PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1955
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved onRelbase 2007/01/17 : CIA-13WP86B00269R000300120001-4
Psychological
Aspects of
United States
Strategy
? Source Book of Individual Papers
Approved .gy
 Psychological
Aspects of
United States
Strategy
Source Book of Individual Papers
 Shortly after the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference, Mr. Nelson Rockefeller,
Special Assistant to the President, convened a panel of knowledgeable persons
to consider the psychological aspects of U. S. strategy in the light of the Post-
Geneva situation. The findings of this panel have been submitted in a report
entitled "Psychological Aspects of U. S. Strategy." Individual papers written
for consideration of the panel in the preparation of this report are included in
this volume.
The terms of reference of the study panel which produced this volume of
individual papers are implicit in the world situation. It was thought that "an
initial survey of the psychological aspects of the political, economic, social,
and military factors affecting [the security of the United States]" would
undoubtedly result in the panel focusing attention not only on certain vital
areas of governmental activity, but on the major regional problems as well.
Background areas of investigation to which the panel turned included:
(1) major political trends, (2) the military balance, and (3) Asia, the Middle
East, Africa, and Latin America as geographic units. Likely emerging for-
eign policies of various nations, the cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc versus the
Free World alliance system, the scale and character of the likely Soviet effort
in the arms race over the next five to ten years, the likely Communist challenge
to the underdeveloped areas over this same time period, and the possible uses
to which the Soviets might put arms parity or superiority, or other positions of
relative strength, were assessed and considered.
The psychological aspects of implementing programs were an important
term of reference for the panel. The scale and character of the Free World
effort in a number of crucial areas were considered. In addition, the panel
accepted the task of how best to integrate its findings in order to provide
governmental departments with useful, definitive psychological guidance.
All the foregoing considerations are in varying degrees reflected in the indi-
vidual papers presented in this volume. These papers were written as a pre-
liminary stop before the panel met to deliberate. They served as the basis
from which the final panel report evolved.
It should be emphasized that each of these papers is the work of an indi-
vidual, with varying degrees of assistance from his critic. The substance of
each is not necessarily agreed to in toto by the panel as a whole.
The letter inviting panel participation and the objectives of the panel are
appended.
 Chairman, Frederick L. Anderson, Major General, USAF (Rot.)
C. D. Jackson, Time Incorporated
Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Director, Operations Research Office, The Johns
Hopkins University
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Harvard University
Colonel George A. Lincoln, Professor of Social Sciences, U. S. Military
Academy
Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger, School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University
Mr. Stacy May, Consulting Economist
Dr. Max F. Millikan, Director, The Center for International Studies,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Dr. George Pettee, Assistant Director, Operations Research Office, The
Johns Hopkins University
Dr. Stefan T. Possony, Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air
Force
Mr. William Webster, Executive Vice President, New England Electric
System
 PANEL MEMBERS------ ----------------------------- --
INDIVIDUAL PAPERS.
Page
xv
1. A Post-Geneva Estimate of Soviet Intentions by Philip E, Mosely
1. The problem------------------------------------- --------------------
1
H. Assumptions--------------------------------------------------------- -
1
III. Discussion----------------------------------------- ----------------
1
2. Thresholds of U. S. Effort by Max Millikan
1. Why are there threshold effects? -----------------------------------------------------
6
II. Critical thresholds in current policy--------------------------------------------------
6
III. Outside aid and the threshold effect--------------------------------------
8
IV. Conclusion--------------------------------------------------------------------
8
3. Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political and Psychological Policy by Max Milliken
1. The thesis------------------------------------------------------------------
9
II. Misconceptions as to the purposes of economic programs----------------------
9
III. The error that aid will gain us friends______________________ -----------------
0
IV. The error that aid is to strengthen foreign military capabilities--------------------------
10
V. The error that Communism springs from hunger---------------------------------------
11
V1, The positive case for economic programs----------------------------------------------
13
VII. Requirements for the growth of political maturity--------------------------------------
13
VIII. How economic programs can promote steps to satisfy these requirements-----------------
15
IX. Economic programs-a way to by-pass political stalemate-------------------------------
17
X. A new policy toward colonial areas---------------------------------------------------
18
XI. Effect on our more developed allies---------------------------------------------------
IS
XII. The conditions for effectiveness of economic programs----------------------------------
10
XIII. What influence can we have from outside on these conditionsl___________________________
20
XIV. The threshold of effort required------------------------------------------------------
21
XV. Economic factors affecting the threshold----------------------------------------------
21
XVI. Non-economic factors affecting the threshold------------------------------------------
22
XVII. The relevance of U. S. trade policy---------------------------------------------------
23
4. General Guide Lines for an American Long Range Psychological Plan by Stefan Possony
I. General principles-------------------------------------------------------------
25
II. American behavior----------------------------------------------------------
28
III. Central concepts of a psychological warfare plan---------------------------------------
29
5. A Positive Position for the Third Phase of the Cold War by George Pettee
I. Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------
33
II. The general position------------------------------------------------------------
34
III. The cold war----------------------------------------------------------------
35
IV. The free world reaction -------------------------------------------------------------
37
V. The world situation of the twentieth century------------------------------------------
38
VI. The backward areas: revolution without Communism----------------------------------
43
VII. The place of Communism-----------------------------------------------------
46
VIII. The position of the U. 5---------------------------------------------------------
50
IX. Conclusions-------------------------- ----------------------------------------
57
The immediate situation --------------------------------------------------------
57
The general situation-----------------------------------------------------
58
The backward areas -----------------------------------------------------------
58
Communism ------------------------------------------------------------------
58
The United States----------------------------------------------------------
50
Summary ---------------------------------------------- -----------------------
59
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 CONTENTS SECRET
Page
6. The U. S. Public-A Matter of Orchestration by C. D. Jackson
I. The problem------------------------------------------------------------- -----
61
H. The need---------------------------------------------------------------
62
III. The proposal--------------------------------------------------------------
62
7. The Discrete Problems of the Far East by Paul M. A. Lineberger
Prefatory-------------------------------------------------------------------
65
1. Prologue-------------------------------------------------------------------
66
II. Draft statement of a ten-year policy____________________________________________ ____
69
Statement of the problem ------------------------------------------------------
69
Facts bearing on the problem--------------------------------------------------
70
Discussion------------------------------------------------------------
72
Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------
72
Recommendations--------------------------------------------------------
73
III. The overseas Chinese ---------------------------------------------------------------
73
8. Policy and Opinion in South and Southeast Asia by Paul M. A. Lineberger.
Prefatory------------------------------------------------------------------
75
1. Indochina-----------------------------------------
75
The present situation in Vietnam________________________________________________
76
The promising area of Cambodia ------------------------------------------------
78
Laos---------------------------------------------------------------
79
II. India_______________________________________________ ______-__________
70
III. The relations of the British to American policy in this area______________________________
81
British domestic policies affecting the U. S. position in the world____________________
81
British policies in the international scene affecting the United States_________________
82
9. The Middle East and Africa-A Working Paper by George A. Lincoln
1. The problem-------------------------------------------------------------------
83
General description of area_____________________________________________________
83
II. North Africa and the Middle East___________________________________________________
83
Current threats to the situation_________________________________________________
86
The Communist hazard_____________________________ --------------------------------------------------------
87
III. Things to do in the North Africa-Middle Eastern area__________________________________
87
The Arab-Israeli situation______________________________________________________
88
The colonial problem __________________________
88
Regional organization ____________________________________________
80
Operation of private organizations_______________________________________________
89
Flexibility, suitability, and rapid action in our Middle East operations_______________
00
IV. Africa south of the Sahara__________________________________________________________
90
French colonies ----------------------------------------------------------------
91
British colonies----------------------------------------------------------
91
Other colonies________________________________________________________________
91
Some problems and hazards of progress__________________________________________
91
The Communist threat__________________ ---------------------------------------------------------
92
African leadership-----------------------------------------------------------
92
V. The U. S. problem in Africa on colonialism------- --------------------------------------------
03
VI. What's the U. S. program?____ ----------------------------------------------------------
93
A possible program ------------------------------------------------------------
04
Appendix A-Notes on U. S. Policy Formulation for Middle East and North Africa__________________
95
Appendix B-The Current Crisis_ --------------------------------------------------------------
go
10. Latin America-As a Demonstration Area of U. S. Foreign Policy in Action by Stacy May
1. Introduction-the thesis of the paper_________________________________________________
99
II. If. S. and Latin American interdependence____________________________
09
III. Heroic objectives and human performance___________________ --------------------------------------------
100
Capital investment_ _________________________________________
101
Trade ----------------------------------------------------
102
IV. Communist subversion efforts in Latin America
103
V. Conclusions----- ---------------------------------------------------
104
SECRET
 11. The National Costs and Policies Required to Maintain a Modern Weapons System by Ellis A. Johnson
I. The problem----------------------------------------------------- ---------------
107
II. Assumptions-----------------------------------------------------------------
107
III, Facts bearing on the problem________________________________________________________
107
TV. Discussions------------------------------------------------------------------
107
V. Conclusions----------------------------------------------------- - --------------
118
VI. Recommendations----------------------------------------------------------
119
Appendix A-Results of Illustrative Game______________________________________________________
121
Appendix B-Defense of Continental U. S. Against Air Attack____________________________________
125
Appendix C-Defense of NATO Against Air Attack______________________________________________
126
I. Current military posture of NATO___________________________________________________
126
IT. Analysis of the problem------------------------------------------------------
126
III. The threat--------------------------------------------------------------
128
IV. Defensive weapons systems---------------------------------------------------------
130
V. Nike-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
131
VI. Employment of Nike---------------------------------------------------------
131
VII. Production feasibility ---------------------------------------------------------------
132
VIII. Costs----------------------------------------------------------------------
132
IX, Personnel requirements-----------------------------------------------------------
132
X. Special problems---------- ---------------------------------------------
133
12. Arms Equation by George A. Lincoln in collaboration with William Webster
1. The problem----------------------------------------------------------
135
II. Assumptions and guide lines ---------------------------------------------------------
135
III. Nature of maned force---------------------------------------------------------
137
Arms race or great power maneuver-arms equation ---------------------------------
137
Characteristics by which to judge military power----------------------------------
138
"Nuclear superiority''__________________________________________________________
138
Two equations---------------------------------------------------------------
138
Equation A--------------------------------------------------------------
130
Equation B----------------------------------------------- ----------------
140
Allies, Geneva, and nuclear standoff----------------------------------------------
141
The importance of NATO---------------------------------------------------
142
IV. Integration of military force with other arms of national policy__________________________
142
V. Things to do----------------------------------------------------------------
144
VI. What is the price tag?--------------------------------------------------------------
146
13. Crucial Problems of Control of Armaments and Mutual Inspection by Ellis A. Johnson
I. The problem---------------------------------------------------------------
147
II. Discussion ------------------------------------------------------------------------
147
Appendix A-Science Advisory Committee Comments on Control of Armaments and Inspection-----_-
149
I, Questions for discussion on armament reduction--------------------- - - ----------
149
IT. Topical outline for a study of the technical and scientific background for a U. S. position on
reduction of armaments----------------------------------------------------
151
III. Related Memoranda---------------------------------------------- -----------
153
14. Thresholds of Armament Effort-U. S. and USSR by Stacy May
1. Current U. S. and USSR comparisons-total economic output and military expenditures---
165
The United States---------------------------------------------------------- --
166
The USSR-------------------------------------------------------------------
165
Comparison of the two------------------------------------------------------
165
IT. The Soviet breaking point----------------------------------------------------------
166
III. Conclusions ------------------------------------------------------------_
167
16. Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR by Henry A. Kissinger
I. The Problem-----------------------------------------------------------------
169
IT. The implications of the Geneva summit conference-------------------------------------
171
III. Outline of a future strategy---------------------------------------------------------
172
IV. Notes on the arms race---------------------------------- -------------------------
174
SECRET
 16. The German Problem by Henry A. Kissinger
17. Soviet Evolution by George Pettee
1. The problem___________________________________________ ____________
II. Sub-problems----------------------------------' --
I11. Facts and assumptions -------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Discussion------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSR in the present world political system___________________________________
The primary characteristics of the USSR as a community---------------------------
Factors tending toward a favorable development___________________________________
Factors tending toward an unfavorable development_______________________________
Alternative forms of struggle____________________________________________________
Possible U. S. courses of action--------------------------------------------------
18. Investigation of NATO by Stefan Possony
1. The problem----"-------------------------------------------------
189
I1. Assumptions-------------' -----------------------------------
189
III. Discussion
190
Security problems---------------------------------------------------------
190
Peaceful collaboration---------_ ______ ________
191
-joint studies---------------------------------------------------------
191
-joint ventures___________ ______________________________________
195
-adaptations-----------------------------------------------------------
198
-reporting organs_________________________________________________________
199
IV. Conclusions
201
V. Recommendation--------------- --"
201
19. The Atoms for Peace Program by Stefan Possony
1. Electric power program----------------------------------------------------------
II. Difficulties
-----------'----------'------------------------------`---
III
Conclu
i
.
s
on
20. The Purpose, Requirements, and Structure of an American Ideological Program
1. Introduction-------------
by Stefan Possony
211
------------'-- II. Discussion
211
The current situation_______
216
III. Summary''---------------'-
220
IV. Conclusions
221
V. Recommendation
222
LETTER OF INVITATION
224
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES OF THE PANEL
225
 Paper 1
A Post-Geneva Estimate of Soviet Intentions
1. THE PROBLEM
The problem is to estimate both the, possible
and probable range of Soviet intentions now and
in the near future, e. g., during the next twelve
to eighteen months.
H. ASSUMPTIONS
For purposes of this discussion, it is not
assumed that the Soviet leaders now in com-
mand of Soviet decisions are entirely new
people, devoid of Soviet experience or Bol-
shevilc ideology, but are people who have
struggled to the top within the Stalinist system,
and that Khrushchev was sincere, in his ex-
promptu speech of September 17, in asserting
his devotion to Leninist ideology. It is also
assumed that, although the present leaders
have demonstrated a greater flexibility and
adaptability in their tactics than at any time
since 1946, they are fully aware of the limits
within which their ideology allows them to
maneuver, as well as of the limits set by the
concrete interests of the Soviet state in the
pursuit of its foreign policy aims. It is further
assumed that the present leadership is well
aware of the earlier periods of relative flexi-
bility, demonstrated particularly in the mid-
1030's and during World War II, and that they
have not exhausted the range of adaptations
which they can introduce into the immediate
conduct of Soviet policy. It is assumed like-
wise that the experience of the past two and
ono-half years suggests that it is relatively
fruitless to attempt to identify a "hard" or
"soft" policy with this or that individual within
the ruling group.
For purposes of this estimate it is assumed
that the Soviet leadership understands, better
than did Stalin, the impact of the atomic age,
the nature of new weapons, and therefore the
dangers which inhere in the race for supremacy.
It is also assumed that the Soviet leaders are
better aware than previously of the difficult
choices which they must make in the allocation
of resources to various purposes. It is clear
that the now leadership is showing a much
sharper awareness of the actual and potential
reactions abroad to their policies, together with
a growing skill in manipulating these reactions.
The Free World, and particularly the United
States, can no longer rely on massive Soviet
hostility of expression to provide the basis for
our own decisions. These decisions must be
planned skillfully to seize and retain the initia-
tive in the face of a greatly expanded Soviet
arsenal of political warfare weapons.
III. DISCUSSION
The new Soviet tactic of relaxation has dis-
tinguished carefully between trivial and essen-
tial interests. The long-overdue Soviet accept-
ance of the treaty with Austria has initiated
profound shifts in the popular estimate, within
Europe, of the nature and extent of the Soviet
threat. Without sacrificing any important
interest, the Soviet leadership has achieved an
important change in the international atmos-
phere. The abandonment of the useless quarrel
with Tito has probably moved Yugoslavia to
CONFIDENTIAL
 the position of a neutral, one which on many
international issues will support the Soviet
position. This gesture, together with the out-
break of Greek-Turkish antagonism, has greatly
reduced, at least temporarily, the defensive
value of the three-power Balkan alliance. The
withdrawal from the Porkkala base will relieve
the fear of renewed Soviet aggression widely
felt in Finland, and will reinforce neutralist
trends in the other Scandinavian countries. At
the same time the Soviet government has made
it amply clear, if it were not clear before, that
it has no intention of abandoning its valuable
colony, East Germany, and that neutralism is
designed only for export beyond the boundaries
of the Soviet bloc.
The effects of the new Soviet tactic are favor-
able within the Soviet Union. It creates a far
stronger basis for popular acceptance of the
regime's claims to be pursuing a peace-loving
policy. If a reversal comes, and it can cone
over night, a new policy of tension will be ac-
cepted with greater credence by the population
at large as well as by the Communist Party.
At home the Soviet leadership has traditionally
followed apolicyof alternate tension andrelaxa-
tion, realizing that an unrelenting state of ten-
sion leads to many unfavorable results, deple-
tion of hope, pessimistic expectations for the
future and other morale-depressing results.
Within the satellites the new tactic is also
favorable. It tends to strengthen the position
of the Communist ruling groups and to discour-
age expectations of an early liberation, which
previously has been expected, as the result of
an early clash between the two major blocs.
A policy of relaxation, which could have been
risky in earlier years, offers no substantial risks
today to Soviet control, for during the years of
sharp tension the Communist apparatus has
been recruited, disciplined and given confidence
in its ability to rule, with Soviet backing.
Within Western Germany the effects of the
new tactic are favorable to the Soviet position.
Those who oppose rearmament can now assert
that the new Soviet policy makes it unnecessary
for Germany to incur the economic costs and
political risks of rearming. It reinforces the
hopes of those who believe that reunification
can be achieved through a policy of weakness.
It discourages those who support rearmament
and cooperation with the West because the
general atmosphere of relaxation makes it ap-
pear that, no matter what efforts Germany may
make, the prospect for reunification becomes
dimmer. In Western Europe and Japan, social
and political resentment of the cost of defense
and political resentments over the inevitable
frictions of alliances promote indifference to
the common aims of the free world and leave
the way open to revive many domestic and
intra-alliance squabbles. Within the United
States the willingness to make sacrifices to
maintain and strengthen the free world alliances
and to give the primary to international aims
over domestic ones is likely to be diminished.
Has the Soviet leadership exhausted its bag
of Christmas presents? There seems to be
very few further "concessions" which it can
make in order to retain the initiative in the
course of relaxation. Cultural exchanges offer
an insubstantial and undramatic ground for
new gestures. The development of trade
between the Soviet bloc and the free world is
likely to be slow and to be fraught with more
disappointments of expectations than with ful-
fillments of hopes on the part of the free world
countries. One possibility is that the Soviet
leadership expects the tendency of relaxation
to be of relatively short duration and is there-
fore willing to spend its chips somewhat lavishly
at this time, in order to achieve a maximum
short-term effect upon opinion abroad. A
second possibility is that, though the Soviet
leadership may intend to continue the policy of
relaxation into an indefinite future, the outside
world will come to realize that the basic position
and demands of the Soviet regime remain un-
changed and will therefore recover gradually
from the immediate impact of the Soviet
policy of relaxation and will come to take a
more balanced view of the medium-range
prospect for better relations between the two
blocs.
 If the Soviet leadership is sincere in seeking
a long-range relaxation, followed by genuine
co-existence, it would do exactly what it is
doing now. However, in order to continue the
strengthening of the mood of relaxation abroad
the Soviet leadership would have to provide
new and stronger proof of its long-Tango inten-
tion. The most important single sphere of
such proof would be in the field of inspection
and limitation of armaments. And it is pre-
cisely in this sphere that the Soviet leadership
is least likely to display any genuine evidence of
seeking a long-range relaxation of tension.
That is why the question of control of arma-
ments must be pursued with a maximum of
energy and the greatest possible clarity of
statement for the public at large, both in the
United States and abroad.
Is the Soviet leadership engaged in one of its
classical maneuvers, designed to reduce tension
and allied unity in Europe, in expectation of
sharpened tension in Asia? There is no ques-
tion but what the Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist leaderships consider Southeast Asia a
highly favorable field of expansion during the
next few years. They also believe that a
further shaking of American prestige in Asia
may give them control of Formosa and of South
Korea, together with the neutralization of
Japan, and that they must strive to minimize
the risks of war in pursuing these aims. The
Chinese communists are preparing intensively
the capability for seizing the offshore islands
and, if they carry this out with direct damage
to American prestige, they may hope to shake
the Chinese Nationalist regime on Formosa.
The important thing for them is to be as certain
as they can that the United States will be
deterred by its allies from retaliation. Strength-
ening the mood of relaxation in Western Europe
is the best way to achieve a separation between
the American position in Europe and that in
Asia.
American policy will be confronted shortly
with the question of whether to permit "free
elections" for the unification of Vietnam; if it
decides not to permit them, in order to prevent
a further territorial expansion by the Com-
munist bloc, it will then face the problem of
creating a viable regime in South Vietnam and
of defending it by American land power. A
refusal of "free elections" will be followed by a
renewal of guerrilla warfare, conducted by a
vastly strengthened Viet Minh force without
direct Chinese Communist participation. Over
this issue, as well as over the question of retalia-
tion against an attack on the offshore islands,
the Soviet leadership presumably hopes to
isolate the United States from its allies. It
may hope, beyond that, that the fear of a major
war breaking out in the Far East may lead the
allies of the United States to request the with-
drawal of American forces from their territories,
perhaps for the period of the Far Eastern crisis.
The Communist aggression in Korea was
followed by a sharpened fear of aggression in
Europe and thus provided an important stimu-
lus to the efforts for self-defense and mutual
defense. The Korean outbreak had been
preceded by several years of extreme pressure
against vulnerable points along the European
periphery of the Soviet bloc. A similar but
more confusing Communist outthrust, for
example in Indochina, may not have a similarly
stimulating effect on self-defense efforts in
Europe, since it will have been preceded by a
systematic pattern of minor but locally impres-
sive concessions.
The "concessions" which are being used as
counters by the Soviet leadership in its present
tactic are of slight or no importance to the
Soviet bloc but have an impressive impact on
the peoples beyond its borders. It is necessary
to negotiate actively on the really difficult
problems in order to make clear to European
peoples that the basic Soviet position in
respect to Germany and the satellites remains
unchanged. It is desirable to take an initiative
in lessening trade barriers, except in carefully
defined strategic lists, in order to prevent this
card from being played against the American
and free world position. It is important to
establish a broader free world position on the
principal issues in the Far East, since otherwise
CONFIDENTIAL
 the United States alliances elsewhere in the
world may be nullified in practice through the
pursuit of a separate policy in the Far East by
the United States, There is no sign whatever
that the Chinese Communist leadership or the
Soviet leadership have relaxed their immediate
awns in the Far East. It is more likely, on
balance, that, by diversifying their tactics in
Europe and in Asia, they are striving to secure
local political and perhaps military advances
in the Far East, hoping at the same time to
weaken or destroy the U. S. system of alliances
and to achieve their basic aim: the retraction
of American power from its advanced positions
to the territory of U. S. allies.
;Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
 Thresholds of U. S. Effort
Originator: Max T. Millikan
Critic: George Pettee
The drafters of basic policy statements at the
level of NSC papers are confronted with a
serious dilemma. On the one hand if they
make these statements too detailed and specific,
they will make inadequate allowance for the
innumerable variations of circumstance and
event which must condition the detailed im-
plementation of a broad policy. On the other
hand if they are to be drawn so as to cover all
contingencies and still be short, they are in
danger of being so general and platitudinous as
to be of almost no use in Providing selective
guidance in deciding between two alternative
specific courses of action. The requirements
of brevity and interdepartmental compromise
usually force the drafters to seize the second
horn of this dilemma and escape their obliga-
tion to be helpful to those charged with de-
tailed implementation by the use of such
phrases as "where appropriate," "when re-
quired by the national interest," "unless
clearly dictated by security considerations,"
and the like. In part this is a weakness which
is inherent in the very nature of a basic policy
paper and cannot be avoided by the most
conscientious and unambiguous drafting. It
is part of the essence of "policy" that it cannot
be fully defined in general terms and can be
recognized only after the fact as a series of
consistent specific acts taken in a particular
context, designed to produce cumulatively a
major general result.
It is the obligation of drafters of basic
policy proposals, however, to reduce to an
irreducible minimum the degree to which
implementation must be played by ear. There
is one particular respect in which there is both
a possibility and an urgent need to improve
Paper 2
practice in this regard. This has to do with
giving indications of the order of magnitude of
effort required if a recommended course of
action is to have, even qualitatively, the result
it is designed to achieve.
Some activities are of the "some is good,
more is better" variety; that is, there is a small
benefit to be derived from a small effort and
the benefit increases in a fairly regular fashion
as the effort increases. The decision as to
how much effort to expend in view of all the
circumstances is one which results from a
balancing of rising costs against rising benefits.
The precise amount decided upon is a matter
of judgment and there is little in the way of
objective rules to tell the decision-maker
whether it should be more or less. There are
other activities, however, in which a minimum
threshold of effort must be crossed if the result
is to be even qualitatively in the right direction.
Lesser effort does not produce merely a lesser
result; it produces no desirable result at all.
One can drive a car at any speed from a creep
in low gear to eighty miles per hour and got
where. one wants to go at a varying cost in
time. But if one is flying an airplane, one
must achieve a certain critical velocity or the
plane will never leave the ground.
Where one is dealing with what the mathe-
matician would call the case of continuous
variation there is some defense for the drafter
of basic policy who refuses to attach numbers
to his recommendations on the ground that
the precise degree of effort justified must de-
pend on complex considerations outside the
scope of the policy under review. The only
question the policy leaves unsettled is the degree
and not the kind of effect to be achieved. But
CONFIDENTIAL
 where there is a discontinuity in the relation
between effort and benefit, specifically where
there exists a threshold effect of the kind de-
scribed above, the policy is not really defined
even in broad terms unless some indication is
given of the minimum scale of effort required
to get the kind of effect one is aiming at.
It is the contention of this paper that thresh-
olds of this sort characterize a number of key
areas of our cold war policy, that we are expend-
ing some effort in all these areas, but that the
effort is currently well below the threshold and
that in consequence we have the illusion of a pol-
icy rather than the policy itself. Whether one
agrees with this judgment of the effectiveness
of current efforts there can surely be no quarrel
with the principle that where a minimum
threshold of effort can clearly be shown to be
required to achieve a result in the right direc-
tion the identification of that threshold (at
least to an order of magnitude) is a necessary
part of any basic document purporting to
describe the policy.
1. WHY ARE THERE THRESHOLD
EFFECTS?
There are three sorts of reasons for the
existence of threshold effects. In the first
place the United States may be engaged in an
endeavor whose outcome depends upon the
relative scale of our effort compared to that
of another power. Conventional military com-
bat falls in this category. The threshold is set
by the opposing power to be overcome or frus-
trated. If the effort is too small, the result is
defeat; if it is adequate, the result is victory or
effective deterrence. The difference between
the results is clearly one of kind and not of
degree.
In the second place an effort on our part
may have as one of its objectives stiffening the
resolve of an ally to continue to undertake
actions we believe to be in our interest. In
the post-Geneva atmosphere whether our allies
maintain a burdensome military effort and a
politically unpopular support for NATO may
depend critically on what kind of an example
we set. The threshold of our effort necessary
to set an example for them is perhaps much
harder to estimate with precision than the mili-
tary threshold described above, and it may be
a hand of values rather than a single sharply
defined one. Nevertheless there is likely to be
a reaction from them which will be qualita-
tively different if they believe we are signifi-
cantly relaxing our efforts than if they believe
we are continuing to carry our just share of
the load.
In the third place there are actions of ours
whose effectiveness may be subject to this
threshold effect wholly apart from any compari-
son with the level of effort by others. An ex-
ample might be air defense. A level of air
defense which gives. us a reasonable assurance
of survival in the face of atomic attack is quali-
tatively and not just quantitatively different
from one which does not provide this assurance.
This is a field in which there may be several
thresholds. Small levels of effort may be suffi-
cient somewhat to reduce the amount of dam-
age we?suffer but inadequate to provide either
effective deterrence or assurance of survival.
A somewhat larger effort, inadequate to give
reasonable, assurance of survival, may still be
enough effectively to deter a potential enemy
from taking the risk of failure. Finally a still
larger effort might reduce the risk of annihila-
tion to a very,,small figure.
H. CRITICAL\,THRESHOLDS IN CURRENT
POLICY
It is perhaps worth elaborating a bit three
areas in which the estimation of a threshold of
effort may be particularly vital in the current
phase of the cold war. The first of these has
to do with the shape of the arms race over the
next decade. One clear purpose of our policy
may be to persuade the rulers of the Soviet
empire that our resources and our determina-
tion are such that they simply have no reason-
able hope of being able to establish sufficient
military superiority over us to use military
power as a principal instrument for extending
their area of influence., One purpose of their
lApproved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
 CONFIDENTIAL THRESHOLDS OF
present line of approach is undoubtedly to see
whether by softening their manner they can
induce a relaxation of our efforts sufficient to
permit them over a number of years to achieve
such a degree of superiority. As long as they
believe they can do this at a bearable cost to
themselves the chances that they will agree to
a really effective system of arms control which
will remove military instruments from the
arena of international conflict are negligible.
There is a minimum and quite high level of
effort in arms production, in the maintenance
of forces, and especially in aggressive research
and development which will be necessary to
persuade them that they cannot gain on us in
the long run.
The estimation of this threshold level is
clearly difficult. It places a very high priority
on intelligence as to Soviet achievements, since
this is clearly in the category of thresholds
which are determined by relative effort. Never-
theless it should be possible, within a fairly
wide band of possibilities, to get some indica-
tions of what we must spend in money and
effort to keep far enough ahead to persuade
them that this particular game is not worth
while. The stakes are so high and the long-
run gains from success so great that we should
be willing to err on the side of exaggerating the
height of this threshold to avoid a risk of defeat.
It is worth emphasizing that the threshold here
defined is a different and probably higher one
than that defined by considerations of our own
short-run security. It is not sufficient merely
to keep abreast or to deter current attack if the
hope is nourished in the Soviet Union that there
is a good possibility that they will gain an edge
in the future. The demonstration that they
cannot win must be sufficiently decisive and
sufficiently sustained to persuade them to alter
a basic policy they have pursued for some time.
The second critical threshold in current
policy relates to the same area of effort, namely
defense expenditures in the United States, but
is defined by the necessity to set a persuasive
example for our allies. The countries of
Western Europe have, under our prodding,
U. S. ErroRT 7
been maintaining military establishments which
are relatively speaking a greater burden on their
poorer economies than we suffer from our
military effort. There are important elements
of public opinion in those countries which hold
that this level of military effort is both un-
bearable and unnecessary. The effort to hold
the alliance together in the faco of the relaxation
of tensions inaugurated at Geneva is going to
require on our part convincing evidence that
Ave regard the threat as still great enough to
justify a major outlay on our part. If we
shave our own defense budget and reduce
taxes in this country at the same thne that we
are pressing the NATO countries for more
rapid fulfillment of their commitments, we will
bring about either the defeat of our friends or
their defection from our causo. A level of
effort which would exceed the first threshold
described in paragraphs toll and cloven above
would almost certainly be sufficient to exceed
the one just described, but the two constitute
separate reasons for insisting that a policy of
maintaining our defensive guard is meaningless
unless a price tag is attached to the policy with
some specific numbers on it.
A third critical threshold exists in an entirely
different area of policy, that of economic aid
to the underdeveloped areas. Troia is explained
in greater detail in Draft Paper Number Four,
but a summary of the argument may help to
illustrate the threshold concept. In the first
place there is a minimum level of investment
which countries with expanding populations
must undertake merely to prevent their stand-
arcls of living from declining. This level will
be quite inadequate to produce any of the
economic or political results which it policy
of encouraging economic development is do'
signed to produce. '111e people of these areas
have acquired, on a scale never before ap-
proached in history, a belief that change and
improvement in their lot is possible. This
revolution of rising expectations is inducing
leaders to explore what forms of society are
likely to have the best promise of satisfying
those expectations. If voluntarist and domo-
CONFIDENTIAr
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
cratic forms do no more than hold their own
with population increase, they will almost
certainly not survive in the face of skillful
persuasion accompanied by example from
behind the Iron Curtain. This means that in
many of these areas investment must be suf-
ficient to produce at least a rate of growth of
national product in excess of 1%% percent per
year, which is a commonly found rate of increase
of population.
Actually the threshold is substantially higher
than this. The process of growth is a cumula-
tive one. If a country is poor, it has great
difficulty in raising the resources required to
expand its physical plant in order to become
richer. But once the process of growth gets
under way, the increments of new product
forthcoming each year provide new resources
for reinvestment and thus for continued and
expanded growth. Beyond this resource con-
sideration, there are many intangible reasons
why growth is a self-reinforcing process. It
must attain a certain scale and momentum in
order to capture the imaginations and enlist
the energies of the vigorous elements in the
population. If it becomes sufficiently evident
that progress is being made not just in one or
two spots but widely throughout the country,
the pursuit of economic change may become a
symbol to which increasing numbers of citizens
attach their national and their personal aspira-
tions. If it occurs on too small a scale, it will
not provide the escape valvefornewly awakened
energies which will pour, instead, into much
more politically and socially destructive
channels of protest,
III. OUTSIDE AID AND THE THRESHOLD
EFFECT
So far we have spoken of the level of effort
required within a country if its own desires to
expand its economy are to be even partially
met. Unless there is local effort, of course, no
amount of outside capital or assistance will be
successful in launching self-sustaining growth.
And unless growth is in the end self-sustaining
it cannot be the basis for political stability and
development. But if the local will is present,
an injection of resources from the outside on a
sufficient scale and over a long enough period
can make the critical difference between a
country's exceeding the threshold of effort
which will launch it on a long-term, upward
path and falling short of that threshold with
resultant deterioration of both its economy and
its body politic. Thus a level of outside aid
which is insufficient is likely to create a vicious
spiral in which the amount of aid called for to
save a country from imminent crisis keeps
rising until at last no amount will prevent
disaster. On the other hand a level above the
critical one in the early years can lead to
growth which will in time make the recipient
quite independent of the need for further
foreign capital resources.
It is worth emphasizing that the upward and
downward spirals described above are likely to
be social and political as well as economic, and
that the thresholds of effort required of us
relate not only to amounts of money to be
spent but also to amounts of American energies
to be put into developing local leadership,
assisting in the most effective use of the
resources we supply, providing political support
to governments which give promise of being
domestically effective, and the like.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are, of course, serious clangors in
putting numbers into basic policy papers. It
is impossible to justify any particular sot of
numbers as being precisely the right ones, A
policy with. numbers runs the risk of being
attacked on, the details of its computations
rather than on its essential elements. But the
argument of this paper is that there are many
policies for which at least the order of magnitude
of the effort recommended is an essential-in
some cases the most assential-olonialit of Clio
policy. To avoid including this element is to
avoid stating a policy at all. This may make
agreement easier in an interdepartmental body,
but it does not advance the national interest,
Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
 Paper 3
Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political
and Psychological Policy
1. THE THESIS
The thesis of this paper is that a much ex-
panded program of American participation in
the economic dovolopuiont of the so-called
undordevolopod areas can and should he one of
the most important oloumnts in a program of
expanding the dynamism and stability of the
Free World and increasing its resistance to the
appeals of (Jonlilt] nism. I boliovo such a
program can bo so designed as to be a principal
and effective instrument in our efforts to
produce political, social, and psychological
results in our interest. Specifically I believe
that Buell it program is one of the few eoneroto
ins trunmu i tali ties available to as for luohioving
the twofold result of (l.) developing viable, ener-
getic, and confident democratic societies through
the Free World and (2) increasing the realiza-
tion elsewhere in the world that tilt) goals,
aspirations, and Values of the peoples of other
countries are in largo part the same as ours.
TO be effective such it program would require
the expenditure by the U. S. Government of
somewhat larger sums than we are currently
spoiling for economic aid, but the amnounis
needed would be small compared to what we
will have to spend in desperate efforts to put
out additional brush fires if they get started.
and insignificant compared to the costs of
waging limited wars,
II. MISCONCEPTIONS AS TO THE PUR-
POSES OP ECONOMIC PROGRAMS
This thesis has been pub forward frequently
over the past, few years and has equally fro-
-
_
,.
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-----------------------
4.8
23.3
------
46.6 1
260. o
o
r
s
ng ex
p
e
t
c
ti
a
ons
i
s
certainly generated in part by modern com-
Irammn Statistics for 1954 are meaningless munications coupled with disparities in ways of
bt?i su c of the Mu sadegI incident, life resulting from the belated equivalent of the
It is apparent that a west
e enmrent e
h rn Industrial
capital is
revolution. Poplulation pros-
' ;uzco: Tke b'c rsno nisi, July 2, 1055. sores generated i11 art b
P by western hygiene,
a rapid lttnt?nnou ;.. ...-t-__
,
e
yprus problem may
develop as not too dissimilar from Vonotia
Giulia or Alsace-Lorraine-Uut with the cle-
velopments
decades. compressed into years rather than
The revolution
f
i
i
DD roved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
 markets except for oil, continuation of the land-
lord system in many areas, lack of raw materials
other than oil, lack of capital and lack of eco-
nomic systems to procure and use it according
to western capitalistic methods-these and
other aspects increase the hazards presented
by the "rising expectations." We have prob-
ably made the primary contribution to building
the expectations to a level incapable of ful-
fillment-even in the oil states. Israel and
Turkey, now overextended on borrowed money,
are good examples. But a projection of popu-
lation increases and probable capital develop-
ment supports the judgment for all states
except perhaps some of the oil states. Capital
development must far outstrip population in-
crease if the expected gains are to be made.
The Middle Eastern-North African area has
no frontiers to exploit except oil, improved
irrigation, and the individual productivity of
the people. A rapidly moving social and
economic situation requires a high degree of
political competence to give reasonable assur-
ance against disaster. If the government is a
democracy, the competence must exist on all
levels and is derived from both literacy and
experience. The required competence prob-
ably does not exist. There is disunity inter-
nationally and probably all governments except
Turkey are of questionable stability and of
questionable continuity as to policy. Peoples
and leadership are volatile and emotional in
reactions to situations.
The unsuitability of the social and economic
base line is a matter turning on the time ele-
ment. If the area had 350 years to make the
changes accomplished in western Europe since
1000 (some portions of the area are starting
from the time of St. Patrick!) all might be well.
But this change seems now scheduled for a few
decades at most-starting from about 1940.
The progression from an agricultural to a mixed
economy, the consequent development of a
large laboring class, even though those in the
oil fields are well paid, the development of a
middle class and the problem of satisfying its
aspirations, the problems created by minorities
traditionally remaining unified and separate
from the remainder of the local people; these
are some of the continuous hazards of the area.
The unnatural boundaries from a geographic
and political standpoint are even more un-
natural from the standpoint of probable eco-
nomic requirements of the future.
Israel is an international fact of life. The
Arab world views Israel, in varying degrees, as
a foreign intrusion into their land (a form of
colonialism), an outpost of, and supported by,
western imperialism, and a future threat to
Arab territories. The Israeli view their situa-
tion as a return to a traditional home from which
they may again be ousted by the Arabs. Theirs
is a military state with power to conquer quickly
in any direction-but with questionable stamina
to hold unless supported. Furthermore, the
Israeli have started a state on an economic level
far above the Arab lands and of the indigenous
capabilities of their land's resources. It can
be sustained only by outside subsidy, by an
industrialization dependent on assured markets
(as Japan and U. K. are dependent), or by both
methods. Israel is in the dilemma that she
needs to get off the western bandwagon, get rid
of the reputation in minds of her neighbors
that she is pot of western world, and be ac-
cepted as part of local national community;
yet she has no present formula for the transi-
tion. We should not be shocked if, in her en-
lightened self-interest, she makes the change.
The Arab refugee problem is one of the most
potentially explosive situations in the world.
Progress toward solution of the three prob-
lems mentioned in the preceding paragraphs is
gravely hampered (at times paralyzed) by the
Arab-Israeli problem. This problem hobbles
the U. S. internationally (and by internal politi-
cal factors) in seeking solutions assisting the
developments in the area along a course which
is not too hazardous to U. S. interests.
Which way might the area go in the next
decade? It seems reasonable to expect as
much change as since 1945. That would be a
lot of change. There is a rapid drift toward
elimination of every form of colonialism.
CONFIDENTIAL
 French North Africa and Cyprus are the only
remaining directly colonial areas. There seems
certain to be increasing pressure to dilute for-
ther the situation sometimes called indirect
imperialism-Jordan and some of the oil com-
pany relationships being good examples. A
leader or leadership group able to demonstrate
an ability to push the foreigner around, has
great popular appeal. Some lessons might be
learned and applied from a study of the history
of Mexico and some other Latin American
countries. Pressures due to increasing popu-
lation and urbanization will increase. There
will be great difficulty in keeping in phase the
markets, the demand for capital, and the
political arrangements for capital import. Lit-
eracy and political aptitude will not keep pace
with political and economic requirements.
Truly democratic governments are likely to be
the exception rather than the normal. Dicta-
torships and oligarchies are more likely, and
perhaps more suitable from many standpoints.
Such governments are prone to generate local
disturbances, external and internal, in order
to rally adherents and distract attention from
unsatisfactory conditions. The white collar
class is likely to be ahead, in number and aspira-
tions, of the political, social and economic
opportunities needed to keep it from being an
increasingly hazardous element. Yet, tradi-
tionally, a relatively large middle class is needed
to give stability in a democracy.
In turning to the U. S. concern over the area,
it may be helpful to split this problem into two
related parts: (a) military; (b) other.
The U. S. military approach to the area is
deeply rooted in analysis of 5-8 years ago. It
would be sound to analyze our military interest
and needs in light of the probabilities of the next
ten years. How long, for instance, will our
security require land bases in the area? Is the
"northern tier" concept for a general war? or
for a peripheral war in the area? or to create a
psychological position of strength in the area?
or to give a reason for our presence there? or
for some combination of reasons? Is there any
hope, over the next decade, for development of
CONFIDENTIAL
indigenous military power (other than Turkey)
beyond that needed for internal security? If
so, what? If one premised their speculation on
an assumption of a very low probability of
general war during this decade, and that it
would probably be nuclear if it occurred, what
then?
As to aspects other than military, the United
States is interested in a progression toward
stable governments friendly to the free world,
But this progression may be similar, although
more rapid, than that of Latin America. The
U. S. is interested in the oil of the area, pri-
marily, at the present time, because of depend-
ence on this oil of parts of the world other than
the U. S. But the U. S. may become much
more dependent on Middle Eastern oil. It is
interested in the friendship and political as-
sociation of the countries.
Current Threats to the Situation
Now what are the threats in the situation?
They are both immediate and long-range. The
"era of perpetual crisis" is likely to continue for
us in this geographical area even if it is partially
dissipated in nuclear matters. First, the Arab-
Israeli problem is most explosive. Second,
French North Africa and Cyprus will continuo
to place our interests in jeopardy in many ways
and may explode any time with practically no
warning. The Soviet Union, while continuing
to radiate Geneva spirits, can fish openly in
these troubled waters. Third, the values of the
"northern tier" can be turned into liabilities by
the success of a bland friendly Soviet gesture
accepted by a country in rear of the tier. The
Arab-Israeli situation gives opportunity for such
penetration which the USSR is able to under-
take without placing any outwardly visible
strings thereon. Fourth, the Egyptian-Sudanese
problem is potentially explosive, Fifth, the
rapid and unsteady pace of political and
economic advance can easily bring revolutions
of violence in one or more countries. Com-
munism is in the happy position of finding its
cause furthered merely by helping these people
 to do what tends to come naturally. Sixth,
there is a great hazard in the building of leader-
ship to fill the gap between the peasant and new
working class on the one hand, and the tradi-
tional feudal-landlord leadership on the other.
It seems that the old leadership must catch up
with the times or be eclipsed. Currently the
leadership in Egypt comes from the military-
and there are worse alternatives, also better
ones. The equivalent of Ataturks may arise.
A frustrated educated class would be a great
hazard.
The Communist Hazard
It seems unlikely that the area under discus-
sion (except Turkey and perhaps Iran) will feel
that the threat of Communism is so overriding
that peoples and states should not deal with
Russia. Even Turkey and Iran will probably
deal on details and on a limited basis. While
Iran may continue to be sobered by the
Azerbaijan incident, there may be a probability
of a policy of playing the USSR against the
west. There is one hazard that needs close
examination. Taking into account the ex-
panding economy of the Soviet Union, the
estimated limitations on Soviet oil reserves,
the possible increasing restiveness toward
foreign companies, coupled with the yearnings
to show independence, and the surplus of
Middle Eastern oil production capability, could
the USSR, again blandly, initiate an oil deal in
the Middle East?
The Communist appeal and way of going in
North Africa and the Middle East seems un-
likely to be a doctrinaire and ideological
appeal except to dissatisfied intellectuals (and
this is admittedly dangerous). Rather, it is
likely to be an economic and social force, per-
haps, if successful at all, deliberately postponing
attempts to seize power openly. It is also
likely to be a political force operating openly in
the colonial issue and with quiet effectiveness
in the Israeli matter. One of our difficulties is
that the optimum Soviet way of going initially
may be approximately the same as it would be
if they honestly had the same general objectives
as the Free World, and were participating
actively in a "Colombo Plan" for the area.
Finally, the USSR with its considerable Moslem
population, having experience and cultures
similar to those peoples in this area, is in an
excellent position to launch a Colombo Plan or
a TCA. The Soviet actions in Afghanistan are
sobering and may be a pilot run. The western
powers can object, but not without suffering
the adverse political impact of strongly imply-
ing that the Middle East is considered to be
their sphere of great power influence.
As a summary statement at this stage in the
discussion, we and our allies have at times
engaged in local power politics on a short-term
basis for short-term advantages since 1946.
We probably had no other recourse. But, in
the revolutionary situation, the short-term
tends to be very short indeed and the price of a
short-term advantage may prove very high in
the mid-term and long-term. The short-term
diversion incident to entrance of Turkey into
the Cyprus problem may cost high in the long
run. It is obviously desirable to discard, as
rapidly as possible, the expediencies adopted to
attain short-term objectives, pointing instead
more directly at longer term objectives. In
doing so, we may more often have two or more
alternatives open to us when the crises arise.
III. THINGS TO DO IN THE N. AFRICA-
MIDDLE EASTERN AREA
Something new has been added to the situa-
tion. First, such motivation and check as was
occasioned by fear of the USSR has been
decreased by Geneva. This trend will almost
certainly continue. The trend is exemplified
by the raising of the Cyprus question and by
current Greek-Turkish difficulties. These
things would not have happened two years-or
even one year-ago. Second, the USSR is
turning to use outside the Iron Curtain of
economic, technological, and social means
which, up to now, have been almost a monopoly
of the West. The ball game, primarily military,
CONFIDENTIAL
 may be about to become a political, economic,
psychological and military Donnybrook affair.
The Arab-Israeli Situation
The Secretary of State has made a wise major
proposition to the opponents. Time appears
to work against Israel, once the U. S. 1956
elections are passed. Dependent on subsidies,
with a high cost in money and in manpower for
armed forces, with Soviet support almost
certain to be given progressively, on an out-
wardly legal basis, to the Arab countries, the
outlook is bleak if the current stalemate
continues-unless (and this is important) the
U. S. continues subsidies. The hope might be
that the Western Powers would, by the develop-
ment of circumstances, be left with no military
base possibilities in that portion of the Middle
East except Israel. But the Geneva develop-
ments do not further the likelihood of this sort
of happening and, from the Western Powers'
standpoint, such a military situation would be
bleak and perhaps of little value. Hence, on
any rational analysis, the Israeli ought to be
willing to come to a reasonable settlement if
properly pressed. But there is no assurance of
rationality and, at the other end of the spectrum
of possibilities, a military flare-up might leave
an expended Israel in the U. S. alignment and
the Arab states taking counsel and resources
from the USSR-with U. N. votes against as,
The Arab situation seems more difficult from
our standpoint. The Arab leadership and
peoples are likely to be emotional and irrational,
they may sense correctly that time is on their
side, and are unlikely to move on propositions
that appear to be U. S. pressure. Put bluntly,
the Arab countries concerned may exact a
considerable quid pro quo from the western
allies-and a settlement would be worth a
considerable cost to these allies. The details
to be considered include the Gaza strip, the
possibility of a freeway across the Negev, the
water problem, Lgcarno type treaties, continued
U. N. policing, assurances on immigration
curtailment, and Great Power guarantees.
The foregoing incomplete list seems drastic.
CONFIDENTIAL
But we can afford to pay a high price and the
hazards are great. In spite of the immediacy
of the problem, particular caution will be
required until late fall of '56. The Soviet
Union may be clever enough to devise a way
to utilize internal U. S. politics to give us a
serious setback in the Middle East. Perhaps a
formula can be devised for initiation through
the U. N. that the Soviet Union, consistent with
their Geneva spirit, would be unable to oppose.
The Colonial Problem
There is an old rule that it is better to go
gracefully than to be kicked out. In retrospect,
a great part of our problems in the world come
from having our allies kicked out of their
colonial areas, and this without having made
preparation for a stable friendly government to
follow. Of the 800 million people, one-third
of the world, in some form of colonial status in
1945, only 200 million so remain. Most of the
latter, except those in Central Africa, and some
islands, seem certain to move to self-dotermina-
tion (not necessarily sovereignty) within the
next decade. The United States has lost to the
Soviet its traditional raiment of support: of
independence movements. It has incurred
some distrust and dislike through being grouped,
in the minds of most newly freed peoples, will,
the colonial powers. The reasons for this
uninvited situation are well known and perhaps
there was no better course. If the current
"soft" Soviet policy continues; there will be
seemingly less reason for the fence walking ap-
proach we have taken during the last few years.
The United States should reexamine its ap-
proach to the colonial problem in light of
Geneva, and Cyprus may offer an opportunity
needed. This is not to suggest that the solution
is either annexation by Greece or continuation
in the present status. Some other formula
should be considered (and is apparently already
beingproposed-late-by the U. IK.). Certainly
all concerned would probably like to see one
produced. The North African situation is
more difficult. But the likely long-run direc-
tion of its movement seems to pose a hazard to
 the U. S. if we become firmly associated in
African and Asiatic minds with opposition
thereto. France needs North Africa; equally,
North Africa needs France. Out of this truth
some better modus vivendi might be developed.
The antipathy toward colonialism and the
colonial powers tends to be carried over into the
conditions of autonomy and independence of
newly formed states. This statement is more
often true when all the conditions on which
independence is granted are not accepted by the
free will of the state concerned. If this inde-
pendence is achieved on the basis of imposed
treaty obligations implying intervention if the
obligations are not kept, there is a tendency to
build up extremes of nationalism. Jordan and
Xuweit can be categorized as somewhat co-
lonial, but their peculiar situation makes cur-
rently for stability. Iraq's remaining colonial
characteristics are diminishing rapidly. Tunis
and Morocco are colonial in that there are
conditions which are not self-determined. This
matter is psychological as well as legal and needs
to be considered in connection with military
bases and stationing of armed forces. In
Finland, for instance, the USSR has given up
nothing that it did not impose on the Finns.
The Soviet base in Finland was a form of colo-
nialism. The U. S. bases and forces in Europe
are in an entirely different category in that the
indigenous governments determined of their
own free will that these forces should be there.
If an allied government ever comes to feel that
it cannot successfully invite us to leave-we
will have grave difficulties and there may be a
resultant impetus to the local "American Go
Home" movement.
The Soviet Union has the capability of en-
gaging in a give away contest with the U. S.
Furthermore, in the long run, it can attain
the facility to live up to its promises. Arms
are the most dangerous give away. They must
be obtained from outside the area since manu-
facturing facilities do not exist, except a few
in Turkey. Up to the limits of a very ade-
quate internal security, the least undesirable
alternative seems to be to stay ahead of the
Russians in this "arms race." But it carries
with it a continuing commitment. Arms re-
quire industrial support not existent in the
Middle East. Promises of this support are
part of the bargaining hazards of the present
and future.
Regional Organization
In the over-all give away program in our
enlightened self-interest, it seems that we should
look to the possibility of a Middle East Colombo
Plan or OEEC type of arrangement. This is
bound to have a very unsettled early voyage.
But it may help to help these people help
themselves and may make them feel more their
own masters. There is a need to develop some
center for study, planning and exchange of
information, which transcends the unnatural
geographic compartments. Even the oil com-
panies have had an inadequate interchange,
partly due to British-American rivalry and the
U. S. anti-trust laws. Our free world stakes
in the Middle East are too high to let such
matters (called "inherent contradictions of the
capitalistic system" by our Communist oppo-
nents) be a barrier to effective action. Politi-
cal and military regional organization probably
does not lend itself to the purpose. But a
social, economic and technological institute
type of organization might be successful.
The U. S. should consider a U. S. regional
organization for guidance of our operations. A
close look may show a disturbing lack of re-
gional knowledge, regional team work and
support of overall U. S. objectives (as com-
pared to local aspirations) on the part of our
personnel. Such parochialism as exists has to
be combatted by a definite program. Integra-
tion of our regional efforts requires more than
a policy statement. It probably depends pri-
marily on provision of funds for travel and
conference purposes and on assignment of
adequate personnel to embassies and missions.
Operation of Private Organizations
Operations of church and other educational
organizations and foundations have long fur-
CONFIDENTIAL
 thered U. S. interests in the Middle East.
The oil corporations have undertaken useful
programs incidental to their activities. It may
well be that this way of going should be further
stressed and expanded. These companies are
the managers of the "one crop" (oil) economy,
from the standpoint of money earnings, of six
governments. This resource, located in the
possession of about 30 million people, is of
vital importance to hundreds of millions. The
oil companies have a tremendous and a very
difficult task important to free world security.
We might recognize that they are, and have to
be, instruments of that security.
An energetic program of association of U. S.
universities, including engineering colleges, with
institutions of learning in the Middle East,
financed in part by government funds, may
pay appreciable dividends. This idea is not
new. The Rangoon association with Johns
Hopkins University seems to set a successful
pattern to follow.
The rapid transition of the Middle East
results in a need for economic and social
planning which these countries are unable to
accomplish on their own. The Soviet methods
are bound to appeal to some. It would be
wise to offer alternatives which are superficially
separated from great power political control.
Flexibility, Suitability, and Rapid Action in
Our Middle East Operations
We should. study and draw lessons from the
Soviet actions in Afghanistan. They have
shown a willingness and capability to use
quickly many of the techniques and programs
we have developed with painful slowness
throughout the world. When technical ad-
visory personnel arrive in the capital city a few
days after being invited, pray in the mosque for
an afternoon and produce what it takes to pave
the main street the next day, the favorable
impression achieved is likely to be enormous.
We should consider:
a. The shifting of our administrative pro-
cedures and organization to take "quick
tricks" when the opportunity offers. We
should have a policy to this effect. A good,
and perhaps sole, example of this typo of
action was the flying of pilgrims to Mecca.
Such a policy requires "mobile forces" in
being and is probably best carried out by
giving the missions to a going U. S. govern-
ment organization or a private firm. In the
technological area, the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, the Corps of Engineers, and civilian
engineering firms are logical instruments for
consideration.
b. How to avoid becoming identified too
closely with existent regimes. Some of
these are bound to change, perhaps accom-
panied by violence.
c. The future hazards of a crisis such as the
Mossadegh affair. In the future, the Soviet
Union may well have a "mobile force" and
an attractive program to offer-as they did
in Afghanistan.
IV. AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
This vast area is entirely colonial except for
the Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of
South Africa. No political unit has more than
20 per cent non-African population except the
Union of South Africa. The remainder, except
for Southwest Africa, Southern Rhodesia and
Eritrea has less than 5 per cant non-African
population.
The Union of South Africa has definitely
adopted a segregationist policy (Malanism or
apartheid). There are differing opinions as to
the likelihood that this policy will succeed,
some knowledgeable individuals contending
that the economic realities alone will cause its
failure. The policy has certainly aroused a
great deal of adverse world comment and will
result in increasing difficulties as colonial Africa
moves further along the direction it appears to
be going. The British portions of colonial
Africa are at the crossroads between integration
and segregation. The French, Belgium and
Portuguese have a policy of integration of those
 who have reached a certain level of what is
called civilization.
The current outward direction of political
movement varies considerably. The Gold
Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Togoland
and the Cameroons are on their way to African
self-government. French tropical Africa and
Madagascar (which has a strong tradition of
nationalism) are destined (by the French) to a
developing status in the French Union.
French Colonies
The French political concept of the French
Union is a difficult one because no such ar-
rangement has ever existed. Lilco the unicorn,
people talk about it but no person has ever
seen one. Hence, it faces the initial difficulty
of competition with the better understood
concept of nationalism. The Union concept
envisages progressive development of colonial
areas either to departmental status or to the
status of "associated states." The point is
made here and stressed again later that the
element of time may be the determinant of
success or failure of this concept-and the
French can be fairly judged as being slow thus
far. It would be most unwise for the U. S. to
base its policy on an assumption of success of
the French Union concept. We must provide
for other alternatives-which are probably
more likely. We should recognize that the
French have, thus far, a consistent record of
disturbance and various degrees of failure in
their arrangements for keeping political institu-
tions in step with evolution of colonies. The
British, on the other hand, have a fairly
uniform record of success-even though their
policies have been much more pragmatic.
British Colonies
The British colonial territories are developing
toward self-government but without an as-
sumption of ultimate African control and with
locally exercised political power in the hands of
non-Africans. As an example, less than a
quarter million whites exercise the local political
power in the British Federation of Central
Africa (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia,
Nyasaland) which contains over six million
blacks. This current situation exemplifies the
difference of opinion as to whether the relation-
ship between white and black should be one of
"trusteeship" or one of "partnership." This
situation, illustrative of the situation through-
out Africa, calls to mind that color conflict can
be as much of a disturbing force as economic
and other factors, and that the Soviet Union
and Communist doctrine can perhaps be even
more persuasive in this area than in economic
and social problems.
Other Colonies
The Belgium, Portuguese and Spanish
territories do not have any developed method
and direction for their future course. Ob-
viously, their course, like the others, lies within
the spectrum of possibilities ranging from an
African state through various types of multi-
racial political structures to close political
supervision by the current colonial power.
Currently the Belgians seem to be progressing
well in the Congo. But the likely rapid
increase in the African laboring and lower
middle class, due to mining and other economic
development, may quickly bring problems.
Some Problems and Hazards of Progress
There is considerable basis for a generalization
that African political participation and progress
toward self-government increases from south
to north. In the current revolutionary situa-
tion, the tendency is likely to be toward
acceleration of the laggards toward the pace of
the foremost. And the foremost may tend
toward increasing pressures for greater speed.
Also, there is a basis for the generalization that
denial of political action leads to conspiracy.
There is no attempt made here to discuss illit-
eracy, shortage of land, shortage of labor, and
several other important African problems. The
discussion is limited narrowly to certain national
security and political aspects. These are
greatly conditioned by the natural drives for
modernization and racial equality. These
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 drives do not necessarily generate a demand for
national sovereignty. The French formula
could give the objectives desired. But na-
tional sovereignty is the traditional formula.
The multiracial societies (even though the
European components are small) are likely to
generate increasing African nationalistic move-
ments. With the introduction of modern in-
dustry (including agricultural methods in some
areas) and communications, and an assured
rise of a literate leadership class among Africans,
the multiracial approach to political institutions
is bound to have progressively tougher sledding.
Much of this part of Africa stands no further
forward than French North Africa, with its
current acute multiracial problems, stood ten
years ago. Perhaps if the French had moved
seven years ago to the point to which they have
now been forced, there would not have been
the recent and current troubles in North Africa.
The principal religion in a great part of this
area is Islam. It is judged by many to be in-
creasing its converts. There are judgments
that the Moslemism of most of the people is not
deep-nor for that matter is the Christianity
of the Christians. The disquieting, perhaps
very improbable, speculation is offered that an
alliance between Islam and Communism in this
areas is a possibility.
The Communist Threat
It is very questionable that the U. S. should
key its policy and objectives in the area pri-
marily to the threat of Communism. Even if
there were no Communism in the world, the
possibilities of unrest, disturbance and power
political maneuver connected therewith, are
sufficient to give concern. If tropical Africa
moved happily to self-government tomorrow,
there might, within ten years, be a major dis-
turbance due to economic problems, or due to a
Moslem drive of conquest to the south, or a com-
bination of these and other developments.
But Communism and the Soviet regime are
interested in Africa and Communism is already
there. The situation is not one for mass parties
such as the French and Italian Communist
parties. It is a situation where small cells of
indoctrinated and deeply dedicated individuals
are the best instruments. The appeals are not
ideological but rather are economic, social, and
nationalistic. Two of the principal methods for
acquiring, training, and introducing party
zealots into the area are the labor union move-
ment and the education of natives abroad.
The French CGT is a channel to French Africa,
the Egyptian labor unions to the Sudan. It is
logical that Communism proselyte native
students abroad. Parenthetically, French edu-
cation on the Paris left bank, even disregarding
Communism, is not today likely to build friends
for America.
African Leadership
This area, like the Middle East, has a prob-
lem of developing an adequately educated
African leadership class. And it has the related
problem of moving rapidly enough to satisfy
their social and economic aspirations after they
are educated.
The development of any African people
through various stages of self-government to
national sovereignty, status of an "associated
states", etc., is almost certain to be materially
different from the usual U. S. idea of develop-
ment of a democratic state. The useful ex-
amples are most likely to be found in Latin
American history. The "hero" or messianic
type of leader is more likely than the Wash-
ington or Jefferson type. There is some pos-
sibility that an African educated elite will
develop while the mass lag far behind in literacy
and political competence. But even a small
proportion of the total population can be very
vocal and can sway the remainder. There have
been recent examples on the rimland of Asia
which support this last point.
Unsuitability for independent status of cur-
rent geographical units. The current bound-
aries in Africa bear only a limited relationship
to ethnic groups, communications, resource
sufficiency, security, and other characteristics
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
desirable for the stability and continued ex-
istence of a nation-state. Every current polit-
ical unit is bound to be materially dependent
on the developed countries for a long while for
markets, capital and technical assistance. These
conditions add hazards to early autonomy. If
granted too soon, there is bound to be shopping
among great powers for the best deals-and the
USSR can even now give a good deal, witness
its rapid action in Afghanistan. Obviously,
from the economic and security standpoints,
continued association with a developed country
is the best solution, The alternative might have
to be long-term subsidies such as Libya and
Israel are receiving.
Once the white man dictated, he now must
deal. Africa now stands at a very definite phase
line, Previously, the colonial powers could
dispose of the local peoples' affairs. Now they
must deal with them about those affairs. The
vision and wisdom with which this dealing is
clone will determine whether in the next decade
we have crises and major concerns about
African impact on our security. It is not yet
too late but time is running out.
V. THE U. S. PROIBLEM IN AFRICA-
COLONIALISM
The U. S. problem and the predominant issue
is the colonial issue. There are other aspects
such as raw materials, military bases, etc. But
the objectives involved will be achieved or fail
of achievement depending on the handling of
this issue. We have two lines of interest: (1)
our traditional anticolonialism; and (2) our
strategic interests in our allies, bases, raw ma-
terials, etc. It is suggested that a doctrinaire
adherence to either line is likely to be disas-
trous. A middle course is a better course. But
it is not a simple course.
The United States faces the almost certain
hazard of being required to stand up and be
counted within the next few years on matters
pertaining to Africa. Our close association
with the colonial powers, the policy of India
particularly to beat the anticolonial drum at
every opportunity, the precedent given by the
newly sovereign Arab states to African areas
which are predominantly Moslem, the un-
impeded movement toward independence of
certain western African areas, the strong
so-called anticolonial propaganda drive of the
Soviet Union, and finally, the opportunities
presented in the U. N. forum, seem to assure
that our country will soon have to be much
more definitive about this problem. One might
even speculate about the possibility of internal
political pressures within the United States.
Fortunately, no area in Africa, except the
Union of South Africa, is moving in a direction
materially different from that which appears
consistent with our interests. The problem
seems primarily one of coordination and accel-
eration rather than of change of direction.
Any acceleration would be in the direction of
generating a feeling in peoples that, by their
own efforts and political decision, they are
progressing toward their social and economic
goals. The peoples, particularly their leader-
ship, need to feel that their grievances, real or
imagined, are receiving reasonable attention.
If this pattern and progress do not come about,
then a nationalism of a type we now little
foresee or understand (witness the Mau Mau
movement), may overflow the land. This
nationalism would be characterized by un-
predictabilities, emotional as to policy, which
would make the irrationality of some Arab
politics seem no cold logic.
VI. WHAT'S THE U. S. PROGRAM?
With respect to colonialism, this paper
obviously cannot and should not suggest more
than a direction of policy and areas for further
investigation. The direction of policy needs
to be a shift away from our comparative silence
on specifics concerning colonialism and toward
more of a middle ground. The Geneva develop-
ments, if sustained, are almost certain to bring
acceleration of pressures (as they already have
in Cyprus). This approach requires prior
notice to allies-which is a leverage. It
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 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
requires a climate reflected to those allies
through all U. S. officials concerned. And it
requires that we speak with constructive
suggestions ahead of the Soviet Union and
India now and then.
How much should we enter the African
scene? This is a very troublesome question.
There are related ones. If the inclination is to
act as an observer enunciating a few pious
principles periodically, we must face the
question of whether we can accept the hazards
of such action. Our interests have been
seriously impaired already by the ineptitude of
our allies in some colonial matters. If we
decide to take an active part in our enlightened
self-interest, what's the program?
A Possible Program
1. Better intelligence. This is a must.
2. More knowledge about Africa in higher
education and U. S. intellectual leadership.
There should be at least one adequately en-
dowed, and active Institute of African Affairs
in the U. S. It should be a part of a university,
thereby facilitating education of African stu-
dents.
3. Emphasize the activities of non-govern-
mental agencies in non-political areas such as
the position of women, health measures,
changing undesirable local customs and taboos,
etc. This means U. N. agencies and also
private foundations. The more that can be
done through private enterprise, the better.
4. Related to the foregoing, there should be a
feasible way to operate Point 4 type of programs
in Africa through contract with universities,
foundations, etc.
5. A search should be made for ways to
assure careers to educated Africans, particularly
those educated abroad. Such careers might
well be in efforts of universities, foundations,
and the U. N. in the area.
6. The U. S. should spend some money on the
area as insurance against problems of 5 to 10
years from now. This might be a few tens of
millions and probably not over 100 million a
year.
7. The way of going of colonial powers in the
area needs to be coordinated before a crisis
situation arises. Something like an Institute
for African Development, tied to a Political
Council for African Development with the
latter forcing consultation and an exchange of
views on the governmental level, may be
desirable. Such an Institute would really be,
in part, a study center for problems of non-
Communist revolutionary change.
8. Maximum use in any U. S. operations in
the area of U. S. citizens of African descent.
9. Consideration of counter-action to Coin-
munism in the trade union movement using
U. S. trade unions.
10. Increased participation of the U. S. in
education of Africans.
11. In general, try to lower the barriers and
reduce the conflicts found to exist due to color
and religion. Nationals of countries such as
Turkey and Mexico may understand the local
problems better than Europeans and Ameri-
cans, and may have more of an appeal as
technological experts, etc.
 P
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Paper 10:
Appendix A
Notes on U. S. Policy Formulation for Middle East
and North Africa
1. Support for Communism in the Middle East
and North Africa is minimal at present:
a. Proximity of Russia
b. Successful programs by U. S.
c. Influence of Islam
d. Failure to create effective local Com-
munist parties.
2. However, conditions favor increasing support
of Communism:
a. Growing social awareness among under-
privileged classes
b. General instability among governments
c. Populations highly susceptible to irra-
tional propaganda
d. Rising labor and middle classes, largely
without voice
c. The tradition of oriental despotism is
more akin to Communism than it is to
the alien concepts of democracy and
freedom
1. Decline of Islam as a force for unity,
stability, and order
g. Improving communications.
3. U. S. policy since World War II has em-
phasized change in the Middle East:
a. Mutual defense agreements
b. Israeli state created
c. Economic development emphasized
d. Modern military forces created
e. Democratic institutions attempted.
4. There are many obstacles to orderly change
in the Middle East that may have been
underestimated by U. S. planners:
a. Lack of resources
b. Corruption within governments
c. Popular suspicion of government as an
innovator
d. Hostility among ethnic and religious
groups
e. Uncooperative attitudes between na-
tional governments
f. Power of vested economic, political, and
cultural interests
Minimal educational standards and gen-
eral illiteracy
h. Inexperience in self-government.
5. Because of these obstacles, some of our policy
has worked to our disadvantage, although
immediate successes have been gained:
a. Distrust between national states has
been fostered
b. Political instability has not been alle-
viated
c. Greater economic expectations have
been fostered among masses
d. Islam-the one unifier-has been in-
creasingly challenged
e. Military power has been thrust into a
vacuum, with minimal political controls
over it
f. The U. S. has allowed self to become
scapegoat for failures.
6. U. S. policy in the future must be conditioned
by the above experiences:
a. Greater emphasis should be placed on
the emotionalism that characterizes
Middle East reaction to U. S. policies..
Policies that save pride and salve emo-
tions may be just as important as
policies which grow wheat.
b. Excitement over some present prob-
lems must be abated as soon as possible,
for the U. S. is held primarily respon-
sible. The Arab-Israeli dispute espe-
CONFIDENTIAL
 cially, the French North African dispute
secondarily.
c. Policies that.generate radical and rapid
change in the area may create as many
problems as they solve.
d. Policies that "use" the Middle East to
satisfy requirements of other areas may
very well undo all that is done for the
area directly. Best example is alleged
support of French in North Africa to
save NATO, etc.
e. Policies which aim at fostering Western
concepts-such as "human freedom"
and "democratic institutions"-must be
interpreted loosely for the Middle East
if they are to be useful,
f. Policies which openly advertise U. S.
sponsorship redound against the U. S.
if failure occurs. Policy failure in the
post-Geneva world may have greater
consequences than in the past.
7. In view of the above considerations, thor-
ough study should be given to the selection
of target groups and areas for U. S. policy.
It is difficult to maintain support of the
mass populace and the special power interest
groups in Middle East areas. It is difficult
to maintain support of discontent opposition
groups and groups in power in the rapidly
changing Middle East. Ultimate success of
U. S. policy may depend largely upon the
ability of the U. S. to counter USSR influ-
ence with vital segments of the population
who hold the power to direct local govern-
mental policy.
Paper 10:
Appendix B
The Current Crisis
All of the preceding pages concerning the
Middle East and North Africa may be only
on theperipheryof our current pressing problem.
In hindsight, the outcome of World War II
almost certainly had to include the ousting of
the colonial powers from most of the Middle
East. This ousting has occurred. It was
bound to be accompanied by instability, a
power vacuum and a distrust for the great
powers only recently lords in the area. A great
opportunity existed for the United States-a
"neutral" great power without imperialist trap-
pings-in its enlightened self-interest, to serve
as a stabilizing factor and fill the power vac-
uum. That opportunity was partially elimi-
nated by the appearance of Israeli. It was
further reduced by the "Geneva spirit" and by
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not finding some action capable of dealing with
Egyptian concern over the military situation.
The United States now seems to have lost the
initiative in the boiling area of Middle Eastern
affairs. This loss is, in itself, not critical. But
who has it? It appears that it may be shared
by the USSR, Israel, Egypt, and perhaps
unpredictable Arab political entities such as
Yom en.
The sight of the USSR moving to fill the
place in the Middle East that might have been
ours should cause some soul searching as to
the who and why of responsibility and some
appraisal of how much we ought to be willing to
pay to reverse assuredly this trend. The ap-
praisal should not stop at a "let the sand
settle" conclusion but should face the hazards
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
of major USSR infiltration and figure the costs
of meeting it successfully; then decide whether
our country wants to pay the cost.
We now have two emerging alliances in the
Middle East:
(1) The so-called Northern Tier
(2) The hinterland less Israel behind the
Northern Tier
The hard facts of the situation include, first, a
currently friendly association and possible
increasing affinity of the second alliance toward
the USSR, and second, a sympathy of the
Northern Tier for the hinterland alliance on any
problem concerning Israel. Stated mildly, this
is an unstable and explosive mixture. The
Middle East does not have much strength
vis-11-vis Communist advance except the two
alliances can be molded together in the stand for
regional security in the Middle East. The
situation has considerable potential for friction
and intrigue. And the Arab-Israeli situation
is a sputtering fuse.
There is of this writing a policy of military
retaliation being pursued by both Israel and
Egypt, general talk of war, talk of "preventive
war" by Israel leadership, and talk of maintain-
ing an arms balance between Arab states and
Israel, as well as mention of other distasteful
subjects. It may be that the United States has
to "bite a bullet" on the Middle East in order
to avoid a high probability of very adverse
happenings. But the alternatives currently
facing us are bleak. Fighting with adverse
developments for the Israelis is certainly con-
trary to our objectives. And the outcome
would be fraught with hazards. Fighting with
major reverses for the Arabs is now likely to
result in disastrous developments from the
standpoint of our interests.
We should face seriously the possibilities of
the Egyptian situation. This hinterland alli-
ance already has ties across North Africa.
Some success against Israel might well set a fire
to Arab nationalism. A reverse could both set
fire to Arab nationalism and create a close
affinity with the USSR.
Looking to the longer range of three to ten
years, Africa south of the Sahara may look
increasingly to people of the same color and
religion for leadership and assistance. If Egypt
and its hinterland alliance adopted as a policy
the active support of anti-colonial movements
throughout Africa, our Communist opponents'
prosperity would increase and so would our
troubles.
The concept of maintaining an arms balance
between Israel and the surrounding Arab
states makes questionable sense in the long run.
Considering areas, populations, and the loca-
tion and numbers of states concerned, the
concept seems parallel to a similar concept for
Luxemburg or Switzerland. Our policy and
programs must, it seems, move to eliminate
this concept of arms balance. The elimination
must be accompanied by the substitution of
something else. Our security guarantee, in
association with Britian and France, may have
to evolve, and soon, to an active posture for
actual "police action", perhaps under UN
aegis.
In summary on the current Middle Eastern
situation, the directions of policy and the
foundation costs which must be paid to reverse
the adverse trends to our interests are:
a. First, and the easiest, U. S. and British
efforts must be and remain together; this
includes matters pertaining to oil.
b. A formula must be sought and applied
to bring the two Middle Eastern alliances
together.
c. The Arab-Israeli situation is a crux
in the matter. In our hard-headed self-
interest we can afford to pay very highly for
some alleviation of the adverse position in
which the situation continually places our
country.
 Paper 11
Latin America-as a Demonstration Area of
U. S. Foreign Policy in Action
Originator: Stacy May
1. INTRODUCTION-THE THESIS OF THIS intensification of the attention and effort that
PAPER we are directing toward Latin America, without
The threshold concept has extraordinary great substantive change in existing procedures,
relevance to our Latin American policies. might carry their effectiveness over the thresh-
Important to that concept is consideration of old that marks the division between moderate
the critical factor of size or intensity of an and spectacular success in the achievement of
otherwise well-conceived effort that must be our aims.
achieved to make it effective, and anything
short of which is doomed to yield disappoint-
ingly II. U. S. AND LATIN AMERICAN INTER-
Our negative e.
Our aims ms and objectives with respect to the DEPENDENCE
area are exemplary and for the most part The importance of Latin America to the
clearly defined. The programs and courses of United States in political, strategic, and eco-
action that have been developed for forwarding nomic terms should notrequire a great amount
our objectives are generally intelligently con- of documentation.
ceived to cast an influence in the direction of On the political front, our relationships with
our aims. the 170 million peoples of the Latin Americas
The results, while far from negligible and (a population that is growing faster than that
seldom negative, cannot objectively be ap- of any major area of the world) have about the
praised as conspicuously successful, or at least most venerable roots that U. S. foreign policy
they seem to fall far short of realizing the full has produced. They have evolved in a pattern
advantage to United States interests that would that has shaped and influenced our arrange-
accrue from a fuller realization of our objectives ments and accommodations with nations in
in an area that is: other areas. The smoothness of their function-
1. Inherently of more direct importance ing is inextricably entwined with the reputation
to the United States than the relative atten- and prestige of the United States in the foreign
tion given to its affairs in our political, policy field. We count heavily upon support
economic, and psychological strategy and of the twenty Republics for U. S. positions in
action would imply. the U. N.
2. Probably of greater potential signifi- On the strategic side, while the military
cance to the broad strategy of our inter- potentials of the several Latin American Re-
national relations in the period immediately publics, or of all of them collectively, are as
ahead than has been overtly recognized in yet inconsequential, there are obvious impera-
our foreign policy formulation as a whole. tives for us in seeing that no potentially hostile
There is a considerable and persuasive body forces obtain a foothold in the Hemisphere, in
of evidence to suggest that a relatively modest protecting the canal, and in assuring our access
(fl?) SECRET
 to imports of materials upon which both our
peacetime and wartime economies are impor-
tantly dependent.
It is in the sector of economic inter-relation-
ships that the community of interest between
the United States and Latin America has been
most underrated. The two-way trade between
these two areas now approximates 334 billion
dollars in each direction. Latin America
affords the United States an outlet for well
over a fifth of its exports and supplies about a
third of its imports. We in turn supply almost
half of their imports and purchase about 45
percent of their exports. Even more impor-
tant is the unmistakably evident trend toward
an increasing degree of interdependence in the
two areas, shown by the growing importance
of their inter-trade as a percentage of the total
trade of each. Upon the basis of the growth
trends of the economies on either side, there is
reasonable expectancy that the trade inter-
change will double by the mid-1970's, an an
annual growth rate of 3% percent. By that
time, the population of Latin America may
total 275 million, outstripping our own by a
considerable margin. There are many eco-
nomic indicators to suggest that the Western
Hemisphere as a whole, with Canada of course
included, is evolving upon a growth trend that
is importantly outstripping that of the rest of
the Free World, in total and per capita outputs
and even in the volume of its inter-trade as a
percentage of world trade.
III. HEROIC OBJECTIVES AND HUMAN
PERFORMANCE
It is impracticable here to spell out the detail
of stated U. S. objectives with respect to Latin
America, and that of the many programs that
have been established to give substance to our
aims. It must suffice to summarize the former
in the statement that it is our purpose to pro-
mote a maximum degree of hemisphere soli-
darity of purpose and procedure, a vigorous
growth of strong and democratic governments,
security forces competent to afford protection
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severally and collectively against outside ag-
gression or internal subversion, and sound
growth economies that yield increasing living
standards and assure reasonable stability. It
is a definite part of our aim to progressively
strengthen the Hemisphere political and security
programs to make them increasingly effective
in the part that they play in the whole Free
World system.
The point that may warrant emphasis here
is that the weight given to Latin American
affairs in our over-all foreign preoccupations is
neither commensurate with the intrinsic im-
portance of the area to our interests nor suffi.
cient to convince Latin Americans that we re-
gard their status as of first-class moment.
In the straight political field, where we have
had really remarkable success despite the gen-
erally instable and embryonic state of demo.
cratic institutions in many Latin Anroricna
countries, there is considerable justification for
their chronic complaint that Latin American
affairs are given relatively small attention in
the highest echelons of the State Department
and the Executive Office. For a considerable
period, consideration of Latin American affairs
has been relegated to last place upon almost all
of our Government policy dockets, and the pro.
emptive demand of emergency situations upon
top-level personnel has too often resulted in
"last-minute" resolution of Latin American
issues that have given the impression of hasty
improvisation.
On the stragetic front, Latin Americans can
learn from the Annual Report on the National
Security Program that their share of poet-war
direct military assistance provided by the
United States has been about one percent of
the total. It is avowedly to our advantage to
see that the military equipment employed by
Latin American countries is of U. S, origin,
particularly to assure that our military missions
are relied upon to furnish training in its use.
Nevertheless, in spite of our declared objectives
to meet foreign competition in this field, it
would appear that about half of Latin American
armanent purchases since 1950 have been made
 from European suppliers. The order of mag-
nitude of such foreign purchases would appear
to have averaged around $25 million per year.
It is on the economic front, however, that
Latin Americans have been most vocal in their
expression of feelings of neglect, or lack of
appropriate consideration. Certainly, the
voicing of a complaint does not constitute its
justification, but the objective record shows
that the Latin American share of U. S. eco-
nomic grant and loan assistance has been very
small when compared to that area's claims
upon U. S. interest based on the relative weight
of its trade. Thus, of the (non-military)
grants and credits extended by the U. S. Gov-
ernment from July 1, 1945 through March 31,
1955, the Latin American share accounted for
only 2.4 percent of the total. In the year
1954, it amounted to 2.5 percent. In the field
of international educational exchange, Latin
Americans received about 6 percent of the
total U. S. grants in fiscal years 1953 and 1954,
and 11 percent in 1955. Even in the matter of
U. S, Information Administration expenditures,
whore the importance of promoting solidarity
and combatting Communist subversion ef-
forts would seem to warrant particular em-
phasis, the share attributed to Latin American
programs has averaged under 3% percent in
the past three fiscal years,
Capital investment
Latin American countries generally have
managed to mobilize some 15 to 16 percent of
their Gross National Products for capital in-
vestment use in the post-war period. This,
together with certain windfall benefits in the
terms of their generally thriving foreign trade,
has resulted in an over-all growth rate in total
economic output for the area considerably
greater than that shown by the United States-
sufficiently greater even to show a comparative
advantage in per capita output as well, despite
the markedly higher rate of Latin American
population increase.
The U. S. contribution to Latin American
capital formation in the post-war period has
played a far more important role in this growth
record than its relative percentage propor-
tions-less than 10 percent-would imply.
The preponderant bulk of U. S. capital contri-
butions to the area have been in the form of
direct private investments. These particu-
larly have focused in high-yield fields of pro-
ductive investment to a much greater degree
than has Latin American domestic investment.
It has been estimated, for example, that U. S.
direct investments in Latin America, which
cumulatively amount to not more than about
6 percent of total stock of the area's capital
accumulation, produce not less than 30 percent
of Latin America's total foreign exchange,
through the export items they generate for
shipment to the United States market alone.
The over-all record since World War II
would seem to imply a very healthy status for
the Latin American economy as a whole, and
equally to testify to the adequacy of the over-all
U. S. economic program directed toward that
area. Unfortunately, a closer scrutiny of the
situation reveals grounds for disquietude. There
seems to have been a marked slowing up in the
tempo of the area's economic growth since
1950-51, when compared to its exuberance in
the earlier post-war years. Progress has not
halted, but its rate has fallen sufficiently to
change the picture of improvement in per capita
living standards from one that considerably
exceeded the long-term growth rate in the
United States to one that is far lower than that
upon which we have counted in this country.
This lowering of growth trend rate has been
concurrent with a considerable falling off of the
direct U. S. private investment of capital funds
in Latin America, which has been compensated
only to a minor degree by the modest but steady
growth of the level of Export-Import Bank and
IBRD loan disbursements to the area.
It would be spurious to impute a controlling
influence to U. S. capital contributions in the
total Latin American economic record, but it
is reasonable to assume that it has had a con-
tributory effect. At least, it would be ac-
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 102 LATIN AMERICA
cepted as a mark of U. S. earnestness in seeking Trade
to foster growth economies in the t
t
en QY
Republics, if we adopted the general goal of It has been contended by some that the
keeping over-all U. S. capital exports to Latin significance to Latin America of its $3% billion
America moving up at a rate that would L
atin trade account with the United States dwarfs
sus-
rain, in a continuing economic growth trend for the importance of all other considerations. This
the area, the same relative influence that it Position probably does less than full justice
exercised over the earlier post-war years of to the influence of capital contributions
vigorous growth. titularly in view of their crucial role inP n.
Obviously, no such commitment could be increasing the production base and the dis.
made in unqualified terms. The "climate" for Proportionately heavy influence that has been
domestic and foreign investment in Latin noted of U. S. direct private investments upon
America necessarily would be a controlling Latin America's export capacity. However,
factor. But the enunciation of the aim would portance of
there can of be no trade doubt opppport tun the ities compelling to the o tiim.
do much to convince Latin Americans of the the a area's
seriousness of our interest in their economic development prospects.
progress. This would be enhanced if our ex- In the trade field, the United States record
pression of purpose were backed up by concrete with respect to Latin America is generally
proposals for action on our part to make direct unassailable. Most of our major imports
U. S. investment abroad more attractive (most from that area are subject to very moderate
hopefully through tax concessions or through tariffs if any at all. But there have boon
quick amortization privileges) and for stepping sufficient uncertainties about our import policies
up the level of Export-Import Bank and IBRD with respect to oil, and suflicient question of
loan commitments and disbursements. There the equities of our sugar policy (which would
has been recent and quite vigorous action along be partly removed and partly intensified by
the latter lines that is a hopeful sign, and the the Pending Administration legislative
establishment of the International' Finance Posals in that field) to undermine full con-
Corporation is a further constructive step, fidence on the part of Latin Americans in the
There also have been a number of promising degree to which their interests will be given
recent developments in the establishment of weight in U. S. trade policy discussions. In
private institutions to furnish intermediate the important trade field of coffee, as well, the
and long-term credits and equity capital for United States has not been able to make a
the area, very positive contribution to current and
It should be noted that the objective sug- prospective Latin American difficulties. There
gested for the U. S. in the field of capital con- is also a heritage of rather unhappy
tributions is far from grandiose. To con- of trade opportunities it memorems total U. S. capital contributions-both ously promoted d by es the U U. . S. during r iing ng viorld
by
private and public-in the same relative mag- War II, and which quicldy evaporated at war's
's
nitude to a continuing growth trend in Latin end. Further, our disposal of agricultural ur-
American economies would imply an increase Pluses gives rise to fears, if not to actual
by only an additional $200 million between damage, in a number of Latin American
now and 1958, the $50o million annual level countries.
of net direct private investment flows, rein- Again, it is far from clear that Latin American
vested earnings, and Export-Import Bank and criticisms of U. S. trade policies are fully
IBRD disbursements combined that has been warranted, or that some of them could be
the post-war average. alleviated by any practical action that we
could take. The point is that we have been
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
less than successful in convincing them that
the essential magnanimity of our stated ob-
jectives toward them in the economic field will
be maintained in the face of opposing pressures.
From their view of the record, we regard them
as poor relations, toward whom our intentions
are benign, and to whose interests we will afford
consideration other things being equal (which
they seldom are).
IV. COMMUNIST SUBVERSION EFFORTS
IN LATIN AMERICA
Although the case for an intensification of
U. S. effort to cultivate increasingly firm and
satisfactory relations with the Latin American
Republics rests primarily upon positive moti-
vations, there are evident signs of intensified
subversion efforts by international Communism
that require effective countering.
The political instability that has been chronic
to most of the Republics and their still retarded
and often insecure economic status provides a
fertile field for Communist subversion efforts
aimed at exploiting unsatisfied aspirations.
Although the Communists have had only
meager and temporary local successes in
capturing effective control of national govern-
ments in Latin America (as recently in Guate-
mala), they have persistently and often success-
fully adopted the tactic of permeating various
"front" movements of labor, youth, student,
women, racial, and peace groups and of dis-
torting valid aspirations for political, economic,
and social reform toward Communist-oriented
solutions and particularly toward anti-United
States sentiments.
Despite the Hemisphere-wide collaborative
efforts to counter Communist subversion formal-
ized at the Caracas Conference, Communist
Party (card carrying) strength in Latin America
is estimated at 250,000, with two-thirds of the
total concentrated in Brazil and Chile.
Since the outbreak of the Korean War, there
has been a marked step-up of Communist effort
in Latin America, fostered by covert transfer of
funds and propaganda material from inter-
national Communist headquarters. This has
been channeled largely through Soviet Bloc
missions to Latin American countries. There
is evidence of abnormal expansion of the per-
sonnel and activities of such missions, particu-
larly in Mexico and the River Plate countries.
Dramatic evidence of recently increasing
effort to build a more effective Communist
apparatus in the area is offered by the record of
Communist-sponsored trips of Latin American
nationals to the Orbit. Less than 100 such
trips were sponsored in 1950; this number had
increased to 1,000 in 1953, and, while it de-
clined somewhat in 1954, it appears that the
operation will attain record levels in 1955 with
particular emphasis on cultural and labor
missions.
The field of trade also presents a picture of
stepped-up Soviet effort at Latin American
permeation. While trade with Soviet Bloc
countries still represents a very small fraction
of Latin America's total trade, there have been
disquieting signs of an increased upward trend
that, if continued, soon would lead to an
uncomfortable degree of trade interdependence
between certain Latin American countries and
Soviet Satellites. There are now 19 bilateral
trade agreements in effect between Latin
American and Soviet Bloc countries. The
actual amount of this inter-trade increased
from a $70 million level in 1953 to between $200
and $250 million in 1954. The great bulk of
this trade-80 percent of the total-was
concentrated upon exchanges between Argen-
tina and Brazil with Soviet Bloc countries.
Argentina's trade with the Bloc quadrupled in
1954, and Brazil-Bloc trade doubled. Trade
between Uruguay and the Bloc also showed an
upward trend in 1954.
While it is true that over-all trade levels fell
far short of bilateral agreement goals, and while
Latin American shipments to the Soviet Bloc
were restricted to non-strategic items-coffee,
cacao, cotton, frozen meat, and wool-in
return for manufactured goods exports from
the Bloc (and minor shipments of machinery
and equipment against much larger Bloc
 promises of deliveries in these items that were that our policy is not one of offering carrots to
unfulfilled), the trade record is one that we recalcitrants while preserving the stick of
cannot afford to view with complacency. It is discipline for good performance. Even within
part of a fabric of evidence that all points to a Latin America, our record has been one of
heightened level of Soviet Bloc effort to drive a offering the most generous assistance to those
wedge into United States-Latin American nations that have departed most widely from
interdependence and the mutual regard it has what we regard as sound practice,
helped to engender. It calls for an increased 4. Although the "public relations" approach
effort on our part to see that the Bloc intentions to Latin America will not suffice of itself to
are thwarted before rather than after they have change the currently widespread resentment of
achieved substantial success. our alleged neglect to an attitude of enthusiastic
cooperation, the demonstration of a deeper and
V. CONCLUSIONS more consistently maintained concern for the
twenty Republics is an important part of the
1. It is difficult to suggest remedies in formula. The recent global broadening of our
generalized terms, particularly since our objec- international interests and commitments is of
tives with respect to Latin America are gen- itself a factor that induces an older-child,
erally beyond criticism. new-born-baby complex in Latin America that
2. The chief shortcoming that may be cited requires an exaggerated demonstration of affec-
with some degree of fairness is that our action tion as a therapy. The base of good will upon
programs, particularly in the economic field, which we can draw is sufficiently established
while consistent with our objectives, are not to give genuine hope of success if our gestures
genuinely adequate for their effective accom- of interest are accompanied by positive actions
plishment either in conception or execution. to demonstrate:
The remedy lies in a meticulous re-examination a. that we are willing to endure a con-
o a strengthening siderable amount of domestic political heat
of f action
programs. of a wide variety a in order to accommodate com etitive Latin
3. While it is understandable that the more p
acute problems in other areas should have American exports to our market;
commanded a disparate claim upon our atten- b. that we are intelligently and resolutely
tion and resources, the result has been a neglect prepared to take stops to keep U. S. capital
of Latin America not only relative to other contributions, private and public, flowing to
areas, but in terms of its inherent importance Latin America at a rate that keeps pace with
to U. S. interests. This has been keenly felt in their commensurate influence upon the eco-
Latin America, to a degree that prejudices our nomic growth of that area in the 1945-51
relationships in that area. As in our early period, provided always that there is local
administration of the ECA program in Europe, effort to make such flows tenable;
our current procedure with respect to Latin c. that we do not apply stricter criteria to
America versus other areas tends to throw the Latin America than we employ elsewhere;
weight of the incentives that our programs d. that we take Latin American potential
offer on the side opposite to our intent and contributions to Hemisphere and Free World
interest, since unsatisfactory performance be- security seriously.
comes the criterion for attention and assistance. 5. The dimension of increased cost to the
Clearly we cannot refrain from taking action United States of implementing such a program
to eliminate trouble that is presently or pro- appears to be relatively modest. Importantly,
spectively threatening our interests. But this it is a matter of intensifying concern and mak-
calls for counterbalancing measures to certify ing our attitudes more conspicuous. As has
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 been indicated, the dimension of appropriately
increased capital contributions is not formi-
dable (a stepping up to an additional $200 mil-
lion annual flow over a five-year period) par-
ticularly since the great bulk of such increase
would be in the area of private direct invest-
ments and the increase in public. funds largely
in the form of loans that should be sound.
Again on an over-all basis, Latin American
resources for servicing foreign equity and loan
investment debt would seem to be adequate for
any expansion reasonably in sight.
6. Finally, it is suggested that we might
profitably regard Latin America as a demon-
stration economic area, the continuity of whose
growth record is usefully exploitable in the
current struggle between political and eco-
nomic systems for the adherence of under-
developed areas. If we are correct in apprais-
ing the Communist strategy as giving ex-
tremely important weight to the subversion of
underdeveloped areas with the lure of the claim
that Communism can offer them a quicker
route to the development they seek, it is of
major importance for democratic-enterprise
countries to rebut this claim effectively. For
all of the qualifications that must be made,
the twenty Republics are generally oriented
toward political democracy and enterprise eco-
nomics. Among all of the broad underdevel-
oped areas of the world they can show the
most convincing evidence of having escaped
dead center and entered into a period of gen-
uinely dynamic growth. There are somewhat
disquieting signs of a slackening off in pace,
but as yet these are not sufficiently serious to
question the validity of the growth trend. If,
as is here argued, a reasonably temperate in-
tensification of U. S. effort promises to con-
tribute usefully to a resumption of their
economic vigor, the effort would appear well
worth the making. The conscious and overt
alignment of United States interest in Latin
American economic dynamism as a demonstra-
tion of the advantages of adhering to our type
of institutions has evident hazards. But the
odds of success appear to be good, and the
gesture would focus our national attention on
something that is important to our interests
quite apart from cold war strategy. It might
serve both to crystallize our own purpose, and
to carry greater conviction of its sincerity and
continuity to Latin Americans than could be
done in any other way.
 Paper 11
The National Cost and Policies Required to
Maintain a Modern Weapons System
Originator: Ellis A, Johnson
1. THE PROBLEM
To determine the effect of economic limita-
tions on the weapons systems of the U. S. and
Soviet Blocs in order to indicate the policies
required to maintain a superior U. S. strength.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
The long-range intention and actions of the
Soviet Union will be such as to cause them to
attempt to retain relative military superiority
over the U. S, Bloc.
III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
a. The U. S. and Soviet Blocs are at present
approximately equal in the technological quality
of weapons systems.
b. Unless vigorous corrective action is taken
by the U. S. Bloc, present trends will give the
Soviet Bloc a 3- to 5-year technological advan-
tage by 1965.
c. In view of the relative technological equal-
ity between the U. S. and USSR, their relative
military strengths depend primarily on the
relative magnitudes of their military establish-
ments.
d. The gross national product of the U. S. is
probably three to seven tunes as great as that of
the Soviet Union.
e. The U. S. military budget is determined
primarily by political rather than economic and
military considerations.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
The military effectiveness of two opposing
military establishments depends on three prin-
cipal factors.
First, it depends on the relative tactical
effectiveness of the two establishments in both
offensive and defensive actions. In the ques-
tion of tactical effectiveness, the quality of the
weapons systems is very important but may
not necessarily be decisive by itself.
Second, the relative effectiveness obviously
depends also on the relative magnitudes, in the
same way that a good big man is always better
than a good little man. Furthermore, because
a modern military establishment must attack
and defend itself simultaneously on land, sea,
and in the air, and since critical parts of the
land-sea-air battle may determine the outcome
of a war even though the remaining strengths
remain proportionately great, both the over-all
relative magnitudes of the military establish-
ments and the relative strengths of the opposing
attacking and defending forces are important.
Third, in the build-up and planning prepara-
tory to a general war, the economic bounds of
the two opponents determine the limitations in
a military-economic game, and it is the success-
ful play in this gains that ultimately determines
strategy and the probable outcome of the war.
Since either side can vary the six semi-independ-
ont parameters of land-sea-air attack and
defense, and since offensive and defensive forces
in critical factors must be matched (but in an
 unsymmetrical way between the two opponents), destruction and lowering of motivations to
the military-economic gaming is critically continue the conflict.
dependent on the quality and timeliness of The outstanding feature of modern weapons
intelligence, especially with respect to the fore- systems is their growing complexity and cost,
cast of the production of the opponent in each For example, in 1937 a U. S. destroyer operated
category and the reporting of the quality of with no more than 60 vacuum tubes to run its
weapons systems and of tactical doctrine, various mechanisms. Today one piece of
which together should result in an estimate of equipment on a destroyer may contain as
the offensive-defensive exchange rates by the many as 2500 vacuum tubes. Most of these
combat units. mechanisms are absolutely critical to the
The importance of lead times cannot be over- combat missions of the destroyer. Not only
emphasized-in particular the lead times re- has this complexity increased cost (as is. shown
quired for training, production, and decision- in Figs. 1, 2, and 3, which give the cost of
making. Since all information with respect to Army tanks, Air Force aircraft, and Navy
the opponent is imprecise, the gamble taken in aircraft carriers as a function of the models
every decision-making move involving large and time), but there has also been a tremendous
expenditures in weapons systems is great, by increase in the logistic requirement for support.
the very nature of the need to forecast. It is Most weapons in combat before and during
like a poker game with deuces and treys wild, World War II could be expected to perform
played by two gamblers, each of whom has a without failure for times ranging from clays to
very limited stake that he must risk on a single months without breakdown, Today many of
hand, guessing at what hand he will getl the critical weapons can be expected to operate
There are, of course, important interactions only for minutes, hours, or a few days before
between these three factors. For example, the breakdown. For example interceptor aircraft
exchange rate between offense and defense and modern guided missiles, as well as much
determines the rules for the military-economic electronic equipment, have an expected life
play. But the exchange rate itself is deter- before failure that can be measured in minutes,
mined by tactical effectiveness, and tactical and complicated weapons, such as the M48
effectiveness itself depends on a complex of tank and strategic bombers, require continuous
military factors that includes very importantly and heavy maintenance and have failure rates
the quality of the weapons systems. Thus in that can certainly be measured in days. Thus
playing the military-economic game, one must the tremendously increased effectiveness of the
bear in mind the whole complex problem of individual new weapon, as compared to its
tactical effectiveness in exchange rates and its predecessor, only partly compensates for its
complicated dependence on the quality of great over-all increase in cost, primarily the
doctrine, training, and weapons systems. logistic cost in manufacture and maintenance,
So far as is known a satisfactory military- It may be argued that the potency of thormo-
economic game has not yet been devised, nuclear weapons is so great that this very
although some progress has been made by the effectiveness will make it less costly to defeat
RAND Corporation and by ORO. One major an opponent. This indeed might be so if
difficulty is that of making an adequate forecast delivery were unopposed and there were no
of costs and of tactical exchange rates; other strategic and tactical reaction to this threat.
difficulties are those concerned with human For example, if the Soviet Union were undo-
factors-in particular the levels of damage to fended against modern high- or low-altitude
populations, troops and economies, which bring bombers, then perhaps 100 bombers carrying
about defeat by a combination of physical thermonuclear weapons would be adequate to
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 40 42 44 46
YEAR
destroy the USSR. These might even be
bombers of a relatively obsolete type. Such a
bomber force could be supported at it cost of 2
to 3 billion dollars a year.
Unfortunately the universal reaction to the
delivery of atomic weapons has led to the
design of incredibly effective air defense systems.
These have now progressed to the point where
the forecast can be made that after paying a
certain admission price to establish warning
and control nets, the air attack, in order to
keep its ability to destroy, will be required to
spend between 2 to 10 dollars for every dollar
that is spent in the opposing air defense. Thus
in a symmetrical game of air attack-air defense
between the U. S. and the USSR, such as now
exists, the outcome will be determined by the
funds spent in the prior 6 years to establish
levels of attack and defense.
The lead time to bring an effective system
into being is of the order of 5 to 8 years, Thus
in this gaming the imprecise forecast, and there-
fore the gambles taken 6 to 8 years previously
and pursued vigorously, determines the out-
come of the combat at the time of war.
The rapid turnover of air weapons systems
shown in Fig. 4 illustrates the dynamic nature
of weapons systems and the rapid rate of
obsolescence. Figure 4 also illustrates the
increasing competitiveness of the Soviet Union
in the race for a modern air attack system.
Note that the Soviet lag, as in the Tu-4 to the
B-29, changed to a forecast lead for the
ICBM. A good part of Fig. 4, of course, is
based on intelligence information with respect
to USSR and U. S. weapons planning.
The nature of the relation between an air
defense budget in billions of (equivalent)
dollars on the one side and an air offense
budget in billions of (equivalent) dollars on
the other side with respect to the outcome of the
air battle is shown in Fig. 5. This applies
only to the battle between manned bombers of
the type shown in Fig. 2, and guided missiles
of the type now being installed by the U. S. and
the USSR. (By equivalent dollars is meant the
amount the U. S. would have to spend to produce
the given weapons systems. The conversion of
equivalent dollars to rubles is complicated not
only by the lack of free-currency exchange
ratios, but also by the fact that the ratios of
labor to capitalization are different in the U. S.
and the USSR. The USSR may to some
extent substitute labor for capitalization. The
uncertainties in the present analysis make
refinements of this sort unprofitable. It is
assumed here that equivalent dollars may be
X40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56
YEAR
Figure 2: Unit Costs of U, S, Heavy Bombers.
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 0 L
38
48
YEAR
converted to rubles by a ratio near that of the
diplomatic currency exchange. The uncer-
tainties of the methodology are thus pushed
back to a determination of the maximum
feasible "peacetime" military budget.)
The linearity of the relations in the main part
of these curves may be subject to refinement,
and even the slopes of the lines may be some-
what in error. One essential feature of these
illustrative curves is the threshold phenomenon
indicated by the horizontal segments at the
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lower ends. The exact nature of this threshold
phenomenon is but poorly known. The pres-
ence of these segments is due to the fact that
a minimum defense budget is required (for
radar systems, etc.) before any real protection
can be afforded and a minimum attack budget
is required before any appreciable damage can
be inflicted even on an undefended ZI. Incre-
ments to the offensive budget above the mini,
mum level produce an immediate appreciable
gain in damage until adequate defense above
 the threshold limit has been provided. The
slopes of the curves in Fig. 5 indicate that an
advantage of over 10 to I for the attack budget
over the defense budget is necessary to achieve
high probability of high damage to the ZI; on
the other hand, a defense budget half the
enemy's attack budget will give high probability
that little damage may be inflicted on the ZI
attacked.
In Fig 6 the relation between submarine and
antisubmarine budget is shown. The presence
of a nearly horizontal segment in the curve
giving high probability of controlling the sea
lanes again indicates that there is a minimum
defensive expenditure before control can be
assured even against light attacks.
On the other hand the curve delimiting mar-
ginal disruption of sea lanes crosses the hori-
zontal axis to the right of the origin, indicating
that sea attack must exceed certain minimum
levels before any appreciable effect can be
produced. The slopes of these curves indicate
that defense budgets must exceed 4.5 times
the attack budget to completely protect ship-
Tu?4(B?29)//
t-y B?36-
ping and maintain U. S. control of the seas,
provided the offensive budget exceeds the
threshold. Moreover, the defense budget must
exceed 3 times the budget for the offense to
maintain even marginal control of shipping
lanes and the ground war in Europe or the
Soviet periphery.
In Fig. 7 the relation between opposing
ground forces is shown. For these curves, it
is postulated on a relatively inadequate basis
that for equal budgets land-combat effective-
ness is approximately the same on both sides,
averaged over a war. Under this assumption
equal budgets lead to stalemate, whereas an
advantage of 3 to 2 in favor of either side
leads to a reasonably high probability of
victory. Whether there is a threshold effect
for this latter case is debatable. Any such
threshold would be relatively small ($0.4
billion, say) and has been neglected here.
An implication of the preceding illustrative
curves is that to ensure U. S. victory, including
heavy damage to Soviet PVO, adequate pro-
tection of U. S. ZI, victory in the European and
I- 39(B?47)
/ I \
/ I B.52 -7---
\E- ICBM -
1< 37(B?52)
ICBM -
-f --- B-50
B?29
I I I
I I I 1 1
56 58 60 62 64 66
YEAR
 Co
3 0 2 / 1 u
(heavy (moderate (light as
damage) ?3 damage) / damage) ,dA
/ ;.
-0
o
0
9.
/ a
r Q (essentially
.a no damage)
e r
a / ~o
6 / ?c
3 / 3
/ o
>a / 'a
0
JI /
01 1 I (
0 I
I
10 20 30
AIR DEFENSE BUDGET, BILLIONS OF (EQUIVALENT) DOLLARS
Figure S.-Relation between Air Attack and Air Defense Budgets. (The numbers Identify the regions designated in the
game matrix results in Appendix A. The bend in the curses for lower budgets Indicates the minimum effectiyq
offense and defense budgets-or "threshold effect.")
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
SECRET
I I I I I I
10 20 30
USSR SEA ATTACK BUDGET, BILLIONS OF (EQUIVALENT) DOLLARS
Figure 6,-Relation between Sea Attack and Defense Budgets. (The dotted lines and numbers Identify the regions used
for scoring the games in Appendix A.)
 10 20
USSR GROUND BUDGET, BILLIONS OF (EQUIVALENT) DOLLARS
Figure 7.-Relation between Ground Budgets. (The doffed lines and numbers Identify the regions and scoring of the games
In Appendix A.)
 peripheral ground wars, and complete suprem-
acy at sea with unchallengeable control of
shipping lanes, the U. S. budget should cover
SAC forces exceeding the Soviet air defense
budget by a ratio of 10 to 1, an air defense
budget exceeding 0.5 times the Soviet LRAA
(Long-Range Air Army) budget, an army
budget exceeding 1.5 times the Soviet army
budget, and a sea defense budget exceeding 4.5
times the Soviet submarine budget. A Russian
budget of any specified size is thus most
effective if most heavily concentrated on sub-
marines and least heavily on SAC. On the
other hand, if the U. S. were content to maintain
the status quo and merely defend with a smaller
budget, the U. S. air defense budget should
exceed 0.5 times the Russian SAC budget and
the naval budget should exceed the Russian
submarine budget by a factor of about 3
to 1, Again the Russians can best force a
larger U. S. budget by concentrating largely on
naval forces. The advantage of air defense
expenditures over air offense expenditures
makes for stalemate (easy parity) in the air
battle or for a quick surprise attack with
Trojan-horse tactics. Thus in searching for
good strategies, the most attractive budgets
tend to be balanced-or are even slightly
directed toward predominantly naval
expenditures.
The general conclusions based on the slopes
and shapes of the assumed curves, imprecise
and inaccurate though they may be,. can be
further explored by simple military-economic
games, as indicated in the matrix of cases
tabulated in Appendix A. Such games can
be established to determine whether or not the
best solution for the U. S. lies in a high, inter-
mediate, or very low budget, and to determine
the general nature of these budgets.
The proposed model would consist of a
symmetrical air attack-air defense model with
exchange rates based on Fig. 5; included in
the air offense budget would be the use of Navy
and Air Force strategic delivery. That other
part of the naval effort that is concerned with
transportation of the Army overseas and with
amphibious landings could be allocated to
land-war budget. The relative exchange rates
shown in Fig. 6 relate to the USSR attempt
to prevent transport of U. S. forces overseas
and the attempt by the U. S. to counteract and
eliminate Soviet attack. Accepting these
relations, then, one plays a set of military-
economic games with different budgets on the
U. S. and Soviet sides.
For illustrative purposes these games have
been played with the budgets ranging from $3
billion to $80 billion in ratios from 4:1 to 1:4.
For budgets sufficiently above the threshold
levels the ratios are most important. The game
matrices are illustrated in Appendix A, where
various combinations of U. S. and USSR budgets
of fixed amounts are compared. A "good"
strategy for each side is then selected according
to the minimax game principle based on
subjective estimates of the values of the
outcomes.
Four striking sets of facts tend to emerge
from these games:
First, by expanding reasonable funds on air
defense it is relatively easy to achieve an
atomic stalemate in which neither side can
make effective use of strategic delivery of
thermonuclear weapons.
Second, the pay-offs have an antisymmetry
(introduced principally by the naval exchange
ratios) favoring the USSR for low budgets,
and to a lesser extent favoring the USSR for
high budgets in ratios from 2 (U. S.) to 1 (USSR)
on through those of high USSR budget ratios.
Considering that the maximum budget in a
cold war condition (without decreasing cap-
italization rates) that either side may expend on
defense is much greater for U. S. than USSR,
the high U. S. budget expenditure gives the U. S.
its most advantageous position vis-d-vis USSR.
These conclusions (as implication of the ex-
change ratios of Figs. 5, 6, and 7) are illustrated
in Fig. 8, where the outcomes resulting from the
good strategies are plotted. The contours of
equivalent results have been constructed from
the outcomes for specific budgets, where each
 1951
IP51
rubles,
billions I
dollars,
billions'
1948-_________
66.
1
66. 3
85. 0
1949___________
79.
1
70.2
1950___________
79.
4
82. 9
1951___________
96.
4
93. 4
1952___________
113.
8
108. 6
1953___________
110.
2
P)
1954___-___-__
100.
3
(s)
127. 0
23. 8
1955___________
112.
1
(a)
136.0
1956___________
4 110 to 115
(')
I Ruble figures do not include hidden or undisclosed
defense expenditures.
' Dollar figures include hidden expenditures.
' Not announced.
' Estimated.
TABLE 2.-U. S. Gross National Product and Yearly
Defense Expenditures (Unclassified)
[Billions of dollars]
side is assumed to follow the "good" strategy
selected from a game matrix like that in Appen-
dix A.
Third, extreme strategies of the type "put-
ting all the eggs into one basket" tend to be
dangerous strategies easily countered by a
balanced force on the other side.
Fourth, that advantage for the U. S. is not
achieved at low budgets until complete dis-
armament is approached.
The recent estimated budgets of the two
countries are shown in Tables 1 to 3. An
estimate of the maximum defense budget each
side is willing and able to expend under cold-
war conditions is subject to many uncertainties.
It is considered that this maximum would not
interfere with the present rate of capitalization,
but would result from decreasing civilian con-
sumption and (for U. S.) achieving a maximum
of production per unit capitalization. These
maxima are estimated to be about $60 billion
for U. S. and about $30 billion (equivalent) for
the USSR. These estimates are given here more
for illustrative purposes. The consequences of
these limits can be seen from Fig. 8.
These figures are not firm estimates of maxi-
mum capability. The $30 billion figure for
the Soviet Union represents the Middle of a
SECRET
1956'__
40.5
8
.85
16.
6
9.70
1955'__
' 3S0
40.6
8
. 90
15.
2
0. 78
1954___
360.5
46.5
12
. 91
15.
7
11. 29
1953___
364.6
5
0.3
16
. 24
16.
1
11, 88
1952___
345. 2
4
3.8
15
. 63
12.
8
10. 10
1951___
328.2
2
2.3
7
. 47
6.
35
6, 58
1950---
285.1
1
3.0
3
. 99
3.
60
4, 10
1949--
257.3
1
2.9
5
.24
1.
76
4.89
1948 ---
257.3
I
t. 8
6.
34
1,
12
4, 20
1947___
232.2
1
4.4
6.28
(point Ar
and Al')
my
5. 50
Extrapolated values based on 1953 maximum
defense expenditures
_--___ ______-
' 425 n ax.
max.
"Survey of Current Business" (National Incomo
Number), July 1955.
The Budget of the United States, RY 195a,
Estimated.
USSR:
Consumption --------
Government_________
Investment__________
Defense_____________
U. S.:
Consumption--------
Government ---------
Investment ----------
Defense_____________
range of USSR defense expenditure estimates
for 1955 and 1956 increased approximately 5
percent annually until 1060 to suggest a rather
optimistic rate of growth in national product.'
The working figure of $60 billion for the U. S.
relied on both an extrapolation of the trend of
' CIA/RR 23 (ORR Project 26-52-I), "The Economy
of the Soviet Bloc: Production Trends and 1067 Poten-
tial," 20 May 1953.
 C' V
. _E
c 3- oos
d`a._L`o Ly
cn D~ ~a
iE oo p o
Cko $ ooE
p X. .oo e~
lno? 0
tooz d w~r~ alndt0sm to u5S4y pV
us meSto`o5 sea and 9soun O fib oaesd? doma9?
US con cois6\ castrol sea and 9soduc8 m
US con 10:1
us dominates all offensive
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
US MILITARY BUDGET, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Figure 8.-Results of Best Strategies on Both Sides in Illustrative Game,
the GNP through 1960 (Table 2) and an esti-
mate of 1960 gross national product amounting
to $425 billion.' This defense expenditure
would amount to about 15 percent of the esti-
mated GNP, the same relation that existed
between the two quantities in 1953, the year
of highest defense expenditure in peacetime.
The $54 billion USSR defense Expenditure in
1054, from which the $30 billion was extrap-
olated, constituted about 20 percent of the
Soviet budget in that year. There is some
reason to believe, however, that the CIA esti-
mate of Soviet product considerably overesti-
2 CJ. Gerhard Cohn. The American Economy in 1960,
National Planning Association, pp. 30-42,
mates the true picture. It should be empha-
sized that the $30 billion figure is used for illus-
trative purposes only, but the uncertainty over
the proper figure to use serves to point out the
necessity for a more convincing estimate.
It is recognized that these particular games
represent only a mockup or simulation of more
accurate informative and extensive games that
might be played in order to determine the best
strategy for the U. S. This kind of qualitative
analysis is a form of operational gaming, and
to be meaningful requires a more accurate
determination of the economic and military
bounds of the U. S. and the Soviet Bloc. It can
be seen that if the economic capability of the
SECRET
 Soviet Bloc can be established at a particularly
low level, this provides the U. S. with the unique
opportunity to outgame the Soviet in a military
economic sense and therefore to deal with it
out of a real strength-Air, Navy, and Army
budgets being equally critical.
From the same argument it is clear that if
the Soviet Union recognizes the nature of this
game it should make a maximum attempt to
bring about a world-wide reduction of military
budgets to the lower level, where it will have a
superiority.
The difficulties in determining the gross
national product of the Soviet Union and the
U. S. are apparent to anyone attempting to
make this estimate. A reasonably accurate
estimate of gross national product and estimate
of the Soviet military budget including break-
down by services must be determined before
significant results can be obtained through this
kind of analysis, since this is critical to the
level of the U. S. budget if war is to be deterred.
Even more important, a rough analysis of the
input-output systems of the two economies is
required. An analysis of such input-output
systems sufficient for this kind of gaming could
be established, but so far as is known this has
not been adequately done. It is also clear
that the present cursory attempt to establish
military models, especially for exchange rates,
is not adequate, but it is considered that such
models (which could be crude and aggregated
for the purposes of this kind of gaming) could
be designed on the basis of existing knowledge
in the military establishments.
In view of the importance of air defense in
this gaming, the effectiveness of air defense
for the continental U. S. and NATO is dis-
cussed in Appendices B and C.
The results of the illustrative games are
strongly dependent on the military-economic
exchange ratios. Obviously these will not be
static quantities; they will constantly change
with the technological evolution of the weapons
systems. The exchange ratios illustrated in
Figs. 5 and 6 are consistent with the prognosis
for the immediate future (1960-1962), assuming
SECRET
that the U. S. as well as the USSR can have
adequate air defenses by this period. When
the ICBM becomes operational the great ad-
vantage of air defense over air attack will be
lost, and the situation with respect to the air
battle will revert to that which has existed
in the immediate past. When the air attack
is favored, the good strategies lead to high air-
attack budgets; when the air defense is favored
the good strategies lead to balanced or even
low air-attack budgets with higher ground and
naval budgets. Not only will the situation
with respect to budget strategies be changed,
but also it is predicted to swing much more
favorably for the Soviet Bloc. For the
period when the USSR has ICBM and the
U. S. does not (1962-1964), the air offensive
will be dominated by the enemy until the U. S.
Bloc can restore parity by making its own
ICBM operational.
V. CONCLUSIONS
1. High-level military budgets provide a far
more favorable chance for the U. S. to win and
a far greater deterrent to war in it conflict
between the U. S, and the USSR than lower
budgets.
2. The Soviet Union at intermediate and
lower budgets would have a relative advantago
and therefore would tend to attempt to bring
about sufficient reductions in world armaments
to bring their system into a favorable zone of
competition.
S. In order to get a good estimate of a
relatively favorable military budget for the
U. S. an input-output analysis for the Soviet
Bloc and the U. S. Bloc is required. Such
an analysis is feasible and could be relatively
crude.
4. An aggregated military model designed in
terms of economic parameters is also required
in order to obtain useful results. Such a model
could be constructed on the basis of existing
information.
5. Only complete disarmament in offensive
 weapons systems approaches a high-level budget
system in relative advantage to the U. S.
6. Intermediate-level military budgets are
regarded as especially dangerous to the U. S.,
and care should be taken to achieve either a
high military budget or complete disarmament
with a minimum of time of transition through
intermediate budget levels. In fact until such
a time as the U. S. is completely assured of the
good intentions of the Soviet Union, it would be
extremely dangerous to consider a prolonged
transition from high budget levels to complete
disarmament.
7. The NSC could make a sufficiently ac-
curate analysis, of the type described herein,
by a cooperative effort of existing agencies.
8. Research and development needs to be
kept at a high level in order to prevent
establishment of an unfavorable tactical ex-
change rate for the U. S., with the resulting
unfavorable effect on the budget required to
maintain deterrence. The U. S, should seek
through research and development to correct
the unfavorable exchange ratio between the
enemy naval attack and the U. S. defense. The
U. S. should seek to maintain a favorable ex-
change for air defense (or air counterattack)
over enemy air attack, particularly with
respect to ICBNI.
9. The U. S. air defense budget requires
the most immediate and urgent national
attention.
VI, RECOMMENDATIONS
Consideration should be given to making an
analysis of the relative U. S. advantage of
military budgets at various levels and at
various future times, and of the land, sea, and
air offense and defense budgets most suited to
provide the greatest deterrent against war.
 Paper 11:
Appendix A
Results of Illustrative Game
This appendix contains the working sheets
for the outcomes of the illustrative game. To
emphasize the game character of the problem,
and to organize the results, the outcomes have
been laid out in rectangular matrices. Because
of the simple linear nature of the assumed
curves of exchange ratios, much of the results
can also be obtained analytically.
The selection of the "good" strategies-that
is, the combination of strategies when each
side is pursuing his preferred strategy-depends
not only on the outcomes but also on a sub-
jective estimate of the relative preference
among the alternatives.
Each budget mix for the U. S. must be selected
in the absence of information concerning that
mix-or even that budget-selected by the
USSR. These uncertainties led to conservation
and to more nearly equal mixes.
The outcomes are coded according to the
code numbers on Figs. 5, 6, and 7, which plot
the exchange ratios for air attack-air defense,
U. S. sea defense-USSR sea attack, and ground
interaction, respectively.
The outcomes based on these approximate
and illustrative curves imply that the U. S,, even
for budget ratios twice as great as that for the
USSR, could have its sphere of influence re-
duced to that of the North American continent,
if challenged, in the period when the weapons
systems described are in effect.
The games illustrated here far from exhaust
the investigation of possible strategies. How-
ever, for budgets above $20 billion (effective)
the outcomes and relative budget mixes are
determined more by the budget ratios than by
their absolute values.
Outcomes are coded in Table Al according
to code numbers in Figs. 5 to 7. The figures in
parentheses at the top of each box give the out-
comes of the air battles (see Fig. 5); the first
number being the effect on the U. S., the second
the effect on the USSR. The number 3 repre-
sents high probability of heavy damage, 2 an
expectation of moderate damage, 1 of light
damage. Thus the combination (2, 1) repre-
sents moderate damage to U. S. expected, but
only light damage to USSR. The number in
the middle gives the probable result of the
ground battle (see Fig. 7), where the interpre-
tation is as follows: 2, U. S. wins; 1, U. S. can
possibly win; 0, indeterminate; -1, USSR can
possibly win; -2, USSR wins ground battle.
Whenever a ground outcome favorable to the
U. S. but a Navy outcome unfavorable to the
U. S. is indicated, the number is put in parenthe-
ses, indicating that the ground battle can be
lost from lack of capability of LofC. The Navy
outcomes are coded according to Fig. 6, where,
the interpretation is: 2, U. S. controls seas; 1,
U. S. can achieve local control of seas; 0, inde-
terminate; -1, USSR can deny local areas of
sea to U. S.; -2, USSR controls seas. Prefer-
able strategies (in judgment of the writer) are
indicated by ellipses.
 ILLUSTRATIVD GAME)
Table Al
$3 billion
35 billion
(equivalent)
(equivalent)
V
.3
2.0
LO
2.0
2.0
B.Q
1.0
0:5
OS
LO
2:0
0.2
0.5
1.0
15
?
Air Atk .5
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
o
Air Del 2.0
ground .2
0
-2
.-2
-2
.?j
Navy .3
0
0
0
a
Air Atk 2.0
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
Air Del 2:0
Ground OS
0
0
-2
+-2 S
Navy 0.5
0
0
0
0
AirAtk1.0
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
Air Del2.0
Ground 1.0
2
2
0
=2
Navy 1.0
1
0
0
-2
0
Air Atk .5
(0,0)
(00)
Air Dal 1.0
Ground 2:0
(::2
2
2
0
Navy 1:5
0
0
0
US Preferre
Strata
Air Atk .3
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0.0)
(OM
Air Del 1.0
Ground 1.5
2
2
2
Navy 2.2
0
0
0
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
S7R.
t5 billion
410 billion
.budgets
N
(equivalent)
'(egdnleol)
.Air Ark
2.0
0.5
0.5
4.0
3,0
-0.5
03
03
4
Air Del
2.0
1.0
3.0
8.0
'3.0
3.11
8.0
2$
8.7
US Ground
0.5
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
:3:0
2.0
4.0
3.4
budgets Navy
03
1.5
OA
2.0
2.0,
33
.43
3,0
2.6
Alr 4&kt2.0
($ ,0)
(0,0)
(0,0) .
(O,0)
(0,0)
(010)
Air. W-2.0
Ground 0'3
-2
'2
w
-2 b
-2
-2
-2
Navy 05
-2
-2
-2 rn
0
-2
-2
-2
9
m -Atk 1.0
(2,0)
-(0,D)
(0,0)
(0.0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
Air.))ef 2.0
Ground.1.0
(0)
-2
.?.
-2 $j
-2
-2
-2
S4
Navy 1.0
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
. Air. Atk .3
05
C
(,Q)
(3,0)
(0,4)
(U0)
(0,0)
AirDel 1.0
3:0
ea
0:5
(2')
-1
rq
-2 YJ
-1
-2
-2
Ground 1,5
Sbgtegy
-2
-2
,
-2
-2
-2
-2
Navy 2.2
1.0
Air Atk A.0
. (0;2)
(013
(0,0)
(0,0)
oa~
(0,0)
(010)
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
Air Dof 8.0
Grouodl.0
2
-2
0
0
-2
-2
-2
-2
2
Navy 2.0
.
+2
-2
-2
-2
-3
-2
-2
+-2
2
S Air
Offene
Air Atk3.6
(0,0)
'(0,8)
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)?
(0,01
(0,0).
(0,0)
(0,0)
Air Def'3.0
Ground 2
0
2
(0)
?
(2)
(2)
tr
a
-2
(0)
-2
w
.
Wavy 2.0
-2
2i
-2-
-2
2 ?
-2
r2
-2
Air Atk 0.5
0,0
O,U
US
steered Str
0.
gy
Air. Del 3.0
2
(2)
E11
2
(2)
-1
Gmund.3,0
Navy .3:5
2
+2
-2
1
-1
L-2
-2
-2
-2
USGro
d Olfene[v
tegy
 Usm
W11.
320 billion (equivalent)
$40 billion (equivalent)
Al, Aik
(0
2
5
4
4
4
4
4
10 5
10
l0
ES
AG Def
2
10
5
4
4
4
S
5
10 5
5
5
12
US Gourd
4
4
S
10
2
7
7
8
10 5
5
(5
0
bad a Navy
4
4
5
2
10
5
4
3
10 25
20
10
5
Air Auk 10
(3,3)
,0
(2+,1)
(2,1+)
(2,1+)
(2,I+
(2,1)
(2,1)
(3,0) (2+,1)
(3,1)
(3,0)
Al, Daf 2
Ground 4
0
0
0-
-2
(2)
-2
-2
-2
-2 0-
o-
-2
-2
Navy 4
-2
-2
-2
-1
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2 -2
-2
-2
-2
Ak Ask 2
,31
(0,0
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,0)
qo)
(01
10) 010)
0,0
0.0)
010
Air Oaf 10
12
1
Preferre
Strategy
U5 P
oIerr.d S
i stogy
Ground 4
0
0
O
0-
-2
(2)
-2
-2
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 USSR
$20. billion
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Paper 11:
Appendix B
Defense of Continental U. S. Against Air Attack
(Because of its security classification, this paper is not included in this volume, It may be
obtained on a "need-to-know" basis from the Director, Operations Research Office, Johns Hop-
kins University, Washington, D. C.) .
SECRET
 SECRET
Paper 11:
Appendix C
Defense of NATO Against Air Attack
1. CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE OF Europe by time and distance. The most
NATO promising air defense system must be based on
The current military posture of NATO has surface-to-air missiles. Of these, NIKE is
an especially crucial aspect: the feasibility of currently available and offers in being a weapon
obtaining an adequate defense of Western that can at once supplement existing weapons
Europe against airborne nuclear attack by and serve as the nucleus from which a high-
1958-60. level defense system can be evolved,
This aspect of U. S. military policy is held to A level of defense sufficient to render the
be crucial for one outstanding reason-the cost of an air assault nearly prohibitive and
viability of the NATO alliance depends on the give visible evidence of a modern delouse in
willingness of the people of Western Europe to being could be achieved by the employment of
face up to the fearful implications of modern 81 NIKE battalions in Western Europe,
war. There are of course other reasons, among Greece, Turkey, and North Africa,
them the necessity for defending U. S. andAllied The initial over-all cost would approximate
bases, lines of communication, and ports $2.2 billion, of which the U. S, would probably
against air attack. But since these purely bear about $1.5 billion, Annual operating
military considerations would be of little costs after installation would total $240 mil-
moment should the NATO alliance fail, major lion, of which the U. S. share would amount to
attention has been directed to the question of $100 million.
Western European morale. L7?om these conclusions it is proposed that
It has been concluded that by 1958-60, immediate steps should be taken to obtain
through an accelerated surface-to-air guided- approval for and direct the implementation
missile production and training program, all of all requisite actions to effect the deployment
antiair defense system could be erected that of NIKE B guided-missile battalions for use
would render an air assault on Western Europe in the air defense of NATO Europe,
very costly and, more importantly, would give
the people of that area visible assurance that
they were not to be left to bear the brunt of if ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
nuclear attack. A program capable of effect- In the absence of clear assurance that tho
ing a very high level of defense, although desir- current policy of nuclear retaliation would in
able, is probably not feasible within the given fact be decisive in the event of war, and in the
time frame, However, a "high level" defense face of possible stalemate or neutralization, the
is not absolutely essential to achieve the pri- role of land armies in Europe cannot be disre-
mary objective,
specifically garded. In the initial phase of it general war
-lore it is concluded that current the principal NATO strength on the ground
and projected NATO defensive measures are necessarily would be the armies of Western
inadequate to meet the magnitude of the Europe.
known air attack threat and that manned Thus the validity of current national policy
interceptors alone are inherently incapable of rests in large measure on the will to light of the
meeting it under the limitations imposed in people of Western Europe, Not only is their
SECRET (126)
 military contribution to NATO land power at
stake; equally important is the safety of
United States forces committed in Europe at
the outbreak of hostilities. Defection of one
or more allies would weaken already inade-
quate land forces, would threaten Unitee
States lines of communication, and would posd
the possibility of internment of those U. S.
troops in, or dependent for escape on passage
through, the defected country.
Without seeking to bring into question the
soundness of existing policy, there must be
emphasized the possibility that the air cam-
paign might be stalemated, or prove indeci-
sive, or be prohibited by exigencies that may
be conjectured but not predicted. In any
eventuality, NATO military success and the
political and economic survival of the NATO
nations would necessarily depend on the
ability and willingness of all members of the
alliance to continue an initially unfavorable
contest on land.
The foregoing considerations relate to possi-
bilities in case of actual war. They bear with
equal or greater force on any period of tension
preceding war or the imminent probability of
war.
Terrible as the threat of nuclear devastation
may appear to the people of the U.S., it is even
more fearful to the people of Western Europe.
Distance and time limits the numbers of bomb-
carriers that may be directed against the
North American continent; Western Europe is
within range of literally thousands of aircraft
capable of carrying nuclear weapons. From the
standpoint of morale, the question of long-
range surface-to-surface missiles, aside from
the technological aspects of attack and defense,
falls into the identical frame of reference. In
the course of development of such missiles
there is precedent for the assumption that mis-
siles capable of reaching Western Europe
targets would precede those capable of attack-
ing targets in the Western Hemisphere,
These facts, magnified by apprehension that
is in turn magnified by propaganda and sensa-
tionalism in politics and journalism, are very
real to the people of Western Europe. They
are complicated both in immediacy and magni-
tude by the publicity given the probable
destructiveness of nuclear weapons. As reports
of more powerful bombs (in being or projected)
and the lethality and inescapability of fall out
reach the people of Western Europe, it is not
unreasonable to suspect that their apprehen-
sions must approach the proportions of genuine
psychosis. Much of what the people of
Western Europe believe may be fantastically
unrealistic, but these beliefs influence their
actions, and upon their actions depends in
large measure the viability of the NATO
alliance. It hardly comports with logic to
expect already war-weary people to achieve
unanimity in accepting certain death as the
price of a freedom that even their children would
not live to enjoy.
Yet all these people except the British have
tasted. dictatorship in recent years. Some-
where between the extremes of resignation to
atomic obliteration and resignation to slavery
lies a mean on which all could rest in hope and
relief. The most acceptable moan, of course,
would be a state of world peace, whether
attained by good will or by a firm stalemate in
military power. If the possibility of war must
be accepted and lived with, the alternative
mean appears to be a defense against the
delivery of nuclear weapons sufficient to
promise each man a bettor chance of survival.
The importance of the hope and promise of
an adequate defense cannot be too strongly
stressed. Whatever decisions the people of
Western Europe may make in the event of war,
these will rest on foundations laid before war
begins. People convinced prior to war that
resistance is synonymous with annihilation
could hardly be expected to put their conviction
to the test. Conversely, people convinced
that defense against nuclear devastation is
possible, and confronted with the physical
evidence of such a defense in being, should be
more ready to risk the chances of war.
It must be assumed that these considerations
are not obscure to the enemy. They provide
 him with a psychological weapon of such
importance that its application may well
determine the alignment of forces against him
and even the course of a war. This weapon is
atomic blackmail.
To undefended people the threat of nuclear
bombing as the alternative to deserting the
NATO alliance must be persuasive indeed.
Such a threat might be preceded by sample
attacks on a few chosen cities, though the
genuine fear of undefended people would seem
to render such tactics hardly necessary-the
threat alone should suffice.
Since it would appear to be in the interest of
the Soviet Union to restrict warfare to a contest
on land with more or less "conventional"
means, consideration must be given to Russia's
capability of using atomic blackmail to achieve
this result. A land assault in Europe, ac-
companied by a declaration that the USSR
would not use nuclear weapons unless the U, S.
initiated their use and that retaliation would
be against the major cities of Europe, could
place the U. S. in a dangerously equivocal
position. Should this form of blackmail
succeed, the U. S. would be faced with the
choice of abandoning long-range air warfare in
favor of an unequal contest on the ground or of
withdrawing from Europe and conducting an
intercontinental war of attrition from its own
final base.
One countermeasure for this sort of black-
mail is the establishment of a reasonably
adequate antiair defense of Western Europe in
time to forestall the contingencies cited above.
The problem is simplified in heavily populated
Europe by the proximity of population centers
and most military targets, Thus defense of
populations and defense of military targets will
in many cases coincide, with consequent reduc-
tion in the requirement for defensive in-
stallations,
The necessity for providing an antiair defense
of military installations in addition to that in
support of the integrity of the NATO alliance
must be considered. Without such a defense,
no war in Europe would be possible, whether
SECRET
or not the NATO alliance remains intact, An
air attack against enemy bases, whether
offensive or defensive in purpose, would be
severely handicapped, if not impossible, with-
out secure and protected NATO bases. No
land army could fight for long at the end of
lines of communication under constant inter-
diction by nuclear weapons. Nor might the
latter consideration be material if a surprise
attack disrupted NATO command echelons
and decimated NATO troop units at the outset.
Although attention has been focused here
on one weapon system and to a lesser extent
on one weapon, there has been no intent to
suggest that this weapon system necessarily
would supplant any or all others. It is regarded
as a valuable, even essential, addition to the
antiair defense of Western Europe.
It should fill a gap now existing between the
capabilities of interceptor aircraft and AA
artillery, while performing more effectively
some of the functions of both.
It should provide useful augmentation, em-
ployed in its surface-to-surface role, to the air
attack on enemy bomber and missile bases, thus
favorably influencing the exchange of nuclear
stockpiles.
Its release to the armies of friendly nations
should stimulate missile R&D in the labo-
ratories of friendly nations and ultimately
should lesson the cost burden on the U. S.
through indigenous production,
More immediately, its presence on site, as a
product of dynamic science, should go far to
reassure the people of friendly Europe that
they have not been forgotten in the titanic
implications of nuclear warfare.
Available estimates of Soviet Bloc air
strength leave little doubt of the enemy's
ability to deliver an air attack capable of over-
whelming defenses now in being and projected
for the period 1968-60. Pertinent estimates
follow;
(a) The Soviet Bloc during the period will
Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
 possess a total of approximately 18,000
military aircraft, of which not less than
6,200 will be bombers.
(b) Bases will be available within range
of NATO targets for approximately 2,800
light bombers and approximately 4,650 fight-
ers, exclusive of interceptors for the defense
of Soviet Bloc territory.
(c) By 1958-60 the Soviet Union is be-
lieved capable of producing nuclear weapons
adapted in size and weight to delivery by
fighter aircraft.
(d) By 1958 fighters capable of carrying
low-yield nuclear weapons will be available.
Employed as bomb-carriers, these aircraft
would be reduced in range to an estimated
70 to 100 nautical miles. It appears,, there-
fore, that their use as bomb-carriers neces-
sarily would be limited almost exclusively to
short-range tactical missions in support of
ground forces.
(e) The Soviet Union during the period
will have developed not only improved ver-
sions of the V-1 and V-2 missiles but a super-
sonic missile with a range estimated at 880
nautical miles.
Of the 18,000 aircraft expected to be available
to the Soviet Bloc, 3,600 to 3,800 will be light
bombers (11-28 and an improved successor) and
10,000 to 12,000 will be fighters. The latter,
including both fighter-bombers and intercept-
ors, will consist almost exclusively of MiG-17s
and a new aircraft capable of performing as
a day or all-weather fighter according to con-
figuration.
The number of aircraft actually available for
attack on NATO targets would be limited pri-
marily by the capacity of Soviet Bloc bases
within range. A second limitation would be
imposed by the magnitude of logistical prepa-
rations for attack as a factor affecting surprise.
An attack by aircraft normally assigned to
bases within range of NATO targets could be
carried out with little or no advance warning
of its imminence. Any material increase in
the light-bomber strength within range, or
preparations to stage large numbers of aircraft
through forward bases, probably could not
escape detection and evaluation as an indication
of Soviet intention to attack.
The probability of success in an initial attack
would be so nearly in direct ratio to the degree
of surprise that it is hardly conceivable that the
enemy would deliberately sacrifice surprise
except to gain some greater advantage. No
such greater advantage can now be envisaged
except the possible one of attack in overwhelm-
ing numbers. Aircraft normally within range
of NATO targets would themselves constitute
overwhelming strength against currently pro-
jected defenses. In addition an obvious build-
up for attack might provoke preventive strikes
by NATO air forces. It appears, therefore,
that the logical Soviet course would be to attack
with those aircraft initially within range, stag-
ing aircraft forward for successive attacks to
the extent that logistical support could be
maintained.
On this basis the Soviet Bloc would have
available 1,410 light bombers for the initial
attack on targets in Western Europe without
prior redeployment of aircraft. These light
bombers would be capable of reaching targets
in all but minor fragments of NATO Europe
from their home bases, 720 returning to those
bases and 690 returning to fighter bases near
the border. Additional light bombers would
be available for follow-up strikes by staging
the number dependent on the extent to which
supplies, especially POL, could have been stock-
piled at staging bases without compromising
surprise.
For attacks on Turkey and Greece, an esti-
mated 670 light bombers would be available
without prior redeployment of aircraft. Thus
an estimated total of 2,080 light bombers could
be committed in the initial assault without
telegraphing the attack by unusual activity
at bases.
In all the foregoing instances, aircraft
available must be multiplied by a factor of 0.70
to 0.75 to account for those temporarily out of
commission. Of those available and sortied,
another 5 percent or more may be expected to
 s
tt
Soviet intentions with rested ko any light on the complete air-do1, ors fensotn lo a for to Wporfo 11
P Missile de- Europe. o
ostorn
abort. Therefore 1,400 to 1,500 of the estimated velopment, and no definite numbers availability
2,080 light bombers available may be accepted has as yet been established.
as representing the magnitude of the actual
initial threat.
Fighter support of these light-bomber strikes, IV. DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS
exclusive of interceptor defense of Soviet Bloc
territory, could be provided by an estimated Within the next 10 years the major weapons
3,290 aircraft without prior deployment. In systems that are in being now, or will come into
addition to limited support by short-range being as fully operational defensive units, are
nuclear bomb delivery, these fighters would be manned interceptors and four families of
available for escort, gunfire, rocket, and light surface-to-air missiles. The latter are NIKE,
bombing attacks on NATO bases, and as decoys TALOS, BOMARO, and a system that could
to degrade NATO early-warning and target- be evolved from the IIAWK I weapon, which
acquisition radar. Support for light bombers shall be designated herein as the IIAW.IC-typo
attacking targets in Greece and Turkey could weapon.
be provided by an estimated 1,360 fighters Obviously defense of NATO would not be
without prior redeployment. This over-all carried. out with any single weapons system,
total of 4,650 must be degraded not only by the Several weapon typos are required, each with
availability and abort factors cited above but its own sot of advantages and disadvantages,
also by the requirement for close support of To develop a nearly uniform capability against
Soviet Bloc land forces should the air attack be the various possible attack strategics and
accompanied by a simultaneous assault on land. tactics, it is essential that the defense be a
Even in the latter event some portion of the mixture of weapons. On the obhor bland
ground support interdiction campaign no doubt availability of the various weapons systems is
would be directed against targets whose destruc- not the same; thus the best air defense cannot
tion would result in concurrent support of the be achieved all at once. For the purposes
air campaign. already examined the NIKE system is the
In addition to its capability for nuclear obvious choice, principally because of its
attack by manned aircraft, the Soviet Union availability. Features of the NIKE system
may he expected to have operational by the will be examined briefly:
period under consideration several surface-to- Conditions of space and time prevailing in
surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear Europe place serious limitations on the efPoc-
warheads. At the present time, improved tiveness of manned interceptors. Of the 26
versions of the V-1 cruise-type and the V-2 aircraft assigned to the interceptor squadron,
ballistic missile are believed operational. The 17 are ordinarily considered to be on ready
known Soviet concentration on ballistic rather status. Of these, 4 are on 5-min alert, 4 on
than cruise-type missiles leads to the estimate 25-min alert, 4 on 50-min alert and 5 on 2- to
that a further improvement of the V-2, the G-2 3-hr alert. Under the conditions of warning
type With a range of 340 nautical miles, is now time available or planned for most of Europe
in process of phasing out earlier models. By it is apparent that only the aircraft on 5-min
1957 it is expected the USSR will have opera- alert could be involved in the air battle, or 10
tional a single-stage ballistic missile with a percent of each squadron. In some areas a Low
range of 880 nautical miles and a CEP of 3.5 of the aircraft on 25-min alert could be engaged.
nautical miles.
It trust be emphasized that information This handicap alone, regardless of other limita-
currently available throw
l lions, renders intorco
1'
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
V. NIKE
This weapon, the first in the U. S. guided-
missile systems, already is operational in
continental defense. It has a maximum range
of approximately 25 nautical miles and can
engage targets up to altitudes of 60,000 feet,
traveling at velocities up to 1,200 miles per hour.
The time of flight varies from 90 seconds at
maximum range to 20 seconds at close range,
averaging roughly one missile per battery per
minute. Its single-shot kill probability has
been assessed at from 0.6 at close range to 0.2
at extreme range.
The first major modification of NIKE will be
conversion to NIKE B, a missile with it range
of 50 nautical miles and an altitude capability
of 80,000 feet. NIKE B will be capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead and may be
equipped with a seeker on which it would home
on its target in the final stage of flight. NIKE
B with conventional warhead is accorded a
single-shot kill probability of unity at close
range, dropping to 0.5 at maximum range.
The single-shot kill probability of NIKE B
with seeker installed should be unity at all
ranges. Equipped with a nuclear warhead, the
missile would inactivate any nuclear weapon
carried by the target,
The principal disadvantages of the NIKE
missile are its relatively low rate of fire and its
limited capability against targets at low
altitudes, features particularly important in
defending against saturation-types raids. It is
possible, however, that both capabilities of the
]NIKE system may be improved by already
known techniques.
In studies of missile effectiveness, many
simulated battle problems have, been run on
high-speed computers, The results of these,
while not put forward as definitive, at least
provide a basis for estimating the effectiveness
of a NIKE B defense of Western Europe.
Should 81 battalions be deployed in Europe, the
enemy loss before effective penetration of all
of the defended areas should total nearly 1,100
aircraft, or two-thirds of the light-bomber foea
initially available. With nuclear warheads Cho
131
cost to the enemy on the above basis should be
more than 1,400 aircraft, or very nearly 100
percent of his initial light-bomber striking force,
It is recognized that this effect is not of a high
order against the maximum threat including
ballistics missiles. With 300 battalions the ]till
would reach up to a minimum of 5,500 aircraft
with HE warheads. And, it is emphasized, the
NIIIE and other future SAM weapons alone
have a potential effectiveness against the ballistic-
missile threat.
VI. EMPLOYMENT OP NIKE
'19nc method adopted for determining the
best employment of guided missiles in the air
defense of Western Europe proceeds from these
assumptions:
(a) The optimum air-defense sysboni nlti-
matoly will rely on surface-to-air guided
missiles as the principal ,kill'' weapons,
(b) An early start, on training personnel in
the developing electronics technology is
ossonknl.
(c) First stops needed to be taken at once,
fixing on the specific weapon that will be,
available within the pertinent Limo frame,
'Phe weapon that best meets these require-
ments is NIKE 13, which will have phased out
the present NIKE by bile time under considera-
tion. To arrive ab the best feasible deploy-
nnonL, a barrier two or tluco batteries deep was
erected along the East-West border. Than
protection was allocated to the principal popu-
lation-industrial cenLors, and finally batteries
Cuero assigned to U.S. SAO bases and other U, S.
military installations. The total is 81 bat-
talions, of which 51't would bo allotted to
defense on non-U. S. military and civilian tar-
gets, and 26.5 Lo U. S. installations, This total
is 75 more than the 6 battalions approved in
the Prose],b program for deployment to Europe.
This total is not presented as representing
an optinrun or adequate missile defense of
NATO Europe. It represents Clio deployment
believed to ho politically acceptablo in the U. S.
and at the same Limo sufliciontly effective to
SEORET
 render excessively costly an air attack on West-
ern Europe. The 54% battalions allotted to
non-U.S. targets are fewer than the 61 currently
approved for defense of the continental U. S.
Yet to the people of Western Europe they would
be tangible evidence of interest in their welfare
and, as representative of scientific achievement
dedicated to their defense, exert a psychological
influence far greater than their intrinsic military
worth.
To achieve an
Europe, as many as 300 NIKE battalions might
be required, a figure not believed attainable at
this time. It is true enough that 81 battalions
are not 300. But they are 81 more than none,
and the critical demand at the present time is
that something palpably reassuring be presented
to Western Europe as the alternative to sur-
render as the sole means of survival.
VII. PRODUCTION FEASIBILITY
Because of the magnitude of the threat, the
total NIKE B requirement for Europe would
be about 14,300 missiles, including a 20 percent
augmentation for reserve. Addition of 75 bat-
talions to the 79 currently planned would
present a requirement for 325 battery sets,
Neither the requirement for missiles nor
that for battery sets, which was considered
jointly with the U. S. requirement, could be met
at currently scheduled production rates within
the time limit under consideration. By some
minor shortening of lead times, increasing plant
shifts from one to three, and transfer to Char-
lotte Ordnance Depot of modification of NIKE
I to NIKE B battery sets, the requirement for
battery sets could be met by mid-1960 and the
missile requirement by 1956. Under a greatly
accelerated program, with major compression
of lead times, expanding the missile source at
a cost of about $250 million, placing missile
source an a 3-shift, 24-hour day, 6-day week
basis, expenditure of about $100 million on
accelerated R & D, and increased tooling level
for test facilities, the missile requirement could
SECRET
be met by mid-1959, about the same thno
estimated for the battery sots.
VIII. COSTS
An 81-battalion NIKE B defense in NATO
Europe could be provided by 1960 at an osth
mated cost to the U. S. of approximately $1.55
billion. This figure includes initial costs over
the 5-year period as well as operating costa as
battalions are activated during the period.
About $625 million of the cost to the U. S. would
provide defense for U. S.-NATO forces and
SAC bases.
The total cost of the 81-battalion program
is estimated at $2.15 billion. Of this total,
approximately $600 million would be borne
directly by the defended countries themselves
or would come from NATO intrastructuro
funds. The annual operating cost, once the
program was in full operation, is estimated at
$240 million, of which $100 million would be
borne by the U. S.
IX. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
Allocation of 81 NIKE battalions to NATO
Europe would require 75,200 officers and men.
Of these, 49,400 would be indigenous personnel,
members of national forces assigned to the 54%
battalions defending population-industrial con-
ters. The remaining 25,800 would be U. S. per-
sonnel, required by the 26% battalions assigned
to NATO forces and defending SAC bases.
Current Army planning foresees a lead time
of not less than 24 months from the decision
to activate a missile battalion to its movement
to site, for training the highly skilled personnel
that form an essential part of its strength.
Although these technicians are relatively few
in number, they are vital to the operation and
maintenance of the battalion's equipment, All
of them must be school-trained in courses re-
quiring 7 to 43 weeks in addition to basic and
other military training.
This requirement for specialist training, acuto
enough in the U. S. Army, would be increased by
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 several magnitudes in the case of battalions
formed from European manpower. Not only
must the U. S. technician first be trained, but he
must then be given time to impart his training
to the European. Some time might be saved,
although the language barrier would impose
serious limitations, by training European spe-
cialists in U. S, schools. Until indigenous bat-
talions have been trained, the program un-
doubtedly would impose onerous manpower
requirements on the U. S, Army. If the program
is initiated promptly, this burden could be
carried with acceptable dislocation. By delay
it would be increased to the point where it
might not be supportable without significant
increases in U. S. Army strength.
Equipping the NIKE B missile with an
atomic warhead would impose a requirement
for an additional 68 special-weapon specialists
in each battalion, or 5,508 (324 officers and
5,184 EM) for the total program. Whether
these additional specialists need be U. S. person-
nel or could be drawn from the indigenous popu-
lation would be principally a question of
security. Assuming that sufficient trainable
personnel could be procured in each country
affected, their assignment to this specialty
world be contingent on the action by the
Atomic Energy Commission or international
treaty. In the absence of assurance that such
arrangements could be promptly made, it is
safe to assume that these technicians at least
initially would be U. S. personnel, increasing the
U. S. manpower requirement for the 81 battal-
ions from 25,800 to 31,308.
X. SPECIAL PROBLEMS
In addition to the questions raised by
inclusion of nuclear warheads in the NIKE B
armament, other essentially political problems
would be posed by the allocation of missile
battalions here proposed. None of these prob-
lems is essentially new in NATO experience,
and none appears insuperable.
One question is that of control of weapons in
the hands of NATO troops other than U. S.
This question, though it deals with command, is
fundamentally political. Antiair measures con-
template the defense of national targets from
national territory by national forces. Yet
since attack on any NATO nation involves all
of them, antiair defense is equally an inter-
national affair that requires a degree of coordi-
nation if it is to return maximum effectiveness.
Once batteries and battalions have been or-
ganized in national components of NATO
forces, and their personnel trained, national
pride should be assuaged and local political
requirements met by their designation as mili-
tary units ruder national command. Coordi-
nation by SHAPE of their tactical employment
would not be an unreasonable provision; its
extent should be the subject of agreement at the
outset. Such agreement should be rendered
less difficult than may have been true, in other
cases, since coordination and not command is
the object.
In any event, coordination of communica-
tions, especially the information net, should be
settled without possibility of misunderstanding
or cavil. Continuing tests then should serve
to maintain coordination as a real rather than
illusory condition.
Land acquisition for sites, while no simple
matter in land-hungry Europe, should present
less than the usual difficulties, since the land
would be designed for the direct defense of
cities and their populations. The majority
of battery sites could be located on land already
devoted to military purposes.
Whatever the relative advantages and de-
ficiencies of the various available and projected
systems of air defense in Western Europe, it is
essential that steps be taken to provide a defense
in which the people affected can place reliance.
The NIKE system, of those now available,
offers the greatest promise of achieving this
aim at the earliest time. And time is the
decisive factor.
 Paper 12
Arms Equation
Originator: George A. Lincoln
Collaborator: William Webster
1. PROBLEM
The problem is to examine the purposes and
uses of military power over the next decade in
the light of developments marked by the
Geneva conference and for the purpose of
developing guidance for portions of the U. S.
national strategy.
This problem needs to be approached within
certain dimensions which are accepted U. S.
policy. One of these is that the unity and
strength of the Free World be maintained and
increased. Another is that there be an orderly,
democratic development of nations outside the
Communist bloc. This would provide a strong,
perhaps the strongest possible, attraction to the
satellites. It has been suggested that the
guidelines should also include (1) retention of
the moral issue of freedom versus the spiritual
oppression of Communism; and (2) provision of
some other motivation than fear. These latter
two dimensions are mentioned here at the
beginning because the creation and employ-
ment of armed force tends to involve actions
and processes difficult to keep within these two
dimensions.
The discussion that follows does not cover
the strategy of a general nuclear war. It
applies to a no-general war situation, which is
the likely situation over the next decade.
going on in the world today and what the world
maybe like over the next decade. Some of these
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
The Soviet Union is very unlikely to choose
general war as a policy course unless free world
military power dwindles to a comparative level
where there is a high possibility of quick success
without major damage to the USSR. Or, the
USSR would be likely to choose general war if,
through a rapid development of events, it
appeared that the Free World might attempt to
extinguish the current Soviet system. This last
point is really a statement to the thesis that a
cornered rat will fight and that you must not
press your enemy against a locked door unless
you are ready to take the consequences. The
term "general war" does not necessarily mean
initiation by surprise intercontinental atomic
attack.
The Soviet Union is likely to continue its
current Geneva type policy line for some time.
This would be in the classical Communist tra-
dition with its precedent from the Party
Congress ending in 1928 and called after the
failures in China and Hungary and the apparent
effective containment of Communism, The
decision to await and exploit the alleged inherent
contradictions in the great power capitalistic
system bore fruit, by 1939, in a great de-
pression, a global capitalistic war, a major
Communist advance in Middle Europe without
cost, and a rapidly crumbling colonial system.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND GUIDELINES There is a reasonable probability, which must
The discussion on this paper accepts certain be guarded against in our military program, of
assumptions and guidelines as to what is really a sudden reversal of this policy line. Such
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 reversal would again be in the classical Com- USSR, are aheady publicizing their views that
nnuist tradition. But, there is this time a the Soviet climate warrants reduction of U. S.
reasonable probability that the current policy Forces.
line will continue, at least throughout the The general tendency in the U. S. toward
decade, without sudden drastic change. military expenditures (and all security expendi-
The policy line cuts two ways, both to the tures except perhaps atomic energy) and per-
probable advantage of the Soviet Union: sonal military service will be one of nibbling
a. If it brings disunity in the Free World reduction. The real impetus will be and a lowering of defensive positions so that cutting, budget balancing, our current varieties
a reversal of the policy may reap great of isolationism, reluctance toward personal
benefits, it is successful. military service, etc. The alleged reasons will
b. If not successful along the line just be various and conflicting, e. g., reduction of
described, it still gives the maximum oppust war threat, shifting burden to allies, improved
tunny for (1) building the economic and technology and management give "greater
political strength of the Communist orbit; security at less cost", "cut time fat while leaving
(2) Communist advance by a "helping hand" the muscle", etc. The initial decline will
program for the underdeveloped. probably be in readiness to doter "creeping
expansion" and local war.
The Soviet Union now shows some chance of The Chinese Communists, while not moving
growing within a decade or two to a power in direct opposition to the Soviet Union, are
center which might quickly overwhelm EurAsia capable of following independent lilies of action.
and Africa, politically, economically, and pay- They will pull together when it helps them,
chologically- if the western world got into especially in use of threats, and go outwardly
difficulties. The difficulty hoped for, of course, separate ways when such works to their
is a recurrence of a great capitalistic depression, advantage.
The current revolutionary change in the Technological advance in nuclear matters
middle third of the world, often called under- will continue rapidly. Both the U. S. and
developed, will continue, may accelerate, and USSR are in sight of enough unclear explosives,
will almost certainly involve periodic occur- No acceptable way will be found from the
renees of violence.
The technological and operational standpoint to
Soviet Union's captive instrument of give an adequate guarantee that nuclear woap-
revolution, the international Communist party, ens will not be used if war occurs. The
while retaining its traditional nature and psychological and political reluctance toward
purpose, may be kept under wraps except when such action will increase. No way will be
opportunities for quick favorable decisions found for an adequate defense against such
appear. It will operate through front organ- weapons which will be accepted psychologically
zations and will strive to capture mass or- and politically by the mass of peoples, Some
ganizations in underdeveloped areas, e, g., theoretically practical formulae may be evolved.
nationalist parties and labor unions in tropical The drive for limitation of armaments, partic-
Africa. This superficially more separate oper-
ration will be harder to ularly in the nuclear area, will be continuous
counter. and probably increase in magnitude.
In the free world there will be a definite There is increasing reluctance, a real danger that any progress whatsoever will
uctance,
G so long as the Soviet cause an undue trust in too many hopeful
Geneva spirit continues, toward major military people. Hence, there is a task for education
expenditures and personal military service. and for direct countering of undue trust-while
The countering of this is a major psychological placing a maximum effort on search for seine
task. Legislative leaders, after 9 days in the effective progress on regulation.
SECRET
 III. NATURE OF ARMED FORCE
Armed force is what people think it is. Until
actually put to active use, the nature of armed
force is what statesmen and peoples think
it is. This situation makes armed force a
psychological factor and a psychological instru-
ment in political affairs, both internal and inter-
national. The emotions it arouses run the
gamut from apprehension to fear insofar as
armed force in the possession of a potential
enemy is concerned, and from concern to
confidence insofar as armed force in the posses-
sion of ourselves and allies is concerned. It
seems unlikely that within the next decade we
will stand at either and of either of those two
defined spectra, If a situation develops where
we do stand at some extreme, it probably will
be fear. The clement of fear, traditionally and
now, is the ]over generating armed forces in
most states. The concept of armed force as a
carefully controlled instrument in support of
policy is overly sophisticated for most peoples
and many statesmen, oven though this is the
traditional use of armed force, The immedi-
ately foregoing points are made here because
part of the problem facing the United States
and the Free World is the maintenance, with
the current dilution of the element of fear, of an
adequate structure of armed force. Looking
to history, states have, in the past, appreciated
the combined advantages and cheapness of
maintaining in being enough of the right kind
of military strength, e. g., the legions of Rome
and the British Navy in the 19th Century.
There are even instances of appreciation of the
need for continuous strength and toughness on
time part of small states, e, g., Switzerland,
Arms Race or Great Power Maneuver-Arms
Equation?
Sloganized short-cut descriptions of com-
plicated situations are often misleading. The
term "arms race" can be clangorously mislead-
ing. It is dangerous if only that the concept
weakens. the unity and strength of the Free
'Vorld. We know that the very highest
137
military people do not consider that we are in
anything as simple as an arms race. The true
situation is a different one and a much more
complicated one, (The term "competition"
seems much more meaningful.) First, the
struggle going forward in the world is essentially
it power struggle. Advance and retreat as a
result of military action are most unlikely to
occur unless there is prior deterioration in the
political, economic and psychological fields.
Conversely, military power must be viewed as
an aid, most of the time, to political, economic
and psychological measures rather than as an
instrument used alone. For the first time in
history no nation can be strong enough mili-
tarily to have absolute security, Even a I to 2
or 1 to 3 statistical superiority does not guar-
antco against a gravely damaging blow. Such
race as exists is in the sum total of relationships
among nations and even extends to develop-
ments within nations, such as the rate of
increase of strength of the economies in the
western world and the Communist world,
A more correct analogy, rather than a race
which implies a finish line, is a contest of team
against team in It chase match in which all
boards are played at once and moves on one
board can influence pieces on another. Some
of the pieces could be described as military,
others as economic, others as psychological;
the pay-offs are always political, The nuclear
rooks counter each other and opposing Collins
rarely, if over, dare to move than, So the
military movements in the dread gang are the
pawns of peripheral and brush fire wars. If
one cares to carry the analogy further, ono can
think of time chess boards as representative of
different areas of the world, or of some other
categorization.
The dynamic situation is materially affected
by the time element. It is too customary to
project some single factor forward five or ton
years, for example, technological advance, and
then to make judgments thereon, Single
factor analysis can of ton be projected in mathe-
matical terms that are superficially prophetic-
and hence a clear guide to action, It is hn-
 possible to state the complete flow of advance
in mathematical terms. The best that can be
done is to envisage an ever widening span of
possibilities as we look into the future, and to
program a method and direction of policy which
will cover the maximum of this span while
having a flexibility permitting adjustment to
include any portion initially uncovered if a
turn of events happens to be that way.
Characteristics by which To Judge Military
Power
These are closely related among themselves
and include magnitude, readiness, location,
mobility, endurance or capability for sustained
action (bases, etc.), cost as a relationship to
the economic base, suitability, versatility and
flexibility, and political aspects (applicability
to political problems, ability of the state to
make political decisions needed to use its avail-
able power, etc.). As an example, massive
atomic power is a very specialized capability
both in actual use and in support of the inter-
play of international political actions. It has
magnitude but limited versatility and suita-
bility. Conversely, conventional military power
has great suitability and flexibility but probably
would not have the magnitude to be an ade-
quate deterrent to general war.
There is a dangerous tendency to equate the
deterrent to general war with adequacy for all
other purposes for which military power is
needed. This leads to concentration on prepa-
ration and planning (which is necessary) for
the unlikely event of general war with a fixation
that results in blindness to the requirements
and characteristics of military power to meet
the more likely and more immediate problems
of creeping expansion. This psychological
phenomena is as old as the activities of the
first amateur magician who misled his audience
by fixing their attention on an item unrelated
to the action lie was actually undertaking.
An essential purpose of military forces is to
win military victories if war comes, but another
essential purpose is to create strategic illrpres-
SECRET
sions in support of prevention of both war and
creeping expansion. Thera is no priority
among these essentials, particularly when there
will shortly be little possibility of strategic
victory if war comes-even though some
battles may be won.
"Nuclear Superiority"
"Nuclear superiority" fulfills only one facet
of security need. The phrases "nuclear superi-
ority", "nuclear parity", etc., are rapidly be-
coming of limited meaning. A state equipped
with nuclear weapons but with "nuclear inferi-
ority" now has, or will soon have, enough to
offer such a hazard to a potential opponent that
the opponent will seek other moans than
nuclear war.
For the first time in history, no Bend of
state, whether democracy or dictatorship,
can promise the man on Main Streets (sio)
clearest and certain victory in war.
(General Twining at Air Force Association
Convention, San Francisco, August 12, 1958.)
It is misleading to speak of our current and
footing nuclear superiority as contributing
materially to our current position of strength.
The Soviet Union has recently decided not to
continue playing, for the time being at least,
on that playing field. We do not have the
political resolution to continuo playing on it
since Geneva, nor did we before-witness
Dienbienphu. Evon if we did, we would prob-
ably logo thereby because of the disunity which
would be generated in the .Free World as a
result. If there is any true race, it is a race to
find and offer proposals for some control of
armaments-the objective being to achieve a
political advantage through psychological im-
pact, even though nothing substantive, results.
This situation could go on, with fluctuating
emphasis, for a decade.
Two Equations
It may be useful to think of the arms equa-
tion as two separate but closely related aqua-
 tions: (a) the massive nuclear destruction
equation applicable to general war, which in-
cludes defense against nuclear weapons (Equa-
tion A); and (b) other armed force (Equation
B), primarily applicable to local and limited
war, creeping expansion, and suitability in
support of political action.
We can be optimistic about avoiding a third
world war, and we can also hope with sound
logic that we will avoid local wars.
But as prudent men we cannot rule out the
possibility that situations may arise again
sometime in which force will have to be used
locally and specifically and controllably as the
modern army, accompanied by sea and air
power, can do it.
(Ambassador Lodge, U. S. Representative to
the United Nations, spoke at a reunion dinner
of the Second Armored Division, of which lie
was a member in World War II.)
Shortly, both the U. S. and USSR will possess
the power of mutual devastation. With sur-
prise, one side might achieve a situation called
"victory" relatively unhurt, unless the other
has maintained strength and vigilance. Hence,
the likelihood of long-term nuclear standoff,
unless one side is driven to desperation or both
sides are so maladroit as to pull down the tent
of nuclear destruction on the world. Accept-
ance of this situation may for a time be only
tacit. There is likely to be probing with
limited wars. Hence, the simultaneous equa-
tions must provide (a) strength and alertness
for a nuclear war while not expecting to use
this ability, and (b) readiness to handle a great
variety of brush Piro wars and situations requir-
ing military power in support of policy,
Equation A
Equation A-general war-has a major elo-
ment of time therein. The march of technology
may at times seem to give somewhat of an
advantage to one nation over another. But
exploitation of any advantage requires a co-
ordination of technology, production, psycho-
logical and political action, which seems very
unlikely, Furthermore, the cost of a mistaken
estimate is much higher than that paid by
Germany in World War II. The overriding
fact is that, for the foreseeable future, both
the western world and the USSR will not trust
each other enough to drop their nuclear guard
below some materially high level, giving a mu-
tual deterrence.
The five main national subprograms for deter-
rent to general war appear to be:
a. A long-range massive nuclear force.
b. Technological advance-if the analogy of a
"race" has any validity, it is in the technological
area, On a 2-5 year leadtime basis, as we are,
the failure to keep up in both attack instru-
ments and counters thereto could be disas-
trous-and the disaster could occur through
political and psychological developments only.
c. Defense. This is part of the deterrent and
also a confidence-building program. But na-
tions may choose to depend primarily on offen-
sive nuclear power, a course of action more
suited to the USSR in time of tension than to
the U. S. Even a mere facade of defensive
power would be an important asset in time of
crisis. It may be argued that a technological
breakthrough may give a near perfect defense.
Even if such is developed on a laboratory and
theoretical basis, it should be viewed with
extreme scepticism from the standpoint of both
practical operational and budgetary considera-
tions. As a final comment, what we can do,
the USSR can do eventually. A 100% sure
defensive system for the USSR, atomic invul-
nerability, might face us with as great a political
predicament as the conning nuclear standoff.
d, international action to reduce the immediacy
of the nuclear threat. Readiness and cost thereof
have an exponential, rather than a straight line,
relationship. A reduction in immediacy might
enable us to shift priorities for military forces
(within approximately the same budget) so as
to provide more atomic defense and other means,
such as deterrents to creeping expansion, thus
far not provided in reasonable adequacy. Also,
a reduction in immediacy of the threat makes
an even further reduction in probability of
general atomic war since more time is thereby
SECRET
 provided for political action to save the situa-
tion. This subprogram must be carried out on
a basis that no trust can be placed in paper
agreements alone. The program must continue
in the USSR a fear of retaliation and a mistrust
of ability to win. The initial dividend of this
subprogram may be development of a high de-
gree of public realization concerning the realities
of the current security situation.
e. A political and psychological program con-
sistent with the above points and directed both
externally and internally. We might well (1)
search for ways to acquire the necessary effort
from our own people and others; (2) while at
the same time following the rule that national
security is the program that statesmen should
do the most about and say the least about. If
we can find a formula for these somewhat con-
flicting objectives, we will go far toward in-
creasing the unity of the Free World and pro-
moting a confidence that furthers great progress.
Time may be on our side if our people become
educated to, and accept, the necessity for alert-
ness, strength, endurance, patience and under-
standing.
Equation B
Military Power for Equation B-deterrent to
limited war and counter to creeping expansion.
What are the subprograms?
a. Forces to deter peripheral and local war
through or by associate and satellite. We have
recoiled from the thought of American boys
dying in limited war and this reaction has
generated, among other things, a policy called
massive retaliation. Some (including allies and
neutrals) interpret this policy as meaning likely
resort to major atomic action if we take any
action at all. Thereby we have tied our hands.
If we have in being the power, other than mas-
sive atomic forces, to intervene militarily
against creeping expansion, we have the most
effective deterrent against that expansion.
The obscurity in the enemies' minds of what
we might do with atomic power, either locally
or generally, adds to the strength of our deter-
rent. We paid too high a price in Korea for
lack of readiness for local war-and perhaps a
higher price in Indo-China.
b. Forces to influence a deteriorating inter-
national situation. If. we have nothing but
general war nuclear capacity, the enemy realizes
that the situation can be pressed a long ways
without real danger of general war. If we have
only specialized nuclear forces able to act, our
allies and neutrals will be quick to counsel
caution and concession. We will not have
acceptable alternatives to offer them or to
choose from ourselves.
c. Internal security against infiltration, local
disorder, and palace revolution. This must
generally be initially a matter for the indigenous
governments concerned. The United States
can, and can afford to, provide the arms, mis-
sions, etc.-the more inconspicuously the better.
In addition, governments should have always
present the hope, or better still the confidence,
that quick assistance is available. In a world
where propaganda is a powerful instrument, an
appearance of legality is useful. Hence, we
should search for increased facility in working
through regional arrangements and the U. N.
In hindsight, Indo-China might have been
made less of a defeat by use of the U. N.
d. The support of an atmosphere of confidence
in Free World, and of a feeling of respect (not
necessarily fear) in Communist, statesmen. We
need that power corning from (1) realization
that strength is there, and (2) it will be used
properly, intelligently, and discreetly. This is
the strategic impression we need to make.
The U. S. negotiator at the conference table,
sitting militarily only with bomb in hand, is
very inadequately equipped for the next Lou
years. Our opponents know we are most un-
likely to use this weapon except 'in case of
general war, which they are not going to pre-
cipitate if we maintain an adequate nuclear
posture. They know that if they can trick its
into flaunting atomic power, they will gain
 through disunity of our allies and antagonism
toward us of neutrals,
We should have a program of suitability,
flexibility and versatility which (a) leaves a
choice to our own statesmen; (b) gives increased
confidence to allies and neutrals that we will
not be forced (by an all or nothing program) to
either (1) atomic war, or (2) knuckling under;
and (c) keeps the opposition a bit unsure. We
have to have a readiness for situations such as
Inclo-China and even hostilities or near-
hostilities in mid-Europe (the German unifica-
tion problem has such possibilities) after
possible initiation of the Eisenhower arms
inspection approach. The characteristic of suit-
ability needs to extend to allied action. The
political and psychological climate of friends
avd neutrals is likely to turn more and more
to a condition necessitating allied (including
U. N,) action if any effective action is to be
launched.
As it final, and very important, point under
this Equation 13, we think readily of historical
instances of technological changes, battlefield
maneuvers, and other shifts which have, often
quickly, neutralized major increments of mili-
tary force and major elements of military
policy. We should bear in mind that the turns
of international political action over the next
decade (which we may find we must accept
even though we dislike them, and might find
to our advantage if we have retained the mili-
tary vo,satility) may have such effect on cur-
rently important portions of our military
program, If anyone wishes an example of the
march of changes overtaking a portion of a
program, consider the history of U. S. coast
defense.
Allies, Geneva, and Nuclear Standoff
Under this heading the allies divide broadly
into two categories: (a) European (NATO);
(b) the rest. The changing situation created
by Genova and the coming nuclear standoff is
probably not going to be drastically different
from the present for countries other than
European (Japan is a possible exception).
Their military problem is one of internal
security and defense against local aggression.
For European countries, we have had a
psychological problem engendered by nuclear
power ever since Hiroshima. These peoples
and their statesmen are deeply conditioned by
a history of conquering armies and of forces
designed to stem the advance of such armies.
How will they react to the changing future?
There has been, and will be, a thesis that the
only real threat and need for armed forces is a
general nuclear war. Hence,
a. the U. S. nuclear power is a sufficient
deterrent and little else is needed.
b. western Europe will be devastated if
involved in nuclear war, hence the U. S.
nuclear forces are not wanted in the area
since they bring the hazard of nuclear attack
which might otherwise be avoided.
With the decline, real or fancied, of the
likelihood of nuclear general war, European
peoples and statesmen will, more and more, ask
what their armed forces are for. This wavering
is already apparent. While not taken within
the scope of this paper, it would be sound to
examine a number of hypothetical situations as
of 1960. Suppose, as one situation, that U. S.
forces withdrew from the continent. Would
the U. S. then hazard American cities over a
repetition of some situation such as Czecho-
slovakia (38 or 48)? We would be in a very
inflexible position to choose any other timely
alternative.
An examination of the Swiss way of national
security may show a pertinent precedent.
The Swiss have, without fighting, maintained
the integrity, except for one short period, of
their country for centuries. This is due, in
great part, to their reputation for readiness to
put up a time-consuming fight, their continuous
posture of readiness and resolution, and the
probability that military action against the
Swiss would trigger other adverse military
actions which could be brought to bear before
SECRET
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 a fait accompli was achieved. Switzerland has
not needed alliances to give assurance of help
in case of attack. The realities of the inter-
national political situation assured that help.
Perhaps the military future of western Europe
is as a confederation of "Switzerlands", but
with the added deterrent of ready arrangements
for U. S. aid.
If Europe moved militarily to an inflexible
situation where the choice apparent to peoples
in time of tension was between nuclear war
and knuckling under, the weaknesses of the
European political system in time of crisis
would create a grave danger of the latter choice.
The United States has here, over the next
decade, a very sensitive psychological-political
problem. Changes in our military deployment,
the planning approach of our officers on allied
staffs, the public and private statements of our
leaders, etc., these will be very important and
should "speak with one voice." Published
reports do not support any belief that NATO
countries are really expending a high proportion
of resources on preparation for a possible long
war of attrition. Nevertheless, a new look at
the balance between readiness on the one hand,
and depth of military power measured in
combat day capability, might produce some
helpful variations in programs.
The Importance of NATO
The current change in Soviet attitude has
been brought about in great part by the exist-
ence of NATO. The importance which the
Soviet Union ascribes to NATO is indicated
by the openly stated intention of the USSR
to destroy NATO. Any complacency about the
Soviet Union striving with perseverance and
ingenuity to carry out its stated intention, is
extremely unwise. It sloes appear that, unless
the NATO powers led by the United States
take some positive actions different from those
in the recent past, the NATO may be badly
weakened.
A method and direction along the following
two mutually supporting lines is suggested:
a. There must be a material increase in
use of NATO as an international political
institution. The concept of NATO as a
purely military institution is completely in-
consistent with the modern realities where
things military cannot be separated from
things economic and things political. The
ties that have bound NATO can be readily
loosened by (1) a succession of events giving
aid and comfort to the enemy such as the
Cyprus affair and (2) a succession of open
differences among NATO members aired in
other international organizations such as
the U. N. If NATO is to continue as a suc-
cessful military alliance it must become a
successful diplomatic alliance also.
b. The United States must give leadership
to NATO on the basis of being "first among
equals". This requirement placed on the
U. S. for leadership exists in the political and
economic areas as much, perhaps more, than
it does in the military areas. Here the
biblical warning "For if the trumpet give an
uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself
to the battle?" is a particularly sobering bit
of strategic guidance to the United States.
There is some question that our country
has given to NATO the most "certain
sounds" that it might have given over the
past few months. We can and should do
better.
IV. INTEGRATION OF MILITARY FORCE
WITH OTHER ARMS OF NATIONAL
POLICY
The classical and generally accepted primary
objective of armed force in this country has
been the achievement of victory in tear.
Relatively little attention has been given to
other objectives until within the last decade.
The obvious existence of other necessary
objectives has been dealt with too often with
the thesis that maximum possible preparation
for victory if war comes (and it has been usual
to define the expected types of employment
rather narrowly) will ipso facto achieve all
 other objectives. Giving priority, sometimes
overriding, to conserving existent military
power for use in a possible general war, and
never having enough to assure strategic victory,
it is customary to resist, as maldeployment, the
commitment or programming of military power
as a deterrent to creeping expansion-unless
the action required happens to fit the estimated
optimum readiness for a narrow range of
possibilities. We are deeply conditioned by
our past military experience, which has tricked
its twice recently (Pearl Harbor and Korea).
We have written our histories that "we always
win" and we now tend to assume that winning
again means winning in the usual way. Some
military men and American statesmen are
turning to a broader view. But time may be
running out.
The generation of psychological strength and
confidence is a main objective of our armed force
and that of our allies over the coming decade.
We must stand before others to command both
respect and a reasonable amount of trust.
This is a variation of the power for peace
theme. It is not inconsistent with, in fact it
requires, such programmed components as
readiness and technological progress.
The application of armed forces to national
policy is determined in great part by the policy
statements made concerning them and by the
general attitude in connection with the handling
of them. As an example, the USSR reduces
its effective military strength, or says it is going
to, with the implication that the world is a
safer and more peaceful world. A few weeks
later, different members of the Executive
Branch of the U. S. Government generate
public discussion of a reduction in U. S. armed
forces in the interests of economy and with the
implication that it is cutting the fat while
leaving the muscle.
Those policy statements and policy actions
come not only from our Road of State but
from a groat many people whose remarks and
actions are noticed abroad and within the
United States. We need to have a much
bettor party line and much more of a party
148
line as to what we are doing and why we are
doing it.
Operation through regional arrangements
and the United Nations seems likely to get
further in many matters connected with mil-
itary force, in spite of the exasperating aspects
of action in cooperation with other nations.
This method usually contributes to unity and
gives added opportunity for useful political
effects. Furthermore, we must consider and
develop ways to use our military international
arrangements in closer collaboration with
political and economic measures. This ap-
proach may well make the needed allied mil-
itary collaboration and effort more palatable
to allies and neutrals. As an example, Para. 2
of the NATO Charter should be dusted off and
ways sought to put it to use. From a practical
political standpoint, this evolution of arrange-
ments originally entirely military may draw
support from foreign ministers and prime
ministers in discussions and negotiations which
are too often heavily conditioned by the points
of view of economic ministers.
Maximum emphasis on suitability and ver-
satility should characterize the maintenance
and evolution of armed forces. To pick an
exaggerated hypothetical example, if we moved
to complete dependence on massive nuclear
long-range power for our military posture, and
a seemingly feasible method of regulation of
such power were evolved and generally accepted
by other nations, we would then probably suffer
a reverse in the world only exceeded by the
fall of a major area to Communism. We must
have armed forces and a military policy which
give our statesmen maximum latitude in the
uncertain future.
Definite thresholds must be topped if our
military power is to be of the needed value in
supporting political action. As an example,
only a token force in Germany would not have
been enough during the last few years and
would not be enough today. There must be
a force in position so adequate that it is ap-
parent to the western Europeans that we have
to stand steady in time of acute tension and
 There should be an examination of the require-
ments of the "thresholds" in connection with
our policy. Our reserve policy, although in-
adequate, is a desirable move toward one
threshold which may be needed to give assur-
ance of the direction of our intentions and of
our steadfastness to our allies.
A scientific study of ways to utilize. U. S.
military power on political targets, in addition
to its narrowly military mission, should be
made. An excellent example, of course, was
the flying of pilgrims to Mecca by the U. S.
Air Force. Another possibility, perhaps worth
considering, is the use of the Army Corps of
Engineers organization and experience. The
line of thought in this paragraph comes from
the two generally accepted theses that (1) the
struggle in the world is a power struggle for
the way of government, thinking and living of
over a billion people; and (2) that peoples, no
matter how friendly, get tired of foreign forces
within their midst.
The responsibility now rests on executive
leadership. Support of military power fluctu-
ates with threat. This truism for a democracy
is an axiom closely related to the axiom that
military power, until used, is what statesmen
and peoples think it is. It is also a political
axiom that.a decrease in military power, usually
generated through cutting budget and personal
service, in a democracy is not recovered until
and unless there is a clearly discernible increase
in the threat to security. Put another way, we
have had to be scared in order to build back and
we probably have had to be scared a bit now
and then in order to maintain a level program.
The next decade requires a sober public under-
standing of the realities. Increases and de-
creases in our military program, usually meas-
ured in terms of dollars allocated, should be
carefully keyed to external political operations
and should certainly not be a matter for internal
politics. This thought may be ignoring the
past realities of public opinion and politics.
But leadership. in the Executive Branch can,
currently, achieve the indicated objectives.
SECRET
The preceding discussion suggests a philos-
ophy of approach and some specific things to do.
The following paragraphs outline additional
don'ts and do's which flow from this philosophy,
The dangers of the coming decade include:
a. We'll lower our guard because of trust,
underrating opponent or softness (both in
the head and in way of life).
b. We'll build an unsuitable or inade-
quately flexible program-as was the Maginot
Line.
c. Our design will be too costly for support
and hence will fall short of the thresholds
of effectiveness.
d. Our program will not be adequately
designed to mesh (inter-lock) with (1) U. N.,
regional arrangements and other states, (2)
non-military factors.
The military agencies need more clear and
more specific guidance for planning and also
for the security philosophy they presont to the
U. S. public and to the world external to the
U. S. This statement refers to two different
but related programs of guidance. If the likely
situation is as suggested in the preceding pages,
then there is a grave question that all services
and the Department of Defense are planning
on this basis, and on the same basis, for the next
decade. Parenthetically, it is believed that
the approach outlined in the preceding pages
provides an adequate basis for shifts in time to
meet the possible but improbable that may de-
velop. As to the way of speaking, our military
people and their civilian superiors should speak
with more of one voice, leaving to the colum-
nists and the technical and parochial military
magazines the arguments as to comparative
merits and demerits of particular weapons
systems.
A military program with a minimum of un-
expected fluctuations is a vital need. Even
with maximum efficiency, lead-times are long
indeed. The dollar and the man, programmed
and spent hurriedly, cannot have the maximum
possible military effect and may be a political
 liability rather than a political asset. The sud-
den shift in direction of a program is wasteful
in money, readiness and other military charac-
teristics. A sudden downward shift in scope of
a program is even more destructive. The num-
ber of dollars saved on paper is almost certain
to be matched by a loss in readiness, mobility
or some other characteristic which is measured
by many times the same number of dollars.
There are current examples. Furthermore,
that these sudden shifts can have grave external
political and psychological repercussions. How,
for instance, can General Gruenther expect to
persuade the European countries to continue
their current military programs when the head-
lines from the United States record both that
the economy of the U. S. is at its highest peak
in history, and rising, and the U. S. is cutting
its military program?
What we say and what we seem to do should
have a close relationship.
Withdrawal of some forces from some parts
of the world must be considered as a proba-
bility of the next decade. We should examine
particularly our forces located in colonial areas
to see if better political arrangements can be
made consistent with political trends.
Military aspects of our Japanese situation
need to be continuously examined with a view
to seeing whether it would not be wise to get
ourselves into a position where we could be
openly pressing the Japanese for arrangements
permitting withdrawal of some forces at least.
It would be much better to be ahead of the pos-
sibility of a movement from the Japanese people
that our forces leave.
Suppose the USSR soft policy is prolonged,
What's the suitable and feasible program? If
the effort is not underway already, the National
Security Council should press the preparation
of a military program and a military policy
pointed at 3 to 5 years from now and which
assumes a continuation of the Geneva spirit
and some success along the line of limitation of
armaments. Such a study, if it provided no
other dividends, might well develop useful
courses of action guiding our national psycho-
logical and political policy.
Are the priorities in our readiness program
suitable to the next decade? The traditional
national security readiness program of the
United States to include industrial mobiliza-
tion, preparations for a long period of hostilities,
large stockpiles of materials and the finished
items, provisions for transportation and support
of huge numbers of personnel and huge tonnages,
etc., may well not be in accord with the reason-
able probabilities of the next decade. Certainly
our continental defense arrangements and
our civilian defense are not currently consistent
with our military inventories and many of our
other preparations. At the other extreme, there
is, of course, a thesis that practically none of
these inventories, etc. would be used if hostilities
broke out. Rather, the decision would be
reached in a matter of hours, if not days, and
in so short a time that there would not even be
opportunity for rapid promotion of the surviv-
ing young officers in the Air Force. Conceiv-
ably, the course of wisdom is a middle ground
with somewhat less emphasis on support of
lengthy hostilities and more on ready mobile
forces suitable for limited war. If this matter
has not been examined incisively in light of the
reasonable probabilities of the next ten years,
then such an examination should be undertaken,
stepping off from guidelines which do not at
present seem to exist with sufficient definition
on the National Security Council level.
A scientific costing review of the current al-
location of effort may be indicated shortly.
The headings for the analysis include:
a. Now-near future-long term.
b. massive nuclear power-defense-nro-
bile forces-follow-up
c. R & D-hardware-bases, etc.-men
d. readiness-mobility-flexibility-politi-
cal applicability
e. Other
Any shift in our military program, such as
the recent budget-balancing proposals, should
be undertaken in light of such an analysis. A
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
close analysis could conceivably show that we
are over-insuring in one area compared to the
hazards being accepted in another. Are we
buying the equivalent of overseas bases twice,
of nuclear devastation of the USSR more than
once, of R & D less or more than once?
The suggestions in the preceding three para-
graphs are admittedly particularly difficult of
achievement and require the best of profes-
sional knowledge combined with judgment.
The difficulties are compounded by the fact
that such analyses immediately crosses the
most important vested interests and runs
athwart firmly held objectives of military,
fiscal, and other individuals and departments
in the Executive Branch.
VI. WHAT IS THE PRICE TAG?
At best, this can be discussed only in gen-
eralities and not in absolute figures. It might
be that savings in some areas, rising out of
the subjects in the immediately preceding para-
graphs, would be about balanced by needed
increases in other areas. It seems almost
obvious that a reduction in U. S. military
expenditures from those programmed at the
beginning of this year, particularly if reductions
are conspicuous ones, will trigger at least pro-
portionate reductions in military effort on the
part of our allies and will reduce the chances
that our statesmen will be able to achieve
political ars'sngements justifying such reduc-
tions. The net effect may be a need for in-
creased cost to the U. S. Costs of equipment
and of men are bound to go up during the
decade.
The price of increased readiness and mobility
for limited and peripheral war should now be
accepted and paid.
There are great psychological dangers in
relating (1) disarmament to (2) the political
desires for balancing budgets while at the same
time cutting taxes. The political wish can
very readily father fallacious judgments in the
national security area. If the U. S. policy
approach is consistently that we are willing
and able to pay the price of security, including
the non-military measures required about the
world, we will better lead the free world in
the efforts it needs to make and will avoid
giving aid and comfort to Communists.
This memorandum does not pretend to under-
take any economic analysis of our capabilities
or of the problems of reconciliation of eco-
nomic capabilities and political realities on the
one hand with national security requirements
on the other. It is noted, however, that our
country's gross national product is expanding
rapidly and that the free world is materially
better off than it has been before since World
War II.
On the other side of the coin the costs of
military power are steadily rising on an item
by item basis and are also rising due to the
rapid rate of obsolescence forced upon us by
the racing pace of technological change. There
is a basis for a judgment that, in maintaining
the present level, (1) cost measured in monetary
units such as dollars must almost certainly rise
if adequate security is provided and (2) cost
measured as a proportion of gross national
product is manageable and may fall slightly.
The most important aspect of the price tag
point is not the exact number of dollars. The
question is: Can we afford it if necessary?
There is no doubt that the U. S. economy can
support materially more than it is now support-
ing without adverse impact. The additional
amount needed, if any, would not be more in
the near future than 10 to 20 percent of the
current military budget. This is available,
and possibly available from the current tax
structure while still approximately balancing
the budget.
 Paper 13
Crucial Problems of Control of Armaments and
Mutual Inspection
Originator: Ellis A. Johnson
Critic: Stefan Possony
1. THE PROBLEM
To determine the critical inspection problems
if a surprise attack is to be prevented.
II. DISCUSSION
Appendix A reproduces the varied opinions
of invited scientists covering the principal
centers of the United States. It is clear that
no consensus was reached and that the diffi-
culties of designing a good inspection system
are great.
An important point is that strategic aircraft
spend 5% of their time in the air in training
flights lasting, on the average, 8 hours. Since
only about 70 aircraft are required for a sneak
attack, U. S. and USSR aircraft would have to
be accounted to within about 2% at least every
two hours. If both sides have 1500 aircraft
this seems a most difficult task.
Surreptitious arming on super highways
appears feasible.
Diversion of the following numbers of nuclear
weapons for clandestine use by the USSR
would be required:
30 percent in 1955
10 percent in 1960
2 percent-5 percent in 1965
This seems easy to do prior to establishment
of inspection without possibility of detection,
especially in the later years.
A fail proof communications system appears
to be difficult to design.
The value of an inspection system appears to
be illusory unless the United States and NATO
has an air defense that when warned can with-
stand the surprise attack which is to be de-
tected. Otherwise, what difference does it
make.
No final conclusions were reached.
 Science Advisory Committee Comments on Control of
Armaments and Inspection
1. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION ON
ARMAMENT REDUCTION
A. What are the purposes, from the U. S. point
of view, of a program of armament reduction?
1. To increase relative strength of U. S., now,
and in the projected future. Remark: Present
position relative to U. K. and USSR probably
satisfactory.
2, To increase absolute physical security of
continental U. S. Remark: present position in
this regard clearly needs improvement; U. S. is
vulnerable to surprise attack, and fear of such
attack plays a strong role in national thinking,
leading, for example to talk of preventive war
and to great stress on massive retaliation con-
cept. Possibly major objective of program
should be to eliminate the possibility of surprise
attack.
3, To create bettor international atmosphere
for normal development of democratic institu-
tions by reducing tension and fear.
4. To open the Soviet bloc and permit pone-
tration of democratic institutions and ideas,
Remark: Our best security would be a hole in
the Iron Curtain,
5, To reduce the economic burden entailed
in heavy armament programs, Remark: This
especially applies to Germany and France whose
economics are unable to support a large military
program, (On the other hand, abrupt curtail-
ment of U. S. Defense expenditures could have
severe impact, both abroad and at home.)
Remark: Present situation of almost total
ignorance of Soviet capabilities and intentions
requires preparation on the part of the free
Paper 13:
Appendix A
world for all possible kinds of attack. Not
infrequently, our plans and policies must be
based on exaggerated intelligence estimates,
with the consequence that expenditures all out
of proportion to the real threat are required.
With better intelligence and elimination,
through control and inspection of certain
weapons systems, great economies could be
achieved and much effort now devoted to
meeting threats that do not actually exist
could be directed to more useful purposes.
6. To establish a position of moral leadership
for the U. S.
7. To further progress in underdeveloped
countries.
B. What can be predicted about the conse-
quencies in the next 10-25 years of present
U. S. policy?
1. Is relative strength of U. S. increasing with
time?
2. What is the rate of technical advance of
the USSR? Is our being ahead enough to
guarantee security?
3. What will be the effect of technical ad-
vances in other countries; specifically growing
atomic weapons capabilities of small countries?
4. What will be the effect of increasing
independence of smaller countries: Japan, SE
Asia, Germany, Arab states? Effect of chang-
ing political complexion on our strategic
position?
5. Weakness of India? Spread of neu-
tralism?
6. If threat of surprise attacks continue,
what is cost of dispersion economically and
socially?
 7. What will be the effect on our security of
foreseeable technological developments as
guided missiles, high-performance aircraft,
ICBM, CEBAR?
8. Is reduction of armament a political,
economic, and military necessity for the free
world? (Adenauer) For the Soviet bloc?
9. To what extent is reduction of interna-
tional tension necessary to preserve our way
of life? Does external tension feed back and
generate internal tension, and can this lead
to a warlike orientation within our own country?
10. Will our present policy be interpreted
by USSR and neutrals (and Allies) as preparation
for aggression?
C. What would be the consequences to the
U. S. of a general arms reduction?
1. What is the purpose of a military force?
a. to promote national aims and support
diplomacy, or
b. to deter aggression, prevent war, win
war, minimize losses.
Remark: current policy is apparently
directed entirely toward (b); Soviet
policy has been successful in both (?).
2. Can a reduced military force meet the
demands of Is and b? What would be the
composition and purpose of such a force as
regards
a. offense
b. defense
c. contribution in alliances.
3. What other means can be used to pro-
mote national aims or settle disputes if military
forces are reduced? U. N.? World Court?
World opinion? Restraint of trade? (Is re-
duced military force correspondingly reduced
in effectiveness if balanced by equal reduction
on the other side?)
4. Economic impact on
duction?
D. What are the obstacles
arms reduction?
arms reduction would be detrimental to the
interests of the U. S." Is this a representative
view of DOD? WHY?
2. Position of Department of State favoring
negotiation? Reasons for difference from DOD
point of view? Relative importance of DOD/
DOS in determining national policy? Possible
reconciliation of views?
3. USSR proposal of May 10, 1955:
a. relation to their previous position?
b. reason for sudden change?
Remark: possibly increased respect for
nuclear weapons, possibly internal
economic difficulties.
c. what parts are unacceptable to us?
d. views of our Allies?
Remark: formulation of a suitable an-
swer to the May 10 proposal is surely a
matter of greatest urgency.
4. What U. S. commitments must be main-
tained? U. N.? NATO? SEATO? Japan?
South America?
5. What can USSR reasonably require as
residual forces for international commitments,
internal security?
6. What will be the reaction in the U. S. to
proposal? How deal with DOD, SAC?
E. What are the technical problems involved
in arms reduction?
1. Feasibility of obtaining strategic warning?
a. value of such warning?
b, assessment of reliability?
c. how much warning can be expected?
d. how define critical terms: "breach, viola-
tion, aggression"?
2. Feasibility of absolute control over or
knowledge of
a. nuclear weapons
b. weapons systems
c. delivery systems (aircraft, commercial
aircraft, ships, submarines)
Remark: high-performance aircraft,
Maclr 0.8, and missiles may require
control even in R and D stages,
d. land armies (how count reserves, in-
ternal police)
1. Clarification of position of the Depart-
ment of Defense: "any negotiation and any
 a. capability for surprise attack
f, overall capability to exploit surprise
attack
g. clandestine activities
h. infiltration, subversion.
3. Will it be necessary to permit a retaliatory
capacity in being? Should each nation retain
a stockpile of nuclear weapons for this purpose?
4. Nuclear weapons
a. Is complete elimination necessary or
possible? Can a fixed number be con-
trolled?
Remark: with present development of
the art a stock of a few hundred could
constitute a serious threat. Production
of weapons-grade material on a massive
scale could probably be controlled,
b. How coordinate reduction in nuclear
weapons with reduction of conventional
weapons?
c. Effect on our forces of elimination of
nuclear weapons?
d. Can Pu be eliminated?
Remark: unthinkable thatexistingstoelcs
would not be used for peaceful applica-
tions, o, g., in brooders, but question-
able whether production would continue;
cost of separation is very groat,
5. Control techniques
a. international vs. national teams?
b. international research center?
c. mechanism of communication?
d. access to "objects of control"; meaning
of language of May 10 proposal?
o. usefulness of open information via press,
trade, travel?
F. The purpose of a program for the reduction
in armaments should be:
1. To increase the relative strength of the
U. S. now and in the projected future.
2. To provide a more absolute physical secu-
rity for the continental U. S. and its possessions.
3. To create a better atmosphere for the
normal development of our institutions and way
of life in the U. S. and in the free world,
4. To open up the Soviet bloc so that dome-
cratic institutions can grow and survive in that
area, and the reduction of mystery and threat
from that area.
5. To reduce the economic pressure of arma-
ment in the free world.
6. To obtain for the U. S. a position of moral
leadership in the world working for an exten-
sion of freedom and democracy to help the
underdeveloped countries make economic and
political progress.
7. To reduce tension and fear all over the
globe.
IT, TOPICAL OUTLINE FOR A STUDY OF
THE TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC
BACKGROUND FOR A U. S. POSITION
ON REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS
A. Projection of relative free world and Com-
munist positions if present policy continues-
10 years, 25 years.
New weapons, etc.
Is the security of the U. S. increasing or
decreasing as the cold war develops?
What strains develop in the economic,
political, and military situation in the free
world allies and in the Soviet bloc?
Query: is reduction of armament or rate of
growth a political, economic, or military
necessity for the free world or for the Soviet
bloc?
Important in this topic is increase in atomic
stockpile, peaceful uses of atomic energy for
powers all over the globe, Now aircraft and
ballistic missiles, dispersion problems and
increasing independence of smaller coun-
trios.
The rise of Asian political consciousness.
The future of Japan, China, India, SE Asia.
The increasing power of the U. K. and the
rising power of Germany. Above all, the
increasing economical growth of the USSR.
Can our position of leadership and superiority
if true) be maintained under the changing
circumstances? Is being ahead sufficient for
the physical protection of the U. S. and the U. S.
way of life?
 B. What U. S. commitments must be main-
tained?
(a) What U. S. forces must exist even if there
were no overwhelming threat of Soviet ex-
pansion? What military power must the U. S.
possess to fulfill its commitments in the U. N.
and to keep peace in the world, i. e., vis-a-vis,
China, the Arab states, SE Asia, France,
Germany, change in Japanese attitudes, weak-
ness of India, etc.? In short, what military
strength and organization is necessary to
promote the national interest and support
national policy?
(b) What military strength could be per-
mitted to USSR so that it can fulfill its require-
ments for self-defense without being a powerful
threat to its neighbors and to the world?
C. Problems of the reduction or abolition of
the stockpile of atomic weapons.
(a) With the destruction of the stockpile
and plants for the production of plutonium,
U" and diffusion plants for the enrichment of
uranium.
1. Effect on the infant atomic industry.
The direction of development of nuclear
power.
2. Inspection problems, intelligence in gen-
eral. Technical devices for inspection.
3. What military capability we would
have left in peacetime military establish-
ment and in case of emergency.
(b) Reduction of weapons but with contin-
uation of plants for production of fissionable
material.
D. Technical problems arising from reduction
of armaments.
(a) Purpose and composition of forces for each
important industry:
Interest of L. S. A. (continental)
1. Diminution, of surprise and maximum
utilization of U. S. natural defenses, wide
oceans, northern wastes, effective elimina-
tion of long-range surprise attack on U. S. by
aircraft, submarine, and ships and missiles
carrying large atomic warheads.
2. Strong defensive power and strategic
and tactical early warning through radar,
intelligence, etc.
3. Retaliatory force in being under proper
control.
Interest of D. S. A.'(allies and free world)
1. Protection of Western Europe warning
systems, neutralized zones. Compositions of
land armies and tactical air forces.
2. Outlying possessions and allies, Japan,
Philippines, Hawaii, etc.
3. Keep sea lanes and communications
open and safe.
4. Mobility and easy transportability.
(b) Enforcement, inspection, and control:
To achieve the objectives of D. The reduc-
tion in armament cannot be on the basis of
percentages or numerical strength or a formal
abolition of some weapon such as atomic
weapons, but must be on the basis of weapon
systems and the inspection enforcement and
control will vary with the different weapon
systems.
(a) Land armies and armored troops-
straight forward method.
(b) Navies, ships and submarines-not
difficult to check, must watch out for
conversions.
(c) Aircraft
1. Ordinary aircraft easy to defend.
2. High performance at long or short
range and high speed over 0.8 Mach very
thoroughly controlled.
3. Missiles-thorough control even in
research and development stages.
4. Atomic Weapons
Elimination impossible with certainty.
Massive production difficult with in-
spection.
Techniques for detection of diversion,
not certain but will diminish surprise.
 III. MEMORANDUM
IDEAS DEVELOPED IN DISCUSSION RELATING TO D. Z. BECIU ER'S LETTER OF
JUNE 3 ON DISARMAMENT
Participants: Bronk, Haworth, Fisk, Beckler, and Berkner at meetings of June 30-July 1, 1955.
A. What are the relative advantages to the free world of control of armaments per Be compared
to the situation as it is and will develop in the absence of control?
On the side of control:
1. Are we willing to continue the present great tensions which the threat of almost unlimited
destruction by nuclear weapons poses to both sides?
2. Is it possible that the present armament activity will shortly lead us to either a financial
or a technical situation from which we acquire growing weakness rather than a continuance
of strength? (Relative strength must be measured in terms of a time scale but our planning
must not only consider our present situation but the future development of this situation
in both the political and technical sense.)
3, Even if we can succeed technologically in retaining our military strength in the game of
measure and countermeasure, will the economic strain tend to destroy the American ideals
of freedom and progress that differentiate it from the "isms"? In other words, even if we
can afford the necessary uncontrolled arms race in new weapons, will not the pressures
of the race destroy our free culture?
4. Is it possible that negotiation on, and steps toward, disarmament could lead to the
disintegration of the "Iron Curtain" thereby supplying us with new strength in new direc-
tions to replace the advantage of present military strength?
On the side of status quo:
1. Would not any form of control over disarmament tend to diminish our present strength
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?
2. Would not disarmament perpetuate the captivity of the Satellites and endanger Western
Europe or other strategic areas?
3. Is not the apparent Russian position evidence of the fact that our military strength is
having a powerful, persuasive effect in modifying certain of their undesirable ideas, and,
if so, would it not be unfortunate at the present time to curtail our military activity?
In other words, if we have them on the run, should we weaken our hand now?
4. Are we necessarily going to lose our strength advantage at any time?
5. Must we assume that a nuclear war would lead to almost unlimited destruction or can
technology contain nuclear destruction in the future?
6. What is the relationship of disarmament to consequent increase in power and influence of
third parties?
B. Quite independently of limitations in armaments, the establishment of mutual inspection
operations may have merit. This could be an important step toward the ultimate breakdown of
the Iron Curtain. In particular, an inspection, if it can be devised, which would reveal the onset
of immediate preparation for a passive blow with nuclear weapons would have the following benefits.
k
tt
i
ac
.
se a
1. It would greatly diminish the possibility of surpr
2, It would generally reduce the possibility of widespread armed conflict.
3. It would induce stability by reducing extent of unfounded suspicions.
4. It would reduce the need for excessive armament in the face of the unknown.
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154 CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION SECRET
We are under no illusion that inspection could be obtained without some cost to us. But we
should evaluate cost in terms of gains.
Inspection and control need not be tied together. It is valuable to think of them separately.
It would be unwise to agree to a control system based on inspection until we know how to
make inspection work and can evaluate it.
C. Basic questions that might be answered by the Science Advisory Committee to aid the
U. S. Government in assessing, developing and evaluating plans for inspection and control.
1. What are the relative strengths derived from various combinations of weapons systems in
relation to different conditions of armaments control.
(a) Which combinations from our point of view are superior, tolerable, and intolerable?
(b) What (numerically) would be the effect on U. S. position now and in the future of
abandoning nuclear weapons?
(1) altogether
(2) retain for air defense
(3) other
(4) does control necessarily require control of nuclear matter?
(c) Is inspection of nuclear materials technically feasible?
(1) What would be precision of estimates?
(2) What is tolerance in accuracy of estimate?
(d) Is "inspection" of means of "long-range" delivery technically feasible?
(1) What would be precision of estimates?
(2) What is tolerance in accuracy of estimate?
(e) What kind of inspection of other than nuclear weapons is necessary to make a control
or disarmament plan feasible; is the necessary inspection technically feasible?
(1) conventional
(2) B & CW
(3) other unconventional
(f) How does one develop and adapt inspection procedures necessary to reveal the de-
velopment of any unanticipated (or now) type of weapons and weapon systems?
2. Is a "fail safe" communications system technically possible?
3. What are the values of inspection and how can we arrange it?
(a) Assuming the Iron Curtain to be one of the great military weapons of all time, can we
evaluate the value of "inspection" as a major means of destroying it?
(1) intelligence value of inspection U. S. vis-d-vis USSR.
(2) negation of surprise
(3) social effects on "climate"
(These points require amplification.)
(b) What type of inspection would best accomplish these ends?
(c) How could the USSR be induced to join an inspection system that is completely satis-
factory to us?
(1) Having evaluated independent values of inspection, what would we be willing to
trade for it?
(2) Could inspection be presented with sufficient attractiveness to obtain Soviet
alliance without undue cost to us?
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SECRET CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION 155
IV. MEMORANDUM
REPORT OF CAMBRIDGE MEETING ON CONTROL OF ARMS SPONSORED
BY SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
A two-day meeting was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 20 and 21, to discuss in a
preliminary manner possible technical approaches to the control of arms through an inspection
system.
Those in attendance all or part of the meeting were:
David Z. Beckler----------------- Science Advisory Committee
Ivan A. Getting------------------ Raytheon Manufacturing Company
Edmund A. Gullion______________ Stassen Staff
Marshall G. Holloway ------------- Lincoln Laboratory, M. I. T.
James R. Killian----------------- Massachusetts Institute of Technology & SAO
Edwin H. Land__________________ Polaroid Corporation
Allen Latham, Jr----------------- Arthur D. Little, The,
Max F. Millikan_________________ Institute International Studies, M. I. T.
Bruce S. Old_____________________ Arthur D. Little, Inc. & SAC
Emmanuel R. Pioro_______________ Avco Manufacturing Company & SAC
Edward M. Purcell--------------- Howard University
Hartley Rowe____________________ United Fruit Company
Earl P. Stevenson---------------- Arthur D. Little, Inc.
Roger S. Warner----------------- Cambridge Corporation
William Webster_________________ New England Power Company
Jerrold R. Zacharias______________ Massachusetts Institute of Technology & SAC
1. The major Soviet strategic threat was its capability of launching a surprise attack. Thus,
the major purpose of an inspection system must be aimed at detecting and blunting any such move
by the Soviet.
2. Massive buildup of army and navy forces could probably be detected by inspection of
depots, combat supply points, and naval bases as long as ninety days before an attack.
3. SAC inspection is an entirely different situation, since its dedicated purpose and its opera-
tions are aimed at maintaining a constant capability of surprise attack or instant retaliation.
Therefore, the majority of the time was spent in discussing means of inspection to prevent
surprise air attack.
The general conclusions reached and observations made were:
1. A limited inspection system can be devised which will increase the probability of detecting
hostile intentions two to twenty-four hours before the launching of a surprise air attack, Detection
of hostile intentions as long as ninety clays prior to such an attack would require cortain limitations
in armaments which would probably have to be violated in order to build up a surprise capability.
Some Elements of Short-Term Detection
a. Observers at Large Air Bases. An inspection system limited to this alone would provide
little or no warning of a surprise attack, However, it would have intelligence and other
values as an important stop in international inspection.
 156 CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION SECRET
b. Right to Unlimited Scheduled Overflight, This is essential to any inspection system for
minimizing surprise attack going beyond paragraph a above. Such overflight would be
carried out in an inspected, identified international plane.
c. Inspection of Long-range Aircraft Traffic. A system of scheduled flight plans for all
long-range aircraft, commercial, tankers or SAC bomber practice flights, and a reporting and
tracking system would be required to account for long-range aircraft in order to detect devia-
tions and possible hostile intentions. Electronic beacons might be devised to assist in the
accounting. Limitations of total number of bombers in the air may be required.
d. Inspection of Payload. Detection of the marrying of weapons to airplanes is one of the
big inspection problems. All long-range aircraft would have to be inspected, especially for
nuclear weapons. This would be valuable despite the possibility of concealed weapons and
secret staging bases.
e. Observers at Delivery Vehicle Production Centers. This would make available production
figures and minimize the possibility of clandestine modification of aircraft.
f. Reliable "Fail Safe" Communications. This is a problem of authentication as well as
communication. Cryptographic means of identification as well as arrangements for inspectors
and their location require study.
g. Inspection and Control of Nuclear Materials and Weapons. Inspection and control
sufficient to keep illegal diversions to within the accuracy of normal accountability (Sec con-
clusion 2.). The importance of limited inspection will increase with time as the USSR
approaches nuclear and delivery parity with the U. S. Although such inspection can reduce
both the possibility and probability of surprise attack, it cannot be relied upon to the exclusion
of tactical warning devices. It can be importantly supplemented by unilateral intelligence
activities. We cannot afford to pay a high price for one- to two-day warning (as by giving up
European bases). Although these inspections and controls can be circumvented or spoofed,
they may introduce such uncertainties into Soviet planning as to discourage the launching of a
global war.
To be effective the inspection indicated above would have to be extended to the entire
Soviet bloc. It would require hundreds of U. S, nationals; although, representatives of neutral
nations could also be used,
Although a surprise attack could be mounted without detectable activity in the army and
navy, such activity might precede an attack. In any case, the posting of inspectors at central
points involving these services would be useful as a source of intelligence for us and a restriction
on Russian preparations to follow up a surprise attack.
2. Any inspection system involving inspection of fissionable materials production should be
based on the assumption that a certain small percentage of the total production (about one to
three percent) cannot be accounted for and could be secretly diverted to illegal uses.
However, an inspection system capable of accounting for fissionable materials down to even
a few percent would be highly worthwhile in refining our estimates of USSR production and would
be essential to control and/or inspection of the distribution of fissionable materials for weapons use.
This conclusion assumes that clandestine nuclear production facilities in the USSR and her
satellites would be detectable through inspection. The quantity of fissionable materials which
could be diverted over the next five years without detection could be sufficient for some ton to
one hundred weapons, including thermonuclear. If our retaliatory power is decreased or con-
centrated on few bases during this period, the diverted weapons could decisively cripple our
retaliatory power if not our population and industry.
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4 CRET CONTROL Or ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION 151
To the above estimate of unaccountable material must be added the irreducible error in
'-counting for past production of fissionable materials.
It follows that there can be no absolute safety in inspecting and controlling fissionable mate-
als production per so; although, such inspection would complicate preparations and plans for a
^rprise attack and would restrict the number of weapons available for delivery. The danger
roan such secreted material can be substantially reduced through control and/or inspection of
Jr delivery systems coupled with strengthening the defensive systems of the countries involved,
'his is a point the Science Advisory Committee will have to consider further.
3. We do not believe that the dangers of secret diversion of weapons materials are such as
o require a cessation of the production of fissionable materials. This would seriously stall the
loveloping nuclear power industry. Some compromise with the State Department moratorium
des might be possible by continuing U-235 but halting Pu-239 production, as there is at present
-to power use for plutonium. Continued production coupled with a reasonable inspection and
3ontrol system over production and delivery could minimize the dangers attendant to continued
production of fissionable materials.
It is worth investigating the possibility that inspection and control of the flow of fissionable
material could be facilitated through the addition of a long half-life radioisotope which could signal
the presence of fissionable material to an inspector in the vicinity who is equipped with a radiation
detection device.
4. Control of one delivery system may convert other uncontrolled delivery systems from
secondary to primary threats duo to the transfer of energies of the secret aggressor, Restrictions
on aircraft delivery would require special attention to the detection and possible control of clan-
destine delivery within the U.S., delivery by ships and submarines, and the use of biological, chemical,
and radiological warfare.
5. In addition to proposing inspection arrangements for lessening the possibility of a surprise
attack, consideration should be given to the following actions which, if necessary, could be taken
apart from inspection of air delivery capabilities. All of these actions would necessarily require
verification through specialized types of inspection and would be implemented in progressive
phases. This could be preceded by general discussions with the USSR on. types of activities and
plants which require inspection:
a. Open nuclear power plants to the public, disclosing total capacity and fuel,
b. Disclosure of size of nuclear stockpile,
c. Disclosure of numbers of aircraft.
d. Nonproduction of high supersonic aircraft.
e. Nonproduction of intercontinental and other strategic missiles and limitation of test
facilities.
Since this weapon and the aircraft of paragraph a are not yet in existence, and there is a good
chance of detection in numbers, there might be advantage to the U. S. in proposing nonproduc-
tion at this time.
f. Nonproduction of bacteriological warfare agents.
This could have unique good will value and provide a basis for cooperation in the life sciences,
Anticrop agents would not be included in this prohibition. BW might be a good guinea pig
area in which to initiate international inspection.
B. Inspection and control should not extend to research and development of new weapons
nefit
This.1imitation is necessary to avoid the technological surprise and leacktime which might
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158 CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND MUTUAL INSPECTION SE ORE, T
the country which carried on clandestine research and development in violation of a control
agreement.
7. In assessing schemes for inspection and control of armaments and related activities, em-
phasis should be placed in the over-all probability of success in detection indications of hostile
intent rather than on absolute reliability in every step of inspection and control. Even though
the chances of deception and evasion in any given step may be ninety percent, a chain of five Buell
steps would have an over-all probability of success of less than sixty percent. Secondly, the in-
spection plans must be measured against our present knowledge of the USSR rather than solely
on the basis of what information would be ideally required. Third, the plans must be evaluated
against the 1960 conditions of nuclear and delivery equality rather than against our fading weapons
superiority.
Any presently conceived system of inspection and control can be circumvented to a clangorous
degree by massive deception practiced by a vast country with a totalitarian government. There-
fore, it is highly important that the U. S. not place confidence in any inspection and control systonl
at the expense of maximum military preparedness under the agreements and of constant national
alertness.
8. Inspection of indicators of national productive capacity such as, the stool, petroleum,
aluminum, power, coal, etc., industries, is not a promising avenue for detection of hostile intentions.
The USSR has already in being an industry capable of supporting a war. Such an inspection of
China would be more to the point.
There was some difference of opinion as to whether the U. S, in spending twelve percent of GNP
for arms was thereby keeping inordinate pressure on the USSR to the extent that the USSR is
talking peace to gain relief, or whether the U. S, current arms spending is more to be considored a
drain on our progress in our world-wide fight against Communism.
9. There was a plea that the Science Advisory Committee try to set down what it considered
to be the ideal control of arms system. Then one might be able to tailor properly an efl'ectivo
inspection system. In general, one could consider as a bare outline for the ideal case:
a. Strong national defensive capability with limited inspection. Make attack obviously
unprofitable.
b. Limited offensive retaliatory capability with full inspection.
c. Brush fires to be handled by a UN Brigade.
BRUCE S, OLD, August 8, 1965.
Distribution: Members and Consultants, SAC Attendants at Cambridge Meeting as listed
on Page 1.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE of DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
V. MEMORANDUM WASHINGTON 26, July 2#, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Washington Seminar on Inspection and Control of Armaments
In accordance with the wishes of the Science Advisory Committee, an informal discussion on
inspection and control of armaments was held on July 11 and 12, 1956, The following persons
participated in this discussion, full or part-time: David Z, Beclder, Ralph Clark, Hugh L. Dryden,
Captain Donald W. Gladney (Mr. Stassen's office), Colonel A. J. Goodpaster, Lawrence J. Hendcr-
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 son, Jr., Ellis A. Johnson, Stefan T. Possony, Herbert Scoville, Jr., William Shocldcy, Merle A.
Tuve, and Alan T. Waterman.
A summary of the opinions expressed is enclosed. This summary has been checked with
selected members of this group, but it has not been possible to circulate it to all who were present.
DAVID Z. BECKLnn,
Executive Officer,
Science Advisory/ Committee.
ODM-12733
VI. SUMMARY OF VIEWS
AD HOC GROUP ON INSPECTION AND CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS MEETINGS IN
OFFICE OF THE ODM SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTED, July 11 and 12, 1955
1. The development of multimegaton thermonuclear weapons and long-range aircraft have
greatly increased the risk of a surprise attack. Fifty to one hundred well-placed bombs on U. S.
targets would at least effectively cripple if not defeat this country.
2. An inspection system could somewhat increase the probability of warning and reduce the
risk of surprise attack. There is no practical inspection system which can assure warning. Even
though unreliable from a warning standpoint, the experimental, intelligence and psychological
value of inspection would be highly advantageous to the U. S. Acceptance of an inspection system
requires considerable build-up of our defense posture, including non-military defenses. Strong
measures would need to be taken to be sure other intelligence activities were improved and
strengthened.
3. Although the group was pessimistic that both a reliable and mutually acceptable inspection
system could bq devised, it felt that the potential importance of developing such a system justifies
serious study.
4, Three levels of armaments require further study in terms of the risks of surprise attack and
its probable consequences (a) the uncontrolled armaments raco, (b) intermediate levels of disarma-
ment, and (c) very low levels of armament, It was agreed that level (a) would be unstable because
the groat destructive power possessed by both sides might lead to an irrational decision to attack
because of a temporary technological advantage accruing to the aggressor nation, Level (b) would
likewise be unstable because the possibility of deception and the availability of reliable information
on relative capabilities would make a favorable outcome probabilistic for the U, S. Level (c) would
require some means of neutralizing the manpower of the USSR with her advantage of interior lines
of communication.
5. The group felt a need for a more precise quantitative, estimate of the degree of accuracy
required in estimating violations of an inspection system in terms of capabilities for surprise attack.
6. Several suggestions were made for limited inspection possibilities to determine what is
required for adequate inspection and warning time and to develop techniques for more general
inspection arrangements,
a. Experimentation within the U. S. employing U. S. nationals to inspect SAC operations, and
U. S. industry.
b. U. S.-USSR inspection of a specific weapons system, e. g., strategic air forces,
c. U. S,-USSR inspection of agreed upon selected geographical areas within each country.
7. A brief examination of possible combinations of inspection and controls to facilitate inspec-
tion (as contrasted with limitations) did not disclose any scheme which could not easily be circum-
vented by a determined enemy to prevent warning during the interval required to launch a surprise
attack. Further, any inspection scheme must consider the possibility that weapons, troops, ma-
teriel and production could be concealed in China or the Soviet Bloc,
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8. There was agreement that a tight inspection system for fissionable material production
would be unrealistic because of the manifold possibilities of diversion, and that controls over de-
livery vehicles were more practicable than over nuclear production.
9. However, there was lack of agreement on the need for inspection and control of nuclear
production. One view rejected nuclear inspection and control as impractical and misleading,
Another view was that the stockpiling of nuclear weapons should be limited to a large but limited
number (such as 500) whereby expected errors in inspection would not be dangerous, but total
destruction in the event of global war could be somewhat restricted as compared with unlimited
stockpiling (thousands of atomic weapons).
10. An inspection and control arrangement must be time-phased to accommodate changes in
weapons systems (as in going from long-range aircraft to the ICBM).
11. There is no basis for hope in being able to control the design or performance characteristics
of weapons systems or to outlaw weapons because of the possibilities of designing around and
circumventing such restrictions. The psychological advantages of outlawing large-scale fallout
through agreements to control the employment of thermonuclear weapons requires study.
12. A possible alternative to control of arms is to balance military power such as by promoting
atomic capabilities on the part of other nations including neutrals.
VII. COPY OF LETTER
C THE RAND CORPORATION C
0 1625 Eye Street, N. W. 0
P WASHINGTON 6, D. C. P
Y Y
August 11, 1965
WL-1054
Pursuant to your suggestion, I have written Dr. DuBridge and enclose a copy of my letter for
your information.
With respect to the summary report you prepared, which I think is excellent, I havo only
two comments:
1. Concerning the second paragraph, which discusses the advantages to the U. S. of inspection,
I should like to point out that there may be hidden disadvantages to us which have perhaps not
been fully examined. It is by no means clear to me that I would want, for example, to agree to
mutual inspection of SAC and SUSAC bases, even though we know very little about the outward
aspects of SUSAC and they know a great deal about SAC. This involves operational and political
intelligence considerations in an important way, not simply the question of intelligence on physical
objects. I think this is a fairly important point.
2. With respect to the paragraph on the three levels of armament, I would not be too sure that
the high level would be unstable because of temporary technological advantage on the part of the
aggressor. It may well be unstable for other reasons, but I doubt that Soviet policy makers at a
high level would initiate an attack, say, because they had an ICBM and we didn't and had no
Mr. DAVID Z. BECELER
Executive Officer
Science Advisory Committee
Office of Defense Mobilization
Executive Office of the President
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
DEAR DAVE:
 defense against it. It is too risky from the operational standpoint to rely on this kind of thing in
the case of a really serious policy decision. Besides, I don't see the relation between level of arma-
ment and technological advantage. Wouldn't the latter be more important in the case of lower
levels of armament?
I hope I was able to be of some help and appreciate the fine job you did in preparing the
summary.
Best regards,
Sincerely,
(s) LARRY
L. J. HENDERSON, JR.
Attachment Associate Director.
VIII. COPY OF LETTER
C THE RAND CORPORATION C
0 1625 Eye Street, N. W. 0
P WASHINGTON 6, D. C. P
Y Y
August 11, 1955
WL-1053
Dr. L. A. DuBRrnGE
Science Advisory Committee
Office of Defense Mobilization
lxecutive Office of the President
WASHINGTON 26, D. C.
DEAR Lnn:
As you may know, Dave Beclder asked me to join with Hugh Dryden, Alan Waterman, and
Merle Tuvo, among others, in a session held here in July on the subject of the control of armaments,
for the purpose of possible assistance to your Committee. Dave tells me the summary report of
our meetings is being made available to your Committee, and when I told him that I had some
_additional notions which might possibly be of assistance in your deliberations, he suggested that
I write to you.
I should first like to say that this letter is purely an expression of my personal views and is
being submitted solely in the hope that it may possibly call the attention of your Committee to
some aspects of the problems you are considering which may not otherwise have been brought to
light. I certainly have no specific proposals to make nor even any suggestions as to solutions of
the very complex and difficult problems involved. However, the general matter of control of
armaments and inspection appears to me to be so critically linked to the security of the free world
that I felt impelled to set down some of my thoughts, however ill-considered, in the hope that
I might perhaps contribute something,
DISARMAMENT
Disarmament, or limitation on armament, seems to me to be a subject on which there are in
some quarters a good many misconceptions. Most of us have perhaps been conditioned to believe
that limitation or reduction of armaments is something to be desired in itself. It is not at all clear
to me that this is necessarily so. For present purposes, lot us assume that what we really wish is
to avoid war or at least a cataclysmic war. We might say. then that this is the end, and disarma-
ment simply one conceivable means to this end. Disarmament or control of armaments is, not
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 therefore an end in itself. It is conceivable, in fact even quite possible, that means other than
disarmament may be preferred. Until recently this has been the position of our government since
the Korean war.
It seems to me, therefore, that we should examine the control of armaments objectively in
terms of probable pay-off and cost in comparison with other means to the same end. Perhaps
an analogy is the local police force. Here the end is the reduction or control of crime. The
reduction of the police force is not an end in itself, although if the end can be achieved while at the
same time reducing the police force without adding other burdens upon the community, then
sometimes the reduction of the police force might be justified. However, in practice such instances
appear to be rather rare.
Considering the end of avoiding or reducing the probability of a catastrophic war and looking
at control of armaments as a means to this end, we then must determine how we can get the ammo
or better protection against the probability of war, at a lower cost, while disarming. If this condi-
tion could be achieved, then disarmament might appear desirable. However, there are certain
facts of life which we must face. In the first place, in the opinion of many responsible people,
our protection is now inadequate. Our present and planned military capability does not look
very impressive in the light of the growing Soviet atomic stockpile, long-range Air Force capability,
and missile development programs. It might, therefore, well be argued that even our present
armament program is grossly inadequate to achieve the protection we require.
A second problem is that in the atomic and thermonuclear era, as opposed to earlier eras,
where mobilization and leisurely preparation after the outbreak of war were possible, reduction
or control of armaments would almost certainly have to be supplemented by other measures such
as passive defense, dispersal and hardening of our remaining forces, etc. These additional meas-
ures might in fact cost as much as a higher armament level and might not necessarily give us as
much protection. This, I am afraid, is a point which has not been adequately considered by those
who see in disarmament a step toward reduction in government expenditures. Furthermore, we
all know how difficult it is to persuade people to take the kind of supplementary action required
to maintain our safety at even the present level. Measures looking to the reduction of vulnera-
bility in our military are woefully slow of adoption and certainly our civil defense program has
not been outstandingly successful. If the political or other considerations which have caused those
programs to lag are of a permanent or seimipermanent nature (i. e,, we just won't make up our
minds to do these things) then disarmament or control of armaments might in fact be suicide from
a practical standpoint.
One aspect of control of armaments which has perhaps not received as much consideration as
it should relates to the relative ratios of types of armament or weapons systems. This is of course
a familiar problem when put in terms of USSR manpower vs. U. S. air-atomic technology, but it is
more complex than this and should probably receive considerable study. Clearly the Soviets
have studied it or they would not have come out with the rather specific proposals they have made.
As a corollary, much is said nowadays about the higher probability of peripheral or limited
war vs. total war. It seems quite conceivable that some forms of control or limitation on arma-
ments which might appear desirable from the standpoint of total war could be very undesirable
in terms of the free world's capability to deter, or, if necessary, wage limited or peripheral wars.
INSPECTION
In looking at the inspection problem, which perhaps can best be considered separately from
the disarmament problem, one is struck by the fact that here also the Soviets seem to have a
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SECRET CONTROL 01" ARMAMEIMTSI ANT) TUTTIMAT. TVQ~~MTnm
notion of what they want which is more concrete than any we have officially adopted. I under-
stand that Charlie Lauritsen has suggested that a careful analysis be made of the Soviet proposals
in an attempt to determine what it is they want or expect to learn from their inspection in the U. S.
This would appear to be an extremely desirable study to have made. I am not at all sure that we
know what it is we want to know about the Russians. This should certainly be given very careful
study in terms not only of objectives but of feasibility and reliability.
In looking at USSR inspection in the U. S., I think we perhaps tend to exaggerate Soviet knowl-
edge of our true operational capabilities. Undoubtedly, they have much better intelligence con-
cerning us than we do concerning them. On the other hand, the confidence they can place in
the information they have may be low enough so their doubts greatly restrict their freedom of
decision. I submit that it is eminently desirable for us to avoid any reduction in these doubts,
for reasons which I shall not go into here but which I shall be glad to discuss with you at any
time. Outward appearances, even on a fairly detailed basis, are very different from a real and
accurate knowledge of true capabilities.
There is a brief suggestion in the summary report of our meetings here in Washington relat-
ing to the balance of military power. This has to do with the possibility of changing the bi-polar
world, at least in military terms, to a multi-polar one. This is an extremely complicated and
difficult problem but perhaps should be studied much more. carefully than it has been, There are
a variety of possibilities.
Even if we took no action, the U. K. and almost certainly some other European nations will
acquire an air-atomic military capability before too long. There are things we could do about
this natural growth. We could accelerate it by support of various kinds or we could, conceivably,
actually create an atomic capability on the part of our allies, or even neutrals, such as India.
Perhaps the existence of multiple atomic capability would not be an unmixed blessing; on the
other ]land, it might reduce the confidence of the Soviets that they could achieve all their objec-
tives by a massive blow against one nation, such as the U. S. It seems to me that this is an area
which requires searching examination.
There is one aspect of disannament which might be mentioned here as it is related to the
question of multi-polar capability. Some armament control schemes which might look attractive
to us or be in our interest might not be in the interest, say, of the U. K., because of the difference
in the state of their atomic or military programs. Presumably such angles are being considered
by the U. S., but there has been very little mention of them to my knowledge.
I am afraid this is a rather disjointed and fragmentary letter, but I hope it may perhaps
contribute to your discussions in a small way.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
/s/ LARRY
L. J. HENDERsoN, JR.
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Thresholds of Armament Effort
U. S. and U. S. S. R.
Originator: Stacy May
Critic: George A, Lincoln
Paper 14
The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibilities of increasing the volume of armament
production to a point where there would be a good prospect of straining the Soviet economy to
the breaking point by inducing a competitive effort beyond that which its economy could support,
1. CURRENT U. S. AND USSR COMPARI-
SIONS-TOTAL ECONOMIC OUTPUT
AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES
Perspective upon the question at issue is
furnished by comparing the rough magnitudes
of the two economics and their respective
military expenditure commitments,
The United States
1. The Gross National Product of the
United States is currently about $385 billion.
2. Our total military outlays are of the order
of $40 billion, or between 10 and 11 percent of
the GNP.
3. Our annual expenditures on military hard
goods amount to somewhat less than one-half
of our total defense outlays,
The USSR
1, The Gross National Product of the USSR
is estimated at around $125 billion, or about
one-third that of the U. S.
2, Its total military outlays are estimated at
something over $20 billion, or 10 to 18 percent
of the GNP.
3. Its annual production of military hard
goods is estimated at around $10 billion,
Comparison of the Two
In proportion to the size of its economy, the
USSR is spending about 50 percent more than
we are for military expenditures as a whole
and for the sub-category of military hard goods,
although the absolute amount of the expend-
itures in each case is only one-half as large as
ours.
The latter statement, taken at face value, is
apt to lead to erroneous conclusions, for:
a. With only about half of the "soft item"
expenditures of the United States, the USSR
supports far larger military contingents than
we do. Among the factors that make this
possible are their far lower pay and sub-
sistence scales and their comparatively large
concentration of military personnel grades in
the lower rank and pay brackets,
b, Similarly, in the matter of military
hard goods production, the USSR appears
to get a larger quantitative return than is
indicated by expenditure figures of currencies
theoretically reduced to a common base.
Intelligence estimates of comparative arma-
ment production seem to indicate a Soviet
production roughly comparable in over-all
magnitude to ours, although the comparison
is admittedly difficult because of wide dis-
crepancies that fall one one side or the other
 in various weapon categories, and of qualita-
tive differences that are hard to appraise.
Seemingly, a much greater degree of stand-
ardization in a variety of major weapon
types on the part of the USSR is an important
factor in producing this result.
At any rate, upon the basis of prevailing
practices and methods of comparing expendi-
tures in the two currencies, it is reasonable to
assume that the USSR could match an ex-
pansion in our overall military outlays at half
the cost represented in our budget. It is not
so clear that this would hold true for a matching
of military hard goods expenditures alone,
particularly if such matching were called for
upon a selective basis. In a number of fields,
such as electronic equipment, the ratio of
Soviet expenditures to American seems to work
out much closer to a 1-to-1 ratio. Comparatively
large capital equipment expenditures on the
Soviet side might also be involved.
How large an expansion of military effort
could the USSR economy support? It is
logical to start from this end, since the U. S.
economy, without reference to internal or
external political considerations, is clearly
capable of supporting a greatly augmented
military program.
Intelligence estimates indicate that, again
measured in purely economic terms, the USSR
could mobilize without collapse as much as 40
percent of her total annual production for
military outlays in a cold war setting, and per-
haps as much as 60 percent under all-out war
conditions.
If this appraisal is accurate, the USSR could
support total military outlays of a $50 billion
dimension without intolerable economic strains if
the competitive pressure were deemed to de-
mand it. That would mean a multiplication of
her present military outlays by two and one-
half times.
Upon the basis of existing U. S: USSR
expenditure ratios of something like 2 to 1, it
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would take a $60 billion dollar increase in total
U. S. military outlays to invoke this Soviet
competitive response. Since a U. S. expansion
of anything like that dimension is far beyond
the range of practical acceptance in the present
domestic and Free World political context, the
concept set forth for exploration in this paper
appears definitely unpromising, at least if the
challenge is offered through an over-all military
outlays approach.
But the prospect of inducing strains in the
Soviet economy appears less fanciful if the
competition is visualized as one that focuses
sharply upon selective military hard goods fields.
If, for example, the United States were able to
achieve a substantial developmental break-
through in major weapons of offense, such as
intercontinental guided missiles, and were
willing to devote considerable additional sums
to their production, there would assuredly be a
considerable pressure upon the USSR to answer
the challenge.
The same result might be obtained by a
United States breakthrough in defensive weap-
ons-particularly in weapons that assured us
of substantial immunity from enemy bombs
delivered by manned aircraft at a time when
the USSR still was vulnerable to our delivery
potential and had not yet developed a massive
capacity for guided missile attack upon us.
Obviously, any breakthrough that would give
us precedence in establishing additionally
effective protection against guided missile
attack would be of even greater significance,
It is by no means clear that the USSR could
expand its output of military hard goods by
anything like 2% times (to a $25 billion level)
in a short period. A recent appraisal estimated
that Russian military hard goods production
at its $10 billion level mortgaged approximately
one-third of her $30 billion per year metal
working industry capacity. By contrast, the
U. S. military hard goods production absorbed
less than 15 percent of our capacity in the
same field. The requirement of matching an
additional $8 or $10 billion expansion of hard
military output would probably cause consid-
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enable internal readjustment of Soviet internal
arrangements that might induce embarrassing
if not untenable strain, if it were of a type that
called for Russian expenditures somewhat com-
parable to ours.
The optimism of the preceding paragraph
should be qualified, however, by a number of
considerations.
It would take a developmental breakthrough
of genuine strategic importance to offer sub-
stantial assurance of sufficient pressure to re-
quire a Soviet response in kind.
Thorn are a number of visualizable clevelop-
monts of this nature that might logically call
for a diversion of current expenditures on either
side, the substitution of now weapon production
for that of weapons currently manufactured,
rather than a not addition to output or ex-
penditures.
The speed with which the USSR would feel
called upon to respond is problematical at best.
In substance, she is in the enviable position of
having control of the trigger. She can be rea-
sonably corlain that, unless she overtly forces
the issue, we will not aggressively attack even
though the aclvantago rests with us. We can
have no such assurance. Therefore, although
such it development as has been promised would
undoubtedly evoke a response, the tempo of
such response could be importantly of Russia's
choosing. The pace could be timed to fall
within the limits of accommodatablo internal
adjustment.
Unilateral action on the part of the United
States to considerably stop up its military ex-
penditures would meet with formidable internal,
allied, and neutralist opposition. The net po-
litical consequences of such repercussions, and
their Communist exploitation, would have to
be carefully weighed. However, it should be
noted that increased U. S. military expenditures
of the type outlined in section II above, could
be rationalized as having a purely defensive
connotation, even though in fact they could
alter the entire balance of massive offensive
potential as a deterrent force. Expenditures
for "defense" could probably be increased with
a minimum of political repercussions.
III. CONCLUSIONS
1. On balance, it does not appear that the
concept put forth at the beginning of this
paper holds sufficient promise at the present
juncture to warrant high precedence in our
current strategy.
2. Time and a change in political climate
could radically alter the appraisal,
3. The potentials of the idea, particularly in
its selected application as suggested, are worthy
of intensive study against a time when the
approach may have greater applicability than
now.
4. Meanwhile, it is significant that our most
hopeful means for inducing at least embarrass-
ing strain in the Soviet economy would seem
to lie in the area of radically increased expendi-
tures for new weapons relating to delivery and
defense against delivery of atomic and hydrogen
bombs, A breakthrough in either of these fields
would be of crucial importance upon solely
strategic considerations. It has the added
virtue of offering the type of production com-
petition that is comparatively most costly for
the USSR to match.
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Paper 15
Psychological and Pressure Aspects of
Negotiations with the USSR
Originator: Henry A. Kissinger
Critic: Stefan Possony
I. THE PROBLEM
The series of negotiations which started with
the Geneva summit conference are forcing the
U. S. to examine again its diplomatic and
psychological posture, to assess the nature of
the process in which we are engaged, and to
determine the moans to deal with its pitfalls.
Perhaps the best way to approach an under-
standing of current negotiations is to compare
them with their counterparts during the hey-
day of "secret diplomacy" in the nineteenth
century, At that time negotiations played a
determinate role: to delimit the area of at-
tainable agreement and to find formulae to
reconcile divergent points of view. Because
no power considered the existence of another
as a threat to its own survival the penalty of
diplomatic defeat was the loss of a tactical
position and not national catastrophe, And
because the risks were smaller, no power felt it
necessary to maintain force levels of a magni-
tude which required intensive preparations of
public opinion, either domestic or allied. The
flexibility of diplomacy was, therefore, much
greater than in an era of imminent nuclear
destruction, In framing his proposals, the
diplomat was more independent of domestic
support and for reasons which can be sum-
marized in these propositions: (1) no gov-
ernment attacked the domestic structure of any
other state; (2) the demands on the population
either in peace or in war were relatively
negligible,
Nothing could be more different from the
situation today. We are confronted by a
power which for over a 'generation has claimed
for its nation both exclusiveness and uni-
versality of social justice; which has based its
domestic control apparatus on the myth Of a
permanently hostile outside world; and which is
building a nuclear capacity to inflict catas-
trophic blows on the U. S. In these circum=
stances the whole pattern of international
relations is transformed. In the face of sub-
version by the Cominform the freedom of
action of many governments is being circum-
scribed. In the face of the demands of the
technological race the U. S. Government must
fight a war on three fronts: domestically, to
generate enough support to build the force-
levels without which we cannot negotiate;
toward our allies, in order not to trade whatever
freedom of action remains to their governments;
and toward the Soviet Bloc, to prevent its
splitting the U. S. system of alliances or to
expand its sphere even further. In this manner,
"normal" diplomatic relations have changed
their meaning. What is at issue is no longer the
adjustment of local disputes between pro-
tagonists agreed on a basic framework, but the
basic framework itself. Diplomatic confer-
ences become sounding boards which attempt
to harmonize conflicting considerations: the
possibility of continuing a domestic consensus
and the relationship of the U. S. to its allies
while determining the area of possible agreement
with the USSR.
 All this is another way of saying that the
predominant aspect of the new diplomacy
is its psychological dimension. If the U. S. in
the process of attempting to establish a better
atmosphere lulls its own people into a false
sense of security it may paralyze itself in the
next round of negotiations. If in order to hold
allies in line the U. S. appeals to its most de-
featist elements, it may gain a propaganda
victory but erode the basis for any decisive
action that may prove necessary. If a detente
is achieved in Europe it may remove the only
incentive of our European allies to support
us in case of a crisis in Asia. The more the
Soviets succeed in giving the impression that
there exists a "third alternative" in the con-
test between the U. S. and the USSR the more
difficult our coalition effort becomes.
And the psychological element is no less true
vis-a-vis the USSR. Let us assume one of
two motives behind recent Soviet maneuvers:
(a) that the USSR sincerely desires an accom-,
modation with the U. S. or (b) that it is simply
playing for time until its nuclear capacity is
more nearly commensurable with that of the
U. S. and until the constellation of forces in
the non-Communist world becomes more fav-
orable. It is true that in case of eventuality
(a) an intransigeant U. S. attitude may lead
in turn to a hardening of the Soviet stand.
(This is so only within limits as will be discussed
below.) But is it no less true that a too rapid
surrender to Soviet blandishments may give
the USSR all the advantages of course (a)
and still retain for the USSR the capabilities
of course (b), i. e., it will still give the Soviets
the option of executing an about-face when it
serves their purpose. Everything therefore
depends on projecting to the Soviet leaders a
correct picture of U. S. determination: if they
are sincere, in order not to mislead them into
believing that a real accommodation can be
purchased by a change of tone alone; and if
they are playing for time, in order not to allow
them to buy it cheaply. In short, it is to the
U. S. interest to strengthen those forces in
the USSR not willing to risk everything for
the sake of expansion but to do so in a manner
which neither disintegrates domestic U. S.
support for a firm policy nor undermines allied
relationships.
The real difficulty with the above observa-
tions arises from applying them to concrete.
situations, particularly if one inquires into the
psychological potential available to achieve
American objectives. There is no doubt that
the desire for peace is the predominant trend
in the public opinion of all the countries of the
world including the Soviet Bloc. It is the
attitude which must be used to legitimize any
U. S. policy. The USSR has so far been most
skillful in utilizing it in two ways: (a) By
talking about peace, in general, it has given
the impression that the outstanding disputes
are minor and that the achievement of peace
depends largely on a change of tone; (b) By
focusing on security problems, such as German
rearmament, the USSR has placed itself in the
position of being threatened and has put the
onus for reassuring it on the West.
Both tactics are eminently to the Soviet
advantage. While the concept of peace is
identified with the ease of international inter-
course it will be relatively simple for the USSR
to play for time and to prolong negotiations as
long as it suits its purpose to negotiate. The
more the Soviet Bloc is permitted to capitalize
on gestures which cost it nothing, such as visits
of Soviet farm delegations or releasing illegally
imprisoned U. S. citizens, the more difficult it
will prove to get popular support for the level
of armament expenditure which brought the
USSR to the conference table in the first place.
The more prolonged the discussions aboub
threats to Soviet security, the more difficult
will it prove to return to the real security prob-
lem: the disproportion in conventional military
strength and the presence of Soviet troops in
the center of the European continent. In the
process unless the U. S. is vigilant it may be
forgotten that no peace is permanent which
does not take into account the nature of power
relationships. Stability is not achieved only
by conciliatory words-at least no statesman
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SECRET NEGOTIATION WITH USSR 171
can gamble the survival of his charge on words
alone particularly under conditions of modern
nuclear capabilities. This is all the more true
when confronted by a power priding itself on
its assessment of "objective" factors to which
professions of good faith unrelated to power
factors will seem caused either by hypocrisy
or stupidity.
If this is true, the U. S. has the following
tasks in the present negotiations: (a) to main-
tain within the U. S. the domestic support for
a continuation of a firm policy; (b) to reduce
the Soviet peace offensive to concrete terms as
quickly as possible; (c) to announce a program
which captures the universal desire for peace
while leaving no doubt that peace can only be
achieved through a series of concrete adjust-
monts; (d) to announce a program which ap-
peals to the general desire for economic ad-
vancement in the, underdeveloped countries;
(e) not to permit the present negotiations to
be conducted solely on a plane where the U. S.
will be placed in the position of reassuring the
USSR. In other words, the presence of Soviet
troops in the center of the continent and the
Soviet satellite orbit must be stressed as one
of the causes of the present tension; (f) to
generate symbols which will create pressures
which the Soviets must include in their calculus
of risks.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENEVA
SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Against the background it may prove useful
to reassess the Geneva conference. There is
no doubt that it yielded some gains for the
U. S.:
a. It demonstrated that U. S. relationships
with its allies can be conducted only as an
aspect of U. S.-Soviet relationships. No
amount of patient discussion with our allies
had the electrifying effect of the U. S. dis-
armament proposal to the USSR.
b. In limited fields and for the time being
the U. S. has gained the diplomatic initiative.
e. For the time being the wind has been
taken out of the sails of the neutralists.
d. If the USSR is really interested in an
accommodation, Geneva has supplied the
atmosphere in which it may occur.
e. It may have launched the USSR on a
process it may find difficult to reverse. In
the present atmosphere ft return to a "hard"
line may have deleterious effects on the
USSR both domestically and abroad.
Many of the above gains are problematical,
however; others are useful only for a limited
time. It is not at all clear for example whether
the USSR cannot reverse its present course at
a moment's notice as it has so often in the
past. On the contrary it may well be that if
the USSR should decide to adopt a more in-
transigeant policy it would derive considerable
benefit from its present line since the Soviet
people at least would probably be convinced
that only provocation on the part of the out-
side world could have led to the new reversal.
Nor is our new-found popularity in the neutralist
press likely to outlast our first attempt to
implement our alliances for something else
than generalities. Above all Geneva has con-
fronted us with the following dangers:
a. Domestically, the "spirit of Geneva"
may make it more difficult to obtain appro-
priations for defense or to continue a firm
policy. The same problem may be faced by
most of our allies.
b. Within NATO, we may have played
into the hand of all the forces making for
inaction. Public support for coalition policy
concerned with anything but a direct threat
to the survival of our European allies may
be reduced.
c. To the extent that tension has been
lowered in Europe we may have isolated
ourselves in Asia for the only incentive for
the support of our European allies in Asia is
their fear of being left alone in Europe.
d. We may have given the USSR an
atmosphere in which to gain time to catch
up in its development of nuclear weapons
 and thereby shift the strategic balance
against us.
e. We have strengthened all the forces
who advocate a third course both in Europe
and in Asia.
f. The policy of the Bonn government
has become more vulnerable domestically.
(See Paper 16.)
III. OUTLINE OF A FUTURE STRATEGY
Whether Geneva was a success or failure
therefore depends on the use we make of it.
We have gained a measure of freedom of action
but it will be of little avail if we do not exploit it.
But what is meant by the term "action" in the
context of a detente or at least a series of
negotiations leading to a detente? What
measures can utilize the psychological potential
of a peace offensive while at the same time
bringing pressure on the USSR? How can we
keep the USSR from gaining time and dis-
rupting our system of alliances without appear-
ing bellicose? What pressures, in short, are
available to the U. S. to bring the negotiations
which started at Geneva to an issue favorable
to us? The answer to these questions depends
on an analysis of what brought the USSR to
the conference table in the first place.
As already noted two interpretations are
possible: (a) that the USSR is simply playing
for time until the constellation of forces in the
outside world is more nearly favorable to it and
until it develops its nuclear capability more
fully, (b) that the USSR has found its previous
course too risky and that it sincerely desires an
accommodation with the U. S. It must be
stressed at the outset that these motivations
are not mutually exclusive. In the short term,
they can coincide or at least it is in the U. S.
interest to make them coincide: i. e., the U. S.
should not permit the USSR to gain time except
on terms which the U. S. considers the basis for
a real accommodation. Conversely, even if the
USSR sincerely desires a settlement it will
undoubtedly seek to buy it as cheaply as
possible. Thus a period of relaxation of
tension which is permitted to remain largely
formal may have the paradoxical result of
tempting the Soviets, whatever their present
intentions, into a more intransigeant attitude
later on if they get through this period with
their power unimpaired.
To be sure, the U. S. should do everything in
its power to strengthen the peaceful elements
within the USSR by giving demonstratons of
limited objectives and by meeting legitimate
Soviet concerns for their security. But the
U. S. cannot gamble its existence on the
assumption of continued Soviet good faith. A
"better atmosphere" is not an end in itself but
only a condition in which U. S. objectives can
be realized. In short, the U. S. while keeping
the door open to a real accommodation must
frame its policy on the assumption of the worst
contingency, that is, that the Soviets are really
playing for time. The most signal achieve.
ment of Geneva has been the emergence of the
President as the most dominant figure on the
world scene and the explosion of the myth of
U. S. intransigeance. This is the platform
from which the U. S. must move in charting its
future strategy.
How then can pressure be brought on the
USSR in the form of a peace offensive? If the
USSR is interested in gaining time, then "time"
itself is negotiable, then the U. S. must sell
time as dearly as possible. This means that
we must overcome the static concept of negotia-
tions which looks at a conference as an isolated
phenomenon the failure of which merely defines
the subject for a future negotiation. Such an
attitude is tailor-made for the Soviets to confuse
the issues while prolonging the semblance of
harmony. If on the other hand we realize that
the failure of negotiation can be used as the
basis for increasing the pressures on the Soviet
Bloc and if no doubt is left that this will be the
result of a failure, we will have created a motive
for Soviet conciliation. For even if the Soviets
are willing to make concessions, they will find
it impossible for domestic reasons except insofar
as the U. S. poses a calculus of risks that will
make yielding appear as the lesser of two evils.
 But how can time be negotiable? It can be
used as a means of pressure if the U. S. an-
nounces objectives whose very existence will
generate pressure on the USSR (i. e., the dis-
armament proposal). Although our tone should
always be conciliatory, it should be made clear
that unless negotiations show some progress
toward these objectives the U. S. will see no
further point in conferences and will await the
time when discussions promise to be more
fruitful. The announcement of these objec-
tives would in itself force the Soviet hand in
case they should wish a long-range settlement
and it will make clear that peace is not equiva-
lent to general statements of good will. By
relating these objectives to definite timetable,
we shall make clear that negotiations cannot
be an end in themselves.
The U. S. therefore faces a threefold task:
(a) to become clear about its own objectives:
specifically, to clarify the extent to which the
Soviet sphere is compatible with U. S. security
and determine what U. S. policy can prevent
further Soviet gains in the uncommitted areas.
It is all the more necessary that the U. S. be
clear about its objectives lest the USSR score
psychological gains by means of concessions
which do not affect the strategic balance (it
will therefore be necessary to develop policies
on the colonial issue, Southeast Asia and the
Formosa Straits); (b) to make these objectives
clear to the American people so that there will
exist public support for a long-range program;
(c) to make clear to the Soviet leadership that
the failure of negotiation entails a penalty, at a
minimum the refusal to continue to negotiate,
at a maximum a stepped-up defense effort.
These goals can be achieved by the following
steps:
(a) A fireside chat by the, President explain-
ing that while Geneva has created a better at-
mosphere it will still be necessary to test Soviet
intentions by concrete measures; that while the
U. S. is willing to negotiate as long as there
exists a hope for concrete results, it will not be
a party to misleading the people of the world if
the negotiations should merely mask continued
Soviet intransigeance. As a first test of the new
atmosphere the President should propose that
the Soviet leaders associate themselves with
him in a declaration that the Big Four oppose
the settlement of disputes by force and that
they will refuse to support materially or other-
wise any effort to settle disputes by force. As
far as the U. S. is concerned such a declaration
would merely formalize what has long been an-
nounced U. S. policy (i. e., the U. S. attitude
toward South Korean threats to advance north)
and it would further strengthen the image of
the President as a man of peace. As for the
USSR, such a declaration is fraught with the
danger of a split with China and it would in any
case make more difficult the strategy of using
the detente in Europe to obtain freedom of ac-
tion in Asia. If the USSR refuses this proposal
we would have an unassailable basis to refuse
further negotiations.
(b) The U. S. should announce a dynamic
program for the underdeveloped areas to con-
vince the USSR that time is not on its side and
to demonstrate the superior viability of the
Free World. This may involve an interna-
tional point IV agency or similar cooperative
ventures and the measures outlined in Paper
16 and others.
(c) The U. S. must maintain its present force
levels and if possible increase them, for, to the
degree that the strategic balance shifts in favor
of the Soviets, their readiness to make conces-
sions will diminish.
(d) The U. S, should continue to push the
Geneva inspection plan but announce at least
partial realization of it as the condition for fur-
ther negotiation.
(e) The U. S. should propose a conference to
discuss concrete measures to lift the Iron Cur-
tain, perhaps beginning with a proposal for free
travel within Germany (See Paper 17).
All these proposals should be designed (a) to
create by their very existence pressure on the
USSR (b) to make Soviet concessions accept-
 able domestically within the USSR; they should
not be calls for surrender but at the same time
they should make clear the penalties of rejection
(c) to attempt to restore fluidity to the diplo-
matic situation by starting a process the
Soviets may find it difficult to control (d) to
make clear to the U. S. public and the rest of
the Free World its dangers as well as its oppor-
tunities (e) above all conciliation should stand
at the end not at the beginning of this process;
it is the price we can. pay the Soviets for concrete
concessions, We can learn from Tito in this
respect: he replied to every Soviet blandish-
ment with a demand for deeds and not words,
until Khrushchev appeared in Belgrade.
SECRET
IV. NOTES ON THE ARMS RACE
A special word must be said in conclusion
about the arms race. There can be little doubt
that the existence of the arms race can in itself
furnish a pressure on the Soviet Bloc. To be
sure, the Soviets can hold their own in some
fields but to the extent that they do so, they
may impose a measure of stagnation on the
Soviet economy and retard Soviet efforts to
industrialize China. On the other hand, Soviet
resources freed by disarmament may well
emerge in a competitive effort in the under-
developed areas. Finally in stressing disarma-
ment plans based largely on the number of
troops under arms, the USSR is seeking to shift
the strategic balance in its favor: (a) because
of its superiority in conventional weapons (b)
because even if it should accept a limitation on
the production of new weapons its stockpile
of conventional weapons is presumably far
superior to that of the Free World.
All these considerations will be dealt with in
detail in other papers. It may be useful, how-
ever, to stress here the psychological aspect of
the arms race which has two facets: (a) its
impact on the USSR (b) its impact on our allies.
Looking at the world through Soviet eyes, the
continuation of a high level of U. S. defense
expenditures, however conciliatory our profes-
sions, will be a source of concern and therefore
SECRET
an effective means of pressure. The U. S.
defense effort can therefore under no circum-
stances be relaxed until we have obtained a
transformation of the strategic situation. It
may be argued that a continued high level of
defense expenditure coupled with a refusal to
negotiate unless the USSR makes concessions
may lure the Soviets into an anticipatory strike.
But it is more than doubtful that the USSR will
launch a "preventive war" unless it considers
its chances better than even, a situation which
our force levels should always be adequate to
prevent. In any case reassuring the USSR is
the task of our diplomacy, not of our military
policy.
The impact of the armaments race on our
allies is more subtle: no matter how disquieted
they may profess to be by American military
preparation, they will be made infinitely more
nervous by a relaxation of this effort. Their
leaders have no illusions, even if their public
has, that U. S. strength is the only obstacle to
the immediate occupation of their country by
Soviet troops. But while the size of the U. S.
military establishment represents the basis for
our diplomacy, the distribution of its force
levels and the strategic concept behind them
supply the basis for its flexibility. The stra-
tegic concept must be adequate to deal with
any form of Soviet aggression for our ability to
act will be largely determined by our planning
before action becomes necessary; and our force
levels must be able to implement this strategic
concept. (It is significant that there has been
increasing debate in the German press about
the meaningfulness of German rearmament.)
The real significance of thermonuclear weapons
may well be that they place a premium on a
strategy which shifts the risk of their use to the
other side by means of an alternative weapons
system. If we stake everything on an all-or-
nothing military policy one of two consequences
becomes inevitable: either our allies will feel
that peace is preferable to wax almost at any
price; or they reduce their military expenditures
on the assumption that events cannot be
affected by their action. In short in order to
 obtain indigenous support for local defense, we opportunities for the U. S. but they will be no
must make local defense meaningful. greater than our strength and if we fail to
Thus even the armaments race has a psycho- grasp them they will merely define the dangers
logical component and one we can ignore only which are inevitable if the USSR gets through
at our peril. The period ahead holds many this period without a major adjustment.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
SECRET
The German Problem
One of the most serious problems facing the
United States is the increasing rigidity of the
diplomatic situation in areas whore the Soviet
position is weakest. While on the surface this
rigidity may seem to work in both ways and
off or a measure of assurance for the maintenance
of the status quo, actually the reverse is true:
for the longer the Soviet bloc can freeze existing
lines of division between it and the Free World,
the more it will give rise to the idea that the
fate of the nations now under Soviet rule and
even more the fate of the nations now divided
depends entirely on the good will of the USSR.
To the extent that this notion gains ground the
U. S. position automatically deteriorates: if the
status quo conies to be generally accepted, the
satellite orbit will require a smaller control
apparatus and, more important, some of the
nations now divided, Germany in particular,
may find a direct deal with the USSR increas-
ingly attractive.
The issue of German unity is ideally suited to
restore a measure of fluidity to the diplomatic
situation. For Germany is the area where we
are diplomatically strongest; there our power
and our moral position are in harmony. By
contrast the USSR can only lose on the issue of
German unity for in almost any form that will
be acceptable to world public opinion German
unity must lead to the collapse of a satellite
regime; it will involve a withdrawal of the Soviet
armies from the center of the continent; it
almost necessarily will raise the issue of the
Oder-Neisse line even if security guarantees
against German aggression are given. One
might add that oven a neutral Germany, as long
Paper 16
as it is rearmed, would be to the Soviet dis-
advantage; it would. still constitute a barrier
to a Soviet advance; it would still exercise
considerable pressure on the satellites. Thus,
on every issue, except the maintenance of the
status quo, the USSR finds itself at a distinct
disadvantage.
It is for this reason that the USSR took its
stand at the November foreign ministers' con-
ference on the security issue. For this is the
one ground on which they can gain public sup-
port both in Western Germany and in Western
Europe: in Western Germany because of the
Socialist argument that only rearmament stands
in the way of German unity, in Western Europe
because of the fear of resurgent militarism in
Germany. But while the Soviet strategy is
understandable we cannot afford to let ourselves
be lured into negotiating only on their ground
and at their pace. European security is the
most disadvantageous negotiating point for us,
because it can be transformed into a technical
problem which deprives it of any symbolic
value, and because of the emotions aroused by
the memories of German aggression. To be
sure, we must be prepared to demonstrate the
hollowness of even this Soviet tactic. But we
need not rest on it; we must be prepared to
show not only that the USSR is not willing to
accept unity on our terms, but that it is
unwilling to accept it on any terms.
And this is equally important in order to
maintain Adenauer's domestic position. For
already there are growing doubts in Germany
about the efficacy of a rearmament in the face
of new weapons' development and a protracted
 diplomatic stalemate may completely erode
the psychological framework which alone can
make German rearmament meaningful. It is
no accident that however the Summit meeting
was received elsewhere, in Germany it was
considered a setback for Adenauer's policy.
The longer negotiations between the USSR and
the U. S. continue without any tangible
progress or at least without a concrete U. S.
proposal which demonstrates bow unity may be
approximated if not achieved, the weaker will
Adenauer's position become. Until November
the German opposition was restrained by the
forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers at
Geneva. Since this passed without result we
can expect the pressures against the implement-
ing legislation for rearmament to multiply.
Color will then be lent to the Socialist argument
that only rearmament stands in the way of
German unity. Moreover not only may it
prove difficult to obtain passage of the necessary
implementing legislation, but pressures for
direct Soviet-German negotiations will increase.
Indeed Soviet strategy may well be designed to
deal on German unity, if at all, directly with the
West Germans, perhaps coupling it with offers
for increased East-West trade.
For all these reasons we must develop an
integrated program for German unity, any
one of the proposals of which we can afford to
have accepted while the acceptance in turn
can only weaken the Soviet position in Eastern
Germany. In drafting such a program we
should focus on the most blatant weakness of
the East German regime, that it cannot afford
a free election. It should, therefore, be our
aim to induce the Soviets to accept or to shoul-
der the onus for refusing free elections for some
all-German organ however circumscribed its
powers. The very fact that there exist two
electoral mechanisms, one for an all-German
body and one for the East German government
coupled with the certainty that free elections
in the Soviet zone would show results totally
different from the controlled elections for the
East German regime would shake the hold
of the Pankov government. The U. S. strategy
on Germany might then take the form of pro-
posals phased in several stages and designed to
shift the onus for the failure of negotiations
on the USSR:
1. In Stage 1, we began by asking for political
unity and all-German elections coupled with a
number of security plans.
2. Now that the Soviets have refused these
proposals, we should announce that since the
USSR did not agree on political unity and since
it would not accept our security proposal we
should move the discussion on a plane which
is divorced either from the issue of political
unity or of rearmament. It should be stated
that the German people should not be deprived
of an approximation to its rightful aspirations
by the inability of the Big Four to agree on
the issue of over-all unity; instead we should
realize German unity in the fields where it is
attainable.
With this general statement the U. S. should
then propose an Economic Parliament for all of
Germany elected by free universal suffrage
under international control. This parliament
should have competence in specific fields such
as finance, customs, or whatever other spheres
may be agreed to by the Big Four. The U. S.
should further propose that the central sector
of Berlin be neutralized by the withdrawal of all
four occupation forces on the model of Vienna,
and be declared the seat of the all-German
Economic Parliament. The U. S. should
further invite the USSR to join in establishing
a fund to assist in the economic equalization of
the two zones. Such a series of proposals
would have the following advantages:
(a) If the Soviets refuse it will take. the
wind out of the sails of the German opposi-
tion which claims that only rearmament
stands in the way of German unity. In
short, it would divorce the issue of German
unity from that of German rearmament.
(b) If the Soviets accept we will have
established the principle of all-German free
elections. The disparity in results between
the controlled and the free elections would
 weaken the moral authority of the East
German regime.
(c) The Economic Parliament can in any
case be only temporary and will by its very
existence add another weight for the achieve-
ment of political unity. Any educated
German will remember that once before, in
the nineteenth century, economic union pre-
ceded political union.
(d) It will be easier for the Soviets to
accept an Economic Parliament than a pro-
posal which is tantamount to a demand to
dismantle the Pankov regime. By the same
token, it will be more difficult for the USSR
to refuse and will shift the onus for failure
clearly on the USSR.
(e) By establishing a free zone in the
center of Berlin we will have added to the
attraction of Berlin as a center of a unified
Germany.
It may be argued that by making such a pro-
posal the U. S. admits the legal existence of the
East German regime and its willingness to
settle for something less than full political
unity. But we can avoid this danger by
making it clear that what is involved is not a
parliament composed of delegations from the
existing parliaments but growing out of free
all-German elections. Moreover we would
not be proposing the Economic Parliament as
our last word on German unity but as the only
attainable step in that direction.
3. For these reasons we should not accept a
Soviet refusal of the Economic Parliament as
final. Instead we should move to Stage 3 of
our strategy and offer variations of the above
plan, keeping the principle of free all-German
elections in the forefront. One possible varia-
tion on the proposal would be the assembly of
an Advisory Parliament based on the same
election modus as the Economic Parliament to
deliberate on certain areas where laws can be
equalized between East and West Germany.
4. If the USSR refuses to accept the prin-
ciple of free elections for anlJ all-German body
we should in Stage 4, upon consultation with
the Bonn government, propose certain areas
where laws between East and West Germany
can be equalized. Specifically we should pro-
pose an immediate end to all restrictions on the
movement of persons between the two zones.
This should be coordinated with the Bonn
government so that the Bonn government will
be able to time its announcement of its readi-
ness to abolish these restrictions with the pro-
posal made at the foreign ministers' meeting or
before.
It must be stressed that every stage of the
above program should be advocated not as an
end in itself but as a stop toward full political
unity. If we fail to emerge with an intermedi-
ary program we will surrender the pace of future
negotiations to the USSR. They will not be
satisfied with maintaining the status quo but
dangle the carrot of German unity and East-
West trade before the Federal Republic in
return for leaving NATO. If on the other hand
we announce a concrete program, Soviet con-
cessions will appear as a result of U. S. pressure
and any progress on the issue of German unity
will strengthen the pro-Western orientation of
the Federal Republic.
 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
1. THE PROBLEM
What would be the character of a Soviet
community which at some time in the future
might play the role of a normal partner in a
permanently peaceful world, without having
had World Wax III?
Soviet Evolution
Originator: George Pettee
Critics: Philip E. Mosely
Stefan Possony
Paper 17
prescribe courses of action for the U. S. con-
sequent of rather than causative of Soviet
developments. The choice of approach taken
in this paper is not meant to imply rejection
or exclusion of the other approach from
consideration.
What would be the nature
political system?
What is the present condition of the Soviet
political system:
a. As a state among states?
b. As a parlei-staat?
c. What factors favor development in the
right direction?
d. What factors favor
the wrong direction?
o. What can the U. S. do about it?
The problem has been stated above so as to
relate it to the issue of possible peace or prob-
able war, rather than to formulate it as a
purely predictive problem as to the actual
evolution of Russia, It is assumed that only
by defining a goal or a range of alternative
goals, by considering the street of all factors
except U, S. actions, and by further considering
the degree to which U. S. actions by all
means available may affect the outcome, can
the question be formulated as an action
problem. The alternative would be to con-
eider the Soviet community as a closed system,
predict its probable course of evolution and
III. FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The Soviet Union is politically organized as
a sovereign state.
Although dominated by the Russian com-
munity, it is a very large state geographically
and in population, and multilingual and multi-
national in origin rather than a typical nation-
state type.
It is one of the two great powers which now
possess the independent capability to wage
major wars; whose interests are affected by
developments in all parts of the world, and
around which most other sovereign or quasi-
sovereign states have coagulated in various
forms of alliances.
The Soviet system has a general culture which
does not share many of the most significant
ingredients of western culture (including re-
spect for the individual, humanitarianism, and
the tradition of law) for the simple reason that
the historical development of western culture
was not shared to any significant degree by the
people concerned.
The Soviet system is now politically organ-
ized as a doctrinaire or partei-staat of police
and totalitarian type, but in the fourth decade
of its existence, a state of this type may be
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182 SOVIET EVOLUTION
subject to developments which do not occur in
a shorter period.
It may be assumed that the United States
can influence the course of social and political
evolution in the USSR through the presenta-
tion of ideas and through the establishment of
facts having meaning to the Soviet mind, as
well as through actions presenting problems
which the enemy cannot ignore.
IV. DISCUSSION
This discussion will be under the following
heads:
a. The USSR in the present world political
system.
b. The primary characteristics of the
USSR as a community.
c. Factors tending toward a favorable
development.
d. Factors tending toward an unfavorable
development.
c. Alternative forms of struggle.
f. Possible U. S. courses of action.
The USSR in the Present World Political
System
The present world political situation has
evolved from that which existed before World
War I. While world politics before World
War I were in a constant state of dynamic
evolution, the situation from the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 to the opening of World
War I in 1914 may be characterized as the
nation-state system. As implied by books on
the nature of nations and nationalism written
in the nineteenth century and the first quarter
of the twentieth, the typical nation-state was
a community having common language, a
large degree of common traditions, a govern-
ment enjoying full legal powers within definite
territorial boundaries, and the capacity to
conduct wars and to survive as an independent
entity. The typical nation-state was France
or Britain, taken in each case without their
colonies or empires. Tendencies to rationalize
and systematize the nation-state system had
led to the unification of Germany and Italy in
the nineteenth century and to the separation
of Belgium from the Netherlands and Norway
from Sweden. The predominance of European
technology and power in comparison with the,
rest of the world had led to the growth of the
colonial empires of the major European powers,
The tendency to identify nations on such
"natural" characteristics as language and
tradition and the tendency to build larger and
larger economic commonwealths with the
growth of technology carne into explosive con-
flict in World War I. Imperialism has rapidly
declined in the west since that time with the
liberation of Ireland, the establishment of free
Arab states, and the division of India into two
independent states. At the same time, how-
ever, it has continued as a major development
on the Communist side with the elimination
of several independent small states (Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia) and the extension of
Russian hegemony over many others, The
relatively small nation-state was militarily,
and therefore politically, viable as an inde-
pendent entity in the period when military
technique was dominated by the long bow or
the musket. Serbia and Greece became in-
dependent of Turkey when the political con-
sciousness of their populations together with
the military technique of the time and con-
ditions made it too costly for the Turks to
maintain their predominance. Other small
states survived because of tacit agreement by
large states that it was more convenient to
keep the small ones independent as in the case
of the Low Countries, but the critical fact
setting the viability of a nation-state was its
military viability under the prevailing con-
ditions of military and logistic technology. In
general, each such state had demonstrated its
capacity to conduct war and to survive war
with its neighbors, and the number of sovereign
states in the world and their size and dis-
tribution reflected these general conditions.
World War II brought, or demonstrated,
radical changes in the economic and teehno.
 logical basis of war, Only a very few states were
able to participate in a fully self-governing
sense because only a very few had the capability
to produce the range and variety of weapons
required for the conduct of war in the quan-
tities essential for the maintenance of combat,
and with the variety of trained military man-
power required. The U. S. was, actually, the
single power which conducted full scale war
with all three types of forces: ground, sea, and
air.
The U. S. and the USSR are today the only
communities which can play the role of pro-
tagonist or antagonist in a truly major war.
This is a reduction from approximately ten or a
dozen states formerly regarded as "first-class
powers" a generation ago. All others, including
even Britian, can play a part in a major war
only as the ally of one or the other of the two
great powers. Other states which, like Bel-
gium, could produce a complete weapons sys-
tem for war as late as 1914 can independently
produce only a small part of a weapons system
today.
The reduction in the number of states with
full power to make war and to survive it from
approximately sixty in 1910 or 1920 to two
today has in some ways modified the nature of
sovereignty. This is obvious as a limitation
on the sovereignty of all states which have lost
such a degree of independence. Obviously the
relationship of each of the two major powers to
the other and to the rest of the world of
"sovereign" states is very seriously modified,
and can modify both the content and the con-
duct of all diplomacy, However, one major
characteristic of the sovereign state remains.
Both of the major powers are sociologically
and politically independent decision-making
entities of the old familiar type in that de-
cisions on a course of action on problems which
affect them both can be made only by agree-
ment reached through processes of diplomacy
or negotiation, or through independent actions
likely to generate friction, or through war.
The processes which ordinarily generate war
between independent political communities are
183
fully operative in the USSR. They are ag-
gravated by the intensification of all elements of
interdependence in the modern world, economic
and social, and by cultural and ideological
disparity between the two great powers. On
the basis of past political history, without
taking notice of modern changes in basic condi-
tions, war between the two present great powers
could be predicted as inevitable. The two great
powers in the world today are concerned with
any minor struggle which can arise in the
world. They are both capable of major war,
but it is highly unlikely that both would
survive another major war. They may be
compared to Athens and Sparta as the two
polar powers of the Hellenic world before the
Peloponnesian Wars, or Rome and Carthage
as polar powers in the Central Mediterranean
before the Punic Wars.
The Primary Characteristics of the USSR
as a Community
The USSR is first of all a state in the tradi-
tional sense of the term. It should be noted
that for a state in this sense, as for Germany,
France, or Britain in the period 1648-1940, the
occasional occurrence of war with its major
neighbors is to be expected, The reduction of
the political scale of the world until the USSR
has only one major neighbor with whom to
have a major war does not affect this. The
polarity of the world between two great powers
tends rather to aggravate it, since all minor
tensions, as between the Arab States and Israel
or between the Portuguese and India are of
concern to the two major powers. On this
ground it is important to recognize that the
factors normally generative of war could be
expected to operate even if Russia were not
Communist.
In the second place, Russia is a state of
doctrinal police-partei-staat type. As such its
decision-making processes are dominated by
the adherents of a single doctrinal party,
adherents deeply and thoroughly trained in the
classics of Leninism-Stalinism, To the degree
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184 SOVIET EVOLUTION
that they think alike, they are as a group
correspondingly less vulnerable to the impact
of ideas foreign to their own doctrine than
would be a multi-party or two-party system.
Thirdly, the historical tradition of the
communities which they govern is fundamen-
tally non-European. The great evolution of
western nationalism and of western humani-
tarianism based on Christian and Hellenic
origins, which occurred in Western Europe and
America in the last few centuries, did not occur
simultaneously or in the same form in Russia
or China or most of the other Communist-
dominated areas. Whether we refer to the
concept of the gentle knight originated in the
troubadour period in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries in Western Europe, the origin of the
Red Cross, the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, or the movements against
child labor, we find historical records in the
West. We find such records in Russia only in
the form of superficial transplants. Many of
the peoples of the world fail to recognize all
"atrocity" or to share the western reaction to
"cruelty" just as, if we bothered to recall it,
our own pre-humanitarian ancestors would have
failed to share such reactions. In simple terms,
this means that the typical inhabitant of the
non-western part of the world has far less
acculturated feeling for the dignity of the
individual, or abhorrence of cruelty, or faith in
the value of justice. In more complex terms,
it is reflected in the wedding of eastern ruthless-
ness and philosophical doctrine analyzed by
Shub as the essential characteristic in the
evolution of Marxism into Leninism.
In summary, we have to deal with a state
which on all ordinary considerations might be
expected to become involved in war rather than
permanent peace, In addition, the situation
is aggravated by the fact that it is a parlei-
stoat, Further, the social and cultural condi-
tions of the community which it governs aggra-
vate the problem. It is the evolution of a
community from such a starting position which
we have to consider,
There are some other important character-
CONFIDENTIAL
istics of the Soviet system. Although it does
not share many elements of the western tradi-
tion, in philosophy and ethics particularly, the
Soviet Union is fully receptive to modern
science. Technological progress, especially in
weapons, threatens not only to equal but to
surpass the United States. At the same tinro,
the general productivity is still low, and by
the same token, the standard of living is low.
Because of this the burden of full scale arma-
ments is felt as acutely by them, in spite of
totalitarian organization and police methods,
as by the West, and the high costs of rapid
replacement of weapons cannot be accepted by
them any more agreeably than by us.
Factors Tending Toward a Favorable
Development
The first favorable factor lies in the age of the
Soviet state. By inevitablo evolution, the for-
mer type of professional revolutionary which
dominated the top cadres of the Communist
Party in the Soviet Government, during the
first few decades of power has been rapidly re-
placed by personnel of administrative-executive
type. The personality structure of such indi-
viduals cannot be the same as for the generation
of Lenin anti Stalin. The relation of intellectual
doctrine to emotional motivation is not the
same. Fanaticism of a hide-bound type may
remain, but it is more the fanaticism of the
one-track mind than the fanaticism of otno-
tional drive. This does not imply that euno-
tional drives towards power for its own sake
may not be present, nor that such drive may
not be as dangerous as doctrinaire fanaticism.
However, the type of actions that will be taken
and the type of judgment exorcised may be
considerably different in the one case from the
other.
The economic austerity which has been im-
posed on the Russian people for four decades,
since the Revolution promised them prosperity
and plenty, is related to the second favorable
factor. However low the present standard of
living in Russia may be in housing, in consump-
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 Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4
CONFIDENTIAL SOVIET EVOLUTION
tion goods, and in consumer's durable goods,
the Russian people have had at least a taste
and a smell of economic welfare. Judging by
all human experience, the more they get the
more they will want. Having never enjoyed
the full prosperity of an economy free from
heavy defense expenditures, the pressures for
reduction of taxes or against increases of de-
fense effort are doubtless far less vigorous than
in the United States. However, many specific
sectors of the Russian economy may demand a
larger share in incon}e in practical ways which
the state cannot deny. The gradual replace-
ment of slave labor by wage labor, simply be-
cause the former dies off, is a concrete case
which they cannot avoid.
The impact of education, including scientific
education, upon all those elements in the Soviet
society which enjoy such education is a third
factor. We know that it is quite possible,
unfortunately, to be both a scientist and a
Communist. However, the police state or
parlei-staai can hardly be compatible in the
long run with the implied philosophic values of
any scientific education. In the very long run,
therefore, it may be expected that the educated
elements in Russia will more and more pull in
favor of the elements of democratic thought
present in Marxist doctrine, and make it more
and more difficult for the totalitarian system to
continue its perversion of such elements. It
remains, of course, quite uncertain as to how
fast such a process will operate, and it would be
only stupid optimism to expect demonstrable
results in less than several decades on this alone.
Fourthly, the Soviet Union cannot be
immune to knowledge of the evolution of the
non-Soviet world. If the United States proves
that it is no longer subject to economic crises,
that it is able to maintain continuous tochuo-
logical advance, and that it is able to solve its
own social and economic problems, the myth of
capitalist collapse must itself collapse. If the
free world is able to rearrange the political
position of former colonial peoples, to develop
systems both within such communities and
between them and the rest of the free world so
that they share in dynamically stable progress
of the free world, the myth that capitalism is
dependent on imperialism must also collapse.
And if the free world is able to maintain a
position of dynamically stable military strength,
such that the Soviet Union never has an oppor-
tunity to attack with the expectation of success
and without the threat of direct attack upon
the Soviet Union, the myth of the eventual,
inevitable conflict must also collapse.
Finally, Communism, even at its ruthless
worst, is not a doctrine of uncalculating,
emotional fanaticism. Communists never at-
tack without expectation of success, and
Marxism, with all its errors, is no bar to a
reasonably realistic calculation of the chances
in an immediate situation, They will not go
out for war for its own sake, or seek martyrdom
for its own sake, and it is a deeply established
part of Communist doctrine not to do so.
Factors Tending Toward an Unfavorable
Development
The normal tendencies to antagonism be-
tween sovereign states, where such states have
substantial interrelations and, therefore, inter-
fore with the conditions of calculability for
each other, are not directly affected by any
decline in the strength of Communism. The
substitution of men of executive type for doc-
trinaires will not by itself assure, that men of
such typo cannot be as nationalistic, and as
inclined to war for national reasons, as the pre-
Communist statesmen of any nation.
The most dangerous condition of all is the
general complex of factors which may provide
them with opportunities to gain in relative
power during the coming years. All gains,
whether in weapons technology, in political
weakening of the free world, in colonial civil
wars, in reduction of free world arms defense
effort, or in economic recessions, will tend to
confirm their confidence and stimulate their
motives to continue their drive to win the whole
world.
In the course of the last eight years of inten-
 sive cold war they were forced by the tactics
they used, and by the free world's reactions
to those tactics, to abandon or foreclose against
themselves many of the opportunities on which
they would otherwise rely for a high and con-
tinuing yield of profit. The abandonment of
the intensive cold war offers them the oppor-
tunity to turn loose many factors not under
direct Communist control ranging from Mor-
roccan nationalism to the demands for greater
welfare in many other areas, and pressures for
tax reduction in the leading free world powers,
which can work greatly to Communist ad-
vantage and against which the free world has
no present well-developed safeguards. The
more they are encouraged by the results, the
stronger their morale will be for continuing
towards their major goals and the greater the
likelihood of eventual war. This is it truism.
Alternative Forms of Struggle
Given that the time will certainly be long in
years before evolutionary processes can change
Russia into a genuine participant in an orderly
and peaceful world, and assuming that it may,
nevertheless, be possible to maintain a situation
which will deter them from choosing major war
throughout this period, the likelihood during
most of this period is for alternative forms of
struggle. The situation will be a more or less
tense armed peace with more or less violence of
limited character. The violence may be of no
great military importance since it may include
sporadic violence such as recent events in
Morrocco, in which there is no such reinforce-
ment of both sides as occurred in Korea and,
therefore, no formal battles. The Communists
may count upon a future economic depression
in the free world to create such conditions that
civil wars of various scale and intensity can
become possible. They can count with assur-
ance upon the fact that all cases of violence in
which Communist initiative is absent or not
apparent will cause severe strains in the system
of alliance of the free world.
The elimination of formal Communist aims
and the turning of Communist efforts
support of movements of local or n
character throughout the free world,
manner of the Popular Front period of 1f
is the appropriate Communist tactic
greatest difficulty which it will place
free world is the difficulty of maintain
identification of the enemy and, there]
maintaining effort along all the lines ri
to maintain a position of deterrent stren
A resort to a Popular Front type of t
fully compatible with the opening of Ri
travel in a far greater degree than in
years. It may be forgotten that Russia
the first Five Year Plan, and again dur
Popular Front period, was again open to
travel and that Russians were able to
international meetings of a cultural and
fie type. There might be a very great
of relaxation of present barriers without
way exceeding the degree of relaxation
such past periods.
Possible U. S. Courses of Action
The permanent avoidance of World I
involves a maintenance of an effective di
posture from now until the firm estabJi
of such a degree of federalism in the we
recourse to war on any serious scale w
become impossible. The principle has
been established in the conduct of Woi
II in charges of crimes against the pet
in the charter of the United Nation
resort to violence is a criminal breach c
This by itself implies, but only implies
the drastic abolition of sovereignty of
When it has been fulfilled as an i
condition in the world community, t1
no longer be substantial national
forces in most nations and the idea of
to war will be as remote from the consid
of the governments of states in the wo
is from the consideration of state gove
within the American union today. T
not necessarily imply a world state, no
necessarily imply any particular pal
 federalism known to us today. It certainly
does imply the acceptance of legal decision-
making processes for the solution of all problems
and the elimination of war as a means of
decision. In order to conduct the world from
its present condition to such a future condition,
a very considerable degree of leadership will be
involved and required. The United States has
already informally, as in Korea and in connec-
tion with atomic energy for military purposes,
accepted an assigned role as the nation primarily
responsible for the conduct of world affairs
toward such a goal. Thus far, however, the
U. S. has done so rather tacitly than explicitly.
The concept of leadership toward such a goal
is an essential one. The U. S. can accept the
position of paying most of the bills and pro-
viding most of the armaments, and still have
no clear answers to many of the problems of
policy. The conduct of psychological warfare
on the most serious scale offers many questions
which remain unanswerable without some con-
cept of the major goal. The grounds of policy
cannot be simply to doter the enemy from war
or from continued profit by aggression. There
has to be an everlasting affirmation in action
and in words to all the principles involved in
the struggle.
On many specific issues, there will be matters
on which a government, particularly the gov-
ernment of the United States, can deal only
awkwardly partly because of differences in
American opinion which make it impossible for
the government to take a position, partly for
sheer difficulties of decision-making in the gov-
ornment. There are many matters on which
the government cannot speak with an affirma-
tive voice in the world. A great part of the
basic foundations of western civilization are
involved in such matters. It is a fact that
these foundations of western civilization were
created by the efforts of non-governmental
groups. The prevention of cruelty to animals,
women's suffrage, universal education, and
many other concrete illustrations of our system
were founded upon the intellectual effort of
private persons followed up by the promotional
efforts of private organizations and persons.
The great body of philosophical and ethical
principles and the great body of acquired cul-
tural practices which we regard as the treasures
of our civilization have to be spread through-
out the three-quarters of humanity which does
not now share it before the social foundations
of a fhm world order will exist. These can be
done far better in many of its aspects by private
money and by private effort than by govern.
mental agencies.
The maintenance of an effective deterrent
defensive position can be rationalized only as
the means to victory in war or as the means of
safeguarding the world during a transition
period which will not last forever. Clarity
about this second condition will permit all
psychological warfare to be oriented around the
positive principles implied and criticism of
everything in the enemy system which contra-
dicts these principles and of every enemy action
not in accordance with them.
The immediate and concrete measures which
the United States should take in relation to the
evolution of the enemy society are not separate
or independent of those dealt with in connection
with other specific issues. It is therefore felt
appropriate to omit any such concrete sugges-
tions from this paper other than the following:
1. The mobilization of a large-scale effort
under private auspices for the promotion of
the principles of western civilization through-
out the world in applied form should be made
a major instrument of American operations
toward the winning of the cold war.
2. The maintenance of a fully effective
military deterrent position is a prerequisite
for all other American actions designed to
affect the evolution of the enemy system and
of the world system toward this stable order.
3. We must clearly formulate, analyze,
and spell' out the concept of a transition
period, starting from the present situation, to
create a permanently orderly and peaceful
world by the close of this century. This
should be most emphatically a magnificent
CONFIDENTIAL
 work project, requiring enormous effort, and ficial one, but involves the creation of a funda-
in no way to be confused with Utopian gadg- mentally new political system in the world to
etry. It must be kept everlastingly clear replace the nation-state system, and that the
that it will not promise relief from sacrifice means are the realistic ones, creative work,
for a long time to come. It must also be not wishful thinking.
emphasized that the goal is in no way a super-
 Investigation of NATO
1. THE PROBLEM
The problem is to investigate methods by
which the NATO structure would be main-
tained as a going concern and be stimulated to
further growth and, perhaps, ultimately, to
integration.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
It has been said that fear was the predomi-
nant motivation for the creation of NATO.
This theory is only partly true: twenty years
ago oven a gigantic pressure of fear would have
been inadequate to bring together the NATO
nations in a venture of joint military security.
NATO was possible because there are many
ties outside military interests which unite the
member nations. These ties, consciously felt
only by the "elites" in the NATO nations, are
as yet dimly understood. It is true, too, that
these ties are still rather weak, All the same,
they are developing, and in general the trend
of the socio-political development points clearly
toward ever greater mutuality and cooperation.
It is conceivable however, that a true and
lasting "easing of tensions" would slow down
this process of "confederalization." If this
slowdown is to be avoided, there are only two
solutions: either to stimulate new and threat-
ening international crises or to stimulate numer-
tusin which the NATO nations join
tax ventures in which the NATO nations join
Paper 18
fields. If it should prove feasible to set up
"joint ventures aiming at great common goals,"
the NATO structure no longer could be dis-
solved and should be moving in the one and
only general direction of confederalization or
even integration.'
Naturally, it is uncertain to what extent this
expectation will be fulfilled. It is equally
doubtful whether fear will cease to be an inte-
grating (as well as disintegrating) factor-in
fact, this is entirely improbable. However, it
can be assumed safely that common efforts
among the NATO nations would:
a. Remove some of the consequences of a
cooperation based exclusively on fear.
b. Create a larger area of truly common
interests and therefore act as an additional
means of improving cohesion.
In addition to the assumption that the
stimulation of common ventures would help
to cement and foster the emerging NATO
community, it is assumed that:
a. The creation of joint ventures is useful
in all fields of public interest;
b. These joint ventures must be well-
prepared and be launched through a system-
atic, step-by-step procedure;
c. They must be of direct benefit to the
populations of the NATO nations;
d. The joint venture program is long-range
in nature and will require ten to twenty
years before it is in full operation.
own I Both of these terms evoke false notions. It is
o of f bringing purpose of their tha abbouut t a necessary to find other words to describe the getting
mmateratriaiall self-interest and double
e
ther of the NATO nations.
t
f
oge
o
community of effort in a maximum number of1S91
 100
III. DISCUSSION
Security Problems
Before entering into a discussion of joint
peaceful ventures, it is useful to stress that the
military cooperation among the NATO nations
also needs to become more intimate and more
"natural." It is desirable to create various
types of joint military organs through which
further progress will be assured. Some ideas
which could be considered are as follows:
1. The more nuclear technology becomes the
basis of modern armaments, the more it will
be necessary to associate the continental
nations with atomic efforts. At the present
moment there are many restrictions against
closer atomic cooperation and it is undesirable
to move too fast in this domain. Among
other reasons, it is necessary to habituate the
European military and civilians gradually to
the new facts of life, and specifically to avoid
paralyzing fears. It is recommended, however,
that small weapons atomic tests be held in
increasing numbers for the benefit of the NATO
staffs and that some of these tests be set up
outside of American territory, for example, in
Atlantic waters or in certain areas of the
continent. In particular, it is recommended
that as soon as capabilities emerge, such tests
be devoted to demonstrations of ground-to-air
missiles with nuclear war-heads in order to show
the potentialities of a truly modern air defense.
2. It has been pointed out before that the
lack of a properly integrated and effective air
defense system protecting the industries and
major cities of the NATO nations is one of the
greatest vulnerabilities of NATO. The Soviets
will not fail to exploit this vulnerability through
nuclear blackmail. It must be recognized that
if the Soviets were successful in psychological
warfare based on nuclear threats such a "non-
military" attack could produce the do facto
paralysis or even the disintegration of the
NATO structure. On the other hand, there is
no gainsaying the fact that. an effective air
SECRET
defense system will require considerable in-
vestments which at the present time may be
beyond available resources. It is this assump-
tion concerning the financial and military
"impracticability" of a NATO air defense
system which has motivated the relative in-
action in this field. However, it is self-evident
that a military structure which cannot assure
the security of its base will prove ineffective
both as a deterrent and as a combat force.
Moreover, there is some doubt about the
validity of the assumptions underlying the
present policy of inaction. For the time being-
with missiles and atomic warheads not yet
being available to the NATO nations-there
is no reason to improvise a costly and perhaps
inappropriate defense system. But it is be-
lieved that some progress could be made if the
NATO nations were to set up a scientific body
modeled after the American RAND or ORO
organizations to study the air defense problem
of NATO and make suitable recommendations.
3. The present strategy of the NATO na-
tions, as well as the utilization of modern
technology by NATO has been, and continues
to be, a matter of controversy. Continental
nations are not happy with present Anglo-
American thinking on two counts. They note
that the territorial defense of "forward areas"
(which happen to be the habitats of some of
the most important member nations) is not
properly assured. Moreover, these nations
are expected to make the major effort in ground
battle, while Britain and the United States
reserve for themselves the naval and air mis-
sions. Many continentals feel that the mili-
tary "sacrifice" is unevenly distributed, with
the Europeans expected to carry the main
blood burden. The point is not that there is
much choice in the present distribution of
military roles. The point is rather that what-
ever strategy is finally adopted, it should be
the result of the best joint strategic thinking
which the NATO nations can produce. NATO
strategy should be made psychologically accept-
able to all member nations through the device
 of having the best national specialists work out
the most suitable solutions.
a. It would be useful to increase the number
of Advanced Military Study Groups and in
particular to create groups which develop
various alternate NATO strategies for the
long-range future. Some of these study groups
should operate from the United States and
preoccupy themselves with the question of
how continental nations can contribute to the
security of the most important NATO "ar-
senal," i. e. the U. S. It is necessary to de-
stroy the notion that, militarily, NATO is a
one-way street, with all the key strength
flowing from the U. S. and none flowing back
into this country.
b. It furthermore would be advisable to
enlarge the structure of military NATO col-
logos in the double sense that additional col-
logos should be created and that the number of
officers attending courses should be increased.
As to the addition of new colleges it is proposed
that consideration be given to a NATO Indus-
trial College,' to a school dealing with the
problems arising from multi-national and
multi-lingual forces, to a school developing
knowledge and procedures about the gradual
adaptation of national military organizations,
and to a tactical air defense school.
c. It is to be expected that these various
schools will come up with new ideas. It is
also to be expected that the validity of these
ideas may not be determinable by merely
theoretical or a priori considerations. Accord-
ingly, it is suggested that there be formed
several types of experimental units which, in
collaboration with these schools, test the sug-
2 A NATO Technological College would be a "nat-
ural'' parallel institution. It would allow the highly
desirable utilization of European technical manpower,
the creation of additional technicians, and the recruit-
ment of qualified personnel into the military and tech-
nical structure of NATO. The fun utilization of
toohnioal manpower throughout NATO ultimately
will be dependent upon the establishment of a NATO-
wide security-clearance system. The development
of such a system is recommended.
gested solutions and moreover bring together
in joint and future-oriented field ventures (as
distinguished from joint staff planning) officers
from all the member nations.
d. In addition to these new NATO schools,
ever greater emphasis should be given to the
potentialities of exchange officers. Large num-
hers of officers-including, most importantly,
reserve officers-should be assigned for tours
of duty with military units in other countries,
partly as students and instructors in military
schools, partly as liaison officers and observers,
and partly (wherever practical) as integrated
officers.
e. Similar efforts should be made with pro-
fessional NCO's, including an enlargement of
exchanges between N. C. schools.
f. Outside such regular duty assignments, a
major effort should be made to encourage
travel by military personnel and civilians in
the military service throughout all NATO
countries. Convenient transport and credit
arrangements should be developed for this
purpose, and clubs and other facilities for
social intercourse should be formed.
g. To the extent that additional security
systems such as SEATO come to life, contacts
between these organizations should be in-
tensified.
Peaceful Collaboration
Programs should be undertaken in four
broad areas: joint studies, joint ventures,
gradual and mutual adaptation, and reporting
organs.
Joint Studies
While many joint ventures could be im-
provised without delay, it must be recognized
that the concrete problems of the various
NATO nations and more particularly of their
interrelationships are as yet poorly under-
stood. There is an urgent and overriding
need for major efforts at fact finding and
documentation as well as for joint training and
SECRET
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 education. The following suggestions should be
given consideration.
Research Institute on NATO Political In-
stitutions. The function of this institute would
be to identify and analyze pertinent facts
concerning the political institutions in the
various NATO countries, government pro-
cedures, and political problems, with a view to
determining:
1. The best methods through which de-
cisions can be made collectively by all
member states.
2. The legal, institutional and political
obstacles delaying or precluding joint actions.
3. In a broader sense, the compatibilities
and incompatibilities of the various political
systems and the possibilities for the har-
monization" of political institutions within
the NATO area.
4. The need for the creation of new organs
of joint decision making.
This Institute should have nationals of all
NATO states among its working members,
including first-class and creative scientists able
to synthesize the information in order to pro-
pose novel solutions which would be beneficial
everywhere. In other words, emphasis should
not be placed on the mere modification of
existing institutions, but on the stimulation of
political and institutional progress.
An Institute for the Study of NATO Legal
Problems. This institute would have to survey
existing legal systems and economic legislation,
their similarities and dissimilarities as well as
their mutual compatibilities and imcompati-
bilities. It should evaluate the sufficiency of
these systems, analyze the validity and per-
tinence of current laws, and determine the
numerous laws which have become invalid but
have not been repealed. On these studies, it
should base recommendations concerning the
joint and mutual reforms of the NATO legal
systems.
A NATO Medical Institute. To survey
existing health programs, health legislation,
and medical education.
A NATO Resources Institute. This institute
would make studies in the field of natural
resources within the NATO area, analyze the
technology of resource exploitation, and rec-
ommend the most advantageous and mutual
exploitation of various types of natural wealth.
Conservation within the NATO area would be
one of the topics to be dealt with by this
institute.
There are a number of other economic
institutes which could and should be created,
to deal with most of the significant economic
problems such as wages, taxes, finances, internal
and external trade, productivity, social legis-
lation, manpower training and mobility, etc.
Closer economic cooperation cannot be
achieved so long as there are major differences
in wage levels, tax structure and systems,
social legislation, etc. However, before these
differences can be adjusted-and this is possible,
if at all, only over the long pull-they and their
causes must be identified and their effectiveness
evaluated. A great deal of work needs to be
done in this area.
Universities. The curricula of continental
universities are in many respects out of date
and do not reflect either the findings of political
science or, more particularly, the specific
problems of NATO. An effort should be made
to establish throughout the NATO university
structure, additional courses on pertinent sub-
jects, including international relations, NATO
economics, intra-NATO cooperation, etc., and to
teach the political and social sciences in all the
universities in a really up-to-date fashion.
Moreover, a major exchange program should be
undertaken in some of the more obvious fields,
such as linguistics and history. As a general
rule the history and language of a particular
nation should be taught in all universities by
natives from that country. In addition, there
should be several mandatory courses which are
to be taught in one or the other of the more
important NATO languages. Seminars par-
 SECRET INVESTIGATION OP NATO
ticipated in by students and professors from
other NATO countries and a growing scope of
international scientific conferences would be
useful.
There should be an attempt to coordinate
academic requirements and to out many of the
bureaucratic obstacles which at present mili-
tate against study in foreign countries, such as
loss of credits, non-accreditation of academic
titles, etc.
There are many subject areas of great im-
portance to the NATO problem which should
be approached through systematic study and
instruction. Reference has been made above
to the usefulness of an Industrial College
within the NATO military structure. Within
the civilian context, there would be an urgent nt
need for an Administrative College, to
attended by public administrators from all
member countries as well as by students ho
seek administrative careers. One by-product
of such a college would be that the clearly
objective administrative practices of the various
countries will be analyzed properly, permitting
the expectation that sooner or later adminis-
trative reforms will take place. Again, this
Administrative college could be broken down
into its various component parts such as
municipal administration, inter-regional ad-
ministration, the administration of finances, etc.
NATO
Consideration should be given
eh colleges
Teachers College, or a group of s
ll
eges neu~