offoc-
tivo coordination araohu thorn, except on a case basis.
The Foderal 33ureau of Investigation, 'which has primarily security and la'z
anforco;-.ont xerxponelbilitioa, is corlcornod in fact with an important area of
.intolligonco. Thin includes domestic count or-espi ,? and countor-sabotago,
control of comranist and other subversive activities crd s'ur oillcnce of alien
individuals and groups. Ail of these functions are closely related to the cc=-
parable activitioo abrcad of the Central Intelligence Aroncy. They all have
an important intelligence aspect, particularly today srhon intelligence from
domestic and foroign sources in so closely related. The fact that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is ' primarily concerned with security and. law enforce-
mint may rorrul.t in a failure to exploit the intelligence poesibilitios of a
situation and my create difficulties in rononciling the intelligence with the
security intarostn.
Mio Federal Bureau of Investigation. i(3 not part of the oxiotix nia.
chinory for coordination of intolligonco t rouGh the Iutolligonco Advisory
Cozrnittoo or othor-sriao. There is no continuing nennox? 'whereby dornootic Intel-
ligonco and cowitor-intolligcnco are related to over-all xutticuinl intolligonco
In erdcw to norvo the general purpmroo not forth in the National Socurity Act
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of coordinating tho intolligonco activitios of the uovorul Co ernmont dopart-
uants and ugencico in the intorost of national ciocurity."
In our opinion, the Central Intolligonco At cncy has the. duty under the Act
to concorn itcolf Frith tho prob1cm of.cobra inating those phases of domostic
intollUE;onco and countor-intollfgonco which relate to the national oocurity
and should submit rocs:ttondations on this cubj oct to the National Socurd.ty
Council. This its not inconsiotent ? with the stipulation of the National Security
Act that the Central Intolliaonco Agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powors, or internal security functions." It would in fact servo to
carry out the pro3ram of coordination set forth in the Act in a broad field
'which has hitherto boon largely noglocted.
A stop toward bringing about the coordination we rocoa nd would be to
prorido far closer association of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the
intelligence agencies by making it a member of the Intelligonce Advisory
Colimittoe.
CO R":Ul7ICATI0:i3 lIIELLIG] CE
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Wo ~uulorr~t;~ni that, at tho diroction of tho Socrotccry of Dofonno, a corrnittoo
corupric~i.ng roprac!oltt.:tttvoo of tho throo Sorvicon is corp1otil ; a otuc:y of i Io
g11uuts cn of creating a joint crL:ulization for tho i>roc1uction of col arnuIliCatiann
11Ito11tgonco.
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PnOPOSAIS FOR 11, ROVED COOT DfUATIOI
In order to remedy the
existing, situation in respect of coordination of
activities, several steps are neccsaary. The Director of Central Intelligence
mu at show a much, greater concern than hitherto Frith the goneral problon. of co-
ordination of intelligence activities which is one of his eoeontial statutory
duties. His is a responsibility to all of the dopartmonts concerned vith na-
tional security; it can be properly diechargod by leadership, i ngination,
initiative and a realization that only a Joining of efforts can achieve tfP
dosirod results.
curity Act by quickoning their intorest and exhibiting, a spirit of active Co-
operation. Ito at ondntont to the Cori ittoo' s charter as cot forth in Thtolligonco
ui.roctiv c' Vo. 1 aypoare necessary' to bring about this isi)rovomont.
In the next, chaptor vhoro tiro dual with the question of national intolli-
aonco ooti,;L'ttoo vo propona Hutt the Into lli.ganco Acl loory Co::.rnittoo anntuno It
60
The other mombors of the Intelligonce Advisory Con n.ittoe 1>iuot also share
in the general rooponaibility for carrying out the intent of the National So-
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 r~r
I -
a
a
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more active role in producing theno cotii1natce. In our opinion, this would not
only improvo the relevance and quality of the oatin2atoa but would give
the Committee the impetuo and the b?sckground it needs to deal effectively with
the coordination of intelligence activities. ?lore than any other stage in the
intelligence process, the consideration of estimates should reveal tho defi-
ciencios and overlaps as veil as the accomplichmonts in intelligence.
We believe, as stated above, that the Foderal Bureau of Investigation
ghould be added to the. permanent membership of tho?Intolliganco Advisory Com-
mittee. We also believe that the Atomic Energy Coi.,,icsion and the Joint Staff
might be dropped from the regular membership. The role of the Atomic Energy.
Commission in intelligence is a limited one and. conf ined to a highly specialized
field. The representation of the joint Staff. upon. the Intelligence Advisor,;
Committee appears to be largely duplicative in vier of the predominantly Serv-
ice membership of the o aittee. However, they, together with other interested
agencies such as the Departments of Treasury and Co=arce, the Research and De-
volop;ncnt Board and the National Security Resources Board, should attend meet-
ings whenever matters of direct concern to them are being considered.
thoec now porfoimed by the Office of Collection rind Dissemination) might be
Within the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency the
Intordepartental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) should be sot up
clearly as ail integral part of the Agency, 'charged with the tack of seeking
out, studying and developing, -in conoultation wick, the other parts of the
Central Intelligence Agency and outoido agoncion, plans for the coordination
of Intelligence activities. It should have no responsibility for current opor-
ationa, except that certain current tacks of coordination (such as come of
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carried out under its direction. The roconutitutod ICAP3 which Might appro-
pi?iatoly be called "Coordination Division" should be small. Ito meniborc should
be persons intercutc,d. in, and- qualified to deal with, problems of intolligonce
organization. Finally, and perhaps moot important of all, the Director must
loo's upon this reorganized and otren.;thoned group as his major support in ful-
filling one of his most difficult assignments under the National Security Act,
that of advising the National Security Council on the intelligence activities
of the Government and making recommendations for their coordination.
It is our belief that the relationship between certain of the functions
presently performed by IC.tPS and the Office of Collection and Dissemination
should be considerably closer. ICAP5 is responsible for the promulgation of
plans and policy in relation to the coordination of collection activities. As
one of its tasks, the Office of Collection endDiocemination coordinates actual
collection and dissemination and in some respects is in a position to implement
the general plans and policies for coordination. Constantly dealing with the
day-to-day "workirg level" problems of colloction,the Office of Collection and
.Dissemination is in a good position to make recomendationo in regard to the
improvement of collection procedures' and. the coordination of collection
therefore, recommend that the collection and dissemination functions
of this Office be placed under the new Coordination Division, subject-to future
? determination of the extent to which individual Officou may conduct their on
dissemination. (See Concluoiono to Chapters VII and VIII). We further recom-
Mond that all of the library, index and register functions be separated from
the Office of Collection and Dissemination. and be placed in a centralized Be-
nenrch rued Reports Division an described in Chapter VI.
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 Co.;CLUSI.O.iu 1ypYiiF'~r~fe~~2te 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP86B00269R000500030001-2
. Intolligc:nco llCcncy under tho 13cs-
{1) The responsibility of the Cent
tional Security Act with. respect to the coard.intition of intolli~; ,,co activii;ion,
which is one of the moot important ones assigned to tho Central Intelligence
jSency, has not been fully d.ischargod.
the irnpa,?tastt areas rnccro more active offorte at coordination
(2) One of tolligcnco.' (See Chapter VI).
are needed is the fi.cld of scientific
(3) Another important area is that of? d.ow-crjtic intolligence and counter-
intollience insofar as they relate to the national security. To improve co-
rdination in this area and between it and the entire Intelligence field, we
o
recommend that the Fedcral eau of Investigation should be made a member of
the lbtolligerico Advisory Co +.ittee .
The Int:nce Adzieory Committee is soundly conceived, but it
should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in
the continuin3 coordination of intelligence activities.
(6) The Intelligence Advisory Coe .itteo should consist c the Director of
Central Intelligence and representatives of the Departments of State) Army,
},gaty and Air Force and the Federal :Bureau of Investigation. Other departonts
and agencies trould sit as ad hoc members when appropriate.
The Intcrdopartmontal Coordinating an3Planning.Staff should bo r. ocon-
. {7) .
etitutcd as a staff` responsible only. to the Director of Central 'Lutelligonco.
"Caordinati Division
*In this c1uclpter wo have. called this new stuff given ." It
should bo noted that V110 muter turd aoric r' i o
br?anc}ir.s of the C(~tosly "o}ralirc)r,cn to illupstl'aa
Central I:nt~~lltt;..nc.c !1"
tt , 1 r-:co1rmlonclation.
tion and ntn,i~lii'icatiotr and not given LLD tt .L'1J ' . .. .
G3
 with tho tWjTprd ediF54'1P9*e 26G3P1 u94 : C R[PP86'9b R004b00 l Ccnco
activities.
($) The reaponoibilitiea of the Office of Collection and Dissemination
with respect to the coordination of collection rvquirc1entr3 and roquoata mud
the diascm1n.tion of intelligence should be c lricd out under the new Coordi-
nation Division. This is subject to future detormination of the extent to
which individual.Officori may conduct their own dissemination.
(-4
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TIl , IIT SP0i:.,Ii3ILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
THE MANDATE UflDEIt T EC Th\TIO;~11, `ECU .TI'Y ACT AIND THE DIRECTIVES
One of the principal duties aceigncd to the Central Intolligonco Agoncy
"for the purpoco of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
Govorn ont dopai~tmento and agencies in the interest of national secilrity" is
"to correlate and evaluato.intolligezco relating to the national security, and
provide for JTt.ij appropriate disse:mination." The Central InteUigonco Agency
is thus given the responsibility of seeing to it that the United States has
adequate central machinery for the examination and interpretation of intell.i-
Bence so that the nation.] security will not be jeopardized by failure to co-
ordinate the boat intelligence opinion in the country, based on all available
infor tion.
In our opinion, this responsibility has not been adequately discharged,
and. remedial xasures are necessary. There is confusion as to the proper role
of the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of intelligence reports
and ostinatos. This confusion has resulted from incorrect interpretation and.
lack of proper inplemontation of the statute and the directives. The reasons
for this go to the heart of the national intelligence problem and need to be
exi inod in so:::o detail in order to discover how the necessary improvement can
be made.
partnontal intol-ligonco," the statute dons not Limit tho duties of the Central
Although the Act provides that "the dopart:monto and other agoncios of the
Covoin-mont shall continuo to collect, evaluate, correlate, and dia oninato do-
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65
 Ijito1Ugonco Agency to corro1,..tto and. ovaluato intollmo>.co a co )t,; t {.,ho
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staff;1i rJ. of "national socurity," Intc,r protat.ion of thoso statutory provi.sionn
tins rztdo by the Ilati.onal. Socu.rIty Council in Intolligonco Dir octivoo No. 1 and
?2io. 3.
Int.olU.gonco Diroctlvo No. 1 (Soa Annex No, 7) provides that the Director
of Central Intollit-onco eliall produce* intolligonco xolatirg to the national
cocurity, callod national intolU.gonce, and. that "in so far an practicabIlo, he
aha. not du
pl.f cato the intolligonco activitioe and redo :.roh of the varioue
Dopartn,onte and Agencies but shell mako uco of existing intelligence facilities
anrl abash utilize doi+ r a ental intelligence for such production purposes."
The directive alga etipulatos that nationva i telligsnce dieconinatod by the
Central Intelligonco Agency "shall be, officially corcizrrod in by the Into Lli-
hence Agoncioe or shall carry
These provision are to
No. 3 (Soo Annex No. 9) which
partnontal intelligence that
'national security, is of
trt ncconda tho oxclunivo
Military Establish ent."
Dizoctivo No. 3 then places on the Central. IntolliLonco Agency the xo-
a1'on.sibility fox the production and. diesorainir;tion of national intelligence.
Such intoitj 3 co is to be dovolopoa and aseonblod in coordination vith other
doliartmonto and. agoncion in order to obtain intollj5onco. dovalopod ti;i.tliin the
k '1'l
t
io
or;:t. "
0 bl an unod l ere, mo:.auc tlto au?opar,ttion tins S.asuanco of an-
oat ant itttz-u?oto& i.]ILolUCoIIOo rvporLu, uud ocrti_t:ctt;oo.
C6
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on a rued. statement of substantial diccont."
Bomo extent cla.-ifiod in Intelligence Directive
defines national intelligence a;a "integrated do-
covers the broad acpoctn of national policy and
concorn to more than one Dopartont or Agency, and
co otonco of a oixMlo Departincnt or Agency or the
',qk.7:v".i^.id.sRi4v~i..aterial is restricted to a very few people at the top levels with
the result that those individuals who are most competent to analyze a particu-
lar situation are left out of the picture entirely. It is therefore nocos-
nary that intelligence estimates be made in full light of our own policies and
operations. The preparation of such ostiratee should not be impeded by any
barriers arising from security vonoidorations' or otherwise, irhich may JeOP-
ardize the soundneoo of the intelligonco product.
tho pro judicoa of thono tcho proparo thorn. 11iia can boot bo cotuitorod byprovidinC
Finally, any discussion of the preparation of national estimator would be in-
adoqunto withvat two caveats. The first applies to thoso who propziro the estimrwtos;
the second to those who mzty uuo them. 'Prejudice in the form of stubborn adhor-
once to l)rcconcoivod id.cau is likely tobo the gravost Bangor to uouncl intolli-
gonco. Estir .toi are aubjoct to the rink of boinu co].orod and twiutod to rofloct
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rou:aori.tLie chocks and balancoo no we brave endeavored to do in the composition
and ro3ponoibilitios of the Intolligonco Advisory Committee. If, for exraanple,
tbo State Dopar' ant, which may be wuddod to a particular policy, proconto the
,facto dictortod. by faulty preconceptions, the final product, as rofloctod. in
an intolligonco estimato, will be dofectivo. It in hoped that in such a case
the now Estimates Group of the Central Intolligonco Agency z-rill supply an ini-.
tial corrective and that the non-State Department members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee will have sufficient breadth of L-nowledge to challenge the
State Department estimate. Likewise, military estimates should be submitted
to scrutiny no that they are compatible with each other and avoid the error,
however unconscious, of magnifying the needs of theix own branch of the Service.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee, if it functions properly, and is as-
aistod by the disinterested work of the Central Intelligence Agency is the body
'whore such distortions should be caught and corrected and. the prejudices of
one mind challenged by the thinking of a mind which at least does not cuff or
from the came prejudices.
In turn, prejudice on the part of the policy-makers may render them blind
ovon to brilliant achievements of an intelligence service. They may just re-
fuao to listen to what they do not like, Hence, nothing would be more den-
gorous than to boliovo that if we once had an offoctivo intolligonco service
and an efficient intolligonco estimating body, we would be immune to a disaster
lino Pearl Harbor.
This does not load'to the concluoion that intolligonco is futile. It
merely shows Ito ibtitationo. If the intolligonco apprainor .can hoop from
twi1+t1nc; and coloring the data ho receives and If the i)olIcy-mltl;or can hoop a
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I.
t
t
C
C
 ~i'c~~~ OQ aai-2ho asoura~~-
rolatSvc~~pC LAB g a P*AaW
-l
tions on which he ? ie rolyiii;,, then oou:id ' intelligence catimatca can be a
pillar of strength for our national security.
CO:%*C.'JIG::S AIM
(1) In the Central Intelligonee Agency there has been confusion between
the responsibility of producing coordinated national intelligence estimates
and. responsibility for miscellaneous research and reporting activities.
(2) The provisions of the National Security Act for the production of
national intelligence eotirnatea,. as interpreted by the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives, are sound but have not been effectively
carried out.
(3) There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small
Est . tc3 Division which would draw upon and, review the o:ecialized intelli-
gence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated
national intelligence estimates.
'( ) Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, these
estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted
Intelligence Advisory Committee whose members should assuio collective respon-
?ibility for them.
(~) Provision should be made in these arrangnncnts for the handling of
crisis aituationswhon coordinated estimates aro required without delay.
(6) Coordinated intelligenco ootiinatco produced in this way inuot, in
ordor to ho offoctivo,.bo rocognizod as the 3noet authoritative ontimatoo avail-
able to the policy .inakoro.
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 CHAPTER VI
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INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND RE, PORTS
I
PROPOSED PES ARCH JJM REPORTS DIVISION
We have recommended in the preceding chapter that there be created a
small, high-level Estir..ntos Division to concern itself primarily with the cor-
relation of national intolligenco_, .subject to final approval by the Intel-
ligonco Advisory Committee. If the responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the production of national intelligence is assumed by this Eati-
mates Division, there will remain certain research and intelligence reporting
functions now being performed by the Office of Reports and Estimates which
might properly be carried out as a service of concnon concern by a newly con-
atituted "Research and Reports Division". -Other activities of the Office of
Reports and Estimates should be discarded as being superfluous. or competitive
with the propor activities of dep:r` mental. intelligence.
There is presently within the Office of Reports and Estimates a nucleus
for the proposed Research and Reports Division in fields of common concern.
To these
there should be added the Poroi.;n Documents Branch of the Office of Operations
(See below., Page 103) and the library, biographical and other rc&istcro and in-
dicou Presently maintained by the Office of Colloction and Disnorriiiation.
Generally spccilcing, this Division will be responaiblo for authoritative
i?cccru?ch and reports in ocouromie, ociontific and tochnologic:al intolligonco,
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tyro main' xv-,nco of central roforence facilitiao, ani such other matters as are
d,oc.;od of co=on concern. To the extent noccs::ary, it will also coordinato the
cCtivitio?.3 of the other agoncioa in these fields. Its staff should include in
eppropriatd casca adequate roprosontation from the Stato Department and Serv-
Icve so that, subject to policy. guidance from the principal. consum.ors, its
products will represent the coordinated opinion of the best available talent
rnd ohould be fully responsive to the requiromonts of the conoumor agencies.
In this chapter we suggest the typo of activity which should be discon-
tinued as unossential or duplicative, the type of activity which should be
rotainod as a common service and some activities, not presently carried out in
the Office of Reports and Estimates, which should be performed by the proposed
Research and Reports Division as services of common concerns It would be the
ronponsibility of the National Security Council, acting on the advice of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to
dotorrnino which of these central services might properly be performed, and we
believe that the Coordination Division (!reconstituted Interdepartmontal Co-
ordinatir , and Planning Staff) should examine this problem and prepare the
necessary plans.
PERIODICAL STJ 2Y.ARIES
The Office of Reports and Estimates presently produces current intelligence
it' two principal forms: a top secret Daily Su^m"ury and a -secret Weekly Summary.
.The former comprises abstracts of a small number of incoming and outgoing
ambles rocoiveed. during the preceding twenty-four hours. . Approximately ninety
Por cent of the contcnto of the Daily Slutmary is derived from State Dopartmont
aotu?cos, inclildir g both operational Lis well as intalligonco mntorial.
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an inherent danger that it will be nisleading to its conmunere. This is because
it is based lcrgoly on abstracts of State Department materials, not in histor-
are occncional comments by the Central Intelligence i goncy on poi i oiia of Lno
Surmary, Ap1ird4zcbf efdaMia' 11200114 IN : I] DBg6 ~ 0 0 1t la wo fight
to the nuatorial itself. The result is a fraLpontary publication which deals
with operations as well ao intelligence, without necessarily boing based an the
moot significant materials in either category. In a suimnary of this typo, cir-
culated to the President and the highest officials of the Government, there Is
ical perspective, lacking a full knowledge of the bac}:ground or policy involved
and with little previous consultation between the. Central Intelligence Agency
and the State l partmont..Moreover,it is incomplote becauee it is not based on
all the most important materials.
The Weekly Summary is more widely circulated-than the Daily S~. '^y, but
also repreconts primarily political reporting and. competes for attention with
several departmental weekly mmrm?rios, particularly those of the State Depart-
ment and the Department of the Army.
Still another periodical publication is the monthly "Review of the World
9
Situation."
an inordinate amount of time and effort end appoar to be outside of the domain
These sum axries, particularly the Daily, are the subject of considerable
controversy and are received with expressions ranging from moderate interest
to strong criticism. Tho Wookly and the Daily are) to a certain extent, duplica-
tivo in that the Stato Departmment, to which political intelligence has been
assigned as an area of dorinant i-itoront,aleo disuominatos its oNm operational
cued intelligence uunnnarioo on the highest levels. As both Summaries consume.
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of t e ntral IntelliGonco A;;:ncy, we bol:iovo that the Daily and. possibly
the 'Weohly, Sum ar'y should bo discontinued in their prouont forni.. We do, how-
evor, appreciate the fact that, to none extent, there may be a need for such
oun=arios, raid we nUegost that the newly constituted Coordination Division ox-
amino the situation to determine whether thero is such a need and how it can
boat be not.
MISC'r-U,Pa,EOUS REPOIRNS IflD rM"ORANDrs
The Office of Reports and. Estimates also produces a varioty of other re-
ports, utudieo and a T^ ies.. Some of those are strategic and. basic studios
on foreign countries or areas, presenting the political, economic and military
situation. Others are intended to be estimates of current international prob-
lomn. These are formal roportu,dealing with a variety of subjects ranging from
."PossibleDevoldpments in Chinn" to "Opposition to the ECA". These estimate-
typ6 reports are circulated throuhout the various agencies for the purpose of
obtaining concurrence or dissent. But the fact that they are so circulated in
no way means that they are properly coordinated estimates which represent the
boat thini.ing on the subject under review. They often deal with topics which
are not particularly relevant to departmental problems or national issues,
with the result that the various agencies often fool that it is an imposition
to be burdened with the responsibility for reviewing those docura.onto, making
approprinto co-nmcnta and. noting concurrence or dissent.
Tho Office of 1loports and Ectimatos also. initiator more informal reports
by manna of intelligence memoranda produced apontancouoly or in an er to spe-
cific roquoctc. Those are not coordinated by circulation theov& the other
;onciou. Subjects again d'ffor Widely and include such topics an "Soviet
1`11::ulcing of the FF.-onch Coat Strike" and "Tungsten in : outh?Korea".
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lduch of this production is academic, tond.7 to duplicato work in other do-
partmonta, hay little rolation to national intolligcnco, and it not produced
an a rocoumizod corvico of cc, rcnon concorn. On the other hand, ocmio of this
prod., tion might, subject to goncral auroemont, be perfornod as a central com-
mon service. In our opinion, the newly constituted Research and Reports Divi-
sion should refrain from the production of essentially political studios and
miscellaneous reports and should concentrate its effort upon the production of
reports in those fields clearly assigned to it as recognized. services of com-
mon concern.
TEE NATIONAL IIIT "LIGENCE SURVEY
Under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, the Central
Intelligence Agency is charged with preparing an outline for the National In-
telligence Survey -- an extensive series of basic studies on all countries and
areas of the world -- and with coordinating the neco3sary departmental contribu-
tiona. This study has been assigned to the Office of Reports and Estimates, not'
as the producer, but rather as coordinator of the program,under specifics.tions
and priorities approvod by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This coordination
is achieved through the allocation of topics for research and production for
the particular purposo of the Survey sorios,but there is no provision for cen-
tralization or coordination of current production in thoso fields.
Under this series, various chapters and sections have boon farmed out to
the State Dopartmont,tho Sorvicos, and other qualified agoncioa. For instance,
the Army has been nosignod the rcaponsibility for the sections on transportation
and com"aunications. The aaaig,nacnt of those sections does not moan that Army
is rocoi;ntzod as having either primary interest in, or continuing rouponei.bility
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for, intollig i i ronpoc 1 o traneportatlon nr communications. i or the
purposo only of tho. handbooks, tho l atioria]. Intelligence Survey oli]Linatou dup-
.lication of production in cortaiii fioldn and provides temporary editorial
coordination of basic into..l.igcnco through the allocation of topics. It does
not t oleo the problem of centralizing or coordinating continuing research and
production in the fields of coon intoroct.
ECONOMIC, SCM;TIFIC td.'D TEC}B:OLOOICAL fl TELLIGEI;CE
The Office of Reports and Estimates appears to have made no serious attempt
? to produce coordinated. estimates or authoritative intelligence in the fiolds
of economic, technological and scientific intelligence, in 'which no department
is recognized as having a dominant interest. The six Geographic Branches., the
Sciontific Branch and a number of the Consultant Paiiels are variously interested'
in these fields but.havo seldom produced authoritative intelligence contribu-
tions therein. We have found in our examination of the Central Intelligence
Agency, State Department and the three Service intelligence agencies that there
is much duplication and little coordination of production on these subjects.
Although often along parallel lines, studies are independently prodncod by the
various agencies and do not, therefore, rc recent the best available coordinated
opinion.
There has been an attempt in National Security Council Intelligence Diroc-
tivo No. 3 to guide the offort of the various agencies into coordinated chan-
nole by the allocation of certain fields of dominant intoroct, but in the
i"iolds of oconcmmic, scientific and technological intolligonco, each agency is
authorizod, to produce in accordance with its needs. Thus, it is in those
x1oldo, loft open to all agencies and for which responsibility in now'
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divided and diffuDod, that trio propocod Reaonrc i
perform a'valunblo aorvico of cor.mson interoat by contralizing or coord.in aLing
roocarch and intolligenco production.
It- i0. doubtful z.?hothor such a high degree of centralization in those fio Ids,
including so:.ie,,esOentj.all-y military intolligenco, io desirable in this country.
Our Service intolligenco a oncies havo boon assigned fields of damins.nt intorost,
and they will continua to produce military intolligence within those areas.
Dowovor, even if each intol.l..igonce cGoncy confines itoolf alrnoat entirely to
the production of intolligonco within its field. of dominant interest, thor?
rozains a vast area of cor on interest in such necessary supporting fields as
economic, ociontific and tochnoloaico.l. intolligence.
The ocono.Ti.c field could include, for oxu.mplo,induatrial production, oco-
nondC renolu'Coo, metallurgy; fusln, pouor,.coi u4cations and. toloconnnunIcationa.
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Tiiooo are oomo of tho cubjccto whoro there In prosont duplication'amrDng our
n.goncico and in which a Groat economy of of fort and improvement of product
would result if intelliConco were produced centrally. To provide an effective
contribution, the centrally produced reports on oconcnnic and industrial m ttors
I.nuut roprocont the most authoritative coordinated opinion on the subjoct and
must be accepted. as such by the consumer agencies. - A principal now consumer
would be the Estimates Division, recomaonded in the preceding chapter. We
also recognize that the requirements of the various agonies in these matters.
of common concern will differ, and that each agency will need to adapt to its
own particular problems the intelligence producod in those fields.
Few subjects of intelligence are more important than science and tech-
uology, ard. yet little success -has been achieved in this country toward coor-
dinating intelligence collection and prodnctior_ in those fields. Among the
agencies which are interested and in a position to contribute are not only the
Cbntral Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the three Services, but
also the Atomic Energy Commission and the Research and Development Board.*
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To fulfill its responsibilities as the chiof analytical and evaluating
unit for scientific intoll.igonco, and consequently as the principal guide for
collection, the Branch would have to be stiffed by scientists of the highest
qualifications. 1e appreciate that in such a Branch it would be impossible to
obtain a leading scientist for each of the many aeGx_snts of scientific and. tech-
nological intelligence, but we'believe that a staff of moderate size and of
high qu^.lity can cope with the normal research and evaluation) co-opting, where
nocessexy, personnel from such organizations as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Energy Cor s sion.
COINCWSIOP+S AND RECO:NOMATIO ;S
(1) In addition to the Ectimatos Division rocc=ondod in the previous
Chapter, thoro.should. be created out of the present Office of Reports and Es
timntea a Rooearch and Roporto Division to nccoriplish contr l research in, and co-
ordinatod production of, intelligence in fields of coannon interest. The staff
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 of thin I)iviaion should include sufficient roprosontati.on fruna' the S{.rlto Do-
part.:.ont and the Sorvico;s to in in-o that their needs are adoquatoly Mt-
(2) The. Coordinatiori : Division (roconotitutod Intord.cpcxtcntal Coor-
dinating and Planning Staff) should be givon the responsibility for ntudying
the actual scope of the Research end Reports Division and for roe s tonding
those sorviced of co-nn-on concern which should be porformod centrally.
(3) . The propriety of the preparation by the Central Inte]ligenco Agency
of essentially political our :sxios should be reviewed, taking into considera-
tion the nee& for such su cri.ries, the existence of a nunber of duplicating
auaerles and. the particular capabilities of the individual dapartments to
prepare then.
The various reports, studies and summaries which are not national
-intelligence or recognize& services of common concern should be discontinued.
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 CIIAPTEIt VII
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SERVICES OF COMMON CONCER'N:
TIIE COLLECTION OF CVEI-T INTELLIGENCE
The Office of Operations, under an Assistant Director, porfo ?o a central
co=on service through the collection of overt intelligence by three esuentially
distinct moans: the Contact Branch is rossponsiblo for the exploitation of
business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in
the United States as sources of foreign intelligence information; the Foreign
Broadcast Information Branch is responsible for all fedoral monitoring of
foreign propaganda and press broadcasts; and the Foreign Documents Branch ex-
ploito foreign language documents and foreign periodicals and press for Intel-
,ligonco purposes.
CONTACT BRAIlCH
foreign intelligence information". The directive also ootabliohes the ge-_sral
rules, under which those activities are to be conducted and provides for the
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7 (See Anne.-. No.
1'iI
provides that "Tho Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for. the
exploitation) on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business
concerns, other non-governmental orgomizations and individuals as . sources of
gays in which the needs of the other.intelligonce agencies are to be mot. This
represents an important stop fomxd toward tapping a valuable source of in-
tolligo, co and. overeaniing the difficulties encountered during World War II,
uhon procedures for thin purpose had to be improvised and the ovorla { rn n-
toroota of a number of agencies reconciled.
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 ub ti acting from c f~~iQr t 9iW ii~i@-L R~$9~QO2& REi0?1500e3OOO3-2.ia
oloctronica, transportation, etc.
There in .a constant and largo float of production from the Foreign Docu-
monte Branch in the form of extracts from the foreign press; current periodical
abstracts, both gor_eral and technical, doaling with itomi of intolligonco value
contained in Soviet and other foreign periodicals; on industrial card file roc-
ord for inclusion in the Foreign Industrial Register of the Office of Colloc-
tiara and Diescminrtion; biographical intolligonco reports; a bibliograp'hy of
Russian periodicals, special accession lists and various translations of cur-
ront material to =et continuing requircmonts.
Inasmuch as it is virtually impossible to have a large pool of expert
translators who are at the same time specialists in various fields, it -is most
important that the work of an agency such as. the Foreign Documents Branch be
porforrod in close relationship to and under the constant guidance of the con-
gwaor agencies. It would, therefore, seem that instead of being associated in
the Office of Operations with the Contact Branch and the Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Branch. with which it has little in season, it would be preferable
for the Foreign Documents Branch to be a part of the proposed Research and
Roports Division suggested in Chapter VI.
CONCLUSIONS APB I COK'"M1TIONS
? (1) The Office of Oporationa consists of three distinctive activities.
which represent useful and recognized functions in their own field but have no
Particular relation to each other.
(2) The Contact Branch should be intogratod with the Office of Special
Operationa and Office of Policy Coordination under single over-all direction
(Oporatioxia Division) within the Contra. Intelligence Agency.
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 + (~) lnro activa offorta should' bo undo to oxploit intolliC;unco from
fo1?olen WA 4&V&' Zr I1 Q3 PPRI94 3'CI fi& 26?R0'bb80tTOl?A414?atoc, c.nd-
otopa should lie taken by the Diroctor of Control]. IatolliCc:nco and tho Litolli-
gonce Advico:y Coaittoo to, coordinate the activities of tho various a anciee
in this field.
(k) Tho Foroien Dociv:.onto Eru4.nch should be made part of the proposed
Rasearch. and ]?cporto Division if one is created.
(5)
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If the Foroign Broadcast Info= ation Branch rcmainB a part of the
Central Intelligence Agency, it should probably bo? administered by the near
Operations Division, but its product shouldbe currently available for aualyis
in the now Rooearch and Roports Division.
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CIIAP'l'LR VIII
SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE COLLECTION OF SECR :T INTELLIGENCE
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Under norial poacotimo couditionu, the bulk of the information on which
a govern wnt baucs itn action in tho international field is obtainable by overt
manna -- that ).a to say, through liplo=tic and military eatablishmonts1
through tho prong, scientific and technical publ1ca.tiona and the normal chan-
eels 'of trade and internatior.:l intercourse. Wit4 these facilities available,
the collection of intelligonco in poacetiue through secret means asoumea rela-
tivoly eoeondary importance. In tact, as montionoel above.,, insofar as our own
Govornmont is concerned, covert collection of intelligence was a negligible
factor prior to World War II.
Today it is an understatement to describe cond;.tiona as merely ab:ncral.
They are uniquely difficult from the viewpoint of intelligence. Where Com-
muniot regines are in control the ordindry means of securing information
t,rondn.
information Which is kopt socrot, but it.. in hard to got -ovon maniple and
ooemingly Unnocuouo dotailu rolating to the economic, financial raid pout-
1cal dovolopmonto which may furninh vital -clucu to political and military
are generally lacking. In those areas, it is true., we have a few diplo-
matie missions and here and there some consular establishments. Their staffs,
howovor, aro so restricted and ogled upon that they cannot perform their usual
iiifcrnation G2thoring functions. Even the typo of inforznatiorx that is
available for the asking horo in tho United States 'is unobtainnblo there.
In this whole groat aroa of comruuniat domination it is not only military
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Aloo, the r".out forci.gn cervices, which have ooparato eopicnacc and counter-eepion^uo
brrnchoa, integrated only throw^,h their chiofo. Ponsibly because of this
or;,an9.rational unification counter-ospionago has not yet been adequately ex-
ploited as a source of positive intolli;onco information, as a channel for
deception, as a roasts of protecting espiona o operations and as a basin for
penetrating fifth coliL"+".n operations abroad, which may be tied in with fifth
column operations here.
The techniques of espionage seem somewhat simpler than those of counter-
espionage, an3thc.forrter generally is assumed to promise more decisive results.
actors such as. these have influenced. the concentration of the Office of Special
Operations on espionage probleTis. It seems apparent that the present counter-
espionage staff of the Office of Special Operations should be materially
strengthened and more intensive couxitor-espionage work promoted.
Owiar to the subordination of counter-espionage to espionage, the ex-
ploitation by the Office of Special Cperations of counter-intelligence oppor-
tunities and its general approach to the problems of counter-intelligence have
not boon markedly successful. Ito liaison arrangemonts with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, which is charged with all counter-espionage reoponsibilities
in the United States, except those affecting personnel of the Armed. Services,
have ' boei} linitod for the most part to exchange of information on suspect
individuals.
Poll collaboration on counter-eopionago plnns and operations has not yet,
-been achieved, and. neither organization is dilly acquainted with the over-all
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I)rc) rzLz oi' the of r, 0 .nco j ~r~,a
S'1ft'n col' :n r~vitias doc a not o op or st.irt at our nutioml bow.d:.rloo, it
is doairnblo that the two cgencios Est: concerned, with courtcr-oapiona,o ghoul d
rnintain ciosor relations with each other.. We have alroa,dy pointod out in
Chapter 1 the extent of the responsibility of the Centra-l-Intolligonce Ar,oncy
to inure coordination of certain count or-intolligonce activities of the
Govorr=ent. We can only observe horo that a )na.jor aspect of such coordination
is a close working rela,tionehip botroon the Office of Special Operations gril
the Fedoral Bureau of Invostigation.
COI?:JNICATIOIiS WTELLIGE' TNCE
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THE 1M FD POLICY D1T. ECTIOIN OF sUCfl IN11.11 ,TGI:'CE
To be genuinely effective, secret intelligence operation:) must be directed
toward the intollir;encc objectives of greatest importance to the Government.
Today, as ere mentioned above, the Office of Special Operations lacks the
direction which it needs to insure the maximum relevancy of its oper