CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040011-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 24, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CHINESE COMMUNIST
INTERVENTION IN KOREA
N I E - 2 / 1
Published 24 November 1950
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
on
i
s
n oliltawun affecting trl2 na;ti
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as anmen'ded
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents m;any`
manner to an unauthorized pis
person prohibited by.=lawF;
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
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ment of State
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DISTRIBUTION (NIE Series) :
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA
NIE-2/1
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the
preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper
is based on information available on 21 November 1950.
SECRET
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CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA
THE PROBLEM
1. To re-estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.
CONCLUSIONS
2. The Chinese Communists will simulta-
neously:
a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding
operations in North Korea.
b. Maintain or increase their military
strength in Manchuria,
c. Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Ko-
rea by intimidation and diplomatic means.
3. In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal
by these means, there will be increasing Chi-
nese intervention in Korea. At a minimum,
the Chinese will conduct, on an increasing
scale, unacknowledged operations designed to
immobilize UN forces in Korea, to subject them
to prolonged attrition, and to maintain the
semblance of a North Korean state in being.
Available evidence is not conclusive as to
whether or not the Chinese Communists are
as yet committed to a full-scale offensive ef-
fort. Eventually they may undertake oper-
ations designed to bring about the withdrawal
of UN forces from Korea. It is estimated that
they do not have the military capability of
driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but
that they do have the capability of forcing
them to withdraw to defensive positions for
prolonged and inconclusive operations, which,
the Communists might calculate, would lead
to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea.
4. So long as Chinese intervention continues,
the USSR will continue and possibly increase
its support to the Chinese by furnishing equip-
ment, planes, technical advisers, and con-
ceivably, "volunteers" as necessary to man the
more intricate equipment.
5. The risk that a general war will develop
already exists. The Soviet rulers may under-
rate this possibility but they appear to have
allowed for it and to feel prepared to cope
with it.
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DISCUSSION
6. The immediate situation with regard to
Chinese intervention in Korea is as follows:
a. The military activity of Chinese troops
in Korea so far is not in itself sufficient to
demonstrate the existence of a plan for major
offensive operations.
b. Military preparations being carried out
in Manchuria and elsewhere in China are on
a scale sufficient to support major operations
of prolonged duration, either offensively in
Korea or defensively in Manchuria.
c. Prevailing opinion in China, including
opinion in circles close to Party leadership, ap-
pears to reflect expectations of hostilities, in-
cluding expectations of extensive air attacks
on Chinese, particularly Manchurian cities.
d. Neither the Chinese Government nor
Chinese propaganda has thus far committed
the Chinese Government to a specific line of
action in Korea. Discussion of preparation
for support of Korea has been only in terms
of "volunteer" action.
e. Chinese propagandists for the past three
weeks have been carrying on an intensive
campaign centering on the charge that US
military action in Korea is an attack aimed at
China and have called for all-out sacrifices to
meet and defeat this threat through "support
of the Korean people." A sub-theme of the
campaign has been American impotence in a
war with China.
f. There has been no suggestion in Chinese
propaganda or official statements that the
Chinese support of North Korea has a limited
objective such as protecting power plants, es-
tablishing a buffer zone on the border, or
forcing the UN forces back to the 38th Paral-
lel. In fact, none of these objectives has been
mentioned by the Chinese. All Chinese for-
mulations have been in terms of the necessity
of bringing about a withdrawal of foreign
forces from Korea.
g. The Chinese decision to send a delega-
tion to the UN has been announced in such a
manner as to give no conclusive indication of
Chinese intentions with regard to Korea. The
delegation has been reported to be willing to
reach a diplomatic settlement on Korea so long
as it is arranged outside the Security Coun-
cil. No terms have been suggested, and there
are as yet no indications that the Chinese
would accept less than the withdrawal of for-
eign troops from Korea.
h. The Soviet press has reported with ap-
proval, Chinese support of North Korea. So-
viet official statements and Soviet propaganda
have identified the struggle of the North Ko-
reans with the Communist cause generally.
However, neither source indicated that the
USSR is in any way committed to any specific
line of action beyond moral support of North
Korea and of China.
7. While there is no reliable intelligence re-
garding the role that the Soviet Union has
played in decisions reached by Chinese leaders
in regard to Korea, Chinese intervention in
Korea furthers Soviet objectives. Although
the USSR has made no open commitment to
support the Chinese, planes drawn from the
Soviet air force have been observed in increas-
ing numbers in Manchuria and over Korea.
Soviet propaganda has recently called atten-
tion to Soviet obligations under the Sino-So-
viet treaty to support China in case of aggres-
sion by Japan or by any power directly or in-
directly associated with Japan. Soviet offi-
cials and propaganda have recently stressed
alleged US use of Japanese troops in Korea
and US preparations to use Japan as a base
for aggression.
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