THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 196
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1949
• Content Type: MF

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Index to the Dulles Rep rt (continued)
Pearl Harbor 5
personnel
problems 36-37
service or civilian 37-38
production of intelligence 5-7, 65-78, 83-87
publicity
avoidance if possible 35
coordination role of t A to be stressed 12, 36, 124
Research and Intelligence Staff - Department of State
CIA relations 157-158
conflict with State policy makers 155-157
inadequacies 13
organization 153, 159-160
responsibilities 152, 153-156
"Research and Reports Divisions" suggested 8, 62, 83
scientific intelligence
coordination 55, 56
coordination failures 3-4, 88-89
National Intelligence Estimates treatment 7
OSO branch 112
f ,"Research and Reports Divisiori19, 90-91
secret intelligence
CIA responsibilities 108-122
importance increasing 107-108
Z policy direction 127
Secret operations relations 13%-,132'
seQp1ty 122-124.
secret operations
OPC setup 132-133
."Operations Division" proposed 134
secret intelligence relations 131-132
security
improvements suggested 35-36
OSO field operations 122-124
problems 34-35
service intelligence agencies
organization 146-149
responsibilities 12-13, 139-146
State, Department of
CIA liaison 1, 26
intelligence duties 151-161 (Research and Intelligence Staff)
policy direction for OSO 127
secret activities liaison (OPC, etc.) 116-117
training for secret intelligence wori 113
United States Communication Intelligence Board
duties 52
establishment 51
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
and
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
William H. Jackson
Mathias F. Correa
I January 1949
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31
AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION
OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS
IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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January 15, 1949
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Mr. Sidney W. Souers
Executive Secretary
Gentlemen:
In accordance with the terms of the memorandum to the under-
signed from Mr. Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council, dated February 13, 1948, as supplemented by his
memorandum of March 17, 1948,* we submit herewith our report on "The
Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence."
On January 13, 1948, the National Security Council recommended to
the President that a group comprising individuals not in Government
service should make a "comprehensive, impartial, and objective survey of
the organization, activities, and personnel of the Central Intelligence
Agency." The group was asked to report to the Counci_1 its findings and
recommendations on the following matters:,
"(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the present organi-
zational structure of CIA.
"(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.
"(c) The relationship of these activities to those of other
Departments and Agencies.
"(d) The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel."
As a result of this action, the present Survey Group was created and
the undersigned appointed by the National Security Council with the approval
* See Annexes No. 1 and 2 for the texts of these two memoranda which
constitute the terms of reference for this survey.
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of the President. The terms of the resolution approved by the National
Security Council were communicated to the Group on February 13, 1948.
Following discussions with the undersigned regarding the scope of
the survey, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council,
with the approval of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and
Air Force, sent to the Survey Group on March 17, 1948, a second memo-
randum which constituted an extension of the scope of the survey as
originally set forth by the National Security Council. In particular,
this memorandum included the following provisions:
"The survey will comprise primarily a thorough and compre-
hensive examination of the structure, administration, activities
and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency
as outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council.
It will also include an examination of such intelligence activi-
ties of other Government Departments and Agencies as relate to
the national security, in order to make recommendations for their
effective operation and over-all coordination, subject to the
understanding that the Group will not engage in an actual physical
examination of departmental intelligence operations (a) outside
of Washington or (b) in the collection of communications intelli-
gence. On behalf of the National Security Council, I will under-
take to seek the cooperation in this survey of those Government
Departments and Agencies not represented on the Council which have
an interest in intelligence as relates to national security.
"It should be understood that the Survey of the Central
Intelligence Agency and its relationship to other Departments and
Agencies will be done for and with the authority of the National
Security Council. The survey of the intelligence activities of
the Departments of State, Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
however, will be for and with the authority of the respective
heads of those Departments."
It was also provided that the Survey Group should submit from time
to time recommendations on individuals problems, and that problems con-
cerning the Central Intelligence Agency should be given priority over
those involving other agencies.
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The Survey Group has submitted two special reports to the National
Security Council, each one in connection with particular problems being
considered by the Council and its members. The first of these reports,
dated May 3, 1948, dealt with
The second interim report, dated May 13, 1948, dealt
with the "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."
The present report is based on an examination and appraisal of our
national intelligence structure and operations as created by the National
Security Act of 1947 and developed in the Central Intelligence Agency and
the individual departments and agencies concerned with national security.
In accordance with the directive from the National Security Council,
emphasis has been placed upon the Central Intelligence Agency, but there
has also been an examination of the principal departmental intelligence
agencies in order to determine their scope in the field of intelligence,
and their relations to each other and to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Our examination has been confined almost entirely to the over-all intelli-
gence organization and activities in the Washington headquarters of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State, Army, Navy and
Air Force.
We have met with members of the directorate and personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency and with representatives of other agencies.
With the assistance of our staff, we have consulted approximately 300
persons who by virtue of their present position or past experience are
familiar with intelligence problems. In addition, a series of confer-
ences were held at which officials of all of the intelligence agencies
were invited to submit their recommendations and suggestions and discuss
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them with the Group. These conferences were attended by representatives
from the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Staff,
Research and Development hoard and Atomic Energy Commission.
In conclusion, we desire to record our appreciation for the effective
work of the staff members of the Survey Group, Robert Blum, Joseph Larocque,
Jr., Wallace A. Sprague and Edward L. Saxe, in assembling data with regard
to our national intelligence organization and in assisting the members of
the Survey Group in carrying out the examination of our intelligence
structure on which this report is based.
Faithfully yours,
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mathias F. Correa
William H. Jackson
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Letter of Transmittal
Summary . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Chapter I
Introduction: The Intelligence Problem in the
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
Chapter II
National Intelligence and the National Security
Act of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
The Duties of the Central Intelligence
Agency under the National Security Act . . . .
21
Control over the Central Intelligence Agency .
24
The General Mission of the Central Intelligence
Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Conclusions and Recommlendations. . . . . . . .
27
Chapter III
The Organization and Administration of the
Central Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . .
29
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29
Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
Conclusions and Reconnnendations. . . . . . . .
38
Chapter IV
The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the Coordination of Intelligence
Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
The Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . .
41
The Organization and Operation of the Machinery
for Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Intelligence Advisory Committee. . . . . . . . 43
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Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4+6
Office of Collection and Dissemination . . . . .
1.8
National Security Council Intelligence
Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
The Degree of Coordination Achieved. . . . . . .
53
Scientific Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . .
55
Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
Affecting the National Security. . . . . . . . .
56
Communications Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . .
58
Proposals for Improved Coordination. . . . . . .
60
Conclusions and Re?commnendations. . . . . . . .
63
Chapter V The
Age
Responsibility of the Central*Intelligence
ncy for National Intelligence Estimates. . . . .
65
The Mandate under the National Security
Act and the Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
The Concept of National Intelligence Estimates .
68
The Organization and Activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency for the Production of Na-
tional Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70
Proposals for Improving the Production of Na-
tional Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
76
Conclusions and Recommendations. . . . . . . . .
81
Chapter VI Servioes.of Common Concern: Intelligence Research
and Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
83
Proposed Research and Reports Division . . . . .
83
Periodical Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
81+
Miscellaneous Reports and Memoranda. . . . . . .
86
The National Intelligence Survey . . . . . . . .
87
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Economic, Scientific and Technological
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Chapter VII Services of Common Concern: The Collection of
Overt Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
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Foreign Documents Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . 104
Chapter VIII Services of Common Concern: The Collection of
Secret Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
The Charter of the Central Intelligence Agency
to Conduct Secret Intelligence Activities . . . 108
Organization of the Office of Special
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Field Activities of Covert Intelligence . . . . 117
Security of Secret Intelligence Activities . . . 122
Counter-Espionage . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Communications Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . 126
The Need for Policy Direction of Secret
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
General Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Chapter DC Services of Common Concern: The Conduct of
Secret Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131%
Relations between Secret Intelligence and
Secret Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
The Office of Policy Coordination . . . . . 132
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . 134+
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Chapter X The Direction of the Central Intelligence Agency . 135
General Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
The Question of Civilian Direction . . . . . . 136
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . 138
Chapter XI The Service Intelligence Agencies . . . . . . . . 139-
Mission and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . 139
Coordination of Service Intelligence Agencies 141
The Status of Intelligence in the Services . 146
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . 149
Chapter XII The Intelligence Functions of the Department
of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
The Research and Intelligence Staff . . . . . . 152
Intelligence Relations between the State
Department and Outside Agencies . . . . . . . . 157
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . 161
Chapter XIII Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
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Page
1. Survey Group Terms of Reference (I): Memorandum dated
February 13, 1948, from Sidney W. Souers, Executive
Secretary, National Security Council. . . . . . . . . . . 165
2. Survey Group Tarms of Reference (II): Memorandum dated
March 17, 1948, from Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secre-
tary, National Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3. Presidential letter dated January 22, 1946, creating the
Central Intelligence Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. . . . . 171
5. Chart: Central Intelligence Agency Organization as of
January 1, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6. Table: Personnel Strength of Central Intelligence Agency,
as of December 24, 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1:
"Duties and Responsibilities" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
8. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2:
"Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad". . . . . . 178
9. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3:
"Coordination of Intelligence Production. . . . . . . . . 180
10. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4:
"National Intelligence Objectives". . . . . . . . . . . . 184
11. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5:
"Espionage and Counter-Espionage Operations". . . . . . . 185
12. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6:
"Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring" . . . . . . . . . 186
13. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7:
"Domestic Exploitation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
14. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 8:
"Biographical Data on Foreign Scientific and Technol-
ogical Personalities" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
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The primary object of this survey has been the Central Intelligence Agency,
its organization and activities, and the relationship of these activities to
the intelligence work of other Government agencies. Examination has been made
of these other intelligence agencies only to the extent that their activities
bear upon the carrying out by the Central Intelligence Agency of its assigned
functions.
SUMMARY
Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 19+7 creates the Central
Intelligence Agency as an independent agency under the direction of the National
Security Council. It gives to the Council broad powers in the assignment of
functions to the Central Intelligence Agency and creates a framework upon which
a sound intelligence system can be built. The Central Intelligence Agency has
been properly placed under the National Security Council for the effective
carrying out of its assigned function. It should, however, be empowered and
encouraged to establish, through its Director, closer liaison with the two
members of the National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends and who
should be the main recipients of its product--the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense.
The National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the National
Security Council, imposes upon the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility
for carrying out three essential functions:
(1)
(2)
The coordination of intelligence activities;
The correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the na-
tional security, which has been interpreted by directive as meaning the produc-
tion of national intelligence;
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(3) The performance centrally of certain intelligence services of common
concern. These include services of a static nature, such as research in fields
of common usefulness, and operational services such as the collection through
the central agency of secret intelligence.
These three functions constitute the basis of an integrated system of in-
telligence and they have'been used as the frame of reference for the examina-
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency and the related activities of other in-
telligence agencies of the Government represented on the National Security
Council, particularly the Department of State and the Departments in the Na-
tional Military Establishment.
No amendment to the provision of the Act relating to intelligence is re-
quired at this time. What is needed is action to give effect to its true intent.
THE RESPONSIBILI'T'Y OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR COORDINATING INTEL-
LICXINCE ACT IVTT IES
Under the statute, the Central Intelligence Agency has broad responsibility
to coordinate intelligence activities relating to the national security. In
the discharge of this responsibility, the Central Intelligence Agency should
review the intelligence field and ascertain where there are gaps or overlaps.
The agency best equipped to do a particular fob should fill any gaps. Where
two or more- agencies are doing similar work, the one best equipped ought to
carry on the job and the others drop out or their efforts be coordinated.
This vitally important responsibility for coordination is to be exercised
by recommending directives for approval by the National Security Council. The
Central Intelligence Agency has the duty of planning for coordination and, in
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consultation with the other intelligence agencies, of taking the initiative in
seeking directives to effect it. Today this coordinating function of the
Central Intelligence Agency is not being adequately exercised.
To assist it in carrying out this task the Central Intelligence Agency
has available the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This group includes the
Director of Central Intelligence as chairman, t the heads of the intelligence
staffs of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
A number of formal directives for the coordination of intelligence activi-
ties have been issued by the National Security Council upon the recommendation
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
These directives, except those specifically assigning to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency the carrying out of certain common services described below, have
not gone far enough in defining the scope and limits of departmental intelli-
gence activities. These activities continue to present many of the same juris-
dictional conflicts and duplication which the National Security Act was in-
tended to eliminate. Consequently, the absence of coordinated intelligence
planning, as between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service agencies and
the State Department, remains serious. What is needed is continuing and effec-
tive coordinating action under existing directives and also directives estab-
lishing more precisely the responsibility of the various intelligence agencies.
The field of scientific and'technological intelligence is an example of
lack of coordination. Responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts
are uncoordinated, atomic energy intelligence is divorced from scientific
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intelligence generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at
authoritative intelligence estimates in the scientific field, with the possible
exception of atomic energy matters.
Another important example of lack of coordination is in the field of do-
mestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating to the national security.
Jurisdiction over counter-intelligence and counter-espionage activities is as-
signed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency abroad. However,fifth column activities and espionage
do not begin or end at our geographical frontiers, and our intelligence to coun-
ter them cannot be sharply divided on any such geographical basis. In-order
to meet the specific problem presented by the need for coordination of activ-
ities in the field of domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating
to the national security, it is recommended that the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation be made a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory
The Intelligence Advisory Committee so far has had little impact on the
solution of the problem of coordination, except in formally approving proposed
directives. It should be re-activated and called upon to play an important
role.
To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his duties
to plan for the coordination of intelligence, the staff in the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.known as the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
should be reconstituted and strengthened. It should be composed of personnel
definitely assigned to, and responsible to, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and charged, on a full-time basis, with carrying on continuous planning
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for the coordination of specific intelligence activities. This staff, which
might be called the "Coordination Division," should support the Director in
fulfilling one of his most important and difficult duties under the National
Security Act.
In concluding the consideration of this most vital problem of coordination
of intelligence activities, it should be emphasized that coordination can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies. With
the right measure of leadership on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency,
a major degree of coordination can be accomplished in that manner.
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
A long-felt need for the coordination, on the highest level, ofintelli-
gence opinion relating to broad aspects of national policy and national security
was probably the principal moving factor in bringing about the creation of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The lack of any provision for the`rompt produc-
tion of coordinated national intelligence of this kind was one of the most
significant causes of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure.
This type of national intelligence, expressed in the form of coordinated
national estimates, transcends in scope and breadth the interest and compe-
tence of any single intelligence agency. Hence, such estimates should be fully
participated in by all of the principal intelligence agencies. All jointly
should share in the responsibility for them.
With one or two significant exceptions, whose occurrence was largely for-
tuitous, the Central Intelligence Agency has not as yet effectively carried
out this most important function.
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The Office of Reports and Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency
was given responsibility for production of national intelligence. It has,
however, been concerned with a wide variety of activities and with the produc-
tion of miscellaneous reports and summaries which by no stretch of the imagi-
nation could be considered national estimates.
Where the Office of Reports and Estimates produces estimates, it usually
does so on the basis of its own research and analysis and offers its product
as competitive with the similar product of other agencies, rather than as the
coordinated result of the best intelligence product which each of the interested
agencies is able to contribute.
The failure of this type of intelligence product to meet the requirements
of a coordinated national estimate is not substantially mitigated by the exist-
ing procedure whereby the Office of Reports and Estimates circulates its esti-
mates to the intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and ob-
tains a formal notation of dissent or concurrence. Under this procedure, none
of the agencies regards itself as a full participant contributing to a truly
national estimate and accepting a share in the responsibility for it.
It is believed that this situation can be remedied if the Central Intel-
ligence Agency recognizes the responsibility which it has under the statute and
assumes the leadership in organizing its on work and in drawing upon that of the
other intelligence agencies of Government for the production of coordinated intel-
ligence. Thus, within its own organization, the Central Intelligence Agency
should have, in lieu of the present Office of Reports and Estimates, a small
group of specialists, which might appropriately be called "Estimates Division."
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It would be the task of this group to review the intelligence products of other
intelligence agencies and of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to prepare
drafts of national intelligence estimates for consideration by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee.
The final process of coordination should take place in the Intelligence
Advisory Committee which would review and discuss the proposed estimates. The
finished estimate should be clearly established as the product of all of the
contributing agencies in which all share and for which all take responsibility.
It should be recognized as the most authoritative estimate available to the.
policy-makers.
Where particular scientific or technical intelligence matters are involved,
the Intelligence Advisory Committee should secure the views of the best quali-
fied technical experts available to them, including experts from the Research
and Development Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.
There should also be provision for the prompt handling of'major emergency
situations so that, as a matter of course, when quick estimates are required,
there is immediate consultation-and collective appraisal by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee on the basis of all available information.
The inclusion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a permanent member
9
should assure that intelligence estimates will be made in the light of domestic
as well as foreign intelligence. Provision should be made for the representa-
tion on the Intelligence Advisory Committee of other agencies of the Government
when matters within their competence are under discussion.
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PERFORMANCE CENTRALLY OF SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
Under the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency should
perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such services
of common concern as may be assigned to it by the National Security Council.
These services, as now being performed by the Central Intelligence Agency,
can be broken down into (1) static services, consisting of intelligence research
and production on certain assigned subjects which do not fall exclusively within
the function of any one existing intelligence agency, and (2) operating serv-
ices, consisting of certain types of intelligence collection and related secret
operations.
At the present time the static services of intelligence research and re-
porting are carried out in the Office of Reports and Estimates. If the duties
of this Office in relation to the production of national intelligence are as-
signed to a newly constituted Estimates Division, the miscellaneous reporting
functions presently carried out by the Office of Reports and Estimates and a
part at least of the personnel engaged in them could be reconstituted as the
nucleus of a separate division of the Central Intelligence Agency to be known
as the "Research and Reports Division." This Division would also include the
Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations and the various reference
and library functions now carried on in the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
The economic, scientific and technological fields are ones in which all of
our intelligence agencies have varying degrees of interest. At the present
time there is serious duplication in these fields of common concern. Central
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production and coordination by the proposed Research and Reports Division,
would result in great economy of effort and improvement of the product. For
example, the organization within this division of a scientific branch, staffed
by highly qualified personnel and empowered to draw upon the scientific per-
sonnel of such organizations of Government as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of dealing with spe-
cialized scientific problems, is a project which should have the highest
This division of the Central Intelligence Agency should be staffed in part
by representatives of the departmental intelligence services so that the reports
produced would represent authoritative and coordinated opinion and be accepted
as such by the various consumer agencies.
The Director's plaffiing staff for coordination of activities, the proposed
Coordination Division, should review the question as to what subjects might
appropriately be assigned to the new Research and Reports Division for central
research and report and what services now centrally performed in the Central
Intelligence Agency might be eliminated. The Intelligence Advisory Committee
would be the agency to determine the allocation of work, and in case of any
failure to agree the matter would be referred to the National Security Council.
OPERATING SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
The operating services of common concern presently performed by the Central ,
Intelligence Agency consist of theI
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collection of secret intelligence abroad through the Office of Special Opera-
tions; and the conduct of secret operations abroad through the Office of Policy
All of these services are appropriately allocated to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. These operating functions are so inter-related and inter-
dependent that they should have common direction at some point below the Direc-
The general administrative problems of these operating offices are unique
because of their secrecy and the consequent security requirements. They differ
importantly from that part of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency which
is concerned with the coordination of activities and the production of intelli-
gence. Accordingly, these three operating offices should have common admin-
istrative services, separate from those of the balance of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
The three activities,
should be responsible to one official charged with their
-direction. The new "Operations Division" would be self-sufficient as to ad-
ministration and semi-autonomous. This would, to a large extent, meet the
criticism frequently voiced, and with a good deal of merit, that it is essen-
tially unsound to combine in a single intelligence agency both secret opera-
tions and over-all coordinating and estimating functions.
In its secret intelligence work, the Office of Special Operations requires
a closer liaison with the other intelligence agencies, especially those of the
military services and of the State Department which are its chief consumers
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and which should be able to guide its collection efforts more effectively than
they do at present. The counter-intelligence function of the Office of Special
Operations requires more emphasis and there is need for better coordination of
all its activities with the military, particularly in the occupied areas.
TEE ORGANIZATION AND DIRECTION OF TEE CEITRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The principal defect of the Central Intelligence Agency is that its direc-
tion, administrative organization and performance do not show sufficient ap-
preciation of the Agency's assigned functions, particularly in the fields of
intelligence coordination and the production of intelligence estimates. The
result has been that the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to become just
one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in competition with older
established agencies of the Government departments.
Since it is the task of the Director to see that the Agency carries out
its assigned functions, the failure to do so is necessarily a reflection of
inadequacies of direction.
There is one over-all point to be made with respect to the administration
of the Central Intelligence Agency. The organization is over-administered in
the sense that administrative considerations have been allowed to guide and,
on occasion, even control intelligence policy to the detriment of the latter.
Under the arrangements proposed in this report, the heads of the newly consti-
tuted Coordination, Estimates, Research and Reports, and Operations Divisions
would be included in the immediate staff of the Director. In this way the
Director, who at present relies chiefly on his administrative staff.,' would
be brought into intimate contact with the day-to-day operations of his agency
and be able to give policy guidance to them.
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In commenting on administration, the question of security should also be
stressed. The Director is charged under the law with protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. One of the best methods of
achieving this is to correct the present situation where the Agency is viewed
and generally publicized as the collector of secret intelligence and to bury
its secret functions within a Central Intelligence Agency whose chief recog-
nized activities are the coordination of intelligence and the production of
intelligence estimates.
In reviewing the work of the directorate, consideration has been .given to
the question whether or not the Director should be a civilian. The work of
the Agency, from its very nature, requires continuity in that office which is
not likely to be achieved if a military man holds the post on a "tour of duty"
basis. For this reason, as well as because freedom from Service ties is de-
sirable, the Director should be a civilian. This recommendation does not ex-
clude the possibility that the post might be held by a military man who has
severed his connection with the Service by retirement.
TE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND TEE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF TEE STATE
DEPARTMENT
The Service intelligence agencies and the intelligence organization of
the State Department have been reviewed from the point of view of the over-all
coordination of intelligence and of the contribution which these agencies
should make to the assembly and productionrof national intelligence.
As regards the Service intelligence agencies,, the active exercise by the
Central Intelligence Agency of its coordinating functions should result in a
more efficient allocation of effort than is presently the case. The Service
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agencies should concern themselves principally with military intelligence
questions, leaving the Central Intelligence Agency to perform agreed central
services of common interest. In addition, continuing responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency for coordination should be exercised with respect
to certain Service activities, for example, espionage and counter-espionage in
occupied areas. The Joint Intelligence Committee would continue to operate
with its membership unchanged and would concern itself exclusively with mili-
tary and strategic questions as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Services would participate in the formulation of national intelligence esti-
mates through their membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee and would
share in the collective responsibility for these estimates.'
In the case of the Research and Intelligence staff of the State Department,
the conclusion has been reached that this staff, as at present constituted, is
not sufficiently close to operation and policy matters in the Department to
furlish the necessary liaison or the political intelligence estimates required
by the Central Intelligence Agency for the preparation of national estimates.
Accordingly, it is desirable that a high official of the State Department be
designated as its Intelligence Officer to coordinate these activities, to act
as the Department's representative on the Intelligence Advisory Committee and,,
in general, to act as liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency with respect
to the intelligence and related activities of the two agencies and to develop
close working relations between them.
CONCLUSION
While organization charts can never replace individual initiative and
ability, the Central Intelligence Agency, reorganized along the functional
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lines indicated in this report, should be able more effectively to carry out
the duties assigned it by law and thus bring our over-all intelligence system
closer to that point of efficiency which the national security demands.
The foregoing summary is only a brief outline of the main points of the
report and does not take the place of the detailed discussion in the report
and the various conclusions and recommendations at the close of the respective
chapters.
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CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
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Before considering the adequacy and effectiveness of the work of the
Central Intelligence Agency and its relations to our other intelligence agen-
cies, a brief word of background may be helpful.
Although the Central Intelligence Agency is largely an outgrowth of our
experience in World War II, it would be wrong to proceed from the premise that
prior to the war our Government had operated without intelligence as to the
capabilities and intentions of possible enemies or prospective allies. The
Department of State had long maintained a widespread information -gathering
service. The Army, the Navy and certain other departments of the Government
had maintained their on systems of collecting information and producing
intelligence.
Prior to World War II, however, we had no integrated secret intelligence
service. We had not adequately exploited the available sources of overt in-
telligence. We had no central agency to coordinate intelligence collection
and production, and to assemble the best available intelligence for expression
in national estimates to guide in the formulation of foreign policy and the
preparation of our defense plans.
In World Wars I and II our European Allies, Great Britain in particular,
had placed the product of their intelligence services largely at our disposal.
While we can expect in the future assistance from the intelligence services of
friends and allies, we have rightly concluded that we should not depend on
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them for our intelligence to the extent we were forced to do in World War I
and during the early days of World War II.
It was World War II which showed both our deficiencies in intelligence
and also what we could accomplish under pressure. Through the expansion of
the facilities of the State Department and the military services, through the
Office of Strategic Services -- our first move towards a central intelligence
.agency -- through enlisting the best personnel that could be found, in and out
of Government service, we were turning out a very creditable performance in
many phases of intelligence work well before the end of the war.
We now recognize that if we are to have adequate intelligence in times of
crisis, we must prepare in time of peace, and we have seriously turned to the
task of building up a central intelligence organization. The country has now
accepted the verdict, even if somewhat reluctantly, that peace-time intelli-
gence is essential to security and, as many of our military leaders have said,
our first line of defense. It took us a long time to reach this conclusion,
and we are only now gradually getting over our suspicions of intelligence and
our tendency to confuse it with mere intrigue and the more lurid side of es-
pionage. We are beginning to accept it as serious and honorable work and essen-
tial to our defense.
It is well to recognize, however, that an efficient intelligence organiza-
It will require years of patient work to provide skilled personnel to do
the job. Blueprints and organization charts, even legislation and ample appro-
priations will not take the place of competent and highly trained men and
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women. Without them we shall have neither effective intelligence operations
nor sound intelligence estimates. Unfortunately, in the difficult organiza-
tional period since the war, the future of intelligence as a career has seemed
so uncertain that many war-trained. and competent men have left the service,
and it has been particularly difficult to find recruits to take their place.
Finally, security for our intelligence activities is not always easy to
achieve here in the United States. It is not only the penetration of fifth
columnists which we have to guard against. We have the general problem rising
out of our tradition that all of the affairs of the Government shall be con-
ducted in the open. Sometimes we tend to carry this over even as regards the
publication of the intimate details of intelligence operations. In peacetime,
particularly, it is not always easy to reconcile our vital interest in pro-
tecting the freedom of the press with the need for silence on certain phases
of intelligence.
As against these debit items we could cite a long list of highly favorable
factors. America has the potential resources, human and material, for the
best intelligence service in the world. Within our borders we have every race
and nationality, loyal sons speaking every language, travelling and resident
in every foreign country. We have a wide geographical base for the development
of intelligence work. We have the greatest reservoir of scientific and tech-
nical skills. We have important allies abroad who are ready to join their
knowledge to ours and to give us the benefit of their years of experience in
intelligence. And last, and possibly most important of all, in the field of
intelligence work,we can develop the individual in_itiative,skill and ingenuity
of a free people, and, in dealing with our main intelligence antagonists, even
though they operate with the iron discipline imposed by the Kremlin, we can
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show that free men can be vastly more efficient than those working for a
slave system.
These are some of our great assets; our problem is to mobilize them.
There are real elements of urgency in seeing that this task is accomplished.
(1) America today, as never before in time of peace, is vul.ilerable to
sudden and possibly devastating attack. To meet an initial attack, there are
no sure military weapons of defense and it may well be that our best protec-
tion lies in adequate advance knowledge of the character and timing of the
danger.
(2) A vast area of the world stretching from the Elbe River in Germany
to the Yangtse in China is largely behind an iron curtain where the normal
sources of information are partially or wholly lacking. The techniques of an
intelligence service ought to be one of the important means of penetrating
this barrier.
(3) A whole new area of knowledge in the field of science has become
vital for our defense. This field cuts across the functions of various Govern-
ment departments and presents new problems from the viewpoint of intelligence
collection and coordination.
(]+) The far-flung activities of the fifth column, both here and abroad,
present a new type of threat to our security, and we require a concerted in-
telligence program to counter this danger.
These are only a few of the developments which give to intelligence an
importance in our defense system which it has never had in the past in time of
peace. Fortunately, these facts are now becoming well understood, and the
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Administration, the Congress and the people share with deadly seriousness the
determination that the United States here and now shall build the best intelli-
gence service that our national genius and our great resources can provide.
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CHAPTER II
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Beginning as early as 194+ preparations were under way for the transition
from war-time intelligence to a permanent intelligence organization suited to
our post-war needs.
In a series of discussions among the interested Government agencies as to
how the country could most effectively organize its permanent, long-range,
peace-time intelligence there was general agreement on some form of a central
agency. There was, however, a sharp divergence of views as to the scope of the
activities of such an agency, the authority it should enjoy, the manner in
which it should be administered and controlled and where in the Government it
should be located. These issues were resolved at that.ti_me,through the crea-
tion by Presidential letter (See Annex No. 3) of the Central Intelligence Group,
and then more definitely determined through the establishment of the Central
Intelligence Agency by Congress in Section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947. (See Annex No. 1.).
TEE DUTIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
Section 102 (d) of this .Act defines the duties of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency as follows: -
"(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national secu-
rity, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National
Security Council --
"(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning
such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies
as relate to national security;
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"(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for
the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelli-
gence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and
facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena,
law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further,
That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue
to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure;
"(1+) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agen-
cies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence-affecting the national security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct."
In these provisions the authors of the National Security Act showed a
sound understanding of our basic intelligence needs by assigning to the Central
Intelligence Agency three broad duties which had never before been adequately
covered in our national intelligence structure. These duties are: (1) to
advise the National Security Council regarding the intelligence activities of
the government and make recommendations for their coordination; (2) to pro-
vide for the central correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence
relating to the national security; and (3) to assure the performance, cen-
trally, subject to National Security Council direction, of certain intelligence
and related functions of common concern to various departments of the
Government?
The powers given to the National Security Council and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency under Section 102 of the Act establish, in our opinion, the
framework for a sound intelligence service for this country. Accordingly, we
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do not suggest any amendments to the Act and believe it would bj unwise to
tamper with this legislation until we have had further experience in oper-
ating under it. Throughout our report we stress the vital importance of
giving effect to the real legislative intent through the effective exercise
by the Central Intelligence Agency of those functions assigned to it by
the Act. We refer particularly to the responsibility of tho Central Intel-
ligence Agency for the coordination of intelligence activities and the co-
ordination of intelligence opinion in the form of national intelligence
estimates.
In providing for a semi-autonomous highly centralized agency with a broad
variety of intelligence responsibilities affecting various Government agencies,
we have departed from the general pattern followed by other countries. There
the tendency in most phases of intelligence has been to avoid such a degree of
centralization. Under the conditions existing in the United States we believe
that the degree of centralization proposed under the National Security Act can
be justified, provided that the distinctive functions of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency are handled according to their special requirements.
As one recommendation designed to offset the disadvantages of over-
centralization in intelligence, we later propose in this report that the
branches of the Central Intelligence Agei'cy which are directly engaged in clan-
destine activities, such as secret intelligence, counter-intelligence, secret
operations and the like, be given a great measure of autonomy as to internal
administration,the control of their operations and the selection of personnel.
In this connection we have considered the arguments which have been fre-
quently advanced that the functions of coordination and of evaluation, on the
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one hand., should be wholly divorced from collection and operations on the
other. One argument is that the analyst will be overly impressed with the
particular items of information which his own organization collects, as con-
trasted with the information reaching him from other sources. There is a fur-
ther fear, partly substantiated by experience under the Central Intelligence
Agency, that if the several functions are combined. there will be a tendency
to neglect the coordinating responsibilities in favor of the more exciting
field of operations. Finally, the point is made that by joining together a
variety of operations whose security requirements are quite different, the
possibility of providing effective security to those activities that require
it most is thereby reduced.
We appreciate the weight of these arguments but do not feel that they are
decisive. We believe that the recognition of the distinctive functions of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the handling of each one according to its
special requirements and in proper relation to the over-all mission, would
largely meet these objections. In particular, the granting of autonomy to the
clandestine work and adequate emphasis on the important coordinating responsi-
bilities of the Central Intelligence Agency would overcome the disadvantages
of combining these functions in one organization.
CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'We do not agree with the argument, often advanced, that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, or at least its operating services, should be placed under the
direct control of one of the executive departments of the Government, such as
the Department of State or the National Military Establishment. The activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency do not concern either of these departments
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exclusively. Moreover, the administrative arrangements of these departments
are not well suited to the conduct of extensive secret foreign intelligence
operations. The fact that in time of war secret activities are primarily of
concern to the military is not, in our opinion, sufficient justification for
placing them under military control in time of peace. The National Security
Act is flexible enough and the authority of the National Security Council
sufficiently broad to permit any necessary adjustments within the Central In-
telligence Agency so that these operations will be responsive to the needs of
the policy-making and operating departments of the Government, without sub-
ordinating them directly to these departments.
We have also considered the question whether the Central Intelligence
Agency as a whole is properly placed in our governmental structure under the
National Security Council. When the National Security Act was being drafted
doubts were expressed whether a committee such asthe National Security Council
would be able to give effective direction to the Central Intelligence Agency.
It was argued that the National Security Council was too large a body, would
be preoccupied with high policy matters, and. would meet too infrequently to be
able to give sufficient attention to the proper functioning of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
There is force to the criticism that a committee, no matter how august,
is rarely an effective body for the direction of the current operations of
another agency. It is true that the National Security Council cannot effec-
tively assume the task of directing such current operations, and should not
attempt to do so, except to the extent of assuring itself of compliance with
its directives. However, the Council, whose chairman is the President and
whose membership comprises the highest authority in the interested departments
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of the Government, can render effective service in determining the nature and
scope of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency within the frame-
work of the National Security Act.
We recommend, however, that provision should be made for closer liaison
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the two members of the National
Security Council on whom it chiefly depends:-namely,the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense. We suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence
be encouraged to seek current advice and continuing guidance from these two
members of the National Security Council on matters which may not properly be
the subject of its formal directives, or which have not reached the point of
requiring such directives. Such close association would help counteract what
we feel is a growing tendency for the Central Intelligence Agency to become a
separate and independent agency of Government working to some extent in com-
petition with, rather than for the benefit of, those departments of Government
which are the primary users of what the Central Intelligence Agency should
produce.
THE GENERAL MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
4'nless the Central Intelligence Agency performs an essential service for
each of these departments and coordinates their intelligence activities it
will fail in its mission. The Central Intelligence Agency should not be mere-
ly another intelligence agency duplicating and rivalling the existing agencies
of State, Army, Navy and Air Force. It should not be a competitor of these
agencies, but a contributor to them and should help to coordinate their
intelligence activities. It must make maximum use of the resources of exist-
ing agencies; it must not duplicate their work but help to put an end to
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existing. duplication by seeing to it that the best qualified agency in each
phase of the intelligence field should assume and carry out its particular
responsibility.
In the succeeding chapters of this report we will suggest concrete steps
for giving effect to these general principles. In doing so we will start from
the premise which we have stated above that the existing legislation affords a
good basis on which to build a central intelligence service. Furthermore, as
the most practical method of approach, we will examine what has been accom-
plished through the Central Intelligence Agency under this legislation and
suggest as we go along the specific and, in some cases, fundamental changes
which we consider desirable. In this way we will build upon what we now have
rather than attempt to start anew and build from the ground up.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act of 19+7 establishes a
framework for a sound intelligence system and no amendments to this Section of
the Act are deemed necessary at this time.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed in our govern-
mental structure under the National Security Council.
(3) The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered and encouraged
to establish through its Director closer liaison with the two members of the
National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends. namely, the Secretaries
of State and Defense.
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CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORGANIZATION
The National Security Act of 19+7 does not make detailed provision for
the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. 'It provides that the
Agency shall be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence and that he "shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, from among the commissioned officers of the And Services or from among
individuals in civilian life".
With one exception, noted below, the Director is free to organize the
Central Intelligence Agency as he chooses and to appoint to positions within
the organization persons of his own; selection, as well as to terminate their
employment without regard for normal Civil Service procedures.
In this chapter we discuss the administrative organization of the Central
Intelligence Agency, leaving for Chapter X, when we have completed our exami-
nation of the various activities of the Agency, an appraisal of the over-all
direction of the organization in relation to its assigned mission.
In carrying out his task of organizing the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Director has designated as his immediate subordinates a Deputy Director
and an Executive Director*. Assisting this directing group in a staff capacity
are the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS); the General
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f the Central Intelligence Agency, dated September 14+,
-jo
which Is to become effective shortly, abolishes the post of Executive
Director.
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Counsel who handles all legal and legislative work; the Advisory Council, a
small staff which represents the Director in handling communications intelli-
gence matters; the Executive for Administration and Management, in charge of
financial and budgetary matters, administrative services, supply and general
housekeeping, personnel and management advice and surveys; and the Executive
for Inspection and Security, responsible for internal security policies and
investigations, physical security arrangements, inspections and audits. (For
Organization Chart as of January 1, 1949, see Annex No. 5).
The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS), comprising
persons nominated by the Departments of State, Army,. Navy and Air Force, has
the primary responsibility for assisting the Director and the Intelligence
Advisory Committee with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities.
(See Chapter IV).
The other functions of the Central Intelligence-Agency are 'performed in
five Offices*, each headed by an Assistant Director. These are the Office of
Reports and Estimates (ORE), Office of Special Operations (OSO), Office of
Policy Coordination (CPC), Office of Operations (00), and Office of Collection
and Disseminatibn (OCD). A chart showing the personnel strength of the various
parts of the Agency as of December 24, 1948 is given in Annex No. 6.
The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to "correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" is assigned to the
Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). However, as we will point out later,
(See Chapters V and VI), a clear distinction has never been made within the
We understand that since this report was written steps are being taken to
create a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence.
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Office of Reports and Estimates between the duty of correlating national in-
telligence and performing other miscellaneous reporting activities which are
more in the nature of "static" common service functions.
The "operating" services of common concern which have been assigned to
the Central Intelligence Agency are carried out by three Offices. The Office
of Special Operations is responsible for foreign espionage and counter-espionage
(See Chapter VIII). The Office of Operations is charged with
I the exploitation of intelligence information found in foreign docu-
ments, press and other publications (See Chapter VII). The Office of Policy
Coordination is charged with conducting secret operations abroad under a spe-
cial mandate from the National Security Council which stipulated that the As-
sistant Director, Office of Policy Coordination, must be nominated by the
Secretary of State, and that his appointment by the Director is subject to
approval by the National Security Council. This is the only case, as mentioned
above, in which the National Security Council has prescribed internal arrange-
ments within the Central Intelligence Agency or limited the appointive author-
ity of the Director. (See Chapter IX).
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines a variety of functions,
each somewhat differently related to the over-all mission of the Central In-
telligence Agency. It performs static services of common concern in that it
compiles and maintains certain biographical, library and other reference mate-
rials. It also performs a coordinating function in handling intelligence col-
lection requests of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other departments.
Finally, it performs administrative functions such as the reception and dis-
semination of documents and reports.- (See Chapter IV).
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ADMINISTRATION
The administrative requirements of an organization such as the Central
Intelligence Agency, which carries out overt and covert activities, many of
which are highly specialized, cannot be expected to conform to normal adminis-
trative practice. The entire organization is, to some extent, affected by
special security requirements, and these are particularly difficult to handle
with respect, to secret intelligence and related operations.
It is for these reasons that we are opposed to proposals for increasing
the degree of administrative centralization in the Central Intelligence Agency*.
In particular, the administrative problems associated with secret work abroad
are of such an unconventional character that they need to be given special
treatment. (See below, page 116).
Administrative arrangements which do not at first sight appear to be ef-
ficient or economical may be necessary in the Central Intelligence Agency.
Personnel requirements for certain types of work cannot conform to normal Civil
Service standards, and the demands of security often impose special and unusual
procedures. This situation must be understood not only by those responsible
for the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency but also by
Congress and the Bureau of the Budget.
The charge is sometimes made that there are too many administrative person-
nel and that the Central Intelligence Agency organization is top heavy in this
respect. The Executive for Administration and Management and the Executive for
idea for the centralization under an Executive for
ecutive for Administration and Management) of all
budget, services, personnel and management functions, both overt and covert.
This measure is, in our opinion, unsound and contrary to the principles
advocated in this report.
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Inspection and Security together represent a large number of personnel total-
This figure does not include per-
sonnel performing administrative functions in other parts of the organization.
However, regardless of the criticism directed against numbers,criticism should
be properly directed against policies and procedures. (See Chapter X).
BUDGET
The Central Intelligence Agency appears to have no serious budgetary
problem and is favored by adequate Congressional support. The budget proposals,
as approved by the Director, are submitted each year with the authorization of
the National Security Council to the Bureau of the Budget where they are
handled by one official who has full security clearance. Then the budget is
supported before special sub-committees of the Appropriations Committee of the
two Houses of Congress.
Both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget have refrained from examining
in detail the internal workings of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to
determine the justification for the budget. It is important that such dis-
cretion and security be continued and that special treatment be accorded.
However, in order to justify this, it is necessary that the National Security
Council continuously assure itself as to the proper management and operations
of the dentral Intelligence Agency, serving as the informed sponsor of the
Agency and as the protector of its security.
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In summary, we believe that the present arrangements for handling the
difficult question of the budget for the Central Intelligence Agency are sound
and that the Agency has not been hampered in carrying out its present respon-
sibilities by lack of funds.
SECURITY
Although there is no evidence of any laxness in the administrative ar-
rangements for security, there area number of circumstances and policies which
detract from the general security of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is
very difficult to create adequate security, other than mere physical security,
around an organization which was publicly created by statute, employs about
individuals, and encompasses a wide variety of activities. The
fact that some of these activities are carried on is a matter of public record;
the existence of others and particularly operating details are highly secret.
Yet, by combining in a single organization a wide variety of activities, the
security of the covert activities risks being compromised by the lower stand-
ards of security of the overt activities.
In the Washington area, the Agency occupies about
buildings,
In various cities throughout the United States, the regional offices
of the Office of Operations conduct their business under the name "Central
25X1 Intelligence Agency". Over
individuals publicly identify them-
selves with the Central Intelligence Agency which has unfortunately become
publicized as a secret intelligence organization.
This security problem is an aftermath of the wartime period, frith its
public dramatization of espionage and other secret operations and a rapid
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turnover of personnel. Intelligence has become a subject of general discus-
sion to which the publicizing of inter-agency rivalries has contributed. For
example, after the Bogota riots in April 19+8 there was a public airing before
a Congressional Committee of the handling of secret intelligence concerning
developments in Colombia. Damaging disclosures were made regarding certain
operating details of secret intelligence activities conducted by the Central
Intelligence Agency. During the past year, there have been newspaper and
magazine articles concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and its secret
activities abroad.
Lest further incidents of this character occur, every effort should be
made to prevent the public disclosure of secret information relating to the
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the National Security
Act (Section 102 (d) (3)), the Director of Central Intelligence is made re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. This mandate appears to give, the Director authority to resist
pressure for disclosure of secret information.
If, however, in his relations with Congress or with other Government de-
partments, the disclosure of secret information is sought from the Director,
and if he has any doubt as to whether he should comply, it should be established
practice for him to refer the question to the National Security Council in
order that it may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
We believe that other steps can also be taken toward an improvement of
security. There should be greater flexibility in the Central Intelligence
Agency's organization by distinguishing between those functions which are
written into the statute and hence are public and those whose existence, and
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certainly whose operations, should remain secret. The two should be adminis-
tratively and functionally separated, and appropriate concealment should be
~ven to the secret activities as discussed below. (See page 116).
At the same time, a serious endeavor should be made to reverse the pres-
ent unfortunate trend wherein the Central Intelligence Agency finds itself
advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization. It should be
presented instead to the public as the centralized coordinator of intelligence.
This would help to cover rather than uncover its secret operations. Even with
these specific steps, in the long run only organizational discipline and per-
sonal discretion will insure security.
PERSONNEL
The Central Intelligence Agency labors under a difficult personnel prob-
lem, in part because a comprehensive intelligence organization such as this
has extremely varied personnel requirements. It is handicapped in meeting
them because of the sensitive security considerations which limit recruitment,
the anonymity which should properly be demanded of a large part of its person-
nel, and the special relationships which need to be maintained with the other
branches of the Government. It needs persons with highly specialized talents,
as well as persons with broad experience. It also requires personnel who are
familiar with the problems of the agencies which the Central Intelligence
Agency serves and with which it works.
The youth of the organization and the conditions of change and uncertainty
which have prevailed in our central intelligence organization during the past
few years have made the task of recruiting and holding personnel even more
difficult.
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Persons who might otherwise be qualified and interested in intelligence
as a career have been discouraged from entering this field or have left
it.
On the whole, morale within the Central Intelligence Agency is not good.-
The chief reasons appear to be uncertainty as to the future of a career in in-
telligence, the widespread criticism of the performance of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and dissatisfaction with leadership. Among the civilians there
is a realization that military personnel who come and go occupy many of the key
'positions; and among some of the military personnel there is often discontent
arising from a lack of interest in intelligence and a belief that a tour of
duty in the Central Intelligence Agency will not lead to Service advancement.
Delay in obtaining security clearances has caused particular difficulty
in recruiting personnel. Although the security of its personnel needs to be
beyond question, procedures and restrictions should not be so rigid that secu-
rity is obtained only by sacrificing talent, imagination and initiative.
There is a relatively high proportion of Service personnel in key posi-
tions in the Central Intelligence Agency.. Although this figure has decreased
over the past year, Service personnel still occupy the three top positions.
In certain instances, officers have been accepted for responsible positions
who are without adequate intelligence experience or aptitude. There are the
further drawbacks that Service personnel are in many cases assigned for a
brief tour of duty, preventing continuity.
It is, of course, important that highly qualified Service personnel be in-
cluded in responsible positions where they can use their particular background
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and training, and work for the closer association of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Services. However, we believe that the proportion of Service
personnel now in key positions is too high.
In our terms of reference, we are asked to submit- our findings and rec-
ommendations as to the "utilization and qualifications of Central Intelligence
Agency personnel". It is difficult to make any sweeping judgment on this
subject. The Central Intelligence Agency is a large, sprawling organization
which combines many diverse functions and has correspondingly difficult person-
nel requirements. Moreover, the organization has grown fast and, in, many
cases, quantity has been attained at the expense of the quality of the person-
nel selected. Many able persons have left the organization and few qualified
ones have been attracted to it. On the higher levels, quality is uneven and
there are few persons who are outstanding in intelligence work.
An appraisal of the directing personnel of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy and of general administrative policies goes so much to the heart of this
Survey that we reserve discussion of these questions until a later chapter.
(See Chapter R).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The centralization of all administration in one office is undesirable
since secret operations require their own separate administration.
(2) The present arrangements for handling the difficult budgetary ques-
tions of the Central Intelligence Agency are soundly conceived, and the Agency
has not been hampered in carrying out its present responsibilities by lack of
funds.
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(3) To assist the Director in carrying out his statutory duty of protect-
ing intelligence sources and-methods he should, in cases where the disclosure
of secret information is sought from him and he has doubt as to whether he
should comply, refer the. question to the National Security Council in order
that it may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
(1k) in the interest of security, the Central Intelligence Agency should
increasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence rather
than its secret intelligence activities in order to reverse the present un-
fortunate trend where it finds itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret
service organization. In this way it can help to cover up rather than to un-
cover the secret operations entrusted to it.
(5) The placing in key positions of a large percentage of military per-
soniael, many of them on relatively short "tour of duty" assignment, tends to
discourage competent civilian personnel from looking to employment in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency as a career.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The coordination of the intelligence activities of the several departments
and agencies concerned with national security was a primary reason for estab-
lishing the Central Intelligence Agency. This is clear from the early discus-
sions concerning the creation of a central agency and from the language of
Section 102 of the National Security Act.
To achieve this purpose, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned the
duty of advising the National Security Council in matters concerning such in-
telligence activities as relate to the national security and of making recom-
mendations to-the National Security Council for their coordination. The Act
does not give the Central Intelligence Agency independent authority to coordi-
nate intelligence activities. Final responsibility to establish policies is
vested in the National Security Council.
This duty of advising the National Security Council, together with the
two other principal duties of correlating national intelligence and performing
common services as determined by the National Security Council, all serve the
general purpose of coordination. In fact, these three basic duties of the
Central Intelligence Agency, although distinct in themselves, are necessarily
inter-related and the performance of one function may involve another.
For example, in performing its duty of advising on the coordination of
intelligence activities, the Central Intelligence Agency may recommend to the
National Security Council the means to be employed in the assembly of reports
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and estimates requisite for the performance by the Agency of its second duty,
the correlation of national intelligence. As another example, the Central In-
telligence Agency may recommend, in accordance with its duty to make recommen-
dations for the coordination of intelligence activities, that a particular in-
telligence function be performed henceforth by the Agency itself under its
third duty of providing services of common concern more efficiently accom-
plished centrally.
The statutory limitations upon the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of the Na-
tional Security Council were obviously designed to protect the autonomy and
internal arrangements of the various departments and agencies performing in-
telligence functions. The Secretaries of departments who are members of the
National Security Council are in a position to review recommendations of the
Central Intelligence Agency concerning their on departments, and provision is
made that other departmental heads may be invited to attend meetings of the
National Security Council when matters pertaining to their activities are under
consideration. In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of
the Central Intelligence Agency, it is clear that the Agency was expected to
provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated intelligence
system. In practice, the National Security Council has, almost without excep-
tion, approved the recommendations submitted to it by the Central Intelligence
Agency for the coordination of intelligence activities.
The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities"
which are to be coordinated under the direction of the National Security Council,
or specify the departments whose activities are covered. Presumably all
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intelligence activities relating to the national security are included, from
collecting information in the first instance to the preparation and dissemina-
tion of finished intelligence reports and estimates. The criterion, a very
broad one, is "such intelligence activities ...... as relate to the national
lL L E GJB
security" and not the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or
locale of the intelligence activity. Thus, practically no limitations are set
upon the scope of.the intelligence activities with which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is to concern itself.
THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION
Three organizations assist the Director of Central Intelligence in dis-
charging his responsibilities respecting the coordination of intelligence ac-
tivities: the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), with its Standing Com-
mittee; the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of Collection and Dissemination
(OCD), also in the Central Intelligence Agency.
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMl'I9.'EE
The membership of this Committee, created by National Security Council
Intelligence Directive No. 1 of December 12, 1947 (See Annex No. 7), includes
the Director of Central Intelligence, as chairman, the heads of the intelligence
staffs of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the head of the
Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff and the Director of Intelligence
of the Atomic Energy Commission. It is the direct successor to the Intelligence
Advisory Board which was created by President Truman in his letter of January 22,
19+6 setting up the Central Intelligence Group (See Annex No. 3).
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Beginning with the discussions that preceded the creation of the Committee
there have been two different concepts as to its proper mission. On the one
hand was the view, held in the various departments, that the Committee should,
in a sense, be a "governing board" for the Central Intelligence Agency. On
the other hand, it was argued that Congress had set up the Agency autonomously
and that any interdepartmental committee should serve merely in an, advisory
capacity at the discretion of the Director. The solution established in Intel-
ligence Directive No. 1 lies between these views.
In practice, the role of the Committee has not been significant, and in
our opinion, this has been one of the reasons for the weakness of the present
arrangements for the coordination of intelligence. In this chapter and the
next we will submit our recommendations for increasing the responsibility of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, both with respect to the coordination of
intelligence activities and the preparation of intelligence estimates.
The members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee are authorized to pass
upon recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence to the National
Security Council and upon directives proposed by the. Director in implementation
of National Security Council Intelligence Directives. Although it is incumbent
upon the Director to transmit to the National Security council dissents of
members of the Committee to his recommendations., the Committee may not prevent
the Director from making his recommendations to the National Security Council
regardless of dissents. Where unanimity is not obtained on a proposed direc-
tive among the military department members of the Committee, the Director is
required to refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it
to the National Security Council.
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The activities of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have been largely
confined to taking formal action, usually by voting slips, upon directives
proposed by the Director of Central Intelligence to be submitted to the National
Security Council or upon implementing directives. These actions are prepared
for the Committee by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and
the Committee's own Standing Committee of departmental representatives. The
Committee has met only infrequently and has had little to do with the continu-
ing coordination of intelligence activities or with the preparation of coordi-
nated intelligence estimates.* This situation is probably due to a combination
of circumstances, including the failure of the Director to appreciate the
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for bringing about coordina-
tion, lack of mutual confidence among the departments and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and a general failure to understand how a coordinated intelligence
system can be brought about.
The conception of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is sound. It is
sound because interdepartmental coordination in such a complicated field as
intelligence cannot be achieved solely by directives and without the fullest
cooperation of the interested departments. It requires frequent consultation
and continuing collaboration on all important questions. The Intelligence
Advisory Committee should be the medium for accomplishing this, but it will
not succeed if it continues to meet only infrequently, and avoids serious
grappling with intelligence problems and continuous consultation on questions
of common interest.
*Oh this subject, see Chapter V and particularly page 75 where there is a dis-
cussion of the ad hoc committee set up in March, 191+8.
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INTXRDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING STAFF (ICAPS)
This was set up as a staff unit of the Director of Central Intelligence
to assist him in his responsibilities for the coordination of intelligence ac-
tivities. Its members are representatives nominated by the intelligence or-
ganizations of the State, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments; the senior
State Department representative is the Chairman of the group.
The assigned task of ICAPS is to review the intelligence activities. of
the Government, and assist the Director in initiating measures of coordination
for recommendation to the National Security Council. In order to accomplish
this mission effectively, it should have intimate knowledge of the organiza-
tions, responsibilities, activities and priorities of the various intelligence
agencies. Actually, its achievements reflect inadequate knowledge of these
subjects and failure to appreciate the breadth of the responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency for coordination of intelligence activities.
ICAPS has been largely concerned with the coordination of intelligence
activities by assisting in the preparation of the nine National Security Council
Intelligence Directives and the four implementing. directives of the Director
of Central :Intelligence.
It was originally expected that ICAPS would act as the secretariat
or working staff for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, but owing in part to
the infrequent meetings of the Committee, this has not happened. Moreover,
there has been confusion between the functions of ICAPS and those of the
Standing Committee comprising representatives from the staffs of the members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the result that responsibilities
are divided and unclear. Moreover, the status of the members of ICAPS has been
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ambiguous because it has never been entirely clear whether the group was pri-
marily a staff of the Director of Central Intelligence or a committee repre-
senting the member agencies. This has left the group with divided loyalties
and uncertainty as to its mandate.
The position of ICAPS has been rendered more difficult because its members
have been given operating responsibilities which are not only unrelated to
their primary task of assisting to formulate plans for the coordinating of in-
telligence, but are responsibilities which seem to belong more properly to the
operating branches of the Central Intelligence Agency. Thus, one member of
the staff serves as the full-time liaison officer with the Joint Intelligence
Group of the Joint Staff. This is purely an intelligence research and report-
ing function in which the Office of Reports and Estimates has almost exclusive
interest. Moreover, the official liaison officer from the Central Intelligence
Agency to the National Security Council staff is the Chairman of ICAPS. This
function also concerns matters affecting primarily the Office of Reports and
Estimates and, in fact, a representative from that Office now also works with
the National Security Council staff.
In these and other ways ICAPS has acquired operating rather than planning
functions and has become, to some extent, a buffer between the operating parts
of the Central Intelligence Agency and outside agencies. In carrying out both
its planning and operating functions, it is not in close touch with the intel-
ligence branches of the Central Intelligence Agency. There are numerous com-
plaints that it is not only failing to carry out its own mission properly, but is
actually impeding the other parts of the Central Intelligence Agency in carry-
ing out theirs.
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In general, we have found that ICAPS, staffed by individuals whose exper-
ience with problems of intelligence organization is not extensive, and lacking
a clear and firm mandate, has failed to undertake a broad and effective pro-
gram of coordination of intelligence activities. It has been allowed to dis-
sipate its energies in activities for which it is not suited and to neglect its
primary mission. It has not given the impression within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency or outside that it grasps the nature of the responsibility for
coordination of intelligence activities which is imposed upon the Central
Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act.
OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines three functions, only
one of which is directly related to the task of coordinating intelligence
activities.
In the first place, it acts as a service organization for the other Of-
fices of the Central Intelligence Agency by procuring intelligence data from.
other agencies and by disseminating to those agencies the intelligence collected
or produced by these Offices. Its second task is the provision of certain
services of common concern for the benefit of the Central Intelligence Agency
and other agencies. These include the maintenance of an intelligence library
and of certain central registers and indices.
Finally, the Office of Collection and Dissemination performs certain co-
ordinating functions with respect to the collection of intelligence. It proc-
esses all intelligence requests received by the Central Intelligence Agency,
whether these call merely for documentary material or require field collection.
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It canvasses the collection capabilities of the Agency and all other appropriate
agencies in order to determine how best to meet these requests. Thus, if the
Office of Naval Intelligence should request of the Central Intelligence Agency
information on the petroleum producing capabilities of various foreign coun-
tries, the Office of Collection and Dissemination would determine the intelli-
gence resources which should be tapped in order to satisfy the request. If the
request cannot be satisfied within the Central Intelligence Agency, it will de-
termine what outside agency is capable of procuring necessary information and
will be responsible for forwarding the request to such agency. In the course of
this actiol,the Office of Collection and Dissemination will attempt to discover
whether any other agency has a similar requirement for information which might
be combined with the original request. In this manner the Office assists in
coordinating the requirements and collection requests received from within the
Central Intelligence Agency and from outside agencies.
It is obvious that this function of coordination is designed to meet cur-
rent requests and does not involve a broad responsibility continuously to mon-
itor and coordinate the collection procedures and requirements of the various
intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Such a re-
sponsibility would force the Office of Collection and Dissemination into the
position of a central clearing house for all collection requirements and re-
quests of all agencies. It would be impractical to have such an arrangement
due to the mass of administrative detail involved and the resulting delay in
the satisfaction of the requests. In practice, direct inter-agency requests,
not requiring coordination, may by-pass the Central Intelligence Agency
completely.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES
The formal accomplishment of over-all coordination is represented mainly
by nine Intelligence Directives approved by the National Security Council upon
recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with
the Intelligence Advisory'Conmiittee, and four implementing directives which
need not be discussed here.
The National Security Council Intelligence Directives* provide for the
coordination of intelligence activities in various ways. The basic Directives,
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 seek to achieve coordination of intelligence activities by
allocation of general areas of responsibility to the several departments and
to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Directive No. 1, as we have pointed out, establishes the general arrange-
ments for such coordination. It sets up the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
discussed above, to advise the Director of Central Intelligence, specifies the
procedures for the issuance of Intelligence Directives and defines the duty of
the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the production of "national
intelligence." Insofar as practicable, the Central Intelligence Agency "shall
not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Depart-
ments and Agencies, but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities."
The Directive provides for exchange of information between the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and the departmental agencies, and authorizes the assignment of
officers to the Central Intelligence Agency by the departmental organizations.
It also includes provision for the Central Intelligence Agency to request au-
thority to inspect intelligence material in agencies of the Government.
*See Annexes No. 7-15 for the texts of the Directives.
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Directive No. 2 allocates responsibility for the collection abroad of
overt intelligence among the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force by
establishing "certain broad categories of agency responsibility." Political,
cultural and sociological intelligence are assigned to the State Department.
Military, naval and air intelligence are assigned to the respective Services.
The collection of ,economic, scientific and technological intelligence is allo-
cated to each agency "in accordance with its respective needs." The Directive
provides for coordination of these collection activities in the field by the
senior United States representative.
Directive No. 3 is an elaborate definition of categories of intelligence
production, i.e., basic, current, staff, departmental and national intelligence,
and it assigns the responsibilities of the departmental agencies and the Central
Intelligence Agency in intelligence production. The same areas of "dominant
interest" are specified as for intelligence collection, and the production of
"national intelligence" is reserved to the Central Intelligence Agency. How-
ever, the terms of the various definitions are broadly drawn, the exceptions
are numerous, and confusion of intelligence functions has continued despite
the effort to eliminate it by definition.
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Directive No. 4 provides that the Central Intelligence Agency shall take
the lead in preparing a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objec-
tives, and from time to time shall indicate the priorities attaching to these
objectives.
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Four of the Directives, Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, assign certain "services of
common concern" to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority granted
in the National Security Act (Section 102 (d)). These are coordinating actions
in the sense that, by common agreement, they assign to the Central Intelligence
Agency primary or exclusive responsibility for conducting certain intelligence
activities of common concern. Directive No. 5 provides that the Central In-
telligence Agency will conduct all espionage and counter-espionage operations
abroad except for certain agreed activities and it also provides that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency will coordinate covert and overt collection activities.
(See Chapter VIII).
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A fourth "service of common concern" is provided in Directive No. 8 which
assigns to the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility for maintaining a
central file of biographical data on foreign scientific and technological
personalities.
These Intelligence Directives allocate responsibilities to the Central
Intelligence Agency in fields which have been conceded to be those of common
concern where work can best be done centrally. This is also true of the allo-
cation to the Central Intelligence Agency of responsibility for the conduct of
secret operations (other than intelligence) abroad by the Office of Policy
Coordination which was accomplished by direct National Security Council action
(NSC 10/2) and not by Intelligence Directive submitted through the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. (See Chapter IK). In all of these cases where particular
functions of common concern have been assigned, the allocation of functions
has been generally accepted as sound.
THE DEGREE OF COORDINATION ACHIEVED
In spite of these formal directives for the coordination of intelligence
activities, it is probably correct to say that departmental intelligence ac-
tivities are substantially unaffected by this program of coordination except
where the Central Intelligence Agency has been given exclusive responsibility
for certain activities.
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In general, there is an absence of effective coordination under the lead-
ership of the Central Intelligence Agency and there is virtually no supervision
of the ways in which the various directives are carried out, except that the
Central Intelligence Agency controls those common service activities assigned
to it. Conflicts of jurisdiction and duplication of activities remain. In
many cases they have not only been unresolved,which is hardly surprising after
such a short time, but they remain unrecognized and unacknowledged.
Despite the provisions of Directives Nos. 2 and 3 in regard to the allo-
cation of dominant interest, each department collects and produces the intel-
ligence it chooses according to priorities it establishes. The very large
loopholes in these directives and the absence of any continuously effective
monitoring of their implementation makes this possible. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency itself has become a competitive producer of intelligence on sub-
jects of its own choosing which can by no stretch of the imagination be called
national intelligence. (See Chapters V and VI). The amount of undesirable
duplication among intelligence agencies is considerable and the absence of co-
ordinated intelligence collection and production is serious.
In our opinion, certain essentials for the improvement of this situation
would include: continuous examination on the initiative of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency of instances of duplication and failure of coordination; direc-
tives which establish more precisely the responsibilities of the various de-
partments; and the effective carrying out of plans through close inter-depart-
mental consultation at all levels. To a greater or lesser degree, all of these
essentials are lacking at the present time.
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Clearly, as pointed out above, the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to coordinate intelligence activities is subject to directives of the
National Security Council. However, the responsibility to advise the National
Security Council and to make recommendations for coordination is squarely placed
on the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore, lack of authority in a specific
situation should not deter the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising its
responsibility to submit recommendations so that proper coordination will re-
sult. If there are doubts as to how the coordination should be affected, it is
the duty of the Agency to ask the National Security Council to resolve them.
The coordination of intelligence activities today is particularly important
in three fields illustrative of the general problem, namely -- scientific in-
telligence, domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence affecting the na-
tional security, and communications intelligence.
SCIENTIFIC IMIIELLIGENCE*
The field of scientific and technological intelligence is obviously one
which may overshadow all others in importance. At the present time there is
no proper coordination of effort in this field, which is one in which there is
a broad area of common interest. In fact, this diffusion of responsibility is
confirmed in National Security Council Intelligence Directives Nos. 2 and 3
which allocate collection and production responsibilities for scientific and
technological intelligence to "each agency in accordance with its respective
needs."
*Since this report was written, steps are being taken to create in the Central
Intelligence Agency a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence and to trans-
fer to it the Nuclear Energy Group now in the Office of Special Operations.
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Each of the military Services collects scientific and technological in-
telligence in accordance with its on program and produces such reports as it
chooses. The Central Intelligence Agency performs certain central collecting
services through its Office of Operations and Office of Special Operations.
The Office of Special Operations also houses the Nuclear Energy Group which is
the central governmental unit for interpreting atomic energy intelligence.
Separate from it is a Scientific Branch in the Office of Reports and Estimates
which was expected to become the central group for stimulating and coordinating
scientific intelligence. It has not yet filled this role. The Research and
Development Board does not itself actively engage in scientific intelligence
but has an important interest in the field. Its needs should therefore be
given major consideration in plans and arrangements for coordination.
In summary, responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts are unco-
ordinated, atomic energy intelligence is divorced from scientific intelligence
generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at authoritative
intelligence estimates in the scientific field, with the possible exception of
atomic energy. Here is a situation which mast have priority in coordination of
intelligence acti'rities. In Chapter VI we propose certain steps which come
within the scope of this survey.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has primarily security and law
enforcement responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important area of
intelligence. This includes domestic counter-espionage and counter-sabotage,
control of communist and other subversive activities and surveillance of alien
individuals and groups. All of these functions are closely related to the com-
parable activities abroad of the Central Intelligence Agency. They all have
an important intelligence aspect, particularly today when intelligence from
domestic and foreign sources is so closely related. The fact that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is primarily concerned with security and law enforce-
ment may result in a failure to exploit the intelligence possibilities of a
situation and may create difficulties in reconciling the intelligence with the
security interests.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is not part of the existing ma-
chinery for coordination of intelligence through the Intelligence Advisory
Committee or otherwise. There is no continuing manner whereby domestic intel-
ligence and counter-intelligence are related to over-all national intelligence
in order to serve the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act
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"of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government depart-
ments and agencies in the interest of national security."
In our opinion, the Central Intelligence Agency has the, duty under the Act
to concern itself with the problem of coordinating those phases of domestic
intelligence and counter-intelligence which relate to the tonal security
and should submit recommendations on this subject to the National Security
Council. This is not inconsistent with the stipulation of the National Security
Act that the Central Intelligence Agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powers, or internal security functions." It would in fact serve to
carry out the program of coordination set forth in the Act in a broad field
which has hitherto been largely neglected.
A step toward bringing about the coordination we recommnend would be to
provide for closer association of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the
intelligence agencies by making it a member of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
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PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED COORDINATION
In order to remedy the existing situation in respect of coordination of
activities, several steps are necessary. The Director of Central Intelligence
must show a much greater concern than hitherto with the general problem of co-
ordination of intelligence activities which is one of his essential statutory
duties. His is a responsibility to all of the departments concerned with na-
tional security; it can be properly discharged by leadership, imagination,
initiative and a realization that only a joining of efforts can achieve the
desired results.
The other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee must also share
in the general responsibility for carrying out the intent of the National Se-
curity Act by quickening their interest and exhibiting a spirit of active co-
operation. No amendment to the Committee's charter as set forth in Intelligence
Directive No. 1 appears necessary to bring about this improvement.
In the next chapter where we deal with the question of national intelli-
gence estimates we propose that the Intelligence Advisory Committee assume a
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more active role in producing these. estimates. In our opinion, this would not
only improve the relevance and quality of the estimates but would give
the Committee the impetus and the background it needs to deal effectively with
the coordination of intelligence activities. More than any other stage in the
intelligence process, the consideration of estimates should reveal the defi-
ciencies and overlaps as well as the accomplishments in intelligence.
We believe, as stated above, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
should be added to the permanent membership of the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee. We also believe that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Staff
might be dropped from the regular membership. The role of the Atomic Energy
Commission in intelligence is a limited one and confined to a highly specialized
field. The representation of the Joint Staff upon, the Intelligence. Advisory
Committee appears to be largely duplicative in view of the predominantly Serv-
ice membership of the Committee. However, they, together with other interested
agencies such as the Departments of Treasury and Commerce, the Research and De-
velopment Board and the National Security Resources Board, should attend meet-
ings whenever matters of direct concern to them are being considered.
Within the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency the
Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) should be set up
clearly as an integral part of the Agency, charged with the task of seeking
out, studying and developing, in consultation with the other parts of the
Central Intelligence Agency and outside agencies, plans for the coordination
of intelligence activities. It should have m responsibility for current oper-
ations, except that certain current tasks of coordination (such as some of
those now performed by the Office of Collection and Dissemination) might be
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carried out under its direction. The reconstituted ICAPS which might appro-
priately be called "Coordination Division" should be small. Its members should
be persons interested in, and qualified to deal with, problems of intelligence
organization. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the Director must
look upon this reorganized and strengthened group as his major support in ful-
filling one of his most difficult assigrmients under the National Security Act,
that of advising the National Security Council on the intelligence activities
of the Government and making recommendations for their coordination.
It is our belief that the relationship between certain of the functions
presently performed by ICAPS and the Office of Collection and Dissemination
should be considerably closer. ICAPS is responsible for the promulgation of
'plans and policy in relation to the coordination of collection activities. As
one of its tasks, the Office of Collection and Dissemination coordinates actual
collection and dissemination and in some respects is in a position to implement
the general plans and policies for coordination. Constantly dealing with the
day-to-day "working level" problems of collection,the Office of Collection and
Dissemination is in a good position to make recommendations in regard to the
improvement of collection procedures and the coordination of collection
activities.
We, therefore, recommend that the collection and dissemination functions
of this Office be placed under the new Coordination Division, subject to future
determination of the extent to which individual Offices may conduct their on
dissemination. (See Conclusions to Chapters VII and VII'I). We further recom-
mend that all of the library, index and register functions be separated from
the Office of Collection and. Dissemination and be placed in a centralized Re-
search and Reports Division as described in Chapter VI.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECC ENDATIONS
(1) The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Na-
tional Security Act with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities,
which is one of the most important ones assigned to the Central Intelligence
Agency, has not been fully discharged.
(2) One of the important areas where more active efforts at coordination
are needed is the field of scientific intelligence. (See Chapter VI).
(3) Another important area is that of domestic intelligence and counter-
intelligence insofar as they relate to the national security. To improve co-
ordination in this area and between it and the entire intelligence field, we
recommend that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
(4) The Director of Central Intelligence should be made permanent chair-
man of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.
(5) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived, but it
should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in
the continuing coordination of intelligence activities.
(6) The Intelligence Advisory Committee should consist af'the Director of
Central Intelligence and representatives of the Departments of State, Army,
Navy and Air Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other departments
and agencies would sit as ad hoc members when appropriate.
(7) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff should be recon-
stituted as a staff* responsible only to the Director of Central Intelligence,
*In this chapter we have called this new staff "Coordination Division." It
should be noted that this name and other names we have given to proposed
branches of the Central Intelligence Agency are only for purposes of illustra-
tion and simplification and not given as a formal recommendation.
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with the task of developing plans for the coordination of intelligence
activities.
(8) The responsibilities of the Office of Collection and Dissemination
with respect to the coordination of collection requirements and requests and
the dissemination of intelligence should be carried out under the new Coordi-
nation Division. This is subject to future determination of the extent to
which individual Offices may conduct their own dissemination.
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CHAPTER V
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
THE MANDATE UNDER TEE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND THE DIRECTIVES
One of the principal duties assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency
"for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security" is
"to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and
provide for .t,2828 appropriate dissemination." The Central Intelligence Agency
is thus given the responsibility of seeing to it that the United States has
adequate central machinery for the examination and interpretation of intelli-
gence so that the national security will not be jeopardized by failure to co-
ordinate the best intelligence opinion in the country, based on all available
information.
In our opinion, this responsibility has not been adequately discharged,
and remedial measures are necessary. There is confusion as to the proper role
of the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of intelligence reports
and estimates. This confusion has resulted from incorrect interpretation and
lack of proper inplemantation of the statute and the directives. The reasons
for this go to the heart of the national intelligence problem and need to be
examined in some detail in order to discover how the necessary improvement can
be made.
Although the Act provides that "the departments and other agencies of the
Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate de-
partmental intelligence," the statute does not limit the duties of the Central
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Intelligence Agency to correlate and evaluate intelligence, except by the
standard of "national security." Interpretation of these statutory provisions
was made by the Nationa]. Security Council in Intelligence Directives No. 1 and
No. 3.
Intelligence Directive No. 1 (See Annex No. 7) provides that the Director
of Central Intelligence shall produce* intelligence relating to the nations].
security, called national intelligence, and that "in so far as practicable, he
shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various
Departments and Agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities
and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes."
The directive also stipulates that national intelligence disseminated by the
Central Intelligence Agency "shall be officially concurred in by the Irxtelii-
gence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent."
These provisions are to some extent clarified in Intelligence Directive
No. 3 (See Annex No. 9) which defines national intelligence as "integrated de-
partmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and
national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and
transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the
Military Establishment."
Directive No. 3 then places on the Central Intelligence Agency the re-
sponsibility for the production and dissemination of national intelligence.
Such intelligence is to be developed and assembled in coordination with other
departments and agencies in order to obtain intelligence developed within the.
* The term "produce," as used here, means the preparation and issuance of as-
sembled and interpreted intelligence reports and estimates.
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scope of their respective missions which will assist in the production or com-
plement the assembly of national intelligence. The directive also instructs
all agencies to maintain sufficient research facilities to meet their individ-
ual needs and to assist in satisfying the requirements of other agencies.
Areas of "dominant interest," a term which is not specifically defined,
are allocated by the directive to the various departments as follows: political,
cultural and sociological intelligence to the Department of State; military
intelligence to the Army, naval intelligence to the Navy, air intelligence to
the Air Force; and economic, scientific and technological intelligence to "each
agency in accordance with its respective needs." Upon this framework is built
the formal program of intelligence production by the departmental agencies and
the Central Intelligence Agency.
The significant provision of Directive No. 3 for the Central Intelligence
Agency is the definition of national intelligence, for which the Agency is
given exclusive responsibility, although it is recognized as having rights and
responsibilities with respect to other forms of intelligence as well. In ef-
feat the directive interprets the vague provision of the National Security Act
on "intelligence relating to the national security" to cover a particular type
of intelligence reasonably distinct from departmental intelligence and con-
forming to admittedly broad but generally comprehensible specifications.
The purport of the National Security Act as supplemented by the directive
in regard to the production of national intelligence can be understood and
justified in the light of the history and general objectives of the Act. Be-
hind the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency lay the necessity not only
for the coordination of diversified intelligence activities (See Chapter IV),
and for the performance by the central agency itself of certain services of
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common usefulness (See Chapters VI-IX), but also for the coordination of in-
telligence opinion in the form of reports or estimates affecting generally the
national security as a whole.
Although the Act and the Intelligence Directives give the Central Intel-
ligence Agency the independent right cf producing national intelligence, Direc-
tive No. 1 stipulates that such intelligence shall, be officially concurred in
by the intelligence agencies or shall carry statement of substantial dissent.
As a practical matter, such estimates can be written only with the collabora-
tion of experts in many fields of intelligence and with the cooperation of
several departments and agencies of Government. A national intelligence
report or estimate as assembled and produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion,
based on all available information. It should deal with tonics of wide
scope relevant to the determination of basic policy, such as the assessment
of a country's war potential, its preparedness for war, its strategic capabil-
ities and intentions, its vulnerability to various forms of direct attack or
indirect pressures. An intelligence estimate of such scope inevitably "tran-
scends the exclusive ec?npetence of a single Department or Agency or the Mili-
tary Establishment." A major objective, then, in establishing the Central In-
telligence Agency was to provide the administrative machinery for the coordi-
nation of intelligence opinion, for its assembly and review, objectively and
impartially, and for its expression in the form of estimates of national scope
and importance.
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
The concept of national intelligence estimates underlying the statute and
the directives is that of an authoritative interpretation and appraisal that
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will serve as a firm guide to policy-makers and planners. A national-
intel-ligence estimate should reflect the coordination of the best Intelligence:
opinion. It should be based on all available information and be prepared with
full knowledge of our own plans and in the light of our own policy requirements.
The estimate should be compiled and.aseembled centrally by an agency whose
objectivity and disinterestedness are.not open to question. Its ultimate
approval should rest upon the collective responsibility of the highest officials
in the various intelligence agencies. Finally, it should command recognition
and respect throughout the Government as the best available and presumably the
most authoritative intelligence estimate.
The production of national intelligence estimates by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency falls far short of such a.concept, in part for reasons which the
Central Intelligence Agency does not control. The principle of the authori-
tative. national intelligence estimate does not yet have established acceptance
in the Government. Each department still depends more or less on its own intel-
ligence estimates and establishes its plans and policies-accordingly. In the
Military Establishment there is some coordination through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff who rely upon the advice of the Joint Intelligence Committee which, in
turn, rests primarily upon the contribution of the three Service departments.
Neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the State Department participates
directly in these procedures in the Military Establishment, and the estimates
of the Joint Intelligence Committee are in most cases more restricted in scope
than a national intelligence estimate. Within the State Department the policy-
makers are, for the most part, their own intelligence, advisors..
Finally, there
is no systematic way of tapping that domestic intelligence information, which
should be chiefly in the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, having
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a bearing on broader intelligence issues. At the National Security Council
level the intelligence estimate which is applied to policy papers is brought
to bear through the individual departmental representatives and the independ-
ently produced contributions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Although the task is made more difficult by a lack of general acceptance
of the concept of national intelligence estimates in the Government, it is,
nevertheless, the clear duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under the
statute and the directives to assemble and produce such coordinated and authori-
tative estimates.
THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL IN'T'ELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE
PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Unfortunately, the attention of the Central Intelligence. Agency has been
largely diverted from the objective of producing national intelligence. We
find in examining its organization and activities, that major emphasis is not
placed on the unique national intelligence function of the Central Intelligence
Agency but that this function is largely diffused and dispersed in an organiza-
tion which concerns itself with a variety of intelligence-producing activities.
These include stmmnaries of current developments, political reports, background
studies on countries and areas, economic reports, etc. (See Chapter VI).
In the original .Central Intelligence Group it was conceived that there
would be a small organization of highly qualified individuals which would limit
itself strictly to national intelligence problems and base its work primarily
on the. specialized reports and estimates produced by the departments rather
than employ a large research and analysis organization of its own. However,
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the character of the organization changed, and the Office of Reports and Esti-
mates, which now carries out the responsibility of -the Central Intelligence
Agency for intelligence reporting,. discharges a large number of intelligence-
producing functions. These include, to. a limited extent, the production and
coordination of national intelligence but. also other functions, to be describ-
ed in Chapter VI. Some of the latter functions duplicate those carried. on in
other departments, and some are more in the nature of common services on be-
half of the other agencies, although they are not always recognized as such.
Under the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates and his deputy is
a large organization comprising persons. There is a broad base of 25X1
six regional or geographic Branches, each a research and estimate-producing
unit with responsibility for one area of the world. In addition, a Map Branch
does map research and publishes map and geographic data and a Scientific
Branch is concerned with studies in the field of scientific intelligence.
Studies and estimates are also produced by five "Consultants Panels"
dealing with economics, transportation and communications, military affairs,
international organizations and "global survey," respectively. The product of
these Branches and Panels is issued through one of two "Groups," the Current
Intelligence Group and Staff Intelligence Group which have editorial and de-
partmental liaison responsibilities. A third Group, the Basic Intelligence
Group, performs supervisory and editorial functions with respect to the fulfil-
ment of the National Intelligence Survey (basic intelligence) program by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the departmental agencies. Finally, a Plans
and Policies Staff develops programs, priorities and policies for the Office
and includes a small unit which handles information from communications intel-
ligence sources.
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The intelligence output of this organization which can be properly termed
"national intelligence" is not impressive. The subjects are normally selected
on the initiative of the staff itself or as the result of discussions in the
National Security Council staff, where a member of the staff of the Office of
Reports and Estimates generally participates. In producing these reports the
Office usually employs the research of its own staff instead of drawing to-
gether and coordinating contributions from departmental agencies. Such depart-
mental contributions are available to the Office of Reports and Estimates under
the terms of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 as inter-
preted in No. 3/1 ("Standard Operating Procedure for the Production of Staff
Intelligence") but in fact only a small number of the reports are actually
derived from departmental contributions. The customary procedure has been for
the Office of Reports and Estimates to prepare a basic draft which is then
circulated to the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force for their
continents and. concurrence or dissent. This procedure has proved to be ineffec-
tive as a means of producing coordinated national intelligence. The depart-
ments participate more as outsiders reviewing the material of another agency
than as collaborators sharing responsibility in an enterprise of equal concern
to all.
In spite.of the use of the system of concurrences for certain types of
reports, the position today of the Central Intelligence Agency is that of an
independent producer of national intelligence, the quality of whose product is
variable and the influence of which is questionable. The tendency within the
Central Intelligence Agency has been to emphasize the independent production
of intelligence and this emphasis has led to two results.
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In the first place, the intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency has not always been relevant to policy requirements and has lacked effec-'
tiveness. In the second place, there has been a failure to develop coordinated,
}
national intelligence which would supersede independent departmental efforts
to produce over-all intelligence.
It is perhaps true that the efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency
have been criticized partly because the opinions expressed by the Agency were'
occasionally at variance with the opinions held in the departments; but there
have been other reasons. The independent intelligence estimate is felt to be
useful but never decisive inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency cannot:
and does not by itself have all the specialized qualifications needed to pro-
duce national intelligence, and is not, as an independent agency, in constant
and intimate association with the policy-makers and planners, a knowledge of
whose work and intentions is indispensible to sound intelligence.
There is also criticism that the product of the Central Intelligence Agency,
regardless of its quality or importance, gets formal circulation at the highest
levels in the Government even though its content may not coincide with the
views of departmental officials whose on information may be more reliable and
complete. There is in fact a serious danger that the product of the Central
Intelligence Agency may be looked upon as coordinated national intelligence,
which it usually is not.
What has happened is that the creation in the Central Intelligence Agency
of a large Office of Reports and Estimates performing, as will be emphasized
in the next chapter, a variety of.functions that are not truly related to the
coordination of national intelligence estimates, necessarily means that concern
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with national intelligence problems is diminished, that the area of competition
with the departmental agencies is enlarged and that the Central Intelligence
Agency concentrates more on the independent production of intelligence than on
its coordination.
Administrative arrangements within the Central Intelligence Agency and
between the Agency and the other departments and agencies have contributed to
this situation. Personnel in the Office of Reports and Estimates who are
responsible for national intelligence (and this includes almost everybody in
part, inasmuch as national intelligence functions are scattered throughout all
parts of the Office) receive little guidance as to what they should report on.
To a large extent they select their own subjects and establish their on priori-
ties, and this practice only increases the criticism from which much of the
product suffers. Finally, the liaison relationships with outside agencies are
unsatisfactory although this situation is largely the-result of the lack of a
clear conception of the proper mission of the Central Intelligence Agency in
the coordination of intelligence opinion in the form of national estimates.
j The most significant exception to a rather general failure to coordinate
intelligence opinion in national estimates was a series of reports on Soviet
capabilities and intentions, beginning in March, 1948, by an ad hoc committee
of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force under
the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency. This case illustrated
that, when properly used, the existing interdepartmental arrangements can,
under the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency, provide the President
.and top policy-makers with an authoritative intelligence estimate.
After some initial delay following the receipt by the Army of a disturbing
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message from General Clay, the President on March 16, 1948 received from Central
Intelligence Agency a brief short-range estimate as to the likelihood of war,
discussed and concurred in by all the interested agencies. Divergent views had
been reconciled and a unanimous estimate drafted. The importance of this pro-
cedure,particularly in an emergency situation, is difficult to overemphasize;
it insures that all the interested agencies have contributed to consideration
of the situation and establishes their collective responsibility for the esti-
mate. If divergences cannot be reconciled, at least the opposing points of
view can be identified..- The possibility of any one service arriving at a
false or completely contradictory estimate and of independent actions being
taken as a result is thereby reduced.
The procedure of consultation followed in march was in this particular
case largely fortuitous. There was at the time no regularly established pro-
cedure for such consultation. It was not nor has it since become normal prac-
tice either for "ordinary" or "crisis" estimates as we believe it should.
* The first message from General Clay was received on March 4th, but there
does not appear to have been interdepartmental consultation before March
13th. Although views were at first divergent, the estimate of March 16,
1948, submitted to the President, was unanimously concurred in by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the intelligence agencies of the Departments of
State, Army, Navy and Air Force. It estimated the likelihood of war during
the ensuing 60-day period. However, the next estimate in the series, dated
April'2, 1948, which sought to extend the estimate beyond the 60-day period,
was accompanied by an Air Force dissent on the grounds that the international
situation was so delicate that it would be unwise to speculate beyond the
short term.
The circumstances leading to the March 16th estimate received wide publicity
as a result of the reference to it in Vol. I, p. 17 of the Report of the
Committee on the National Security Organization (Eberstadt Committee), in
the following terms: Testimony was presented to the Committee that in the
spring of 1948, a mistaken intelligence estimate, prepared by a departmental
intelligence agency, stimulated recommendations -- which if followed -- might
well have had serious consequences. Fortunately, in this instance, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and other intelligence groups correctly evaluated
the available information in good time."
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In fact, one of the most important recommendations of this report is that
a reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee should perform this function.
In at least one other situation requiring immediate intelligence inter-
pretation there was once again only fortuitous coordination. This case was the
result of intelligence received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
distributed by it. The Central Intelligence Agency performed only a secondary
role and there was no formal intelligence estimate. This further illustrated
the fact that, under present arrangements, recognized and prompt procedures
are lacking for the authoritative coordination of intelligence views in an
emergency situation. In addition, it was seen that there is no regular and
agreed arrangement for participation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and. for the use of intelligence from domestic sources in a national estimate.
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
In order to remedy the present unsatisfactory arrangements for the.pro-
duction of national intelligence estimates and provide for the coordination-of
intelligence opinion at times of crisis and for long term planning, as contem-
plated in the National Security Act, there needs-to be a revision of the pres-
ent arrangements. Insofar as the Central Intelligence Agency is concerned it
is necessary, in the first place, to make a clear distinction between the
function of correlating national intelligence opinion to assist plans and
policy formulation on the highest level and those intelligence reporting
activities which may be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as a cen-
tral service of common concern.
The mission with respect to the production of national intelligence cannot
be fulfilled solely through a large staff such ad the present Office of Reports
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and Estimates whose work Is directed more to the production of miscellaneous
reports than to the cooAination of national intelligence opinion. In our
opinion the present Office of Reports and Estimates should be replaced and for
it substituted two offices one of which, to be described in the next chapter,
will not be involved with the production of national intelligence but will
perform intelligence research and reporting services of common concern. The
other office, an "Estimates Division," would comprise a small group of highly
selected individuals whose task it would be to draw upon and review the
special,ized.'intelligence product of the departmental agencies in order to pre-
pare, for final discussion and approval by the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
a finished national intelligence estimate. This small group would rely pri-
marily upon the intelligence reports of the individual agencies but it would
have access to such source material as it requires in order to review depart-
mental contributions and prepare consolidated estimates for final action by
the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
National intelligence estimates, in order to be authoritative, must be
fully participated in by all of the principal intelligence agencies in order
that the best advice may be tapped and responsibility shared for those major
estimates on which high policy decisions depend. Therefore, the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, under. the leadership of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, should actively assist in establishing and supervising the national
intelligence production program as well as discuss and review the proposed
estimates submitted to it for approval. The Committee would, at the same
time, concern itself more actively than at present with the coordination
of the other intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies,
as discussed in Chapter IV. In fact, by assuming an active responsibility for
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the reconciliation of intelligence estimates the Committee would almost auto-
matically be able to assist the Director more effectively in coordinating in-
telligence requirements and developing sound arrangements for the coordination
of intelligence generally.
The membership of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as we have pointed
out in Chapter IY,would include the Director of Central Intelligence as chair-
man, and representatives from the Departments of State,- Army, Navy and Air
Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Ad hoc membership should be
given to other Agencies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, Joint Staff and
Research and Development Board, whenever appropriate.
These revised arrangements should make adequate provisionfbr the handling
of major emergency situations so that there is automatic consultation and
collective responsibility when quick estimates are required. We have seen that
in the past such consultation has been largely fortuitous and could not be
relied upon to operate promptly.
This proposal would not affect the responsibility of the Joint Intelligence
Committee to prepare strictly' military estimates for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and perform such other military duties as the Joint Chiefs of Staff might
assign. Through the membership of the Service intelligence chiefs on the In-
telligence Advisory Committee and through close liaison between the Joint
Intelligence Group and the new Estimates Division in the Central Intelligence
Agency, every effort should be made to insure the consistency of the Joint
* See below, page 159, for a discussion of the status of the State Department
representative.
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Intelligence Committee's military appraisals and the broader national estimates
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
Whatever arrangement is decided upon, there are certain general condi-
tions which must be observed, if intelligence estimates are to be sound and
timely. All information, whether it originates from intelligence sources or
whether it comes from other sources including operations, must be available
to the intelligence people who by putting together and studying all of the
bits of information must provide the overall interpretation. There is always
a dangerous tendency, particularly in time of crisis, when it can be most
serious, for vital information to be withheld on the grounds that the intel-
ligence personnel should not see it because it concerns operations or for
alleged security reasons. In other instances the disseminatign of vital but
sensitive material is restricted to a very few people at the top levels with
the result that those individuals who are most competent to analyze a particu-
lar situation are left out of the picture entirely. It is therefore neces-
sary that intelligence estimates be made in full light of our own policies and
operations. The preparation of such estimates should not be impeded by any
barriers arising from security considerations or otherwise, which may jeop-
ardize the soundness of the intelligence product.
Finally, any discussion of the preparation of national estimates would be in-
adequate without two caveats.. The first applies to those who prepare the estimates;
the second to those who may use them. Prejudice in the. form of stubborn adher-
ence to preconceived ideas is likely to be the gravest danger to sound intelli-
gence. Estimates are subject to the risk of being colored and twisted to reflect
the prejudices of those who prepare them. This can best be countered by providing
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reasonable checks and balances as we have endeavored to do in the composition
and responsibilities of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. If, for example,
the State Department, which may be wedded to a particular policy, presents the
facts distorted by faulty preconceptions, the final-product, as reflected in
an intelligence estimate, will be defective. It is hoped that in such a case
the new Estimates Group of the Central Intelligence Agency will supply an ini-
tial corrective and that the non-State Department members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee will have sufficient breadth of 1oaowledge to challenge the
State Department estimate. Likewise, military estimates should be submitted
to scrutiny so that they are compatible with each other and avoid the error,
however unconscious, of magnifying the needs of their own branch of the Service.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee, if it functions properly, and is as-
sisted by the disinterested work of the Central Intelligence Agency is the body
where such distortions should be caught and corrected and the prejudices of
one mind challenged by the thinking of a mind which at least does not suffer
from-the same prejudices.
In turn, prejudice on the part of the policy-makers may render them blind
even to brilliant achievements of an intelligence service. They may just re-
fuse to listen to what they do not like. Hence, nothing would be more dan-
gerous than to believe that if we once had an effective intelligence service
and an efficient intelligence estimating body, we would be immune to a disaster
like Pearl Harbor.
This does not lead to the conclusion that intelligence is futile. It
merely shows its limitations. If the intelligence appraiser can keep from
twisting and coloring the data he receives and if the policy-maker can keep a
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relatively open mind and be prepared for continual re-evaluation of the assump-
tions on which he is relying, then sound intelligence estimates can be a
pillar of strength for our national security.
(1) In the Central Intelligence Agency there has been confusion between
the responsibility of producing coordinated national intelligence estimates
and responsibility for miscellaneous research and reporting activities.
(2) The provisions of the National Security Act for the production of
national intelligence estimates, as interpreted by the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives, are sound but have not been effectively
carried out.
(3) There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small
Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelli-
gence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated
national intelligence estimates.
Intelligence Advisory Committee whose members should assume collective respon-
sibility for them.
estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted
(4+) Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, these '
(5) Provision should be made in these arrangements for the handling of
crisis situations when coordinated estimates are required without delay.
(6) Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this way must, in F~
order to be effective, be recognized as the most authoritative estimates avail-
able to the policy makers.
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SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND REPORTS
PROPOSED RESEARCH AND REPORTS DIVISION
We have recommended in the preceding chapter that there be created a
small, high-level Estimates Division to concern itself primarily with the cor-
relation of national intelligence, subject to final approval by the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee. If the responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the production of national. intelligence is assumed by this Esti-
mates Division, there will remain certain research and intelligence reporting
functions now being performed by the Office of Reports and Estimates which
might properly be carried out as a service of common concern by a newly con-
stituted "Research and Reports Division". Other activities of the Office of
Reports and Estimates should be discarded as being superfluous or competitive
with the proper activities of departmental intelligence.
There is presently within the Office of Reports and Estimates.a nucleus
for the proposed Research and Reports Division in fields of common concern.
It includes the Scientific Branch, which should be strengthened and have re-
attached to it the Nuclear Energy Group; the Map Branch, which produces maps
and map intelligence as a recognized common service; the Economic and Trans-
portation Panels; and some elements from the Geographic Branches. To these
there should be added the Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations
(See below,page 103) and the library, biographical and other registers and in-
dices presently maintained by the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
Generally speaking, this Division will be responsible for authoritative
research and reports in economic, scientific and technological intelligence,
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the maintenance of central reference facilities, and such other matters as are
deemed of common concern. To the extent necessary, it will also coordinate the
activities of the other agencies in these fields. Its staff should include in
appropriate cases adequate representation from the State Department and Serv-
ices so that, subject to policy guidance from the principal consumrs, its
products will represent the coordinated opinion of the best available talent
and should be fully responsive to the requirements of the consumer agencies.
In this chapter we suggest the type of activity which should be discon-
tinued as unessential or duplicative, the type of activity which should be
retained as a common service and some activities, not presently carried out in
the Office of Reports and Estimates, which should be performed by the proposed
Research and Reports Division as services of common concern. It would be the
responsibility of the National Security Council, acting on the advice of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to
determine which of these central services might properly be performed, and we
believe that the Coordination Division (reconstituted Interdepartmental Co-
ordinating and Planning Staff) should examine this problem and prepare the
necessary plans.
PERIODICAL SUMMARIES
The Office of Reports and Estimates presently produces current inte3ligence
in two principal forms: a top secret Daily Summary and a secret Weekly Summary.
The former comprises abstracts of a small number of incoming-and outgoing
cables received during the preceding twenty-four hours. Approximately ninety
per cent of the contents of the Daily Summary is derived from State Department
sources, including both operational as well as intelligence material. There
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are occasional comments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of the
Summary, but these,for the most part, appear gratuitous and. lend little weight
to the material itself. The result is a fragmentary publication which deals
with operations as well as intelligence, without necessarily being based on the
most significant materials in either category. In a suimnary of this type, cir-
culated to the President and the highest officials of the Government, there is
an inherent danger that it will be misleading to its consumers. Thisis because
it is based largely on abstracts of State Department materials, not in histor-
ical perspective, lacking a full knowledge of the background or policy involved
and with little previous consultation between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the State Department. Moreover, it is incomplete because it is not based on
all the most important materials.
The Weekly Summary is more widely circulated than the Daily Summary, but
also represents primarily political reporting and competes for attention with
several departmental weekly summaries, particularly those of the State Depart-
ment and the Department of the Army.
Still another periodical publication is the monthly "Review of the World
These summaries, particularly the Daily, are the subject of considerable
controversy and are received with expressions ranging from moderate interest
to strong criticism. The Weekly and the Daily are, to a certain extent, duplica-
tive in that the State Department, to which political intelligence has been.
assigned as an area of dominant interest,also disseminates its own operational
and intelligence summaries on the highest levels. As both Summaries consume
an inordinate amount of time and effort and appear to be outside of the domain
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of the Central Intelligence Agency, we believe that the Daily, and possibly
the Weekly, Summary should be discontinued in their present form. We do, how-
ever, appreciate the fact that, to some extent, there may be a need for such
summaries,and we suggest that the newly constituted Coordination Division ex-
amine the situation to determine whether there is such a need and how it can
best be met.
MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND MEMORANDA
The Office of Reports and Estimates also produces a variety of other re-
ports, studies and summaries. Some of these are strategic and basic studies
on foreign countries or areas, presenting the political, economic and military
situation. Others are intended to be estimates of current international prob-
lems. These are formal reports,dealing with a variety of subjects ranging from
"Possible Developments in China" to "Opposition to the ECA". These estimate-
type reports are circulated throughout the various agencies for the purpose of
obtaining concurrence or dissent. But the fact that they are so circulated in
no way means that they are properly coordinated estimates which represent the
best thinking on the subject under review. They often deal with topics which
are not particularly relevant to departmental problems or national issues,
with the result that the various agencies often feel that it is an imposition
to be burdened with the responsibility for reviewing these documents, making
appropriate comments and noting concurrence or dissent.
The Office of Reports and Estimates also initiates more informal reports
by means of intelligence memoranda produced spontaneously or in answer to spe-
cific requests. These are not coordinated by circulation through the other
agencies. Subjects again differ widely and include such topics asr-_
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.Much of this production is academic, tends to duplicate work in other de-
partments, has little relation to national intelligence, and is not produced
as a recognized service of ccnmion concern. On the other hand, some of this
production might, subject to general agreement, be performed as a central com-
mon service. In our opinion, the newly constituted Research and Reports Divi-
sion should refrain from the production of essentially political studies and
miscellaneous reports and should concentrate its effort upon the production of
reports in those fields clearly assigned to it as recognized services of com-
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
Under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, the Central
Intelligence Agency is charged with preparing an outline for the National In-
telligence Survey -- an extensive series of basic studies on all countries and
areas of the world -- and with coordinating the necessary departmental contribu-
tions. This study has been assigned to the Office of Reports and Estimates,not
as the producer, but rather as coordinator of the program,under specifications
and priorities approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This coordination
is achieved through the allocation of topics for research and production for
the particular purpose of the Survey series,but there is no provision for cen-
tralization or coordination of current production in these fields.
Under this series, various chapters and sections have been farmed out to
the State Department,the Services, and other qualified agencies. For Instance,
the Army has been assigned the responsibility for the sections on transportation
and communications. The assignment of these sections does not mean that Army
is recognized as having either primary interest.in,or continuing responsibility
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for, intelligence with respect to transportation and communications. For the
;purpose only of the handbooks,the National Intelligence. Survey eliminates dup-
lication of production in certain fields and provides temporary editorial
coordination of basic intelligence through the allocation of. topics. It does
not.aolve the problem of centralizing or coordinating continir? research and
Production in the fields of common interest.
]ECONCHIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE
The Office of Reports and Estimates appears to have made no serious attempt
to produce coordinated estimates or authoritative intelligence in the fields
Of economic, technological and scientific intelligence, in which no department
gee recognized as having a dominant interest. The six Geographic Branches, the
Atgency,State Department and the three Service intelligence agencies that there
is much duplication and little coordination of production on these subjects.
although often along parallel lines, studies are independently produced by the
various agencies and do not, therefore, represent the best available coordinated
crpinion.
kientific Branch and a number of the Consultant Panels are variously interested
to these fields but have seldom produced. authoritative intelligence contribu-
tions therein. We have found in our examination of the Central Intelligence
There has been an attempt in National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tive No. 3 to guide the effort of the various agencies into coordinated chan-
nels by the allocation of certain fields of dominant interest, but in the
fields of economic, scientific and technological intelligence, each agency is
authorized to produce in accordance with its needs. Thus, it is in these
fields, left open to all agencies and for which responsibility is now-
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divided and diffused, that the proposed Research and Reports Division could
perform a valuable service of common interest by centralizing or coordinating
research and intelligence production.
It is doubtful whether such a high degree of centralization in these fields,
including some essentially military intelligence,is desirable in this country.
Our Service intelligence agencies have been assigned fields of dominant interest,
and they will continue to produce military intelligence within these areas,.
However, even if each intelligence agency confines itself almost entirely to
the production of intelligence within its field of dominant interest, there
remains a vast area of common interest in such necessary supporting fields as
economic, scientific and technological intelligence.
The economic field could include, for example,industrial production, eco-
nomic resources, metallurgy, fuels, power,,communications and telecommunications.
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I'hese are some of the subjects where there is present duplication among. our
would be the Estimates Division, recommended in the preceding chapter. We
also recognize that the requirements of the various agencies in these matters.
of common concern will differ, and that each agency will need to adapt to its
must be accepted as such by the consumer agencies. A principal new consumer
must represent the most authoritative coordinated opinion on the subject and
'agencies and in which a great economy of effort and improvement of product
would result if intelligence were produced centrally. To provide an effective
contribution, the centrally produced reports on economic and industrial matters
251
awn, particular problems the intelligence produced in these fields.
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Research and Development Board.*
Few subjects of intelligence are more important than science and tech-
CZology,and yet little success .has been achieved in this country toward coor-.
4inating intelligence collection and production in these fields. Among the
agencies which are interested and in a position to contribute are not only the
dntral Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the three Services, but
closest coordination among the existing agencies through the use of committees
tific inte4igence. Where centralization is not practical there should be the
ate 'believe that there is an obvious need for more centralization of scien.-
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such as the present interdepartmental atomic energy intelligence committee
which works in consultation with the Nuclear Energy Group of the Office of
Special Operations (See below,page 114). A. strong Scientific Branch, as a com-
mon service within the Central Intelligence Agency, would be the logical focal
point for the coordination and appropriate centralization of scientific intel-
ligence. There appears to be no overriding reason for the segregation of the
Nuclear Energy Group within the Office of Special Operations, and it would be
preferable to reattach this Group to the Scientific, Branch, even though some
insulation may be necessary for security reasons.*
To fulfill its responsibilities as the chief analytical and evaluating
unit for scientific intelligence, and consequently as the principal guide for
collection, the Branch would have to be staffed by scientists of the highest
qualifications. We appreciate that in such a Branch it would be impossible to
obtain a leading scientist for each of the many segments of scientific and tech-
nological intelligence, but we believe that a staff of moderate size and of
high quality can cope with the normal research and evaluation,co-opting, where
necessary, personnel from such organizations as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
(1)
In addition to the Estimates Division recommended in the previous
Chapter, there should be created out of the present office of Reports and Es-
timates a Research and Reports Division to accomplish central research in, and co-
ordinated production of, intelligence in fields of ccmmon interest. The staff
* We understand that since this report was written steps have been taken to
create a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence which is to include the
Nuclear Energy Group.
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of this Division should include sufficient representation from the State De-
partment and the Services to insure that their needs are adequately met.
(2) The Coordination Division (:reconstituted Interdepartmental Coor-
mating and Planning Staff) should be given the responsibility for studying
the actual scope of the Research and Reports Division and for recommending
those services of common concern which should be,performecd centrally.
(3) The propriety of the preparation by the Central Intelligence Agency
f eheentially political summaries should be reviewed, taking into considera.-
reP re them.
u=exies and the particular capabilities of the individual departments to
tion the need for such summaries, the existence of a number of duplicating
(4+) The various reports, studies and summaries which are not national
.y
.titeUigence or recoized services of aomnon concern should be discontinued..
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CHAPTER VII
SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE COLLECTION OF OVERT INTELLIGENCE
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The Office of Operations, under an Assistant Director, performs a central
common service through the collection of overt intelligence by three essentially
distinct means:
I and the Foreign Documents Branch ex-
ploits foreign language documents and foreign periodicals and press for intel-
ligence purposed.
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The third Branch of the Office of Operations is the Foreign Documents
Branch which has the responsibility for exploiting foreign language documents
and foreign periodicals and press for intelligence purposes.
I the Foreign Docu-
25X1 ? ments Branch
not recognized officially
as a unique common service. The other departments and agencies do some of
their own translations of foreign language documents, etc., but also rely on
the Foreign Documents Branch.
The Foreign Documents Branch is engaged,in completing its exploitation of
large quantities of materials captured during the recent war. In addition, it
monitors current press and periodical publications and besides these routine
translations it occasionally translates specific documents upon request. It
also maintains for the various consumer agencies a continuing program of
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betracting from periodical publications specific materials in such fields as
There is a constant and large flow of production from the Foreign Docu.-
~rstracte, both general and technical, dealing with items of intelligence value
rite Branch in the form of extracts from. the foreign press; current periodical
-rd for inclusion in the Foreign Industrial Register of the Office of Collec-
oritained in Soviet and other foreiga periodicals; an industrial card file :r8'0-
-Son and Dissemination; biographical intelligence reports; a bibliography of
~_4ssian periodicals, special accession lists and various translations of cur-
n`thaterial to meet contVnuing requirements.
Inasmuch as it is virtually impossible to have a large pool of expert
ranslators who are at the same time specialists in various fields, it is most
rtant that the work of an agency such as the Foreign Docwnents Branch be
25XI
formed in close relationship to and under the constant guidance of the con-
agencies. It would, therefore, seem that instead of being associated in
he ,tffice e of Operations
it would be preferable
or the Foreign Documents Branch to be a part of the proposed Research and
sports Division suggested in Chapter VI.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The Office of Operations.consists of three distinctive activities,
ich represent useful and recogatzed functions in their own field but have no
particular relation to-each other.
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(1.) The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part of the proposed
Research and Reports Division if one is created.
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SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE COLLECTION OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE
Under normal
a government bases
means -- that is
through the press,
nels of trade and
the collection of
tively secondary
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peacetime conditions, the bulk of the information on which
J
its action in the international field is obtainable by overt
to say, through iiplomatic and military establishments,
scientific and technical publications and the normal chan-
international intercourse. With these facilities available,
intelligence in peacetime through secret means assumes rela-
importance. In fact, as mentioned above, insofar as our own
Government is concerned, cgvert collection of intelligence was a negligible
factor prior to World War II.
Today it is an understatement to describe conditions as merely abnormal.
They are uniquely difficult from the viewpoint of intelligence. Where Com-
munist regimes are in control the ordinary means of securing information
are generally lacking. In these areas, it is true, we have a few diplo-
matic missions and here and there some consular establishments. Their staffs,
however, are so restricted and spied upon that they cannot perform their usual
information gathering functions. Even the type of information that is
available for the asking here in the United States is unobtainable there.
In this whole great area of communist domination it is not only military
information which is kept secret, but it is hard to get even simple and
seemingly innocuous details relating to the economic, financial and polit-
ical developments which may furnish vital clues to political and military
trends.
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follow a unique pattern in, various foreign countries and in the United States
which: calls for the beat that we have in the field of counter-intelligence.
Also, the methods of fifth column penetration practiced. by the Communists
to find methods of informing ourselves about Iron Curtain countries. As we
As a result of this,there is an urgent call upo*i our skill and ingenuity
lcannot do it adequately by orthodox methods, an increasingly heavy burden is
!today a higher priority in our over-all intelligence picture than in the past.
placid on--our secret intelligence and counter-intelligence and, hence they have
11IE ()ETFR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO CONDUCT,SECREI INTELLIGENCE
The responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency for the collection
f tggert intelligence abroad are performed as a "service of common concern"
In accordance with the terms of National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
oaf overt intelligence, where the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency is
tive No. 5 of December 12, 1947. (See Annex No. 11). Unlike the collection
linnted one, the collection of practically all covert foreign intelligence
aeisigne4 to the Agency.
following duties t
Intelligenc6 Directive No. 5 gives to the Central Intelligence Agency the
To conduct all organized federal espionage operations abroad,
except for agreed activities by other departments and agencies.
k. To conduct all organized federal counter-espionage abroad,
eluding occupied areas.
g. To coordinate covert and overt intelligence collection, and to
coordinate the activities of casual agents employed on covert missions by
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other departments and agencies, members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.
d. To disseminate the intelligence thus obtained to the various
departments and agencies having an authorized interest in it.
Covert collection thus includes espionage and counter-espionage abroad,
i. e., the clandestine collection of information and counter-action against
foreign secret intelligence activities. It does not include intelligence col-
lection by secret but essentially technical means, such as communications
intelligence.
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 sets forth the
respective responsibilities of the departmental agencies for collection of
certain categories of foreign intelligence information. The Army was thus
given primary responsibility for collecting foreign military information, the
Navy naval information, the State Department political, cultural, and socio-
logical information, etc. The effect of Directive No. 5, however, is to Limit
these responsibilities to overt collection, and set aside the entire field of
covert intelligence operations (with a few exceptions) as the 'domain of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Further, the Agency is "responsible for coordi-
nating covert and overt intelligence collection activities," and is also
charged with coordinating the activities of casual covert agents employed by
other agencies with its own "organized covert activities."
It is important to note, in this connection, that the National Security
Council has rejected, and we believe rightly, the concept that espionage might
be conducted by several agencies, each independent of the other, and each
authorized to operate in the same areas with roughly the same objectives.
Multiple espionage of this kind has occasionally been advocated as a means of
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security.
It is argued that the penetration of a centralized
destroy its entire roster of agents, leaving the nation
0epicnage agency might
ithcut an effective secret intelligence service in time of crisis, whereas
penetration of one of several espionage units might destroy its networks, but
#t*ould. leave those of the others untouched..
We consider this view to be largely theoretical, provided espionage is
properly conducted to keel) the identity of chains entirely separate and if
groper security is maintained in the central office. In any event, we feel
hat this danger is less serious than the confusion and overlapping in the
field. of espionage which would result if several services were engaged in it.
doption of a centralized espionage structure has meant that, except for cer
operations in occupied areas, the.. foreign covert operations of ether
agencies of the Government, have been dissolved or turned over to the Central.
ntgllU.gepce Agency.
0XIANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
The Central Intelligence Agency does not enter the intricate field of
Foreign espionage and counter-espionage without some background of experience.
he covert operations unit, known as the Office of Special Operations (OSO),
s in effect the legatee of the operating experience, the records, and many
pf the personnel of the secret intelligence (SI) and counter-espionage (X-2)
`branpi es of the former Office of Strategic Services and Strategic Services
Jnit., War Department.
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I In its headquarters structure it
has drawn heavily upon the previous experience of these organizations in
conducting war and post-war operations.
Administratively, the Office of Special Operations is on the same level
as the four other Offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. Contact with
the Director is maintained almost exclusively by its chief, the Assistant
Director for Special Operations, and his deputy. The Assistant Director's
personal staff also includes an Executive Secretary, whose duties are ap-
proximately that of an executive officer, and several consultants and advisers
who deal with particular aspects of agent operations, archives, budget and
the like.
Under the Assistant Director, the organization is divided into three major
operating groups.
The Operations Group is responsible for the actual conduct of espionage
and counter-espionage. Its major subdivisions are seven regional branches,
each of which controls and guides covert operations in the particular area
abroad for which it is responsible. These operating branches function inde-
pendently of each other except at the top level,wbere branch chiefs coordinate
operations involving more than one area. Security of branch operations is thus
fairly well maintained within headquarters. It is the policy to assign person-
nel to a particular area or country for considerable periods to gain adequate
background for sound operations. Arrangements exist for the assignment of
headquarters personnel to the field, and vice versa, although a comprehensive
program for rotation of personnel has not yet been worked out.
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eespianage, assist the branches in directing operations of particular kinds,,
+3nd Liz assuring orderly dissemination of the secret intelligence materials
obtained as a result of operations.
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Several staff units, including a deputy chief of operations for counter-.
The scientific and technical, section of the Office of Special Operations
Through the Nuclear Energy Group, departmental intelligence collection requests,
SM, mitted via the Office of Collection and Dissemination, and the Scientific
Iranch, Office of Reports and Estimates.
Office of Reports and Estimates.* For its own part, it receives direction
assists the regional branches in directing operations likely to produce infor-
Natio:n in these fields. The section works closely with the Nuclear Energy
Group of the Office and has some contact with the Scientific Branch of the
!~xp comments on reports of the Office of Special Operations received from the
The Information Control Section is concerned with directing the work of
the regional branches, analyzing and controlling their output, and reviewing
Office of Reports and Estimates and occasionally from departmental agencies.
Ihis is the point to which intelligence requirements of other agencies are
Bent by the Office of Collection and Dissemination. It is responsible for the
editorial review of intelligence reports prepared by the branches of the Office
of Special Operations.
Approved reports are forwarded by the Information Control Section to the
Office of Collection and Dissemination, which then determines the agencies. to
which they will be disseminated. When urgent dissemination is required by the
zxatur4~ of .a report received, members of the section may deliver it personally-
* See' footnote below, page 115.
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to authorized recipients. This distribution is subject to review by the Office
of Collection and D isseminat ion, which may extend it to other agencies on its own
initiative. In line with our recommendation, given below, to give the Off ice of
Special Operations greater independence and autonomy and to bring it in closer
contact with the principal users of its product, we recommend that the power to
determine dissemination of its reports should rest largely in the Office of
Special Operations itself. In order to bring the Office closer to its chief
consumers, we also recommend that there be included in the Information Control
Section representatives of each of the Services and of the Department of State.
Training of staff members and career agents is undertaken by the training
section of the Operations Group. Several courses in basic and advanced intel-
ligence are given to administrative and operational personnel. The courses
emphasize practical problems of field operations, not only for administrative
and secretarial personnel, but also for staff members who will conduct opera-
tions. The building of a corps of trained personnel for secret intelligence
work is one of the crucial problems which the Office of Special Operations has
to face.
The Operations Group also includes a section which analyzes the needs of
the operational units for special devices and equipment. Actual development
of such equipment is supervised by the Administrative Group, but is conducted
in close collaboration with members of this section.
The second major division of the Office of Special Operations is the
Administrative Group, headed by a chief and deputy chief, which has hitherto
had responsibility under the Assistant Director for such matters as supply
and transportation, special funds, personnel, central files, cover and
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dow mentation. The Administrative Group also controls field communications
which we recommend should be brought into closer contact with the Operations
Group.
As we mentioned in Chapter III,consideration is now being given in the
Central Intelligence Agency to the removal of all of these services except for
central files, cover and documentation, and communications to the Executive
for Administration where they would be beyond the direct authority and control
:cf;the A,sistant Director for Special Operations.
by the same token the unique character of secret operations renders inapplicable
breached when overt and covert administrative units are placed together; and
rule, secret administrative support should be as close and as accessible to
secret operations as possible. The most elementary rules of security are
the point of view of internal security we also deprecate it. As a general
that this proposed transfer of its administrative services is unsound. From
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We consider that the Office of Special Operations and its closely related
ser"riees should be largely autonomous and self-sufficient. Hence, we believe
vitiate his ability to conduct the very operations with which he is charged.
the direct authority of the official responsible for secret operations would
most ordinary rules of administration. Removal of administrative support from
The third major division of the Office of Special Operations is the
Nuclear Energy Group. 'Unlike the Operations and Administrative Divisions
which we have discussed above, it has no direct contact with agent operations
or collection but is an analyzer and consumer of secret intelligence. Its
character, indeed, is that of a reports staff studying foreign research and
developments in the field of nuclear energy. Historically, the Group was
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organized in the Manhattan District and was transferred to the Central In-
telligence Agency at the time of the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Attached first to the Director of Central Intelligence, it was later transferred
to the Scientific Branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates where, because
of its analytic and reporting functions, it logically belonged. It was after-
wards (early 19}+8) moved to the Office of Special Operations because of dif-
ficulties within the Scientific Branch.
The success of the Nuclear Energy Group will be measured in terms of the
effectiveness of its relationship to the Atomic Energy Commission, one of its
major consumers, and to the National Military Establishment. The Group's work
with these agencies has been considerably improved in recent months by the
appointment of a highly competent scientist as the Chief of Intelligence in the
Atomic Energy Commission and the functioning of an inter-agency committee con-
cerned exclusively with atomic energy intelligence.
As we have indicated, it is obvious that from a functional point of view,
the Nuclear Energy Group does not belong in the Office of Special Operations.
As a research unit, its place is clearly with the Scientific Branch of the
proposed Research and Reports Division, the successor to the Office of Reports
and Estimates.*
Before concluding our survey of the headquarters organization of the
Office of Special Operations, we wish to add a recommendation to which we
attach particular importance and which affects the relationship of this Office
to other covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* See above, Chapter VI. Since this report was drafted, we understand that
steps have been taken to transfer the Nuclear Energy Group to a new Office
of Scientific Intelligence.
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in Chapters VII and I we briefly consider the similarity of the opera-
ioina3 -&6a administrative problems faced by the Office of Special Operations,
'Operations`. All three offices carry on activities of a highly confidential
atuxe.` These activities are interkrelated. and require close coordination.
`In addition they are able :mutually to service each other. This is particularly
true of the overseas operations of the Office of Special Operations and the
j9ffice of Policy Coordination. We recommend that the three activities be
under the common control of a single directing head who would be one
of the chief assistants of the Director. The three Offices might be set up as
eeparate branches of a common service of secret activities which should enjoy
autonomy within the Central Intelligence Agency and might appropriately
1 e ca,llpd Operations Division. Whether eventually a closer merger of the
threj~ activities should be effected can best be determined in the light of
t expe:~ience .
s`a part of such a central organization devoted to covert operations,
entralized administrative services should be established under the single
chief of covert activities, and should not be identified with or combined with
the administrative arrangements made for the balance of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The covert organization thus established should,in particular, under-
take its own personnel recruitment
using the facilities of the personnel
section of the Central Intelligence Agency only insofar as they appear to serve
the purpose of the covert organization.
In making. this recommendation., we appreciate that the Office of Policy
Coordination under NSC 10/2 has a special relationship to the
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State and the Secretary of Defense. We believe that substantial benefits
would accrue in having this same relationship established, through the head of
the Operations Division, with both of the secret overseas activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, assuming that they and
brought together in the manner we recommend above.
are 25X1
In this recommendation we have also had in mind the desirability of quickly
establishing a particularly close relationship between the secret activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Military Establishment and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in case of war. If the measure of autonomy we suggest for
these services is achieved, they could be attached, without delay, to the
Secretary of Defense or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the National Security
Council should consider this advisable.
Subject to the foregoing recommendation, we believe that the headquarters
organization of the Office of Special Operations is soundly conceived and has
made a satisfactory start toward setting up our secret intelligence work.
FIELD ACTIVITIES OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE
The headquarters of the Office of Special Operations directs an extensive
and ramified network of field stations located
throughout the world.
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In some countries, contact has been established
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useful, and their potentialities for the future are great.
x W
These relations are often most
In certain friendly but threatened countries, the Office of Special
Operations has begun arranging with these services for the installation of
be used in the event of a military emergency. In most
instances independent networks are also being built up.
The agent operations of the Office of Special Operations abroad have been
criticized as being too frequently directed against fairly obvious, short-term
objectives, and as having overlooked or failed to exploit strategic targets.
The Office is also sometimes criticized in the departmental agencies and in the
Office of Reports and Estimates for producing quantity rather than quality. It
can in part answer such criticism by showing that it has not received adequate
directives from the policy-makers. This serious failure should be remedied.
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As a phase of the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency
and military commands, it may be noted that firm arrangements have not yet been
completed for the conduct of secret intelligence operations in a military
theatre in wartime.
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There is no easy solution to this problem. We must recognize that it is
aggravated by putting so many eggs in the Central Intelligence Agency basket,
We believe the solution. lies along the lines we recommend in this report --
n:iely, to divide the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency generally
into two parts: (1) the overt, recognized and admitted functions of coordina-
tion, and central appraiser and evaluator and (2) the .covert activities of the
Office of Special Operations, Office of Policy Coordination, etc. The two
could be physically and, to a large extent, functionally separated. Persons
working for the one would openly admit their connections while those working
for the other would find various and differing types of cover.
The Central Intelligence Agency should then endeavor to reverse the
present unfortunate trend where it finds itself advertised almost exclusively
as a secret service organization and become to the public the centralizer and
coordinator of intelligence, not the secret gatherer,
recommending are effected., they would furnish a good
the Central Intelligence Agency to do this.
If the changes we are
point of departure for
COt3NIER-ESPIONAGE
Espionage and counter-espionage have been unified in the Operations Group
of the Office of Special Operations. This arrangement represents a departure
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from the wartime structure of the office of Strategic Serviced in which these
activities were conducted in separate branches. It is also different from
most foreign services, which have separate espionage and counter-espionage
branches, integrated only through their chiefs. Possibly because of this
organizational unification counter-espionage has not yet been adequately ex-
ploited as a source of positive intelligence information, as a channel for
deception, as a means of protecting espionage operations and as a basis for
penetrating fifth column operations abroad, which may be tied in with fifth
column operations here.
The techniques of espionage seem somewhat simpler than those of counter-
espionage, and the former generally is assumed topromise more decisive results.
Factors such asthese have influenced the concentration of the Office of Special
Operations on espionage problems. It seems apparent that the present counter-
espionage staff of the Office of Special Operations should be materially
strengthened and more intensive counter-espionage work promoted.
Owing to the subordination of counter-espionage to espionage, the ex-
ploitation by the Office of Special Operations of counter-intelligence oppor-
tunities and its general approach to the problems of counter-intelligence have
not been markedly successful. Its liaison arrangements with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, which is charged with all counter-espionage responsibilities
in the United states, except those affecting personnel of the Armed Services,
have been limited for the most part to exchange of information on suspect
individuals.
Full collaboration on counter-espionage plans and operations has not yet
been achieved, and neither organization is fully acquainted with the over-all
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prcgra3n of the other. Since the clanger of foreign espionage and the menace of
i
fifth column activities does not stop or start at our national boundaries, it
1 is desirable that the two agencies most concerned with counter-espionage should
maintain. closer relations with each other. We have already pointed out in
Chapter IV the extent of the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency
to insure coordination of certain counter-intelligence activities of the
Government. We can only observe here that a major aspect of such coordination
is a close working relationship between the Office of Special Operations and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
COMNTCATIONS INTELLIGENCE
It is particularly irnportant to coordinate the activities of the Office
of:Special Operations with commtuzications intelligence so that the two activi-
nei can work together for mutual support and protection,
Coications intelligence, on the other hand, can be a vital source of
information, guidance and protection for espionage and counter-espionage
operations provided that the Office of Special Operations has access to this
ource to the full extent necessary for these purposes. Although, as pointed
out Elsewhere in this report (See Chapter IV), we have not gone into this
field., there appears to be some question whether the Office of Special Opera-
tions now has adequate and prompt access to this material,
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THE NEED FOR POLICY DIRECTION OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE
To be genuinely effective, secret intelligence operations must be directed
toward the intelligence objectives of greatest importance to the Government.
Today, as we mentioned above, the Office of Special Operations lacks the
direction which it needs to insure the maximum relevancy of its operations to
the problems of foreign and military policy. It is, indeed, a fundamental
failing of the American intelligence services that, in general, they are not
advised of the current needs of policy-makers. Unfortunately, continuing ef-
fort is rarely made by intelligence consumers to guide intelligence activities
toward the most meaningful targets.
The formal requirement lists of the military services are received by the
Office of Special Operations; generally speaking, these are of a "spot", short-
term nature. They are often transmitted with the implied expectation that the
desired answers can be secured almost immediately. Adequate guidance from
the State Department is lacking, except in the cases of a few officers of the
Office of Special Operations who maintain personal contact with policy officers
in the State Department. No regular evaluatory or other comments are received
on the intelligence reports put out by the Office except from the Office of
Reports and Estimates which is not necessarily the best source for such judg-
ments. It is thus deprived of the guidance in specific cases which Service
agencies and the State Department could supply.
We believe that these deficiencies would be remedied, at least in part,
by the attachment to the Office of Special operations, as suggested earlier in
this chapter, of representatives from the Department of State and the Services
and by the creation of a more direct relationship to the Secretaries of State
and Defense,
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GEI J3 A.L APPRAISAL
In appraising the general results of the operations of the Office of
Special Operations, it is too early to arrive at definite conclusions. Certain
operations now being conducted, hitherto lacking in results, may prove to be
of the first importance at some time in the future. It can be said, however,
that the Office haa been successful in securing certain categories of valuable
intelligence. It has also established or maintained relations with the in-
telligence services of several friendly countries, not only for the exchange
of information but, in some cases, for the conduct of operations.
Macy priority targets of secret intelligence remain untouched
We recognize the -vast
'Lit of this type of undertaking and the need for extreme caution,.
Thri the departmental intelligence services, as we have remarked!
,earlier, there exists a general feeling that the results of secret intelligence
operations have not yet attained the level which the current concentration of
jersonnel and funds should warrant. This, we believe, is in part due to the
7;acj of sufficiently intimate liaison between the Office of Special Operations,
11e Services and the State :Department.
In thus assessing achievements, it cannot be forgotten that the agency is
still very young.
This is the reason for some of the defects which have been
pointed out in the foregoing discussion. The organization does have the serv-
ices of some highly talented, and experienced . persons, both in headquarters and
in the field. Their presence gives promise of systematic improvement for their
work as a whole.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOI PTDATIONS
(1) The covert operations of the Office of Special Operations and Office
of Policy Coordination and the activities of
of the Office
of Operations should be integrated, and the three operations should be brought
together under single over-all direction (Operations Division) within the
Central Intelligence Agency.'
(4) The Office of Special Operations (or the new Operations Division)
must give primary attention to the building up of a corps of trained personnel
for operations abroad.
(5) The cover policies of the Office of Special Operations in the field
should be generally reviewed and tightened.
(6) The counter-espionage activities of the Office of Special Operations
should be increased in scope and emphasis, and closer liaison in this field
should be established with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(7) Relations with departmental agencies should be brought closer, and
the guidance which the Office of Special Operations receives from intelligence
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.consumers should be strengthened. This might be achieved by including repre-
sentatives of the Service agencies and the State Department in the Information
Control Section of the Office of Special Operations.
(8) The Director should assure himself that the Office of Special Opera-
one is receiving adequate information on the current and strategic intelli-
gence needs of the Government. This might be achieved by establishing closer
relations with the Secretaries of State and Defense.
(9) The Office of Special Operations should exercise a greater measure
of control over the dissemination of its own material.
1;10) The Nuclear Energy Group should be moved from the Office of Special
}perations to the proposed Research and Reports Division where it should be a
- jhe general scientific work.
The Office of Special Operations should have access to commuunications
steifigence to the full extent required for guidance in directing its opera-.
tions and for more effective conduct of counter-espionage.
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SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE CONDUCT OF SECRET OPERATIONS
RELATIONS BETWEEN SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET OPERATIONS
The collection of secret intelligence is closely related to the conduct
of secret operations in support of national policy. These operations, includ-
ing covert psychological warfare, clandestine political activity, sabotage and
guerrilla activity, have always been the companions of secret intelligence.
The two activities support each other and can be disassociated only to the
detriment of both. Effective secret intelligence is a prerequisite to sound
secret operations and, where security considerations permit, channels for
secret intelligence may also serve secret operations. On the other hand., al-
though the acquisition of intelligence is not the immediate objective of secret
operations,. the latter may prove to be a most productive source, of intelligence.
It was because of our views on the intimate relationship between these
two activities that we submitted our Interim Report No. 2, dated May 13, 1948,
"Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence," which was a
comment on proposals, then before the National Security Council, for the ini-
tiation of a program of secret operations. In that report we made the follow-
ing observations:
"In carrying out these special operations, the Director Zo-f Secret
Operations 7 and his staff should have intimate knowledge of what is being
done in the field of secret intelligence and access to all the facilities
which may be built up through a properly constituted secret intelligence
network. Secret operations, particularly through support of resistance
groups, provide one of the most important sources of secret intelligence,
and the information gained from secret intelligence must immediately be
put to use in guiding and directing secret operations. In many cases it
is necessary to determine whether a particular agent or chain should
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primarily be used for secret intelligence or for secret operations, be-
cause the attempt to press both uses may endanger the security of each.
Unless the p e r s o n n e l for both operations Is u n d e r
one over-all control in Washington, even though a measure of insulation
is provided in the field, there is likely to be overlapping of activities
and functions in critical areas which will imperil security.
"The Allied experience in the carrying out of secret operations and
secret intelligence during the last war has ointed up the close relation--
shi of the two activities.
E CPFFCE OF POLICY COORDINATION
The National Security Council in creating within the Central Intelligence
,gency, in-accordance with Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act,
4e,0fioe of Special Projects (now known as the Office of Policy Coordination)
eco@nized these'views to the extent that both secret intelligence and secret
operations were included within the same organization. However, this action
O.id :.ot go as far as we had recommended, with the result that the Office of
Policy Coordination (secret operations) and the Office of Special Operations
secret intelligence) are not bound together by any special relationship and
pers,te as entirely separate Offices.
Although it is too early to appraise the accomplishments of the Office of
Policy Coordination which has been in existence only a few months, experience
ias, in our opinion, already shown that the organizational relationship be--
tweer.. it and the Office of Special Operations should be closer. Although the
roblems.with which the tro Offices are concerned are so intimately related,
ere is no arrangement for coordinating their operations under common direc--
Lion except insofar as they are both under the Director of Central Intelligence.
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Even this relationship is weakened by the fact that NSC 10/2 which created the
Office of Policy Coordination provides that "for purposes of security and of
flexibility of operations and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency,
the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components
of Central Intelligence Agency." Thus,complete separation was made mandatory.
The Office of Policy Coordination, which is the only Office in the Central
Intelligence Agency created by direct order of the National Security Council,
is also given a special position in that its charter provides that the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "insuring, through desig-
nated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense,
that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with
United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities" and
that disagreements between the Director and these representatives shall be re-
ferred to the National Security Council for decision. Furthermore, the Chief
of the Office of Policy Coordination can be appointed only upon nomination by
the Secretary of State and approval by the National Security Council.
In practice, the Office of Policy Coordination enjoys a position which
gives it direct ties to the Department of State and the National Military
Establishment and support from them not enjoyed by the Office of Special Opera-
tions. Consequently, the two activities which should be closely integrated
are in fact-operating with different outside guidance and support, with ais-
similar charters, and they occupy a different status. within the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
In our opinion, this situation is unsound. The close relationship between
these two activities, as pointed out above, needs to be recognized along with
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the fact that secret intelligence requires the same degree of control and sup-
25
pdrt from the State Department and the Military Establishment as secret opera-
tions. As' recommended in Chapters VII and VIII, we propose therefore that
theme two activities be closely integrated (along with parts of the Office of
Operations) in a single Operations Division which would enjoy considerable au-
tonomy, in accordance with our over-all recommendations for changes in the
organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.
in any detail. We believe, however, that the Assistant Director in charge of
tbe.Office of Policy Coordination is proceeding wisely in building slowly in
q oat difficult field.
As we have stated above, the operations of the Office of Policy Coordina-
tior.. have been so recently initiated that it is premature to comment upon them
OONCLUSIONS AND RECO IWA,TIONS
(1) The close relationship between covert intelligence and covert pp ra-
tions and the fact that the latter is related to intelligence affecting the
rational security justifies the placing of the Office of Policy Coordination
ithj.;z,the Central Intelligence Agency.
bovert Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, namely,the Office of Special
(2) The Office of Policy Coordination should be integrated with the other
-operations, and with f the Office of Operations, and these
three operations should be under single over-all direction, (Operations Divi--
+3ion) within the Central Intelligence Agency.*
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CHAPTER X
THE DIRECTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
GAL APPRAISAL
We have reserved for this final chapter an the Central Intelligence Agency
the discussion of the post of Director. An appraisal of the qualifications
and achievements of the directing, personnel is only possible in light of an
examination of the entire organization. Within the scope of his mandate under
the National Security Act, it is the Director who must guide the organization
to the attainment of its objectives, establish its operating policies and win
the confidence of other branches of the Government.
This is not an easy task. The Central Intelligence Agency has a diversi-
fied and difficult mission to perform. Its success depends, to a large extent,
on the support it receives from other agencies which may be ignorant of its
problems and. suspicious of its prerogatives. It has peculiar administrative.,
personnel and security problems and has to handle complicated operating situa-
tions. Moreover, the pressure to build rapidly has been strong and there has
been little time in which to demonstrate substantial accomplishments.
We believe that these difficulties cannot alone explain the principal de-
ficiencies which we have discussed in previous chapters. The directing staff
of the Central Intelligence Agency has not demonstrated an adequate under-
standing of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that
mandate effectively.
The duties of the Central Intelligence Agency in regard to the coordina-
tion of intelligence activities have not been fulfilled. The responsibility
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 for the correlation of national intelligence has not been carried out in such
a manner as to provide the policy-makers with coordinated national intelligence
estimates. Some activities are being carried out by the Central Intelligence
Agency which largely duplicate the work of other departments and agencies, and
there has been no adequate attempt to coordinate or centralize others. Gen-
erally speaking, satisfactory working relations have not been established with
other departments and agencies. Within the Central Intelligence Agency in-
adequate guidance as to the intelligence requirements ff the Government is
f,',-received from the Director. These deficiencies exist in spite of a broad stat-
utory mandate, reasonable appropriations and support from the National Security
council.
d , a.inistrative policies within the Agency contribute to this situation..
1 'hem tornal organization does not reflect an appreciation of the Agency's sev-
eral 4iatinctive yet inter-related missions under the National Security Act:
In fact, the scheme of organization tends to blur and impede the performance
of the organization's essential intelligence functions under the, Act. The
Aireotorate has given positions of pre-eminence to officials who are primarily
administrators yet exert policy control over As intelligence Offices without
,being, qualified to do so. There is little close consultation on intelligence
and policy matters between the various stratified levels. Although the heads
.of tho several Offices are allowed considerable latitude in conducting their
.respective operations, they do not share substantially in the determination of
TIM QUESTION OF CIVILIAN D:LRECTION
We have also considered the question whether the Director ought to be a
hiviliari. While we recognize that the statute provides that he may be either
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civilian or military we have reached the conclusion that he should be a civil-
ian. We do not mean to exclude the possibility that a Service man maybe se
lected for the post, but if this is done he should resign from active military
duty and thereafter work as a civilian. In such a case appropriate provision
should be made so that he does not lose his retirement benefits.
We have reached the conclusion that the Director should be civilian be-
cause we are convinced that continuity of tenure is essential and complete in-
dependence of service ties desirable for carrying out the duties of the Direc-
tor. The post cannot properly be filled as a mere tour of duty between mili-
tary assignments. Unless there is such continuity of service and complete in-
dependence of action, the Director will not be able to build up the esprit de
corps, the technical efficiency, the loyalty of home staff and field workers,
which are essential to the success of the enterprise. We agree with the intent
of the provision of the National Security Act that the Director "shall be sub-
ject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or oth-
erwise)" by the Service departments, but do not feel that this provision can
alone offset the disadvantages to which we have pointed.
It is inevitable that there should be rotation in the Service intelligence
agencies, though in recent years that rotation has 'been far too rapid in the
top ranks. However, in the Central Intelligence Agency there should be sta-
bility and continuity of leadership.
Finally, we recommend a civilian Director because we believe that in work-
ing out a well balanced top echelon committee (the reconstituted Intelligence
Advisory Committee) for appraising and coordinating Government intelligence,
the strong, and properly strong, representation of the military intelligence
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Services on such a body should be balanced with an equally strong civilian
representation.
We have considered the argument that the Director of Central Intelligence,
because of the high security requirements of the post, shcnuld be a man perma-
nently devoted to Government service, amenable to the disciplines of the Serv-
ices and free of political ambiticme or entanglements. We believe that the
qualificatigns of the Director of Central Intelligence, whether his past er-
per;t.ence has been in civilian life or In military or other Government service,
should be on so high a level that there would be no more doubt as to the loyalty
and responsibility of the Director than of the Secretary of State or the Sec-
retary of Defense. In appointing the Director of Central Intelligence with the
responsibilities he must carry today, we must select a man to whom we would
willingly entrust any position of responsibility whatsoever in our Governmexrc.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECON DATIONS
(1) The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency has not dem-
onstrated-an adequate understanding. of the mandate of the organization or the
ability to discharge that mandate effectively.
(2) Administrative organization and policies tend to impede the carrying
out, 3f the essential intelligence functions of the Central Intelligence Agency
under the Act.
(3) Continuity of service is essential for the successful carrying out
of the duties of Director of Central Intelligence.
(4) As the best hope for continuity of service and the greatest assur-
ance of independence of action a civilian should be Director of Central In-
telligence. If a Service man is selected for the post he should resign from
active military duty.
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THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
The Survey Group has been primarily concerned with examining the struc-
ture, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the Central