NOTES ON THE SECTIONS IN THE 'DULLES' REPORT PERTAINING TO ICAPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500020059-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: February 1, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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1 February 1949
SUBJECT: NOTES ON THE SECTIONS IN THE "DULLES" REPORT PERTAINING
TO ICAPS
ICAPS has read with interest the "Dulles" Report severly criticizing
the Government's civilian intelligence activities and suggesting detailed
broad-scale reorganizations.
We note with especial interest that the element of "direction" con-
tained in the word "coordination'', so frequently used throughout this
report, is unduly emphasized. This factor is usually unacceptable
to most of the interested Agencies and individuals. wally the IAC
have insisted on "cooperation" rather than "coordination,'' so agreed
papers cannot be written in 'tprecise't language. Even cooperation, in
practice, has often been given reluctantly or on a limited scale (not
only among the IAC Agencies but within CIA itself and also within the
Departments). Accordingly, we heartily endorse the Report's statement
on Page 45 ".....coordination in such a complicated field as intelligence
cannot be achieved solely by directives and without the fullest cooperation
of the interested departments."
Whereas ICAPS is thoroughly in accord with actively directed coordination,
it fails to see how in practice this can be put into effect without real
over-riding authority for CIA. Thus, in Washington, it thinks unrealistic
the Report's statements on Pages 42 and 55: "In spite of these calculated
limitations on the authority of the CIA, it is clear that the Agency was
expected to provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated
intelligence system." ''.....lack of authority in a specific situation should
not deter the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising its responsibility
to submit recommendations so that proper coordination will result."
Although the Director of Central Intelligence is not "prohibited" by the
IAC or by other restrictions from submitting his recommendations to the
NSC without IAC approval, in practice this would constantly cause dissension
and friction with the IAC Agencies with whom this Agency must work.
Also, without such definite authority, a situation may well be "grasped"
(understood) but may not be effectively changed. It is noted on Page 41:
"The Act does not give the CIA independent authority to coordinate intelli-
gence activities"; yet many of the recommendations hinge upon having such
authority and many of CIA's alleged short-comings are due to this lack.
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Apparently the Investigators obtained most of their information on
ICAPS from others in CIA and elsewhere., as it is not always exact. It
does not reflect much of the brief discussions with the Investigators in
ICAPS. At that time, the Investigators indicated largely their concern over
the duplicative functions of the Standing Committee (which is hardly mentioned
in this Report) and the more active personal participation of the IAC
Members in substantive intelligence.
As stated on Page 16 a new agency cannot be built up effectively
and efficiently in a short time., especially when the subject is intelligence
in which there has been no long American civilian experience.
An inherently incompatible viewpoint is prevalent throughout the
report. It recognizes that compulsion will not achieve full coordination
but then adversely criticizes CIA for not being more positive., firm, and
definite in its policies and procedures with the IAC Agencies.
Throughout the report there is the impression that the authors often
wish to make changes for the sake of change. Whereas personnel is criticized
throughout the Report, we note that but few concrete recommendations have
been made, Too often their recommendations are of a very academic nature
which, in Washington, in this day and age., are too unrealistic for practicable
application.
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DETAILED COMIv1ENTS
Although the Index lists only Page ).6 as the Investigators' report
on ICAPS, there are several other specific comments on and references to
ICAPS throughout the Report, so this section will contain ICAPS' comments
on the Investigators, criticisms and suggestions as they pertain to ICAPS.
ON PAGE 4: As suggested ICAPS is already ".....composed of personnel
definitely assigned to and responsible to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence.....on a full-time basis.....". We are not sure what the Investigators
mean by how it could best be "reconstituted and strengthened" unless they
mean that it should be given staff authority for coordination and planning,
to act within CIA as well as among the IAC Agencies. The Investigators
spent but a short time on two different occasions in ICAPS, total time about
an hour, inadequate for personnel evaluation, so we think that "strengthened"
does not mean necessarily a change of personnel.
Also, ICAPS is already ".....charged, on a full-time basis, with
carrying on continuous planning for the coordination of specific intelligence
activities" and it does endeavor to ".....support the Director in fulfilling
one of his most important and difficult duties under the National Security
Act". The collateral duties of two of its members representing the Director
on the National Security Council Staff and on a planning Subcommittee of
SANACC do not detract from the staff responsibilities of ICAPS.
As CIA has become more firmly established since the original days
of its organization three years ago, there has been considerable planning
in the operating offices of CIA. and considerable working-level liaison
and coordination, so that the duties of ICAPS in the purely planning
field have naturally changed somewhat and include some high-level trouble-
shooting as well as liaison and coordination activities.
In connection with the whole question of coordination, the statement
of the Investigators on Page 5 should not be lost sight of in view of the
recurring prominence given to their criticism that there is a lack of
coordination. We quote and underline the section which is particularly
applicable and which has usually been our policy, but which in other
sections of this Report is criticized as being the undesirable method:
"In concluding the consideration of this most vital problem of coordination
of intelligence activities, it should be emphasized that coordination can
most effectively be achievef6y mutual agreementa.mong t e various agen is es".
A gical deduction is that a primary staff function of ICAPS should be to
bring about this "mutual agreement."
Coordination by mutual agreement is, and has been, the policy of
ICAPS and CIA so, naturally, perfection cannot be attained promptly or
"precisely" or imposed forcefully; yet elsewhere throughout this Report
CIA is criticized for not forcefully directing the various government
agencies engaged in intelligence along the line of centralization, even
when there is no real authority to do this granted to CIA by law or by
directives. Furthermore, none of the IAC Agencies will accept the "direction's
of CIA, an authority outside their own departments and to which they are
not primarily responsible.
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ON PAGE 9: "The Director's Planning Staff for coordination of
activities should review the question as to what subjects might appropriate-
ly be assigned to the new Research and Reports Division for central
research and report and what services now centrally performed in CIA
might be eliminated". This recommendation would put the reconstituted
ICAPS back in to planning within CIA where it was before the above-mentioned
duties were given to I & S and A & M and other CIA offices. In this we
concur.
The next sentence in this paragraph reads: "The Intelligence Advisory
Committee would be the agency to determine the allocation of work, and in
case of any failure to agree, the matter would be referred to the National
Security Councils'. This transcends the determination already arrived at
in NSCID 3, by alloting to the IAC authority to determine the work within
CIA also. In this we do not concur since it would abrogate the control
authority within his own organization of the Director of CIA.
ON PAGE 30: The paragraph about ICAPS on this page is merely a
statement of fact. As stated ICAPS is comprised of persons "nominated"
by their Departments for assisting the Director and the IAC. Nothing is
said here about divided loyalties or about not being wholly responsible to
the Director yet elsewhere in the Report these two unsubstantiated view-
points seem to be given credence.
ON PAGE )43: As stated, the IAC and ICAPS are certainly two organizations
assisting the-Director respecting coordination and this might be extended
also to OCD, but on a wholly different (operating) level. The first two
are on the planning level and the "coordination" which OCD does is ordinary
day to day business incidental to the operation of its Office in accordance
with efficient centralization, chanelizing of communications, security
requirements (Cf. Comments on OCD under heading "ON PAGE 61," etc.)
ON PAGES ).6-48: This is the principal section about ICAPS. It
refers to as a "sta unit," at the beginning of is section, but later
on indicates that it has been encumbered by "operating responsibilities".
Halversen's position with the JIG has already been taken out of ICAPS and,
we should say, more properly allocated to OCD rather than to ORE, which
these Investigators think "has almost exclusive interest" in his work.
The designations of Childs to the NSC Staff and MacCarthy to the SANACC
Subcommittee do not entail "operating responsibility". They represent the
Director at these meetings. Any demands for operational support of NSC
Staff activities are fulfilled by operating echelons of the interested
Departments or Agencies such as ORE, Policy Planning Staff of Department
of State, etc. Furthermore, the SANACC Subcommittee for Special Studies
and Evaluations is planning in peacetime for the coordinated use of
Psychological Warfare w i e) in time of war or threat of war.
As stated, ICAPS does "review the intelligence activities of the
Government" and "assists the Directors' but all "measures of coordination"
are not "initiated" within ICAPS. The IAC m- tubers or various offices in
CIA. often take the first steps in bringing to our attention new matters
requiring coordination.
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Contrary to the implications of the Report, ICAPS does "have an
intimate knowledge of the organization, responsibilities, and activities
of the various intelligence agencies". We do not, however, know what their
"priorities" are. We think that the IAC agencies would consider it
redundant to keep us informed on their own priorities, which may change
from day to day, or even from hour to hour.
Our "achievements" do not necessarily indicate "failure to appreciate
the breadth of the responsibility of the CIA for coordination of intelligence
activitiesti. When authority is lacking and when "coordination can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement", a great gap between real
accomplishments and the far higher desire to realize greater coordination
is inevitable.
Contrary to the Report's statement, ICAPS was not "originally
expected" to be the secretariat of the IAC, but did assume these duties
a year ago and is now carrying them out in conjunction with the Standing
Committee members as requested by the IAC.
"There has been confusion between the functions of ICAPS and those
of the Standing Committee". This is in large measure caused by a redundancy
in the membership of the two groups. In our opinion the Standing Committee
is unnecessary.
Contrary to the statement in the Report, ICAPS is a "staff of the
DCI"' not a "committee representing the member agencies it. We work full-time
in CIA. Although paid by our respective Departments, this does not cause
"divided loyalties".
The paragraph at the bottom of Page i7 states: "In these and other
ways ICAPS has acquired operating rather than planning functions and has
become, to some extent, a buffer between the operating parts of the
Central Intelligence Agency and outside agencies. In carrying out both
its planning and operating functions, it is not in close touch with the
intelligence branches of the Central Intelligence Agency. There are
numerous complaints that it is not only failing to carry out its own
mission properly, but is actually impeding the other parts of the Central
Intelligence Agency in carrying out theirs".
With reference to the part time "operating responsibilities"
mentioned above, ICAPS does. not know in what "other ways" ittas
acquired operating rather than planning functions. ICAPS is a "buffer"
between the operating parts of CIA and outside agencies as it was
constituted in part for this purpose. This is a necessary and desirable
function to enhance the contacts between the working level and higher
levels. Some friction has developed between the operating offices of
CIA. on the one hand and the IAC Agencies on the other when our planners
on the operating levels have actively completed direct plans, agreements
or operations, without giving adequate consideration to the overall
policies of the respective agencies.
We note that the Report states: "in carrying out both its planning
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and operating functions, it is not in close touch with the intelligence
branches of the Central Intelligence Agency". We maintain that in
our designated field we are "tin close touch". The former internal
inspection and planning functions of ICAPS were transferred to other
CIA offices a year and a half ago. If ICAPS should have the staff
authority recommended in the Report, closer touch is bound to result.
Undoubtedly there are "numerous complaints" about ICAPS, but when
any of them have been referred to us, we have endeavored to rectify
the situation. We should be glad to have the other offices in CIA
(who have apparently made these complaints) tell us how we are
"impeding the other parts of the Central Intelligence Agency in carry-
ing out their missions".
Few individuals can legitimately claim to be experienced "authorities"
on the "problems of intelligence organization". We make no such claim.
It is pointed out above that we can "grasp the nature of the responsibility
for coordination of intelligence activities" without being able to accomplish
ultimate perfection through the above mentioned "mutual agreements" and
through lack of an overriding authority which cannot impose its will on
other independent agencies. And, since ICAPS has been excluded from
internal study of CIA, the requirement for experienced "authorities on
problems of intelligence organization" is not apparent.
ON PAGES 61 and 62: As suggested, ICAPS already is "within the internal
organization o the CTA ..... set up clearly as an integral part of the
Agency..... It but under present authority it is not "charged with the task
of seeking out,studying and developing in consultation with the other parts
of the C an outside agencies, plans for the coordination of intelligence
activities". (Applicable words underscored.)
We do not understand how ICAPS can become a "small's"coordination
division" devoting itself to planning and at the samime direct the
carrying out of "certain current tasks" of QCD, which are operating functions.
OCD is "constantly dealing with the day to day working level problems
of collection". If these cannot be solved on the working level under
standing instructions and if these standing instructions impede its
procedures, ICAPS could well take up interdepartmental coordination
measures to smooth out these matters if it had the authority to seek out
and study internal CIA procedures.
It would assist the coordination of intelligence activities if the
"Coordination Division" had the authority to assure the adequate implementa-
tion of various directives - NSCID's, DCIts, etc. - as it is known that in
some instances offices, within CIA and within the IAC Agencies, do not always
carry them out. .. 7411
-a- '
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