EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION TEHRAN, APRIL 28-30, 1960 U.S. VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (C/8/05)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000400060004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 86
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 18, 1960
• Content Type: PAPER

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EIGHTH CENT? RIAL COUNCIL SESSION
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Zxecutive Registry
TEH D-6/1
Avril 18, 1960
21,1T11April 28,0.30, 1960
U. S. Views On the Report of the Military Committee (08/D5)
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AnticIeted Position of Foreign'%-evernments:
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1. The member states may be expected to find the 22,2E1, of the
Military Committee agreeable. As it deals with topics en which there
ard-Raerencss opinion, howevor cornideration nr the Report may
give rise to discussion of at least some of these and certainly will
on Command Structure.
2, There are two subjects inherent in consideration of the Report
which, because of their complexity are dealt with in separate papers;
as fellows:
(a) Command Structure - See D-6/2 CENT() Cowand Structure
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and Related Questions.
(b) Basic ssumptions for Global War - See D-6/11, Basic
Actions for Global War,
3. During consideration of the asport discussion of the feller:45Am:
Id,tters iztay occur:
(a) CENTO Liaison with NATO and SEATO
(i) The three regional states favor closer military
7.;son with NATO and SEATO and will support the request in the Military
P,;:cm;ttee's report that the Council. ..assist the military in expeditily!,.
to the extent reasible:?.theescanat of ...necessary /liaison betusen/
ternotional organizations which are &voted to the same principles.li
(ii) Turkey as a member of NATO and Pakistan as a member
*f !ATO recognize the necessity of working on this matter in unison with
their allies in those two organizations.
SECRET ?
STATE review(s) completed.
(b) GAPS
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(b) CMPS Budget
(i) The United Kingdom feels strongly that, in accordance
lAth British constitutional practice; the budget of the Combined Military
Planning Staff (CMPS) should be subject to CENTO civil reviou before
being submitted to the Ministerial Council for approval, and that this
review should be performed by the Budget and Administration Committee.
(ii) Turkey and Iran are disposed to agree to a procedure
which will meet the British objective.
(iii) Pakistan ia also disposed to agree, but net to
plementation of new procedures until a year hence.
(c)
innnin-Y
Contilivenry Planninu See B-6/3 CENTO Military ConUmala
(d) U. S. Military Assist mos Program
(i) Despite their limited absorptive capacities, all
three regional govaenmenbs desire increased U. S. military assistance.
(ii) The United 'Kingdom maybe expected to defer to U. S.
views in this mat.ter.
(e) Infrastructure
(i) The /addle Eazt membor governn:nts favor the establishment
o; r.? ncomon infrastructura': program. It is unlikely that they could
ute materially to its financing and the United States we-old be
-,.::7,:7cted to bear most of the cost. There have been indications that the
111:i=1.1-? of the regional countries is to obtain more British financial support.
(ii) The United Kingdom favors continuation of the present
a;ld U. K. Llfra.structure support programs on frl"national" rather than
7,cc!,:-m" basis
oe:niended U0 S Position:
,
The Rapozb of the Miilax, is agreeable.
2. U. S. views on ma7Asrs which may arise during 6iscussion of the
.T1pert are given below:
(n) CENTO Liaison with NATO and SEATO
(i) The United Stator, favors developing military liaison
with NATO end SEATO. It should be recognized, however, that political
prob leas
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problems do eltistl, especially in NO, uhich inevitably bear on the .7,,,ao9
of ths dovelopi,t of such liaison. It Eg GENTOls interert to at:Ai-clop
thIs liAleon finely: on a gradual ?stop-by-etop basis rather than to be
neipitant
(i If the regional morccers press for foiivai action by
the Couneil this matter, the United States Is rrepared to undertake in
PATO:, acting in cienjunction with the U. K. and Turkey, and in SEATO acting
in conjanothn with the U. K. and Pakistan? to bring to the attention of
the respective organizations the concern of the CENT? Ministerial Cauncil
2or some feria of liaison as regards exchanges of nilitsry infontion?
leaving to representatives of the overlapping CENTC countries in each carie
discretion as to how and when they may most effectively take this Lotion.
(b) CMPS Budget
(i) The United States believes review of the CMP3 Budget
the 5udst and tdministrotion Committee -6ould be useful as a means for
c=nriug greater uniformity in (ENT? administration and is prepared to
ar,end7ent of 032,NT05's 1-.)cedaires designed to ncoomplish this
r.tive? but the United States hopes the Y. 1960/61 budget (August lo
-.1x 31, 1961) can be approved exK:,oditiously,?
(ii) Should GhTS budste in the future include operitional
iilesr itL?ss in addition to t*:lo purely administra-Uve items they now
United SI,Lttes 1:::-dioves those 2re -iJithin the exollwsive our-
of LT)s Lilitau and should not be subject to civil revieW before
(c) U. S ilitery
roval.
b,!-.nce Programa
U. S. m- r assistance programs with the -egionsl
states are developed in close and continuous consultation with
have been of substantial magnitude. They have,? in our judg-
,ancsd the dsfenso capabilities of the CENTO states,
Livid anpropriatio?is make it imposc5ble to increase
states... We shell have to live with
the 2,7,z1!t that the United States and its pertners in the Mutual Security
arc 1ielY to have to de :Aors -sith Jess money in the period
tylsA,
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a:structure
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(d) Infrastructure
?rnwase.m.azirmaraceais
(i) We do not favor the establishment of a ono "comon
infrastructure" program, which would have to be financed largely by the
United States, We have agreed, however, to a GENro Infrastructure
Coordinating Cormittes to develop common standard.s. We also agree that
the CMS might usefu.U.y thake a study of existing and required faciUtie
Discussion
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Discussion
CENTO Liaison with NATO and SEATO
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While the Military Committee's request to the Council for assiAance
in expediting liaison with NATO and SEATO is not limited specificar4 to
ir
liaisonmi
on li li
tary matters, the Mit Committee's concern in this
regard is for exchanges of military inf lotion.. As regarda non-wilitary
information, arrangements have been agreed to between CEDTO-NATO god
CENfO-5E.U0 for exchanges of such documents up to and including CONFIDENTIAL
in political, economic, informational, organizational, and similar ficId3.
In point of fact, however, there have been few actual exchanges in this
respect.
As regards military liaison with NATO, CENTO 's request was considered
by the NATO Council in January 1959, but a final decision was not taken
in view of Canadian and Scandinavian reservations. Pursuant to authozisa,
tion by the NAG, Secretary-General Spaak informed his CENTO colleague
that NAC recognises the mutual benefits of exchanges of information end
that NATO military authorities were being asked to r,-;commond what sort
of information they thought would be most useful to receive in such
exchanges. CE=0 has already indicated to NATO the types of military
information it would like to receive. Discussion on this subject in a
team under the NATO Standing Group has become bogged down over the question
of whether the rather limited types of information which NATO is prepared
to furnioh should be provided to CENTO through a "sponsor nation" acting
asn intamodiary or should be supplied directly between bodies of the
to organizations. This aspect hoznotyet been Tesolved.
:-'.:.;ATOas deliberations on CENTO 's request for military exchanges has
,oect= involved in a consideration of the value to CENTO of SEATO docu-
3htt; classified no higher than CONFIDENTIAL, the upper limit to which
o:11TO is
prod to agree. Ohile SEATO is continuing its deliborations
-2 this natters it is not clear whether a decision is imminent.
GYPS Midget
,agegia.tageardawanssaramearal
Early in its history CENTO adopted the procedure that the CMPS Budget
bo prepared by CMPS in coordination with Budget and Administration
Committoe and then be submitted directly to the hiodsterial Council for
approval. In accordance with this procedure the report which the Military
Cemmitbee
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Committee baa placed before the Minis erial Council at Tehran has
annexed to it the CAPS Budget for CENTO FY 1960/61 (August 1, 1960
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July 31, 1961)0 The United Kingdom, while having originally agreed to
this procedure, has pressed for some time for amended regulations which
would be in accord with the British practice that military budgets are
subject to civil reviewing authority, which in the case of CENTO would
mean review by the Budget and Administrative Committee after preparation
by the CMPS. The discussions of this matter have been sporadic and have
included such aspects as whether civil review should cover all matters,
including operationa2or merely administrative matters, In these dis-
cussions we have taken the position contained in the recommended U. S.
position set forth above.
In the Idanhington Ministerial Council the British representative's
instructions did? not permit him to accept the CMPS Budget for CENTO 's
FY 1959/60, inasmuch as it had not been reviewed by civil authoritye
Subsequently, the United Kingdom agreed to approval of this budget while
maintaining its view that in future years the CAPS Budget should be
referred to the Budget and Administration Committee for review before
being sent to the Ministerial Council, In consequence, the question of
procedures for approving CMPS budgets has been discussed in the ensuing
meetings of the Budget and Administration Committee and the Council
Deputies. In the Council Deputies meeting of April 72 19602 the British
representative stated that it appeared the United Kingdom would not
be able to join in final approval of the CMPS Budget for FY 1960/61
(i.e., the budget annexed to the Report nos; before the Council) until
it had been examined by CENTO civil reviewing authority, and that the
United Kiegdom intended to raise this question in the Tehran meeting.
The Pakistani representative in the April 7 meeting indicated for the
'first time that his country could now agree to civil review of the
CAPS Budget, provided there would be no undue delay jeopardizing execu-
tion of military programs, but that this agreement to revised procedures
would apply beginning with consideration of the FY 1961/62 budget. In
consequence, the issue of civil ? review appears more nearly resolved but
has not yet been disposed of,
i--
DraftedTy: Cleared
NEA/NR - tev. Gannett NR - Mr. Wright
NEA - Mr. Hart
RA - Mr. George
BNA - Mr. Moffett
S S-RO: Raymond L. Perkins, Room 5ff74-5S, Ext. 4 4.5
by:
FE - Mr. Jones
OIA - Mrs. Westfall
OSD/ISA R/Adm.
Grantham
C - Mr. Achilles
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EIGHTH CENT? 111.131STERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran/ April 28-302 1960
CTO Coad Structure and Related qle
Poeition Paper
TEg D-6/2
April 18, 1960
Introduction:
Comma Structure **rill be one of the principal issues to arise
in the Tehran meeting.
Command Structure vas the primary topic Considered at the recent
meeting Of CENTO's Military CoWeittee. The salient issues involved
in the Coamittee's vigoroug discugslons on this Metter were (a) whether
the military planners.' study of COmmand Structure, prepared pursuant
to the Washington Ministerial CoUncil's directive to Study "the prob-
lem of the Command Structure", web in adequate Shape to be placed
before the Tehran meeting of the Council, end (0) whether the decision
of the Washington meeting that the Committee ahead Study the question
Of Cowan& Structure constituted Ministerial agreement in principle to
the establishment of such a Structure. On the first aspect (a) the
Committee decided to refer the study back to the planners for farther
review, but the Pakistan representative made clear hereearded this
action as totally 'unnecessary. On the second eepect (n) there was no
consenwas of vievsbuteur representative made clear the Ministers'
action did not constitute agreement in principle to the establishment
Ora Command Structure.
A tUrther development of interest in the Military. Committee meet-
ing is that Turkey may have under consideration the commitment to
CENTO rather than to MO of forces in the eastern part of that
country; however, the scope and import of Turkey's censideration
are not clear.
Closely related to the CO Cemmand Structure qUestien is the
concept of assigned forces. The Shah's interest in becceadng CENTO's
military Commander-in-Chief, until recently =Ida mooted, is also
related but is now a less prominent fetter. Thee* two topics are
discussed below jointly with Cemeand Structure.
14.-n-ASUated Position of11024E-25METEStl:
1. Pakistan believes positive steps should be taken without
further dellay to set up a Command Structure and to assign forces
adeqeste for the defense of the CENTO region. It esaniot agree to
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regard CEMPO as a flank guard of NATO. In Pakistan's view, the
Washington Ministerial Council agreed in principle to the establish-
ment of a CENTO Command Structure. At one point Pakistan agreed
privately to support the anointment of the Shah as Ocassander-in-
Chief. While it recently indicated a preference for a U. S. officer
or for a regional officer other than Iran's Chief of State, it pro-
bably would still accept the Shah.
2. Iran also believes positive steps should be taken without
delay to establish a Command Structure and that the Washington
Ministerial Council agreed in principle to its creation. In the
recent Military Comaittee meeting, however, Iran took the position
that it was necessary to determine what foi*ces would. be assigned to
the defense of the =TO area before a Structure could be established.
AU of Iran's forces would be so assigned. Iran has customarily
taken an equivocal position as to the stationing of foreign forces
on Iranian soil, because of possible Soviet reaction. 2tie Shah would
like to be CEVTO's Supreme Oommandar.
3. Turkey has always supported in principle the establishment
of a cam Command Structure and now appears to have under review the
cceeziterent of forces to CENTO as well as to NATO. In a somewhat
contradictory presentation in the recent Military Committee meeting,
the Turkish representative stated that in case of global war Turkish
forces in the eastern part of Turkey would be under the operational
control of CENTO; however, he stated subsequently in the meeting
that he could not agree with the concept of offering part of Turkey's
forces to NATO and part to CENTO.
4. The United Kingdom, though professing on a political level
little enthusiasm for a Command Structure, has vacillated on this
subject and. would be willing to go along in principle if the United
States agreed, but would wish to keep the Structure ult1mate3.y
created to very medest proportions. The United Kingdom believes the
issue of whether to establish such a Structure was conceded at the
Washington Ministerial meeting and that a crisis in confidence on
the part of the regional members is likely to ensue if some progress
is not made in the near future.
Recomended U. S. Position:
1. The United States believes that the creation of a MOTO
Os:wand. Structure now or in the immediate future would be undesirable
for political reasons. The establishment of such a Structure, or
announcement of agreement in principle on its creation, 'would adversely
affect Free World interests in the Middle East area by disturbing, with-
out commensurate gain, the relations between the member states and. their
neighbors.
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2. The United States believes that real military progress can
be made by Co without establishing a Otentand Structure. CTO 'e
military planners should be encouraged to proceed, under the guidance
of the Military Committee, with perfecting contingency plans for a
Command Structure which would be available on a standby basis if and
when the Iifinisterial Council agrees that such a Structure iv needed
and. is politically desirable. This position is wholly consistent
with our agreement with the decision of the Washington Ministerial
Comma Session "that the problem of the Command Structure should
be studied by the Military Committee".
3. The regional members should recognize that the United States
has effectively demonstrated its sincere desire to make CIENTO a mean-
ingitl organization. The question of a Command Structure is only one
aspect of CENTO arrangements, and United States unwillingness to
participate at this time is dictated by compelling political reasons.
It in no way suggests a weakening of U. S. support for =ITO. The
United States will continue its strong support of MVO's defense
cooperation, threugh the Eisenhower Doctrine, bilateral executive
agreements, substantial military assistance programs, and participa-
tion in CIRO military activities.
4. The United States is not ale to assign or earsark forces
to CROW at this time (nor will it be able to furnish increased
military assistance hopes of which would be aroused by creation of
the Comma Structure)
50 In view of its position on Command. Structure, the United
States feels that, without prejudice to any particular candidate,
there is no need to consider appoinizsemot of a ?amender-in-Chief.
Discussion:
=KU
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Discussion:
Command Structure complete with 'theater and service headquarters and
Pakistan. and Turkey have long4favored the establishment of a CENCI
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Iran now ant/ports this view. Pakistan and Iran believe that a Structure
is essential in order to strengthen the military aide of CZOO, and have
intensified in recent months their pressure to obtain U. S. agreement
to such a ProPomelo Torkey's position is undergoing a review which
appears to include consideration of whether forces in eastern Turkey
now committed to NATO should-be committed to CO. One possible
interpretation of the contradictory remarks of the Turkish represeata-
?tive in the recent Military Committee meeting is that Turkey could agree
only in time of global war to divide its forces between NATO and CENTO
commands. If this laterpretation of Turkey's position is correct, a
possible reason prompting it is that the Turkish authorities may have
belatedly concluded to do otherwise would require them to admit pub-
licly NATO's defense planning fails to cover the emote eastern part
of Turkey.
An important element in Iran's approach to the problem is the
Shah's interest in becoming =TO 'a Ccemand,er-in-Chief. Until recently,
Iran tied its acceptance of the concept of a Structure to agreement to
the appointment of the Shah to this position, and it is not unlikely
Iran will again assert this condition at a moment it considers more
propitious than the present for discussion of the Supreme Commander
position. Iran has also intimated that constitutionally Iran's forces
could not be placed under a non-Iranian commander.
The United States has been opposed to a Command Structure on the
ground it would be both a political and an economic liability. There
is no compelling military requirement for its establishment at this
time. In addition to our concern over reactions in the Middle Nast
area to its creation, we believe the regional states would use our
participation in the Structure as a means for asserting that we support
their national positions in intra-area disputes, such as over Shatt-al-
Arab and Puahtunistan. We believe that each allegations on their part,
however Wee, would lessen our capability to exercise lit moderating
influence on the disputants. Furthermore, the establishment of a
Cameand Structure would not save the basic problems we tone in =TO,
such as dezends for increased economic and military assistance, a CENTO
common infrastructure program, and ultimately the assignment or ear-
marking of U. S. forces. Indeed, such a Structure would be likely to
intensify these pressures.
There is also the matter of whether, in the absence of U. S.
adherence to =NO, the Executive Branch should seek Congressional
views or approval as retparda U. S. participation in a CENT? Commend
Structure
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Structure. It is most likely that rCf the considerations involved
in the question of U. S. adherence 10 4IO would also arise in con-
nection with any proposal for the United States to associate itself
with a CENTO Oemmand arrangement. (See 7)-11/1, U. S. Adherence to
The position of the Department of Defense on a CENTO Command
Structure is that its establishment would be a logical and legitimate
step to which the United. States should not be opposed, subject to
agreement on the terms of referees inrolved; however, the question
of whether the United States could participate in such a conneed
organization requires consideration of the political factors involved.
The Turkish position appears to us to require clarification,
particularly as regards the possible division of Turkish farces between
NATO said CENTO commands in time of global war. We are considering
-whether we should raise this matter bilaterally with the Turks, perhaps
during the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Istanbul.
The discussion in the Washington Ministerial Council Session, when
it, was decided on October 8, 1959, "that the praise of the Command
Structure be studied by the Military Committee and the results of its
study be placed before the Council at its nest meeting", left uncertain
in the written record whether the Ministers contemplated the establish.
ment of such a Structure prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The
original wording proposed for this decision was to the effect that the
problem of the Command Structure invert-treeless to be studied, but was
amended in, the course of a sortwhat inconclusive discussion. The
Secretary in his conversation with Secretary Geeeral Baig on October 6,
19590 was very explicit, however, that the United States was prepared
to agree to planning ofaComamnd Structure only onattartingeney basis.
Clearly, the regional members have chosen to regard the Wording adopted
as agmeamat in principle to the ettablishment of a Structure prior to
the outbreak of hostilities; and the United Medan it prepared to con-
cede on this point. Our representative in the recent Military Com-
adtteeimeeting, as recorded in the minutes of the Committeets first
plenary session to. March 280 1960, "pointed out that this Jecizion to
study the question of the Comma Stracturg did =twain- t the
principle of the Command Structure had been accepted."
Drafted by:
NEA/NR - Mr. Gannett
Cleared by:
NR Mr. Wright
GTI - Mr. Owen &sees
SOA - Mr. Adams
NE - Mr. Elite
BEA - Mr. Lewis Jones
BNA - Mr. Moffett
RA - Mr. Fessenden
H - Miss ,Kirlin
OSD/ISA - R/Adm.
Grantham
- Mr. Achilles
S/5-B0 - Raymond L. Perkins,
Room 5274 NS, Ext. 4445
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ElaHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
?
Tehran April 30.122?2
CENTO Militar Contin encv Plannin,
_ .
Positioner
TEE D-6/3
April 18, 1960
$1
At
Anticipated Position of Foreian Governments:
1. Iran is deeply obsessed with the possibility of what it terms
Soviet 'aggression by proxy" from either Afghanistan or Iraq. It
desires CENTO military contingency planning covering these two countries.,
In view of bilateral discussions of this subject with the United States,
however, Iran may not press this point as vigorously in the CENTO forum
as heretofore.
2. Pakistan, while less concerned with the Iraqi threat, is dis-
turbed over recent Afghanistan developments. It, too, favors military
contingency planning covering Afghanistan and, to a lessoning extent,
India* It would be willing to go along with similar planning for Iraq*
3. Turkey., whose relations with Afghanistan and Iraq are reasonably
good, does not favor CENTO military contingency-planning against either of
these states at this time. It will, however, probably support the posi-
tion taken by Iran and Pakistan.
L. The United Kingdom has favored GENTO military contingency
plaaniry covering Afghanistan and Iraq, but has thus far deferred to
U. S. views in this matter. It has acknowledged there is no immediate
military need for this, but feels it would bolster Iranian and Pakistani
morale. It does not want such planning extended to India.
Recomended U. S. Position:
1* The United States firmly believes that CENTO military con-
tingency planning for Afghanistan or Iraq is politically undesirable
and is not militarily necessary at this tins. The United States has not
written off Afghanistan or Iraq as Soviet satellites.
2. The United States does not consider as likely Soviet-inspired
oggression fm the uncommitted countries in the CENTO region, Afghanistan
or Iraq in particular.
3. Knowledge
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3. Knowledge of such CENTO cont* gency planning--which is bound
to leak out--would be interpreted t eeeghauttheMiceneEast as attempted
CENTO military involvement in intra-e- a disputes. As such, it will
increase already existing area suspicions of CENTO, which have of late
shown some signs of abating. It could also disrupt the delicate balance
now obtaining in Afghanistan and Iraq and drive these states closer to
the Soviet camp. Any such development is not in the free world's
interest.
4. While Afghan and Iraqi willingness to take Soviet arms delivery
is to be deplored, the United States does not believe that either of
these states is likely to possess any real military capability to employ
these arms for serious aggression against a CENTO state for some time to
COM.
50 The United States agrees that the situation in both of these
states requires close and continuous watching. It is prepared to exchange
udth its CENTO friends, preferably on the political level, assessments
of developments in these countries.
6. The United States readily understands, however, that the military
planners of the regional states may have to envisage tensions flowing
from disputes with neighbors and in which the element of Communist sub-
version cannot be clearly demonstrated. Such planning, although under-
etandable, does not fall within the ambit of U. S. support of CENTO and
cannot be supported by the United States. U. S. world-wide responsibilities
demand that it keep its energies focused on clearly demonstrated Communist
threats. This decision is subject to reconsideration if the political
situation in either of these countries were so to alter that the United
States is persuaded a major Communist threat emanates from them.
7.. The United States considers. that the United Nations is the proper
forum in Which to deal with strictly localised dieputee.
8 The United States has amply demonstrated In the past, e.g.,
Taiwan, Lebanon, etc., that it will take appropriate action, both inside
and outside the United Nations, in cases of direct aggression.
Drafted by:
ITAIER - Mr. Gannett
Cleared by:
NR - Mr. Wright GTI - Mr. Mouser
SOA - Mr, Adams BNA - Mr. Moffett
NEA - Mr. Harz C - Mr. Achilles
OSD/ISP. - R/Adm. Grantham
S/S-R0 - Raymond L. Perkins, Room 5274 NS, Ext. 4445
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EIGHTH CENTO . STERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
IshanikLAn10 1960
1.1? a? Vlele.2 ?n.a12:102L241-1,122
Counter-Saversion Conusittee CAIRO
1221a1:2211292ES
Anticizted_Position of ForeivA k7, CflitS
1. The Report of the Coirnter-Sibveralon Commi
expected to be satisfactory.
2. The United Kingdom may propose that C ?place more emphe.As
on attributable public re4ations attivities and suggest that this
should be accomplished through merging the activities of the Public
Relations Division and the Counter-Subversion Office.
3. The three regional states may again express their feeling of
frostration with the laot of accomplishments by the Counter-Saversion
Office.
TEH D-8/1
April 18, 1960
(C/8/D2) may be
Recommended U. S. Position:
I. The Report of the Counter-Saversion C
tee is acceptable.
.. The resolution recommended to the Council is acoeptable.
3. If the United Kingdom ?cli.sousses a possible merger of the Counter-
Subversion Office an 6.' the Public Relations DiViaiOn:
a. We believe past experience has demonstrated adequately the
viadoa of handling separately, on the one hand, the production of publi-
city attributed directly to CENT? and, on the other hand, the production
ond placement of unattributed information, ;Allah requires optimnm co-
ordination and zecurity arrangements.
b. We are willing nonetheless to defer adopting a position
on this matter until action 55 taken on proposals which are expected to
ox.:.se from the Iranian 5dbmisedon to the CSC for a reorientation of
C30 efforts.
4. The United States bao noted with satisfaction Iranian initia-
tive in ouggesting a basis for developing a realistic approach to the
role of the CSO. We look forward to seeing the study which the CSO has
been directed to orepare on the basis of the Iranian paper.
5. As
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5. As necessary and appropriate, the following observations may
be made:
a. While the United States is in fon agreement that all
subvexsive threats to ? states require careful watching, it
believes that the CSO effort should be focUsed on meeting the Com-
annaist and Communist-inspired blieversive threats 'to the CTO region.
b. We feel that no changes in CSO oremnization, administra-
tion or procedures, including recruitment of additional personnel for
authorized but unfunded positions, should be made until after the CSO
has connented on the Iranian proposal.
Discussion:
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MSCUSSiOn :
? Ole .Cagnter7Subvwsion Cemset? (CSO)? operating thrOugh a permanent
working pok,oup in the CM= orgenilation, namely the Counter-Subversion
Office (CSO)?, "ins the responsibility for planning effective counter
-
subversion vograms in the CENTO regon. It has a broad 'charter .1Thich
enables it to consider and, recomend action designed to =inter the
Comminist subversive threat. ?
The CSO consists of an international staff of 11 persons (3.3 posi-
tione authorited and funded) and five national secretaries (one from
each nation). The head of the CSO is the Deputy Secretary General
(Counter-Subversion)? who also serves as the national secretary from
Iran. This office is charged with the detailed planning of programs as
directed by the CSC. The United States pars 20 percent of the CSO
operational budget. In Fr 1959/60 the U. S. shwe of the E 39,740.
budget included unused funds carried over frcen past USIA and CIA support.
.141e CSO pmgrams, to date have been of limited value. ',Ws has been
particularly true since Iraq's withdrawal from =TO (then the Baghdad
Pact,) in Jay, 1958, but the disruption caused by this development now
appears to be subsiding and a. more realistic spcproa(4h seems to be develop-
ins on the part of the mzpiber nations! It is recoguited that the acti-
vities of an international ergsnization of the 080 type are necessarily
of limite,d scope.
Tieregional states' criticism of the CSO is typified by the com-
ments in the Iranian paper entitled "Snggestion About, the Alm, runction
and Organization of the Counter-Subversion Office" (Annex A to C/8/D2).
This paper states that the feeling which premed its preperation is
"one of frustration and uneasiness". It adds that, "compared to the
importance end the immensity of the task, the outcome of our common
efforts has been so slight that we have to consider them as practically
ineffectual . . the Counter-Subversion Office has quite a sizeable
oroanizetion, inc .ding a number of highly qualified men, end involving
impor,tant e7pe-mses. That so much energy' and money should be dissipated
for so little result is indeed disqnleting."
lathou0a basically in agreermat with, the above Criticism, the
United States for some time has not been in full agreement with the
regional states on what should be the scope of CSO activities. At
least ?some of the regional states, while recognizing the Cc:2;41111st
threat, feel, that they are more threatened by their neighboring states,
e.g.; India, Afghanistan, Iraq. Consecuently, while they may talk in
ter= of "Comenist-inspired" subversion, they eptuelly wish the CSO to
address
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addresteltself to these all more immediate threats. Consistent
with our reasons for associa with CTO activities, the United
States has felt that the countar-subversion program should focus
exclusively on meting the Coemunist and Came:list-Inspired subeer-
eive threats. We have leesseconcerned lest CSO activities in regional
states could redeund to cENTO's disadeentagc as well as create
problems for us in our relations withIper regional states. To
date, We have been able to focus CSO attention en the Communist
threat as the principal menace to the Treaty area. We .propose to
maintain these concepts in establishing our position on the Iranian
paper.
The resolution "Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against Iran", which
the CSC recommends in its Report to the Council (C/8/D2), is prompted
by Iranian concern over intensified Soviet propaganda activity which
had contiened since the, Council's Washington meeting in October 1952.
At that time the Council took note of the Soviet campaign and issued
a declaration, together with its final communlye, ehich. deplored the
Soviet He propaganda activities. The recommended resolution is generally
in line with the 1959 declaration. It contains the added point, how.
ever, relating to the "constructive measures being undertaken by the
Iranian authorities to develop social well-being and a sound economy
in Iran." This was included primarily because of injured Irenien
sensibilities resulting from U. S. press cement critical of Iran.
(See position paeer on Soviet Pressures on Iran.) Assuming the
Council approves the CSC'eRepeet, this resolution ay be expected
not to glee rise to farther comment.
The proposed text of a communique on the Poshtunistan (PUkhtoonis.
tan) dispute, included in the _ReeorttotheCoup211, is not likely to
require action by the Council iii-tha?C-orit---a----extconsidering the CSC
Report. .Pakistan is most likely to raise thie levee in a restricted
Council session. (See position paper on Mghe'i-.Pakistan
Drafted by:
14EA/NR Mr. Waletrom
Cleared by:
MR - Messrs. Wright & Gannett
SOA -Mr. Adams BRA -Mt. Moffett
GTI - Mr. Mouser USIA - Mr. Vonier
RME - Mr. Liebesey CIA
REA - Mr. Hart' C e Mr. Achilles
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PER D1-11/5
EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERII, COUNCIL SESSION
TehraO 1960 April 18, 1960
Positimilur
Alghal7rarp Relations
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
6/.
Anticipated Iranian Position
There is considerable concern on the part of Iran over developments in
the internal and external policies of Afghanistan. This concern is based
on (1) evidence of substantial Soviet economic and military aid programs in
Afghanistan which might pose a threat to Iran and (2) the expressed Afghan
desire to construct a new dam on the lower Helmand River which could divert
waters presently flowing into Iran.
Iran has taken the position that, as a nation committed to free world
defense arrangements, the countries with which she is aligned should support
her in her concern over potential military and economic threats from Afghan-
istan. Specifically, Iran would like our support for (1) CENTO military
planning based on the contingency of Soviet-inspired aggression from Afghan-
istan; (2) economic and military assistance which is greater than Soviet aid
to Afghanistan in relation to the size of the two recipient countries; and
(3) the Iranian position on the Helmand River controversy.
Recommended U.S. Position
1. While we have serious reservations concerning the policy of Afghan-
istan in accepting large amounts of Soviet economic and military aid, we do
not feel that such aid has resulted in Soviet domination of that country,
nor do we believe that Afghanistan possesses the military potential to pose
an immediate threat to Iran. The rulers of Afghanistan seem determined to
preserve their countrygs independence and territorial integrity.
2. If the matter of contingency planning is raised, we should indicate
we do not consider as likely Soviet-inspired aggression from the uncommitted
countries In the CENTO region or from Afghanistan (or Iraq) in particular.
Pe therefore do not believe CENTO should engage in planning on the contingency
of 5oviete4nspired aggression from these areas. Furthermore, if such planning
were to come to the attention of the Afghans the effect might be to weaken
their own determination to stay out of the Soviet camp. (See D-6/3, CENTO
Military Contingency Planning)
3. The United States, as well as the CENTO countries, has an important
Interest in preserving Afghanistan from Soviet domination. This interest can
best he furthered, in our view, by continuing a policy of friendship and con-
eiliation on the Helmand River and other quertions plaguing bilateral relations.
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Discussion
SovietiAfig_lanist_aq
The Soviet Union, since 1954, has granted large-scale economic and
military assistance, including advieors and equipment, to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan ranks fifth among recipients of Soviet bloc aid in terms
of total magnitude and among the foremost recipients of such aid in per
capita terms, having accepted approeimetely t100 million in loans and
90,000 tons of wheat.
Included within this aid pogram is an f80 million all-weather road
from the Soviet border at Kushka Kandahar; this project is beIng
financed either by a grant or a long-term, low-interest loan. Concern
has been expressed by Iran and Pakistan that this road, near both of their
borders, might be utilized as an avenue for military operations.
Despite considerable penetration in the economic and military fields,
the ideological impact of the Soviets has been limited. Local communist
activity is prohibited and contacts between the populace and Soviet
technicians have been restricted, apparently by mutual desire.
American Assistanceistm
The United States has made about $150 million available in grants and
loans, including 1409000 tons of wheat, to Afghanistan. This assistance
has contributed to good Afghan-American relations and provided some offset
to Soviet influence. American efforts have been concentrated in the fields
of education, irrigation and communications (including surface and air
transport).
HelmVA-Bint-RLERute
Iran and Afghanistan have a long-standing disagreement over the use of
the waters of the Helmand River which rises in central Afghanistan, flows
tteough Iran and ends in Afghanistan in an internal drainage basin. A
We4tral Commission, establiehed through American good offices in 1950, made
a thorough study of the matter but the two sides 'lave not yet been able to
wyree to the Commission's conclusions as to an equitable distribution of
the waters. The principal issue is the rate of flow to be provided to Iran;
the Afghans have considered 22 cubic meters per second to represent tradi-
tional Iranian uses whereas the Iranians are sellting a higher rate.
PriM0 Minister Daud of Afghanistan visited Tehran for three days in
March 1960, reportedly bringing new proposals for settlement of the Helmand
uaters problem; these proposals reportedly provided that Iran mould receive
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a rate of water flow of 26 cubic meters per second. The Prime Minister was
well received by the Iranians and it was Wiped that agreement could be
reached. Since the Shah reportedly was not prepared to accept a rate of
flow less than 30 to 36 cubic meters per second, however, agreement was not
realized. Iranian Prime Minister Eqbal plans to visit Kabul in the near
future and will probably continue discussions on this question.
Afghanistan has requested the United States for funds to be utilized
in construction of a diversion dem in the lower valley of the Helmand.
We have informed both Iran and Afghanistan that the United States Govern-
41ent is prepared to consider sympathetically assistance to both countries
in surveying development needs of the lower Helmand and subsequently in
examining possibilities of furthering those projects which might be indicated
as desirable by such surveys, but only if the two governments first reach
at least provisional agreement regarding use of the Helmand waters. There
is some evidence that the Afghans may seek Soviet financial assistance for
the dam if American aid is not forthcoming.
Drafted by:
NEA:GTI:AMStillman
NEA:NR:MRGannett
SOA - Mr. Gatch
GTI - Mr. Hope
NEA - Mr. Hart
Cleared by:
SOV - Mr. Armitage
C Mr. Achilles
-RO - Raymond L. Per]d ne,Room 5274 NS, Ext. 4445
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EIGHTH CENI2AUUTERIaL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran Apail_V=1O1.1262
Eagigmluste
Soviet Prespures on Iran
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)
TEH D-11/7
April 18, 1960
katicinated Iranian Position
Since February 1959 Iran has been subjected to subversive pressures
and an abusive campaign of propaganda by the Soviets. This campaign per-
sonally insults Iranian leaders, calls for the overthrow of the Iranian
government and charges that Iran's ties to CENTO and the western powers
betray the interests of the Iranian people. The Soviets began the campaign
when the Iranians reolected Soviet attempts to come to an accommodation with
Iran, and Iran decided to strengthen its ties to the U.S. by concluding the
Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation. The Soviets have clearly indicated
that they would relax their pressures on Iran and even provide aid to Iran
If Iran would shift toward a neutral securitypolicy. Iran has rejected
these Soviet approaches.
While other pro-Western countries increasingly engage in exchanges
with the Soviets and neutralist countries seek the benefits of aid from
both the USSR And the West, Iran resists Soviet pressures with only limited
assurances of support and insufficient material aid from the Free World.
Iran hopes that the U.S. and CENTO powers will support Iran's stand against
Soviet attacks in a more effective manner.
Recommended U.S.
The U.S. and Iran's CENTO partners have shown their clear support for
Iran in the face of these unwarranted and hostile Soviet pressures. At
the Washington Ministevial Meeting last fall the CENTO declaration of sup
port for Iran against Soviet propaganda forcefully stated the Organization's
? position. The White Haase Statement following Prime Minister Eqbars call
on the President at the conclusion of the Washington meeting emphasized the
U.S. position of support for Iran against Soviet threats. U.S. support for
Iran against Soviet pressures was reiterated by the President on March 23,
1960, on the occasion of receiving Ambassador Zahedi. We support the re-
solution recommended to the Ministerial Council in the Report of the Counter
Subversion Committee (see position paper D-8/1) concerning action to be
taken in consequence of Soviet propaganda attacks on Iran.
We continue to believe that hostile propaganda should cease before
correct relations can be considered to exist between the USSR and Iran.
We also appreciate Iran's posture of polite firmness in dealing with Soviet
threats and blandishments. While Soviet threats can never be discounted,
we have no evidence that the USSR intends to invade Iran. With the assur-
ances noted above and the aid which is possible within the limitations of
Free World resources, Iran can be confident that its courageous insistence
upon determining its own policies in the face of the Soviet campaign has
lion international respect.
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Dieggagim
Origke-2110..14-teuete of SovietiMMIUSMARaInN1
In January 1959 the Shah, in a period of disappointment with the extent
of U.S. military and economic aid, invited a Soviet delegation to Tehran to
discuss the possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR.
Because of the intransigence of the Soviet negotiators and warnings from the
U.S., U.K., Turks and Pakistanis of the possible consequences, the Iranians
broke off the negotiations on February 11, 1959. This breaking-off of
negotiations and the conclusion on March 5, 1959, of the Bilateral Agreement
of Cooperation with the U.S. over Soviet protests angered the Soviets.
Khrushchev indicated Soviet outrage that the USSR had been rebuffed by the
weak Iranians. In this atmosphere the Soviet propaganda campaign was
launched.
Radio broadcasts in Persian began on February 25, 1959, with a Khrushchev
speech comparing the Shah's regime to that of the recently deposed Iraqi
government. Bloc transmitters and a clandestine 'National Voice of Iran"
operating from the Soviet Caucasus vilify the Shah and other Iranian leaders,
call upon the Iranian people to overthrow their government and charge that
Iranian association with CENTO and the West is a betrayal of Iran's national
interests. East German stations regularly call for the reorganization of
the outlawed Tadeh (Communist) Party of Iran into an instrument of subversion.
At the outset of this campaign, the Soviets may have expected to bring
about the collapse of the Iranian government. As it became apparent that no
each immediate result would occur, the Soviets gave indications to the Iran-
ian Ambassador in Moscow that they might call off their propaganda campaign
and even give aid to Iran if the Iranians lessened their cooperation with
the West and made conciliatory gestures toward the USSR. The Shah privately
told the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran that he would give a written assurance
that he would not permit foreign missile bases in Iran in peacetime but
insisted that Iran would otherwise choose its own course in domestic and
international affairs. The Soviets have not considered this offer a suf-
ficient basis for terminating their pressures on Iran. Most recently, the
Indian Ambassador in Tehran has hinted that if the Iranian Foreign Minister
visited Moscow, a high-ranking Soviet official might then visit Tehran and
relations ?eight thereby be improved. Nothing has come of this to date.
Current Iranian AttiInejag
Soviet broadcasts have an irritating effect on the Iranians. who are
always sensitive to criticism and historically aware of the power and
designs of their northern neighbor. The Iranians are particularly dismayed
when Soviet commentators cite criticisms of Iran in the U.S. press. To .
some extent the Soviet campaign is offset by Iranian boredom with repetitious
abuse, but it inevitably contributes to a continuing sense of uneasiness on
the part of most Iranians.
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Iran also also sees signs of inc ing contacts between the West and the
USSR while Iran continues to come der Soviet fire. The Summit talks,
the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits anthe proposed Menderes-Khrushchev
visits give rise among Iranians to eculations that a Soviet detente
with the West would ignore Iran's interests. It is possible that in this
atmosphere Iranian Foreign Minister Aram will be sent to Moscow to discuss
means of bettering Iran's relations with the USSR.
U_adCETRANDIstilf_slIran
So far, the existence of CENTO and U.S. aid and assurances have
stiffened the Iranians ? resolve not to bow to Soviet pressures. Our Bi-
lateral Agreement of Cooperation, CENTO and U.S. declarations last fall
and the President's visit to Iran in December 1959 highlighted to the
Iranians the considerable moral and material support they have received from
the U.S. against Soviet threats. Most recently the President said on re-
eeiving the new Iranian Ambassador on March 23, 1960:
"You have mentioned your Government's decision to abandon its tradi-
tional policy of neutrality and to cooperate with the United States in its
struggle to preserve the independence and integrity of the nations of the
free world. You have found that this cooperation has brought down upon
Iran a barrage of vicious and unwarranted propaganda. You may be assured
that you do not stand alone in the face of these hostile pressures. I am
more confident than ever that the cause of freedom and peace with justice
which we Share shall inevitably triumph. Men in all nations aspire to this
goal, as they have found from the dawn of history."
A further CENTO resolution concerning action to be taken in consequence
of Soviet propaganda attacks on Iran, which we intend to support, has been
proposed in the Counter Subversion Committee (see position paper D-8/1).
It can he expected, however, that U.S. and CENTO will be called upon to
support Iran against Soviet pressures vigorously until there is a genuine
change in current Soviet attitudes towards Iran.
Drafted by:
GTI - Mr. Nussbaum
Cleared by:
GTI - Mr. Hope SOV - Mr. Gleysteen
NE - Mr. Gannett C - Mr. Achilles
NEA - Mr. Hart
-110 - Raymond L. Perkins, Room 5274 NS, Ext. 4445
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&SETH SEATO MIETERIate aeeeeeS SS8SI014 B-11/I
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960 April 15, 1960
Background Euer
Turkey
POLITICAL
SUA
fils
The Democrat Party, headed by Prike Minister Adnan Menderea, is currently in
p9 in Turkey. The principal opposition party is the Republican People's Party
under Ismet Inonu. Both parties support Turkey's anti-Russian, anti-neutralist,
pro-NATO, pro-UN and pro-U.S. policies. The Cyprus agreements have improved Greek-
Turkish relations. Turkey distrusts Nasser but supports Qasim as the only
alternative to either Communism or chaos In Iraq. Turkish foreign policy is
deeply committed to the alliance, through CENTO, with Iran and Pakistan. Turkey
feels that the West must concentrate on bolstering the will and determination of
the Shah to resist Soviet pressures. Turkey is suspicious of the USSR, and even
though a Khrushchev-Menderes meeting may take place, there is little doubt that
the GOT will be cautious in its relations with the Soviets.
Doneetic Turkish Politica
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