DEPARTURE STATEMENT FROM WASHINGTON FOR CENTO AND NATO MEETINGS AND VISIT TO GREECE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 21, 1960
• Content Type: STATEMENT

'Apprdbed For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
Departure Statement from Washington
for C T I Y$'ee s and
Visit to Greece
TEH D-0/3
April 21, 1960
I am going to Tehran to attend the meeting of the
Council of the Central Treaty Organization. Immediately
thereafter, I shall meet in Istanbul with the Foreign
=inisters of the NATO countries at the regular spring
Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Before
returning to Washington I shall stop in At ens.
My visit to Iran is a welcome opportunity to renew
friendships with the leaders of a country bound by tradi
?and close ties to the United States, I look forward
to meeting with our associates in CENTO. We in the United
States attach the greatest importance to the Central Treaty
Organization. We strongly support CENTO's steadfast
efforts to strengthen the principle of collective security
in that vital area of the world and to promote the economic
well-being of their peoples.
I also look forward to my visit to Turkey,, a staunch
friend of the United States and stalwart member of both
CENTO and NATO. At the Ministerial meeting of the NATO
Council we shall, in addition to other subjects, discuss
preparations for the meeting of Heads of Government in Paris
or May .1.6.
I much appreciate the invitation of the Creek Govern-
ennt to visit Athens and the courtesy shown by the King and
Queen of the Hellenes in agreeing to receive me o I will
?:-l.so see Prime Minister Karamanlis for a discussion of
subjects of interest to Greece and the United States.
This trip will take me to three of our oldest friends.
t, is my hope that it will serve to strengthen further the
, i :mss which for so many years have bound us in close and
1nti;:i6 ~e friendship.
Drafted by: RA - Mr. Lehmann Cleared by: RA - Mr. Fessenden
GTI - Mr. Hope
NEA - Mr. Sims
NR - Mr. Walstrom
P - Mr. Berding
C - M
A
hill
r.
c
es
-RO - Raymond Lo Perkins Room 5274 Ns, 44U Ext.
STATE review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 ' Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
EIGHTH CANTO 1 T M C(3I CIL SESSION
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960
AGEWA
TEH D-3/1
April. 21, 1960
I* Installation of Cbairmm
Ile opening of the Meeting -- lutaeod actory r by the Secretary
Gera. and s'c'ents by the Chsirsen cmd H of Delegations
III. Adoption of Agenda (C/8/A3 - Third Revise)
IV. Appointment of a D ing Committee for the Final Ccmmunlque
V. Report by the Secretary General (C/8/D6)
VT. Report of the Military Committee (C/8/D5)
VII Q Report of the 7. ,aison Committee (c/8/D1)
VIII. Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee (C/8/D2)
n Repwt of the Etc Caamnittee (c/8/D3)
X. Anmial Report of the Economic Coamittee for 1959 (C/8/ D4)
X14 Review of the International Situation
M. Place and Date of the Next Council meting at the fUnIsterial
i l
CIO Aprova of Final C que
XIV Any Other DMAsiness.
o Closing Arrangemamis :
(a) Final Photographs of the Council
(b) Issuance of Final Ccmxmlqm
(a) Press Conference by the Chair=m
fte d U. S. Position:
ei Agenda is satisfactory.
Ct IDZW2IAL
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
EIGHTH C NTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran, April 25-30,1960
?A i I~iY~?~0?tl
Political-Economic Situation of Pakistan
(Background Paper)
TEII B-113
April no 1960
Summa
In its first year and one-half, President Ayub Khan's regime has sue=
ceeded in consolidating its position and attracting wide popular support. It
has made substantial progress in political, social and economic reform but
still faces formidable basic problems. Its most notable achievements have
been in land reform, refugee rehabilitation, balance of payments and fiscal
management. While martial law has been replaced in practice by ordinary
civil law, it remains formally in force as a deterrent to corruption and
other activities which might disrupt the regime s programs,
A Constitution Commission has been established and restoration of
representative., constitutional government is anticipated within one year.
Meanwhile, ttie regime is proceeding with the "Basic Democracies" program
aimed at evolving democratic institutions from the grass roots up as well as
implementing, and gaining popular support fora its policies. While refraining
from political persecution, the regime has moved to disqualify corrupt and
irresponsible ex politicians from holding public office for the next few years.
Organized opposition to the regimo is not anticipated in the foreseeable
future. There is, however., a longer-range possibility that popular opposition
may develop, particularly in East Pakistan, if the regime should fail to
satisfy the basic economic requirements of the people and the desire for
greater participation in government. The long-range prospects for the
economy are not bright unless sizeable foreign assistance continues.
Pakistan remains firmly committed to the Went, and participates actively
in CENTO and SEATO. It continues to pursue a conci iato*- policy toward India,
but recently has hardened its attitude toward Afghanistan because of growing
tension over the "Pushtunistan" dispute and Pakistan's apprehension over-
Soviet influence. in Afghanistan. The U.S.. is encouraged by the progress being
made by the GovernIe t of Pakistan and continues to support it with economic
and military aid.
Internal Situation
During one and one-half years in power, President Mohammad Ayub than and
the controlling
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2OU3T04/23 :~CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
the controlling group of Pakistan military and civil officials have succeeded
in consolidating their position and in attracting general popular support.
,Ayub personally has gained wide popularity and continues to retain the
loyalty of the armed forces.
The f avernment has made substantial progress in its far-reaching program
of Political, social and economic reform. '-ts .oat dramatic achievement has
been in arrarian reform with floe virtual coF,pletion of a land redistribution
prograr ivP West Pakistan cauipl ?i i;:i ` a vigoraa "Grow More road" c.avgiaig'n0
While V-,, effect of these mean;+.ir s on agrinultural output is still uncertains,
'they hay;e had the intended pnl.iti cal affect of reducing it,e power of the
landlords and of attracting mass slut y and support for the government.
? i ~ ai.ficant progress has a 1-o boon made in the rehabilitation of refugees
throup,h x -lief mea .ures, constriction of low-cost urban housing, granting of
proprietary rights to refugees, and settlement of refugee claims. Reports
have x per_ rendered by refnrna comrnissiorr in the fields of law and justice.,
public edaxc-;tion and the press, and plans are under way to carry out their
recommend?tions. Regulations to control labor, prices, tax evasion and
various forma of "anti- social activi r" (e.g., official corruption, smuggling,
blackmarketi.. g) have been imposed and enforced. The government is shifting
from direct to indirect economic controls and plans to restore a free market
in .foodgrainaf.
Reforms have also been introduced in the governmental field. Civil
servants ogre screened to remove corrupt and inept officials,, with somewhat
uneven: re alts. Essential reforms have been adopted in fiscal management, and
a program of austerity has beer, introduced in governmental operations, including
defense expenditures. The government has been reorganized along somewhat
more efficient lines, and administration ' as been placed largely in the hands
of experienced professional civil servants.
Martial law was largely replaced by ordinary civil law early in the
regime., but it remains formally in force and the government has demonstrated
from time to time its readiness to resort to martial law to deter corruption
and other activities which might disrupt the regime e s program. The judiciary
remains independent and relatively free from interference by the adminis-
tration.
While the government has suppressed communist and other subversive
activity from the start,, it has refrained from general political persecution.
A number of the more corrupt and irresponsible ex politicians, however, have
bean disqualified from holding public office (or coerced into retirement)
until 1966 under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO),
.Re=-establishment of Representatives Constitutional Government
Durinippr8v~ b I $I~~0 4/ R81E;~0Or Ref~fl+l 8
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
CONFIDEJ TIAL
toward the restoration of representative, constitutional government in
Pakistan and toward the gradual evolution of democratic political insti-
tutions In the country through the so-called "Basic Democracies" prograaam
In nation-wide local elections completed in January 19609 some 809000
persons were chosen on the basis of universal adult suffrage to serve on
village and town councils (called "union councils") , The follow .ng month
these persons served as electors in "legitimizing" Field Marshal Arab as
President of Pakistan through an overwhelming "vote of confidence" conducted
by secret ballot,
The government is now in the process of selecting 119000 appointive
members for the "union councils"9 the base of a five-tier government
structure,, and is also preparing to establish councils on the four higher
levels. dhile the "Basic Democracies" program is designed in the long run
to develop democratic institutions and processes from the grass roots up9
its more immediate objective would appear to be to implement, and gain
popular support for,, the government's policies at the lccsl level.
Considering the "vote of confidence" in mid-Februar r to be a popular
mandate, President Ayab promptly appointed a commisalon to draft rec en
dations for a new national constitution which will probably be promulgated
by early 19619 bringing an end to martial law. It eppearo likely that the
Coxes ;i?liation will establish a unitary form of government wzith sta ing
executive authority vested in the President,
Pacts of the Res
While: organized opposition to the regime is not expected within the
.fez seeable future, there is a distinct longer range possibility that
popular discontent and even hostility may develop if the regime u e reform
efforts should fail to satisfy the basic requirements of the people for the
necessities of life, Pressures may also develop for greater populax-
par?iicipation in local and national affairs among poli tic;ally'-sophisticated
elemen'4s of society, especially in East Pakistan where demands for local
autonomy have long been voiced and resentment of alleged domination by West
Pakistan has been chronic, Another potential danger would be the development
of factionalism and dissension among members of the coatr oUing group. This
could frustrate the government's reform progrm and could. even precipitate
a change to a regime less desirable from our standpoint than the benevolent
dictatorship which prevails,,
While prospects for some short--term basic ecanonlo 3m:. ovemcsat,,
especially in agricultural productions appear rather good, the lczg-range
prospects for solution of Pakistan ?s formidable economic p: bleb (e.g.,
attaining a favorable balance of trade,, keeping production apace with a
rapidly growing population, and establishing a viable economy) are not bright.
Approved For Release 2003/04/23: CIA-RDP86BO0269RO004OM nt
CONFIDWT1AL
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
The government recently released a Second Five Year Plan (1961-66) which fore-
sees a modest improvement in per capita income during its period, eventual
attainment of self-generating economic growth and an end to dependence on
foreign economic aid. Nevertheless, Pakistan is expected to require sub-
stantial foreign aid for a long time to come.
International Position
The Ayub government has manifested a determination to maintain and even
strengthen Pakistan's close ties with the U.S. and the West, and to uphold
its international commitments and obligations, including active participation
in CENTO and SEATO,, At the same time it, like its predecessors, has endeavored
to obtain through these pacts, and bilaterally through its allLes, assurances
for its defense against aggression other than communist or communist innpited.
It also continues to press for material assistance in modernizing its armed
forces.
Recently Pakistan has shifted the emphasis of its defense policy toward
the Sino.-Soviet threat, and has assumed a conciliatory policy toward India.
It has adopted a "hard" attitude toward Afghanistan in the light of growing
tension over the "Pushtuniatan" dispute and apprehension over Soviet
influence in Afghanistan. The Indus Waters dispute with India is in the final
stages of negotiation through the good offices of the IBRD which, with friendly
foreign countries including the U.S., has promised financial assistance toward
a plan of settlement, While both India and Pakistan have Accused each " other
of raising last minute objections, a solution is still possible. . Pakistan
continues to seek solution of other outstanding Indoa-Pakistan issues with the
ultimate objective of a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. India,
however,, is reluctant to discuss Kashmir and asserts that recent developments
in IndoaPakistan relations have set back the course of rapprochement,
U.S. Attitude Toward the Regime
U.S.-Pakistan relations are probably more close and cordial than ever
before,, as exemplified by the good will generated during the President's
highly successful visit to Pakistan in December. 1959, de have been encouraged
by the new regime's progress in tackling fundamental economic and social
problems, as well as by the deliberate steps it is Ming toward restoring
constitutional government and establishing democratic political institutions
in Pakistan, We believe these measures should strengthen Pakistan's internal
position and her international posture as an. ally. We therefore continue to
give encouragement to the government of President Ayub and to support it with
military and economic afd.
Drafted by: 'Cleared by:
SOA - Mr. Spengler SOA - Mr. Adems NR - Mr. Gannett
- Mr. Poullada NE& - Mr. Hart
- Mr. Horgan C - Mr. Achilles
- Mr. Wilcox
S/SRO: Rayamond L. Perkins, 5274 Ns, Ext. 5
Arrrnvpd For RPPaisp 200-110412-1 CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
CONFIDENTIAL
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
,Tehran, Aril 2830, 1960
Position Paper
U. S. Attitude Toward the Summit
( e Secretary m ght wish to raise)
T 21-1111
April 21, 1960
Because of the great interest which the regional members
of 3EibTO will demonstrate in the U. S. attitude toward the Sum-
'rnita the recommended U. S. position has been set forth in the
Discussion Section in the form of a talking paper,
This position paper outlines (1) basic U. S. motivations
in agreeing to a Summit conference, (2) the question of par-
ticipation, (3) Summit preparations, (4) a broad appraisal of
the Soviet position, and (5) the general U. S. approach to the
Suit a
It is considered desirable that U. S. views be covered at
sane length in view of the importance which all three regional
members attach: to this subject, The Iranians and to a lesser
~xte?:t the Pakistanis have not been kept v1fformed of Summit
preparations on a continuing basis. The Turks hs;are been kept
informed on such a basis through NATO,
1'a~t c gated Position of the Foreign Governments
The regional members of CENTO will expect to learn of the
Ua S, and the U, K. views regarding the Summit with primary
interest in reassurance that nothing will be done at the Summit
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
CONFIDENTIAL
which would tend to lessen their collective or individual
security.
Like other smaller mmbers in the free-world alliance
systems, the regional members of C:2TD want to be assured that
their views on Summit issues will be taken into consideration
during the broad consultative processes preparatory to the
summit.
While the Turks, Iranians and Pakistanis have show, n some
understanding of the rationale which motivates the U. S. to
ougage in a summit meeting, they have been suspicious of Soviet
notives and apprehensive lest a one-sided detente weaken their
positions vis-e-vis the Soviet Union and result In increased
rather than lessened Soviet pressures in their rogion. The
situation has been complicated by the Turkish a=mouncement of
a Nenderec. rushchev exchange of visits. The Turks have indi-.
cat6d they do not intend to discuss matters of substance with
the Soviets but anticipate that their position in NATO will be
"-stored by this indication of their willingness to partici-
pate in the general effort to lessen world tensions. The
Iranians have greeted the Turkish decision with approval and
are now considering more actively than before a visit of the
Iranian Foreign Minister to Moscow. The Pakistanis have mani-
fested some uneasiness about the Turkish action, which acne
fear will counteract their heretofore successful efforts to
persuade Iran to resist Soviet blandishments or threats,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
CONFID
Recommended U. S. Position:
1. U. S. Motivations. In agreeing to a meeting of the
Heads of Government of the U. S0, the U. L., France and the
Soviet Union,, the U. S. had in mind the following purposes
with respect to the Summit conference: (a) to clarify posi-
tions and to reduce the possibility of miscalculation- (b) to
probe Soviet intentions and sincerity with respect to moves
toward a detente; (c) to press the Soviet Union to curb its
expansionist tendencies; and (d) to demonstrate the confidence
and faith which the free world maintains in its institutions
and the values which underlie its social systems?
2. Participation. As recent Soviet policy has stressed
the crucial questions of Berlin and Germany, the U. S. con-
sidered the Summit conference should be restricted to the
powers primarily concerned with this problem. It was felt, too,
that a limited meeting would facilitate discussions of other
questions of mutual concern.
In agreeing to a limited conference, however, it should be
clearly understood that the U. S. does not consider the Summit
meeting as a "Four-Power" directorate which has arrogated to
itself the responsibility for negotiating for the rest of the
world. On the contrary, the U. S. recognizes that it can bind
only itself to any agreements which might, be reached and that
questions affecting its allies or other free nations through-
out the world can only be negotiated in consultation and with
the consent of those directly concerned.
3. Summit Preparations. Intensive and thorough prepara--
ti.;oxns have beesn undertaken and are continuing on the Western
side in anticipation of the conference. A large measure of
accord on substantive issues has been reached by the U. S.3
the U. K., and France. The Western Heads of Govc-rnrnent will
undertake a final coordination of their positions just prior
to their meeting with Premier Khrushchev on May 16.
. General.
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
CONFIDENTIAL
4a. General Analysis of Soviet Position. The U. S. recog-
nizes that t~viet leaders continue to harbor a fundamental
hostility toward all non-Communist forms of society and that
Khrushchev and his colleagues continue to desire to consolidate
their post.-war gains and to expand the Soviet system by any
means apart from those which might jeopardize their home base
in the Soviet Union. This latter consideration appears to rule
out deliberate resort to an all-out nuclear war, and we must
try to ensure through our own efforts that this calculation
continues to obtain,
Moreover, the U. S. is aware of the implications inherent
in the Soviet thesis that a "fundamental" and "serious" shift
has taken place in the balance of world forces in favor of the
"socialist camp," Khrushchev may view the Summit meeting as
a concrete recognition by the Western powers of this change.
He clearly considers the Summit as a forum for the projection
of the image of a peaceful and progressive Soviet Union and of
the Communist program of "peaceful coexistence," which is
designed to further Soviet penetration of non-Communist areas,
to turn neutral opinion against Western policy, and in time to
weaken and divide the free world,
5o U. S. Approach to the Summit, The U, S. believes that
the present stage of nuclear weapon and missile technology has
its own imperatives for Communist and non-Communist alike. We
consider it desirable, therefore, to utilize the opportunity
of the Summit to probe for areas in which it might be possible
to reach mutually beneficial agreements.
One of the first tasks of the Western leaders at the Sum-
mit will be to demonstrate through their attitude and the
clarity" Ad firmness with which they present free world posi-
tions that the Soviet analysis of the world-power relationship
is incorrect and unacceptable. We hope to shake Khrushchev's
belief that the free world's unity can be breached and to make
it clear to him and to world opinion that there can be no real
cooperation between or peace among nations as long as the
Soviet Union adheres to its expansionist aims,
00NFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 S
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
CONFIDENTIAL
-5-
We believe this approach can be effective only insofar
as the free world alliance system remains vigorous, strong
and cohesive. In short, the free world must continue to give
the highest priority to the maintenance and strengthening of
its collective security arrangements.
In view of. the depth of the issues which presently divide
the Communist and free worlds, we do not envisage any dramatic
resolution of these differences at the approaching Summit. We
must be realistic and must also recognize that one summit meet-
ing may provide no more than tentative indications of Soviet
intentions. By a realistic appraisal of our prospective nego-
tiating effort, we will guard against premature relaxation in
free world defense efforts and disappointment and frustration
which would flow from unrealistic expectations.
Nevertheless, this will not deter the U. S. from entering
into the Summit discussions in a constructive spirit. We are
not merely content to ascertain how far the Soviet Union is
willing to go on specific, limited agreements of mutual benefit.
We intend to approach the Summit as an opportunity to assert
and prosecute affirmative purposes of our own. We view the
Summit as a means to enhance free world confidence and cohesion
and to further worldwide respect for the free world alliance
system, its firmness, its clarity of purpose and its claim to
the future.
Drafted by : Cleared by :
SOV - Mr. Dubs NR - Mr. Wright NEA - Mr. Kennedy
- Mr. Gannett - Mr. Elting
SOA - Mr. Adams C - Mr. . Achilles
NE - Mr. Eilts S0V - Mr. Mc$veeeney
GTI - Mr. Ho .
S S-RO - Raymond L. Perkins, 527 NS, Ext. 44,V5
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran, April 28-30,.1960
U. S. Views on the Report of the Secretary General
Position Paper
Anticipated Position of Foreign Governments:
TER D - 5/1
April 21, 1960
The member governments may be expected to note the Secretary Genera1Os
Report.
Recommended U. S. Position
1. That the Council should take note of the Report of the Secretary
General and commend him for his frank., forthright and encouraging account
of CENTOes affairs during the past six months,
2. To state that the United States has taken note of specific com-
ments contained in the Report and will bear them in rind in the course
of future CENTO activities.
GONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 d
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
The Secretary General'- Ttepor*, is intended to review CE'aTO's prr'ress~r
from 3r..tbber 1959 to April 1960. :"r, Baig's presentation is a somp!ahat
rambling account but ,7pnerally is v i.?ornus, forthric ht and encour r ,i.ng,
In places it is soriewi! t carping, ar.,:i tends to reflect the Secretary
Generil's impatient and critical persconality.
At its (Washington Meetingg the Council accented the Secretary
General's previous Report s;ah,imct t- c:arrsm&r.ts to be lade inter in the
meettn , on mattera with w .ic.r. were not, in full agreement.
Secretary General Bad, meetir.;~ of the ;o,Ancil neputtes
his .# sssatisfaction with t" i A F1roce7' , :is in fact no corwncnt was made
durir*, t_i,e subsequent sgss .or:s c, t? t: asrz]r.^ton meeting, In his view
this presumably meant all pis r"ntorwxindations had been accepted, although
he Corr-eluded tinis was o viously n-' ?she case. He therefore hoped the
Council would make clear at its Tet}c-n-A session whether or not it accepted
?iiss Report.
In our view the Secretary General's position on this matter is rat
realistic. The reports he submits are not merely reviews of past events
but also expressions of his own personal and professional views on sub-
stantive matters and procedures arising in all aspects of CENTO affatrs.
They are prepared without any partbcipation by or consultation with
representatives of the five governments supporting CIE;fTO. The Ministerial
Council should not be asked either to accept his reports, and thereby
indicate its endorsement of their co_-,rtents in tot., or alternatively to
discuss their contents paragraph by paragraph until full agreement is
reached throughout. The Secretary General should be encouraged to state
what is on his mind without requiring the Council to pass judgment, and in
essence this is our recommended position set forth above. If the Secretary
General also has specific recommendations on which he wishes the Council's
views, these should be set forth separately and clearly identified, and
under usual circumstances it may be expected they will be referred to
appropriate sub-bodies of CE"."TO before being discussed in substance by
the Ministerial Council.
There follows a summary of some of the comments contained in the Report,
arranged according to its section headings:
Pclitical - The Secretary General notes the success of the Washington
meeting comments favorably on President Eisenhower's visit to the CENTO
countries and on the visit to the CET TO headquarters by President Ayub, the
first made to the headquarters by a CENTO Chief of State,, He comments
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
there has been a "noticeable abatement in the propaganda against CENTO
formerly carried on in India, the VAR and Iraq" but states that "Communist
pressures on the regional member states have shown little change," and
that there has been a continuation of the Soviet policy of exploiting
disputes such as the question of "Pakhtoonistan" without reference to
their iaerits.
Administration - The Report refers to various administrative topics,
in the course of which the emphatic views of the Secretary General are set
forth on certain matters as follows: (a) the work of the Budget and
Administration Committee is impeded by the practice of some members in
referring questions of even minor importance back to their governments
for instructions; (b) Secretariat positions are not to be filled in rota-
tion by nationals of the participating countries; (e) there is need for a
status agreement providing, inter alia, tax exemptions on salaries and other
immunities to members of the-Mecre iat, whether stationed in Ankara or
traveling elsewhere in participating countries on CENTO business; and (d)
Secretariat personnel should not have their national pension rights adversely
affected by their CE'11TO service,
Military ? The Secretary General speaks with moderation and brevity
under this heading, noting favorably the activities undertaken by the PMDG.
In the concluding section of his Report he refers to Command Structure and
adds:
"Whatever may be the future, course of these military
deliberations, it is satisfactory to note that they are at
least under way and moving in the right direction. It would
perhaps be unrealistic to expect so many interests and per-
spectives, being considered from such widely separated
geographicsle and psychological angles, to be resolved in a
hurry. Geography is usually the governing influence in
foreign policy, and foreign policy must of necessity control
military policy. These two aspects of our defence, with
all that they imply in historical backgrounds and emotions
and present relative strengths and needs, involve complica-
tions that may take a considerable amount of time and thought
to work out on any rational and practical basis. But no
enemy is likely to wait indefinitely on his opponents B con-
venience before attacking."
Economic - The Secretary General comments that CENP08s economic record
shows solid results but that activities are lagging for lack of financing
and that there is a need to find ways of effectively promoting progress in
projects of joint interest to Pakistan and Iran.
Drafted by: NR - Mr. Gannett Cleared by: NR - Mr. Wright
COP3FIDENTIAL NEA -- Mr. Kennedy
OIA - Mrs. Westfall
C - Mr. Achilles
S S-RO t RcRea 3/8dM - 6M00 000400060005-6
 ,L r
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
56
TEN D-11/6
April 21, 1960
EIGHTH CF2ITO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran Anril 29-36, 19-65
Position Paper
Afghan-Pakistan Relations
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
Anticipated Position of Pakistan
1, Pakistan is likely to raise and emphasize strongly the problem
of Afghanistan in the context of one or more of the following claims;
a. That Afghanistan has passed the point of no
return in its relations with the USSR and has virtually
become a Soviet satellite, thus constituting a potential
threat to Pakistan's security;
b, That Pakistan is faced with the threat of direct
or indirect aggression by Soviet-equipped and inspired
Afghan forces;
c, That Afghan intrigues in the Pushtun tribal areas
constitute a subversive threat to Pakistan by fomenting
disorder in the tribal areas of Pakistan;
d, That Afghan-USSR collaboration in the political
field represents a potential threat to Pakistan of communist
or communist-inspired subversion.
e, That by endorsing the Afghan position on 1TPush-
tunistann recently, Soviet spokesmen have indulged in un-
warranted interference in Pakistan?s internal affairs and
should be condemned for their action.
2. Pakistan is therefore likely to call for a manifestation of
support from its (.ENW associates in its differences with Afghanistan,
possibly in the form of:
&, A public statement by the CEN1) Ministers declaring their
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
governments' recognition of the Durand Line as the legal
boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the SEATO
Council did in March 1956 (See attached Discussion section
and annex)-
b. A CENTO Council communique, or a public statement
by the Secretary General of C N'1O, strongly condemning
Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan for
their recent public pronouncements on the "Pushtunistar"
issue.
3. Pakistan may also be expected to propose that CENTO undertake
contingency planning to meet an increasing security threat to the treaty
area from Afghanistan (See separate papers on U.S. Views on Afghanistan
and CENTO Military Contingency Planning).
Recommended United States Position
1. The United States does not consider Afghanistan to be completely
under Soviet influence or to be in immediate danger of coming under Soviet
domination. 1 114ii1e not wishing to minimize the extent of Soviet influence
in Afghanistan, we continue to believe that the Afghan leaders and people
are determined to maintain their national independence and neutrality.
(See separate paper on U.S. Views on Afghanistan.)
2. The United States considers the survival of Afghanistan as an
independent and neutral nation to be important to the Free World. An
improvement in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is considered to be a cruc:Lal
element in containing Soviet penetration of Afghanistan. We believe that
whatever the origin and merits of the "Pushtunistan" dispute, it has now
become inextricably linked with Afghan susceptibility to Soviet influence.
It is our judgment that a "tough" forward policy by a CENT() country against
Afghanistan will, according to past experience and present circumstances,
inevitably drive the Afghans for protection into the Soviet camp. We
believe, therefore, that it is of the utmost importance for Pakistan and
Afghanistan to settle their differences by conciliatory means as soon as
possible. We believe the two countries should deal with the "Pushtunistan"
and other Pakistan' Afghanistan problems through bilateral negotiations.,
and we stand reader to assist in any practicable way in seeking solution to
such problems provided there is reasonable hope of success and both countries
request our assistance.
3. Regarding a possible Pakistan proposal for a C34TO statement
either recognizing the legal standing of the Durand Line or condemning
Soviet leaders for their pronouncements on "Pushtunistan",, or both, we
1Z Pr PIP T
Approved For Release 264123 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
-3-
continue to regard the "Pushtunistan" question as primarily a regional
issue to be handled through bilateral negotiation. We do not favor
action by CENTO responsive to the "Pushtunistan" question per so because
we believe such action would tend to transform this local dispute into
a "cold war" issue and only heighten the controversy, thus contributing
to the undoubted Soviet objective of increasing tensions between Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Our recognition of the Durand Line is already a matter
of public record and needs no reiteration.
If, however, other regional members of the Council wish to support
some CIZITO statement in response to recent Soviet statements, we would
be prepared to agree to a carefully worded statement which would (a)
refrain from judging the merits of the "Pushtunistan" dispute and (b)
condemn recent Soviet statements as interference in an essentially local
dispute and as a transparent attempt to increase tensions in the treaty
area,
Approved For Release 2M3 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
SECRET
Since 19147 there has been almost constant friction between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Afghanistan's relations with the Free World and particularly
with Pakistan are greatly complicated by the so-called "Pushtunistan"
dispute, a controversy over the question of autonomy for the four to five
million Pushtun tribesmen residing in the northwest frontier area of
Pakistan. The Soviet Union has exploited this issue by supporting Afghanistan,
thereby inducing the Afghans to rely on Soviet political., economic and
military support.
Background of the "Pushtunistan" Dispute
The history of the "Pushtunistan" dispute is long and complex. It
antedates the partition of the Indian subcontinent but has reached its
present acute form only since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Afghan
agitation against Pakistan, mostly through informational media such as Radio
Kabul, has fluctuated over the years. At times it has reached vicious
proportions and at other times it has been muted to a whisper. Since Prime
Minister Daud came to power in 1953 the dispute has become more inflamed.
In 1955 it led to virtual cessation of diplomatic relations between the two
countries and to economic reprisals by Pakistan. This, in turn, resulted in
closer relations between Afghanistan and the USSR. The friction between
Pakistan and ilfgh anistan, therefore, is directly reflected in the willing-
ness of Afghan leaders to accept Soviet aid and influenced
Pakistan has reacted to Afghan claims in various ways at different
times. On the whole., Pakistani leaders claim that the "Pushtunistan" issue
is a complete fabrication -r a "stunt" - with no basis in fact, Their
first reaction, therefore., is to ignore the matter. On the other hand,, at
vaiioua times, pricked by Afghan propaganda attacks, the Pakistanis have
seriously considered attempts to overthrow the Royal Family either by an
internal coup or by instigating tribal uprisings. At other times, the
Pakistanis alarmed by exaggerated or inaccurate reports of Soviet subversion
in the tribal areas, have pleaded for United States aid to maintain a strong
military position along the Afghan border in order to deter any Soviet-
instigated border incursions.
The Afghans claim that they have no territorial ambitions against
Pakistan and that they are satisfied with the present frontier. They have
at various times offered to consider the problem settled provided Pushtun
leaders on the Pakistan side would declare themselves to be loyal Pakistanis
and satisfied with conditions in the tribal areas. The Afghans have also
hinted that if Pakistan were to admit publicly the existence of "a political
problem" and were to grant a greater measure of local autonomy to the
Pushtu-speaking
Approved For Release 2023 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
SECRET
- 5..
Pushtu-speaking area of Pakistan, this might satisfy the basic Afghan
desire to protect Pushtun culture and identiV. Although the sincerity
of these Afghan overtures is open to some doubt, it has never been tested
because the Pakistanis fear such proposals to be merely a trick to get
Pakistan publicly to acknowledge existence of the problem and recognize
the right of a linguistic minority to demand special status. This would
be a dangerous precedent in a multi-lingual nation such as Pakistan.
Recent Developments
In recent times an era of good feeling between Pakistan and Afghanistan
followed the exchange of high level visits in 1956 and 1957 between the
King and "rime Minister of Afghanistan and the President and Prime Minister
of Pakistan. This impetus, however, was lost after the October 1958
revolution in Pakistan. The arrest of several Pushtun leaders by the
martial law authorities in Pakistan for alleged anti-national activities
and the new regime's apparent determination to retain a unified province
in West Pakistan displeased the Afghan Government and provided it with
grounds on which to reassert its Pushtunistan claims. It denounced the
Ayub regime and revived.its propaganda campaign which became particularly
intense by the fall of 1959. An attempt by the Pakistan Ambassador in Kabul
to obtain agreement on a "face-saving" formula to end the "Pushtunistan"
dispute the so-called "Khattak Plan" (which we supported with both
governments)! failed when the Pakistan Government declined to endorse
the proposal~on the ground that it was imprecise and might prejudice its
legal and moral position.
The Pakistan Government refrained for. some time from striking back
publicly at the Afghan propaganda attacks. Privately, however, President
l,.yub and his colleagues began to advocate the adoption of a "hard" forward
policy toward Afghanistan. They proposed to us' gt the highest levels the
application of a concerted "shock treatment".. 9p. Afghanistan, including a
U,SO threat to withhold economic aid to Afghanistan unless it abandoned its
'Push vunistan" policy and its heavy reli inc;e on the Soviet Union. The
Afghan Government, on its part, began to suspect renewed Pakistani designs
to overthrow the regime in Kabul; it complained of Pakistani involvement
in inciting anti-government riots in the, Afghan city of Kandahar toward
the end of December 1959 and in fomentin ;trouble' among the numerous
Pushtun tribes in eastern Afghanistan,
A meeting between Afghan Foreign Minister Naive and President Ayub' -
initiated largely at our suggestion to Foreign' Minister Qadir following the
last CENTO Council session, and carried through only after urgent inter-
cession on our part with both governments m was arranged in Rawalpindi in
mid-January this year in the hope that agreement might be reached to reduce
tensions pending
Approved For Release 200;NWEI: CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
-6m
tensions pending further negotiations. This meeting miscarried as both
sides remained inflexible and the Pakistanis, in particular, antagonized
the Afghans by proposing self-determination for all the Pushtuns, starting
with those residing in Afghanistan, or better still that the Afghans simply
"dodge the issue".
Reacting to increasingly heavy and virulent Afghan propaganda, the
Pakistan Government reversed its long-standing policy of restraint and by
February this year began to retaliate "in kind" through the press and radio.
Its stated reason was the need to protect itself from criticism, and
possible disaffection, among Pakistani Pushtuns for pursuing a weak and
cowardly policy in the face of Afghan provocations. The resultant
Pakistani counter-propaganda effort matched and even exceeded the afghan
campaign in intensity and was directed primarily at the Afghan Royal Family
itself. Moreover, the general deterioration in relations between the two
countries was manifested in other ways, eogo, suspension of work in
implementing the Pak-Afghan transit agreement, harassment of each other's
diplomatic and consular representatives, and repeated indications of
intrigue by one government against the other in the Pushtun tribal areas.
USSR Reiterates Support for "Pushtunistan"
Premier Khrushchev capitalized on this situation during a brief visit
to Kabul at the beginning of March 1960. In the joint communique at the
conclusion of the visit., Khrushchev associated the USSR unequivocally with
the Afghan position on "Pushtunistan" and endorsed. "the principle of self-
determination" as the "reasonable way of so.lving' this problem". On his
return to Moscow, Khrushchev went one step farther by asserting that
"hf atoricallly, Pushtunistan has always been part of Afghanistan", thus
lying that the Afghans had a territorial' claim to the "Pushtunistan" area.
Denouncing the Khrushchev statements as unwarranted interference in
Pv.~l:i_stan's internal affairs,, Foreign Minister Qadir issued a statement
declaring that "the time has come to put by some of the restraint which
Pakistan has all along observed,. o", and repeating, publicly President Ayub'a
earlier proposal to Foreign Minister Naim for a plebiscite among the Pushtuns,,
beginning with those in Afghanistan.
Adding fuel to the fire, the new Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, during
a press conference immediately following his presentation of credentials
to President grub in Rawalpindi on March 12, characterized Foreign Minister
Qadir's proposal as "a joke", asserted that the USSR did not recognize the
Durand Line as a legal international boundary., and endorsed again the
principle of self--determination for the Pushtuns Paki: van.
U.S. Conciliatory Effort Unsuccessful
Meanwhile., in late February we instructed our Ambassadors in Karachi
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005a-6
and Kabul
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
- 7 4
and Kabul to propose to the respective governments a 90-day propaganda
truce during which bilateral discussions might be held to seek a more
permanent settlement. While President Ayub indicated his willingness to
cease all Pakistan propaganda if the Afghans would reciprocate and to
acknowledge publicly the existence of "political differences" for
negotiation with the Afghans, Prime Minister Daud held that our proposal
would not serve a useful purpose unless the Pakistanis openly acknowledged
the existence of the "Pushtunistan problem" ear se and unless the problem
itself were tackled directly. We have thus far been unable to resolve
.this dilemma without further damaging our relations with the two countries
particularly with our ally, Pakistan.
We are now coming under increasing pressure publicly in Pakistan,
privately from the Pakistan Government and in the CENTt) forum to make a
formal statement of support for Pakistan in its dispute with Afghanistan,
especially since thq Soviet Union has openly taken sides with Afghanistan.
Pakistan has reminded us of tl a SEATO commm pique of March 9, 1956 (text
appended) in which we joined with her other SEATO allies in affirming
recognition that the "sovereignty of Pakistan eitends up to the Durand
Line". Pakistan also recently proposed that the CEN1O Secretary General
be instructed to issue a strong communique condemning Soviet statements on
"Fuahtunistan" as having a subversive effect on the areas and implying
CFENTC support for Pakistan in its dispute. with Afghanistan. While a
proposal to this effect was recently withdrawn by the, Pakistanis from
consideration by the CENID Council of Deputies, there is reason to believe
that they may introduce it in the Ministerial Council meeting.
Current U.S. Position
The United States continues to belies .- as earnestly reiterated by
the Afghan King, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to our Ambassador
in Kabul recently - that Afghanistan is determined to maintain its freedom
sad independence despite its heavy reliance in recent years on the USSR
for militazy and economic aid. We are also convinced that a "tough" forward
policy toward Afghanistan, such as advocated by Pakistan,, is more likely to
drive Afghanistan for protection Into the Soviet fold than cause it to
back down on its "Pushtuni; tan" claim and abandon its heavy reliance on the
USSR. In any event, we prefer not to render the already complex "Push--
t.inisean" problem more difficult to solve by placing it in a "cold war"
context through formal CE.riTC action via a vis the USSR? We continue to
is;-,egard the problem as essentially a reg ate and to ac rrocate
moderation on both the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan in their
relations with each other,, We believe the tiro governments should deal with
the "Puahtunistan" and other Pakistan-Afghanistan problems through bilateral
negotiations,
Approved For Release 2003/04/432U-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
negotiations. We continue to stand ready to offer our assistance in seek-
ing a solution to such problems provided there is reasonable hope of
success and both countries request our aide
Annex: SEATO Communique, march 99 1956.
Drafted by: SOA - Mr. Spengler and Cleared by: SOA - Mr. Adams and Mr.
Mr. Poullada Bartlett
NR- Mr. Gannett
NEA -- Mr. Hart
C -- Mr. Achilles
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/23:`CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86800269R000400060005-6
UNCLASSIFIED
F, ccerpt from the Final Communique of the Second SEATO Council Meeting,
held in Karachi, Pakistan,, March 6a-,, 1956?
"...The Council agreed that there had been useful progress in
cooperation among member governments in assisting_ each other to combat
subversive activities. They observed that co unist tactics were
placing increasing reliance on methods of political and economic in-
filtration. They noted, however, that this shift in tactics was
companied by any convincing evidence of intent to abandon efforts
to subvert, weaken and overthrow the political, economic and social
systems which have been freely chosen by the peoples of the area. The
Council attributed in large measure this seeming shift in tactics away
from violence in some parts of the world to the collective security
arrangements of the free nations.
"They particularly deplored statements and interventions by Soviet
leaders in recent months designed to increase tension and promote
division in the Asian communities and among other nations of the free
world. Insofar as these statements referred to 'Pakhtoonistans the
mambers of the Council severally declared that their governments
recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand
Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and
it was consequently affirmed that the Treaty area referred to in Articles
IV and VIII of the Treat, includes the area up to that line..."
- March 9s 1956
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
Please substitute the attached page 4 at the proper place in the briefing
paper TEH D-6/i (U.S. Views on Report of the Military Committee) issued
April 18, 1960.
-4-
(d) Infrestrueturs
(1) We do not favor the establiabsent of a CRDITO "==m
~3 Ctl~re" WW=., which d have to be finamed ler t by th
United States. We have agreed,, however, to a CXWO Iufras'racthre
Cooardinatix~g Cttittee to develop comm standards. We also agree tha
the CM might usefully make a study of existing and required fteilitirs.
3- The Secretary may alrao wish to state that, in ;connection with
the invitation extended to members of Ct O's Court ned ;*iiitary P1snni iig
Staff and other regional miUitaty rqresentstivez to be U. S. guests at
selected training exercises, we should be pleased if the regional govern''
rents would consider including officers from the but Military
Deputies Group (P ) auong those attending these mi3. tsry exercises.
Diecussi=rn
D-6/1
Revised page 4.
April 21, 1960
Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
EIGHTH CEO MIN1a-1TR1.AL COUNCIL SESSION SECRhT
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960
TEH D-11./9a
Position Paper April 21, 1960
Menderes-Khrushchev Exchange of Visits
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
The Problem
The Turkish Government has announced a Menderes-Kbrushchev exchange of visits,
with Prime Minister Menderes going to Moscow in July and Ktrushchev visiting Ankara
later. According to the Turks, the visits are being arranged to indicate their
participation in the general effort to bring about some relaxation of tensions and
to promote a favorable atmosphere for calmer resolution of Turkish-USSR problems.
The Turks do not intend to discuss substantive questions, and it is generally be-
lieved Menderea can be expected to deal with the Soviets without detriment to the
West. Some concern is felt for the ultimate effect the visits may have on other
countries, notably Iran and Pakistan, and Greece has already manifested a reaction
of embarrassment and annoyance.
Anticipated Turkish Position
Turkish leaders will characterize the visits as Turkish efforts to keep in
step with the current world-wide spirit of detente, which they maintain should
be viewed as an expression of Turkish solidarity with the West in similar efforts.
Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu has stated the GOT feels that after an exchange of
visits Turkey would be under less pressure from some of its NATO allies who have
expressed the view that the GOT has maintained a "provocative" attitude toward
the USSR. Menderes has undertaken not to discuss basic foreign and defense policies
affecting Turkey's allies in NATO and CENTO. Turkish officials have indicated
their conviction that there is no change in the position or attitude of the USSR,
and no significant developments in Turk-Soviet relations-are anticipated.
Recommended U.S. Position
In earlier discussions the U.S. informed the Turks that the question of a
Menderes-Khncchev meeting was a matter for decision by the Turks and that we
had full confidence in their ability to conduct their relationsIvith the USSR
in a manner advantageous to the West. The U.S. continues to be confident that
Turkish leaders in making the decision have weighed the advantages and disadvan-
tages and that their relations with the USSR will be.conducted without prejudice
to Western interests. The U.S. welcomes the decision of Turkey to approach the
visits as a NATO member and to continue in close communication with its NATO allies
about any developments. If the Turkish Foreign Minister should allege that
criticism within NATO of Turkish policy towards the USSR motivated the forth-
coming Menderea-Khrushchev visits, the Secretary should assure him that the
U.S. has never engaged in such criticisms in NAC or elsewhere.
Drs3't y: eared y:
PIEA:GTI - Mr. Morris ~~~ GTI ---Mr.-Hope C. - Mr. Keyser
Revised 4/
 Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060005-6
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COU;?CIL SESSION
Tehran, April 2830, 1960
Annotated Agenda
Installation of Chairman - Public
TEH D-0/1
April 21, 1960
Council Action: CE14TO practice would have Iran serve as Chairman
on two counts: (a) 1960 is Iran's turn for the
year, and (b) customarily the Chairman for the
year defers to the host representative,, in this
case again Iran,
U. S. Position: Concur in Installation of Iranian Representative.
Ii Opening of Meeting - Public
Council Action: The Secretary General will open the ireetinngo
The Iranian