STATE'S FOUR PAPERS RE NSC 50

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500020001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1949
• Content Type: MF

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ER-0-8206
30 December 1949
MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, GENERAL STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE,, HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP,
THE JOINT STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SUBJECT: State's Four Papers re NSC 50.
ENCLOSURE: Report on the Four Papers submitted to the
Director of Central Intelligence by the Special
Asst. to the Secretary of State for Research &
Intelligence, dated 21 Dec. 1949.
1. With reference to previous memoranda and discussions on the
above subject, there is enclosed, as requested, the CIA Report on
the Four Papers submitted by the State Department.
2. The Recommendations in each instance show the position of
this Agency on the problems under consideration and the contemplated
action.
PC/dhl R. H. HILLENKOETTER
COAPS Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central
DISTRIBUTION: Intelligence
Signer's Copy
Executive
General Counsel
Chief, I&S
All Assistant Directors State Dept. review completed
General Magruder
Admiral Souers
CAPS
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21 December 1949
Report on the Four Papers
Submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence
by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Research and Intelligence
on 2 August 1919
I. Coordination of Intelligence Activities
II. ......... Production of National Intelligence
III. ........ Research and Reports
IV. Political Summaries
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STATEtS FOUR PAPERS
("COAPS" is substituted for "ICAPS" throughout this paper
after 1 October 19)49)
a. "clearly indicate the areas of agreement and
b. "isolate and define the issues and areas on which there is
disagreement."
1. On 2 August 1949, TvMr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.., Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, transmitted to the
Director of Central Intelligence four papers containing recommendations for
implementation "at the earliest feasible time," which he wished to have con-
sidered by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The DCI submitted copies
of these papers to the IAC members by circular memorandum dated 5 August
1949.
2. A preliminary examination of the State proposals was made within
CIA prior to the Intelligence Advisory Committee meeting of 19 August 1949
at which it was decided 'tto pass (the four papers) on to the Standing Com-
mittee to see what can be worked out and refer them back to the IAC members."
3. On 24 August 1949, the State Department member of ICAPS met with
Mr. Allen Evans to clarify certain aspects of the presentation made by the
State Department.
4. Or 30 August 1919 the IAC Standing Committee met to consider the
State Department proposals. The goal of this meeting, which was not
realized, was to evaluate the State recommendations and express Standing
Committee indorsement or lack of indorsement on each one. Much discussion
of substantially differing viewpoints dissipated progress-at this meeting.
5. On 8 September 1949 the IAC Standing Committee met again, to con-
sider a draft of a report to the Intelligence Advisory Committee on State
Department's Problem I - Coordination. At the outset of this meeting the
Department of Defense members submitted for the first time a prepared paper
expressing their views on the Department of State proposals. Basically the
Defense paper supported many of the State recommendations and asked that the
entire series of problems be examined and suggested solutions be offered by
ICAPS.
6. A report on these Four Problems was prepared as a result of these
discussions, and on 1 November 1949 the Director of Central Intelligence
sent to the IAC two reports -- one of which was concurred in by all of the
Standing Committee except the State member, who recommended in the second
separate short report that the proposals of the Department of State be re-
ferred to COAPS "for preparation of a staff study which will:
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7. A staff report by COAPS on the Four Problems of State met with the
indorsement of most of the IAC members in response to the DCI memorandum of
1 November 1949.
2.
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PROBLEM I - COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
State Recommendation 1:
"That COMPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of,
and responsible to, the DCI, be composed of members contributed
by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not 'repre-
senting' the agency, and be headed by a chief who will also be
the Executive Secretary of the IAC."
This recommendation describes the present situation as regards the Chief
of Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff and the member from the Depart-
ment of State. The "joint staff" concept has not been clearly established
in the case of the members contributed by-the military departments. The
words "Executi.ve Secretary" should be changed, however, to "Secretariat" to
cover the staff work essential for promoting efficiency at the IAC meetings
and at the same time to prevent conflict with the concept of single re-
sponsibility in operations to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Conclusion:
The functions of COI,PS, as part of the CIA. organization, have been
established and clearly enumerated by the Director of Central Intelligence.
These duties cover the viewpoints expressed by the Department of State.
Recommendation s
That a memorandum from the DCI to the IAC members indicate that COAPS,
as his staff, will, among other duties, accomplish the staff work on all
problems being brought to the attention of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
3.
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State Recommendation 2:
"That matters of coordination be referred to COAPS for study
and recommendation by the DCI, or through the DCI by the IAC,
but that COAPS itself may submit to the DCI, or through the DCI
to the IAC, recommendations which it considers appropriate for
consideration."
This recommendation describes accurately a relationship whereby the
Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff serves the DCI as a staff unit,
recognizing that problems may be referred to the unit for staff study and
that COAPS may itself initiate action when required.
Inherent in the wording of this recommendation, however, is the
"Board of Directors" philosophy -- giving little or no recognition to the
principle of "forthright initiative and leadership" of the Director of
Central Intelligence in the coordination of intelligence activities. NSC
50 has confirmed that the IAC is to function as an advisory committee.
Conclusions:
1. Although COAPS works as a staff unit of the DCI, the Intelligence
Advisory Committee agencies must recognize, if progress is to be achieved,
a, that COAPS is the only permanently established unit of
organization available for staff analysis and formulation of appro-
priate recommendations;
b. that the DCI is not looking to COAPS for only favorable
answers on any problems under examination and that the agencies should
not require similar partiality;
c. that COAPS, composed of individuals contributed by the par-
ticipating agencies, can and does achieve objectivity in its evalua-
tion of problems.
2. COAPS should assume more progressive initiative in exploring areas
of difficulty in the coordination process and in preparing adequately items
for Intelligence Advisory Committee consideration.
1. That a memorandum be sent by the DCI to the IAC members notifying
them that COAPS will be available to help appraise and recommend solutions
to problems of intelligence coordination.
It.
Er
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2. That COAPS assume responsibility for preparation of the items
which are to be placed on the agenda of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
meetings and in so doing COAPS be guided by the principle that with adequate
prior staff study it is not necessary that all such items be first referred
to the Standing Committee before consideration by the Intelligence Advisory
Committee itself.
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State Recommendation 3:
"That the representation on the Standing Committee be the
same as that of the IAC,?and that the Standing Committee serve
as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on
an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC."
Discussion:
From a practical standpoint the Intelligence Advisory Committee Stand-
ing Committee cannot serve the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a "staff
committee" since it has no permanent continuous working status. The main
advantage of the existence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee Standing
Committee is the clement of time-saving to CIA in securing departmental view-
points in round-table discussions on interdepartmental problems. Thus, in
producing staff studies for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, COAPS is
enabled to get agency reaction on these studies before putting them in final
form for IAC action. Hence, the Standing Committee is the proving ground for
testing the Staff Study, but in this process the Standing Committee should
not be considered a barrier or layer between the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Accordingly, formality of
procedure, demanding official actions such as motions and votes are non-
essential in Standing Committee meetings. The adoption of parliamentary
procedures in such meetings would servo no purpose since the Standing Com-
mittee, representatives of an advisory committee, can formulate no binding
decisions.
Since meetings of any committee are non-productive unless some prior
analysis is made of the problems to be discussed, the only items which the
IAC should refer to the IAC Standing Committee "to consider on an inter-
agency basis" are those upon which some staff work is already performed to
clearly define the issue involved. This may have been done by the IAC
agency introducing a particular problem. In most instances, however, pro-
blems requiring consideration "on an interagency basis," being beyond the
pale of interest of any one department fall within the coordinating responsi-
bility of the Director of Central Intelligence, and, as such, should be re-
ferred to him for adequate and proper consideration. In such "consideration"
he will, of course, test his tentative findings with the Intelligence Advisory
Committee before arriving at a decision.
The wording in the recommendation limits the kind of problems, that
the Standing Committee may consider, to those 'referred to it by the IAC."
This restriction serves no useful puirpoue-,
That the Recommendation of the Department of State be accepted if changed
to read as follows:
"That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same
as that of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and that the Stand-
ing Committee consider all problems referred to it on an interagency
basis so as to speed up the attainment of departmental views on
interdepartmental. issues."
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State Recommendation 4:
"That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research
programs primarily through the Estimates Division, whose primary
function should be such coordination, in accordance with the
following principles:"
Discussion:
The primary function of any "Estimates Division" is to prepare in-
telligence estimates. Efficient work in this field will bring about a
certain degree of coordination as a by-product. However, whether or not
CIA establishes an organizational unit to be known as the "Estimates
Division" is an internal decision to be made by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
"Research,'F as such, is an undertaking very essential in producing
an intelligence estimate and "research program" at the most is a segment
of the total production function. CIA's coordinating responsibility goes
far beyond the purview of just "research," embracing also coordination in
many other fields; e.g., collection, dissemination.
How CIA carries on its coordinating responsibility is to be determined
by the Director of Central Intelligence, and hence these "principles" of
conduct are at the most suggestions for DCI to consider.
Conclusion:
Since the general subject being considered in State's first "Problem"
is "Coordination of Intelligence Activities," the lead paragraph of
Recommendation ) should be reworded to express more accurately CIA's
position.
Recommendations:
1. That -it be recognized that the following principles are not
all-inclusive,
2. That State Recommendation 1: be reworded to read:
"That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility in accord-
ance with the following primary principles;"
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First Principle
State Recommendation 4a:
"CIA will constitute itself the center of information on
all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, including current
research intelligence projects;"
Discussion:
The word "activities" places a false limitation on the scope of CIA
functions. Knowledge of "all U.S. foreign intelligence" is sufficiently
general to include information on activities.
As a central producer of national intelligence and as a coordinator
of all intelligence in the federal structuro,CIA should be the recognized
repository of all information pertaining to intelligence undertakings
planned, in progress, and completed in the I.lC agencies.
To achieve this objective the IAC agencies themselves must take the
initiative in maintaining strong world-wide collection facilities and in
guaranteeing the free flow of raw information, finished departmental
products, and other pertinent data to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Conclusion:
To comply with the mission of CIA, this statement of principle should
be reworded so as to be more inclusive of CIA's total responsibility.
That this statement of principle be accepted if reworded to read:
"CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all
U.S. foreign intelligence matters, including agency programs,
projects, reports, and activities, of all types, and also on the
nature and scope of the basic supporting data."
8.
"a RFT
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State Recommendation 4b:
"CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of
the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall depart-
mental regulation;"
Discussion:
CIAts authority to comprehend fully the,agency intelligence activities
and functions is circumscribed seriously by the present wording of NSCID 1,
wherein it is specified that CIA may see only "intelligence materials" and
these with the express permission of the department.
The last phrase of the principle, "subject to overall departmental
regulation," could hamper progress if it were applied too generally.
There is no objection to its usage if meant to cover only the security
regulations of each department and agency.
1. The general acceptance of this principle by all IAC agencies
would strengthen and facilitate the responsibility of CIA in the field
of interdepartmental coordination.
2. The principle might well be clarified so that there will be no
misunderstanding regarding the kind of departmental regulations which are
meant to apply.
Recommendations:
1. That this principle be adopted by CIA for IAC application.
2. That the IAC members instruct their organizations in adequate de-
tail regarding full recognition of this principle at all levels throughout
each agency.
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Third Principle
State Recommendation LGc:
"CIA will recognize that it should have active liaison re-
sponsibility to other agencies as well as receiving liaison
from those agencies;"
Discussion:
The goal expressed by this recommendation is practical and worthwhile,
and is a responsibility concomitant with the "free access" thoughts ex-
pressed in the last proposed principle. The "free flow" idea should be
a two-way endeavor applicable to persons as well as materials and informa-
tion. This interagency liaison should exist at policy levels as well as
at working levels.
Conclusions
The efficiency of present liaison functions between the IAC agencies
and CIA is a subject worthy of proper examination.
1. That CIA examine the condition of present liaison activities
between CIA and the IAC agencies, and
2. Based upon the findings of such examination, issue the necessary
operating instructions.
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Fourth Principle
State Recommendation )td;
"CIA will effect coordination as much by positive action
in stimulating appropriate intelligence effort as by negative
action in preventing undesirable duplications;"
Discussion:
This principle ties in with the "forthright initiative and leadershiptt
concept of the Dulles Report and NSC 50.. Its adoption by CIA and its un-
qualified recognition and acceptance by the IAC agencies would strengthen
the administrative role of the Director of Central Intelligence in effect-
ing coordination.
1. The "positive action" approach is undoubtedly the more acceptable
method for stronger coordination efforts.
2. To work properly, this principle must be accepted fully by the
Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies so as not to raise a question of
"interference" with departmental undertaking when the DCI takes action in
overall planning to stimulate "appropriate intelligence" efforts in the
agencies.
Recommendation:
That this principle be adopted to guide CIAts actions in all fields
of coordination, after receiving agency guarantees of full cooperation.
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Fifth Principle
State Recommendation lie :
"CIA will recognize that requests.for intelligence other
than national intelligence, as defined, shall be forwarded for
action to the agencies in accordance with established alloca-
tions and existing programs;"
Discussion:
Requests coming to CIA are for intelligence relating to the national
security, and, as such, are not earmarked "national," "departmental," or
any other category. Neither does the reques:tor specify that the desired
intelligence estimate must be prepared initially by any IAC department
or agency. Accordingly, even though the request on CIA may ask for an
intelligence product which is very largely political, this does not mean
that CIA's responsibility to the roquestor is fully discharged by merely
calling upon the Department of State for the production of the estimate.
Usually a departmental intelligence estimate will not be allowed to
go beyond the limits of the department unless the findings agree with
policy. Hence all departmental intelligence products are framed in de-
partmental policy viewpoints, and, as such, lose their objectivity when
judged by intelligence standards.
Regardless of this deficiency, however, CIA utilizes departmental
intelligence products and seeks departmental concurrences in the task of
producing national intelligence estimates. The urgency of the request will
determine whether the work thereunder falls into the category of "normal,"
"urgent," or "exceptional" as specified in DCI 3/1.
Conclusions:
1. "National Intelligence, as defined" being the basis for this
recommendation by the Department of State, we should give consideration to
improving the definition of National Intelligence.
2... The IAC agencies should realize:
a.., That CIA was so constituted, and so placed in the Executive
Structure to enable it to prepare national intelligence estimates in
a completely objective manner, without necessity for reference to,
or deference to, established policy.
b... Because of this important factor, CIA, in producing national
intelligence estimates,..has perse production responsibility even in
the fields of dominant interest which are allocated by directive to
the departments."
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Recommendations:
1. That NSCID 3 be amended to include a new definition of National
Intelligence as indicated in this report.
2. That DCI 3/1 and DCI 3/2 then be scrutinized in the light of an
amended NSCID 3 for proper emphasis and meaning.
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S ith Principle
State Recommendation if
"CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance
to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in
some cases the temporary assignments of personnel to the agencies.."
The suggested norm that "coordination also implies assistance" is an
unsound thought for general application. There may be, and have been
exceptional instances, when it was expedient to give the departments and
agencies some personnel or financial aid. The NIS program is an example
of this type. However, it must be recognized clearly that this help was
not to be considered a precedent for other undertakings, but was rather
an exception to the normal operating practices of CIA.
This principle should be rejected as a substantially unsound inter-
pretation of the function of coordination.
1. That CIA non-concur in this principle and,
2. Whenever an IAC agency is given financial or other assistance by
CIA it should be understood clearly that a particular purpose is to be
served by such act, and that CIA does not prepare, an could not properly
prepare, a budget to take care of anything except "contingency" cases of
this nature.
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PROBLEM II - PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE"
State Recommendation la:
"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national
intelligence estimates:
"a. That national intelligence applies only to intelligence
which is interdepartmental in substance;"
Discussion:
This recommendation expresses the State viewpoint on the fundamental
differences between State and CIA regarding the production of national intel-
ligence. CIA feels that national intelligence cannot be defined exclusively
in terms of being interdepartmental in substance, but that the definition must
embrace also the thought (based on the National Security Act of 19+7) that any
intelligence (regardless of category) "relating to the national security" is
national intelligence, for which the Director of Central Intelligence, as the
sole objective producer of intelligence in the federal government, not hemmed
in by departmental policy prejudices, must assume full production responsibility.
In examining the present definition of National Intelligence in NSCID 3
many are prone to overlook the second and shorter definition of National Intel-
ligence appearing in paragraph fit- of NSCID 1, wherein it is stated:
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence
relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national
intelligence."
1. The viewpoint expressed in this recommendation is too narrow to
cover the essential components of National Intelligence, and
2. The Director of Central Intelligence should not concur in the concept
that this recommendation be placed before the IAC for agreement.
Recommendation:
1. That this State recommendation be rejected as inapplicable and
inappropriate as it fails to recognize the responsibilities imposed by law.
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State Recommendation lb:
"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national
intelligence estimates:
"b. That national intelligence should be developed with
a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication
of departmental intelligence activities;"
Discussion
This recommendation completely overlooks the fact that much of the
"duplication of departmental intelligence activities" exists between depart-
mental agencies themselves. Though "duplication," as construed generally, is
a wasteful endeavor, the thought should never be used when applied to intel-
ligence production without being modified by the word "undesirable." Though
each agency of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, including the Central
Intelligence Agency, has had allocated to it by National Security Council
Directive a field of dominant interest, "it is recognized that the staff
intelligence of each of the departments must be broader in scope (underscor-
ing supplied) than any allocation of collection responsibility or recognition
of dominant interest might indicate."
A second grave weakness in the recommendation is that the words "maximum
use of departmental facilities" convey the erroneous notion that each depart-
ment should prepare "its" section of a national intelligence estimate, or that
national intelligence is merely the combining or stapling together of depart-
mental intelligence products.
The principle that CIA should recognize the departmental facilities and
should look to them for assistance whenever possible is worthwhile as long as
this is done in a realistic manner.
Conclusions:
1. This recommendation should not be accepted as written until the IAC
agencies understand and accept uniformly the meaning of "National Intelligence."
2. The IAC agencies should recognize that National Intelligence is not
merely the editing and joining of departmental products, neither is it just
the blending and merging of departmental viewpoints but rather is an overall
objective evaluation analysis which transcends the competency, capacity, and
policies of any department of government.
3. CIA should never subscribe to any recommendation or principle which
overlooks the reality that "duplication" in the intelligence field, when
within reasonable bounds, is more a blessing than a curse because of the adage
that "Two minds are better than one."
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Recommendations:
1. That CIA not accept this recommendation until the basic problem of
definition of "National Intelligence" is solved.
2. That even then this recommendation be rewritten before acceptance so
a. "Duplication" be modified to read "undesirable duplication,"t and
b. The "undesirable duplication" concept be understood to apply
among the IAC agencies themselves as well as to the relationship between
CIA and the agencies.
3. That the IAC agencies understand clearly that any such recommendation
as this lays a positive burden on the agencies themselves to expedite an ef-
ficient and complete "free flow" of departmental raw information and finished
departmental intelligence products to the Central Intelligence Agency.
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State Recommendation lc:
"I. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national
intelligence estimates:
"c. That except in crisis situations no step be taken in the
preparation of national estimates before consultation with appropriate
agencies."
Discussion:
This recommendation misplaces the emphasis of the basic fact that the
Central Intelligence Agency is the SOLE unit of government charged with the
production of National Intelligence. In carrying out this function CIA cannot
seek direct or indirect prior permission or approval. from any of the IAC
agencies. CIA assumes full responsibility for the content and format of all
national intelligence estimates, and hence CIA has to determine the mode to
follow in the production of each such estimate.
However, CIA acknowledges the benefit to be achieved by tapping agency
facilities. DCI 3/1 establishes clearly what shall be done in "normal,`
flurgent" and "exceptional" circumstances to seek agency participation in the
production of national intelligence estimates. Agency participation even in
Crisis Situations is now in the process of being formalized.
Conclusions:
1. To follow this recommendation would put fetters on the operations
of the Central Intelligence Agency, by subordinating the function of produc-
ing National Intelligence to the policies and procedures of the departmental
activities.
2. In showing the proper spirit of cooperation with the Intelligence
Advisory Committee agencies, CIA has already gone further than the exception
called for in this recommendation by asking for departmental comments even in
"crisis situations."
3. To meet its deadline for furnishing a national intelligence estimate
to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and others, the Central Intelligence Agency cannot be dependent upon
departmental promises of completion which are subject to the determination of
departmental policy officials.
Recommendations:
1. That this State recommendation be rejected as being at variance with
the mission and objectives of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. That after "National Intelligence" has been understood, the IAC agencie
recognize fully their position in the development of the national intelligence
products.
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State Recommendation 2:
"That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates
on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the
request of a member."
Discussion:
This recommendation has two major weaknesses:
a. The IAC is looked upon as a Board of Directors to assume
ultimate responsibility for the content of CIA's products - i.e.,
National Intelligence estimates, and
b. The recommendation is contrary to the conclusions of the NSC
with respect to the Dulles Report. NSC 50 stated that the Director and
the IAC should not be bound by the concept of collective responsibility
because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence
to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned.
Furthermore, there is no cogent reason why it should always be necessary
to discuss dissents at IAC Meetings. The controlling factor for discussing
national intelligence estimates at IAC Meetings should be the importance
attached to the need for such discussion by any member of the IAC, rather
than the mere existence of a difference of opinion as to the conclusions of
the estimate.
We must recognize, however, that our present system on agency concurrences
does not achieve the same end as would be derived by simultaneous collective
discussion. Thus, some sympathetic consideration should be given to the fact
that collective discussion rather than bringing out a weak "common denominator"
of thought, might, if adequately staffed, add to the potency of the majority
findings, might eliminate minority dissents without weakening the major con-
clusions, or might evolve new and even strengthened judgments on the premise
under consideration.
Conclusions:
1. The recommended action is too broad and sweeping in calling for
Intelligence Advisory Committee discussion on "all national intelligence
estimates upon which there is substantial disagreement.,..."
2. IAC discussion should not be discouraged, but should be premised on
the need as desired by any one member rather than on the existence of a
substantial dissenting opinion.
Recommendations:
1. That the State recommendation be reworded to read:
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"That the IAC discuss estimates upon the request of a member;
provided that, in the opinion of the requesting member, there is a
substantive and important fault in the estimate to be discussed."
2. That the recommendation as reworded be accepted.
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State Recommendation 3:
"That COAPS review and make recommendations for any revision of
procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis
situations, such procedures to be, as far as possible, in accordance with
the principles outlined in existing NSCID's. NSC 50 and Recommendation
1 above.
Discussion:
COAPS studied the need for a formal procedure to govern in crisis situa-
tions, and drafted. and sent to the IAC agencies a proposed. DCI on this subject.
The Army and some other members wished to have the Army's phraseology as an
amendment to NSCID No. 1, so the agreed-upon substance has been referred to
the NSC to determine the method of issuance.
Conclusion:
It is thought that the objective of the State recommendation has now been
reached.
Recommendation:
No further action is required until a reply is received from the NSC.
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PROBLEM III - RESEARCH AND REPORTS
"That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelli-
gence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI
on the advice of the IAC."
Discussion:
This recommendation conflicts with the view contained in 1+e of State
Paper I, which says that CIA will accomplish nothing beyond what is known as
"National Intelligence." If "National Intelligence" is redefined in adequate
fashion this State recommendation would apparently cause no restrictive limita-
tion on the production responsibility of CIA. However, appearances are some-
times deceptive and such would be the case in this instance. The Director
of Central Intelligence does not have authority to prescribe fields of common
concern, nor does the IAC. The National Security Act is most specific in
stating that CIA shall "perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence
agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;" and
furthermore that CIA shall "perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct." (Underscoring supplied) The recom-
mendation also restates the Board of Directors" philosophy that the Central
Intelligence Agency shall undertake what is prescribed by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee.
Conclusions:
1. This State recommendation is too restrictive as the Director of Central
Intelligence must comply with requests from the President, the National Security
Council, and others.
2. This State recommendation is erroneous in content by ascribing a
responsibility to the DCI and the Intelligence Advisory Committee which
belongs, by law, to the National Security Council.
Recommendation:
1. That the State recommendation be rejected.
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State Recommendation 2:
"That, on a priority basis, COAPS prepare for consideration in
IAC recommendations on the delineations of fields of common concern."
Discussion:
The "fields of common concern" are those areas of production which do
not fall wholly into the allocated responsibility of any one department or
agency. Thus under NSCID 3 "Economic, Scientific, and Technological Intel-
ligence" are assigned to "Each agency in accordance with its respective
needs."
Since the issuance of NSCID 3, a permanent interdepartmental Scientific
Intelligence Committee has been established after long delays under DCI 3/3
"to plan, support and coordinate the production of scientific intelligence as
it affects the national security." By this action the scientific and techno-
logical "fields of common concern" have not only been delineated, but have
also been put under coordination control.
Conclusions:
1. Best coordination in fields of common concern is not achieved by
mere "delineation" of the fields.
2. Continuous problems of coordination exist in those fields.
3. The precedent of establishing the Scientific Intelligence Committee
should carry much weight in considering problems in the economic intelligence
field.
4. Because of vaster scope and more complexities in the economic field
there is even greater justification for establishing an Economic Intelligence
Committee.
Recommendations:
1. That the State recommendation be rejected as not affording a true
solution in the Economic Intelligence field.
2. That there be established by the Director of Central Intelligence
a permanent interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of-a repre-
sentative of CIA, to plan, support and coordinate the production of economic
intelligence as it affects the national security and that such committee be
known as "The Economic Intelligence Committee."
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PAPER - IV
PROBLEM IV - POLITICAL SUI ARIES
State Recommendation 1:
"That COAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration
by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political
summaries, both daily and weekly."
Discussion:
As the intelligence facility of the National Security Council and the
President, the Central Intelligence Agency must continually and systematically
report all developments, political, economic, military, and otherwise, which
materially affect or have a bearing upon United States national security and
objectives abroad..
While CIA',s Daily and Weekly Summaries are based to a considerable degree
upon Department of State materials, the major cause for this situation derives
from the fact that the Department of State makes its highest level intelli-
gence and operational materials, which have utility for intelligence purposes,
available to the Central Intelligence Agency whereas the Departments of Army,
Navy, and Air Force normally do not provide operational details. It is hoped
that this situation will be improved. Moreover, in periods of relative peace,
the bulk of intelligence is of a political and economic, rather than military,
nature.
The Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence summaries are the only
ones designed primarily for the President and the National Security Council.
Each departmental intelligence agency is authorized to produce such current
publications as are required to meet its own departmental needs.
Conclusion:
The CIA Daily Summary and Weekly Summary are not designed to be only
"political summaries." They are issued as current intelligence under Para-
graph I of DCI 3/1.
Recommendation:
1. That the State recommendation be rejected.
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