REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040010-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY N
? 214
REVIEW OF THE WORLD
SITUATION
CIA 11-50
Published 15 November 1950
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
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WARNING
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tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
1. As a result of the intervention of Chi-
nese Communist troops in Korea, the UN
tactical position there has deteriorated
sharply, and the USSR has regained the in-
itiative in its continuing world-wide power-
contest with the US and its allies. The in-
tervention demonstrates that the USSR is
willing to pursue the experiment in war-by-
proxy despite a considerable risk of vastly
enlarging the area of armed conflict. Neither
the beginning of the accelerated North Atlan-
tic Treaty rearmament program nor the new
vigor shown by the UN has caused the USSR
to change either its strategic objectives or its
aggressive tactics. Soviet policy continues to
aim at the development and exploitation of
local weaknesses on the periphery of the
non-Communist world.
2. Despite the grave risk that intervention
in Korea would lead to retaliation and pos-
sibly global war, both China and the USSR
stood to gain certain immediate advantages
from it : averting the immediate psychological
and political consequences of the North
Korean defeat; keeping UN forces away from
the actual frontiers of China and the USSR;
prolonging the commitment of UN forces in
Korea; and keeping open the possibility of a
political settlement. By not formally an-
nouncing the objectives of their intervention,
the Chinese Communists have retained full
freedom of action, and, depending upon US
and UN reaction, can tailor the precise nature
and extent of their intervention to develop-
ments.
3. The introduction of Chinese Communist
forces into Korea has confronted the UN with
a more serious challenge than that presented
by the initial invasion of South Korea.
Nevertheless, there are definite signs that the
international organization has become a more
effective device for curbing aggression than
at any time in its history. Although the Chi-
nese Communists may limit their intervention
to still-to-be-defined local objectives, the grave
probability exists that a strong UN military
reaction against Chinese territory would en-
courage the Chinese Communists to attempt
a large-scale offensive designed to secure
Korea.
4. The situation in Indochina remains one
which the Communists can exploit without
serious fear of early and effective UN counter-
action. Both the military and political situ-
ations have deteriorated to a critical state,
but so long as the present political context of
the war in Indochina continues, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that the UN could agree on
a basis for initiating effective military action
against Ho Chi Minh. Containment of Ho's
forces presently depends almost exclusively
on US aid, and even with such help (short of
direct ground, air, and naval support) the
French probably cannot hold northern Indo-
china for more than six months, nor all of
Indochina for more than eighteen months.
5. The Chinese Communist invasion of
Tibet has aroused considerable anger and re-
sentment within the Indian Government. Al-
though a basic change in India's interna-
tional outlook is not yet apparent, consider-
able pressure is undoubtedly being placed on
Nehru to have him abandon his moral sup-
port of Communist China. As the threat of
Chinese-dominated Communism in Southeast
Note: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the De-
partments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The review contains information
available to CIA as of 10 November 1950.
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Asia increases, prospects for such abandon-
ment will improve, together with the conse-
quent possibilities of Indian cooperation in
curbing Communist expansion.
6. French intransigence is not only prevent-
ing positive international action in Indochina,
but is delaying the developing defense pro-
gram for Western Europe, where the conse-
quences-though less immediate-are poten-
tially graver than those in Indochina. Al-
though French opposition to German partici-
pation appears to be weakening, the fact re-
mains that unless the NATO countries arrive
at an adequate solution of the defense prob-
lem, Western European skepticism as to the
efficacy of the West will be so intensified as to
render the entire program a dubious enter-
prise.
7. The recent Soviet overtures toward Ger-
man unification were designed, in part at
least, to deter the West Germans from sup-
porting German remilitarization. Although
it is conceivable that the USSR may be willing
to forego the advantages of its control over
East Germany in order to try to neutralize
Germany through unification, it is more likely
that these Soviet overtures are merely a gam-
bit which the USSR might develop seriously
only if the Western rearmament program
shows signs of real implementation.
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Current Patterns of Soviet Strategy.
As a result of the intervention of Chinese
Communist troops in Korea, the UN tactical
position there has deteriorated sharply, and
the USSR has regained the initiative in its
continuing world-wide power-contest with the
US and its allies. The intervention demon-
strates that the USSR is willing to pursue
the experiment in war-by-proxy despite a con-
siderable risk of vastly enlarging the. area of
armed conflict. Chinese-Soviet propaganda
and the course of action undertaken by the
two powers suggest that Communist leaders
believe the Western Powers are unprepared
either politically or militarily to initiate hos-
tilities against the USSR, and that they will
avoid war with China so long as neither the
USSR nor Communist China is technically and
officially in the Korean war. As a form of in-
surance, however, the USSR has simultane-
ously developed its "peace offensive" in the
UN and in other diplomatic contexts, thereby
laying the foundation for temporary with-
drawal through a limited political accommo-
dation, if and when such a move should prove
expedient. In the meantime, Soviet policy
continues to aim at the exploitation of local
weaknesses on the periphery of the non-Com-
munist world without the direct use of Soviet
military power.
In addition to halting the advance of UN
forces in Korea, the Chinese Communists have
moved to take over Tibet and are both train-
ing and supplying the Communist-led guer-
rillas who are gravely threatening French
control of northern Indochina. The USSR is
engaged in long-range penetration programs
in many areas, particularly Germany, Yugo-
slavia, Greece, Iran, Burma, Malaya, and the
Philippines, where local military action can
be precipitated when conditions permit.
Neither the beginning of the accelerated North
Atlantic Treaty rearmament program nor the
new vigor and determination shown by the
UN in recent months has caused the USSR to
change either its strategic objectives or its
aggressive tactics. Prolongation of the fight-
ing in Korea as a result of Chinese Commu-
nist intervention is a crucial step in securing
the immediate Soviet aims of: (a) consoli-
dating control over the Satellites, including
Communist China; (b) securing the strategic
approaches to the USSR; and (c) preventing
the establishment on the Soviet periphery of
forces capable of threatening the Soviet mili-
tary position.
2. Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.
In addition to considerations of general
strategy, the USSR and its Chinese allies were
faced during the past month with the need to
take immediate action to offset or minimize
the effects of the defeat of the North Korean
forces and of the rapid UN advance toward
the Manchurian and Siberian borders. In de-
ciding upon intervention of Chinese Commu-
nist forces to restore the military situation
and to avert the political and strategic conse-
quences of the threatened disaster, both the
USSR and China accepted a greater risk of
direct war with the US than was implicit in
any earlier adventures. Because the USSR
is in an advanced state of war-readiness, it
must be assumed that the Kremlin leaders,
aware of the danger of direct UN or US re-
taliation against China or the USSR, were
prepared to accept any challenge given.
Both the USSR and China stood to gain
certain immediate advantages from inter-
vention, which would serve to: (a) avert the
immediate psychological and political conse-
quences for the world Communist movement
of the military defeat of the North Korean
forces; (b) keep UN forces away from the ac-
tual frontiers of China and the USSR; (c)
provide an area in Korea from which military
and guerrilla operations could be mounted;
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(d) prolong the commitment of UN forces in
Korea, thus sapping both Western strength
and morale and discouraging the redeploy-
ment of UN forces to Indochina, Germany, or
elsewhere; and (e) keep open the possibility
of a political settlement in Korea. The Chi-
nese themselves, having assumed greater risks
than did the USSR, probably hoped for some
compensating advantages such as greater
prestige in both the Communist and non-
Communist worlds, protection to the Suiho
electric power installations, and the strategic
advantage of eliminating any threat of US-
Chinese Nationalist military action against
China from Korean bases.
By not formally announcing the objectives
of their intervention, the Chinese Communists
have retained full freedom of action with re-
spect to Korea, and, depending upon UN and
US reaction, can tailor the precise nature and
extent of their intervention to developments.
3. A New Challenge to a Stronger UN.
By introducing Chinese Communist forces
into Korea, the USSR and its allies have con-
fronted the UN with a more serious challenge
than that presented by the initial invasion
of South Korea. That challenge, if accepted,
will expose the Western Powers in the UN-
as well as the USSR-to a grave threat of
global war. Some members of the UN will
be much less inclined to take a strong position
against China than they were on the more
limited and much better defined issue of Com-
munist aggression against South Korea.
India, for example, advised strongly against
the UN movement north of the 38th Parallel
even before the Chinese Communists had
intervened.
Although the problem of Chinese inter-
vention has placed a new strain on the UN,
there are certain very definite signs that the
international organization has become a more
effective device for curbing aggression than
at any time in its history. The General As-
sembly has taken forthright action regarding
Korea and has even taken steps to prevent
paralysis of UN machinery in the event of a
Korean-type venture elsewhere. The UN, in-
creasingly impatient with Soviet intransi-
gence, has reached the point where emphasis
has shifted from seeking to win the coopera-
tion of the USSR to determination to act ef-
fectively despite Soviet obstructionism. This
new UN determination will undoubtedly cause
the USSR, in preparing new aggressive moves,
to give more careful consideration to the pos-
sibility of UN intervention.
Nevertheless, the Korean intervention poses
a most serious problem for the UN. The bold-
ness of the Chinese Communists and the mag-
nitude of their military capabilities suggest
that a strong military reaction by the UN, in-
cluding air bombardment of Chinese supply
centers, probably would encourage-rather
than discourage-the Chinese Communists
from attempting a large-scale offensive de-
signed to drive the UN forces off the Korean
peninsula. Nevertheless, the UN may also
by means short of military action against
China persuade the Chinese Communists to
refrain from such an offensive and limit their
intervention to still-to-be-defined local ob-
jectives.
It is doubtful that a UN condemnation of
Chinese action would either drive the USSR
out of the UN or divert the Chinese Peoples
Republic from its ambition to join the UN.
On the contrary, the USSR shows every in-
tention of remaining and of doing all in its
power to prevent further strengthening of the
UN and further consolidation among the non-
Stalinist nations.
Although the growing unity within the UN
may induce the USSR in the future to be more
astute in applying the technique of local ag-
gression, the local situations in Indochina and
in other vulnerable areas contain elements
which the USSR can probably exploit while
still avoiding effective UN counteraction.
4. Crisis in Indochina.
In northern Indochina the forces of Ho
Chi Minh have begun a limited offensive in
the Chinese border regions with the apparent
objective of opening supply lines to China.
Improvement of transport facilities on the
Chinese side of the border foreshadows an
early improvement in Ho's logistical position
and a subsequent offensive (probably within
six months) against the French forces now
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deployed in the populous Red River Delta
area around the northern capital of Hanoi.
The deteriorating French military position
has aggravated the political crisis in Indo-
china. The Vietnamese Premier, who here-
tofore has acquiesced to French policy, has
apparently expressed the views of even the
moderate Vietnamese in publicly denouncing
the French position in current French-Viet-
namese political negotiations.
If the Indochina problem were to be taken
to the UN in the present political context, con-
structive and helpful action by the UN would
be extremely difficult. So long as the Chinese
Communists have not given convincing evi-
dence of overt intervention, so long as the
external appearance is one of European colo-
nial power fighting revolutionary native ele-
ments, and so long as the anti-Communist
native government is at odds with the French,
it is extremely doubtful that the UN could
agree on a basis for initiating effective mili-
tary action against Ho Chi Minh. Until the
civil as well as the military problem of Indo-
china is submitted to the UN, and Indochina
becomes, like Korea, virtually a trust terri-
tory, it is improbable that the UN can take
effective action.
Although some Frenchmen now favor
throwing the entire Indochinese problem into
the UN, it is unlikely that, in the absence of
intense pressure from other Western Powers
and further deterioration of the French posi-
tion, the French Assembly would accept such
a solution. The containment of the Ho Chi
Minh forces at this juncture depends, there-
fore, almost exclusively on unilateral US ac-
tion. Given a continuation of the present
political situation in Indochina, even with US
aid (short of direct ground, air, and naval
support), it is doubtful that the French can
hold northern Indochina for more than six
months, nor all of Indochina for more than
eighteen months. The mounting threat of
deeper US involvement in Korea, however,
may well force both the French and the UN to
seek an early political solution. One recent
development which may contribute toward the
solution of the Indochina problem is the dis-
illusionment in India with the aims and poli-
cies of China.
5. Deterioration of Indian-Chinese Communist
Relations.
Concurrent with their operations in North
Korea, Chinese Communist forces in south-
west China have apparently begun a westward
movement toward the Tibetan capital. This
well-advertised advance makes it clear that
the Peiping government is determined to ex-
tend its control over the province, with or
without a negotiated settlement. In pursu-
ing that objective, the Chinese Communists
have not been, nor will be, deterred by Indian
entreaties to refrain from a military settle-
ment.
China's conduct regarding Tibet has
aroused considerable anger and resentment
within the Indian Government. Recent Chi-
nese references to the Indian border princi-
palities of Nepal and Sikkim, China's agita-
tion among the tribes of northern Burma, and
increasing Chinese support for the Ho Chi
Minh cause in Indochina present a further
potential challenge to Indian security inter-
ests and should produce further misgivings
about the wisdom of retaining friendship to-
ward Peiping as one of the central features of
Indian foreign policy. Nevertheless, Nehru
himself is still the prime mover in external
affairs, and the underlying considerations in-
volved in his China policy (the need to get
along with India's most powerful neighbor,
the belief in the Peiping regime as a legitimate
expression of Asiatic nationalism, and the
fear of global war) continue to exercise a
powerful influence on Indian thinking. Al-
though it is not yet clear that any basic
change in India's international outlook will
take place in the immediate future, consider-
able pressure is undoubtedly being placed on
Nehru to abandon his moral support of Com-
munist China. As the threat of Communist
expansion into Southeast Asia with Chinese
support and instigation is intensified, the
pressure for abandonment of China will in-
crease. It is already apparent that some In-
dian leaders are worried about Indochina and
Burma, and positive assistance from India in
curbing Chinese-dominated Communist ex-
pansion into those two countries must be
recognized as a definite possibility.
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6. Western European Defense Problems.
Not only has France's unwillingness to give
up its prerogatives thus far prevented positive
international action in Indochina, but French
intransigence is delaying the developing de-
fense program for Western Europe, where the
consequences-though less immediate-are
potentially graver than those in Indochina.
In an attempt to preserve its life, the present
French Government has attached conditions
to German remilitarization which are largely
unacceptable to the other NATO countries.
However, French opposition appears to be
weakening, and, if the NATO countries ad-
here to their position, it is almost certain that
NATO can develop some satisfactory com-
promise formula which, in the face of isola-
tion, the French would be obliged to accept.
Indeed, unless the NATO countries arrive at
an adequate solution of the defense problem,
Western European skepticism as to the efficacy
of the West would be so intensified as to ren-
der the whole defense program a dubious
enterprise.
Present French intransigence over German
rearmament also has adversely affected the
ability of the Adenauer Government to secure
parliamentary support for providing West
German units to a European defense force.
Already obliged to defend itself against So-
cialist and Protestant attack, the Adenauer
Government not only would find it politically
impossible to accept the present French con-
ditions, but its ability to contribute forces to
any European Army is being sapped by the
continuing debate and uncertainty regarding
the method. Nevertheless, given an early com-
promise solution permitting German entry on
an equitable basis, the West Germans can be
expected to contribute to a European force.
Underlying all the discussion of the West-
ern defense problem is the fundamental ques-
tion which has existed since the program was
conceived: will the continental NATO coun-
tries be willing and able to bring about suf-
ficient internal unity and to make sufficient
economic sacrifices to contribute to the West-
ern defense forces the necessary enthusiasm,
equipment, and manpower to make that force
an effective deterrent to Communist aggres-
sion? Complicating the entire program, at
least on the continent, is the vicious circle
which has been set up : the rearmament and
defense program cannot be carried out ef-
fectively unless the individual West European
believes in it and supports it, yet the West
European will not extend his full support un-
less it is demonstrated to him that the pro-
gram will be effective.
7. A Soviet Counter-Thrust at Germany.
The dilemma of the West European citizen
was posed directly by the USSR to the Ger-
mans when the Foreign Ministers of the Sat-
ellite countries under the guidance of Molo-
tov issued a declaration in Prague calling for
German unity and a peace treaty. The dec-
laration in effect told the Germans that by
supporting Western rearmament they might
involve themselves in a war, but by staying
out of the Western camp they would achieve
the unification of Germany.
Whether the declaration and the subse-
quent formal Soviet demarche calling for a
CFM meeting on Germany will succeed in ex-
ploiting German differences and thus deter
the Adenauer Government cannot yet be de-
termined, nor can it be stated definitely that
this Soviet proposal was not intended as a
serious overture to the West. It is conceiv-
able that the USSR is genuinely frightened at
the prospect of Western rearmament and at
the new firmness of the non-Stalinist coun-
tries in dealing with Soviet expansion. The
USSR may, therefore, be willing to forego the
advantages of its control over East Germany
(for example, unhampered further exploita-
tion of the uranium deposits) and agree to
German unification. If such is the Soviet
intent, it is so only because the USSR hopes
to neutralize Germany by adding East Ger-
man Communist and Protestant strength to
the already substantial anti-remilitarization
sentiment in West Germany.
The probability is, however, that the Prague
declaration is a gambit which can be further
developed if the Western program shows signs
of real implementation. Since the Soviets
are well aware of the hazards which the West-
ern program must surmount before an ef-
fective fighting force can be created, it is
doubtful that the USSR at this stage has spon-
sored German unification with any immedi-
ate seriousness.
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